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Abstract
This article provides a critical overview of the main arguments in favour of four-dimensionalism. It begins by discussing several issues that will help us better understand the nature of the debate between presentists and fourdimensionalists. Then the article discusses in detail the three main arguments in support of four-dimensionalism: the argument from the impossibility of temporal passage, the truthmaker argument, and the argument from special relativity. The first two arguments on their own pose no serious threat to presentism. However, the options available to presentists for replying to the third argument are extremely implausible, and that the considerations commonly cited in favour of presentism are generally outweighed by those arising out of the first and third arguments taken together. Thus, it is concluded that, as the debate currently stands in the literature, four-dimensionalism has the upper hand.
... 5 C. D. Broad (1923), Peter Forrest (2004), and Michael Tooley (1997 defend the growing block view. 6 See, for example, Sider (2001), Michael C. Rea (2003), Lawrence Sklar (1985), Ferrell Christensen (1981), and Putnam (1967). 7 See Kristie Miller (2013), Ned Markosian (2004), and Ned Markosian, Meghan Sullivan, and Nina Emery (2014) for overviews of the debates. ...
... In a nutshell, I consider the challenge of attributing rights to nonexistent future persons to be a particularly intractable case of the general problem that "cross-temporal" relations pose to those who deny the existence of nonpresent objects. Rea (2003), Matthew Davidson (2003), and Giuliano Torrengo (2006, 2010 pose the problem of cross-temporal relations for presentists. See M. Oreste Fiocco (2007), Markosian (2004), Crisp (2005), and Rafael De Clercq (2006) for presentist defenses. ...
... However, special relativity has been frequently cited as tensism's enemy, probably more than any other scientific theory (e.g. Baker 1974;Callender 2000;Crisp 2007;Godfrey-Smith 1979;Hinchliff 1996Hinchliff , 2000Maxwell 1985;Rea 1998Rea , 2003Rietdijk 1966Rietdijk , 1976Savitt 1994;Sider 2001;Sklar 1974Sklar , 1981Stein 1968Stein , 1970Stein , 1991. That enemy, we dare say, has been defeated. ...
Tensism holds that the present moment has a special status that sets it apart from the past and the future, independently of perceivers. One of the main objections to this view has been Einstein's argument from special relativity, which aims at showing that absolute simultaneity is a myth. We argue that the moving observer in a causal variant of Einstein's original thought experiment is subject to a temporal illusion. Owing to the analogy of the cases, this casts doubt on the conjectures that there is no privileged frame of reference and that special relativity poses a problem for tensism. © 2013 The Authors 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved.
... There are different versions of eternalism. The reader is referred to Rea (2003) and references therein for a discussion of eternalism. ...
Presentism is, roughly, the metaphysical doctrine that maintains that
whatever exists, exists in the present. The compatibility of presentism with
the theories of special and general relativity was much debated in recent
years. It has been argued that at least some versions of presentism are
consistent with time-orientable models of general relativity. In this paper we
confront the thesis of presentism with relativistic physics, in the strong
gravitational limit where black holes are formed. We conclude that the
presentist position is at odds with the existence of black holes and other
compact objects in the universe. A revision of the thesis is necessary, if it
is intended to be consistent with the current scientific view of the universe.
It is a commonplace that things persist, though thinkers disagree over what persistence consist in. Views about time are closely related to views about persistence, though some have questioned the compatibility of certain combinations, such as Jonathan Tallant’s recent argument that presentism is incompatible with all views of persistence, including endurantism. We believe that such arguments can be avoided with neutral definitions of the terms. However, a nearly exhaustive investigation of contemporary literature revealed that, except for two that we could find, all definitions of “persist,” “endure,” and derivatives are incompatible with presentism! And, the exceptions fail to capture endurantist intuitions about endurance. But we believe that present-friendly and intuitive definitions of these concepts can be given. In this paper we offer such definitions. We go on to apply our definitions to two sample cases, showing that if our neutral definitions are used, the arguments in the cases fail.
