No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary
Abstract
This book is a comprehensive commentary on Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). It differs from most recent commentaries in paying special attention to the structure of the work, the historical context in which it was written, and the views to which Kant was responding. It argues that, despite its relative brevity, the Groundwork is the single most important work in modern moral philosophy and that its significance lies mainly in two closely related factors. The first is that it is here that Kant first articulates his revolutionary principle of the autonomy of the will, that is, the paradoxical thesis that moral requirements (duties) are self-imposed and that it is only in virtue of this that they can be unconditionally binding. The second is that for Kant all other moral theories are united by the assumption that the ground of moral requirements must be located in some object of the will (the good) rather than the will itself, which Kant terms heteronomy. Accordingly, what from the standpoint of previous moral theories was seen as a fundamental conflict between various views of the good is reconceived by Kant as a family quarrel between various forms of heteronomy, none of which are capable of accounting for the unconditionally binding nature of morality. Kant expresses the latter by claiming that they reduce the categorical to a merely hypothetical imperative.
... Истинска морална вредност захтева да се добра дела бирају без икаквог свесног или скривеног сопственог интереса као одлучујућег фактора, и, сходно томе, супротност добра и зла мора бити могућа у једнако чистом облику. Крајем осамнаестог века Кант је тврдио да слобода моћи избора има карактеристику, потпуно својствену њој, да се не може одредити да делује никаквим подстицајима осим ако је људско биће угради у своју максиму (Allison, 2013). Релативно неоспоран део Кантовог аргумента састоји се у тврдњи да ако се прихвати идеја објективног моралног добра и разлика између "подстицаја" и стварних моралних избора, следи да се неморални избори не могу разумети у смислу пуког неуспеха, већ се намерно извршавају. ...
... If in such light gameshows, the means to ascertain such ethical is to not take the facets individually, wherein one should not ascertain if the means are morally right or wrong, in the same manner as that of the intention. In such light, Kantian Deontology does not dissect the facet rather it explicates the entirety, the end included (Allison, 2011). Therefore, if such is subjected to this framework, there will be no individual analysis of the end, the means, and the intention, rather the act as a whole is explicated even that of the mode of the give and the receiver of such act. ...
The existence of game shows in the Philippines is ascertained and examined under the
Kantian Deontology. In a more popular view, game shows provide a type of enjoyment that is
not only felt by the viewers or spectators, but rather those who are able to be fortunate enough
to receive prizes given by such activities. On the onset, the opus presents the conditions of the
game shows in the Philippines and that of the other countries in a comparative light. This is
necessary so that the ethical discussions may be nuanced in light not of the circumstantial
factors but rather on the acts themselves. Moving forward, the methods of Kantian
Deontology gives light on the framework by providing the necessary principles of the
Categorical Imperative, Respect for Persons, and On Duty and Reasonableness. These certain
principles allow the phenomena to be subjected to an examination in light of inherent value
and axiological dispositions. Having said such, the arguments presented are those that further
verify and actualize how and what should be done on issues arising from the phenomenon of
game shows. It can be argued that there should be a respect for dignity, as such this means that
the intention of the said activities must point only to benevolence. Furthermore, the
representations of societal problems and issues must never be used to sensationalize such
problem at the cost of exploiting the experiences of certain participants. Lastly, the argument
on duty to be prudent on what certain social effects a certain action may merit, the
uncontrollable evil may also be considered as a result of negligence to be prudent and as such
negligence of duty as well.
Keywords: Kantian Deontology, gameshows, ethics, dignity, exploitation
... Kant's remarks on the equivalency claim can be understood in different ways. A simple interpretation might be that each formula generates the same and only the same duties, if followed or applied (Allison, 2011;O'Neill, 1975;Engstrom, 2009;Sensen, 2011). However, Allen Wood rejects this interpretation. ...
This paper delves into the intersection between Kant’s moral theory and evolutionary perspectives on personhood. It explores how Kant’s emphasis on rationality in moral agency aligns with evolutionary studies on the development of moral behaviors. By examining the transcendental implications of Kant’s Categorical Imperative (CI) and the evolutionary origins of moral agency, this study aims to illuminate the link between Kant’s conception of moral agency and personhood. Additionally, it investigates how Kant’s call for CI resonates with evolutionary insights on the adaptive nature of social cooperation in human societies. Through this analysis, we seek to deepen our understanding of the cognitive, social dimensions of moral agency and moral status within the framework of Kant’s moral theory and evolutionary perspectives on personhood.
... 1. My goal in this essay is to begin to sketch a conception of practical identity of an agent as constituted by certain of his conative states and their content. 1 ...
... Thanks to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to clarify this point. 3 Reath 1989 has offered the most well-known version of the epiphenomenal or intellectualist interpretation, but numerous others have subscribed to a similar view, including: Allison 1990, Guyer 2008, Herman 1993, Lockhart 2017, MacBeath 1973, O'Neill 2013, Walker 1989, and Wolff 1973 states from playing a positive role in Kant's account of moral motivation.6 Due to the earlier dominance of the intellectualist interpretation, however, for quite some time scholars were focused on showing that feeling was involved in moral motivation rather than explaining how this works.7 The task for more recent scholarship has been to explain how exactly the feeling of respect might play a positive role in action motivated by the moral law alone. ...
In this paper I propose to shed new light on the role of feeling in Kant’s psychology of moral motivation by focusing on his concept of an incentive (Triebfeder), which he borrowed from one of his most important rationalist predecessors, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten. I argue that, similar to Baumgarten, Kant understands an incentive to refer to the ground of desire, and that feelings function as a specific kind of ground within Kant’s psychology of moral action, namely as the ‘impelling cause’ of desire. I claim that this interpretation has several advantages over the alternatives currently on offer in the literature.
... 7 For a brief discussion of the influence of Rawls in the study of Kant's ethics see Schneewind (2010: 239-47) and Ameriks (1996: 38). For additional examples of this interpretation see (among others) Kemp (1958), Gregor (1963), Dietrichson (1964and 1969), O'Neill (2013[1975and 1998), Höffe (1977, Schnoor (1989), Sullivan (1989), Reath (1989 and1994), Allison (1990), Schneewind (1991, Joerden (1993), Korsgaard (1996), Wood (1997 and1999), Kerstein (2002), Guyer (2005), Hill (2007), Timmermann (2007, Galvin (2009), Velleman (2012, Timmons (2017) and Kleingeld (2017 and. 8 See for instance the BBC Radio 4's (2017) 'Kant's Categorical Imperative'. ...
