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Issues in Political Discourse Analysis NOVA Science Publishers
Vol. 1, Number 2 (September, 2005), pp. ISBN:
* I am extremely grateful to Kunjilika Chaima, Noam Chomsky, Owen Kalinga, Andrew Tilimbe
Kulemeka, John Lwanda, Jack Mapanje, Felix Mnthali, Al Mtenje, George Nnensa, Martha
Saavedra, David Willingham, and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza for reading earlier versions of this paper
and for making comments and suggestions that have improved its content and style. They do not
necessarily agree with or endorse the views expressed in the paper. Responsibility for that, and for
any errors, rests with the author. I thank Muna Ndulo and the Institute for African Development at
Cornell University for providing the stimulus to focus on this issue.
RELIGION AND POLITICS IN MALAWI*
Sam Mchombo
Department of Linguistics
University of California, Berkeley
Abstract
The prevailing attitude about elections and power shifts in many African countries is
that religion plays a minimal role in shaping the results. By and large, this seems
correct. Nevertheless, religion does play a role in influencing political developments. In
some cases, the pulpit has occasionally served more to articulate political aspirations
than to preach the word of God. In Malawi, the transition to democracy was influenced
as much by the Catholic Bishops’ public stand against the injustices of the Kamuzu
Banda regime as it owed to agitation of civil society. With the end of the late President
Kamuzu Banda’s autocratic rule and the rise to power of President Bakili Muluzi, a
Muslim, the country has been in the grips of speculation as to whether Islam is poised to
replace Christianity as the dominant religion. Charges of desire to “Islamicize” the
country have had to be consistently refuted by the incumbent. Still, the rise of Islam, an
erstwhile minority religion, to a position of virtual dominance through being identified
with the presidency, aided by sponsorship from oil-rich nations, and the emergence of
strained relations between it and Christianity, have increasingly become relevant factors
in current political developments in Malawi. As the general election that will retire
Bakili Muluzi from the presidency draws near, the question of the religious affiliation of
the next president has acquired significance; it is relevant to prospects of maintenance of
peace, calm, and stability. Further, in the current climate of global conflict, couched as
it is in a policy of “war on terror,” the alignment of Christianity and Islam in these
global issues is far from neutral. This paper places these two religions in historical
context, comments on recent events in global politics, and examines the role Islam and
Christianity are likely to play in shaping political developments in Malawi.
MUSLIM PROTESTS IN MALAWI
On Friday, June 27, 2003, after prayers, the Muslim community in the main
commercial city of Blantyre in Malawi went on a protest march. They held a demonstration
2 Sam Mchombo
in the city streets, disrupted traffic, vandalized the offices of the Muslim Association of
Malawi, destroying some of the computers there, and generally created an afternoon of
tension and apprehension. Other demonstrations were held in Kasungu, a town in the central
region of the country. The situation was much worse in the town of Mangochi, located at the
southern extremity of Lake Malawi. A locale dominated by the Yao ethnic group, and
predominantly Muslim, the Muslims attacked establishments identified with Christianity and
with an American presence. They burned down churches belonging to the Assemblies of
God, the Presbyterians, Seventh Day Adventists, Baptists, and Jehovah’s Witnesses. The
Police rushed to protect the residence of the Mangochi Diocese Bishop Alessandro Assolari
when word reached them that the protesters were headed in his direction. Less fortunate was
Catholic Father Gilevulo who was assaulted on the road and had his vehicle overturned and
set ablaze. They attacked the property and personnel of Save the Children USA, and torched
the district office of the ruling United Democratic Front (UDF) Party. Some of the
demonstrators were even quoted as claiming that Mangochi is Muslim territory, with no place
for Christianity which, together with its American influence and sponsorship, should be
ejected.
The indignation of the Muslims did have some basis. It was in response to global
politics of the modern era. In the summer of 2003, President George W. Bush of the United
States did visit Africa. In the aftermath of the Sept. 11 (2001) attacks in the United States,
attributed to the organization al-Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden, the world has been required
to focus on, and get actively involved in, waging the “war on terrorism.” The September 11
events had as harbingers earlier bombings in Kenya and Tanzania that targeted American
installations. Lyman & Morrison (2004, p. 75) noted that “On August 7, 1998, two massive
bombs exploded outside of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi,
Kenya, killing 224 people—including 12 Americans—and injuring 5, 000. Responsibility
was quickly traced to al-Qaeda. Four years later, al-Qaeda operatives struck again, killing 15
people in an Israeli-owned hotel near Mombassa, Kenya, and simultaneously firing missiles at
an Israeli passenger jet taking off from Mombassa airport.”
In response, the United States Government went after the al-Qaeda infrastructure in
East Africa. However, Lyman & Morrison remained critical of the United States Government
for focusing on al-Qaeda while, apparently, failing to heed other sources of terrorism. They
warned that, while the U.S. has gone after the al-Qaeda infrastructure in East Africa, “the
potential for growth of Islamic extremism and other sources of terrorism elsewhere on the
continent has not registered sufficiently on its radar screen. By far the most troubling case is
Nigeria” (Lyman & Morrison, p. 75).
The identification of “Islamic extremism” with al-Qaeda and terrorism does,
unwittingly, give to America’s war on terror the appearance of an onslaught on Islam in
general. Extremism tends to be identified with fundamentalism. Although the concept of
“fundamentalism” may have come from Princeton Presbyterian fundamentalists about a
hundred years ago (Chomsky, p.c), the term has, in recent times, been used primarily in
connection with aspects of Islam.1 In order to defuse misconceptions about the intent behind
1 Chomsky (p.c.) has pointed out that, with regard to the “war on terror,” “…the current
incumbents in Washington declared ‘war on terror’ in 1981, when they took office under Reagan,
and that one of their prime targets of that ‘war on terror’ was the Catholic Church. The notorious
School of the Americas takes pride in the fact—which it proclaims—that the US army ‘helped
defeat liberation theology.’ So, whatever the latest phase of the ‘war on terror’ is supposed to be,
Islam is just a target of convenience, like the Catholic Church was the first time around.”
Although Islam is a “target of convenience,” the current phase of the “war on terror” appears to be
contributing to a polarization of the world along religious lines of Christianity versus Islam.
Religion and Politics in Malawi 3
the “war on terror,” and to stress that it is not an onslaught on Islam in general, there has been
considerable effort in the Bush administration to distinguish “Islam” from “Islamic
extremism.” The distinction between them notwithstanding, the implementation of the policy
has been perceived as largely indiscriminate. This was reinforced by President George W.
