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Kant’s Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality
Abstract
Recent interpreters of Kantâ__s moral philosophy and contemporary advocates of neo-Kantian moral theories generally minimize the importance of Kantâ__s metaphysical beliefs. This volume re-evaluates these minimizing approaches, exploring Kantian positions on such topics as sin, the relation between God and ethics, the metaphysics of human freedom and the possibility of knowledge of God. This volume is the first to examine all of these topics within the context of Kantâ__s ethical writings.
... They need fair treatment based on their performance and they have a right to claim it either individually or collectively. For Kant, any moral code even if it is only an assertoric hypothetical imperative which is a counsel of skill and the process of attaining our end though not perfect moral end, needs reason as its base (Lipscomb & Krueger 2010). Thus reason plays an important role in every decision making though at times conditioned by immature human approach. ...
The Kantian code of ethics is guided by pure practical reason and since reason is consistent and permits no exceptions to favor the lawmaker or its adherent, the moral law is also consistent and inflexible. This nature of the law is very significant for trade as trade norms cannot be flexed to favor a particular nation or company. This paper believes that Kantian cosmopolitanism should be the credo of business and trade. The reason for this assertion is because the ultimate goal of humanity is a prosperous living of all people in a spirit of unity. Humanity is at its best when rising above the barriers of race, caste and creed. And Kant's ethics has always recommended a path for humanity that leads to this cohesion. Ethical commonwealth, cosmopolitanism, League of Nations and Kingdom of ends have in themselves this one-point agenda to envisage a humanitarian society that takes pride in peaceable solidarity of human existence.
This article utilizes the Zhuangzi’s critical approach to language to expand contemporary discourse on the philosophy of fanaticism beyond the conceptual categories derived from European Enlightenment-era critiques of religious and political fanaticism. Recognizing some of the problematic tendencies that stem from the method of comparison itself, an articulation of a post-comparative paradigm is proposed, which emphasizes approaches from non-Western sources that are not predicated upon the comparison of similarities or differences with Western sources. The main body of this article explicates the Zhuangzi’s critiques of a linguistically and discursively conditioned fanaticism. These critiques focus on the following: (1) the interdependence of binary linguistic terms that constitute shifei discourse; (2) semiotic chains of cascading distinctions that confound attempts to ground shifei judgements; and (3) the relationship between unhealthy forms of language, thought, and anxieties and a discursively conditioned fanaticism. This article concludes with a brief reflection on how the Zhuangzi’s critiques of a linguistically and discursively conditioned fanaticism might open discourse on the philosophy of fanaticism in more ways than by merely adding a token Chinese voice.
Este ensaio objetiva discutir sobre as relações sistemáticas possíveis entre o sensível e o suprassensível a partir da Crítica da faculdade de julgar, obra publicada em 1790, passando também pelo breve ensaio O que quer dizer: orientar-se no pensamento, de 1786. A terceira Crítica pretende legitimar um princípio a priori de finalidade para a faculdade de julgar. No entanto, a investigação encontra diversas dificuldades, o que faz com que Kant chegue a pressuposições. Como a faculdade de julgar tem importância sistemática, moral, estética e teleológica, Kant se depara com as pressuposições nas quais se assentou o seu projeto crítico transcendental, chegando a uma investigação sobre o estatuto da pressuposição e os limites de acesso ao suprassensível.
This article discusses the challenges of European Islam at the intersection of Islamic traditions and modern liberal democratic values and the urgency of bridging the two. European Islam is looking for a common ground that can combine reason and faith in harmony, integrate the values of modernity with the spiritual view of Islam, and identify the challenges and opportunities faced by European Islam in the context of Western liberal society. Bidar, in his contribution to the concept of European Islam, argues that religion is not only about rituals but also about profound spiritual experiences. He proposed the concept of Self Islam, which emphasizes individual freedom, personal responsibility, and spiritual connection with Allah. According to Bidar, individual freedom is the key to spiritual life. In addition, everyone can choose how to practice religion according to his spiritual needs. Bidar proposed Islamic reform, oriented towards the unification of religions and modernity, by prioritizing humanist values and human rights and reforming Islam in the light of modernity. According to him, humans become God's autonomous vicegerent on earth and have the right to manage it freely but responsibly. In addition, in harmony with Kantian, Bidar believes that human immortality can be achieved through piety and good deeds. According to him, humans become God's autonomous vicegerent on earth and have the right to manage it freely but responsibly. In addition, in harmony with Kantian, Bidar believes that human immortality can be achieved through piety and good deeds. According to him, humans become God's autonomous vicegerent on earth and have the right to manage it freely but responsibly. In addition, in harmony with Kantian, Bidar believes that human immortality can be achieved through piety and good deeds.