On the currently dominant reading of the Groundwork, Kant’s derivation of ‘imperatives of duty’ exemplifies a decision procedure for the derivation of concrete duties in moral deliberation. However, Kant’s response to an often-misidentified criticism of the Groundwork by G. A. Tittel suggests that Kant was remarkably unconcerned with arguing for the practicality of the categorical imperative as a decision procedure. Instead, I argue that the main aim of Kant’s derivation of imperatives of duty was to show how his analysis of the form of moral judgement is indeed presupposed in the four types of moral imperative that philosophers of his time recognized.
... In the face of many questions and criticisms, the voices defending or reinterpreting Kant's views are also opposed to him and put forward "reconcilable propositions": Paton's "isolation approach [4]," Henson's "multiple stipulations [5]," Hermann's concept of duty as a restrictive condition [6], and Allison's "absorption thesis [7]." However, these conciliatory propositions without exception have their own problems, namely, "to explain Kant's motivation and moral value with a motivation theory that does not exist in Kant," thus missing the "fundamental purpose [8]" of Kant's practical philosophy. ...
German philosopher Kant, in his moral philosophy, made a clear distinction between categorical imperative and hypothetical imperative. Under his three propositions of morality, Kant argued that only actions motivated by maxims (or moral principles) rather than any other emotional feelings could produce moral worth. Since then, the criticism from Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and a series of reconciling propositions from other later scholars such as Paten, Henson towards such Kantian dichotomy have never ended. This sets the main focus of my article.The article is divided into three parts: the first part expounds the content and ethical basis of Kantian philosophy by explaining the epistemological gap between noumenon and phenomenon. The second part focuses on four different reconciling propositions proposed by Paton, Henson, Herman, and Allison as well as their shared issue: they all try to revise the conclusion within Kantian philosophy in a theory of motivation outside the Kantian philosophy. By tracing back to the three propositions and the relationship between autonomy and heteronomy, the last part offers the articles own argument: though Kant denies emotion as a motivation to produce moral worth, he does not exclude it from the inevitable concomitant from phenomena.
... Ou seja, sem uma lei formal da vontade somente restaria à determinação dessa faculdade "regras práticas materiais" que, todas, põem o fundamento determinante na "faculdade de apetição inferior", essa que lida exclusivamente com desejos sensíveis. 5 Como parece ser o caso com Allison (2011) no seu comentário à FMC, cf. a parte 4 sobre a GMS 3 (passim). 6 Precisamos "representar-nos em pensamento um ser como racional e com consciência de sua causalidade com respeito às ações, isto é, dotado de uma vontade" (GMS, AA 04: 349, p. 357). ...
Na 3ª Seção da Fundamentação, Kant procura estabelecer o "princípio supremo da moralidade" oferecendo o rationale para o que sua "determinação correta", alcançada na 2ª Seção através de uma investigação metafísica, apresentou como resultado maior: que uma vontade livre e uma vontade sob leis morais é uma e a mesma coisa (a tese da Einerleiheit). Ao esclarecer o que isso requer quanto ao tipo de atividade de uma razão prática, que o "eu devo" moral para os seres humanos é o necessário "eu quero" das suas vontades, que pode ser tal na medida em que é a atividade puramente racional da vontace, eu procuro explicar a "justificação" da moralidade que Kant oferece nessa Seção através a identificação do que está à base do necessário "eu quero": ele encontra sua justificação "objetiva" ao ser a constituição do "eu conheço" prático. Meu argumento é desenvolvido através da atenção aos detalhes da intrincada dialética de Kant na Seção.
... Practical ideas, foremost the notion of a wise author of the world, constitute 'incentives for resolve and realization' (A813/B841). Not implausibly, Ypi follows interpreters such as Henry Allison (2011), who have argued that this is a remnant of Kant's pre-critical view that we need affective incentives to follow the moral law. Accordingly, she follows a second line of interpretation. ...
According to Lea Ypi, Kant’s attempt in the first Critique to unify reason via the practical route fails because his notion of purposiveness as design commits him to a dogmatic metaphysics. I challenge this claim on two grounds. First, I argue that practical reason does not have an interest in a strong modal connection that guarantees the unity of freedom and nature rather than a weak modal connection that merely affirms the possibility of our ends. Second, I highlight that the epistemic status of practical ideas is one of faith or hope rather than knowledge. Hence, Kant’s attempt to unify reason via the practical route can be reconstructed in a way that is largely in line with the commitments of his critical philosophy.
Kant has been interpreted as claiming that persons possess unconditional and incomparable value. If this claim, which I call the “absolute value claim,” entails that persons are valuable in all circumstances and cannot be valued vis-à-vis each other, then its philosophical validity may be disputed. I point to passages in which Kant can be understood as saying that persons, as opposed to non-persons, can be thought to have absolute value, but persons performing immoral actions can be denied value. I argue that if we accept these propositions, then, at least from the Kantian standpoint, some well-known cases which seem to problematize the absolute value claim—a soldier sacrifices himself in battle to save four of his comrades; a person kills another person in order to save his own life; should a scarce life-saving drug be given to a young or an old person?—need not be seen prima facie to undermine the philosophical viability of this claim.
This chapter suggests a blueprint for reading literature and philosophy together, through a Kantian notion of spontaneous cognitive form that is flexible and linked with the underpinnings of objective knowledge. While “stream-of-consciousness” fiction is often recruited to enforce empiricist paradigms of the mind, this chapter argues that Woolf’s The Waves discloses what Kant called the mind’s spontaneity. Due largely to her well-known description of the “incessant shower of innumerable atoms” that rain down on the mind, Woolf has been almost exclusively interpreted as an empiricist. This chapter argues, by contrast, that while Woolf may take the sensory impression as a central unit of analysis for her depictions of a consciousness at work, she also routinely exceeds and indeed ironizes the empiricist framework she inherits, laying bare its limits. Woolf most clearly moves beyond the conceit of naturalistically rendered consciousness in the The Waves, which reveals modernist production of fiction at its most Kantian, or at least as a form working in the impasse between Hume and Kant. In representing the internal synthesizing abstractions that underlie the appearance of objects, Woolf’s fiction joins Kant’s epistemology in requiring a type of representation different from description, since what is being rendered has not yet taken the form of an object. Drawing not on Kant’s third Critique but on an anti-psychologistic reading of the first Critique, the broader aim of this chapter is to suggest the real untapped potential that cognitive spontaneity in its theoretical use maintains for aesthetics.
