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Organizational Neuroscience
Organizational Justice through the Window of Neuroscience
Sebastiano Massaro William J. Becker
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ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE
THROUGH THE WINDOW
OF NEUROSCIENCE
Sebastiano Massaro and William J. Becker
ABSTRACT
This chapter advocates the use of neuroscience theoretical insights and
methodological tools to advance existing organizational justice theory,
research, and practice. To illustrate the value of neuroscience, two gen-
eral topics are reviewed. In regard to individual justice, neuroscience
makes it clear that organizational justice theory and research needs to
integrate both emotion and cognition. Neuroscience also suggests promis-
ing avenues for practical individual justice interventions. For other-
focused justice, neuroscience clarifies how empathy provides a mechanism
for deontic justice while again highlighting the need to consider both
emotion and cognition. Neuroscience research into group characteriza-
tions also suggests promising explanations for deontic justice failures.
We also show how other-focused justice interventions are possible, but
more complex, than for self-focused justice. We conclude that interdisci-
plinary research has great potential to advance both organizational
justice and neuroscience research.
Keywords: Neuroscience; self-focused justice; other-focused justice;
emotion; empathy
Organizational Neuroscience
Monographs in Leadership and Management, Volume 7, 257276
Copyright r2015 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved
ISSN: 1479-3571/doi:10.1108/S1479-357120150000007010
257
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In recent years, interest in organizational neuroscience (ONS) has grown as
organizational scholars have begun to capitalize on advances made in var-
ious fields of neuroscience research (Becker, Cropanzano, & Sanfey, 2011).
Organizational justice represents a particularly fertile area for integrating
neuroscience because its fundamental underpinnings cut across many
related fields and include areas of interest to basic science research (Becker &
Cropanzano, 2010). In fact, scholars have already proposed preliminary
models of neuro-organizational justice (Beugre
´, 2009;Salvador & Folger,
2009). We believe, however, that rather than attempting to create new
neuroscience-based models of organizational justice, ONS can be also
proficiently applied to organizational science and practice by integrating its
insights and methods into existing models. For that reason, in this chapter,
we promote a broader view of how neuroscience can be incorporated into
organizational justice research. To that end, we explore two general topics
and outline how neuroscience research influences it in terms of theory,
methods, and practice.
While there are many topics within organizational justice that will be
impacted by neuroscience, we chose two to explore here: (1) the balance
between emotion and cognition in self-focused justice; and (2) how neu-
roscience informs other-focused, deontic justice. We selected these topics
because they involve fundamental principles of organizational justice that
also have important practical implications. In addition, there are well-
developed streams of neuroscience research that can inform both of these
topics.
SELF-FOCUSED JUSTICE
In organizational research, justice and morality have often been closely
related and sometimes equated with each other (for a review on the differ-
ences, see Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001). Here, we focus
specifically on justice, while the chapter “Neuroscience of moral cognition
and conation in organizations” in this book covers the neuroscience per-
spective on ethical behavior and moral intentions. We contend that the dis-
tinction between morality and justice derives primarily from a core
differentiation between motives and actions.AsKant (1997) stated, the
value of morality is in the intention, not in what is actually done: the com-
mand of morality is first of all to act with good will, even if this may not
necessarily produce right actions. In contrast, justice is primarily concerned
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with perceptions, behaviors, and outcomes. In general, there can be no jus-
tice violation without the occurrence of some sort of offending action or
outcome. The intention may then become an issue in judging the severity of
the wrong. Within this definition, the self-focused justice perceptions and
reactions of individuals have been a primary focus of the organizational
justice literature. In other words, how do employees react when they are
treated unfairly or receive unfair outcomes?
EMOTION AND COGNITION IN ORGANIZATIONAL
JUSTICE
Justice scholars have debated the relative role of cognition versus emotion
in explaining how individuals perceive and respond to just (and unjust)
treatment and outcomes that they experience. A number of prominent
theories of organizational justice have been heavily grounded in cognition.
For example, equity theory suggests that individuals consider the balance
between their effort and outcomes relative to referent others when making
judgments regarding justice (Adams, 1963). The organizational justice
literature has borrowed from these scholarly traditions, as it has emerged as
a dedicated area of research with its own descriptive agenda (Cropanzano,
Bowen, & Gilliland, 2007). Fairness theory is one such theory that
describes how individuals assess justice and accountability for injustice in
the workplace using contrastive thinking (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001).
