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Theoretical pluralism and the scientific study of behavior

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... In this paper I propose to evaluate realism in this sense with respect to abstraction and idealization. Abstraction is leaving out detail from a theory, while idealization involves distortion of a representation relative to its target (Jones 2005;Godfrey-Smith 2009;Elliott-Graves and Weisberg 2014;Levy 2018). I will compare niche and neutral theories with respect to how they abstract and idealize in order to argue that they are similarly realistic theories (or similarly unrealistic, depending on one's perspective). ...
... Abstraction and idealization are central to modelling practice and both involve leaving stuff out from models. Specifically, abstraction is omitting detail from models, while idealization involves deliberately distorting or fictionalizing a model relative to a target system, often though not necessarily in a way that simplifies the model (Jones 2005;Godfrey-Smith 2009;Levy 2018). Thus, leaving out the atmosphere from a model of the earth is an abstraction, while modelling the earth as a perfect sphere is an idealization. ...
... Everyone should agree that highly idealized models are less realistic representations compared to less idealized models of the same phenomena, all else being equal (Wimsatt 2007;Godfrey-Smith 2009;Potochnik 2017;Levy 2018). This is because idealization, by definition, involves the distortion of a model relative to its target. ...
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Ecological neutral theory has been controversial as an alternative to niche theory for explaining community structure. Neutral theory, which explains community structure in terms of ecological drift, is frequently charged with being unrealistic, but commentators have usually not provided an account of theory or model realism. In this paper, I propose a framework for comparing the “realism” or accuracy of alternative theories within a domain with respect to the extent to which the theories abstract and idealize. Using this framework I argue, contrary to most previous commentators, that neutral and niche theories are similarly realistic. Realism cannot provide a basis for accepting or rejecting either type of theory; instead, community ecologists should continue working with a plurality of models. While theoretical unification may become possible, we should treat a plurality of complementary, partial models as the expected situation within community ecology.
... En una de sus variantes, por ejemplo, el binomio ha sido articulado en torno a teorías o representaciones científicas, lo que ha suscitado el interrogante acerca de la posibilidad de unificar diferentes teorías o representaciones entre sí -siendo la reducción una de las formas más discutidas-. Bajo esta caracterización, el monismo supone la posi-bilidad de alcanzar teorías o representaciones unificadas mientras que el pluralismo acepta la multiplicidad como algo no defectuoso de la actividad científica (Kaiser 2015;Kellert, Longino & Walters 2006;Longino 2002Longino , 2013. Otra posibilidad ha consistido en pensar el debate en términos metodológicos, lo cual ha dado origen a la pregunta acerca de si existe una única lógica de justificación válida que deba ser aplicada en todo ámbito de investigación -variante monista-o si, por el contrario, también deben aceptarse diversas lógicas justificativas -variante pluralista- (Carnap 1937;Ruphy 2016). ...
... O, por lo menos, no tiende a buscar a priori los modos de unificar esos enfoques ni a suponer que uno de ellos debe imponerse sobre el resto. Esa disposición intelectual le corresponde al monista, quien, enfrentado a la pluralidad, considera que esta debe ser eliminada en favor de la unidad (Kellert, Longino & Walters 2006;Longino 2002;Pallitto 2019). ...
... En principio, el esquema propuesto admite la posibilidad de ser pluralistas respecto a ciertos elementos y ser monistas respecto a otros. Por ejemplo, se puede considerar la posibilidad de aceptar una única lógica de justificación válida para toda la actividad científica, pero aceptar que distintas representaciones de un mismo fenómeno no pueden unificarse, tal como sugiere Longino (2002). ...
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Las ciencias exhiben intereses, valores, lenguajes, metodologías, representaciones, teorías y ontologías múltiples y plurales. Este reconocimiento ha dado origen en la filosofía de la ciencia al debate monismo vs. pluralismo, arena en la que disputan posturas que valoran negativa o positivamente la pluralidad. En términos generales, los argumentos esgrimidos de un lado y otro se nutren de consideraciones metafísicas o epistemológicas. El objetivo de este trabajo es incorporar al debate argumentos de tipo ético, exhibiendo que, en contextos de intervención científica, cómo se concibe la pluralidad repercute de forma directa en nuestra percepción de los riesgos asociados a determinada intervención.
... The essential role that idealizations and distortions play in scientific modelling has been well documented (for just a small sampling, see : Batterman, 2001;Chirimuuta, 2014;Craver & Kaplan, 2018Hochstein, 2016a, 2016bHolland et al., 2019;Levy & Bechtel, 2013;Longino, 2006Longino, , 2013Mitchell, 2002Mitchell, , 2004Plutynski, 2013;Potochnik, 2015Potochnik, , 2017Weisberg, 2013). Put simply, we are often forced to represent the world in idealized ways that we know to be incorrect for different practical and representational purposes. ...
... This resulted in a collection of models which described different aspects of the action potential in incompatible ways, with no way of merging them all into a single comprehensive representation (see : Hochstein, 2016a;Holland et al., 2019;Trumpler, 1997). Similarly, the study of phenomena like aggression and sexual orientation in cognitive science involved the application of idealized and incompatible models from domains like neurobiology, social psychology, dynamical systems theory, and behavioural genetics (Longino, 2006(Longino, , 2013. 1 All of this means that under the traditional account of integration, our ability to generate integrated models of complex cognitive phenomena is extremely limited. So what does this say about the quest for integration in cognitive science? ...