Bush’s pronouncement on September 29, 2001 that the “war on terror will be much broader
than the battlefields and beachheads of the past. The war will be fought wherever terrorists
hide, or run, or plan” (Roth, 2004, p. 2). To the extent that Islamic establishments and
regions are taken as locations where terrorists might “hide” or “plan,” they become targets of
the “war on terror.” The situation is further complicated by the fact, noted by Roth (2004, p.
2), that “the Bush administration has used war rhetoric precisely to give itself the
extraordinary powers enjoyed by a wartime government to detain or even kill suspects
without trial.”
Thus, one could excuse the tendency on the part of Muslims to view the current
United States administration’s policies through the prism of subjugation of Islam and
plundering of the oil resources of the Arab world.
As plans for President George W. Bush’s visit to Africa were underway, it was
imperative that appropriate security measures be taken. Naturally, a major component of
those security measures was identification and “appropriate” removal of suspected al-Qaeda
members.
For three weeks prior to the Muslim unrest in Malawi, it was rumored that five
foreign nationals resident in Malawi had been identified by the USA security network (CIA
and FBI) as, allegedly, being members of al-Qaeda. These were: Fahad al Bahli of Saudi
Arabia, Ibrahim Habachi and Arif Ulasam of Turkey, Mahmud Sardar Issa of Sudan, and
Khalifa Abdi Hassan of Kenya. The National Intelligence Bureau of Malawi, apparently
working in cooperation with the USA security network, apprehended the individuals and
whisked them out of the country to an unknown destination. Rumors were rife that they had
been taken to Guantánamo Bay in Cuba, the holding place for alleged al Qaeda “terrorists.” It
was also rumored that one of the detainees was very ill, and that another might already have
died.
The situation was exacerbated by an apparent official clampdown on coverage of the
event. While the local independent print media made some commentary on the incident, and
there was extensive commentary in Chichewa (the main local language) on the leading
private radio by a Muslim who denounced in no uncertain terms the action of the U.S.
personnel involved along with their Malawian accomplices, the national radio and television
remained mute.2 The official news blackout was indicative of the degree of interference or
control of the media exercised by the government, despite pretensions to democracy and
freedom of the press. It was reminiscent of proscriptions on media independence and
government control of information disseminated to the public that characterized the
dictatorial regime of Kamuzu Banda (see Mchombo 1996, 1997, 1998b). In fact, the current
regime in Malawi has been plagued with charges of corruption, occasionally leading to
suspension of international aid, and is viewed as exploiting the façade of democracy with the
intent of reverting to autocratic rule (see Chirwa & Kanyongolo 2000; Mchombo 2000,
2002).
The rumor fanned anti-Christian and anti-American sentiment among the Muslims,
who construed the incident as an attack on their Muslim brothers and on Islam in general, and
who claimed that the “disappearance” of the five suspects was an effective manifestation of
2 I am indebted to Owen Kalinga for the information about the commentary made by the Muslim
commentator on the private radio station. The individual is, apparently, a regular commentator.
4 Sam Mchombo
the perception of American policy as it was couched in terms of a “war on terror.” They
decided to react violently to register their anger and, through that, to signal their preparedness
for Jihad (holy war). Most of the targets which they selected on which to vent their rage and
indignation were either Christian or American. The exceptions were the vandalism of the
Muslim Association of Malawi offices in Blantyre (and destruction of their computing
machinery) and the torching of the district office of the ruling UDF Party in Mangochi. The
reasons for that will be seen below.
BRIEF HISTORY OF ISLAM IN MALAWI
The incident in Malawi could have been ignored or treated as comparable to the
occasional student unrest or worker demonstration for upward salary adjustments or
improvement in working conditions. That it took on greater significance is due to shifting
perceptions about the role that religion has come to play in political developments in Malawi
and the belief that there is external sponsorship to “Islamicize” the country. The cold war in
the northern hemisphere expired in the early 1990s, but something akin to it persists to this
day in Malawi, masked in religious fervor and proselytization. It is useful to provide context
for these claims.
The recent history of Africa, especially from the 19th century, is one of colonialism
by various European nations. Their quest for various raw materials and affordable labor led
to the continent being carved up into states that reflected more the European rivalries than the
need for internal cohesion of the African colonies. Thus, the legacy of colonialism in Africa
includes the creation and subsequent maintenance of highly arbitrarily drawn political
boundaries that have placed different ethnic groups within the same countries, while
simultaneously spreading some ethnic groups across different countries (see Mchombo,
1998b; Ungar, 1986).
The Republic of Malawi, formerly known as Nyasaland, became a British
Protectorate in 1892. It attained independence from Britain in 1964. Like other African
states, Malawi has a number of ethnic groups within its borders. Of these, the major ones are
the Nyanja, Lomwe, Tumbuka, Yao, Tonga, Sena, Lambya, Nkhonde, and Nyakyusa. Of
these, the Nyanja were in the majority (see Kishindo, 1994; Matiki, 1997, forthcoming;
Mchombo, 1998a; Young, 1949). The Tumbuka, Tonga, Lambya, Nkhonde, and Nyakyusa
are concentrated in the northern part of the country. In the north, the Tumbuka constitute, by
far, the major group extending into the neighboring country of Zambia to the west. The
Nyanja spread from the central plains to the southern parts of Malawi, spreading further into
parts of Mozambique and Zambia. One sub-group of the Nyanja, concentrated in the central
hinterland of the country, is called Chewa. The Yao predominate along the southern coastline
of Lake Malawi, on both the Malawi and Mozambique sides, and spread into parts of
southern Malawi. They are more numerous in Mozambique and spread to southern Tanzania.
The Yao will be singled out here because, more than the others, the Yao is the ethnic
group that converted to Islam much earlier under the influence of Arabs (see Bone, 2000, for
a detailed discussion of Arab/Muslim interaction in Malawi). Before the British moved into
Malawi, the Arabs had been active, engaging in ivory collection and the slave-trade. Sailing
down Lake Malawi from Tanzania, they set up slave trading centers at Karonga near the
northern extremity of Lake Malawi and at Nkhotakota on the central shore of the lake. In
each of these locations, local collaborators served as agents of the Arabs. In Karonga, there
was a series of conflicts between the British and the slave-trader Mlozi, which started in 1887
and continued at least until 1889; although they more likely continued until 1895 when Mlozi
was finally captured in battle (see Kalinga, 1980). In Nkhotakota, a deal was struck between
Religion and Politics in Malawi 5
the British and the local slave-trade agent Jumbe to desist from further slave-trade. A treaty
was signed between Jumbe and Sir Harry Johnston in 1889. The tree under which the treaty
was brokered remains as an historical monument a few yards from the main center of
Anglican missionary activity in Nkhotakota. The tree is near All Saints Church, the major
Anglican church in Nkhotakota, St. Anne’s Hospital, and Linga Primary School, all run by
the Anglican Diocese.