Black Mirror is not only among the most popular but also the most debated science fiction productions. The series, which premiered on the British Channel 4 channel in 2011 and later gained popularity worldwide after being acquired by Netflix, thoroughly explores various themes such as technology, crime and punishment, consumption, ethics, and freedom. Amongst these themes, morality has a central position as morality and moral concerns form the major point of criticism in the production. This article analyzes technologies depicted in Black Mirror from a posthuman scope and their moral aspects from the perspective of Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy. In this context, the article refers to Kant’s categorical imperative. In addition, the notion of immortality depicted in the series is explored from the viewpoint of influential philosophers such as Descartes and Hegel and addressed comparatively with the visions of immortality depicted in the series. To that end, the article specifically concentrates on the most striking episodes of the series namely, “San Junipero”, “White Christmas” and “Black Museum”. These episodes demonstrate various different utopian and dystopian visions of the future combined with posthuman technologies. Thus, besides their technological and economic facets, the study exposes their moral aspects and puts forward particular findings derived from these results, hence revealing the moral implications behind posthuman visions within a postmodern context.
This essay tackles head on the argument that sees an inherent paradox in the autonomy of the will as the ground for the authority of the fundamental practical norms. It points out that only on reductive understandings of the autonomy of the will can this idea be qualified as paradoxical, thereby yielding outcomes that either contradict their premises or present autonomy under a false guise. With that done, it will proceed to offer a conception of the autonomy of the will which is not vulnerable to the paradox, and which may therefore be equipped to rest the fundamental practical norms on solid ground. Throughout this discussion, I will rely on constitutivism about practical reasons to specifically defend the twofold conclusion that (a) the paradox of autonomy can be avoided and that, relatedly, (b) if autonomy is properly conceptualised, it is fully equipped and well positioned to ground the authority of the fundamental practical norms.
The concept of autonomy is one of Kant's central legacies for contemporary moral thought. We often invoke autonomy as both a moral ideal and a human right, especially a right to determine oneself independently of foreign determinants; indeed, to violate a person's autonomy is considered to be a serious moral offence. Yet while contemporary philosophy claims Kant as the originator of its notion of autonomy, Kant's own conception of the term seems to differ in important respects from our present-day interpretation. Kant on Moral Autonomy brings together a distinguished group of scholars who explore the following questions: what is Kant's conception of autonomy? What is its history and its influence on contemporary conceptions? And what is its moral significance? Their essays will be of interest both to scholars and students working on Kantian moral philosophy and to anyone interested in the subject of autonomy.
The concept of autonomy is one of Kant's central legacies for contemporary moral thought. We often invoke autonomy as both a moral ideal and a human right, especially a right to determine oneself independently of foreign determinants; indeed, to violate a person's autonomy is considered to be a serious moral offence. Yet while contemporary philosophy claims Kant as the originator of its notion of autonomy, Kant's own conception of the term seems to differ in important respects from our present-day interpretation. Kant on Moral Autonomy brings together a distinguished group of scholars who explore the following questions: what is Kant's conception of autonomy? What is its history and its influence on contemporary conceptions? And what is its moral significance? Their essays will be of interest both to scholars and students working on Kantian moral philosophy and to anyone interested in the subject of autonomy.
The concept of autonomy is one of Kant's central legacies for contemporary moral thought. We often invoke autonomy as both a moral ideal and a human right, especially a right to determine oneself independently of foreign determinants; indeed, to violate a person's autonomy is considered to be a serious moral offence. Yet while contemporary philosophy claims Kant as the originator of its notion of autonomy, Kant's own conception of the term seems to differ in important respects from our present-day interpretation. Kant on Moral Autonomy brings together a distinguished group of scholars who explore the following questions: what is Kant's conception of autonomy? What is its history and its influence on contemporary conceptions? And what is its moral significance? Their essays will be of interest both to scholars and students working on Kantian moral philosophy and to anyone interested in the subject of autonomy.
The concept of autonomy is one of Kant's central legacies for contemporary moral thought. We often invoke autonomy as both a moral ideal and a human right, especially a right to determine oneself independently of foreign determinants; indeed, to violate a person's autonomy is considered to be a serious moral offence. Yet while contemporary philosophy claims Kant as the originator of its notion of autonomy, Kant's own conception of the term seems to differ in important respects from our present-day interpretation. Kant on Moral Autonomy brings together a distinguished group of scholars who explore the following questions: what is Kant's conception of autonomy? What is its history and its influence on contemporary conceptions? And what is its moral significance? Their essays will be of interest both to scholars and students working on Kantian moral philosophy and to anyone interested in the subject of autonomy.
The concept of autonomy is one of Kant's central legacies for contemporary moral thought. We often invoke autonomy as both a moral ideal and a human right, especially a right to determine oneself independently of foreign determinants; indeed, to violate a person's autonomy is considered to be a serious moral offence. Yet while contemporary philosophy claims Kant as the originator of its notion of autonomy, Kant's own conception of the term seems to differ in important respects from our present-day interpretation. Kant on Moral Autonomy brings together a distinguished group of scholars who explore the following questions: what is Kant's conception of autonomy? What is its history and its influence on contemporary conceptions? And what is its moral significance? Their essays will be of interest both to scholars and students working on Kantian moral philosophy and to anyone interested in the subject of autonomy.
