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The Media, Public Opinion, and Terrorism
Abstract
This chapter studies the links between public opinion, terrorism, and media. It discusses counterterrorism, specifically how the responses to terrorism become a part of the propaganda and demand schemes of governments and terrorists, and looks at how the media puts up with them. The chapter then reviews and evaluates the important literature of different research strains in four categories on media and terrorism.
... The existing literature (Nacos 2016;Nacos and Bloch-Elkon 2011; O'Loughlin 2016) has widely described how the media and terrorism are in a "symbiotic" relationship (Schmid 1989;Spencer 2010, 5). Margaret Thatcher (as quoted in Spencer 2010, 5) famously argued that the media provide terrorism with the "oxygen of publicity". ...
Although the involvement of women in terrorist activities is not new, it is still considered to be an exceptional phenomenon. The figure of a woman militant contradicts the main gender constructions and thus produces a certain shock and disconcertment in societies. In the case of “Jihadism”, women who willingly join a terrorist organisation also challenge the Western Neo-Orientalist perspective on Muslim women in the West. Starting from these theoretical standpoints, this article focuses on a group of terrorists who have recently received a great deal of attention: ISIS women jihadis. Based on a critical discourse analysis of three main UK broadsheets, this article presents, deconstructs and problematises the main depictions that were used to describe these subjects. Furthermore, it discusses how the frames described reconcile these women’s actions with the gender and Neo-Orientalist constructions that circulate in Western societies, safeguarding the deriving hegemonic narratives. In other words, the article focuses on how women terrorists are made into “Jihadi Brides”.
This Research Paper seeks to explore what ‘sympathy’ and ‘support’ actually mean when it comes to terrorism. The text addresses some of the problems of public opinion surveys, includes a conceptual discussion and then continues with the presentation of data from public opinion surveys. It notes that opinion polls can be helpful in gauging (verbal) support for terrorism but also finds that the questions asked in opinion polls are generally lacking precision while the answers are often influenced by political pressures. When translating (generally low) percentages of sympathy and support for al Qaeda and so-called Islamic State in various countries into actual population figures, it emerges that there is a sizeable radical milieu in both Muslim-majority countries and in Western Muslim diasporas, held together by the world wide web of the internet. While large majorities of Muslims in most countries have no love for jihadist extremists, there are more than enough breeding grounds for terrorism. The Research Paper concludes that better instruments for measuring sympathy and support for jihadist terrorism are needed to inform counter-terrorist strategies.
This article examines the causes of terrorism at a global level. It also reexamines the chronology of terrorism since the nineteenth century. It argues that local causes cannot explain global waves, and that while ideology is a necessary ingredient in causing terrorism, it does not explain it. The article proposes that the most important cause of global waves of terror is the inspiring example for radicals everywhere of what are, or appear to be, successful uses of terrorist strategies. This hypothesis is tested in the context of a reevaluation of David Rapoport's chronology of global waves of terrorism. The article argues for different periodization, and for labeling the waves as Italian, German, Chinese, and Afghan.
The likelihood that al-Qaeda will lose its Afghan base raises the question of whether practical sovereignty within contiguous territory is necessary for the terror-group's success, or whether advances in communications and encryption - coupled with increasingly good tradecraft - will over time obviate the need for a territorial base. This is a crucial question for the US and others who are fighting the network, because even complete success in Afghanistan will not destroy this terrorist threat. Nor will the terrorists be appeased by any conceivable change in US policies toward the Muslim world. Moreover, preemptive or preventive strikes against terrorist operations will not always be feasible. In this kind of world, a strategy dependent upon identification and elimination of specific threats will have to be combined with one focussed on remedying vulnerabilities to ill-defined, all-azimuth threats of potentially catastrophic scope.