One other outpost was Mangochi, located at the southern extremity of the lake. The
latter was convenient, since it was in the heartland of the Yao, who were allies through their
conversion to Islam. The slave-trading outposts of the Arabs, unsurprisingly, became the
major locations where Islam flourished in Malawi. In Karonga, there have been pockets of
Muslim settlements around the Boma (the local government offices) at Ngerenge lakeshore
areas as well as near Kasoba. A small mosque was opened as recently as three years ago at
Kasoba by President Muluzi, the current president of Malawi.3 The Muslims in Karonga
were known as BaSwahili (the Swahili people) because of their use of Kiswahili (the Swahili
language) and their links with Tanganyika (now Tanzania). Interestingly, many of these
“Swahili people” were originally Yao from northern Mozambique and southern Malawi.
The group of Muslims who were located in Karonga identified linguistically and
culturally with Muslims in Tanzania. They had minimal interaction with the majority of
Malawian society. Instead, it was the Muslims from the central and the southern shores of
Lake Malawi who became more visible in the country. For a long time, Muslims in Malawi
were associated with either being of the Yao ethnic group (or with having origins in
Mangochi and its environs) or being from the Nkhotakota area.
British penetration of Nyasaland was spearheaded by missionary activity, specifically
that of David Livingstone and, later, Robert Laws. Evangelization and the spreading of
Christianity led to the establishment of a number of denominations in Central Africa,
including those of the Church of Scotland (locally known as the Church of Central African
Presbyterian (CCAP)) and the Church of England (the Anglican Church). Because of its
active program of recruitment of young graduates in British universities for missionary work,
the Anglican Church was popularly known as the Universities Mission to Central Africa
(UMCA). The UMCA was formed after Dr. David Livingstone delivered a famous speech at
Cambridge appealing to the British to turn their attention to Africa. The UMCA was formed
by people at Cambridge, Oxford, Durham, and Trinity College, Dublin, all of which were
very much associated with High Anglicanism (see Mphande 1996). Then there were the
Catholic Church, the Seventh Day Adventist Mission, and other denominations. Some of
these missionary impulses, especially within the Anglican Church, were initially drawn to
abolishing the Arab slave trade. The task of deterring the Arab slave traders and abolishing
slavery placed the Anglican missionaries squarely in the coastal locations where Arab activity
was most intense. The Anglican Church established its strongholds in Nkhotakota and
Mangochi, the very locations where the Arabs had two of their slave-trade outposts and where
Islam had been flourishing.
In order to monitor the Arab ships sailing down the lake with their cargo of slaves,
the Anglican Church established its major cathedral on the island of Likoma in Lake Malawi,
making it a convenient observation post. This led to the conversion of practically the whole
island population to the Anglican religion, including some of the coastal villages on the
Mozambican mainland across the lake from the island. Among the earliest converts were
3 I am grateful to Felix Mnthali (p.c.) for drawing my attention to the existence of Islam in
Karonga, and to Owen Kalinga for indicating that some of those Muslims who were referred to as
BaSwahili (the Swahili people) were, in reality, of Yao ethnicity.
6 Sam Mchombo
freed slaves who, consequently, fell under the patronage of the missionaries and adopted
Christianity. For the generation of Malawians currently in mid- to old-age, being Anglican or
Muslim amounted to a declaration of one’s (possible) origins. If one were Muslim or
Anglican, one had to be from the coastal areas just mentioned. The rest of the country was
converted to other brands of Christianity, primarily Catholicism and Presbyterianism (the
Church of Scotland).
ISLAM IN INDEPENDENT MALAWI
In 1964, the colonial era in South Central Africa began to end. In July, 1964,
Malawi, formerly British Nyasaland, became independent. Hastings Kamuzu Banda,
ethnically a Chewa from the central region district of Kasungu, became the Prime Minister.
Malawi attained Republic status in 1966, and Kamuzu Banda became President and later,
after forcing the necessary constitutional amendment, was sworn in as President for Life.
Kamuzu Banda was autocratic and brooked no opposition to his rule or to his political party,
the Malawi Congress Party, which became the ruling and sole legal party in Malawi. Critics
of his rule and policies, real or imagined, experienced the harshest conditions of political
detention or worse (see Lwanda, 1993; Short, 1974). President Banda’s domestic policies,
which saw him acquire land and wealth at the expense of the dispossessed masses, enforced
“capitalism at its most rapacious,” as Tony Green, a British academic teaching at the
University of Malawi in the early 1970s, commented.
In foreign policy, Banda opted for open diplomatic relations with the countries that
were at the time under sanctions imposed by the Organization of African Unity or the United
Nations. These were South Africa, Rhodesia, then ruled by Ian Smith under a Unilateral
Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain, and Portugal, which was involved in a tense
struggle with Frelimo forces in Mozambique. The crafting of Malawi’s foreign policy was as
much a function of global alliances, geo-political factors, and economic incentives as it was a
function of the personal character of Banda. President Banda’s foreign policy of cordial
relations with apartheid South Africa resulted from the latter’s willingness to provide initial
capital for one of Banda’s cherished projects (see Hedges, 1989; McMaster, 1974; Short,
1974).
The major thing that Banda did which shaped Malawi’s foreign policy was to move
the administrative capital from Zomba, a small town located some forty miles northeast of
Blantyre, the main commercial city, to the centrally located city of Lilongwe. The logic for
this was simple: economic development in the country had been skewed because power was
concentrated in the southern region, which hosted both the administrative capital and the
commercial center and had the tea estates. The claim was that the country would develop
more uniformly if the administrative headquarters were more centrally based. It would
stimulate economic activity in the region, already the area for tobacco farming and corn
growing. Naturally, it was supposed to be purely accidental that Lilongwe and the central
region was also the heart of Chewaland and that Kamuzu Banda was a nationalistic Chewa.