More recently, scholars have focused on investigating the dimensions of
organizational justice such as distributive and procedural justice. These
efforts have relied heavily on the mainly cognition-oriented social
exchange theory to justify the mechanisms and linkages between each foci
of justice and attitudes and behaviors (Cropanzano & Rupp, 2008).
In short, cognition has been a dominant perspective within the bulk organi-
zational justice literature.
In contrast, the broader justice literature has long recognized the role
that emotions play in shaping the experience and response of individuals
who encounter injustice (Homans, 1961). Recently, there has been renewed
interest in the role of emotions in organizational research in general
(Barsade & Gibson, 2007;Elfenbein, 2007;Gaudine & Thorne, 2001).
While organizational justice has traditionally embedded emotions as parts
of its wider framework (Colquitt et al., 2013), the ongoing “affective revo-
lution” (Barsade, Brief, Spataro, & Greenberg, 2003) has encouraged a
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more narrowed account of affect and discrete emotions as key elements
behind justice perceptions and behaviors in the workplace. The body of
works on emotions has largely relied on a valence approach and investigated
positive and negative affect in response to unfair treatment. A number of
studies have found that distributional, procedural, and interactional justice
violations are associated with a negative affective response (see Barsky &
Kaplan, 2007, for a quantitative review). Organizational justice researchers
have also begun to incorporate discrete emotions into their investigations.
Weiss, Suckow, and Cropanzano (1999) first showed that different combina-
tions of distributive and procedural justice produced unique patterns of
discrete emotions. In summary, the affective perspective also plays an
important role in organizational justice research.
To date, organizational researchers investigating individual reactions to
unfair treatment have largely chosen one perspective or the other to inform
their predictions. Surprisingly, there have been few attempts to include
both perspectives within studies, much less to develop overarching theoreti-
cal models that incorporate both perspectives. A recent meta-analysis of
the justice literature found meaningful indirect effects of justice dimensions
through both social exchange and affective measures (Colquitt et al., 2013).
The effects of social exchange and affect had to be tested separately, how-
ever, due to the paucity of studies that included measures of both. The
authors specifically called for more integration of social exchange and
affective perspectives in future research.
INTEGRATING COGNITION AND EMOTION WITH
NEUROSCIENCE
In neuroscience, the debate between the competing roles of cognition and
emotions has been a topic of debate and empirical investigation for a long
time. As a result, ONS is uniquely suited to resolve this issue for organiza-
tional justice. For one, the debate between emotion (e.g., intended as
automatic processing) and cognition (e.g., intended as controlled proces-
sing) largely ended in a draw (e.g., Izard, 2009). That is, emotion and
cognition are so tightly entwined that both must be considered. Dual-
process models in behavioral psychology have tended to consider emotion
and cognition as parallel processes. Neuroscience shows that dual proces-
sing is not only parallel but is also highly interactive (Satpute & Lieberman,
2006). It is clear that dual-process models are particularly applicable for the
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context of organizational justice and could help to foster the integration
suggested by Colquitt et al. (2013). More so, dual-process models make it
clear that models that only include emotion or cognition are misspecified,
and hence cannot possibly fully capture what is actually occurring.
One reason that ONS has not been more widely adopted within organi-
zational research is a diffuse misunderstanding of neuroscience research.
For instance, many of the attention grabbing findings from functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies tend to produce localization
lay interpretations. In these studies, when an individual performs a task or
makes a decision, certain regions of the brain are often found to more
strongly activated than others. Yet, people outside of neuroscience wrongly
interpret this to mean that those are specialized brain regions uniquely
associated to distinct behaviors. By extension, some people expect that we
should be able to locate the “justice” area of the brain and determine if
justice depends more on emotion or cognition. In truth, there are very few
brain regions that are so highly specialized. Most regions are involved of a
range of focused yet flexible processing: for instance, simply put, the
amygdala plays a role in emotional processing and response, the frontal
lobes provide a variety of working memory and executive control
functions, and the anterior cingulate serves as an intermediary between
emotion and cognition. As a result, any single localization interpretation is
largely inductive in nature. Over time, it has become clear that most
complex processing is highly networked and recruits multiple brain regions
(Sporns, Chialvo, Kaiser, & Hilgetag, 2004). As such, any complex psycho-
logical process such as justice perception and response relies on a number
of brain regions in an extremely dynamic fashion (Verplaetse, 2009).