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It is traditionally thought that integration in cognitive science requires combining different perspectives, elements, and insights into an integrated model or theory of the target phenomenon. In this paper I argue that this type of integration is frequently not possible in cognitive science due to our reliance on using different idealizing and simplifying assumptions in our models and theories. Despite this, I argue that we can still have integration in cognitive science and attain all the benefits that integrated models would provide, without the need for their construction. Models which make incompatible idealizing assumptions about the target phenomenon can still be integrated by understanding how to draw coherent and compatible inferences across them. I discuss how this is possible, and demonstrate how this supports a different kind of integration. This sense of integration allows us to use collections of contradictory models to develop a consistent, comprehensive and non-contradictory understanding of a single unified phenomenon without the need for a single integrated model or theory.
... Similarly, the view of levels being proposed acknowledges the important role that idealization and abstraction plays within scientific reasoning (e.g. Batterman, 2010;Cartwright, 1999;Elgin, 2004;Eliasmith & Trujillo, 2014;Hochstein, 2016bHochstein, , 2016cLongino, 2006;Potochnik, 2015;Woods & Rosales, 2010). Our cognitive limitations, and the particular representational tools we use, mean that certain patterns or regularities in nature may only be visible or understandable to us if presented in a way which foregrounds and backgrounds information in particular ways. ...
... For practical reasons, neuroscientists will often isolate a given neurological mechanisms from environmental influences under laboratory conditions to study its structure and behaviour (see: Datteri & Laudisa, 2012). Likewise, many kinds of genetic and epigenetic influences are not included in neuroscientific models (Longino, 2006). As such, the theories and models of neuroscience have tended to foreground and background different kinds of information than do models of other domains, like psychology and genetics. ...
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Talk of “levels” can be found throughout the sciences, from “levels of abstraction”, to “levels of organization”, to “levels of analysis” (among others). This has led to substantial disagreement regarding the ontology of levels, and whether the various senses of levels each have genuine value and utility to scientific practice. In this paper, I propose a unified framework for thinking about levels in science which ties together the various ways in which levels are invoked in science, and which can overcome the problems that different senses of levels have faced. I argue that levels can best be understood as choices scientists make regarding what sort of information to foreground in their models and theories, and what sort of information to push into the background. To change levels is to change the foregrounding and backgrounding of information for different representational and pragmatic purposes.
... (AgEn) endorses the critical interaction that makes the limitations of particular models, explanations, theories, and the limited range of concepts and methods visible (cf. supra, the example of Longino, 2006). It emphasizes the partiality of scientific knowledge and, as such, avoids exaggerated beliefs about the comprehensiveness of scientific knowledge. ...
... (Lawson, 2006: 499, his italics) Lawson makes the division of labour between post-Keynesians, institutionalists, Austrians, feminist economists and others heterodox approaches, explicit, focusing on their different concerns, substantive orientations and emphases, "in a manner that does not compromise their coherence as fruitful traditions in economics." (Ibid., 502) The comparative exercise Lawson is making here does resemble Longino's (2006) analysis of competing approaches in the Scientific Study of Behavior, mentioned above in section 3.3. ...
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(This paper was presented in the symposium "Scientific Pluralism and Epistemic Democracy: Interpreting Dissent in Economics" at INEM 2008.) The paper focuses on questions concerning diversity, plurality and dissent in economics from the perspective of social epistemology, inquiring social epistemologists’ ways of assessing competing scientific approaches. The main objective is to elaborate an adequate philosophical framework (based on the work of Helen Longino) that helps us to deal with scientific plurality and to show how this framework can be used to evaluate and improve (methodological) discussions in economics. In Section 2, I identify three different ways in which dissent and the plurality of scientific approaches has been interpreted (and normatively endorsed as scientific pluralism). Section 3 distinguishes between a consequentialist and a procedural way of dealing with competing scientific approaches. Subsequently, Helen Longino’s procedural proposal is introduced, and I advance her account as an outline for epistemic democracy. Some important aspects of Longino’s account in relation to scientific plurality are articulated in Section 4, while Section 5 inquires how her account can help us to evaluate the heterodox economists’ discussion on the limitations of neoclassical economics, the heterodoxy’s interpretation of pluralism and their strategies in dealing with dissent. Section 6 discusses briefly whether Longino’s CCE-norms should become part of good economic methodology pointing at some shortcomings of her account.
... It is for this very reason that some propose we need a more pluralistic understanding of explanation in order to better account for actual scientific practice in the behavioural sciences (see Longino 2006;Chemero & Silberstein 2008). What is important to note for our current purposes, however, is the fact that we use phenomenological models to perform different tasks than those we use mechanistic models for, regardless of whether each can be explanatory in the appropriate circumstances. ...
... A growing number of philosophers and scientists suggest that the complexity of nature, and the essential idealizations and distortions that scientific representations must employ, may make it impossible for a single type of model to capture everything that is scientifically relevant about a complex phenomenon (see for instance : Truesdell 1980;Dupré 1993;Suppes 1993;Hacking 1996;Cartwright 1999;Longino 2002Longino , 2006Batterman 2000Batterman , 2002aBatterman , 2002bFehr 2006;Chemero & Silberstein 2008). As Patrick Suppes notes: ...
... These assumptions may be correct in some cases, but there is considerable research, including psychological research, to suggest that individuals sometimes -perhaps often or even usually -are not "rational" nor seek to maximize profit (Bishop, 2007). 5 For similar reasons as other social sciences, there have also been calls for variations of strong pluralism in psychology (e.g., Fishman, 1999;Gantt and Melling, 2009;Howard and Christopherson, 2009;Longino, 2006;Miller, 2001;Slife and Gantt, 1999;Slife, Wiggins, and Graham, 2005;Viney, 1996;Wiggins, 2009;Yanchar and Slife, 2000). Like economics, the complexity of psychological phenomena is thought to resist reduction to monistic explanatory frameworks. ...