The project did not win the approval and support of the “traditional” donor countries
(Great Britain, the United States, and other Western countries). They expressed reluctance to
fund the project. Diversification of economic activity did not appear to justify the
expenditure for shifting the administrative headquarters. In the ensuing impasse, South
Africa, noting major political and strategic advantages, offered to provide Banda with the
initial capital for the project. Malawi’s foreign policy immediately underwent a major shift to
accommodate relations with the apartheid regime. Under the policy of “contact and
dialogue,” Banda defended relations with South Africa using the argument that the way to
Religion and Politics in Malawi 7
change human relations in South Africa was not through economic boycott, but through
discussion. It was a policy that isolated Malawi from the rest of the African countries, and for
most Africans, Banda degenerated into “the greatest rogue that went unhung” (for more
details, see McMaster, 1974).
The criticism derived from the pressure on African countries to demonstrate unity
against apartheid and for the liberation of countries then still under white rule. Malawi’s
foreign policy of “contact and dialogue” with the white regime in South Africa as well as in
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and of maintaining cordial relations with the Portuguese (then still
controlling Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea Bissau) amounted to undermining the call for
African unity and the liberation of those countries. Admittedly, Malawi was not alone in
cultivating or retaining diplomatic relations with South Africa. Despite pretenses, the UK and
the US supported South Africa too—in the case of the US, right through the 1980s.4
However, Malawi is an African country and, as a member of the Organization of African
Unity, it was expected to show solidarity with the other nations in their commitment to
African liberation.
In terms of global alliances, and its pretensions to non-alignment notwithstanding,
Malawi had aligned itself with the Western bloc. Kamuzu Banda’s regime pursued a policy
of anti-communism in its extreme version. This was reflected in the banning of anything
communist, especially communist literature, liberally defined as works either promoting
communist ideology or any publication originating from the Eastern bloc irrespective of the
subject matter.
With regard to the Middle East, Malawi’s policy was very closely allied to the
policies of Britain, the United States, etc. In brief, Malawi maintained a pro-Israel policy in
the Arab-Israel conflict. This had implications for the spread of Islam in Malawi. With a
pro-Israel policy and minimal contact with Arab nations, Arab influence and values remained
rudimentary. The history of the Arab slave-trade in Central Africa contributed further to
Banda’s political indifference to the Arab states. In one of his public speeches, commenting
on his policy of contact and dialogue with the Afrikaner regime in apartheid South Africa,
Banda noted that his critics were among those Africans who addressed Arabs as “brothers”
despite the historical record of Arab atrocities towards Africans. He remarked that his father
would squirm were he to see him being cordial to and embracing (Gamal) Nasser (then
President of Egypt). Banda’s allusion to Arab enslavement of Africans was certainly a strand
in his approach to the visibility of, or prominence accorded to, Islam in Malawi (see Short,
1974, pp. 297-304).
Furthermore, Kamuzu Banda was a puritanical member of the Church of Scotland,
Presbyterian denomination. He had studied medicine in Scotland, later opening a private
surgery in Harrow, near London. He was such an Anglophile that on more than one occasion
he remarked that he regarded Great Britain as his other home. It was no surprise, therefore,
that, when Britain and Argentina went to war over the Falkland Islands, Malawi vigorously
attacked Argentina as the aggressor in the conflict. In brief, the value system that imbued
Banda’s psyche, ranging from his attire, through diet and language (he only spoke English),
to religion, was British (see Mphande, 1996). Given all that, Banda’s tolerance of Islam
could be construed as no more than that, tolerance. There was no vested interest in promoting
it.
Although Kamuzu Banda allowed freedom of worship in Malawi, the churches, just
like the media and educational institutions, had, with few exceptions, to toe the party line (see
Schoffeleers, 1999). Only the Jehovah’s Witness sect, whose members had been physically
4 I thank Noam Chomsky for pointing out this fact to me.
8 Sam Mchombo
harassed and driven out of the country because of their unwillingness to purchase
membership in the Malawi Congress Party, exhibited open dissent. However, Malawi was,
by general consensus, a Christian country.
The spread of Islam may have also been hampered by the Muslims’ lack of
investment in educational or health-care facilities. This could also have resulted from
interference from the British missionaries and administration. Having effectively ended Arab
activities in the region, allowing them to establish social services would negate the objectives
of colonization and evangelization. It should be noted that the Churches exerted pressure on
the British government to colonize Malawi on the pretext that Islam, in the guise of Muslim
slave-traders, was a threat to “Christian civilization,” then being implanted in the region. The
missionaries had established schools and hospitals, and Kamuzu Banda was among the many
beneficiaries of those facilities.
The establishment of educational and health facilities by the Christian missionaries
placed an onus on Muslim families whose children, in order to secure an education, had to
attend missionary-run schools (see Bone, 1985; Chakanza, 2000). For many of them, peer
pressure got them to convert to Christianity. To avoid increased defections of the youth from
Islam to Christianity, some Muslim families simply avoided sending their children to school,
effectively reducing their literacy levels and their competitiveness in job markets requiring
skilled labor. This effectively guaranteed employment opportunities and subsequent political
prominence to Christians. Islam remained a minority religion confined primarily to coastal
areas which had come into contact with Arab influence, or among the Yao in the southern
part of the country but predominating in Mozambique.
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND THE RISE OF ISLAM
Banda’s control over Malawi was so absolute, from the media through the judiciary,
the military, and the legislature, to the executive branches of government, police and domestic
affairs, and foreign affairs, etc., that it was practically impossible to imagine him dislodged
from power. The expectation was that he would only relinquish power upon his demise, after
which issues of transition would be dealt with. Under his autocratic rule, human rights
violations practically became an aspect of ordinary daily life, a fact noted in various
publications by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and other organizations
devoted to monitoring human rights abuses. Africa Watch’s 1990 publication, Where Silence
Rules: The Suppression of Dissent in Malawi, provided more details about the human rights
violations of the Banda regime. Sam Mpasu (1995), a former political detainee, offers rare
insight in lucid prose into the Kafkaesque politics of the Banda regime and the realities of life
in Malawi’s notorious detention camps. This is in his non-fictional publication, Political
Prisoner 3/75 of Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda.
The brutality of the Banda regime made the population yearn for a change to a more
democratic system. The altered global politics in the early 1990s, which witnessed the
demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war along with other changes in the
regional politics in southern Africa, heralded an era of transition to democratic practice (see
Mchombo, 1998b; Zeleza, 1994, 1997).
With regard to regional politics, Malawians witnessed a change in leadership in the
neighboring country of Zambia. President Kenneth Kaunda, who had ruled that country for
some 26 years, was finally defeated at the polls. The government of Frederick Chiluba took
over as a result of democratic elections. This conveyed the lesson that seemingly entrenched
incumbents could be unseated. The possibility of peaceful change achieved through a
democratic process appeared less remote.
