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Walking away from terrorism: Accounts of disengagement from radical and extremist movements
Abstract
This accessible new book looks at how and why individuals leave terrorist movements, and considers the lessons and implications that emerge from this process. Focusing on the tipping points for disengagement from groups such as Al Qaeda, the IRA and the UVF, this volume is informed by the dramatic and sometimes extraordinary accounts that the terrorists themselves offered to the author about why they left terrorism behind. The book examines three major issues: what we currently know about de-radicalisation and disengagement, how discussions with terrorists about their experiences of disengagement can show how exit routes come about, and how they then fare as 'ex-terrorists' away from the structures that protected them, what the implications of these findings are for law-enforcement officers, policy-makers and civil society on a global scale. Concluding with a series of thought-provoking yet controversial suggestions for future efforts at controlling terrorist behaviour, Walking Away From Terrorism provides an comprehensive introduction to disengagement and de-radicalisation and offers policymakers a series of considerations for the development of counter-radicalization and de-radicalisation processes. This book will be essential reading for students of terrorism and political violence, war and conflict studies, security studies and political psychology.
... The present study examined an online incel community to understand the values of incels who exit their extremist online communities through the theoretical lens of deradicalization theory Horgan, 2008Horgan, , 2009Horgan & Altier, 2012;Horgan et al., 2017). Deradicalization theory refers to a set of ideas, approaches, and strategies aimed at countering and reducing radicalization in the context of extremism Horgan, 2008Horgan, , 2009Horgan & Altier, 2012;Horgan et al., 2017). ...
... The present study examined an online incel community to understand the values of incels who exit their extremist online communities through the theoretical lens of deradicalization theory Horgan, 2008Horgan, , 2009Horgan & Altier, 2012;Horgan et al., 2017). Deradicalization theory refers to a set of ideas, approaches, and strategies aimed at countering and reducing radicalization in the context of extremism Horgan, 2008Horgan, , 2009Horgan & Altier, 2012;Horgan et al., 2017). The goal of deradicalization is to prevent individuals who have been drawn into extremist ideologies from engaging in violence. ...
... The goal of deradicalization is to prevent individuals who have been drawn into extremist ideologies from engaging in violence. Thus, these efforts focus on disengaging individuals from extremist groups and beliefs and reintegrating them into mainstream society (Fink & Hearne, 2008, p. I;Horgan, 2008, 2009, Horgan & Altier, 2012Horgan et al., 2017). The key components of deradicalization theory include psychological factors, counter-narratives, education and awareness, social support and reintegration, community involvement, criminal and legal measures, and evaluation and assessment Horgan, 2008Horgan, , 2009Horgan & Altier, 2012;Horgan et al., 2017). ...
Involuntary celibates, known as incels, have gained media attention due to violent incidents involving members of their community. Previous studies have examined their violent norms, radical ideologies, and views on women, but none have explored why incels may disengage from the online incel community. This study utilizes a media content analysis framework to analyze data from an open-access forum (n = 237) and understand the values of former incels. Inductive media content analysis reveals four main themes: (1) leaving inceldom, (2) social interactions of incels, (3) self-conception of incels, and (4) the incel philosophy. These findings shed light on the dynamics within the incel community for those who abandon the incel lifestyle. Future research should investigate the reasons for incels leaving their community and explore strategies to support them in this process. Intervention approaches could be developed to assist incels during their transition.
... Groups may shift their focus, modify their goals, or adapt their narratives to remain relevant or appeal to new recruits. These ideological shifts further complicate efforts to counter terrorism (Horgan, 2009). ...
... Personal Trauma and Experiences: Some individuals who become terrorists have experiencedpersonal trauma, such as the loss of loved ones or exposure to violence. These experiences can fuel anger, resentment, and a desire for revenge, which terrorists may see as justification for their actions(Horgan, 2009). ...