Realisee avant les evenements tragiques du 11 septembre 2001, cette etude examine la perception qu'ont les Americains de la menace terroriste. Si celle-ci est consideree comme serieuse, elle demeure diffuse, collective, peu personnalisee. La source du terrorisme est percue autant comme exterieure que comme interieure, en raison notamment de l'attentat d'Oklahoma City, commis par des extremistes americains. Les personnes interrogees placent une confiance limitee dans la politique gouvernementale de lutte contre le terrorisme, moins en raison des politiques elles-memes que de la nature du terrorisme. Enfin, une majorite est prete a conceder des pans de liberte individuelle au profit d'une securite accrue
Media‐oriented terrorism has stirred growing interest in the communication strategy of modern terrorism and in the quantity, forms, and consequences of media coverage of terrorist events. One limitation of previous analyses is the lack of a theoretical framework to pinpoint the uniqueness of terrorism as media drama, and the commonalities with other kinds of media drama. A theoretical media‐event framework is proposed. The attributes, social processes, and impact of media events are compared with these same factors in terrorist events. The representative case selected to illustrate terrorist events is the June 1985 TWA airliner hijacking.
This article examines public attitudes towards terrorism in five countries: Uruguay, Spain, Italy, Germany and Northern Ireland. It analyzes public concern over terrorism, images of the terrorists, support for the terrorists' goals, and public approval of anti‐terrorist measures. There are significant differences between nationalist and revolutionary terrorism. Nationalist terrorists have a high degree of support from an ethnic constituency, while revolutionary terrorists attract a much smaller degree of support primarily from the educated young. It is concluded that public opinion towards terrorism is a product of complex historical situations, and that public attitudes are unaffected by the terrorist campaign itself.
A national survey of terrorism-related risk perceptions was recently conducted in Canada, with a total of 1,502 adult Canadians interviewed by telephone. This paper provides a descriptive account of the perception of terrorism threats in Canada, specific types and effects of terrorism, as well as information sources on terrorism. Overall, respondents reported that terrorism was a low to moderate threat to the Canadian population and an even lower threat to themselves as individuals. They also indicated that they currently worry little about terrorism in Canada. The Canadian media was cited as the source most often referred to when seeking credible information about terrorism, whereas elected politicians and government officials were referred to the least. Demographic differences in perceptions of terrorism were examined, with gender representing an important determinant. Survey results are discussed in relation to their implications for addressing and managing the risks of terrorism as well as preparedness planning in Canada.
This article reports the American public's assessment of the U.S. government's post-9/11 efforts to prevent further terrorist attacks. It presents poll data from September 11, 2001 to December 31, 2005 and addresses issues such as the degree of confidence Americans have in their government's ability to protect them from further terrorist strikes; the public's evaluation of the effectiveness of actions at home and abroad as a means to prevent terrorism; and the perception of Americans regarding President Bush's and his administration's performance in the area of homeland security.
To examine the public's response to future terrorist attacks, we surveyed 1,001 New Yorkers in the community one year after the September 11 attacks. Overall, New Yorkers were very concerned about future terrorist attacks and also concerned about attacks involving biological or nuclear weapons. In addition, while most New Yorkers reported that if a biological or nuclear attack occurred they would evaluate available information before evacuating, a significant number reported they would immediately evacuate, regardless of police or public health communications to the contrary. The level of public concern was significantly higher on all measures among New York City and Long Island residents (downstate) compared to the rest of the state. A model predicting higher fear of terrorism indicated that downstate residents, women, those 45 to 64 years old, African Americans and Hispanics, those with less education/income, and those more likely to flee, were more fearful of future attacks. In addition, making disaster preparations and carefully evaluating emergency information also predicted a higher level of fear as well. A second model predicting who would flee suggested that those more likely to evaluate available information were less likely to immediately evacuate, while those with a higher fear of future attacks were more likely to flee the area. Given these findings and the possibility of future attacks, mental health professionals need to be more involved in preparedness efforts, especially related to the psychological impact of attacks involving weapons of mass destruction.