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Putin's Power Play in Syria How to Respond to Russia's Intervention
... n of international law and under a false pretext." In July 2017, CIA's aid to opposition forces had ended. Another significant event had occurred between Russia and US parties had agreed that Euphrates River would be the de-escalation zone. Russia and her allies have supposed to stay on the west side, the US and her allies in the east (Eilam, 2019;A. Stent, 2016. In 2018, aftermath of another chemical weapons attack who had claimed that initiated by Assad, the US, the UK (United Kingdom) and France had targeted air strikes against Syrian weapons facilities coordination with Russia for ensuring prevent any Russian casualties (Stent, 2020, p.255 Burevestnik and an intercontinental undersea drone, ...
... The response will be instant and will all the relevant consequences." In response to that speech, Donald Trump had initiated to raising Pentagon's budget for nuclear weapons to counter Russia's (Anonymous, 2018, Mar 1; A. Stent, 2016. ...
... But Putin had signaled some positive affirmations about Arab Spring. He had argued that social dynamics resulting in the Arab Spring were both positive and necessary, and the "sympathies of Russians were on the side of those struggling for democratic reforms" (A.Stent, 2016). Despite Putin's soft arguments about Arab Spring, Kremlin had argued that this was no Arab Spring, but an Arab winter. ...
The Middle East region has suffering from certain disputes since the end of the WWI. Issues related with political, economic and military instabilities, in particular, have never been settled since then. Syria is one of the crucial and complex states of the Middle East. In this thesis, by using the qualitative research method, the questions arising from the historical and the current situation of the Syria are tried to be answered. Therefore, why Syria is important for Russia, what are the Russia’s interests in Syria, why Russia and the US are following different pathways over Syria, and why both parties’ rivalry has turned into Cold War 2.0 are the inquiries of the current study.
Since independence from 1946, Syria has been through the deep domestic issues and uneasy international relations. Political rivalries on the domestic matters and historical hostility with Israel have been a great challenge in the Cold War period. Due to multi-ethnic and multi-sect structure of Syria and beginning from the Hafez Assad period, sectarian issues have emerged. Bashar Assad, as successor of his father, has been facing the similar troubles and issues. Rooted historical close ties with Soviet Union and Syria has continued with Soviet Union’s successor, Russian Federation. When Syrian Civil War has emerged, Russia has quickly responded in favor of the Assad Regime. At the same time, failure of US on the Middle East policies, particularly after 9/11, the terrorist activities in the Middle East region have emerged and spread to the rest of the world. Russia’s President Putin’s long-term objectives in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean region have become great rivalry between parties. Russia and US conflicts in becoming a power in Middle East region, the proxies participating in this rivalry and the endless domestic instabilities of Syria brought about a new situation. This situation is indicating a new Cold War and pronounced as “Cold War 2.0” between the parties in dominance.
... Rapporter om, at to russiske fragtfl y var landet i Latakia og havde afl aesset store maengder materiel, herunder telte og praefabrikerede huse til hundredvis af mennesker, blev af det russiske forsvarsministerium forklaret med, at man var i faerd med at opstille en lejr til de mange fl ygtninge i området (BBC News 2015b). Og selvom Moskvas forberedelser i Syrien havde vaeret off entligt kendt siden midten af august 2015, kom nyheden om de russiske luft angreb mod den syriske opposition alligevel til en vis grad som en overraskelse for Vesten, herunder øjensynligt også for Washington (Stent 2015) -lidt i stil med da Rusland annekterede Krimhalvøen i marts 2014. 10 (10) På trods af at operationen i Syrien angiveligt tog ni måneder at forberede (Trenin 2015). ...
... Formålet var åbenbart: Rusland øgede støtten til Assadstyret, da dets overlevelse var staerkt truet (Stent 2015). Men hvad er baggrunden for denne støtte? ...
... Som Putin udtrykte det i sin tale i FN: "Sammenbruddet af Syriens offi cielle myndigheder vil kun mobilisere terroristerne. Lige nu, i stedet for at underminere dem, bør vi genoplive dem, styrke de statslige institutioner i konfl iktzonen" (Stent 2015). ...
... Rapporter om, at to russiske fragtfl y var landet i Latakia og havde afl aesset store maengder materiel, herunder telte og praefabrikerede huse til hundredvis af mennesker, blev af det russiske forsvarsministerium forklaret med, at man var i faerd med at opstille en lejr til de mange fl ygtninge i området (BBC News 2015b). Og selvom Moskvas forberedelser i Syrien havde vaeret off entligt kendt siden midten af august 2015, kom nyheden om de russiske luft angreb mod den syriske opposition alligevel til en vis grad som en overraskelse for Vesten, herunder øjensynligt også for Washington (Stent 2015) -lidt i stil med da Rusland annekterede Krimhalvøen i marts 2014. 10 (10) På trods af at operationen i Syrien angiveligt tog ni måneder at forberede (Trenin 2015). ...
... Formålet var åbenbart: Rusland øgede støtten til Assadstyret, da dets overlevelse var staerkt truet (Stent 2015). Men hvad er baggrunden for denne støtte? ...
... Som Putin udtrykte det i sin tale i FN: "Sammenbruddet af Syriens offi cielle myndigheder vil kun mobilisere terroristerne. Lige nu, i stedet for at underminere dem, bør vi genoplive dem, styrke de statslige institutioner i konfl iktzonen" (Stent 2015). ...
... The reasons for Russian intervention in Syria were explained by major arguments. A.Stent revealed that Russia wanted to prevent the situation where a new Syrian president would be set up by the West, as happened in Egypt; the author considered the Syrian conflict as a proxy war between the US and Russia (Stent, 2016). R. Dannreuther studied the Russian response to the Arab Spring and concluded that Russia suffered a political crisis because of the protests in 2011 and 2012, so the support and participation in the Syrian conflict could contribute to increasing the assurance to authorities inside Russia (Dannreuther, 2015). ...