Unveiling the Mind of Terrorists-Cracking the Code of Extremism Terrorism, a formidable global challenge, remains an enigma that threatens peace and stability. In this concise qualitative analysis, the writer embarks on an illuminating journey into the intricate minds of terrorists. By exploring the untapped potential of criminal profiling techniques, the writer exposes the hidden facets of their motivations, behaviours, and ideologies. Revealing Profound Insights: Delving into the psychological and behavioural traits of terrorists, this research uncovers profound insights that have eluded the world for too long. It beckons policymakers, security experts, and global citizens to explore fresh perspectives.
... Groups may shift their focus, modify their goals, or adapt their narratives to remain relevant or appeal to new recruits. These ideological shifts further complicate efforts to counter terrorism (Horgan, 2009). ...
... Personal Trauma and Experiences: Some individuals who become terrorists have experiencedpersonal trauma, such as the loss of loved ones or exposure to violence. These experiences can fuel anger, resentment, and a desire for revenge, which terrorists may see as justification for their actions(Horgan, 2009). ...
Terrorism, a formidable global challenge, remains an enigma that threatens peace and stability. In this concise qualitative analysis, the writer embarks on an illuminating journey into the intricate minds of terrorists. By exploring the untapped potential of criminal profiling techniques, the writer exposes the hidden facets of their motivations, behaviors, and ideologies. Revealing profound insights: Delving into the psychological and behavioral traits of terrorists, this research uncovers profound insights that have eluded the world for too long. It beckons policymakers, security experts, and global citizens to explore fresh perspectives.
... In an effort to overcome these flaws, a second body of work breaks away from causal approaches to investigate the "how" of radicalization (Horgan, 2009). The focus is on the processes and stages leading to radical engagement (Horgan, 2009;Collovald & Gaïti, 2006) and often based on the interactionist F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l y tradition and on qualitative approaches (see Arena & Arrigo, 2005 for the U.S and Fillieule, 2010 for Europe). ...
... In an effort to overcome these flaws, a second body of work breaks away from causal approaches to investigate the "how" of radicalization (Horgan, 2009). The focus is on the processes and stages leading to radical engagement (Horgan, 2009;Collovald & Gaïti, 2006) and often based on the interactionist F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l y tradition and on qualitative approaches (see Arena & Arrigo, 2005 for the U.S and Fillieule, 2010 for Europe). These studies consider the relationships between a political and ideological context, an organizational framework and an individual or group. ...
This analysis seeks to understand the appropriation or rejection of radicalism by two groups in a poor and immigrant neighborhood of Montreal. Yet although both defend the same causes and share the same progressive dimension, one presents itself as a group of non-radical citizens while the other presents itself as a group of radical activists. So for each group, what do these different definitions of identity enfold: citizens versus militants, non-radicals versus radicals? More than the acceptance and the use of violence, the investigation’s results reveal that the divergences observed illustrate a different construction of the intersection between social class and cultural or ethnic identity, and global and local boundaries, one which shapes specific democratic practices and relations to politics. This analysis outlines the relevance of not restricting the reflection on radicalism to a focus on the repertoire of collective action but rather exploring its meanings for citizens in their daily lives and its implications for their relations to politics. Finally, it also offers a concrete picture of left-wing ideological tensions and debates and how some grass roots organizations try (or do not try) to resolve them.
... However, the interview method is one of the most common qualitative research strategies used by terrorism scholars. Terrorism researchers have interviewed American, Asian, European, South American, African, and Middle-Eastern terrorists, as well as anti-abortion, left-wing, right-wing, eco and animal rights, Buddhist, Christian, Jewish, Islamic and Sikh terrorists, among others (see for e.g., Altier, Boyle, Shorthand, & Horgan, 2019;Azca, Ikhwan, & Arrobi, 2019;Berko & Erez, 2007;Blanchad & Prewitt, 1993;Bloom, 2005Bloom, , 2012Chernov Hwang, 2017;Della Porta, 1995;Horgan, 2004Horgan, , 2009Horgan, , 2012Jurgensmeyer, 2003;Kaplan, 1996;Kenney, 2018;Orsini, 2013;Post, Sprinzak, & Denny, 2003;Stern, 2003;White, 1993). ...