The concept of autonomy is one of Kant's central legacies for contemporary moral thought. We often invoke autonomy as both a moral ideal and a human right, especially a right to determine oneself independently of foreign determinants; indeed, to violate a person's autonomy is considered to be a serious moral offence. Yet while contemporary philosophy claims Kant as the originator of its notion of autonomy, Kant's own conception of the term seems to differ in important respects from our present-day interpretation. Kant on Moral Autonomy brings together a distinguished group of scholars who explore the following questions: what is Kant's conception of autonomy? What is its history and its influence on contemporary conceptions? And what is its moral significance? Their essays will be of interest both to scholars and students working on Kantian moral philosophy and to anyone interested in the subject of autonomy.
The concept of autonomy is one of Kant's central legacies for contemporary moral thought. We often invoke autonomy as both a moral ideal and a human right, especially a right to determine oneself independently of foreign determinants; indeed, to violate a person's autonomy is considered to be a serious moral offence. Yet while contemporary philosophy claims Kant as the originator of its notion of autonomy, Kant's own conception of the term seems to differ in important respects from our present-day interpretation. Kant on Moral Autonomy brings together a distinguished group of scholars who explore the following questions: what is Kant's conception of autonomy? What is its history and its influence on contemporary conceptions? And what is its moral significance? Their essays will be of interest both to scholars and students working on Kantian moral philosophy and to anyone interested in the subject of autonomy.
The concept of autonomy is one of Kant's central legacies for contemporary moral thought. We often invoke autonomy as both a moral ideal and a human right, especially a right to determine oneself independently of foreign determinants; indeed, to violate a person's autonomy is considered to be a serious moral offence. Yet while contemporary philosophy claims Kant as the originator of its notion of autonomy, Kant's own conception of the term seems to differ in important respects from our present-day interpretation. Kant on Moral Autonomy brings together a distinguished group of scholars who explore the following questions: what is Kant's conception of autonomy? What is its history and its influence on contemporary conceptions? And what is its moral significance? Their essays will be of interest both to scholars and students working on Kantian moral philosophy and to anyone interested in the subject of autonomy.
The concept of autonomy is one of Kant's central legacies for contemporary moral thought. We often invoke autonomy as both a moral ideal and a human right, especially a right to determine oneself independently of foreign determinants; indeed, to violate a person's autonomy is considered to be a serious moral offence. Yet while contemporary philosophy claims Kant as the originator of its notion of autonomy, Kant's own conception of the term seems to differ in important respects from our present-day interpretation. Kant on Moral Autonomy brings together a distinguished group of scholars who explore the following questions: what is Kant's conception of autonomy? What is its history and its influence on contemporary conceptions? And what is its moral significance? Their essays will be of interest both to scholars and students working on Kantian moral philosophy and to anyone interested in the subject of autonomy.
The concept of autonomy is one of Kant's central legacies for contemporary moral thought. We often invoke autonomy as both a moral ideal and a human right, especially a right to determine oneself independently of foreign determinants; indeed, to violate a person's autonomy is considered to be a serious moral offence. Yet while contemporary philosophy claims Kant as the originator of its notion of autonomy, Kant's own conception of the term seems to differ in important respects from our present-day interpretation. Kant on Moral Autonomy brings together a distinguished group of scholars who explore the following questions: what is Kant's conception of autonomy? What is its history and its influence on contemporary conceptions? And what is its moral significance? Their essays will be of interest both to scholars and students working on Kantian moral philosophy and to anyone interested in the subject of autonomy.
The concept of autonomy is one of Kant's central legacies for contemporary moral thought. We often invoke autonomy as both a moral ideal and a human right, especially a right to determine oneself independently of foreign determinants; indeed, to violate a person's autonomy is considered to be a serious moral offence. Yet while contemporary philosophy claims Kant as the originator of its notion of autonomy, Kant's own conception of the term seems to differ in important respects from our present-day interpretation. Kant on Moral Autonomy brings together a distinguished group of scholars who explore the following questions: what is Kant's conception of autonomy? What is its history and its influence on contemporary conceptions? And what is its moral significance? Their essays will be of interest both to scholars and students working on Kantian moral philosophy and to anyone interested in the subject of autonomy.
The concept of autonomy is one of Kant's central legacies for contemporary moral thought. We often invoke autonomy as both a moral ideal and a human right, especially a right to determine oneself independently of foreign determinants; indeed, to violate a person's autonomy is considered to be a serious moral offence. Yet while contemporary philosophy claims Kant as the originator of its notion of autonomy, Kant's own conception of the term seems to differ in important respects from our present-day interpretation. Kant on Moral Autonomy brings together a distinguished group of scholars who explore the following questions: what is Kant's conception of autonomy? What is its history and its influence on contemporary conceptions? And what is its moral significance? Their essays will be of interest both to scholars and students working on Kantian moral philosophy and to anyone interested in the subject of autonomy.