Some Kantians argue that freedom is not a metaphysical property that we might or might not possess, but instead an idea or presupposition that we must adopt from the practical standpoint. In doing so, they look to secure our freedom, no matter what science or theoretical reason reveals about us. This paper lays out two problems for this position. The problems are both metaphysical and epistemic. The metaphysical issues are that conceiving of freedom as an idea or presupposition that we must adopt from the practical standpoint makes it especially difficult to account for interaction between freedom and experience, but also why some things occupy a practical standpoint where others do not. The epistemic issue is that the standpoint view struggles to account for knowledge of freedom in experience. I contend that these problems are decisive, and that we should abandon the standpoint view of freedom.
In this paper, we consider how demandingness objections pertain to perfect duties in Kantian ethics. We revisit the framework of demandingness that we introduced in a previous paper, before introducing three cases that have been suggested to constitute problems for Kant, specifically regarding perfect duties. We argue that some of these cases do constitute problems for the Kantian framework, but the complaint of overdemandingness obfuscates other issues. In particular, we suggest that Kantian ethics may benefit from a theory of goods. However, we observe that supplementing Kantian ethics in this way may yield a number of further difficulties.
In this article I attempt to explain Kant’s notoriously obscure argument for the principle that every rational being should be treated as an “end,” and not merely as a means. I take my lead from the appearance in the argument of terms and ideas that he uses earlier in the Groundwork to express two distinctive features of moral value and to make a related claim about how moral value is achieved. I argue that, of the candidates for the “end” of moral action that Kant considers, only rational beings instantiate both of these features and satisfy the related claim. I also argue that these features and this claim explain why no other candidates need be considered and why moral actions must have an “end” at all. Thus I show that these features and this claim resolve the puzzles posed by Kant’s own argument and make sense of some of the remarks that he makes in it.
Kant distingue entre vontade, enquanto faculdade legisladora, e arbítrio, enquanto faculdade de executar o que é prescrito como lei. Ele também distingue entre o princípio de judicação da obrigação, através do qual avaliamos a bondade de máximas e de ações, e o princípio de execução da obrigação, que consiste no motivo para agir com base no que é representado como obrigação. Já que o respeito é o personagem principal de um capítulo sobre os motivos da razão prática pura, os intérpretes kantianos o tomam naturalmente como relacionado ao arbítrio e à execução. Em contraposição a isso, interpreto o sentimento do respeito como relacionado à vontade e à legislação, mais exatamente, como um motivo para fazer da lei moral o princípio de judicação supremo e para tomar um interesse por ela. Além disso, mostro que algo análogo ao sentimento do respeito tem de estar presente na relação da lei moral com a vontade de toda criatura racional.
Moral autonomy might seem to harbor inconsistency. Whereas nomos suggests that moral laws are grounded in our essence or nature (and thus are not up to us), autos suggests that they are grounded in some free act of self-legislation or prescription (and thus are up to us). Latter-day Kantians often respond by compromising on autonomy, deflating either nomos or autos . This investigation reconstructs how Christian Wolff, Kant’s great rationalist predecessor, already forged a path for embracing autonomy without compromise. His reconciliation, I argue, rests on distinguishing different respects in which moral laws stand in need of grounding. I further unravel why no parallel reconciliation is found in Kant. This, I conclude, still leaves open that Kant may similarly seek to embrace autonomy without compromise.
Beyond the deep affinities linking Immanuel Kant’s declared “primacy of practical reason” and Emmanuel Levinas’s “ethics as first philosophy,” these thinkers radically diverge, as do modern rationalism and contemporary phenomenology. The paper shows that Kant, despite his declaration, continues to give primacy to epistemology and reason, as evidenced by the supreme status of law – both in nature, to be sure, and in the autonomy of rational self-legislation. This contrasts with Levinas who recognizes as “original right” a moral imperative more exigent than the rule of law, emanating from the alterity or face of the other person. Such original right orders the self pre-originally or “an-archically” to a moral responsibility to and for the other person before all else. In this way, Levinas, in contrast to Kant, understands the source of intelligibility – including the rationality of logic and science – in and as the goodness of the priority of moral obligation.
This article aims at addressing the question of human dignity in the face of the suffering that people of the city of Antakya (formerly Antioch) experienced after the devastating earthquakes on February 6, 2023. The main question the article raises is concerned with the impact the destruction of shared sacred sites has on the heritage of the city and the dynamics of intercultural and interreligious relations among its different communities. The theoretical argument is that human dignity must be conceptualized in relational terms as a dynamic force that captures the human potential to shape relations among different communities.
Kant defined 'Right' (Recht) as the condition that obtains among a population of physically embodied persons capable of setting their own ends who live on a finite surface and therefore cannot avoid interaction with each other if each is as free to set their own ends as is consistent with the freedom of all to do the same. He regarded this rational idea, heir to the traditional idea of 'natural Right, as the test of the legitimacy of the laws of any actual state, or 'positive Right.' He clearly considered Right to be part of morality as a whole, namely the coercively enforceable part, as contrasted to Ethics, which is the non-coercively enforceable part of morality. Some have questioned whether Right is part of morality, but this Element shows how Kant's "Universal Principle of Right" follows straightforwardly from the foundational idea of Kant's moral philosophy as a whole.
Can Kantians distinguish unfair free riding from innocent coordination? If they cannot, the whole approach is flawed. This paper develops a novel solution. Free riders, as I will put it, fail to make their conduct conditional on other people’s preferences. They refuse to do their part regardless of what others prefer. It is not just that other people share the same preferences - as alternative accounts have it - but that the free rider does not care whether they do or do not share the same preferences. The same does not carry over to innocent coordination.
There is an interpretative puzzle at the centre of Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals . The text presents the single principle of morality ( G , 4: 392), but instead of providing a definitive statement of the principle, we find a three-step sequence of formulas. The puzzle concerns the formula relation: given the contrast between the moral law’s individuality and the plurality of formulas, how do the formulas relate to each other and the moral law? This paper takes the first step towards a new account by focusing on G , 4: 436, a passage in which Kant makes claims about the matter and form of the moral law. By understanding the hylomorphism entailed by these claims, it is possible to achieve new perspectives on common questions about Kant’s ethics, in particular, the role of the formulas in deriving or explaining duties and how the formulas are used in the argument of Groundwork II and its transition from popular moral philosophy to metaphysics of morals.