In addition, thus far, justice researchers have relied almost exclusively
on self-report measures of cognitive and affective constructs. This was rea-
sonable for measuring cognitive perceptions or complex emotions that
result from appraisal theory. However, the dual-process models of ONS
indicate that automatic and implicit processing and basic emotional
responses also need to be considered in order to fully understand how
individuals respond to unfairness. Neuroscience also makes it clear that
discrete emotions are more informative than a valence-based approach
to affect. ONS can also provide new measures of automatic and implicit
emotional response that will allow organizational researchers to investigate
these responses (Becker & Menges, 2013). In short, ONS provides insights
and tools that are needed to integrate the cognitive and affective perspec-
tives of organizational justice. To illustrate these points, we detail some
recent findings in the next sections.
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ONS FINDINGS FOR INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE
Unfair situations are frequently reported in organizations and often elicit
strong feelings of injustice in employees. Indeed, the management literature
has shown that unfair treatment plays a central role in work behavior, feel-
ings, and attitudes (for reviews, see Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996;Lind &
Tyler, 1992). Workers who experience first-hand unfair treatment are
reported more likely to leave their jobs, reduce their commitment, and
behave in anti-normative ways (Greenberg, 1993). While these observations
are well documented, a key question remains: Why do individuals react so
strongly to unfair treatment? As we have seen, thus far, organizational jus-
tice research has tended to explore cognition or emotion-based accounts of
these reactions.
Neuroscience has begun to reveal how and why justice behaviors are
produced in human brains. For instance, as Tancredi (2005) outlines, moral
constructs “would not exist without the brain,” and clearly similar consid-
erations apply to human responses to unfair actions. A number of valuable
insights come from individuals with impaired brains that dispose them to
deviant social behavior (Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio,
1999). This has helped to dissociate and characterize the affective and
cognitive processes that shape ethical decisions (Moll, Zahn, de Oliveira-
Souza, Krueger, & Grafman, 2005). For instance, anger or disappoint-
ment for unjust outcomes are often linked to brain structures connected
with emotional response and rewards (for an overall review, see
Lieberman, 2007).
Across studies, a number of brain regions have been consistently impli-
cated in justice-related functions. The anterior insular cortex is one such
brain area. It is strongly associated with disgust and other negative emo-
tions (Calder, Lawrence, & Young, 2001). In particular, it has been shown
that ethically salient emotions also elicit disgust and increased insula activa-
tion when individuals experience unfair treatment or group exclusion
(Haidt, 2003;Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 1999). We also know that
employees often feel disgust in response to unfair actions by their managers
or organizations (Weiss et al., 1999). Furthermore, the anterior insular
cortex appears to be strongly involved in justice-related behaviors, such as
the rejection of unfair offers (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen,
2003;Zaki, Davis, & Ochsner, 2012), and in resentment when being
excluded from a group (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003).
There is additional evidence that fair treatment produces positive emo-
tions that are linked to specific neural correlates. For instance, Tabibnia,
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Satpute, and Lieberman (2008) investigated the positive emotional impact
of fairness by examining self-reported happiness and neural responses to
fair and unfair offers. Controlling for monetary payoff, they found that
fair offers were associated with greater happiness and activation in the
so-called “reward regions” of the brain. Thus, this research suggests that
our brain employs areas originally developed for basic emotional response
for more complex mental tasks (e.g., responding to unfair treatment). It
also suggests that the brain employs fundamental structures, whose basic
functions may share little with justice per se, to promote “just” behaviors
or elicit emotions related to justice in social circumstances. These studies
support the idea that emotions play a fundamental role in justice percep-
tions and behaviors. Furthermore, there is compelling evidence that our
initial response to such situations is emotion based, even if these emotions
do not rise to consciousness (Izard, 2009).
However, neuroscience also confirms the assertion of Colquitt et al.
(2013) that organizational justice needs to develop theories that integrate
emotion and cognition. Indeed, Sanfey et al. (2003) shed light on how
emotion and cognition may interact in response to unfairness. In their
neuroimaging study, participants participated in an Ultimatum Game
(UG), where the first individual (confederate or computer) proposes a
potential division of a fixed sum of money and the second individual
(participant) decides whether to accept or reject the proposal. If the parti-
cipant accepts the offer, the money is split as proposed; if the offer is
rejected, neither player earns any money. Interestingly, participants are
more likely to reject offers that are considerably lower than half of the
total as unfair (Greene, 2009).