Religion and Politics in Malawi 9
Then there were changes in South Africa. The apartheid regime that had contributed
to Banda’s security apparatus was about to be unseated by the African National Congress
under the leadership of Nelson Mandela. If South Africa, with its military might and
elaborate repressive internal security machinery designed to oppress the majority population
and protect minority interests, could crumble in the face of an unabated onslaught of
indomitable aspirations to equality and democratic values, Malawi could certainly achieve
similar goals. These changes also had a more direct impact on the options available to
Kamuzu Banda. The Chiluba administration in Zambia and the ANC in South Africa had no
vested interests in the Banda regime. They had fought for democratic changes in their
respective countries, and they were sympathetic to groups fostering democratic values in the
region. Just as Banda’s status within the New World Order created by the end of the Cold
War had been altered, Malawi’s position in the geo-political situation was faced with
overhaul.
The opposition groups based outside Malawi found more support from these new
democratic forces that provided impetus to challenge Banda’s rule. These external dynamics
had the conspiracy effect of dismantling the dictatorship in Malawi. The regional politics
derived extra effectiveness from an information revolution or the technological innovations in
information transmission. Information technology facilitated the transmission of news and
ideas without prior submission to the state machinery for censorship (see Lwanda, 1993,
1996; Mchombo, 1998).
Before political developments overtook Banda and eventually led to his ousting from
office, Islam had begun to receive assistance. Beginning in the early 1980s, there was
renewed interest from such countries as United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait to
alter the image of Islam and promote Muslim youth in Malawi.5 Muslim youth organizations
and activities began receiving sponsorship, giving Islam visibility beyond the backwaters
where it had survived. The 1980s witnessed a resurgence in construction of mosques in
prominent locales that registered the presence of the religion. The visibility was intentional
and disconcerting to the non-Muslims who began to see the country as overwhelmed by
Islam.6 Banda’s receptiveness to increased Muslim presence was influenced by altered
relations within the Middle East. Some Arab states, for instance Egypt under Anwar Sadat,
had opened dialogue with Israel in the search for peace in the region. And, of course, there
was the oil crisis of the 1970s which, effectively, made it necessary to maintain relations with
the oil-producing countries, mainly Arab, in order to sustain economic activity and reduce
inflation. So, Islam began to venture into new territory. Even schools for Muslim students,
referred to as Madrasa, sprouted up in “highly visible places,” and Islamic Centers were
established in many areas.
Islam then received a major boost from subsequent political developments. Although
5 Circa 1982 the author, while a faculty member of the University of Malawi’s Chancellor College
in Zomba, and as Head of the then Dept. of Chichewa & Linguistics (now renamed Dept. of
African Languages & Linguistics), was once visited on campus by a Muslim from either Kuwait
or United Arab Emirates. The visitor was involved in directing or promoting Muslim youth
activities in Malawi. He paid the author a visit to review with him, and possibly to secure his
assistance in, a proposed project of translating the Qur’an into Chichewa. The promised follow-up
visit for a progress report on the project never materialized. Incidentally, there may now be a
Chichewa version of the Qur’an, according to a recent press report in Malawi.
6 Andrew Tilimbe Kulemeka (p.c.) noted that in Lilongwe the minaret of a centrally-located
mosque is equipped with speakers that are so loud that the muezzin’s call to prayer can neither be
missed nor ignored. It is believed that this is deliberate, serving to underscore the presence of
Islam in the country.
10 Sam Mchombo
for a long time the Church in Malawi had confined its activities to ministering to the spiritual
needs of the people, it had also played a great role in meeting the educational and health
needs of the population. In all this, the church had stayed clear of politics to the point of
being viewed as an ally to the regime. However, the gross injustices prevailing in Malawi
under the Banda regime could no longer be ignored as not meriting comment and redress.
These included the disappearances of people in political disfavor; inequalities of access to
economic resources, medical care, and education; and the curtailment of freedom of speech,
of the press, and of academic inquiry. In January 1992, the Episcopal Conference of Malawi
met in Lilongwe to review their relationship with the government. The end result was that
“the bishops decided to act by writing a letter exposing unjust government policy in several
areas of Malawian life.” (Cullen, 1994, p. 36).
The letter, an 11-page pastoral document entitled “Living Our Faith,” spelled out the
new course for the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church resolved to be more proactive in
addressing the temporal problems of the people than had been the case previously. The
pastoral letter detailed the ills of Malawian society, such as the increasing inequality between
the rich and the poor, the spread of corruption, flaws in educational systems, denial of basic
freedoms, cutbacks in health care, etc. There were 16,000 copies of the letter printed in the
three major languages of the country (10,000 in Chichewa, 5,000 in Chitumbuka, and 1,000
in English) and distributed to all parishes to be read during the Ash Wednesday celebration on
4 March, 1992. The real impact of the pastoral letter lay in the use of the pulpit to provide
scope for public comment on the economic and political problems in Malawi, done
simultaneously nationwide. This was an aspect of freedom of speech that the government had
previously completely curtailed. The public criticism of the government that ensued
constituted the real significance of the pastoral letter and the government was never to recover
from it.
It should be noted that the Catholic Bishops’ Pastoral emerged out of many years of
religious acquiescence in Banda’s policies. The acquiescence arose out of earlier clashes
between church and state when the then Archbishop of Blantyre had helped Chester Katsonga
and others form a Christian Liberation Party along the lines of the Christian Democratic
Parties that arose in Europe after World War II (see Schoffeleers, 1999). The creation of such
a party to challenge the supremacy of Banda’s Malawi Congress Party, and his eventual rise
to power, so angered Kamuzu Banda that, in order to maintain cordial relations between the
church and the new government, the Catholic Bishops pledged to distance themselves from
politics. The 1992 Pastoral letter was something of an abrogation of that earlier pledge. It
had a vigor borne out of a kind of confession and was symptomatic of a kind of contrition,
and it galvanized all faiths.