The dogma of transubstantiation defined by the Roman Catholic Church generates several philosophical questions. These problems should be addressed from a perspective broader than the one that has been usually adopted in the recent discussion in Analytic Philosophical Theology. What has been taught is that the Eucharist is a sacrament but at the same time a real sacrifice. And the sacrifice of the mass is a “renovation” of the sacrifice of Jesus Christ in the Calvary. It is argued here that the best way to understand these formulations is embracing the thesis of identity, i. e.: the sacrifice of the mass = the sacrifice of the cross. The thesis of identity has substantive metaphysical presuppositions that may have been seen as extravagant by the fathers of the Council of Trent. It is argued here, moreover, that those presuppositions are perfectly coherent.
The paper consists of two parts. The first critically analyses Meyer’s [2005] version of the triviality objection to presentism (according to which, presentism is either trivial or untenable), and tries to show that his argument is untenable because – contrary to what he claimed – he did not take into account the entire possible spectrum of interpretations of the presentist’s thesis. In the second, positive part of the paper, it is shown that a leading form of tensed theory of time postulates the same ontology as presentism and that it avoids the triviality problem which means that it can be used to generate an alternative formulation of presentism which is no longer vulnerable to the triviality objection.
A standard conception of metaphysical modality accepts that (i) Some de re modal claims are true, (ii) These should be understood in terms of a possible worlds semantics, and (iii) There is trans-world identity. For instance, it seems true that Humphrey could have won the election. In possible worlds speak, we say that there exists a possible world where Humphrey wins the election. Furthermore (given trans-world identity), had that possibility been actualized instead of this one, Humphrey—our Humphrey, the very same man—would still have existed. Here, I argue that this way of understanding de re modal claims, in conjunction with certain other plausible assumptions, entails that The World (i.e., the enormous object which has both you and I as proper parts) is a necessary being.
The most recent theory of time introduced by D. J. Pons, A. D. Pons, and A. J. Pons in their paper “Time: An Emergent Property of Matter” states that time is an emergent property of matter. The theory, based on the non-local hidden-variable approach to quantum mechanics presents an account of time as a layered emergent property of particule frequency oscillation. The paper goes on to explain how time and the arrow of time emerge at different level of matter assembly, most notably in decoherent systems. The theory also addresses the issue of human time perception and, partly, the ontological issue of space-time substantivalism. The theory however seems to be suffering from some pitfalls, which I intend to delineate and examine. Although in the end the theory appears not to hold, it nevertheless offers an important new direction in the analysis of time, one that seems worth pursuing further. The following paper presents the original theory first, before moving on to consider objections.
The familiar challenges to historiographical knowledge turn on epistemological concerns having to do with the unobservability of historical events, or with the problem of establishing a sufficiently strong inferential connection between evidence and the historiographical claim one wishes to convert from a true belief into knowledge. This paper argues that these challenges miss a deeper problem, viz., the lack of obvious truth-makers for historiographical claims. The metaphysical challenge to historiography is that reality does not appear to co-operate in our cognitive endeavours by providing truth-makers for claims about historical entities and events. Setting out this less familiar, but more fundamental, challenge to the very possibility of historiography is the first aim of this paper. The various ways in which this challenge might be met are then set out, including ontologically inflationary appeals to abstract objects of various kinds, or to “block” theories of time. The paper closes with the articulation of an ontologically parsimonious solution to the metaphysical challenge to historiography. The cost of this approach is a revision to standard theories of truth. The central claim here is that the standard theories of truth have mistaken distinct causes of truth for truth itself. This mistake leads to distorted expectations regarding truth-makers for historiographical claims. The truth-makers of historiographical claims are not so much the historical events themselves (for they do not exist) but atemporal modal facts about the order of things of which those events were a part.
It is often claimed that the debate between presentism and eter-nalism is merely verbal, because when we use tensed, detensed or tenseless notions of existence, there is no difference in the accepted metaphysical statements between the adherents of both views. On the contrary, it is shown in this paper that when we express their positions making use, in accordance with intentions of the presentists and the eternalists, of the tensed notion of existence (in the case of the presentists) and the detensed or tenseless notion (in the case of the eternalists), the controversy remains deep and very important for us, because both ontological claims express a different attitude to the existence of the flow of time. It is shown that not only does the proposed approach to presentism and eternalism exactly express the intentions of the adherents of both views but it also offers a better understanding of them joining together seemingly different theses maintained by the presentists and the eternalists, and explaining at the same time the dynamism of the presentists' ontology. The paper takes for granted that we should assess metaphysical theories in a similar way as we assess scientific theories, that is on the basis of their explanatory value.