... Second, none of these interviews occurred before the individuals became terrorists and few were conducted while the offender was engaging in terrorism. Instead, most of the interviews were conducted after the individual had "retired" from terrorism, in many cases long after, and the questions often engaged issues that occurred in the distant past. 1 (Horgan 2009) notes that the "involvement and engagement in terrorism result in changes to those who join" (p. 4). ...
This paper identifies what we see as opportunities to improve data collection, analysis, and interpretation of findings in American and British terrorism research. We suggest seven directions that we see as promising. These include: 1) interview methods and reporting, 2) source reporting in database studies, prioritizing available court records, 3) more comparison groups, including non-offender activists for the same cause and non-political offenders, 4) comparison of cases with and without confidential informants, 5) extremist ideas and extremist violence studied as separate problems, 6) more attention to grievances, avoiding controversies over defining ideology and narrative, and 7) more attention to emotions of terrorists, their supporters, and their victims.
... In recent years, violent radicalization has become one of the prime threats to societies' peaceful coexistence, safety and cohesion Moyano, 2019). Radicalization is essentially understood as a social and psychological process involving a gradual commitment to an extremist political or religious ideology (Horgan, 2009). Even though radicalization has diverse consequences and seldom culminates in violence (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009), terrorism, meaning violence used deliberately against civilians to achieve political objectives (Ganor, 2002), is its most extreme expression. ...
... En los últimos años se ha constatado cómo la radicalización violenta se ha erigido como una de las principales amenazas para la convivencia, la seguridad y la cohesión de las sociedades Moyano, 2019). Básicamente, la radicalización se entiende como un proceso social y psicológico de compromiso progresivo con una ideología política o religiosa extremista (Horgan, 2009). Aunque las consecuencias de la radicalización son diversas y en la mayoría de los casos no culminan con el ejercicio de la violencia (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009), el terrorismo, entendido como la violencia utilizada deliberadamente contra los civiles para alcanzar objetivos políticos (Ganor, 2002), constituye la expresión más extrema. ...
Radicalization is a complex process given the fact that several factors interact in it. In order to gain an overview of these factors, a case study was performed of the cell that carried out the terrorist attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils. The 3N model of radicalization was used, which proposes three factors: needs, narratives and networks. The content of the order handed down by the National High Court and the police proceedings of Mossos d’Esquadra, the police force in Catalonia, were analysed to identify possible indicators of those three factors which may have contributed to the radicalization within the 17-A cell. The results showed the existence of different indicators such as providing a life purpose, giving personal significance, exposure to extremist propaganda materials, the assimilation of values, identity fusion and having a common cause. We conclude by stressing the importance of considering the interaction of multiple factors in understanding radicalization in all its complexity.
... In addition to the history of war in Iraq, terrorism is a process that starts with simple steps towards radicalization and evolves into acts of violence (Horgan, 2009). It is possible that the faith campaign (Al-Hamla Al-Imaniyah), invented and enforced by the Saddam Hussein regime in the period between 1990 to his last days of rule in Spring 2003, was a step towards shifting the country as a whole in the direction of Islamist extremism (Helfont, 2014(Helfont, , 2018. ...
... Still, the prevalence rate of 54.5% of PTSD is exceptionally high, even when compared with Iraqi refugees and findings among criminal gang members (Kerig et al., 2016;Return Working Group et al., 2019;Wood and Alleyne, 2010;Wood et al., 2017). This high rate of mental disorder among affiliates of a terrorist group challenges the common understanding that terrorist groups rely on mentally healthy members and purposely exclude the mentally ill during their screening process, as they deem them unreliable (Horgan, 2009(Horgan, , 2014Silke, 2014). However, in lack of a detailed temporal assessment or a longitudinal observation we cannot determine to what extent the participants had been traumatized before recruitment, during combat, or after imprisonment. ...