The effect of the pastoral letter was to force people to talk openly about it and thus
about the things it had detailed. This conversation provided scope for unbridled attacks on
the government and gave rise to the emergence of opposition pressure groups, which later
became opposition political parties. The major opposition parties to emerge were the
Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) led by Chakufwa Chihana, a Tumbuka from the north, and
the United Democratic Front (UDF) led by Bakili Muluzi, a Yao from the south. The
political activism that ensued, compounded by international pressure for democratization, a
severely weakened economy due to, inter alia, drought and the effects of HIV/AIDS, forced
President Banda to hold a referendum on the retention of one-party politics. The referendum
was held in 1993 and, with 67% voting for multi-party politics, Banda was handed his first
defeat at the polls. In May 1994, a general election was held, and Banda received his ultimate
defeat when his party, the Malawi Congress Party, lost to the United Democratic Front.
The election results were notable for their ethnic alignments. The Tumbuka ethnic
Religion and Politics in Malawi 11
group in the north overwhelmingly voted for the candidate from their part of the country and
of their ethnic affiliation, Chakufwa Chihana. The Malawi Congress Party, led by Kamuzu
Banda, a Chewa, had its best showing in the central region of the country, predominated by
the Chewa ethnic group. The southern part of the country, more multi- ethnic, with a larger
percentage of the population, threw their support behind the candidate from their region,
Bakili Muluzi, and the United Democratic Front (see Chirwa, 1994/1995; Mchombo, 1998b;
Posner, 1995). With the victory of the United Democratic Front, Bakili Muluzi, a Yao and a
Muslim, became the second president of Malawi.
The irony implicit in the Catholic Bishops effectively paving the way for a Muslim to
attain the highest office in the land has to be tempered with the realization that political
change and the emergence of democratic practice had been achieved, in part, through the
actions of religious figures (see Doepp, 2000). Religion has remained central to political
consciousness in Malawi. Now that Islam had made the ultimate transition from being a
minority religion, slowly expanding with a little help from oil-rich sponsors, to the State
House, is now identified with the Head of State, the recurring question among Malawians has
been “is the genie out of the bottle?” In brief, can Islam be contained and be made to co-exist
with Christianity? Alternatively, does the change herald the eventual take-over of Malawi by
Islam, with prospects, or the specter, of introduction of Shariah law, leading to the kind of
unrest witnessed in other countries as was the case in parts of Nigeria?
RELIGION, POLITICS, ELECTIONS, AND BEYOND
The charge that a Muslim president may be inclined to make Islam the dominant
religion in the country has been recurrent, and President Muluzi has repeatedly dismissed it as
unfounded and completely antithetical to his political program. That may be so, but relations
between the two religions have manifested signs of strain. During the summer of 2002, a
Malawi paper carried a rather disturbing headline on the front page. It referred to the
Catholic Church requiring that teachers in Catholic schools be Christian. This was supposed
to be in retaliation, or in response, to perceived discriminatory tendencies in Muslim schools
where students and teachers of other faiths were not (regularly) admitted.
The quest for young minds through educational programs has been compounded by a
concerted effort to reach out to the general public through the air-waves. The Muslims
established a radio station, Radio Islam, countering, or countered by, Radio Maria of the
Catholics. Then, there is the issue of the foreign policy that has been pursued by President
Muluzi. The policy has promoted relations with Arab states and other Islamic nations such as
Malaysia, with corresponding reduction in relations with western countries such as the UK
and the USA—countries which are currently viewed as not very supportive of Muluzi. In
2002, when President Muammar Qadaffi of Libya visited Malawi, on his way back from the
Africa Union meeting in South Africa, it was widely “rumored” that part of his agenda was to
ensure that Islam continues to maintain a stronghold in the country.
Such rumors have also been fueled by the influx of “petro-dollars” into Malawi.
Both Libya, whose leader is viewed as being on a crusade to spread Islam, and Kuwait have
poured money into Malawi. There are a number of projects in the country that have been
funded by the Kuwait Fund for International Development.
Besides the involvement of the Arab nations, Muslims of Pakistani origins have also
been very active in revitalizing Islam in the country. They have worked with Muslims in
Malawi and South Africa (the Durban area being key) and with those from Arab countries.
Through these countries, young Malawi Muslims have been trained in Islamic universities in
12 Sam Mchombo
the Sudan, Egypt, and other Middle Eastern countries.7
An effort to retain Islam in the State House was a relevant side issue to President
Muluzi’s spirited attempts over the past two years to get the Constitution amended in order to
repeal the restriction on holding the presidency for only two terms, each of five years
duration. The idea was to replace it with what was called an “open term.” This meant that a
candidate could run for as many terms as s/he deemed fit. The open term bill did not garner
the necessary votes in Parliament. It departed, however, only to be replaced by a modified
version, at least terminologically, called the “Third term Bill.” The modification was to have
the Constitution amended to enable President Muluzi to run for a third term. That got
withdrawn when it became evident that it was headed for defeat in Parliament (see Mchombo,
2002). Both the open term bill and third term bill were viewed as subterfuges for President
Muluzi to remain in power indefinitely, effectively reverting to autocracy and dictatorship.
The year 2004 was an election year in Malawi. After ten years of having a Muslim
as Head of State and the United Democratic Front as the ruling party, the question is: What
changes are imminent? For Islam, the issue is: Can it continue to hold in those higher
positions of political power? Conversely, the Christians must wonder whether their
numerical superiority can restore the political patronage that they enjoyed under President
Banda. As noted by Felix Mnthali (p.c.), the expectation is that there is minimal chance that
“…the Muslims will hold on to their hegemony in the politics of Malawi. They cannot be
more than 30% of the population. The Christians won’t let them get away with whatever they
wish.” Indeed, Christian Churches have been active facilitators in current efforts to create a
credible opposition coalition to defeat the UDF at the next elections. The Christian leaders
formed an organization called the Christian Churches Committee on the Electoral Process
(CCCEP).8 Although some of the churches belong to the Public Affairs Committee (PAC),
which includes Muslims, the CCCEP are doing this as individuals and their churches are “not
involved.” By maintaining this separation, the PAC cannot be associated with any issues
relating to the other organization. Further, given that the PAC also has Muslim members, the
CCCEP can advance a Christian agenda without implying the connivance or complicity of the
Muslim community. Nevertheless, in light of the sponsorship available and the hearts and
minds willing to pursue the goal, one wonders whether Mnthali’s comment might not reduce
to wishful thinking. Note that there is even a new organization called the League of Islamic
Graduates of Malawi. Bakili Muluzi has been a keen supporter of this organization, with
which he holds annual meetings (Lwanda, p.c.). Imran Shareef, a university lecturer based at
Chancellor College, the main liberal college in the University of Malawi, serves as the
Secretary General of the organization.