The article presents the results of an analysis of the strategic narratives of the President of Russia and representatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry in substantiating Russian military operations abroad. The analysis is carried out on the example of the military operation in Georgia (2008), special operation in Crimea (2014), Crimea joining Russia, and the military operation in Syria (since 2015). The justification for military operations was mainly carried out by the president and representatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry. The justification for military operations was intended to legitimize the military actions and decisions of the Russian Federation. Officials used strategic, national and issue narratives. The core of the justification was the interpretation of historical memory and the description of the actions of Western countries as contrary to international law. The author shows that the justification for Russia's military operation in Georgia differed from that of the Crimea joining Russia, and the military operation in Syria. In the first case, Russian officials blamed Western countries for illegitimate actions to a lesser extent than in the case of justifying the Crimea joining Russia, and the military operation in Syria. Moreover, after 2017 Russian actors began to use narratives about the humanitarian mission of Russia.
... As the one of the most prominent ongoing intrastate conflicts in the decade, the Syrian civil war is undoubtedly among the most well-documented wars in history. The ongoing conflict has drawn longlasting worldwide attention due to three main factors: the refugee problem arising from the humanitarian crisis [Ostrrand 2015], the intervention from major global powers [Stent 2016], and the widespread access to internet (social media in particular) in the war-torn country [Klausen 2015]. ...
Through this research, we explore the dynamics of coalition formation through agent-based computational modeling with a focus on empirical applications. Inspired by a wide spectrum of theories, we adopt an interdisciplinary approach to the problem. Our solution entails an abstract formal model and an agent-based computational model. In the broader context of competitive games, we view coalition dynamics as an outcome of rational choices made by competitive agents. After building the intended simulation platform, we investigate the impact of various input parameters on the coalition dynamics through computational modeling. Subsequently, we explore some real-world scenarios to evaluate the model’s empirical value. The validation work is done in two parts. First, we derive analytical solutions for some basic interactions in the abstract model. Next, we develop an agent-based counterpart that extends the formal model. By comparing the analytical solutions to simulation results, we verify the proper implementation of the simulation platform. After establishing its structural validity, we examine the model’s practicality, external validity, and extensibility in three empirical case studies.
... Применение Россией ВС в Сирии объяснялось тем, что Россия преследует «великодержавные» интересы (Averre and Davies, 2015). Анализ взаимодействия США и РФ в сирийском конфликте показал, что российская интервенция в Сирию переросла в прокси войну между РФ и США (Stent, 2016). Изучение выгод российской политики в Сирии для внутренней политики РФ продемонстрировало, что участие России в Сирийском конфликте могло поспособствовать укреплению доверия к власти внутри России (Dannreuther, 2015). ...
The trajectory of the Russian foreign policy changed in 2014 as Russia deviated from its foreign policy principles. A specific justification was needed in order to legitimize Russian foreign policy domestically and abroad. Russian officials provided such a justification. It was successful on the domestic level, but its effectiveness on the international level was questionable. This article undertakes an analysis of the justification strategies of Russian foreign policy after 2014, with a focus on those, which were used by Russian authorities in their justification of Crimea joining Russia and Russian actions in the Syrian Arab Republic. It is shown why the justification could be considered as strategic. Applying the instruments of the strategic narratives’ theory, the author reveals the main strategic narratives of Russian foreign policy officials. The article discovers that the main justification strategies were communicative defense, communicative attack, communicative counter-attack, and position declaration. The communicative position of the Russian Federation in the case of Crimean justification could be explained as initially difficult, but gaining a communicative position in the justification of Russian actions in Syria could positively support the justification of the Crimean case.
... Segundo, en marzo de 2014 cuando se anexionó Crimea y comenzó a apoyar a los separatistas prorrusos que luchan contra las fuerzas ucranianas en el este del país. Finalmente, en el masivo despliegue de fuerzas militares rusas a Siria en 2015 (Stent, 2016;Kaim y Tamminga, 2015;Mearsheimer, 2014). ...
... Explanations of Russian intervention have focussed on numerous factors but have nevertheless concentrated on political motives. Various scholarly work foregrounds the instrumentality of Syria in a broader Russian attempt to re-define its role as a global actor and co-equal of the United States, as well as Russia's foreign policy towards Syria in the wider systemic context of global order (Averre and Davies, 2015;Charap, 2013;Pieper, 2019;Stent, 2016;Trenin, 2013Trenin, , 2015Tsygankov, 2015). ...
Interpretations of Russia’s military intervention in Syria overwhelmingly focus on Russia’s political motivations. An alternative view foregrounds Russia’s economic motivations, namely, the construction of a multi-billion-dollar gas pipeline traversing Iran, Iraq and Syria. This article examines the salience of Russia’s economic motivations and considers two related aspects: First, if Russian intervention aims to secure areas of strategic importance for the proposed pipeline. Second, if Russian intervention realises longer term political and commercial interests that include proposed future pipeline projects. The evidence suggests Russian military policies towards Syria are unlikely to be motivated primarily by the prospect of a proposed gas pipeline, but that regime consolidation is a more immediate policy goal. This article then posits that Russian intervention has a distinct ‘dual logic’ aimed at integrating the interests of key regional actors into a transnational energy network, while stabilising Russia’s regional dominance within this network.
... In Syria, the political and statutory incapability of that country's government to mitigate internal conflict and thus maintain the rule of law led to the outbreak of civil war in 2012. Parallel to successive Western interventions in the country by the United States and Russia, regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey continue to seek a lasting solution to the ISIS menace in Syria (Ayata 2015;Stent 2016). It can be argued that terrorism in Syria is equally-if not more-an externally induced phenomenon (Rivera de la Fuente 2015; Gupta 2016). ...
Studies on terrorism have often taken the usual bias towards studying and analyzing phenomena from a male-dominated perspective. The current article looks at jihadi feminism as a growing trend in contemporary terrorism. The paper argues that there is an increase of women from both traditionally Muslim and traditionally non-Muslim regions joining ISIS and taking part in the Syrian war on the side of Islamic extremists. The paper argues that women from Western countries, because of their understanding of feminism, are more combatant in championing religious terrorism than are women who have been brought up in Islamic role, who see their role mainly as that of helper of terrorist activists rather than active participants.