Duties to oneself are central to Kant's moral thought. Indeed, in his Lectures on Ethics , he claims that they “take first place, and are the most important of all” ( LE : 27:341). Despite this, Kant is not clear about what they are or why they are ‘the most important.’ What is it for a duty to be owed to oneself? And in what sense do such duties ‘take first place’? I answer these questions: a duty to oneself is a self‐legislated duty, and they ‘take first place’ in that all ethical duties are, fundamentally, duties to oneself. Based on a close reading of Kant's “Apparent Antinomy” regarding duties to oneself in The Doctrine of Virtue §§1–3, I argue that Kant holds that (1) a duty is owed to its legislator, and (2) all duties are self‐legislated. I then argue that this interpretation is further supported by Kant's understanding of the Categorical Imperative as a “principle of autonomy” in the Groundwork ( G : 4:433). I conclude by offering an interpretation of the Categorical Imperative on which even though all duties are ultimately owed to oneself, there remains an important sense in which some duties are owed to others as well.
In Kant’s Groundwork II, the Formula of Universal Law (FUL) seems to be the argumentative link between the notion of a categorical imperative and later formulae (e.g. of humanity), its function as this link dependent on its equivalence to both. Some commentators have denied this equivalence and read the section as a failure. Others have abandoned its expository development by reading later formulae into the FUL. I argue that we need do neither if we distinguish the universality of the FUL from that of the will of all and read Groundwork II as extracting the latter from common moral cognition.
El presente trabajo se propone esclarecer en qué medida el principio establecido por Kant en la Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres constituye un conocimiento. Se mostrará que, al reconstruir la caracterización kantiana de conocimiento práctico, podemos luego examinar de qué manera aquella obra se trata justamente de alcanzar ese tipo de conocimiento. Tal investigación se ve justificada, por un lado, porque ayudaría a comprender el lugar sistemático de la obra en cuanto en ella hay un conocimiento necesario para la ciencia ética y, por otro lado, iluminaría cierto aspecto del debate contemporáneo respecto de si acaso la filosofía moral de Kant es realista o antirrealista en alguna de sus variantes. Para aquello es necesario comenzar por aclarar qué entiende Kant por conocimiento práctico, y luego ver cómo esto se realiza o no en dicha obra, finalmente bosquejaremos los posibles rendimientos filosóficos que esto logra en relación con otras aproximaciones contemporáneas a la filosofía moral de Kant.
Purpose. The authors of this article set the main purpose of understanding the ideological potential of Kant’s philosophical heritage from the viewpoint of its influence on the spread and legitimization of the self-made man idea in the worldview transformations of the modern world. Theoretical basis. Historical, analytical, and hermeneutic methods became fundamental for achieving the goal. The study is based on Kant’s works, as well as on the works of modern researchers of his ideological heritage. Originality. The analysis shows that the idea of the Self-made-man, which originated in the ancient world and gradually spread in the Western culture of the Middle Ages, early Modernism, and especially the Enlightenment, receives significant additional impulses in the context of Kant’s rethinking of the metaphysical foundations in the theory of knowledge and morality. Perhaps, the systematic theoretical substantiation of people’s abilities to use their own mind, their intellectual, and therefore moral autonomy, and freedom of will as the fundamental principles of personal Self-determination and Self-realization became the most important consequence of this rethinking. This, in turn, became the theoretical and moral-legal basis for further legitimization in the modern and postmodern world of the ideal of a person who creates oneself. Conclusions. The importance of Kant’s philosophy in the context of idea generation of the self-made man is hard to overestimate. It is entirely imbued with a leitmotif appeal to the individual to have the courage to use his/her own mind, to be independent and self-sufficient in assessments, choices, and actions, and therefore also responsible for their consequences, in the end, to be primarily an end, not a means. Thanks to this, a person, according to Hegel, finds an unconditionally strong and stable center in oneself. In fact, by strengthening the position of human-centric philosophy, as well as the moral and legal foundations of liberal humanism, Kant’s ideas provided further ideological legitimation in the orientation of an objectively growing individual towards actively placing Self-reliance and Personal responsibility on one’s own destiny as the key principles of the Self-made-man concept.
The Overdemandingness Objection maintains that an ethical theory or principle that demands too much should be rejected, or at least moderated. Traditionally, overdemandingness is considered primarily a problem for consequentialist ethical theories. Recently, Kant and Kantian ethics have also become part of the debate. This development helps us better understand both overdemandingness and problems with Kant's ethics. In this, the first of a pair of papers, we introduce the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties as well as a framework for understanding the overdemandingness objection that allows us to discuss overdemandingness across different ethical theories. We then consider two ways that Kantians have sought to avoid the implication that imperfect duties may be overly demanding: (1) via the latitude of imperfect duties, and (2) by the suggestion that the wider system of duties is self‐moderating. We conclude that it is unclear whether the two most prominent ways of addressing the overdemandingness objection work, challenging them on their own terms, and observing that they are inapplicable to potential demandingness concerns pertaining to perfect duties.
In the history of art and aesthetics, beauty in nature and beauty in art can be seen meeting in the works of Immanuel Kant. Thinkers such as Kirwan and Allison believed that Kant endorsed a predominantly nature-centered aesthetics. I dissect Kant’s The Critique of the Power of Judgment with the help of convictions by various thinkers in maintaining that Kant does not prioritize beauty in nature over art. For this, I revisit Kant’s views on beauty in art and nature, and finally his views on the genius which marks the significant difference between art and nature. If we analyze and reread his views in an intellectually subtle manner, we can see that in Kant, philosophy of art and aesthetics acquire a fine balance.
This article raises critical questions about Pauline Kleingeld’s interpretation of how one can derive concrete duties from Kant’s Formula of Humanity. Kleingeld has proposed a clear, three-step procedure that can give guidance for a variety of complicated cases. According to her view, to use someone merely as a means, one must (i) use the other person as a causal means to one’s end, (ii) have an attitude of not paying due regard to the patient’s consent, whereby (iii) it is the patient’s genuine, actual consent that is crucial. This article raises several examples that question whether the three conditions are jointly sufficient to make an action morally wrong, and it asks about each condition separately whether it is necessary to violate the first part of Kant’s Formula of Humanity. The examples suggest that Kleingeld’s interpretation is of local importance, but might not be the supreme limiting condition of one’s freedom. The article ends with a brief sketch of an alternative approach.
Zusammenfassung
Das Verbot, andere „bloß als Mittel“ zu gebrauchen, ist eines der bekanntesten und einflussreichsten Elemente der Moralphilosophie von Immanuel Kant. Es wird jedoch weithin als unmöglich angesehen, die Bedingungen, unter denen dieses Verbot verletzt wird, genau zu bestimmen. Auf der Grundlage einer erneuten Prüfung der kantischen Texte entwickelt dieser Aufsatz eine neue Interpretation der Bedingungen, unter denen jemand „bloß als Mittel“ gebraucht wird. Es wird argumentiert, dass diese Interpretation nicht nur durch die Texte verlässlich gestützt wird, sondern auch erhebliche philosophische Vorteile gegenüber alternativen Lesarten aufweist.