The concept of autonomy is one of Kant's central legacies for contemporary moral thought. We often invoke autonomy as both a moral ideal and a human right, especially a right to determine oneself independently of foreign determinants; indeed, to violate a person's autonomy is considered to be a serious moral offence. Yet while contemporary philosophy claims Kant as the originator of its notion of autonomy, Kant's own conception of the term seems to differ in important respects from our present-day interpretation. Kant on Moral Autonomy brings together a distinguished group of scholars who explore the following questions: what is Kant's conception of autonomy? What is its history and its influence on contemporary conceptions? And what is its moral significance? Their essays will be of interest both to scholars and students working on Kantian moral philosophy and to anyone interested in the subject of autonomy.
The concept of autonomy is one of Kant's central legacies for contemporary moral thought. We often invoke autonomy as both a moral ideal and a human right, especially a right to determine oneself independently of foreign determinants; indeed, to violate a person's autonomy is considered to be a serious moral offence. Yet while contemporary philosophy claims Kant as the originator of its notion of autonomy, Kant's own conception of the term seems to differ in important respects from our present-day interpretation. Kant on Moral Autonomy brings together a distinguished group of scholars who explore the following questions: what is Kant's conception of autonomy? What is its history and its influence on contemporary conceptions? And what is its moral significance? Their essays will be of interest both to scholars and students working on Kantian moral philosophy and to anyone interested in the subject of autonomy.
The concept of autonomy is one of Kant's central legacies for contemporary moral thought. We often invoke autonomy as both a moral ideal and a human right, especially a right to determine oneself independently of foreign determinants; indeed, to violate a person's autonomy is considered to be a serious moral offence. Yet while contemporary philosophy claims Kant as the originator of its notion of autonomy, Kant's own conception of the term seems to differ in important respects from our present-day interpretation. Kant on Moral Autonomy brings together a distinguished group of scholars who explore the following questions: what is Kant's conception of autonomy? What is its history and its influence on contemporary conceptions? And what is its moral significance? Their essays will be of interest both to scholars and students working on Kantian moral philosophy and to anyone interested in the subject of autonomy.
Many thinkers discuss ethics as something inherent in life, one of which is Immanuel Kant. Kant, who is known as a transcendent-rationalist philosophy and founder of criticism, stated the importance of ethical obligations based on the reason for humans. Through his criticism of pure reason (pure reason) and practical reason (practical reason) led to a concept of the highest ethics of happiness, where happiness now can not be achieved without ethics purely based on duty. This is also in line with the teachings of Islam that with a commendable character lead humans to the highest happiness, namely the encounter with God. Islam teaches morals that are based on reason in addition to the main foundation of the Koran and hadith. Then the obligation to do good basically can be recognized by reason without any encouragement from various directions. This article will discuss and show the relevance of ethical obligations and Islamic ethics which are consistent and need not be contested. This research is based on library research using descriptive-analytical and holistic methods. In the end, Western ethical thinking is compatible with Islamic ethics.
Artikkeli käy lyhyesti läpi Quentin Meillassoux’n Äärellisyyden jälkeen -teoksessa esittelemiä spekulatiivisen materialismin lähtökohtia: ajatuksen Kantin jälkeistä filosofiasta hallinneesta korrelationismista ja sen ”heikosta” ja ”vahvasta” muodosta sekä Meillassoux’n perusargumentin, jolla hän pyrkii osoittamaan vahvan korrelationismin pyrkimyksen absoluuttisista viitepiisteistä luopumiseen sisäisesti ristiriitaiseksi. Tarkastelun pääpaino on kuitenkin Meillassoux’n väitteessä, että ajattelun riisuminen kaikista absoluuttisista näkökohdista johtaa vahvan korrelationismin omaksumaan ”fideistisen”, uskon ja järjen erillisyyttä ja keskinäistä riippumattomuutta korostavan suhtautumisen uskonnolliseen uskoon. Tällainen fideismi voi Meillassoux’n mukaan suojella tai jopa palvella ”nykypäivän fanatismia”. Artikkeli esittää joukon kriittisiä huomioita Meillassoux’n fideismin ja uskon, uskonnollisten absoluuttien sekä fanatismin käsitteistä. Hänen klassiseen valistusmoderniin nojaava fideismikritiikkinsä osoittautuu toistaiseksi puutteellisesti perustelluksi ja ongelmallisesti muotoilluksi.
In my paper, I shall take seriously Kant’s puzzling statements about the moral feeling of respect, which is, according to him, “a feeling self-wrought by means of a rational concept and therefore specifically different” from all common feelings. I will focus on the systematic position of the moral feeling of respect within the framework of Kant’s transcendental idealism. By considering its volitional structure, I argue for a compatibilist account of the moral feeling of respect, according to which both intellectualist and affectivist interpretations are true. As such, respect can be understood in terms of a process of moral self-consciousness and self-formation, which means that the will must be freed from initial empirical motives, and finally be determined only by rational principles.