Using fMRI, Sanfey et al. (2003) found that the insula activation
increased with the magnitude of unfairness. It was also more active in
human- versus computer-generated offers and was positively associated
with an increased likelihood of offer rejection. So again, this indicated
that individuals initially responded to unfair treatment with an emotional
response and many individuals acted upon this response. However,
another brain region, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), also
showed increased activation in response to unfair offers in many subjects.
This region has been associated with higher cognitive functions, such as
planning, inhibition, and abstract thinking. While there is some debate
on the role of the dlPFC (cf., Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer, &
Fehr, 2006), increased activity in the dlPFC was positively associated
with the acceptance of unfair proposals and to decreased activity in the
insula.
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The researchers concluded that the dlPFC was able to override the nega-
tive emotional responses to unfairness (and the impulse to reject the offer)
when rational and fairness motives were in conflict. Simply put, these
results may suggest a mechanism by which the brain allows people to swal-
low negative emotions that are provoked by unjust deals when they judge
that it is in their long-term self-interest to do so. Similarly, employees may
initially perceive that their supervisor is unfair, but nevertheless realize that
it is in their best long-term interest to not react angrily and even come to
realize over time that their perceptions were not accurate. Altogether, these
findings confirm the importance of continuing to develop and investigate
dual-process models of organizational justice.
NEUROSCIENCE-BASED MANIPULATION OF
INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE
Organizational justice researchers are also concerned with the practical
implications of how their theories might be used to make the workplace
more just (Greenberg, 2009). Thus far, these interventions have been lim-
ited to relatively mundane methods such as training or procedural changes
(Kickul, Lester, & Finkl, 2002;Skarlicki & Latham, 1996). As we have
shown, dual-process consideration of both emotion and cognition are
necessary in order to fundamentally alter individual justice perceptions and
behavior. Therefore, we need to develop interventions that address both.
Neuroscience research has already begun to investigate whether the brain
can be “engineered” to alter how individuals respond to injustice.
For example, Knoch et al. (2006) examined what happens if brain pro-
cessing is temporarily disrupted while deciding to accept or reject offers in
the UG, which we discussed in the previous section. These researchers
employed transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), a noninvasive method
used to inhibit activity in local regions of the brain (O’Shea & Walsh,
2007). Remarkably, one-third of the participants whose right dlPFC was
stimulated accepted all the offers, even those clearly unfair. Interestingly,
the TMS treatment did not impact participants’ justice perceptions and
they still reported that the accepted offers were unfair. From a practical
perspective, these results suggest that it may be possible to alter how indivi-
duals respond to injustice in the workplace in productive ways. In this case,
individuals recognized injustice but responded “rationally” rather than
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“emotionally.” If this could be accomplished in the workplace, employees
could be influenced to not act out of anger and could likely address the
injustice more constructively over time.
Clearly, neuroscience efforts to alter brain processing using TMS are in
the very early stages of development and not likely suitable or practical for
organizational settings. However, the possibility of altering individual jus-
tice perceptions and behaviors is too impactful to ignore. As we have seen,
we know that our brain plays important roles in emotional and cognitive
justice processing. We also know that brain areas are active in a variety of
different tasks that require emotional or cognitive processing. Rather than
stimulating or suppressing activity in these regions using artificial means
such as TMS, neuroscientists have also begun to explore the possibility that
these regions can be primed to promote more emotional or cognitive
response using other tasks (Kvaran, Nichols, & Sanfey, 2013). So far, these
efforts have produced modest effects using simple scenario or math-
based tasks. These methods of influencing individual justice behavior
should be explored and adapted in organizational justice research.
Furthermore, there are also promising methods of bringing about
changes using the sorts of neurofeedback techniques described by
Waldman, Balthazard, and Peterson (2011),aswellasinchapters
“Neuroenhancement in tasks, roles, and occupations” and “Neuroscience
of leadership” of this book.