En los debates recientes sobre la fórmula de la humanidad del imperativo categórico se intenta comprender los insumos conceptuales de dicha fórmula a partir de obras kantianas que no son propiamente la Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres. Este proceder se ampara en la falsa suposición de que en la GMS no hay un significado claro o concreto de lo que encarnarían términos como humanidad (Mensch) o fin en sí mismo (Zweck an sich selbst). En virtud de lo anterior, en este artículo buscaré analizar acuciosa y detalladamente qué es lo que tiene que decir Kant concretamente en GMS AA IV 42719-42833, puesto que ahí sí hay una argumentación que se construye progresivamente desde la noción de fin hasta la equivalencia de la naturaleza racional como fin en sí mismo, lo cual considero que es central para una comprensión adecuada de la fórmula de la humanidad presentada posteriormente.
A última metade da Fundamentação III é frequentemente negligenciada pelos comentadores, mas contém as próprias avaliações de Kant do status de suas afirmações anteriores na dedução. A seção final, antes do parágrafo de conclusão, discute a natureza da razão prática e seus limites mais externos. Eu mostro que Kant pretende que as afirmações na dedução tenham o status de meras ideias da razão, ao invés de afirmações ontológicas sobre nosso eu verdadeiro. O limite mais externo da razão prática também fornece uma limitação que esta razão nunca possa fornecer explicações completas e não pode nunca ser satisfeita em sua busca pelo incondicionado, seja prático ou especulativo, mas simplesmente assume uma ideia de um incondicionado, neste caso a ideia da lei moral incondicionada. Fundamentação III fornece apenas uma justificação parcial de uma visão prática dos humanos como seres morais.
Rawls regarded the priority of the right over the good as the characteristic feature of Kantian constructivism. I have four goals in the paper. First, I try to refute Rawls’s reading of Kant on the relation between the right and the good. Second, I fill out Kant’s picture of the rational natures that have intrinsic value: They have the law of duty within, are predisposed to respect themselves and others who have the law of duty within, and belong to a community of rational natures. Third, I argue that because Kant thought that the right and the good were coeval, he is not a constructivist, but a kind of realist. Finally, I use my examination of the good, the intrinsically valuable in Kant, to reject any temptation to regard his ethics as dependent on his teleological claim that human nature is the end of nature.
Anthropology and physical geography were among Kant’s most popular and longest running courses. He intended them to give his students the world-knowledge (Weltkenntniß) that they needed in order to be effective world-citizens (Weltbürgern). Much of this indoctrination amounted to teaching Occidental white men, Kant’s default audience, to perceive themselves as uniquely entitled and obliged to work as agents of human progress on the assumption that they, thanks to their geographic location on Earth, were naturally formed as an exceptional race. I trace this perception to a combination of Kant’s lectures and publications. He already indicated it in some of his works from the 1750s and 1760s. He subsequently fleshed it out through a theory of race based on his geography course in conjunction with a pure moral theory, a pragmatic anthropology that complements the moral theory, and a theory of education that builds on those three.
Public international law is concerned with the relationship between human dignity and human rights. Concepts such as person, freedom and justice occur in legal texts, often without an accurate definition. To solve these ambiguities, thus contributing to developing a virtuous legal and political debate, a philosophical clarification might be helpful. In this article, my aim is to provide an analysis of the notion of human dignity in Kant’s works and in Islamic thought and to evaluate how Kant’s approach can offer tools that are relevant to the current debates on dignity in both Western and non-Western traditions.
Although maxims are central to Kant’s ethical theory, his account of them remains obscure. We can make progress towards understanding Kantian maxims by examining not only their role as the object of moral judgement but also their connection to freedom of the will and causality. This requires understanding maxims as causal laws that explain the actions that we impute to agents. In this way, they are analogous to causal laws of nature, but they are limited in scope to the agents who are responsible for them. Understanding maxims in this way explains our limited epistemic access to them and helps to clarify Kant’s account of virtue and character as well as how they mediate the relationship between practical and theoretical reason.
In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals , Kant explains a perfect duty as one that “admits no exception in favor of inclination”. An imperfect duty must then, in turn, be one which does admit such exceptions. However, according to Kant, all duties are valid without exception, and so there has been broad agreement among Kantians and Kant interpreters from the beginning that perfect duties cannot be characterized by exceptionless validity. I would thus like to argue in favor of a different reading of Kant’s explanation. My thesis is that he uses the term ‘exception’ in quite different ways, as can be documented, for instance, in the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Pure Reason . The term then has another meaning, and this is also the case in the passage in question in the Groundwork .
The aim of the present paper is to show that a particular interpretation of the end in itself, which is widely accepted in research on Kant’s critical philosophy, is at least worth discussing. I refer to the interpretation of the end in itself as a so-called existing end, i.e., something for the sake of which we perform an action but which we do not realize – simply because it already exists. As I will argue, this interpretation does not take into account a crucial aspect of the end in itself, i.e., its property of being an end. Being an end, the end in itself must fit into the Kantian general definition of a practical end and must therefore be something to be realized.
Na Fundamentação III, Kant alerta para a suspeita de um círculo na relação entre liberdade e moralidade. Comentadores discordam se a "espécie de círculo" em questão é um círculo vicioso ou uma petição de princípio, e se Kant soluciona esse suposto defeito lógico ou não. Essas interpretações, entretanto, negligenciam o papel que as seções I e II da Fundamentação desempenham no problema do círculo. Neste artigo, pretendemos argumentar que a "espécie de círculo" consiste em duas petições em um círculo não vicioso, e que Kant o remove ao substituir o procedimento analítico das seções I, II e início da III pelo procedimento sintético a partir da subseção 3 da Fundamentação III. Em nossa interpretação, o papel do círculo é enfatizar a necessidade de mudar de procedimento para justificar a liberdade humana mediante a distinção crítica entre fenômenos e númenos e a moralidade humana mediante a dedução transcendental do imperativo categórico.
The paper examines Kant's self-criticism to the account of hypothetical imperatives given in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Following his corrections in the introductions to the third Critique, the paper traces the consequences of that change in his later writings, specifically with regard to the status of prudence. I argue that the revision of the account of hypothetical imperatives leads to differentiate, and ultimately separate, two functions in prudence: the setting of ends through maxims, and the pragmatic rules establishing means to reach those ends. Accordingly, I furthermore argue, there is ultimately no genuine structural distinction between the rules of prudence and skill. The only difference lies in the domain in which prudence unfolds, that is, the field of human relations, and in the relevant cognitions.