In this paper, I investigate the non-rational, affective dimension of religious experience that Rudolf Otto attempted to address with his notion of the numinous. I argue that this notion is best understood in terms of an atmospheric quality impacting on the subject’s feeling body. Therefore, I draw on discussions in phenomenology and pragmatism, despite the fact that Otto’s own epistemological framework is rooted in a different tradition. Drawing on those discussions helps defend some of Otto’s claims about the relation between the non-rational, affective dimension and reason against the prevalent accusation of unscientific mysticism. I then illustrate the yet unexhausted potential of these very claims by arguing that the numinous in Otto’s sense plays an irreducible role in the ethical reflections of such distinct authors as Kant and Levinas.
One of the arguments for which Kant is best known (or most notorious) is the so-called “moral proof” of the existence of God, freedom, and the immortal soul. Versions of the proof can be found in each of the Critiques, in various lectures, and in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. “Proof” has to be taken loosely here, since the attitude licensed by moral considerations, for Kant, is not knowledge but rather Belief (Glaube). Still, loose talk of “proof” is appropriate insofar as the argument is supposed to motivate not mere Belief or faith but rather “rational Belief (Vernunftglaube)” - i.e. assent that is justified in a non-epistemic way for finite practical agents. Kant is hardly advocating an irrationalist leap into dogmatic or mystical fancy.
After identifying contrasting formulations of the practical postulates of reason in Kant's second critique, I analyse the context of each formulation, showing both how the postulate of the ‘possibility’ of God is consistent with Kant's understanding of a significant transition arising from practical needs as well as how the postulate of the existence of God can be seen as a ‘practical belief’ acting out a ‘hope’. My goal is to re-examine Kant's view of the relation between the practical and theoretical employments of reason in order to distinguish clearly between what Kant sees as required of the moral believer as opposed to permitted.
Kant's speculative theistic proof rests on a distinction between "logical" and "real" modality that he developed very early in the pre-critical period. The only way to explain facts about real possibility, according to Kant, is to appeal to the properties of a unique, necessary, and "most real" being. Here I reconstruct the proof in its historical context, focusing on the role played by the theory of modality both in motivating the argument (in the pre-critical period) and, ultimately, in undoing it as a source of knowledge of God's existence (in the critical period). Along the way I examine Kant's version of the now-popular "actualist" thesis that facts about what is possible must be explained by facts about what is actual. I conclude by discussing why the critical Kant claims both that there are rational grounds for accepting the conclusion of his theistic proof, and that such acceptance can not count as knowledge. This is important, I argue, because the same considerations ultimately motivate his prohibition on knowledge of things-in-themselves generally.
7ZR&RQFHSWLRQVRIWKH+LJKHVW*RRGLQ.DQW $QGUHZV5HDWK Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 26, Number 4, October 1988, pp. 593-619 (Article) 3XEOLVKHGE\-RKQV+RSNLQV8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV DOI: 10.1353/hph.1988.0098 For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v026/26.4reath.html Access provided by University of California @ Riverside (10 Jun 2015 19:40 GMT)
Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.4 (2002) 477-499
To annihilate the subject of morality in one's own person is to root out the existence of morality itself from the world, as far as one can. Immanuel Kant writing on suicide, Metaphysics of Morals, 6:423.
To some Kantians it may seem obvious that Kant was a moral anti-realist since he appears to have admitted his anti-realism repeatedly by invoking transcendental idealism in ethics. But to other Kantians it appears just as obvious that Kant was a moral realist given his claims that we are obligated to morality categorically, that we must believe that God exists to buttress the moral order of the world, and that when we think about the world as it is in itself as a noumenal world, we must employ reason and reason's child, morality. These different claims about Kant's moral theory stem from two sources: disagreements about the proper definition of moral realism and disagreements about Kant's own moral theory. This paper will first briefly survey different claims about Kant's realism or anti-realism and provide a definition of moral realism; then the bulk of the paper will show that the metaphysics in Kant's moral theory, when properly understood, is anti-realist.
There is no firm agreement about whether Kant was a moral realist or moral anti-realist. I will review three positions that exemplify different general approaches to Kant's metaethical theory: John Rawls's anti-realist constructivism, Allen Wood's realist focus on the rational will, and Karl Ameriks's strong moral realist metaphysics.
Rawls takes Kant to offer a constructivist theory in which the categorical imperative is, roughly speaking, understood as a procedure for testing maxims. The result of the procedure will be a set of permissible maxims that form the content of morality; these are said to be constructed because they do not reflect any prior moral order. The categorical imperative procedure itself is not the result of construction but rather "laid out" on the "basis [of] the conception of free and equal persons as reasonable and rational, a conception that is mirrored in the procedure" and "elicited from our moral experience." Thus, practical activity by agents who view themselves with a resulting collective self-conception provides the basis for a procedure that in turn provides the content for morality. On this view Kant is seen as a moral anti-realist because morality is not independent of the practice and self-conception of certain types of beings.