That religion continues to be relevant to politics in Malawi was made manifest only
last year. As the political parties prepare for the coming general elections, President Muluzi,
having conceded that aspirations to a further term must be abandoned, and lacking the
constitutional amendment that would legitimize the effort, decided to select the presidential
candidates for his party. Ignoring here the procedural irregularities that accompanied this
idiosyncratic selection process in which, apparently, participation by the UDF executive, let
alone of the rank and file, was curtailed, President Muluzi selected Bingu wa Mutharika to be
the Presidential candidate for UDF, with Cassim Chilumpha as his running mate. Bingu wa
Mutharika was one of the intellectuals who joined the UDF at its inception. He had been with
7 Thanks to Owen Kalinga for this observation. Indeed, the Asian (primarily Indian) community
in Malawi was, for a long time, the most visible Islamic community in the towns.
8 Thanks to George Nnensa for this point. The Christians’ effort to facilitate the formation of a
coalition that could challenge the United Democratic Front (UDF) is not being done through the
Public Affairs committee. This remains a non-partisan body and wishes to protect that image.
Religion and Politics in Malawi 13
Comesa (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) and remained there after standing
against Muluzi at the UDF Convention in 1993 but failing to win the nomination. This act
caused resentment in the UDF ranks, as did his ambition to stand for the presidency in 1999.
Later, he was removed from Comesa, but he then formed his own party, the United Party,
although he was eventually persuaded to re-join the ruling party, which he publicly did. He
was rewarded for this change of heart by being appointed to the position of Deputy Governor
of the Reserve Bank of Malawi and thereby became automatically a member of Muluzi’s
economic circle (Lwanda, p.c.). Then followed his accelerated rise to prominence, facilitated
by President Muluzi. While strict adherence to democratic practice may have been given
short shrift in the selection of candidates, and the general public has consigned that to politics
internal to the UDF party, what could not be overlooked is the religious affiliations of the
appointed candidates.
Bingu wa Mutharika is from the southern part of the country and is a Catholic.
Apparently, he was selected to attract or appease the Catholic or Christian voters and the rest
of the population in this most populous region of the country. Cassim Chilumpha is from
Nkhotakota in the center and is a Muslim. The constitution of the UDF party was also
amended—the amendment eventually ratified at the UDF General Convention last August.
The amended constitution provides for President Muluzi to become the Party Chairman when
he leaves the office of President. The innovation is that, should the UDF win the elections,
the President and the Vice-President will be under the Party chairman. Islam may thus
continue to maintain its presence in the highest echelons of the UDF Party.
For Christians who see tentacles of Islam strengthening their grip on the country’s
leadership, the UDF’s slate of candidates does not provide much comfort. It is noted that,
given the relatively advanced age of Bingu wa Mutharika and his perceived political
ineptness, his term of office, were he to be elected, might have to be completed by the Vice
President, the Muslim. Indeed, some church leaders speculate that Bingu wa Mutharika
would have no real power, which would instead be wielded by the Muslim Chilumpha. Add
to that the de facto rule by the former President from the vantage point of Chairman of the
Party, and Islam will or could remain the religion of Malawi’s leadership.
It is against this background that George W. Bush’s crusade to engage in war on
terror, fighting Islamic fundamentalism, conducting war in Iraq, routing al-Qaeda, has to be
evaluated. It is perceived as a concerted attempt to reverse the gains made by Islam, to
subject the oil resources of the Gulf region to American control, and to subjugate Islamic
civilization to western or Christian values. In addition, there is a certain idealism that sees
Islam as the underdog standing up to both America, the sole remaining super-power, and
Britain, its staunchest ally. Add to that the perennial question of Palestine which invites
sympathy from non-Muslims and Muslims alike, and the Muslim protests in Malawi fit into
the larger picture of global politics.
Events in countries such as the Sudan, where a civil war has raged for over twenty
years, a war that has pitted the Muslim and Arab north against a Christian and African south,
provides testimony of the consequences of confrontation between the two religions. In this
case, the situation is further compounded, albeit subtly, by racial considerations. The civil
war broke out when the Muslim (and Arab) north tried to impose its laws on the
predominantly Christian (and African) south. This is Shariah law, whose origins date back to
the origins of Islam. As noted in one place:
Muslim jurisprudence is ordered by an imposing set of canonical texts,
sometimes going as far back as the origins of Islam which constitute the
sunna, the “trodden path” (i.e., by the Prophet). Religious law, called the
14 Sam Mchombo
shari’â, flows directly from it and is wholly inspired by it, sometimes in
complicated detail. It is still imposed by governments of several theocracies,
such as the Sudan. (Chebel, 2003, p. 11)
Further, there is the case of Uganda, a country that for a long time resisted promoting
Kiswahili as a lingua franca, despite the reality of its linguistic ubiquity. This resistance
derived from the perceived linkage between Kiswahili and Islamic culture and religion. For a
country where, “particularly in Buganda, the Church has enjoyed an enviable esteem”
(Whiteley, 1969, p. 69), the spread of Kiswahili was viewed as tantamount to submission to
Islam. In fact, as noted further by Whiteley, “the position of Swahili in this land of
Christians, was jeopardized from the outset by its association with Islam, a rival and ‘inferior’
religion, about whose alleged vices apprehensive Christians and many denominations were
prepared to unite.”
In brief, a version of a religious cold war seems to be underway in countries such as
Malawi with the usual alignment of forces, allies, etc. The issue of the apprehension of the
alleged al-Qaeda members was immediately cast in “Islam-versus-Christianity” terms. As
noted in the local newspaper, The Daily Times of June 30, 2003, for the Muslims in
Mangochi, “the whole issue was between Christians and their (The Muslims’-SM) faith” (p.
3).
BACK TO THE MUSLIMS’ PROTESTS IN MALAWI
An issue that was left pending relates to why the Muslims vandalized the Muslim
Association of Malawi (MAM) offices in Blantyre, damaging some of the computers, and
why they torched local offices of the UDF Party in Mangochi. The prevailing view was that
the Muslims were expressing anger at the President for his failure to protect them, and also at
MAM’s failure to press President Muluzi to take action. Instead, the President had allowed
himself to be dictated to by the biggest enemy of Islam and friend of Israel, America.
While this seems to provide a unified explanation for the attacks on installations not
identified with either American influence or Christianity, the destruction of computers in
MAM offices, inevitably, gave rise to alternative accounts. Speculation was that there might
have been information relating to al-Qaeda activities stored in the computers of MAM.
Destruction of the computers can be seen thus as a ploy to eliminate possible corroborative
evidence.