... It is also a far more complex regional security setting because it involves more competing powers than the more simplistic West-Russia divide in Eastern Europe, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, and Israel. Nevertheless, despite this complex web of interests, the US and Russia have still managed to find themselves on opposing sides of the Syrian civil war (Stent, 2016). The US, although for a long time reluctant to intervene, ended up supporting a Sunni coalition led by Saudi Arabia, while Russia has, since 2015, directly supported Assad and has maintained a robust strategic dialogue with Iran (Trenin, 2018). ...
This chapter begins with an examination of the structural factors which underpinned the development of the Cold War in the first 15 years. It is argued that the emerging bipolar structure (and accompanying bipolarization) was an important precursor to the development of the Cold War because it pitted the US and the Soviet Union against one another—by forcing them to face one another. Importantly, key differences emerge when the Cold War is compared with the structure underlying the current US-Russia relationship. The current state of the relationship is that the US represents the (fading) unipole while Russia is in decline, much different from the superpower competition of the Cold War. Furthermore, where the two sides mainly conflict is geographically confined to Eastern Europe and the Middle East, far different from the truly global struggle of the Cold War.
... In taking this position, Russian President Vladimir Putin has maintained that external forces, namely Western nations, should not infringe on the territorial sovereignty of authoritarian states (Allison, 2013). Political observers have also pointed out that one of the main underlying reasons for Russia's support of the al-Assad government is Russia's concerns that if the Islamist groups in Syria are successful in ousting al-Assad, they might turn their attention to assisting insurgents in Russia's North Caucasus (Allison, 2013;Stent, 2016). ...
This study analyzed news stories published on the online sites of CNN, Al-Jazeera English, and Sputnik to investigate how the transnational news outlets framed the human suffering associated with the Syrian war. Unlike prior studies that have tended to be based on traditional nation-state paradigms, this research approached the analysis from a cosmopolitan perspective. The findings revealed that in concert with standard journalistic routines and news values, all three news outlets commonly employed a mass death and displacement frame to depict human suffering inside Syria. The adoption of this frame suggests that in telling the story of human suffering, the three media outlets focused on brief facts and shocking statistics without detailed depictions of the human suffering. The meager presence of a cosmopolitan outlook in the news coverage indicates that although transnational media target a global audience with English as Lingua Franca, they cannot be completely independent of geopolitics.
... To protect its sole Mediterranean military base at Tartus on the Syrian coast and upgrade its role across the region, Moscow has supported the al-Assad government by vetoing UN Security Council resolutions, deploying troops and conducting airstrikes. This has not only offered a shop-window to showcase Russian military capabilities and put Moscow on a par with Washington, but also tipped the power balance in favour of President al-Assad and ensured the survival of the regime (Stent 2016). As an indispensable player now in the Syrian conflict, Russia holds great sway on the peace negotiations and post-war reconstruction. ...
In view of the resources invested by China in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the geopolitical-security dynamics at play, it is helpful to examine the notable security risks and uncertainties of the project. Embedded in this broad context, the paper at hand zooms in on one of the world’s most volatile regions—the Middle East, situated strategically at the juncture of the overland and seaborne routes. Substantively, it focuses on the security dynamics in the region and China’s current engagement therein, with a view to assessing whether and the extent to which China will boost its strategic presence in the BRI context. Some conclusions can be drawn from the research. First, the Middle East faces a multiplicity of security risks and challenges, compounded by a problematic existing security architecture based on inadequate cooperation among regional actors and questionable ad hoc interventions by major outside powers. Second, China’s current relations in Middle Eastern countries have been overwhelmingly economic and driven by energy. Its political-security presence, albeit growing, remains marginal. Third, given the imperatives for China to play a more substantial role in Middle Eastern security (not least the need to ensure the BRI’s security) and the risks/costs of doing so, it would make sense that China seeks to step up its game in areas that are conductive to stabilising the region and yet do not entail intensively investing strategic resources and publicly taking sides (e.g. infrastructure and conflict mediation). This offers reasonable prospect of further EU-China cooperation.
... A number of analysts see the resolution of the Fourth World War (assuming that the Third World War was a Cold War), and the behavior of the Kremlin leader is often compared to the actions of Hitler in late 30's. You can accept such estimation of international situation, because the world conflict actually started before the Crimean events, and incorporation of Ukrainian territory only reaffirmed the intention of Russia "to move" west borders by force [Stent, 2016]. ...
The article gives a detailed analysis of the confrontation between the leading centers of global influence – the EU, the US and Russia, which led to the aggravation of the situation in two countries at once. It was found that both Ukraine and Syria face the risk of becoming a major geopolitical struggle springboard between Russia and the West. Russia’s military presence in Syria in particular is to build military bases in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, by supporting the regime in Damascus. Expanding the strategic impact of Russia is also in supervising oil and gas market and transit of energy resources to the EU. Continuation of military intervention in Syria and Ukraine had a profound impact on the security situation in the former Soviet Union and the Middle East. This reality makes all members of the settlement of these conflicts reconsider their foreign policy strategy and future plans regarding Ukraine and Syria. EU and US support only peaceful diplomatic solution to the crisis in eastern Ukraine through the allocation opposing sides of the contact line and holding democratic elections. Meanwhile, Syria’s main task for the West is fighting against ISIS and removing the current authoritarian regime from power. Russia does not show much interest in resolving these regional crises and intends to maintain instability in Eurasia and the Middle East.
... The debate is further influenced by the war in Syria, where Russia is described as establishing itself as 'a player' in the Syrian crisis or as a 'key regional player' (Kozhanov, 2015) in the wider Middle East. A move from Putin that once again has caught Washington 'off-guard' and essentially forces the USA and the West 'to get real' about Russia and forego any plans of another 'reset' (Stent, 2016). Another general argument in the debate has been to highlight a supposed trend towards a narrowing of the circle of people around Putin to mere yes-men, ridding him of critical advice (Galeotti & Judah, 2014;Judah, 2014). ...
Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding international relations (IR) discourses – or foreign policy directions. On the one hand, there is an IR-realism/geopolitical discourse that puts security first and often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with ‘exploring’, ‘winning’ or ‘conquering’ the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind Russia's national interests in the area. Opposed to this is an IR-liberalism, international law-inspired and modernisation-focused discourse, which puts cooperation first and emphasises ‘respect for international law’, ‘negotiation’ and ‘cooperation’, and labels the Arctic as a ‘territory of dialogue’, arguing that the Arctic states all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully. After a short but very visible media stunt in 2007 and subsequent public debate by proponents of the IR-realism/geopolitical side, the IR-liberalism discourse has been dominating Russian policy in the Arctic since around 2008–2009, following a pragmatic decision by the Kremlin to let the Foreign Ministry and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov take the lead in the Arctic. The question asked here is how solid is this IR-liberalist-dominated Arctic policy? Can it withstand the pressure from more patriotic minded parts of the Russian establishment?
... Russia's involvement is therefore aimed at entrenching its influence in the region as well as a show of military power. This military power has been displayed by Russia's success rate in obliterating ISIL bases and positions regardless of the short-time it has been directly involved in the conflict (Roth, 2016;Stent, 2016). This has prompted the USA to have diplomatic agreements with Russia that they have a common enemy in this war and hence they should increase joint efforts to eliminate ISIL. ...
The Syrian war has raged on for more than 4 years now and the global citizenry had decided to keep quiet until recently(Grover, 2015). This paper sets out to explain the Syrian crisis and analyse it in relation to how it affects the global citizenry. It will also lay down the events that have fuelled the crisis, explain some underlying issues and discuss the best possible solutions to address it. When Syrian Arab Spring-type protest erupted experts wrongly predicted that they will frizzle out. What initially started off as protests later became a civil war. The crisis had all the features of a Cold War before the direct involvement of the super powers. The causes of the Syrian crisis are as complex as the different players in it. These key issues go beyond the events of March 2011, which triggered the first shots in Daraa. If this crisis continues uncontrolled it could escalate into World War III. Its end is pinned on the political will and commitment to implement the Vienna Statement of October 30, which incorporates by reference the 2012 Geneva Communique. The lack thereof was witnessed during the short-lived ceasefire of September 2016.
... Nevertheless, Assad has allies in other powers, such as China and mainly Russia, which began conducting air strikes to combat terrorist groups at the end of 2015 on Assad's request. Although Putin sees Daesh as a major threat, Russia has bombed Syrian opposition groups that the U.S. has supported and thus the conflict has transformed into a proxy U.S.-Russian conflict (Stent 2016). Unfortunately, what was at the beginning spontaneous action has increasingly become a theatre for regional and international power struggles and the human element has been squeezed out. ...
The protest movements in the Arab world have taken different trajectories and have resulted in different political outcomes. And so we ask: What is so specific about Syria? Why does the violence continue? What has been done and what has not been done to end it? And mainly: what should be done?
... Must this intervention be attributed to Putin's desire to aid his only Arab ally no matter the cost? 5 Or has Putin decided to step in the conflict only to distract NATO and the USA from his actions in Ukraine? 6 Or does Putin just want to show that Russia can still play in the "first league" of the world powers? 7 Should this intervention be ascribed to Putin's aversion for "colour revolutions" and popular uprisings? ...
The Russian military intervention in Syria since September 2015 has sparked spirited debates in Western policy-making and intellectual circles about the genuine motives behind the Kremlin's unexpected decision. Various monocausal explanations have been propounded which, however, do not interpret this intervention in either an objective or systematic way. This article aspires to examine the Russian military intervention in Syria in an unbiased, innovative and thorough way by adding the crucial geopolitical dimension. This article will show that, without discounting the other incentives (e.g. support for the only Arab ally), this operation intends primarily to restore Russia's status as a world power in the 21 st century.
This research discusses the national security strategy of the United States of America and the Russian Federation according to international changes between 2000 and 2020. The study proposed a shift in the national security strategies from the strongest nation concept to the global cooperation and collaboration principles. This modification was due to the change in the structure and values of the international system, Therefore, this study uses the Principles of New Realism, Using the international system approach to clarify the nature of the new entries in it. This study concluded that the United States and Russia still depend the realistic on the superior nation principle when making national security decisions. despite the claim of nations’supremacy of liberal values based on international cooperation and integration, which appeared in their international behavior.
The humanitarian crisis in Syria has fuelled the Circassian issue in Russia. Escaping from the war, hundreds of Syrian Circassians (Adyghe) chose Russia as their destination because their ancestors came to the Middle East from the North Caucasus. Syrian Circassians have faced difficulties in entering Russia and staying there regardless of the state’s ability to accept a large number of immigrants. In the case of receiving Syrian Adyghe, Russian authorities were suspicious about: (1) growing Circassian activism before the Olympics in Sochi; (2) ISIS infiltration; and (3) ethnic tensions in the Southern regions. Nevertheless, many Syrian Circassians settled in Russia due to the support extended by local Adyghe. Our findings are based on interviews and public polls conducted in Karachay-Cherkessia in 2017 and Adygea in 2018.
This chapter examines the resort to humanitarian intervention in the unfolding post-hegemonic, multipolar and regionalized world order with Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, Syria and Mali as the main cases. It argues that humanitarian crisis management at the United Nations Security Council is shaped by the underlying fundamental institution of great power management and the associated practices of concert, soft balancing and hard balancing, which are back as real options after the end of US hegemony. Furthermore, there is strong evidence that great power agreement on humanitarian intervention and the legitimacy of such steps depends on the initiatives and involvement of regional organizations. In the African context, the regional organizations typically seek to align humanitarian principles with concerns for state building. This indicates that humanitarian intervention has become post-hegemonic, rather than obsolete.
This book argues a position contrary to much of the conventional wisdom regarding the current complexion of power relationships. It is that, despite power shifts, the emergence of multi-polarity and America’s determination to balance China, anarchy will not prevail, disorder will not be unleashed and world order will survive. But it also argues, as against the more recent liberal mantras, that it will not be the same world order that we have been enjoying for the last thirty years. It is about power transition and how to understand both the processes involved in power transitioning and how to calibrate the results.