É indiscutível a extensão da originalidade e da importância da ética de Kant. O que talvez não seja tão evidente é que a filosofia moral de Kant como um todo não foi uma teoria subitamente construída, mas dependeu de um extenso e profundo debate com a tradição filosófica, sobretudo, a representada pela escolástica alemã, com uma consequentemente apropriação ou assimilação de vários de seus aspectos. No que diz respeito a história do desenvolvimento da doutrina do imperativo categórico, em particular, não é possível ser indiferente í influência da filosofia prática do filósofo e teólogo alemão do iluminismo, Christian August Crusius. Meu objetivo nesse artigo é , dessa forma, o de tentar identificar, levando em conta a distinção da praxis em necessidade problemática e moral e o contraste entre prudência e moralidade, alguns pontos de interseção entre as filosofia morais de Crusius e Kant em sua origem.
Neste trabalho, proponho uma interpretação para a polêmica terceira seção da Fundamentação à metafísica dos costumes de Kant, defendendo que a espontaneidade da razão cumpre um papel central para a prova da liberdade como fundamento da lei moral. Sem pretender tratar exaustivamente de toda esta seção (e dos diversos problemas envolvidos nela), farei um recorte bem preciso de textos e limitarei minhas análises apenas aos seus tópicos iniciais. Em primeiro lugar, (I) exponho alguns problemas mais gerais envolvidos nesta terceira seção; em seguida, (II) apresento meus argumentos em defesa da centralidade da espontaneidade da razão para a força conclusiva da prova pretendida por Kant; por fim, (III) exploro uma das possíveis consequências desta interpretação no que diz respeito à limitação (e articulação) entre uso teórico e uso prático da razão.
A terceira seção da Fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes tem seus argumentos expostos, não raro, de forma extremamente condensada, reclamando, ademais, um apelo sistemático não apenas às teses expostas em seções anteriores da própria Fundamentação, mas também a teses centrais à filosofia transcendental expostas na Crítica da razão pura, teses essas que são retomadas, no mais das vezes, de modo excessivamente simplificado. Em vista disso, pouco ou nenhum acordo tem sido logrado acerca do que se pretende provar na terceira seção, acerca da estrutura de seus argumentos (acerca, portanto, do modo como se prova) e, por isso mesmo, acerca do sucesso ou insucesso na consecução de seus objetivos. No presente trabalho, não se buscará solucionar um a um os problemas que se enfrenta na interpretação da terceira seção, problemas que, estando sujeitos a uma pletora de respostas diferentes, aguardam ainda um tratamento capaz de lograr algum acordo. Buscar-se-á, ao contrário, examinar tão-somente uma dificuldade, a qual condiciona a compreensão das demais: a suposta confusão entre espontaneidade e autonomia da vontade, confusão essa que seria cometida por Kant no início mesmo da terceira seção.
O objetivo deste trabalho consiste em apresentar o debate entre duas interpretações sobre a GMS III de Kant. As interpretações aqui analisadas são as de Dieter Schönecker e Henry Allison. Isso será feito por meio da reconstrução de seus argumentos e teses centrais, bem como da consideração das críticas recíprocas. Para isso serão identificadas primeiramente as passagens da obra de Kant às quais estas interpretações se relacionam. Em seguida, serão apresentados e analisados os argumentos e a perspectiva de um e de outro intérprete. Por fim, estabelecemos um resumo das questõees centrais da controvérsia.
Neste artigo, proponho como objetivo último o exame dos parágrafos 9 a 12 da primeira seção da Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes, a partir da perspectiva de uma linha de raciocínio que podemos depreender da parte final do parágrafo 8. Pretendo mostrar que, nesse contexto da Fundamentação, Kant levanta uma discussão sobre graus de dificuldade e de facilidade relativos à aplicação da distinção conceitual entre ações por dever e ações que estão apenas externamente em conformidade com o dever, graus esses que variam de acordo com o que deparamos quando, em determinadas situações, buscamos de uma maneira ou outra notar possíveis aparições de uma boa vontade.
In this paper I deal with an argument for the foundation of human dignity that Kant sketches in the introduction to his lecture Feyerabend on natural law (1784). After presenting very briefly Kant's discussion of Achenwall's concept of value I argue that the starting point of the argument on human dignity that Kant develops in the introduction to the lecture is teleological. I discuss then the problems that such a starting point inevitably entails regarding Kant´s practical philosophy and offer an explanation as to why Kant was able to include this argument in the introduction to his lecture despite the problems it raises. Finally I claim that despite these problems the central idea of the argument reflects a fundamental idea of Kant's thought on human dignity. In support of the latter I refer to the fact that Kant turns to the same central idea of the argument some years later in his discussion of teleology developed in the Critique of Judgment (1790).
The term “categorical imperative” was introduced into moral philosophy by Immanuel Kant. The concept of a categorical imperative is central to his moral philosophy, and if he is right, to moral thought and reasoning generally. It refers both to a certain kind of substantive rational requirement on action that we shall call “a categorical imperative” – a rational requirement that is independent of and takes priority over reasons based on one's inclinations and personal ends – and to the fundamental principle that can be used to determine our moral requirements, a principle that we shall call “the Categorical Imperative.” Kant provides different formulations of this principle in his works in moral philosophy. This entry explains the concept of a categorical imperative and then turns to the fundamental principle and its application.
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) is a common problem worldwide, and it is recognized that the term encompasses overlapping sub-phenotypes of disease. The development of a sub-phenotype may be determined in part by an individual's genetics, which in turn may determine response to treatment. A growing understanding of the genetic factors that predispose to COPD and its sub-phenotypes and the pathophysiology of the condition is now leading to the suggestion of individualized therapy based on the patients' clinical phenotype and genotype. Pharmacogenetics is the study of variations in treatment response according to genotype and is perhaps the next direction for genetic research in COPD. Here, we consider how knowledge of the pathophysiology and genetic risk factors for COPD may inform future management strategies for affected individuals.
Introduction It is central to Kant's moral philosophy that one should always treat other human beings with respect. He articulates this requirement in his formula of humanity as an end-in-itself, which he calls the supreme limiting condition of one's freedom: ‘So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.’ (G IV 429, cf. IV 430 ff.) However, the exact reason why one should respect others remains a matter of debate. The standard view in the Kant literature is that one should respect others because of an absolute inner worth or value all human beings possess. The absolute value is often called ‘dignity’, and dignity is said to be the reason why one should respect others. The debate focuses on the question whether human beings have this value or dignity in virtue of a pre-moral capacity they have (such as freedom or the capacity to set ends), or because of a morally good will. Against the standard view I shall argue that Kant does not ground the requirement to respect others on any value at all. Rather, one should respect others because it is commanded by the categorical imperative. While this claim is not novel, what is new is my argument that the formula of humanity passage (G IV 427–9) supports this claim.