... After all, there is not a single reigning grand theory in psychology. There are, according to Longino (2006), at least four dominant theories of human behavior at work among psychologists: behavior genetics, social-environmental approaches, neurobiology, and developmental systems. Moreover, psychologists use a diversity of research methods: randomized controlled trials, naturalistic designs, case studies, and qualitative designs, for example (Kazdin, 2003). ...
Article
William James’s A Pluralistic Universe (1909/1987) was not very influential in his day; 100 years later, however, calls for a Jamesian-style pluralism are increasingly common in the natural and social sciences. We first summarize James’s critique of monism and his defense of pluralism. Next, we discuss similar critiques of monism and calls for “strong” pluralism across the natural and social sciences, even in traditional bastions of monism like physics, biology, and economics. We then argue that psychology is also in need of this pluralism, but the discipline is mired in uncritical, monistic assumptions, most notably operationism. We describe the problems this particular assumption presents, and also suggest some solutions we believe James would proffer, in the context of this monistic requirement.
... Often, the theories that have this property survive and thrive in the mainstream because they are Turing-complete 4 or otherwise very flexible and/or vague. Theories that act in amoeba-like anti-pluralist ways, encircling, engulfing, and perhaps even digesting other accounts, thus enforcing unification where none is needed nor asked for, likely are vicious and could even be said to dam-age their fields (also see Longino, 2006;Dow, 2012;Sawyer, 2021;Hibbert, 2016). ...
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I present an ontology of criteria for evaluating theory to answer the titular question from the perspective of a scientist practitioner. Set inside a formal account of our adjudication over theories, a metatheoretical calculus , this ontology comprises the following: (a) metaphysical commitment , the need to highlight what parts of theory are not under investigation, but are assumed, asserted, or essential; (b) discursive survival , the ability to be understood by interested non-bad actors, to withstand scrutiny within the intended (sub)field(s), and to negotiate the dialectical landscape thereof; (c) empirical interface , the potential to explicate the relationship between theory and observation, i.e., how observations relate to, and affect, theory and vice versa; (d) minimising harm , the reckoning with how theory is forged in a fire of historical, if not ongoing, abuses—from past crimes against humanity, to current exploitation, turbocharged or hyped by machine learning, to historical and present internal academic marginalisation. This work hopes to serve as a possible beginning for scientists who want to examine the properties and characteristics of theories, to propose additional virtues and vices, and to engage in further dialogue. Finally, I appeal to practitioners to iterate frequently over such criteria, by building and sharing the metatheoretical calculi used to adjudicate over theories.
... Furthermore, consider the view that reality itself is disunified, because the world is somehow "dappled" (Cartwright, 1999) or "disordered" (Dupre, 1993). This kind of ontological pluralism often holds that "there is not only one correct way of carving up the natural world and that different scientific interests and values lead to different but equally valid ontologies" (Ludwig & Ruphy, 2021), and has been defended as the proper epistemic attitude to adopt, because of the complexity of the world or because of the world's lack of an ordered structure (Longino, 2006(Longino, , 2013Waters, 2017). ...
Article
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Here, I take alethic views of understanding to be all views that hold that whether an explanation is true or false matters for whether that explanation provides understanding. I then argue that there is (as yet) no naturalistic defence of alethic views of understanding in cognitive science, because there is no agreement about the correct descriptions of the content of cognitive scientific explanations. I use this claim to argue for the provisional acceptance of afactivism in cognitive science, which is the view that the truth or falsity of an explanation of cognition is irrelevant to whether that explanation provides understanding. I conclude by discussing the relation between understanding in cognitive science and understanding in other domains.
... None of the approaches gives the whole picture. As Longino (2006) described so brilliantly: "Conflict develops when approaches seek to displace one another, but this is more a function of external pressures than of features intrinsic to the research itself" (p. 127). ...
... The philosophy of science in practice demands the inclusion of experimental techniques, research traditions, and repertoires when studying SP (Pickering 1992;Galison 1997;Soler and Catinaud 2014;Ankeny and Leonelli 2016). SP comes in many different flavors, such as metaphysical vs. epistemological SP (Cartwright 1999;Dupré 1993;Longino 2006); normative, evaluative, or descriptive SP (Chang 2012;Dupré 1993); intra-or interdisciplinary SP (Galison and Stump 1996); and integrative vs. non-integrative SP (Mitchell 2002;Chang 2012), to name a few. While SP is often not explicitly defined, I formulated these three criteria elsewhere as a common ground for card-carrying scientific pluralists in the recent literature (Veigl 2021): ...
Article
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Scientific pluralism has become a household position within the philosophy of science literature. There are numerous accounts of plurality within various research fields. Most scientific pluralists, however, focus on the plurality of theories, explanations, or mechanisms, while other potential targets of plurality that the philosophy of scientific practice has particularly emphasized have so far not received extensive treatment. How should we approach such practice-based candidates of plurality? And what are potential pluralist positions concerning the objects of scientific practice? In this article, I set out to answer these questions. I combine approaching a widely influential topic within the philosophy of science, scientific pluralism, with social science methodology. Using interview data combined with sociological analysis, I provide a nuanced picture of the dynamics of one particular research field that displays plurality. Focusing on how sociological configurations resonate with intellectual commitments within a research field, I disentangle practice-based from theoretical plurality. I consider how these empirical results should feedback on the scientific pluralism literature.
... The existence of several explanations (supported by different theories, experiments, tools, concepts, or categories) supporting a CAIS-based decision leads us to move the question of what would be a correct explanation. The question reminds us of the persistent challenge on how to work with a non-unifiable plurality of partial knowledge (Longino, 2006) [see also (Alrøe & Noe, 2014)]. ...