2015 년 러시아가 시리아 위기에 관여한 이후부터 외교정책 연구분야 전문가들은 러시아의 이와 같은 행동의 논리와 동기를 이해하기 위하여 많은 노력을 기울이고 있다. 여기서 가장 핵심적인 연구주제는 다음의 질문들이었다. 우크라이나 위기에 관여한 이후 엄청난 대가를 지불했음에도 불구하고 왜 러시아는 본연의 정책노선을 변경하지 않았는가? 또한 왜 러시아는 오히려 우크라이나 위기에 상응하는 수준의 위험을 감수하면서까지 시리아 위기에서
군사작전을 감행하기로 결정했는가? 상술한 문제들에 관해 설득력 있는 해답을 찾기 위하여 논문의 저자들은 대국정체성이론 에 기반한 해석방법을 제시하고자 한다 결론적으로 말하면 러시아가 인식하고 있는 스스로의 대국정체성과 대국지위야말로 러시아가 극단적 대외정책을 선택하게 되는 가장 근본적인 원인이었다.
This article explores and compares the visual images used by Channel One (Ch1), Russia’s biggest state-aligned television broadcaster, to justify Russia’s intervention in two major geopolitical conflicts in recent history: the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine and Syria’s civil war. The data reveal that while Ch1’s projection of Ukrainian conflict is anchored in compassion to the Eastern Ukraine population speaking the Russian language, the Syrian war is framed to fuel the feeling of national pride by focusing on the Russian greatness as a political and military superpower. This research, thus, extends the theoretical understanding of media representation of war, especially how the changing political context impacts which identities are represented and made potent through different emotional appeals. The article conceptualises visual images as affective anchors that can be used to reactivate collective memory and dominant discourses and construct emotional relationships between the audience and mediated events.
The Arab Spring was regarded with suspicion by Russian decision-makers, their worst fears were seemingly confirmed with the case of Libya in 2011 when NATO was seen as abusing the UN Security Council R2P mandate for the purpose of regime change. This had a great impact on Russia’s decision to support the Syrian government, when the regime change process began there. By the summer of 2015, the world was predicting the fall of the Syrian government, it was at this point Russia became directly and overtly involved with the fighting. The West tried to project a dire scenario that Russia would become embroiled in an Afghan-scenario, they made many guesses about the ‘true’ nature of Russia’s engagement, but largely failed to comprehend or understand the actual motivation. Despite negative Western projections, Russia has been largely successful in its aims and goals. Russia has consequently emerged as an external actor of significance and influence in the MENA region, which seems to be owed somewhat to taking the decision to become directly involved in Syria as a powerful broker. Keywords: Syrian War, Russia, military intervention, soft power, hard power, powerful broker
The main purpose of this chapter is evaluating the existing situation in the Syrian hydrocarbon sector in the early 2020s; its regional position mostly from the economic and geopolitical points of view, direct and indirect influence of the principal external and regional actors on the sector—Russia, the US, Iran, Iraq and to some extent Turkey—as well as these actors interests, means and issues in the realization of their goals. It pays extra attention to some contradicting trends like increased US activities in supporting SDF’s control over the largest part of Syrian oil potential and securing the financial flows from its exploitation despite the general withdrawal of American military forces from northeastern Syria since October 2019. At the same time, the chapter also underlines new problems emerging from much more active and direct Russian presence in the region which is also connected to its attempts to access oil fields. In early 2020, it inevitably caused direct contact and tensions between American and Russian regular troops in Syria for the first time since the Russian military’s involvement in the Syrian conflict (Tsvetana Paraskova, “US, Russian Forces Face Off Near Syria’s Oilfields”, Oilprice, 27 January 2020, https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/US-Russian-Forces-Face-Off-Near-Syrias-Oilfields.html).
In the Astana process, the world witnessed the emergence of a new alliance between three countries: Russia, Turkey and Iran. This chapter uses theories of alliance formation to explain the impetus for forming an alliance between Russia, Turkey and Iran: three countries having competing interests. The paper starts by examining Russia, Turkey and Iran’s interests in Syria and then the threats they face along the dimensions of aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability and offensive intentions. The paper suggests that the three countries aligned in Syria to balance against what they perceive as the most threatening state: the US. On the other side, the US, Europe and Gulf countries have seen their influence marginalized in Syria. By employing the theories of alliance formation the paper argues that the US, Europe and Gulf countries have failed to form an alliance due to their diverging threats’ perceptions (that is, the Saudi perception of Iran as a threat is not shared by Qatar and Europe’s interest in stability because of refugees’ concerns are not shared by the United States’). The chapter concludes with discussing the implications of the Astana process for the US, Europe and the Gulf states States due to the rise of a new alliance between Russia and Iran and resultant competition of Astana with Geneva talks.
The aim of this chapter is analyzing US–Turkish relations in the light of the Syrian crisis in 2011–2019. It highlights the issues which strain the bilateral relationship and also highlights the divergent and convergent points in US–Turkey relations. It also analyzes Turkey’s policy in Syria, and the threats and opportunities it represents. The chapter also dissects the American policy in Syria in Obama’s as well as Trump’s era, its objectives and the motives behind them. It analyzes how the Syrian crisis has affected the relations between Washington and Ankara. The Syrian crisis represented a complication in the relation. For the Turks, American reliance on the Kurds represented a threat. An empowerment of the Kurds in neighbouring Syria could signal a threat domestically. This element created tensions between the two NATO allies that ended in the US withdrawal from Northern Syria and in the Turkish incursion. This chapter analyzes all these factors as well as the way forward in the relations.