Wood focuses on the nature of the rational will as such, not any particular activities or thoughts of particular beings. He sees Kant as holding that the truth of moral statements stems from reason itself, identical for Kant with the rational will. The basis of the independent truth of moral statements, then, is the nature of reason itself, not the practice or thoughts of particular beings endowed with reason. Reason itself provides the ground for the derivation of particular moral principles. Wood holds that "since Kant holds that moral truth is irreducible either to what people think or to the results of any verification procedures, he is a moral realist in the most agreed-upon sense that term has in contemporary metaphysics and metaethics." Wood allows for the possibility in principle for us to be mistaken regarding moral principles because our judgment might err, individually or collectively, by failing to agree with the idea of the rational will. The real moral principles are not dependent on our actual beliefs about them.
Ameriks takes Kant to insist on a strong metaphysical grounding for morality. He sees Kant as a realist insisting on an independent standard of morality that can be known by human reason yet is not created by it: "In practical philosophy we move beyond appearances, we have absolute truth" of the real standards of morality in a way very similar to a traditional rationalist. Ameriks also cites freedom as a requirement of morality for Kant. Kant insists on "a literal notion of nonempirical agency" that would "give talk of freedom a real reference and point...
The 2,500-year history of Western philosophy has witnessed quite fundamental changes in the way that human conduct and action in general has been evaluated and understood. Ernst Tugendhat has attempted to formulate the basic transformation that has transpired between the via antiqua and the via moderna in the sharpest terms as follows: ‘The question governing ancient ethics was: what is it that I truly desire for myself; that governing modern ethics is: how should I properly act in relation to others., The general turn from a classical ethics essentially concerned with the achievement of happiness towards a modern and specifically deontological ethics is usually traced back to the work of Kant. For it is here that moral philosophy effectively seems to lose its earlier character as a theory of happiness to become what is now pre-eminently a theory of duty and obligation. But in fact this Kantian reorientation of practical philosophy, fundamental as it is, is hardly something that simply fell unprepared from the heavens, but one that actually possesses an interesting and significant prehistory of its own. This prehistory has remained largely unexamined and unclarified as far as previous research is concerned. THEORY OF OBLIGATION. I should like here to make some small contribution to exploring this important lacuna in our knowledge.
Kant's philosophy of ethics and his doctrine of right seem to reveal a double face. On the one hand, he presents a modest and ‘minimalist’, entirely formal, theory of morals that only rules out principles of action (maxims) that cannot be willed or conceived without contradiction as universal principles valid for every rational being. On the other, he offers an extremely ambitious ultimate metaphysical grounding for all moral and juridical duties (and for the only permissible motive of complying with them) in terms of pure reason conceived independently of any specifically human attributes and characteristics. Kant's interpreters, critics, and successors have generally opted for one of these two aspects of his thought, often by assigning a different degree of weight and importance to different texts in the Kantian corpus. Thus the late work The Metaphysics of Morals is often treated as a kind of retreat from the critical self-limitation to a purely formal ethics that characterises the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. And it is sometimes even claimed that the latter text itself is difficult to reconcile with the position articulated in the Critique of Pure Reason. But anyone attempting to elucidate the Preface to the Groundwork can hardly ignore the exceedingly strong metaphysical claim that is clearly presented there.
Although there can be no doubt regarding the centrality of the concept of freedom in Kant's thought, there is considerable disagreement concerning its proper interpretation and evaluation. The evaluative problem stems largely from Kant's insistence that freedom involves a transcendental or non-empirical component, which requires the resources of transcendental idealism in order to be reconciled with the “causality of nature.” There is also, however, a significant interpretive problem posed by the number of different conceptions of freedom to which Kant refers. In addition to “outer freedom” or freedom of action, and a relative, empirically accessible or “psychological” concept of freedom, which admits of degrees, Kant distinguishes between transcendental and practical freedom, both of which seem to involve indeterminism in the sense of an independence from determination by antecedent causes. Moreover, within this sphere he conceives of freedom as both absolute spontaneity (negative freedom), which is a condition of rational agency as such, and as autonomy (positive freedom), which is a condition of the appropriate moral motivation (acting from duty alone). Given this complexity, the present discussion must be highly selective. Specifically, it will focus initially on the nature of and relation between freedom as spontaneity and as autonomy. But since both of these senses of freedom affirm (albeit in different ways) an independence from natural causality, this necessitates a consideration of the relationship between freedom (in both senses) and transcendental idealism. And to situate Kant's views in their historical context, I shall frame the discussion with a brief account of the treatment of free will by some of his predecessors, on the one hand, and his idealistic successors, on the other.