... We derived various arguments from here. As recommended by Horgan (2009), Postdoctoral Researcher Ayşenur Benevento called researchers to stop looking for "profiles" and start mapping "pathways" when studying violent radicalisation, as well as shift their attention from "root causes" to "outer qualities" (Benevento 2023a). The study of those outer qualities involves the examination of contextually meaningful parameters and determination of the ideal environment in the variation of radicalisation experiences as different people become radicalised in various ways and over various issues. ...
ERC Prime Youth Policy Brief Final
ERC Prime Youth Policy Brief Final, 2023
This policy paper aims to address policy options, outcomes, and proposals related to radicalisation among European youths, with a focus on the historical juncture marked by the escalation of ethnocultural and religious tensions in the EU. Contrary to the scholarship that studies European youth in separate clusters divided by ethnicity, culture, and religion, such as “Muslim-origin” and “native”, we analyse Islamist and nativist radicalisations through a single scientific lens. See https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr
... Deradicalisation is viewed as a social and psychological process that emphasizes individual commitment to reduce participation in violent activities to a low-risk level (Horgan, 2009). There are three components to the deradicalisation program: reduction, rehabilitation, and resocialisation and reintegration. ...
Objective: This study aims to evaluate and describe the dynamics of deradicalization policies in preventing terrorism. Terrorism has caused security disturbances, and damage in many countries. Various theories and perspectives regarding de-radicalization policies have been developed in many countries to avoid acts of radicalism and terrorism. Case studies regarding de-radicalization policy initiatives in various nations must be researched in greater depth in order to find the optimal synthesis model. Theoretical framework: Radicalism and terrorism are two types of international crimes that are extremely damaging to society and the Nations (Nashir & Si, 2019). Radicalism is not the same as terrorism, But both of them are closely connected (Nashir & Si, 2019). This crime has a substantial and catastrophic impact on individuals, communities, and the state (Taskarina et al., 2022) The United Nations Session in Vienna, Austria in 2000, concluded that acts of extremism and terrorism are serious crimes that must be dealt with swiftly via international collaboration (Phelps, 2021). In different nations, the De-radicalization policy program has shown to be a successful method of reducing radical activities and terrorism. De-radicalization is accomplished by increasing understanding among perpetrators of radicals, terrorists, through socialization and education (Petrus Reinhard Golose, 2009; Safii, 2019; Sembiring, 2019) Method: This study uses a systematic literature review technique, in the field of de-radicalization policies to prevent acts of radicalism and terrorism. Our research strategy is based on the idea that a full understanding of research findings requires comparison with other research findings. The author searches the database with Scopus; PubMed (Medline); Google Scholarship; JSTOR; CONTENT Web of Science for papers. And using the following inclusion criteria: (1)articles in Indonesian and English with a full text published in open access journals, peer-reviewed, and in the last 5 (five) years of publication in 2019-2023; (2)related articles with titles and abstracts; (3)keywords: Deradicalisation; Radicalism, Terrorism; Policy Implementation; National Counter Terrorism Agency; and (4) research methods. Titles and abstracts were checked to see if the inclusion criteria were one, two, three, and four. The results are obtained based on the integration of evidence from previous studies that have been identified and analyzed through patterns, trends, or conclusions that can help strengthen understanding in the field of De-radicalization policy research. Results and Conclusions: The synthesis research show that the success rate of De-radicalization policy implementation, will depend on the design of the program on the variable content of the policy. De-radicalization must be interpreted as work that emerges after the basics of radicalism have been identified. Because every perpetrator of radicalism is different and varied, further studies are needed to produce a more comprehensive and adaptive De-radicalization module. The combination of hard tactics and soft approaches adopted by the government in dealing with radicalism and terrorism has advantages and disadvantages. In the context of the fight against terrorism and radicalism, the concept of De-radicalization must be used for the fight against "the ideology", for "counter-radicalism and/or counter-terrorism". Implications of the research: The De-radicalization policy strategy is oriented towards persuasive, proactive, and adaptive actions, as well as protecting human rights. It is carried out using the "ideological awareness" approach through education and outreach. The concept of De-radicalization must be strengthened by the government's commitment to eliminating social and economic inequality. The De-radicalization program is carried out holistically and inclusively, by involving all levels of society and cross-sectoral collaboration. Originality/value: The novelty of this research is the establishment of a theoretical model for De-radicalization programs based on a synthesis of case studies with various complexities and variables originating from different countries with different origins and different challenges. In order to provide suggestions for decision-makers that are more comprehensive, adaptable, and representative.