Article
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A widespread need to explain the behavior and outcomes of AI-based systems has emerged, due to their ubiquitous presence. Thus, providing renewed momentum to the relatively new research area of eXplainable AI (XAI). Nowadays, the importance of XAI lies in the fact that the increasing control transference to this kind of system for decision making -or, at least, its use for assisting executive stakeholders- already affects many sensitive realms (as in Politics, Social Sciences, or Law). The decision-making power handover to opaque AI systems makes mandatory explaining those, primarily in application scenarios where the stakeholders are unaware of both the high technology applied and the basic principles governing the technological solutions. The issue should not be reduced to a merely technical problem; the explainer would be compelled to transmit richer knowledge about the system (including its role within the informational ecosystem where he/she works). To achieve such an aim, the explainer could exploit, if necessary, practices from other scientific and humanistic areas. The first aim of the paper is to emphasize and justify the need for a multidisciplinary approach that is beneficiated from part of the scientific and philosophical corpus on Explaining, underscoring the particular nuances of the issue within the field of Data Science. The second objective is to develop some arguments justifying the authors’ bet by a more relevant role of ideas inspired by, on the one hand, formal techniques from Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, and on the other hand, the modeling of human reasoning when facing the explanation. This way, explaining modeling practices would seek a sound balance between the pure technical justification and the explainer-explainee agreement.
... We have entered an era where the philosopher's job consists of (at least in part) detailing the extent of pluralism in science, as well as providing a typology of the forms it takes in various domains (Wylie 1999). A quick skim of the literature concerning the relationships between scientific domains, fields or theories shows that pluralism can indeed take various forms in science-ontologically, conceptually and metaphysically-such as the promotion of a plurality of research methods in science or the denial of the reducibility of some scientific fields or concepts to lower-level ones (for a nonexhaustive sample of philosophers arguing in favor of different forms of pluralism see Brigandt 2010;Faucher 2012;Fodor 1974Fodor , 1998Galison and Stump 1996;Grantham 2004;Longino 2006Longino , 2013Mitchell 2002Mitchell , 2009Sullivan 2017;Wylie 1999). The particular form of pluralism that interests us here is the "local" integration of models taken from various fields, 1 or what, Tooby and , call an ICM-integrated causal model. ...
Article
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How can we best understand human cognitive architectural variability? We believe that the relationships between theories in neurobiology, cognitive science and evolutionary biology posited by evolutionary psychology’s Integrated Causal Model (ICM) has unduly supported various essentialist conceptions of the human cognitive architecture, monomorphic minds (to use Griffiths’ apt phrase), that mask HCA variability, and we propose a different set of relationships between theories in the same domains to support a different, non-essentialist, understanding of HCA variability. To set our case against essentialist theories of HCA variability, we detail the general notion of an ICM and the specific ICM at the heart of evolutionary psychology. We briefly illustrate the type of essentialism fostered by evolutionary psychology’s ICM by showing how it grounds essentialist theories of cognitive gender. We shall not criticize these theories here since the literature is replete with compelling objections to them, but shall instead focus on motivating a replacement ICM to destabilize evolutionary psychology’s ICM wholesale. ICMs usually span larger than the models they support, hence larger than arguments against these models, and one reason the essentialist theories addressed here have the kind of staying power they do is that they are partly supported by the ICM in which they are grounded. In short, we offer “A New Hope” against the essentialist empire. True to the Hollywood trope, this new hope rests on an alliance between a young theory, cognitive network neuroscience, and two older, but still quite young, epistemic rebels: enactive cognitive science and developmental systems theory. Accordingly, we detail and discuss the proposed emerging ICM and test-drive it by sketching the multimorphic view of gender it grounds.
... Neurobiologists studying the mechanisms responsible for psychological phenomena like sexual orientation often do not have the resources or time to include the information provided by behavioural genetics, despite such information providing essential insights into various components of the mechanism. Instead, the models from neurobiology often abstract away from, simplify, or idealize genetic details out of practical necessity, just as models in behavioural genetics will similarly idealize or simplify neurobiological details (for details, see : Longino 2006: Longino , 2013. This means that: ...
Article
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The study of psychological mechanisms is an interdisciplinary endeavour, requiring insights from many different domains (from electrophysiology, to psychology, to theoretical neuroscience, to computer science). In this article, I argue that philosophy plays an essential role in this interdisciplinary project, and that effective scientific study of psychological mechanisms requires that working scientists be responsible metaphysicians. This means adopting deliberate metaphysical positions when studying mechanisms that go beyond what is empirically justified regarding the nature of the phenomenon being studied, the conditions of its occurrence, and its boundaries. Such metaphysical commitments are necessary in order to set up experimental protocols, determine which variables to manipulate under experimental conditions, and which conclusions to draw from different scientific models and theories. It is important for scientists to be aware of the metaphysical commitments they adopt, since they can easily be led astray if invoked carelessly.
... Also, the juxtaposition of FFM and IPT perspectives makes the valuable point that a comprehensive account of PD will need to incorporate multiple perspectives. The idea implies that the philosophy of science pertinent to studying complex phenomena like PD is pluralism (Longino, 2006(Longino, , 2015-the notion that any scientific model only offers a partial perspective on complex phenomena and that multiple perspectives are needed to account for all the issues related to them. PD has traditionally been examined from multiple perspectives including cognitive and psychoanalytic approaches besides the trait and IPT approaches discussed. ...