In the Preface to his best known work on moral philosophy, Kant states his purpose very clearly and succinctly: “The present groundwork is, however, nothing more than the search for and establishment of the supreme principle of morality, which already constitutes an enterprise whole in its aim and to be separated from every other moral investigation” (Groundwork, 4:392). This paper will deal with the outcome of the first part of this task, namely, Kant's attempt to formulate the supreme principle of morality, which is the intended outcome of the search. It will consider this formulation in the light of Kant's conception of the historical antecedents of his attempt. Our first task, however, must be to say a little about the meaning of the term “supreme principle of morality.” For it is not nearly as evident to many as it was to Kant that there is such a thing at all. And it is extremely common for people, whatever position they may take on this issue, to misunderstand what a “supreme principle of morality” is, what it is for, and what role it is supposed to play in moral theorizing and moral reasoning. Kant never directly presents any argument that there must be such a principle, but he does articulate several considerations that would seem to justify supposing that there is. Kant holds that moral questions are to be decided by reason. Reason, according to Kant, always seeks unity under principles, and ultimately, systematic unity under the fewest possible number of principles (Pure Reason, A 298-302/B 355-9, A 645-50/B 673-8).
Although there can be no doubt regarding the centrality of the concept of freedom in Kant's thought, there is considerable disagreement concerning its proper interpretation and evaluation. The evaluative problem stems largely from Kant's insistence that freedom involves a transcendental or non-empirical component, which requires the resources of transcendental idealism in order to be reconciled with the “causality of nature.” There is also, however, a significant interpretive problem posed by the number of different conceptions of freedom to which Kant refers. In addition to “outer freedom” or freedom of action, and a relative, empirically accessible or “psychological” concept of freedom, which admits of degrees, Kant distinguishes between transcendental and practical freedom, both of which seem to involve indeterminism in the sense of an independence from determination by antecedent causes. Moreover, within this sphere he conceives of freedom as both absolute spontaneity (negative freedom), which is a condition of rational agency as such, and as autonomy (positive freedom), which is a condition of the appropriate moral motivation (acting from duty alone). Given this complexity, the present discussion must be highly selective. Specifically, it will focus initially on the nature of and relation between freedom as spontaneity and as autonomy. But since both of these senses of freedom affirm (albeit in different ways) an independence from natural causality, this necessitates a consideration of the relationship between freedom (in both senses) and transcendental idealism. And to situate Kant's views in their historical context, I shall frame the discussion with a brief account of the treatment of free will by some of his predecessors, on the one hand, and his idealistic successors, on the other.
This book contains chapters on various features of Kant's moral psychology and moral theory, with particular emphasis on a conception of rational agency autonomy. The opening chapters explore different elements of Kant's views about motivation, including an account of respect for morality as the distinctive moral motive and a view of the principle of happiness as a representation of the shared structure of non-moral choice. These chapters stress the unity of Kant's moral psychology by arguing that moral and non-moral considerations motivate in essentially the same way. Several of the chapters develop an original approach to Kant's conception of autonomy that emphasizes the political metaphors found throughout Kant's writings on ethics. They argue that autonomy is best interpreted not as a psychological capacity, but as a kind of sovereignty: in claiming that moral agents have autonomy, Kant regards them as a kind of sovereign legislator with the power to give moral law through their willing. The final chapters explore some of the implications of this conception of autonomy elsewhere in Kant's moral thought, arguing that his Formula of Universal Law uses this conception of autonomy to generate substantive moral principles and exploring the connection between Kantian self-legislation and duties to oneself.
The book examines the central tenets of Hume's epistemology and cognitive psychology. It adopts a two level approach. On the one hand, it considers Hume's thought in its own terms and historical context. So considered, Hume is viewed as a naturalist, whose project in the first three parts of the first book of the Treatise is to provide an account of the operation of the understanding in which reason is subordinated to custom and other non-rational propensities. Scepticism arises in the fourth part as a form of metascepticism, directed not against first-order beliefs, but against philosophical attempts to ground these beliefs in the 'space of reasons'. On the other hand, it provides a critique of these tenets from a Kantian perspective. This involves a comparison of the two thinkers on a range of issues, including space and time, causation, existence, induction, and the self. In each case, the issue is seen to turn on a contrast between their underlying models of cognition. Hume is committed to the perceptual model, according to which cognition is regarded as a seeing with the 'mind's eye' of the relation between mental contents. By contrast, Kant appeals to a discursive model in which the fundamental cognitive act is judgment, understood as the application of concepts to sensory data. Regarded from the first point of view, Hume's account is deemed a major philosophical achievement, while seen from the second it suffers from a failure to develop an adequate account of concepts and judgments.
L'A. presente l'opposition entre Garve et Kant en reference au statut de la philosophie qui devrait etre comprehensible par le peuple mais est consideree comme «scientifique» et «obscure» chez Kant, ainsi que la critique de Garve de l'idealisme transcendantal dans la theorie kantienne de la connaissance
This volume contains a collection of seventeen essays which have been previously published on Kant and an addendum to one of these essays that is here published for the first time. Although these essays cover virtually the full spectrum of the author's work on Kant, ranging from his epistemology, metaphysics, and moral theory to his views on teleology, political philosophy, the philosophy of history, and the philosophy of religion, most of them revolve around three basic themes: the nature of transcendental idealism, freedom of the will, and the purposiveness of nature. The first two of these have been the foci of the author's work on Kant since its inception and the essays dealing with them in this volume are intended as clarifications, elaborations, and further developments of what the author has said on these topics elsewhere. Among their major new elements is the introduction of a significant comparative dimension, which is intended both to place Kant's views in their historical context and to explore their contemporary relevance. To this end, Kant's views are contrasted with those of his major predecessors and immediate successors, as well as present‐day philosophers. The concept of the purposiveness of nature is the major contribution of the third Critique (Critique of the Power of Judgment) to Kant's “critical” philosophy and one the main concerns of the essays dealing with it is to demonstrate its central place in Kant's thought.