OTHER-FOCUSED JUSTICE
Our second topic focuses on other-focused organizational justice. Broadly
defined, this involves justice sensitivity towards others, how individuals
evaluate and react to experiences of injustice with which others are treated
(Yoder & Decety, 2014). In particular, we are interested in why and how
managers and employees value or devalue fair treatment of others. It is
fairly intuitive that our “self-interested” brain is concerned with our own
experiences of first-hand justice events. Indeed, this concept has important
foundations both for who we are and how we act (Baumeister & Exline,
2000). However, it is becoming increasingly clear that employees often also
respond to the unfair treatment of others such as coworkers (Spencer &
Rupp, 2009), customers (Skarlicki, van Jaarsveld, & Walker, 2008), and
even the society in general (Rupp, 2011).
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NEUROSCIENCE IMPLICATIONS FOR DEONTIC
JUSTICE
Generally speaking, organizational scholars have used the concept of deon-
tic justice to account for reactions to third-party justice (Rupp & Bell,
2010). The deontic model of justice suggests that individuals value the fair
treatment of others because they care about justice as a principle
(Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003). Scholars have generally sug-
gested that deontic justice relies heavily on emotion, and one recent study
even proposed a dual-process model of deontic justice (Skarlicki & Rupp,
2010). However, these studies have not fully explained why individuals care
about deontic justice. More importantly, they do not address why people
often do not seem to care about the justice of others at all. Neuroscience is
uniquely suited to address these important questions and refine theories of
deontic third-party justice by illuminating some of the underlying brain
mechanisms and correlates.
Not surprisingly, the mechanics of other-focused justice are quite com-
plex. Nonetheless, given the strong association of deontic justice with emo-
tional response, it seems clear that empathy plays a role in why individuals
care about justice for others. The neuroscience of emotions and affect,
including the affective aspects of empathy, are highlighted in the chapter
“Neuroscience as a basis for understanding emotions and affect in organi-
zations” of this book as well. Nevertheless, we will specifically address how
empathy, justice, and neuroscience can be brought together.
The association between empathy and justice was demonstrated in a
study by Batson, Klein, Highberger, and Shaw (1995). Empathy provides a
sense of similarity in feelings experienced by the self and the other (Decety &
Lamm, 2006). More importantly, research has shown that empathy is a
multifaceted construct (Batson, 2009). The findings indicate that empathy
can be induced by both topdown and a bottomup processing systems
the former being more conscious and cognition based and the latter being
more automatic and emotion based.
Decety and Batson (2009) suggest that the lateral prefrontal cortex and
the anterior cingulate are essential parts of the cognition-based system that
can produce topdown, empathic emotions. The automatic emotional
empathy system has been further reinforced with the discovery of mirror
neurons as a possible neuroscience explanation (Rizzolatti & Craighero,
2004). Research increasingly suggests that a “mirroring” system automati-
cally causes us to experience the affective feelings we observe in others.
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Lamm, Decety, and Singer (2011) found that when we observe other
peoples’ emotional states, the anterior insula and the cingulate show similar
activation to when we personally experience physical or emotional pain,
embarrassment, admiration, or disgust. Several studies have shown that
perceiving familiar others in pain generally leads to empathic concern
(Decety & Lamm, 2006;Singer et al., 2004).
Empathy provides a robust mechanism for deontic justice to occur.
When we see other people treated unfairly, we can literally feel their pain,
either automatically or through conscious reflection. As a result, we may
feel similar emotions and react as if the injustice had occurred to us. The
evidence suggests that emotional empathy is more likely to produce
stronger reactions than cognitive empathy. In addition, given the neural
correlates identified for each, neuroscience also provides a number of
promising methods for determining the relative effects of each for deontic
justice (Dziobek et al., 2011).
This also suggests and answers to why sometimes individuals do not
value justice for others and are even capable of behaving unjustly or immo-
rally towards others. Birbaumer et al. (2005) showed that individuals with
high levels of psychopathy, characterized by lack of empathy, showed
typical responses for pain when imagining the pain as occurring to them.
However, when they imagined pain to others, these regions did not show
activation compared to controls. Not only did they not feel the pain,
subjects actually showed an increased response in the ventral striatum, an
area often connected to feelings of pleasure. It seems that, when we do not
experience empathy, we do not sympathize with and may even take delight
in the misfortunes of others.
However, once again, deontic justice, like individual justice, has both
emotional and cognitive components. Individuals who are lower in emo-
tional empathetic response can still value the justice of others through cog-
nitive empathy. The efficacy of cognitive empathy training has been
demonstrated with individuals with Asperger’s Syndrome whose capability
for emotional empathy is extremely impaired (Golan & Baron-Cohen,
2006). However, this process is slow and requires an internal or external
trigger to initiate the cognitive effort necessary to produce. Therefore, indi-
vidual differences in empathy can likely account for some of the observed
differences in people valuing or devaluing the justice of others in the work-
place. Thus far, the evidence suggests that these individual differences are
much more pronounced for emotional, as compared to cognitive, empathy.