Regardless of the ranking of these speculations on a veracity scale, the message is
explicit. A Muslim president should stand up for his religion, protecting it against the forces
bent on its destruction, subjugation or, worse, annihilation. If Islam remains the religion of
the ruling elite, expectation will be that it is a duty that the elite must discharge or
responsibility that they have to bear.
There is, however, one significant observation about Islam in Malawi that has been
made by Lwanda. He notes that in Malawi the relationship between the ruling Muslim elite
and some orthodox Muslims has not been straightforward. A Muslim, Sheikh Bughdad, was
allegedly beaten to death by ruling party youth, unfashionably referred to as Young
Democrats, in 2002. He had been openly critical of the way “Muluzi was using the name of
Islam for his own corrupt objectives.” Some orthodox Muslims did not see Muluzi’s regime
as torch-bearers of true Islam. Some political commentators suggest that, like Banda, who
used culture, Muluzi has used Islam as a legitimating and leveraging tool (see Lwanda, in
press).
Still, the enemy of Islam, personified by George W. Bush and Tony Blair, is viewed
Religion and Politics in Malawi 15
as plundering the resources of the Arab world, in part for personal aggrandizement,
enrichment, and partly as a means of dealing with domestic problems. It is noted by
Samantha Power (2003, p. 96) that “as even a democracy like the United States has shown,
waging war can benefit a leader in several ways: it can rally citizens around the flag, it can
distract them from bleak economic times, and it can enrich a country’s elites.” Critics of the
current U.S. war in, and occupation of, Iraq echo the views expressed above. Ezequiel
Adamovsky (2004), writing for ZNet, makes the following poignant claim:
The hidden link between capitalism, social unrest, state violence, and
corruption is becoming more and more exposed all over the world. Iraqis
do not need to be explained this: George W. Bush is not only killing them
on a daily basis, but also privatizing their economy in record time, while
giving most contracts to his family’s and friends’ companies. (p. 1)
So, the Muslim response emanated from deep-rooted sentiments. Naturally, the
destruction of property and the endangerment of lives were swiftly condemned by both the
government and the local press. The Nation newspaper of 30 June, 2003, in an editorial,
pointed out that
the Muslims have also attacked people of other faiths like the Catholics in
Mangochi. We have reason to believe that fuelling inter religious feuds will
only bring lack of security among the many pious people in the country.
Christians and Muslims always preach love and tolerance. It is a shame for
such institution to start violence…” (Vol. 10, No. 121, p. 2)
This may have been enough of an indictment of Islamic extremism. However, the
real boon to the Christian community was in how they could counterpoise their reaction to
adversity. Thus, while Muslims could degenerate into acts of intolerance, the Christians
responded by taking the high ground of tolerance. They did not retaliate by attacking Muslim
establishments. Instead, their reserve showed the content of their religion and their adherence
to the tenets of their preaching, as noted in the editorial of The Nation. Clearly, this was as
much of a demonstration of the Christians’ respect for the laws proscribing destruction of
property as it was an aspect of sheer propaganda.
The response may have also been motivated by other considerations. Speculation
raged that the Christians’ response had been calculated to deprive the ruling party of the
pretext for unwarranted action. It was believed by many, especially in the Christian
community, that the Islamic riots could have been instigated by the UDF leadership itself in
the hope that the Christians would react violently too, in retaliation. That would have
provided the ruling party, the UDF, with an opportunity to declare a state of emergency.
Such a declaration might have provided the pretext for the postponement of the general
elections, giving the ruling party more time to re-organize itself and purge opponents of the
“third term.” The Christians’ reserve, whether construed as respect for the laws proscribing
destruction of property and endangerment of life, or as propaganda or fear of adverse
repercussions, resulted in (probably unwitting) avoidance of playing into the hands of UDF,
assuming that the belief had plausible grounds.
The significance of this was to become clearer a little later. At the consecration of a
Catholic Bishop, Bishop Peter Musikuwa of Chikwawa a month later, President Muluzi
openly threatened that he would deal with any religious unrest, without referring directly to
the Mangochi incident. The pragmatics of this pronouncement was not lost on the Christian
16 Sam Mchombo
community. It should be noted that over two years later, as far as is publicly known, no
action has been taken by the President to compensate the churches for their losses.
Regardless of how the events of June 2003 and the responses to them are construed, it is a
reality that, in Malawi, religion and politics have come into a symbiotic relationship, the full
ramifications of which have yet to be determined.
In closing, it should be noted that the individuals who had been apprehended and
were the ostensible cause for the protests were, allegedly, set free in Sudan a month later.
Curiously, there are conflicting reports about their release. It was reported in The Chronicle
that they had not been interrogated by American security personnel nor had they come into
contact with any. Yet, coincidentally, there was an article in The Daily Times entitled “AL-
QAEDA SAGA ...Govt. not aware of suspect’s release ... US says release confirmed in
media.” In the article, it was claimed that the League of Islamic Graduates of Malawi (see
above) wrote to the government inquiring into the fate of the five al-Qaeda suspects and
demanding the return of their property. The Ministry of Home Affairs responded with the
claim that there was no communication from the US government of any progress. The US
government, on the other hand, said that the fate of the five suspects had been widely
publicized in the local and international media, hence that there was no need to advise the
Malawi government. The events may appear muddled from the standpoint of the Malawi
press, and understandably so, but Kenneth Roth (2004) gives a clearer account. Criticizing
the United States government for its adoption of “war rules” instead of following “law-
enforcement rules” in its dealings with foreign governments on issues of suspected terrorists,
he points out that
the administration followed a similar pattern in June 2003, when five al-
Qaeda suspects were detained in Malawi. Malawi’s high court ordered local
authorities to follow the law and either charge or release the five men, all of
whom were foreigners. Ignoring local law, the Bush administration …
insisted that the men be handed over to U.S. security forces instead. The
five were spirited out of the country to an undisclosed location—not for trial,
but for interrogation. The move sparked riots in Malawi. The men were
released a month later in Sudan, after questioning by Americans failed to
turn up any incriminating evidence. (p. 5).
Thus, the situation remains ominous and far from re-assuring, given the potential for
reprisals. In the meantime, Christian Churches, as noted above, have been at the forefront of
a movement that has almost achieved an anti-UDF (in effect an anti-Muslim) coalition of
opposition parties designed to remove the UDF and its Muslim allies from power in the
coming elections. Whether or not the egos of the opposition leaders will permit this, the
message is clear: the divide between Christians and Muslims continues to grow.
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