This volume contains a collection of seventeen essays which have been previously published on Kant and an addendum to one of these essays that is here published for the first time. Although these essays cover virtually the full spectrum of the author's work on Kant, ranging from his epistemology, metaphysics, and moral theory to his views on teleology, political philosophy, the philosophy of history, and the philosophy of religion, most of them revolve around three basic themes: the nature of transcendental idealism, freedom of the will, and the purposiveness of nature. The first two of these have been the foci of the author's work on Kant since its inception and the essays dealing with them in this volume are intended as clarifications, elaborations, and further developments of what the author has said on these topics elsewhere. Among their major new elements is the introduction of a significant comparative dimension, which is intended both to place Kant's views in their historical context and to explore their contemporary relevance. To this end, Kant's views are contrasted with those of his major predecessors and immediate successors, as well as present‐day philosophers. The concept of the purposiveness of nature is the major contribution of the third Critique (Critique of the Power of Judgment) to Kant's “critical” philosophy and one the main concerns of the essays dealing with it is to demonstrate its central place in Kant's thought.
People talk about rats deserting a sinking ship, but they don't usually ask where the rats go. Perhaps this is only because the answer is so obvious: of course, most of the rats climb aboard the sounder ships, the ships that ride high in the water despite being laden with rich cargoes of cheese and grain and other things rats love, the ships that bring prosperity to ports like eighteenth-century Königsberg and firms such as Green & Motherby. By making the insulting comparison - as I am in the course of doing – between us Kant scholars and a horde of noxious vermin, my more or less transparent aim is to mitigate, or at least to distract attention from, the collective immodesty of what I am saying about us. For my point is that, in the past half-century or so, Kant studies has become a very prosperous ship indeed. Its success has even been the chief thing that has buoyed all its sister ships in the fleet of modern philosophy, most of which are also doing very well.
This volume contains a collection of seventeen essays which have been previously published on Kant and an addendum to one of these essays that is here published for the first time. Although these essays cover virtually the full spectrum of the author's work on Kant, ranging from his epistemology, metaphysics, and moral theory to his views on teleology, political philosophy, the philosophy of history, and the philosophy of religion, most of them revolve around three basic themes: the nature of transcendental idealism, freedom of the will, and the purposiveness of nature. The first two of these have been the foci of the author's work on Kant since its inception and the essays dealing with them in this volume are intended as clarifications, elaborations, and further developments of what the author has said on these topics elsewhere. Among their major new elements is the introduction of a significant comparative dimension, which is intended both to place Kant's views in their historical context and to explore their contemporary relevance. To this end, Kant's views are contrasted with those of his major predecessors and immediate successors, as well as present‐day philosophers. The concept of the purposiveness of nature is the major contribution of the third Critique (Critique of the Power of Judgment) to Kant's “critical” philosophy and one the main concerns of the essays dealing with it is to demonstrate its central place in Kant's thought.
In this article I argue that Kant's conception of dignity is commonly misunderstood. On the basis of a few passages in the Grundlegung scholars often attribute to Kant a view of dignity as an absolute inner value all human beings possess. However, a different picture emerges if one takes into account all the passages in which Kant uses ‘dignity’. I shall argue that Kant's conception of dignity is a more Stoic one: He conceives of dignity as sublimity (Erhabenheit) or the highest elevation of something over something else. ‘Dignity’ expresses that something is ‘raised above’ all else. What it is raised above, and in virtue of what, depends on the context in which Kant uses ‘dignity’. For instance, he talks about the dignity of a monarch to refer to his rank as the ruler of his subjects. When Kant refers to the dignity of humanity, he expresses the view that human beings have a prerogative over the rest of nature in virtue of being free. What Kant is saying in the famous Grundlegung passage on dignity is that morality is raised above other determinations of will in that morality alone should be valued unconditionally. In unfolding the complicated usage of ‘dignity’ in Kant's works, my reading helps to bring out the coherence of his ethics.
What is the proper task of Kantian ethical theory? This paper seeks to answer this question with reference to Kant's reply to Christian Garve in Section I of his 1793 essay on Theory and Practice. Kant reasserts the distinctness and natural authority of our consciousness of the moral law. Every mature human being is a moral professional—even philosophers like Garve, if only they forget about their ill-conceived ethical systems and listen to the voice of pure practical reason. Normative theory, Kant argues, cannot be refuted with reference to alleged experience. It is the proper task of the moral philosopher to emphasize this fact. The paper also discusses Kant's attempts to clarify his moral psychology, philosophy of value and conception of the highest good in the course of replying to Garve's challenge.
Kant's comments `against Garve' constitute his reaction to the latter's remarks on Cicero's De Officiis . Two related criticisms of Kant's against Garve are discussed in brief in this paper. A closer look is then taken at Garve's claim that `Kantian morality destroys all incentives that can move human beings to act at all'. I argue that Kant and Garve rely on two different models of human action for their analyses of moral motivation; these models differ in what each takes to be salient for the explanation of human action. I show that Samuel Clarke's analogy of physical explanation in the framework of Newtonianism (in his Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion ) usefully illuminates the difference between Kant and Garve in these respects.
Part I raises some questions concerning the extent of our freedom on the view that Henry Allison's Kant's Theory of Freedom attributes to Kant, and the possibility, on that view, of weakness of will. Allison is correct to attribute to Kant the ‘Incorporation Thesis’: one is never compelled to do x just because one has a desire (even a very intense desire) to do x; a desire moves one to action only if one allows it to. But while the attribution seems correct, there is a puzzle: how, given the Incorporation Thesis, is weakness of will, or ‘frailty’, possible? Part II considers Kant's claim in The Doctrine of Virtue that we have an indirect duty to cultivate our sympathetic feelings. Allison's interpretation is unsatisfactory because it fails to steer clear of the ‘impurity’ problem: the interpretation seems to foist on Kant an endorsement of impurity, i.e. the seeking out of nonmoral reasons to induce one to do one's duty. To seek out such reasons is to cultivate an impure will, something Kant warns against. A different interpretation is offered.
This volume contains a collection of seventeen essays which have been previously published on Kant and an addendum to one of these essays that is here published for the first time. Although these essays cover virtually the full spectrum of the author's work on Kant, ranging from his epistemology, metaphysics, and moral theory to his views on teleology, political philosophy, the philosophy of history, and the philosophy of religion, most of them revolve around three basic themes: the nature of transcendental idealism, freedom of the will, and the purposiveness of nature. The first two of these have been the foci of the author's work on Kant since its inception and the essays dealing with them in this volume are intended as clarifications, elaborations, and further developments of what the author has said on these topics elsewhere. Among their major new elements is the introduction of a significant comparative dimension, which is intended both to place Kant's views in their historical context and to explore their contemporary relevance. To this end, Kant's views are contrasted with those of his major predecessors and immediate successors, as well as present‐day philosophers. The concept of the purposiveness of nature is the major contribution of the third Critique (Critique of the Power of Judgment) to Kant's “critical” philosophy and one the main concerns of the essays dealing with it is to demonstrate its central place in Kant's thought.