Emotional empathy deficits in individuals with autism, Asperger’s
Syndrome, and borderline psychopathy have helped our understanding of
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the linked to brain regions that are important for automatic processing of
emotion (Blair, 2010;Dziobek et al., 2011). There is also evidence that indi-
vidual differences in the default mode network of the brain are associated
with emotional empathy deficits (Cox et al., 2012). This network is
discussed elsewhere in this book, including chapters “Antagonistic neural
networks underlying organizational behavior” and “Neuroscience of moral
cognition and conation in organizations.”
EMPATHY AND INGROUP/OUTGROUP
CATEGORIZATION
Social categorization (in/outgroup) phenomenon can also inform theories
of when and why individuals value or devalue justice experienced by
others. The notion of “others” as people belonging or not belonging to
one of our valued social groups has profound effects on our social inter-
actions and relationships (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994). Neuroscience
has shed new light on how these categorizations might affect deontic
justice. In general, findings suggest that ingroup membership enhances
(and outgroup membership suppresses) both emotional and cognitive
empathy (Eres & Molenberghs, 2013). In a study of particular interest,
individuals observed a member of their ingroup (fellow fan of their
favorite team) or outgroup (fan of rival team) experience pain (Hein,
Silani, Preuschoff, Batson, & Singer, 2010). When observing the ingroup,
individuals showed increased activity in the insula and were more likely
to help the other person. Those who observed an outgroup showed
greater activation in the nucleus accumbens (often associated with reward
processing) and lower activation in the insula when they chose not to
help. In addition, these activation patterns were a better predictor of
individuals’ willingness to help an outgroup member than were self-report
measures of empathy.
In a similar vein, oxytocin, a neuropeptide associated with increased
affection and trust toward others, has been shown to increase empathy and
positive affect toward ingroup members (Bartz, Zaki, Bolger, & Ochsner,
2011). However, elevated levels of oxytocin have also been shown to
decrease empathy and increase negative emotions and competition toward
outgroup members (De Dreu, 2012;De Dreu, Greer, Van Kleef, Shalvi, &
Handgraaf, 2011). This research suggests that group categorizations funda-
mentally alter trust processing. When an individual views someone as an
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ingroup member, we are biased to value justice for that person. In stark
contrast, for perceived outgroup members, we seem to be equally biased
toward devaluing and even disregarding altogether their feelings and fair
treatment.
Overall, these examples from neuroscience provide promising insights
into the question of when and why people value justice experienced by
others. Empathy clearly plays a central role. Nonetheless, even empathy
involves both emotional and cognitive processing. Finally, neuroscience
findings and measures of outgroup bias have great potential for explaining
and moderating some of the more troubling deontic justice failures whereby
individuals ignore injustice that does not involve them directly, or worse,
purposefully treat others unfairly. This concept should be familiar to orga-
nizational justice scholars, since outgroup membership has been identified
as a predictor of discrimination and prejudice (Stone-Romero & Stone,
2005). Nonetheless, ONS provides new theoretical insights and methods for
investigating the roles of empathy and group categorization in deontic
justice.
CAN WE INDUCE GREATER CONCERN FOR THE
JUSTICE OF OTHERS?
As before, organizational justice research should also be concerned with
how we might increase employee and manager concern for the justice of
others in ways that can improve organizational outcomes and individual
well-being. This is especially true as interest has grown in promoting
empathetic leadership and more compassionate organizations (Barsade &
O’Neill, 2014;Mahsud, Yukl, & Prussia, 2010). Once again, neuroscience
research provides a number of theoretical insights and potential active
interventions that can be brought to bear on this endeavor.