... My approach in this paper is in many ways akin to the philosophical literature on scientific pluralism. In different ways philosophers such as Kellert (2009), Longino (2006, Cartwright (1999) and Giere (2006a) have advocated ideas along the line that (often) topics of interest ''cannot be fully explained by a single theory or fully investigated using a single approach. As a consequence, multiple approaches are required for the explanation and investigation of such phenomena'' (Kellert et al. 2006, vii). ...
Article
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In this paper, I present a philosophical analysis of interdisciplinary scientific activities. I suggest that it is a fruitful approach to view interdisciplinarity in light of the recent literature on scientific representations. For this purpose I develop a meta-representational model in which interdisciplinarity is viewed in part as a process of integrating distinct scientific representational approaches. The analysis suggests that present methods for the evaluation of interdisciplinary projects places too much emphasis non-epistemic aspects of disciplinary integrations while more or less ignoring whether specific interdisciplinary collaborations puts us in a better, or worse, epistemic position. This leads to the conclusion that there are very good reasons for recommending a more cautious, systematic, and stringent approach to the development, evaluation, and execution of interdisciplinary science.
... It delimits and focuses the field of observation, and makes possible the observation of certain phenomena and aspects. This view of science implies that there are many scientific truths about any complex problem, and that the question for philosophy of science is not how to select the correct one, but how to appreciate and use the nonunifiable plurality of partial knowledges (Longino 2006). All ontological claims are interwoven with the epistemological conditions for observation that apply in the perspective where it is grounded. ...
Article
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Cross-disciplinary use of science is needed to solve complex, real-world problems, but carrying out scientific research with multiple very different disciplines is in itself a non-trivial problem. Perspectives matter. In this paper we carry out a philosophical analysis of the perspectival nature of science, focusing on the synchronic structure of scientific perspectives across disciplines and not on the diachronic, historical structure of shifting perspectives within single disciplines that has been widely discussed since Kuhn and Feyerabend. We show what kinds of cross-disciplinary disagreement to expect due to the perspectival structure of science, suggest how to handle different scientific perspectives in cross-disciplinary work through perspectives of a second order, and discuss some fundamental epistemic differences between different types of science.
... The problem is that this leaves us with neuroscientific theories that only provide an account of the behaviour of neurological mechanisms in isolation from other causal influences and organizational features that alter the behaviour of these mechanisms when embedded within larger cognitive systems (see: Bechtel, 2015;Datteri & Laudisa, 2012;Longino, 2006;. As Datteri & Laudisa note, "these [neurological] generalizations are highly idealized, as they omit reference to the myriads of conditions that could perturb the behaviour of the modelled system in real-world settings" (2012, p. 602). ...
Article
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There is a long-standing debate in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of science regarding how best to interpret the relationship between neuroscience and psychology. It has traditionally been argued that either the two domains will evolve and change over time until they converge on a single unified account of human behaviour, or else that they will continue to work in isolation given that they identify properties and states that exist autonomously from one another (due to the multiple-realizability of psychological states). In this paper, I argue that progress in psychology and neuroscience is contingent on the fact that both of these positions are false. Contra the convergence position, I argue that the theories of psychology and the theories of neuroscience are scientifically valuable as representational tools precisely because they cannot be integrated into a single account. However, contra the autonomy position, I propose that the theories of psychology and neuroscience are deeply dependent on one another for further refinement and improvement. In this respect, there is an irreconcilable codependence between psychology and neuroscience that is necessary for both domains to improve and progress. The two domains are forever linked while simultaneously being unable to integrate.
... Instead, we come to conclusions about the unified mechanism in the world by drawing relevant inferences from the different and sometimes contradictory models in our collection used to represent the different facets of the system. We move between the different models in our collection as the need arises, drawing information from each when appropriate (see, for example: Longino 2006Longino , 2013Potochnik, unpublished). ...
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There have been recent disagreements in the philosophy of neuroscience regarding which sorts of scientific models provide mechanistic explanations, and which do not (e.g. computational models, dynamical models, topological models). These disagreements often hinge on two commonly adopted, but conflicting, ways of understanding mechanistic explanations: what I call the “representation-as” account, and the “representation-of” account. In this paper, I argue that neither account does justice to neuroscientific practice. In their place, I offer a new alternative that can defuse some of these disagreements. I argue that individual models do not provide mechanistic explanations by themselves (regardless of what type of model they are). Instead, individual models are always used to complement a huge body of background information and pre-existingmodels about the target system.With this in mind, I argue that mechanistic explanations are distributed across sets of different, and sometimes contradictory, scientific models. Each of these models contributes limited, but essential, information to the same mechanistic explanation, but none can be considered a mechanistic explanation in isolation of the others.
... However, it is also important to recognize that even the apparently simple things in nature can still be unfathomable and may exhibit an indefi nite amount of complexity when probed in the right way. In this book I hope to have demonstrated that pluralism is a cogent philosophy even in the "simplest" of physical domains, not just in obviously complex subjects such as the biology of social insects (Mitchell 2003 ) , or the sciences of human behavior (Longino 2006 ) . Again, the introduction by Kellert, Longino and Waters provides a friendly and articulate foil ( 2006 , xi): "We think that some phenomena may be such (e.g., so complicated or nebulous) that there can never be a single, comprehensive representation of everything worth knowing, or even of everything causal (or fundamental), about the phenomenon." ...