Both in ethics and in epistemology one source of scepticism in its contemporary version is the realization, often belated, of the full consequences of atheism. Modern non-moral philosophy looks back to Descartes as its father figure, but disowns the Third Meditation. But if God does not underwrite one's cognitive powers, what does? The largely unknown evolution of them, which is just a version of Descartes’ unreliable demon? “Let us … grant that all that is here said of God is a fable, nevertheless in whatever way they suppose that I have arived at the state of being that I have reached, whether they attribute it to fate or to accident, or make out that it is by a continual succession of antecedents, or by some other method — since to err and deceive oneself is a defect, it is clear that the greater will be the probability of my being so imperfect as to deceive myself ever, as is the Author to whom they assign my being the less powerful” (Meditation I, Haldane and Ross, tr.).
Michael Friedman criticises some recent accounts of Kant which 'detach' his transcendental principles from the sciences, and do so in order to evade naturalism. I argue that Friedman's rejection of that 'detachment' is ambiguous. In its strong form, which I claim Kant rejects, the principles of Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics are represented as transcendental principles. In its weak form, which I believe Kant accepts, it treats those latter principles as higher order conditions of the possibility of both science and ordinary experience. I argue also that the appeal to naturalism is unhelpful because that doctrine is seriously unclear, and because the accounts Friedman criticises are open to objections independent of any appeal to naturalism.
The paper gives an interpretation of Kant's doctrine of the fact of reason against the background of a constructivist reading of his philosophy, which does not allow us to appeal to any indubitable facts. The fact of reason is the object of a philosophical account of the moral law forms the quid juris part of deduction or legitimization of the law. A more intuitive grasp of the fact is the phenomenon of reverence for duty which ordinary people grasp in form of a feeling and emotion.
Any student who approaches Kant's philosophy of religion for the first time is bound to be daunted by the task. The obstacles are wide, deep, and long. They are wide because Kant thought about virtually every aspect of religion. They are deep because he thought through all these issues with systematic thoroughness and relentless rigor. And they are long because Kant began to think about religious issues as early as the 1760s, and his thinking underwent several transformations through the decades. If these challenges are not enough, Kant's thinking appears in a formidable corpus of writings. His mature religious philosophy is expounded in his three critical works, the Canon of the Critique of Pure Reason, the Dialectic of the Critique of Practical Reason, and the Doctrine of Method of the Critique of the Power of Judgment. The most important mature work, the only one entirely devoted to the philosophy of religion, is his 1793 Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Apart from these systematic works, there are several important essays of the 1780s and 1790s; there are also the lectures on theology, and last but not least the lectures on ethics, which are crucial for their religious themes.
Is the refutation of scepticism a central objective for Kant? Some commentators have denied that the refutation of either theoretical or moral scepticism was central to Kant's concerns. Thus, in his recent book Kant and the Fate of Autonomy, Karl Ameriks rejects 'taking Kant to be basically a respondent to the skeptic'. According to Ameriks, who here has Kant's theoretical philosophy in mind,
What Kant goes on to propose is that, instead of focusing on trying to establish with certainty – against skepticism – that the objects of common sense exist, let alone that they have philosophical dominance, or, in contrast, on explaining that it is only the theoretical discoveries of science that determine what is objective, one can rather work primarily to determine a positive and balanced philosophical relation between the distinct frameworks of our manifest and scientific images.
Kant famously insisted that "the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will" is the supreme principle of morality. Recent interpreters have taken this emphasis on the self-legislation of the moral law as evidence that Kant endorsed a distinctively constructivist conception of morality according to which the moral law is a positive law, created by us. But a closer historical examination suggests otherwise. Kant developed his conception of legislation in the context of his opposition to theological voluntarist accounts of morality and his engagement with conceptions of obligation found in his Wolffian predecessors. In order to defend important claims about the necessity and immediacy of moral obligation, Kant drew and refined a distinction between the legislation and authorship of the moral law in a way that precludes standard theological voluntarist theories and presents an obstacle to recent constructivist interpretations. A correct understanding of Kant's development and use of this distinction reveals that his conception of legislation leaves little room for constructivist moral anti-realism.
When a new epoch opens up in the history of philosophical thought, it often transpires that the very thinkers who first helped to encourage and prepare the way for this development themselves fall into almost immediate oblivion. There are therefore a host of figures who were once considered significant participants in the philosophical debates of the past and proved effective and tenacious opponents of now celebrated philosophers, but who are now only familiar to us from the assessment they have received in the works of the philosophers in question. One purpose of historical research in the philosophical field must be to reveal a proper and fuller picture of the thought of such figures behind the faded image of them, which is generally communicated to us by the great and now-established names of subsequent philosophy. Only then shall we find ourselves in position, with independent judgement of our own, to evaluate the real significance of such figures for the emergence of a genuinely new line of philosophical thought. As far as classical Greek philosophy is concerned, there are particular difficulties facing this task insofar as the only texts now surviving from the time of the original manuscript's creation are those that were judged to be the most significant at the time.