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Mark Hinchliff concludes a recent paper, “The Puzzle of Change,” with a section entitled “Is the Presentist Refuted by the Special Theory of Relativity?” His answer is “no.”
I respond by arguing that presentists face great difficulties in merely stating their position in Minkowski spacetime. I round up some likely candidates for the job and exhibit their deficiencies.
In [28] there is a brief paper by Kurt Godel [11] entitled ‘A Remark about the Relationship between Relativity Theory and Idealistic Philosophy’.1 According to Howard Stein [36], this paper ‘appears to be the only published piece by Godel that deals with philosophical issues not directly concerned with mathematics’. Godel [12] had recently found a novel exact solution to the field equations of the general theory of relativity (GTR) that permitted the existence of closed timelike curves. His paper in the Einstein volume has often been taken to show that in this ‘Godel uni-verse' time travel is possible.2 While there is a sense, as I shall argue below, in which this view is correct, Godel seems to have had a more dramatic conclusion in mind as well. In his recent book, The Disappearance of Time, Palle Yourgrau [39, pp. 2-3] complains that ’the primary philosophical point of Godel's. paper seems to have been lost or downplayed ï namely, that the deduction, from the General Theory of Relativity. of the possibility of time travel shows that time is ideal ï a mere appearance imposed on reality by a kind of “optical refraction” of the subjective lens of the mind but reflecting nothing objective in the nature of things.'3 In the Preface to his book Yourgrau writes in the same vein:. © 1994, Australasian Association of Philosophy. All rights reserved.
In debate about the nature of persistence over time, the view that material objects endure has played the role of "champion" and the view that they perdure has played the role of "challenger."' As in other contests, the champion's job is merely to defend her title, whereas the challenger's job is to prove herself worthy. I have no view about how these roles came to be assigned; but the historical fact is that perdurantists have traditionally borne the proverbial burden of proof in this debate. It has fallen to the perdurantists rather than the endurantists to motivate their view, to provide reasons for accepting it that override whatever initial presumption there is against it. Perdurantists have sought to discharge their burden in several ways. For example, perdurantism has been recommended on the grounds that: (i) it solves several of the puzzles that raise the problem of material constitution; (ii) it is (at least) suggested by the special theory of relativity (hereafter "SR"); (iii) it is the only view that makes sense out of the possibility of intrinsic change; (iv) it is the only view consistent with the doctrine of Humean supervenience; and (v) it makes better sense than its competitor out of the possibility of fission. These are the primary and most powerful claims that have been made on behalf of perdurantism.2 They are
It has been repeatedly argued, most recently by Nicholas Maxwell, that the special theory of relativity is incompatible with the view that the future is in some degree undetermined; and Maxwell contends that this is a reason to reject that theory. In the present paper, an analysis is offered of the notion of indeterminateness (or "becoming") that is uniquely appropriate to the special theory of relativity, in the light of a set of natural conditions upon such a notion; and reasons are given for regarding this conception as (not just formally consistent with relativity theory, but also) philosophically reasonable. The bearings upon Maxwell's program for quantum theory are briefly considered.
A theory of temporal passage is put forward which is "objective" in the sense that time flow characterizes the universe independently of the existence of conscious beings. The theory differs from Grunbaum's "mind-dependence" theory, and is designed to avoid Grunbaum's criticisms of an earlier theory of Reichenbach's. The representation of temporal becoming is accomplished by the introduction of indeterministic universe-models; each model representing the universe at a time. The models depict the past as a single four-dimensional manifold, and the future as a branched structure of such manifolds. Time flow is relativistic in that it manifests itself in a frame-dependent (but not observer-dependent) way. The indeterministic character of the universe-models is mirrored in a "temporal" theory of truth which rejects the principle of bivalence, and suitable semantics are provided for this theory. Finally, an account of physical law is given which defines it in terms of physical possibility, rather than vice versa.
I examine the issue of persistence over time in thecontext of the special theory of relativity (SR). Thefour-dimensional ontology of perduring objects isclearly favored by SR. But it is a different questionif and to what extent this ontology is required, andthe rival endurantist ontology ruled out, by thistheory. In addressing this question, I take theessential idea of endurantism, that objects are whollypresent at single moments of time, and argue that itcommits one to unacceptable conclusions regardingcoexistence, in the context of SR. I then propose anddiscuss a plausible account of coexistence forperduring objects, which is free of these defects. This leaves the endurantist room for some maneuvers. I consider them and show that they do not really helpthe endurantist out. She can accommodate the notionof coexistence in the relativistic framework only atthe cost of renouncing central endurantist intuitions.