Chapter
In this chapter I present a sustained and systematic defence of pluralism in science, building on various hints from earlier chapters. I define my position as “active normative epistemic pluralism”. Based on the recognition of the benefits of having multiple systems of practice in each field of study, pluralism as I intend it is an active stance committed to the cultivation of plurality. There are two types of benefits of plurality. Benefits of toleration arise from simply allowing multiple systems simultaneously, which provides insurance against unpredictability, compensation for the limitations of each system, and multiple satisfaction of any given aim. Benefits of interaction arise from the integration of different systems for specific purposes, the co-optation of beneficial elements across systems, and the productive competition between systems. Pluralism should not be confused with an abdication of judgment: each pluralist has the freedom and responsibility to evaluate the quality and value of scientific work. Pluralism can deliver its benefits without a paralyzing relativism or an uncontrolled dissipation of resources. In practice, the kind of pluralism I advocate comes down to a directive to proliferate valuable systems of knowledge: this has concrete implications for scientific practice, and also gives new purpose and approach to the history and philosophy of science, in line with my vision of history and philosophy of science as “complementary science”.
... This implies that all scientific knowledge is perspectival, given that scientific knowledge is created in scientific perspectives, and that scientific representations and measurement outcomes are perspectival (Fraassen 2008: 8, 183). With regard to interdisciplinary science, the cognitive perspectivist approach has led to a pluralist view of science, a "perspectival pluralism" (Giere 2006b), where different perspectives highlight different aspects while ignoring others (Giere 1999: 28), and maintaining a plurality of perspectives promotes scientific progress (Longino 2006): " a thorough-going disciplinary pluralism […] suggests that sometimes the perspectives don't fit nicely together on the same plane: they overlap or conflict or cannot both be held at the same time, and yet you need both of them. " (Kellert 2006: 225) The perspectivist view of science implies that there are many scientific truths about any complex problem, and the question is not how to select the correct one, but how to appreciate and use the "nonunifiable plurality of partial knowledges" (Longino 2006: 127). ...
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Context • The problems that are most in need of interdisciplinary collaboration are " wicked problems, " such as food crises, climate change mitigation, and sustainable development, with many relevant aspects, disagreement on what the problem is, and contradicting solutions. Such complex problems both require and challenge interdisciplinarity. Problem • The conventional methods of interdisciplinary research fall short in the case of wicked problems because they remain first-order science. Our aim is to present workable methods and research designs for doing second-order science in domains where there are many different scientific knowledges on any complex problem. Method • We synthesize and elaborate a framework for second-order science in interdisciplinary research based on a number of earlier publications, experiences from large interdisciplinary research projects, and a perspectivist theory of science. Results • The second-order polyocular framework for interdisciplinary research is characterized by five principles. Second-order science of interdisciplinary research must: 1. draw on the observations of first-order perspectives, 2. address a shared dynamical object, 3. establish a shared problem, 4. rely on first-order perspectives to see themselves as perspectives, and 5. be based on other rules than first-order research. Implications • The perspectivist insights of second-order science provide a new way of understanding interdisciplinary research that leads to new polyocular methods and research designs. It also points to more reflexive ways of dealing with scientific expertise in democratic processes. The main challenge is that this is a paradigmatic shift, which demands that the involved disciplines, at least to some degree, subscribe to a perspectivist view. Key words • Perspectivism, semiotics, complex phenomena, social systems theory, differentiation of science , perspectival knowledge asymmetries. " Perspective is one of the component parts of reality. Far from being a disturbance of its fabric, it is its organizing element. " (Ortega y Gasset 1961: 90) " …a scientific perspectivism does not degenerate into a silly relativism. " (Giere 2006a: 13)
... Studying the actual practice of science, we come across many instances in which scientists analyzing one and the same phenomenon, for instance, aggressive behavior, provide us with very different explanations of the phenomenon using different (seemingly) irreconcilable approaches, i.e. behavioral genetics (molecular or quantitative), social-environmental approaches (behavioral dispositions of socialization patterns, familial environments, and/or parental attitudes and interactions with their children), neurobiology (physiology and anatomy -the neural substrate of behavior) or the developmental systems approach (cf. Longino 2006Longino , 2013. One finds similar situations in biology, for instance, the alternative models of predator-prey dynamics in population biology, in economics, think about the explanations given for the financial crisis, in physics, e.g., in quantum dynamics (cf. ...
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Scientific pluralism, a normative endorsement of the plurality or multiplicity of research approaches in science, has recently been advocated by several philosophers (e.g., Stephen Kellert, Helen Longino, and C. Kenneth Waters 2006, Philip Kitcher 2001, Helen Longino 2013, Sandra Mitchell 2009, and Hasok Chang 2010). Comparing these accounts of scientific pluralism, one will encounter quite some variation. We want to clarify the different interpretations of scientific pluralism by showing how they incarnate different models of democracy, stipulating the desired interaction among the plurality of research approaches in different ways. Furthermore, the example of scientific pluralism is used to advocate the application of democratic theory to philosophy of science problems in general. Drawing on the parallels between models of science and models of democracy, we can articulate how the plurality of research approaches in science should interact within a democratic framework as well as how to cultivate multiple research approaches in the epistemically most productive way possible. This will not only improve our understanding of scientific plurality, but it can also help us stipulating how different research approaches should interact to constitute the most objective account possible or how the ideal of scientific consensus has to be understood. Ultimately, developing democratic models of science bears on the question of how deeply science and democracy are entwined.
... 2 Problematically, these bracketing assumptions are often implicit rather than explicit. While the strategy of bracketing certain causal factors in order to isolate others for targeted empirical investigation is ubiquitous and important in science (Longino 2006), this only makes it all the more important to occasionally take a step back from these local bracketing assumptions and seek an integrative ''big picture'' of the phenomena, which relaxes the bracketing assumptions to combine the knowledge gained by localist empirical research programs into a coherent understanding. Clever Hans, Alex the Parrot, and Kanzi 87 ...