Few people in contemporary democracies have what John Rawls calls "fully comprehensive doctrines" (FCDs). In particular, mainstream religions are not FCDs; further, most people, including educated, reflective ones, do not have FCDs. I argue that if an FCD conflicts with political liberalism, as Rawls explains it in Political Liberalism, then it is the FCD that must yield. What distinguishes fanatics from most religious people in contemporary democracies is the fact that fanatics (purport to) place all value in things of some transcendent realm. Terrorists are fanatics who, ironically, try to impose their values on the world. © 2000 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
Kant famously said that one could not do morality a worse disservice than to derive it from examples, and this pronouncement, taken together with his formulations and explanations of the categorical imperative, has led some critics to regard him as too abstract. Ross, by contrast, has been widely viewed as taking individual cases of duty to have a kind of epistemic priority over principles of duty, and some of his critics have thus considered him insufficiently systematic, or even dogmatically limited to deliverances of intuition. This paper arises from the conviction that understanding of the categorical imperative may be enhanced by reflection on Rossian principles, and conversely. Kant and other systematic philosophers who have done moral philosophy in the grand style have had too little faith in intuitive singular moral judgement; Ross and other intuitionists have had too little faith in comprehensive moral theory. Drawing in part on an independent account of selfevidence and its relation to intuition, the paper shows how a Rossian view can be integrated with a Kantian moral theory in a way that yields the major benets of both positions: the moral unication possible through the categorical imperative and other notions prominent in Kantian ethics, and the relative closeness to moral practice of Rossian principles.
Soulevant la question des origines kantiennes du constructivisme, l'A. s'interroge sur la definition de cette theorie ethique et politique dans le sens d'une interpretation particuliere de la philosophie pratique de Kant, d'une part, et mesure l'hypothese d'une comprehension constructiviste de Kant, d'autre part. Comparant les deux definitions du constructivisme en tant que theorie normative procedurale et en tant que justification pratique des theories normatives, l'A. montre que la doctrine morale et politique de Kant ne peut etre consideree comme constructiviste, malgre son acceptation d'une condition de publicite definie par J. Rawls dans les «Conferences Dewey» de 1980.
The determination of individual moral status is a central factor in the ethical evaluation of controversial practices such as elective abortion, human embryo-destructive research, and the care of the severely disabled and those in persistent vegetative states. A review of recent work on Kant reveals the need for a careful examination of the content of Kant’s biological and psychological theories and their relation to his views about moral status. Such an examination, in conjunction with Kant’s practical-metaphysical analysis of the origins of freedom, reveals Kant’s principled basis for his contention that all human beings possess moral status.
There are two prevailing interpretations of the status which Kant accorded his claims in the Critique of Pure Reason: 1) he is analyzing our concepts of cognition and experience; 2) he is making empirical claims about our cognitive faculties. I argue for a third alternative: on Kant’s account, all cognition consists in a reflective consciousness of our cognitive faculties, and in critique we analyze the content of this consciousness. Since Strawson raises a famous charge of incoherence against such a position, I begin by showing that this charge is misplaced.
Manipulation by another person often undermines freedom. To explain this, a distinction is drawn between two forms of manipulation: indoctrination is defined as causing another person to respond to reasons in a pattern that serves the manipulator's ends; coercion as supplying another person with reasons that, given the pattern in which he responds to reasons, lead him to act in ways that serve the manipulator's ends. It is argued that both forms of manipulation undermine freedom because manipulators track the compliance of their victims, while neutral causal mechanisms do not. Manipulators see to it that their victims comply even in the face of forces that threaten to derail them from the manipulator's desired course. It is suggested that this has an impact on freedom because part of what we desire in wanting to be free is the availability of forms of life very different from those we actually enjoy.
Peer Reviewed http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/45787/1/11153_2004_Article_BF00141353.pdf
The “Apology for Sensibility” that constitutes sections 8–11 of the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) offers a summary justification for one of the most important innovations of Kant's critical philosophy. Without the invention and justification of Sinnlichkeit or “sensibility” the concept of experience informing the Critique of Pure Reason and the critique of traditional metaphysics based upon it would not have been possible and Kant's philosophy would have remained a footnote to the then prevailing Leibniz-Wolff system of philosophy. Indeed, when his contemporary Eberhard claimed that everything in the critical philosophy had already been said by Leibniz and Wolff, Kant defended the originality of his contribution in terms of the “infinite difference between the theory of sensibility, as a particular mode of intuition” and one that regards sensibility as the “imprecise representation of an intellectual intuition.” Yet the doctrine of sensibility is itself internally complex, drawing together diverse lines and styles of arguments ranging across the disciplines of aesthetics, logic, metaphysics, psychology, politics, and ethics. In order to invent an integrated doctrine of sensibility it was necessary for Kant to find a space for reflection free from the limits imposed by these disciplines. Such a space was opened in the lecture course on anthropology that Kant offered for the first time in 1772–3 and which served as the crucible for the integrated doctrine of sensibility central to the critical philosophy.