The economic tools of Russian security strategy include market access including labour market, subsidies, loans and credits . WEell-tailored economic policies to every partucular actor might be enough to aschieve expected outcome as in politics what matters is first and foremost the relative power of states
Bu çalışma, küresel ve bölgesel şartların değişimiyle oluşan yeni bağlamın güçlü oyuncularından birisi olan Rusya Federasyonu’nun Putin dönemi ulusal güvenlik stratejilerini inceleyerek Rusya’nın Suriye krizine dahil olmasını ele alacaktır. Bu doğrultuda, özellikle Rusya Devlet Başkanı Vladimir Putin döneminde oluşturulan 2000, 2009 ve 2015 güvenlik strateji belgelerini siyasi, askeri, enerji ve ekonomi odağıyla inceleyecektir. Rusya’nın kısa ve uzun vadede belirlediği hedefler, bu hedefleri gerçekleştirmeye yönelik kullanılan araçlar üzerinden bölgesel ve küresel konjonktürel gelişmelerin ışığında bir sentez oluşturulacaktır. Ayrıca, Rusya Federasyonu’nun ulusal güvenlik belgesinde belirlediği tehditler de ele alınarak, RF’nin Suriye’ye girmesinin nedenleri, Putin dönemi hazırlanan ulusal güvenlik strateji belgeleri ekseninde değerlendirilecektir. Genel olarak, RF’nin Suriye krizine dahil olmasının oluşturulan güvenlik strateji belgeleriyle bağlantılı olup olmadığı ve yıllar içinde belgelerde olan dönüşümde Suriye’nin konumuna odaklanılacaktır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi, Rus Ulusal Güvenlik Strateji Belgesi, Rusya’nın Suriye Politikası, Stratejik Düşünce, Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika, Stratejik Modelleme, Suriye Müdahalesi, Putin’in Stratejisi
Populism defines numerous political movements with heterogeneous ideological platforms within the EU, but they share the self-definition as being the true representative of the ‘the people’ versus the national and EU ‘elite’. European populist parties have consolidated as an element of the political landscape in Europe, however, the positions of populist parties towards EU foreign policy remain understudied. This chapter asks how European populist parties contest EU foreign policy in the European Parliament. It argues that the populist approach to EU foreign policy in the European Parliament defies the organising principle of consensus and seeks to normalise the contestation above any substantive considerations. To illustrate this argument, this chapter analyses the practices of contestation of far-left (European United Left–Nordic Green Left/GUE-NGL) and far-right (Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy/EFDD) populist parties during the plenary debates and in motions for resolution on the Ukrainian and Syrian crises. Even though both the left-wing and right-wing populist parties continuously oppose the mainstream approach taken by other EU institutions and dominant EP political groups, they promote very heterogeneous alternative approaches. Therefore, the influence of populist parties on the European Parliament role in the EU foreign policy has been limited so far.
This research project examines the following central question: what does Syrian identity mean in the eyes of contending groups in the current Syrian crisis (2011-2017)? In answering this question, the project engages in original research, shedding light on the ‘identity’ dimension of the war in Syria. It challenges primordialist and/or Orientalist approaches to identity, which shadow the cosmopolitan components of the Middle East, confining the region’s identity-politics to notions of sectarianism and conservative militant Islamism resistant to modernity. Through employing Hamid Dabashi’s critical postcolonial cosmopolitan framework of analysis, the research historicizes the crisis of Syrian identity, focusing on critical periods ranging from the 1920s, up to the contemporary crisis (2011-2017). It demonstrates that the country’s postcolonial state-imposed national identity projects have for years been exclusionary, and either have been shaped by, or have encountered, three ideological formations: those are, anti-colonial nationalism, third-world socialism, and Islamism. These formations emerged in conversation with, and in response to, European colonialism and were conveniently deployed by the ruling regimes to legitimatize their position. Through a discourse and content analysis, based on Dabashi’s analytical framework, the research argues that the 2011 Syrian Uprising was an attempt to bring an inclusive meaning to ‘Syrianism’ and to retrieve the repressed cosmopolitan worldliness. Protestors were committed to a unified Syria, as a political entity and a source of identity. They were not seeking an Islamist, a pan-‘Arabist’, a separatist, a Ba’athist socialist or a sectarian vision, but were rather united by prospects of creating a locally produced alternative that would maintain national harmony and retrieve the country’s cosmopolitanism. The research argues that the prolonging of the Syrian conflict has resulted in the deterioration of an inclusive, cosmopolitan ‘Syrianism’, as various actors have risen with conflicting ideas about national identity. Using archival primary and secondary sources, the research problematizes the identity discourse of the conflicting groups and to compare where they place ‘Syria’ in their ideologies. The research findings suggest that the ideologies of the studied combatant groups embody counter-revolutionary exclusionary notions of identity, which are not based on the cosmopolitan worldliness, but rather reinforce the suppressed, reactionary and exclusionary post-colonial ideological dichotomies.
Es scheint, als hätte sich die ganze Welt auf einen gemeinsamen Feind geeinigt und alle Staaten wollen diesen bekämpfen. Dennoch schaffte es der IS in den letzten Jahren, ein riesiges Gebiet in Irak und Syrien unter seine Kontrolle zu bringen. Obwohl der UN-Sicherheitsrat zu einem gemeinsamen Kampf gegen den IS aufrief, wurde dieser bisher nicht mit allen Mitteln bekämpft und konnte seine Macht weiterhin aufrechterhalten. Zwar verliert er in Syrien und im Irak seit dem letzten Jahr kontinuierlich Gebiete, die islamistische Terrororganisation hält sich dennoch und wird wahrscheinlich auch im Fall eines Zerschlagens des Kalifats weiterhin bestehen. Der Einfluss des IS geht über das Gebiet im Irak und Syrien hinaus und entwickelte sich bereits zu einem globalen Phänomen. Dennoch müssen bestimmte Maßnahmen gesetzt werden, um gegen den IS und dessen Terror jetzt und auch in Zukunft präventiv vorzugehen. Den IS in Irak, Syrien und seinen erklärten Provinzen, wie etwa in Libyen, nur militärisch zu bekämpfen reicht daher alleine nicht aus.
Es gilt zu hinterfragen, warum und wo der IS trotz einer globalen Militärkoalition gegen ihn immer noch besteht. Es stellt sich außerdem die Frage, woran es liegt, dass nicht alle Staaten gemeinsam und mit allen Mitteln gegen diese weltweite Bedrohung vorgehen. Schließlich kann man nur so die zentrale Frage beantworten, die die ganze Welt beschäftigt: Wie muss vorgegangen werden, um den Islamischen Staat endgültig zu bekämpfen und eine weitere Ausbreitung des jihadistischen IS-Terrors zu verhindern?