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The development of cognitive capacities depends on environmental conditions, including various forms of scaffolding. As a result, the evolution of cognition depends on the evolution of activities that provide scaffolding for cognitive development. Non-human animals reared and trained in environments heavily scaffolded with human social interaction can acquire non-species-typical knowledge, skills, and capacities. This can potentially shed light on some of the changes that paved the way for the evolution of distinctively human behavioral capacities such as language, advanced social cognition, and elaborate forms of tool craft. In this light, I revisit several widely known—but also widely misunderstood—cases of exceptional animals and argue that each of these cases provides clues about key innovations in our own evolutionary history.
... Second, this case-study helps us to test and further our philosophies of social science, in particular in relation to the issue of scientific pluralismdifferent understandings of (the ideal of) scientific pluralism can be made explicit in the contributions of participants to the IPE-discussion. These understandings are compared with philosophical accounts of scientific pluralism (cf., e.g., Longino, 2006;Mitchell, 2009;Van Bouwel, 2009a and2009b). Through this comparison, we evaluate the philosophical accounts and make the IPE-contributions more explicit. ...
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In this paper, I analyse a controversy that is taking place within the (relatively young) discipline of International Political Economy (IPE). This very lively controversy was triggered by a paper of Benjamin J. Cohen (2007), which offers us a way of slicing up the field (a dichotomy of American versus British approaches to IPE) as well as a proposal for the future development of IPE as an academic discipline. The many reactions this paper provoked (more than 20 articles in journals up to now), provide us with an exceptionally clear insight into the self-understanding of a discipline, and in particular into issues of (un)desired pluralism, heterodoxy, synthesis, dialogue, mainstream, etc. (see, for instance, Helleiner, 2009; McNamara, 2009; Palan, 2009; Phillips, 2009). The importance for philosophers of social science of undertaking such a case-study is threefold. First, the analysis of the controversy will clarify what social scientists themselves consider as the ideal approach towards the multiplicity of approaches in their field ('schools', theories, models, research programs, …); is it coexistence, some form of interaction, or a synthesis of competing approaches? And, how would they translate that ideal into practice? Second, this case-study helps us to test and further our philosophies of social science, in particular in relation to the issue of scientific pluralism – different understandings of (the ideal of) scientific pluralism can be made explicit in the contributions of participants to the IPE-discussion. These understandings are compared with philosophical accounts of scientific pluralism (cf., e.g., Longino, 2006; Mitchell, 2009; Van Bouwel, 2009a and 2009b). Through this comparison, we evaluate the philosophical accounts and make the IPE-contributions more explicit. Which brings us to the third point; the feedback into the social science. Some contributions to the IPE-controversy might benefit from philosophical explications (as concerns the problems of, for instance, conceptual exclusion, strategic pluralism, hermeneutic injustice, consensus/synthesis, etc.). Thus, the relevance of philosophical accounts for the practice of social science will be demonstrated by showing how they help making the intuitions of IPE-scholars present in their contributions more explicit, improve the self-understanding of the field and enable the elaboration of better legitimations of visions on the future development of the discipline.
... The question of whether phenomenological models can be explanatory in the behavioural sciences is still in debate. Some, for instance, have proposed that we need a more pluralistic understanding of explanation in order to better account for actual scientific practice in the behavioural sciences (Longino 2006;Chemero and Silberstein 2008). ...
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In this article, I argue that the use of scientific models that attribute intentional content to complex systems bears a striking similarity to the way in which statistical descriptions are used. To demonstrate this, I compare and contrast an intentional model with a statistical model, and argue that key similarities between the two give us compelling reasons to consider both as a type of phenomenological model. I then demonstrate how intentional descriptions play an important role in scientific methodology as a type of phenomenal model, and argue that this makes them as essential as any other model of this type.
... It is not an accident that philosophers and historians of science who have found gender bias lurking in the objectivizing tone of much scientific writing have tended to be supporters, even pioneers, of models-based approaches to scientific method (Longino 2002;Lloyd 2005). Nor is it surprising that those taking this view have also written exemplary studies of particular evolutionary claims whose reach is greater than their actual grasp (Keller 2000(Keller , 2010Lloyd 2005;Longino 2006, 2012 this issue). The lesson is that since models do not apply everywhere-knowledge is inevitably ''local''-the best antidote for the tendency to overextend them is to cultivate enhanced reflexivity about the values, standpoints, and assumed meta-narratives from which they spring. ...
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I argue that Darwinian evolutionary theory has a rhetorical dimension and that rhetorical criticism plays a role in how evolutionary science acquires knowledge. I define what I mean by rhetoric by considering Darwin’s Origin. I use the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis to show how rhetoric conceived as situated and addressed argumentation enters into evolutionary theorizing. Finally, I argue that rhetorical criticism helps judge the success, limits, and failures of these theories.
... Resistance to reductive universalism among social scientists is not necessarily matched by enthusiasm for theoretical pluralism in their own fields, however; a separate defense of theoretical pluralism is needed. 3 Psychology in particular must deal with the first-person situated and subjective perspective of consciousness, and many philosophers also want to preserve legitimate discourse and inquiry into such experience. Churchland may be better located here with Reductive Physicalism, along with Jaegwon Kim, who admits that some mental features may not be entirely eliminable as unreal by proven reductions. ...
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... It delimits and focuses the field of observation, and makes possible the observation of certain phenomena and aspects. This view of science implies that there are many scientific truths about any complex problem, and that the question for philosophy of science is not how to select the correct one, but how to appreciate and use the nonunifiable plurality of partial knowledges (Longino 2006). All ontological claims are interwoven with the epistemological conditions for observation that apply in the perspective where it is grounded. ...