Etude du debat opposant la theorie de la perdurance a celle de l'endurance, d'une part, et la these presentiste a la these non-presentiste, d'autre part, concernant l'existence dans le temps. Rejetant les interpretations de N. Markosian et D. Lewis, l'A. developpe une conception de l'etre-pleinement-present qui fait place a une theorie des parties temporelles non-instantanees
I It is a commonplace in certain circles that the Special and General Theories of Relativity require us to regard time as being like space. Of course, expressions such as 'spacetime' and 'the fourth dimension' have become familiar to all. But quite apart from the casual use of these vague phrases, many scientists and philosophers have held explicitly that if Relativity is true, the nature of time must indeed be very similar to that of space. Unfortunately, equally explicit arguments for this conclusion are seldom given; at least, this writer has run across little of substance on the point. Perhaps the reasons seem too obvious to require mention. In any case they deserve a careful look, and it is the purpose of this paper to explore arguments that might be given to the effect that the Special Theory, in particular, requires 'space-like' time. A second thing that is generally not made clear is just what it means, or ought to mean, to say that time is like space. This is itself a very complex matter, which cannot be pursued in any depth here. It will have to suffice to mention one or two aspects that are essential to the notion of space-like time, as I see it-aspects without which time would have to be regarded as being radically different from space. In the ordinary concept of time, as this writer understands it, there is a big difference between a certain few of the events and states of affairs of history-the ones we call 'present'and all the others: the former exist-they are occurring, they are realwhereas the latter do not, merely having been real, or being yet to exist. For example, one difference between (say) the reader's studying of his first-grade reader and (say) his perusing of this paper is as fundamental a difference as one can imagine: the one event is real, it is occurring, and the other is not. In contrast to this common-sense view, it seems clear that under the concept of time as being like space there would be no existential difference among any of the events of history. They differ from one another in their temporal locations, they are temporally distant from one another by various amounts, but that is all. The events of one temporal location are no more real than those of another: the reader's perusing of this paper is occurring, World War II is occurring, World War III is (perhaps) occurs ring, and so on, all in the same sense of the word. It follows from this that
Definissant l'actualisme comme l'affirmation de l'existence de tout ce qui existe et l'actualisme serieux comme l'affirmation qu'il n'existe aucune propriete dans le monde d'un objet qui n'y existe pas, l'A. defend la these de l'implication selon laquelle l'actualisme implique l'actualisme serieux, d'une part, et soutient la these analogue selon laquelle le presentisme implique le presentisme serieux, d'autre part. Repondant aux critiques de H. Hudson, et modifiant sa propre position, l'A. mesure la possibilite d'un transfert de la sphere modale a la sphere temporelle d'une version de l'actualisme plus proche du presentisme
The term ‘proposition’ has been used by philosophers in a myriad of ways to do a number of different jobs. There are, however, three basic roles or jobs that propositions have been called on to perform. First, propositions are said to be the meanings of sentences. I shall call this view of propositions the ‘linguistic view’ and refer to such propositions as ‘linguistic propositions’ (or LPs). Second, propositions are said to be the contents of our acts of thinking, i.e. our thoughts. They are the contents of our mind when we think, believe, or know something. I call this view of propositions the ‘epistemic view’ and shall refer to such propositions as ‘epistemic propositions’ (or EPs). Finally, propositions are viewed as the prime bearers of truth and falsity and are the subject matter of propositional logics. On this view, propositions either represent, correspond to, describe, or in some way relate to the world we live in. This is the metaphysical view of propositions and I refer to such propositions as ‘metaphysical propositions’ (or MPs).
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Harvard University, 1967.
The open future view is the common-sense view that there is an ontological difference between the past, the present, and the future in the sense that the past and the present are real, whereas the future is not yet a part of reality. In this paper we develop a theory in which the open future view is consistently combined with special relativity. Technically, the heart of our contribution is a logical conservativity result showing that, although the open future view is not definable inside the causal geometry of Minkowski space-time, it can be conservatively added to it.