A number of neuroscience studies have begun to investigate how the
use of TMS can influence justice perceptions and behaviors toward
others. For instance, Uddin, Molnar-Szakacs, Zaidel, and Iacoboni
(2006) asked research participants to look at pictures in which their own
face was progressively changed into a stranger’s and report if they could
recognize themselves. Application of TMS on the right inferior parietal
lobe while performing on this self versus others task considerably
impaired the subjects’ ability to discriminate their self from others. This
result is potentially interesting since distinguishing ourselves from others
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plays an important role in justice judgments. In another study, TMS dis-
ruption of the dlPFC resulted in less cooperative and more selfish beha-
vior (Buckholtz & Marois, 2012). In a subsequent study, disrupting the
activity of the dlPFC resulted in increased willingness to punish others
who acted unfairly to a third party (Bru
¨ne et al., 2012). Taken together,
these results suggest that intervening in other-focused justice is much
more complex and potentially perilous undertaking than with individual
justice. On the one hand, diminishing an individual’s “executive processing”
could make the person less concerned with fairness directly, but on the
other hand, it could make the person more willing to punish injustice on
behalf of others. Nonetheless, these lessons from neuroscience likely also
apply to more traditional, other-focused justice interventions as well.
Certainly, this topic merits increased attention and investigation within
organizational justice. And as mentioned earlier, the types of neurofeedback
interventions described by Waldman et al. (2011) might be employed to
achieve change in individuals, particularly those who might be lower in
emotional empathy.
Neuroscience has also explored the modification of other-focused jus-
tice behaviors using pharmacological approaches, like those involving
intranasal administration of oxytocin, which has discernable effects on
brain functioning (Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2005).
As discussed earlier, oxytocin’s association with increased trust, bonding,
and empathy sparked significant research interest. In one study, subjects
whose oxytocin levels were artificially increased via intranasal spray
behaved more fairly in a trust game (i.e., they assigned more money to
the trustees). In another study, elevated levels of oxytocin were associated
with increased concern for a victim of a crime, but not with a greater
desire to punish the offender (Krueger et al., 2013). Once again, these
types of interventions do not always produce the intended effects. As we
discussed earlier, increased oxytocin levels seem to have the opposite
effects on prosocial behavior toward others who are in an outgroup. In
sum, any attempts to increase individuals’ concerns for others also need
to be extremely well thought out and tailored to the specific social con-
texts of the organization in which the intervention takes place. Findings
from neuroscience make it clear that there is no silver bullet or simple
answers when it comes to other-focused justice. Indeed, in the quest to
better understand and eventually manipulate justice, only interdisciplinary
research performed at the highest scientific standard will balance the
270 SEBASTIANO MASSARO AND WILLIAM J. BECKER
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hope and hype currently surrounding neuroscience research in the work-
place (Massaro, 2015;Waldman, 2013).
CONCLUSIONS
The goal to further understand organizational justice perceptions and beha-
viors is an essential endeavor to better understand human flourishing and
struggles inside organizations. In modern organizations, the ability to
recognize and respond to unjust behavior oriented towards us or to a team-
member is beneficial, while its lack is a serious social peril (Greenberg &
Cropanzano, 1993). With advancing knowledge on the neuroscience of jus-
tice, and organizational research beginning to implement these insights in
their frameworks (Salvador & Folger, 2009;Robertson et al., 2007), an
ONS perspective offers considerable room to broaden our theoretical and
practical knowledge of organizational justice.
In this chapter, rather than to advance a “neuro-model” of organiza-
tional justice, we sought to demonstrate that neuroscience should be
viewed as a source of theoretical insights and methodological tools that
can enhance and unify existing organizational justice theories. To that
end, we reviewed two general topics for which basic neuroscience findings
are relevant to both scholarly investigations and practice. For individual
justice, we explained how neuroscience supports the need to integrate
both emotion and cognition into theories of organizational justice. We
also reviewed some avenues for creating interventions to manage indivi-
dual responses to justice. For other-focused justice, we reviewed how
empathy provides a fundamental mechanism for deontic justice that
incorporates both emotional and cognitive elements. We also revealed
that practical interventions for other-focused justice are particularly
complex and not to be undertaken lightly. To this end, neuroscience
again provides some exciting new possibilities for future interventions.
In conclusion, the broader field of ONS is still in its relative infancy and
will continue to develop rapidly. Rather than simply being passive obser-
vers and consumers of this new knowledge, we believe that it will be impor-
tant for organization justice researchers to become active participants.
More dedicated interdisciplinary research is needed to advance organiza-
tional justice and neuroscience research forward in the most efficient and
271Organizational Justice through the Window of Neuroscience
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informative manner possible. In this way, rigorous experiments across
fields, converging measures, sound meta-analyses, and multiple sources of
confirmation will produce new theoretical models and ecologically valid
practical interventions.
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