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Although our health-related concepts such as disease are strongly value bearing and action guiding, we seem to direct these actions towards one singular direction in a very crude sense in general. This singular direction in the contemporary West is the direction of health care. Although what we hold dear as health, and what we try to avoid as disease make a lot of meaning in our lives, the care we need rarely comes and even rarely comes in the form we want from healthcare. One particular problem that I have addressed throughout the work was the generality of disease concept and the diagnostics of the disease model that we have, which focuses on finding and curing particular diseases. There have been enormous developments that has been challenging the limited system of the organism that sees the boundaries as continuous rather than dichotomous. I have advocated for an evolutionary understanding which conceptualizes disease in a way that enables them to see it with reference to organism’s relationship to environment.
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Feminist philosophers have discussed the prospects for assessing values empirically, particularly given the ongoing threat of sexism and other oppressive values influencing science and society. Some advocates of such tests now champion a “values as evidence” approach, and they criticize Helen Longino’s contextual empiricism for not holding values to the same level of empirical scrutiny as other claims. In this paper, we defend contextual empiricism by arguing that many of these criticisms are based on mischaracterizations of Longino’s position, overstatements of certain claims, and false dichotomies. Her contextual empiricism not only allows for the empirical support and disconfirmation of values, but Longino explicitly discusses when values can be empirically adjudicated and emphasizes the crucial role of the community for standards of evidence. We support contextual empiricism and elaborate a less direct account of “values as heuristics” by reviewing Longino’s theory of evidence and then using a case study from Elisabeth Lloyd on the biology of female orgasm, demonstrating the disconfirmation of androcentric values in evolutionary science. Within Longino’s and Lloyd’s contextual empiricism, values do not get treated as empirical evidence to be directly assessed by individuals, but rather values are heuristic tools to build models whose use can be validated or invalidated by communities based on their empirical fruitfulness in the logic and pragmatics of research questions in specific historical and cultural contexts.
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In this chapter, opinions for and against the relevance of philosophy of science to the study of interdisciplinarity are discussed. To some the relevance of philosophy may seem so obvious that it is hardly worth discussing. Others are of different opinion, though. Some arguments of the latter group are presented as well as some philosophical examples which speak strongly in favour of the former position.
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A case for a pluralistic approach to cognitive science is sketched. It is argued that cognitive scientists should take seriously the possibility that a single, unified framework for all of cognition is an unrealistic expectation for its diverse interdisciplinary goals and subject matter. A pluralistic approach instead seeks ways of integrating the multiple perspectives that have provided explanatory success in loosely interconnected sub-domains of cognitive phenomena. Research strategies recommended by this approach are discussed, with review of research currently carrying out such strategies and others that may hold promise for the future. The article ends with a discussion of seeking closer integration of the inquirer into consideration of which explanatory framework to choose. A systematic exploration of this transactional approach to cognitive science may grant coherence to pluralism even as it embraces diverse schemes of explanation.
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G. Gottlieb (see record 1991-11868-001) suggests that behavior geneticists and developmental psychologists have underestimated the importance of environmental regulation of species-typical behavior, outlines a theory of how environments and genes interact dynamically as behavior develops, and provides supporting examples from his own and others' laboratories. Although oversimplified explanations of development have occasionally gained currency, it is contended that the complexities of genotype–environment relations have been addressed in psychology, with still greater difficulties arising from psychologists' interest in individual differences in behavior. The complexities of studying genetic and environmental determination of the development of individual differences are explored, using intelligence as an example. Finally, a research program is outlined in the spirit of Gottlieb's contribution. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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To test the hypothesis that evidence of reduced central serotonergic (5-HT) system function in probands with personality disorders is associated with an elevated morbid risk of psychopathological conditions putatively associated with 5-HT dysfunction in first-degree relatives of these probands. Data were collected during a study of the 5-HT correlates of behavior in male patients with DSM-III personality disorders conducted at a Veterans Affairs medical center. Probands in this study were selected from those patients who had undergone both a fenfluramine hydrochloride challenge and a family history assessment. Axis II diagnosis were made according to DSM-III criteria after a structured interview of the proband, using the Structured Interview for Diagnosing Personality Disorders, given by two raters and a similar interview with a knowledgeable informant by another rater. Reduced prolactin responses to the 5-HT releasing/uptake inhibiting agent fenfluramine was associated with an elevated morbid risk of impulsive personality disorder traits in the first-degree relatives of patients with a primary DSM-III diagnosis of a personality disorder. Quantitative scores on assessments of impulsive aggression in the probands were not correlated with an increased morbid risk for impulsive personality disorder traits. A trend in the same direction was noted for affective personality disorder traits and alcoholism. These results suggest that a central 5-HT system abnormality in probands is associated with an increased risk of impulsive aggression in their first-degree relatives, and that assessment of central 5-HT system function in probands may be a more sensitive parameter for identification of this familial trait than the presence of impulsive aggressive behaviors in the proband.
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A comprehensive meta-analysis was performed to address the possible association of fluoxetine with violence or aggression. Data from the United States Investigational New Drug Clinical Trial Databases for approved and potential indications (depression, obesity, bulimia nervosa, obsessive-compulsive disorder, smoking cessation, alcoholism; n = 3992) were evaluated. Statistically significantly fewer fluoxetine-treated patients (0.15%) than placebo-treated patients (0.65%) experienced events suggestive of aggression (hostility, personality disorder, antisocial reaction). A relative risk analysis indicated that aggression events were four times more likely to occur in placebo-treated patients than in fluoxetine-treated patients. Although the possibility that some rare phenomenon was not detected cannot be excluded, this meta-analysis did not show fluoxetine to be associated with an increased risk of emergence of violent or aggressive behaviour.