This article looks at Russia’s exercise of power politics in Ukraine and Syria as a way of improving its international status. Russia’s recent willingness to use power and coercion is theoretically counterintuitive as it appears to be in dissonance with the prevalent characterisation of the country as a status-overachieving inconsistent power. We argue that this behaviour is not the result of a consistent weighing of status against capabilities, but rather reflective of both internal and external dynamics. We analyse issues of identity, opportunity and costs as factors that influence Russian foreign action, showing that power politics will not solve Russia’s status-inconsistency problem in the long run.
ئاڵۆزی و ململانێ سیاسییهكانی سوریا پێی ناوهته قۆناغێكی نوێ و ههستیارهوه. سوریا بههۆی گرنگی پێگهی جیۆپۆلهتیكی و سیاسیهوه بووته هۆی گرنگیپێدانی وڵاتانی ههرێمی و سهروو ههرێمی، كه ههریهك له وڵاتانی ئهمریكا، ڕوسیا، بهشێك له وڵاتانی یهكێتی ئهوروپی، توركیا، سعودیه و ئێران قهیرانهكانی سوریا ههم وهك مهترسییهك بۆ سهر ئاسایش و بهرژهوهندی نهتهوهیی و ههم وهك دهرفهتێك بۆ جێبهجێكردنی ئهجیندای سیاسی و ئامانجهكانی دهرهوه دهبینن. بهشێوهیهكی گشتی وڵاتانی ڕۆژئاوایی و له سهرووی ههموویانهوه وڵاته یهكگرتووهكانی ئهمریكا قهیرانه سیاسییهكانی سوریا وهك دهرفهتێك دهبینن بۆ لاوازكردنی ڕژێمی سوریا، پێگه و ههژموونی ههریهك له ڕوسیا و ئێران له ناوچهكه و پاراستنی زیاتری سهقامگیری ئاسایشی وڵاتانی هاوپهیمانی ناوچهیی بهتایبهت ئیسرائیل. ههروهها ههریهك له وڵاتانی سعودیه و توركیا ههوڵدهدهن گۆڕانكارییه سیاسییهكان وهك دهرفهتێك بقۆزنهوه بۆ پڕڕهنگكردنی ڕۆڵی ناوچهیی و لاوازكردنی ڕكابهره ههرێمییهكهیان كه ئیڕانه و، لهو ڕێگهیهوه جارێكیتر هاوسهنگی هێز له ڕۆژههڵاتی ناوهڕاست به سوود و قازانجی خۆیان دابڕێژنهوه. ههرچی ڕوسیایه، له ڕیگهی پاڵپشتییه سیاسی، دیبلۆماسی و سهربازییهكانی دهیهوێت ههژموونی خۆی له سوریا و ناوچهكه به گشتی بپارێزێت و، ڕووبهڕووی ههر گۆڕانكارییهك ببێتهوه كه لهگهڵ بهرژوهندییهكانیدا كۆك و هاوئاراسته نهبێت. بۆیه دهبینین، لهمڕۆدا سوریا بووه به ناوهند و مهیدانێكی ململانێی سیاسی ئاڵۆز و بهریهككهوتنی بهرژهوهندی و ئهجیندای هێزه ههرێمی و سهروو ههرێمییهكان، كه ههریهك لهو هێزانه ههوڵدهدهن نهخشهی سیاسی سوریا بهپێی بهرژوهندیی و ئهجیندای سیاسی خۆیان دابڕێژنهوه. ئهوهی لێرهدا بۆ ئێمه گرنگه ئایندهی فیدراسیۆنی دیموكراتی باكوری سوریا (ڕۆژاڤا)یه له نێو ئهو هاوكێشه سیاسییانهدا، كه ئایا دۆزی كورد و ئایندهی سیاسی ڕۆژاڤا له نێو ململانێ سیاسییهكاندا به كوێ دهگات؟ وڵاتانی بهشداربوو له قهیرانی سیاسی سوریا چۆن دهڕواننه دۆز و پرسی كورد؟ گۆڕانكارییهكان به سوود و قازانجی پرسی كورد كۆتاییان دێت یاخود بهپێچهوانهوه؟ لهم توێژینهوهیهدا، ههوڵدهدهین وڵامی ئهو پرسیارانه بدهینهوه و، ئاماژه به ئهجیندای سیاسی وڵاتان و دۆزی كورد لهو نێوهندهدا بكهین.
We examine some problematic narratives in the American international relations scholarship on Russia, focusing on some implicit assumptions about the drivers of Russian foreign policy. Most prominently, this includes the idea that Russian foreign policy is driven primarily by the qualities of its internal regime. While domestic institutions undoubtedly matter, we argue that two other factors are key for understanding Russia’s foreign policy: the pursuit of primacy in its immediate neighborhood, and the pursuit of peer recognition with major Western powers. These imperatives are key for understanding Russian behavior abroad, transcend particular leaders and domestic institutions, and can help explain “unexpected” shifts in Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy that domestic explanations tend to miss.
In this edited volume, an assessment of Orthodox religion “in its own right” (Stoeckl 2016: 132) is demanded that, first, pays attention to different factions inside Eastern Orthodox religious communities and, second, addresses the agency of Orthodox communities in a more detailed perspective. In so doing, we have attempted to find new approaches for interpreting the interplay between Orthodox religion, politics and secularisation in contemporary Eastern Europe any beyond. For this the concept of ‘entangled authorities’ has been developed that draws attention to the fact that too many different ideas have been put into one single concept. On the one hand, there has been a tendency to focus on cooperation and entanglements; and to neglect unintended consequences and conflict. Instead we suggest looking at both, cooperation and conflict. On the other hand, at least three different forms of entanglements have been intermingled which have to be delineated and analysed separately: Personal, ideological and institutional entanglements. Only then, so it is suggested, will we be able to describe, analyse and grasp the interplay between Orthodox religion and politics more fully and more accurately.
During recent years tensions between Russia and Western states have risen, undermining the stability that Europe has enjoyed since the end of the Cold War. The purpose of this research is to study Russia’s behavior and external actions during this time, and determine the driving factors that led its leadership to adopt them. The analysis is made principally through Structural Realism, using in addition the Perception and Misperception Theory to explain state behavior and threat perception. Initially the thesis examines Russia’s geopolitical position and the post-Cold War international system, as well as the alternative strategies of A2/AD and Hybrid Warfare that characterize Russian actions.
Then, the post-Cold War Western foreign policy actions in Europe and the Middle East are discussed. The main issues examined are the NATO and EU enlargement to the East, the development of NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defense and Western global interventions after 1990. Emphasis is placed on Russia’s perception of these actions as threatening to its perceived sphere of influence, its Near Abroad, and its initial reaction to this emerging security dilemma. Subsequently, analysis focuses on Russian aggressive actions and external behavior. Beginning with Putin’s ascent to power, Russia recovered from its decline and rebuilt its military, using it as a central tool to promote its foreign policy objectives. This became obvious in the interventions that started with the invasion in Georgia in 2008 and its engagement in Ukraine in 2014. The latest intervention in Syria, in 2015, marked Russia’s first step beyond its Near Abroad, aiming to extend its influence on global scale.
The research concludes that the current Russian assertive behavior in its Near Abroad resulted as a reaction to external threats, as Russian leadership perceived the West’s strategic behavior in the post-Cold War period. In order to confront these threats and reclaim Russia’s Great Power status, Moscow chose a hard power approach that led to a confrontation with the West. This ongoing antagonism has a serious impact on the security balance on a regional and global scale.
Since the rise of the Islamic State in the Middle East, anthropological research has focused on the many deliberate destructions of cultural heritage in the region. Whilst such analyses can offer important insights into the multidimensionality of contemporary warfare and the important role of culture in perpetuating physical violence, heritage ethnographers should also spotlight the post-conflict futures of Syria and Iraq's war-torn heritage. Drawing on extensive ethnographic research on (world) heritage politics in the Russian Federation, this article highlights the strategic manipulation of Palmyra by the Russian Federation and investigates how conservation and reconstruction are also important political episodes in a heritage object's cultural biography.
Since 2001, the United States has made major military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, as leader of the anti-Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) coalition. Now, it is possible to compare the full scope of the Bush and Obama presidencies. Accordingly, this article will address patterns of continuity and change in approaches to American military intervention between 2001 and 2016. It asks two questions: What are the patterns of continuity and discontinuity in military intervention since September 11? And what do these patterns suggest about the future of American military interventions? In general, there is far more continuity than not in post-September 11 military interventions with regard to patterns of presidential commitments to domestic law, international institutions and multilateralism. The article then addresses major implications of American interventionism and what it portends in the age of Donald Trump.
In Chapter 5, ‘A Cold Peace Between Russia and the West: Did Geo-economics Fail?’, Nikita A. Lomagin examines the ways in which Russia has used its economic dominance within post-Soviet space and beyond to achieve political objectives. After a brief discussion of the place of economic sanctions in international affairs, Lomagin examines the Russian response to Western sanctions after the Ukraine Crisis, as well as Russia’s earlier use of economic pressures, primarily against post-Soviet states, in the effort to accomplish political goals. Although Russian geo-economic policy has been only partially successful, it has become an integral part of Russia’s effort to defend its perceived interests in post-Soviet space and beyond.
In the second chapter, ‘Growing Confrontation Between Russia and the West: Russia’s Challenge to the Post-Cold War Order’, Suzanne Loftus and Roger Kanet track the gradual deterioration of Russian-US relations, with emphasis on Russia’s growing resistance to what it sees as direct challenges to Russian interests. Over time, as its resource base improved, Russia has been more assertive in challenging Western initiatives. The confrontation is based not only in part on great power competition but also on very different conceptions of the nature of governance, at both the state and the international levels. Loftus and Kanet are not confident that relations will improve in the near future, short of Western acceptance of Russia’s expanded role in Eurasian and global security.
This article develops a theoretical explanation of the patterns of violence and distribution of conflict in contemporary world. It combines the international political thought of Carl Schmitt with an exploration of the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria and tensions over the South China Sea in order to envisage a new spatialisation of the world (‘nomos’ in Schmittian parlance) based around Großräume – ‘large spaces’, that is, powerful agglomerations of states – and peripheral lands in-between. It is thereby stipulated that while direct violence between Großräume is limited (or nonexistent), inter-Großraum competition is channelled towards the periphery, and the three cases presented in this article demonstrate how the exact nature and means of conflict depend on a particular inter-Großraum alignment. This reconceptualisation of the international order is presented in the wider context of Schmitt’s political thought, particularly his notions of the political, sovereignty and the exception in order to elucidate the latent processes behind the formation of state groupings and their willingness to engage in conflict beyond their borders.
Both the U.S. and Russian Gulf policies must be viewed in the context of broader geostrategic goals. The main U.S. objective is to deescalate local crises and conflicts, combat terrorism, prevent nuclear proliferation and - in the Gulf Region - preserve the balance of power between Riyadh and Tehran. Russia's Gulf policy is part of its strategy to increase its influence in the Middle East. Moscow seeks to strengthen its position vis-à-vis Washington throughout the entire region and thus to compensate at least in part for the loss of power it suffered as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It exploits the conflict between Tehran and Riyadh in order to gain additional influence and exert pressure on local actors.
The 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 occupation of Iraq were central to US global strategy to dominate global capitalism after the fall of the Soviet Union. The United States dealt with perceived challenges to its domination through conquest. The Middle East has been central to US global strategy to maintain control of Western Europe and in its rivalry with its two main competitors, the Russian Federation and China. Developing crises in global capitalism exposed the United States to instability in its global position, which it countered by invading and destabilizing Middle Eastern states. The following questions present themselves: What is the relationship between the crises of capitalist globalization and US global strategy? In what way is the Middle East central to US global strategy and instrumental in meeting the challenges posed by its rivals and competitors, the Russian Federation, China, the European Union and Iran? What role has Iraq played in this strategy? Attempting to answer these questions would go a significant way in assessing the US role in Iraq and the Middle East.
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