... Comme le soulignent dans leurs articles Nicolas Amadio et Rachel Sarg, les pratiques sociojudiciaires en matière de réintégration sociale des personnes radicalisées ont la particularité de poursuivre plusieurs objectifs : la réinsertion sociale, la surveillance, le désengagement et parfois la déradicalisation. Si les notions de désengagement et de désistance semblent désormais préférées à celle de déradicalisation (Blokland et Van der Geest, 2017), le manque d'usage stabilisé des notions employées dans les pratiques de réintégration et les recherches sur ce processus (Horgan, 2009) est un obstacle important à l'efficacité des programmes actuels. Par ailleurs, l'analyse des facteurs de désengagement et de réinsertion doit se faire au regard non seulement des dimensions individuelles et collectives, mais aussi des attentes et des valeurs de l'ensemble des acteurs, bénéficiaires et intervenants (Windisch et al., 2016 ;Chernov Hwang, 2017 ;Altier et al., 2014 ;Van der Heide et Shuurman, 2016). ...
Dans Cahiers de la sécurité et de la justice Cahiers de la sécurité et de la justice 2023/2 (N° 58) 2023/2 (N° 58), pages 4 à 12 Éditions Institut des hautes études du ministère de l'Intérieur Institut des hautes études du ministère de l'Intérieur Distribution électronique Cairn.info pour Institut des hautes études du ministère de l'Intérieur. Distribution électronique Cairn.info pour Institut des hautes études du ministère de l'Intérieur. La reproduction ou représentation de cet article, notamment par photocopie, n'est autorisée que dans les limites des conditions générales d'utilisation du site ou, le cas échéant, des conditions générales de la licence souscrite par votre établissement. Toute autre reproduction ou représentation, en tout ou partie, sous quelque forme et de quelque manière que ce soit, est interdite sauf accord préalable et écrit de l'éditeur, en dehors des cas prévus par la législation en vigueur en France. Il est précisé que son stockage dans une base de données est également interdit.
... Comme le soulignent dans leurs articles Nicolas Amadio et Rachel Sarg, les pratiques sociojudiciaires en matière de réintégration sociale des personnes radicalisées ont la particularité de poursuivre plusieurs objectifs : la réinsertion sociale, la surveillance, le désengagement et parfois la déradicalisation. Si les notions de désengagement et de désistance semblent désormais préférées à celle de déradicalisation (Blokland et Van der Geest, 2017), le manque d'usage stabilisé des notions employées dans les pratiques de réintégration et les recherches sur ce processus (Horgan, 2009) est un obstacle important à l'efficacité des programmes actuels. Par ailleurs, l'analyse des facteurs de désengagement et de réinsertion doit se faire au regard non seulement des dimensions individuelles et collectives, mais aussi des attentes et des valeurs de l'ensemble des acteurs, bénéficiaires et intervenants (Windisch et al., 2016 ;Chernov Hwang, 2017 ;Altier et al., 2014 ;Van der Heide et Shuurman, 2016). ...
La réintégration sociale des personnes condamnées pour faits de terrorisme et des détenus suspectés de radicalisation constitue l’un des principaux défis sociaux des années à venir et une préoccupation considérable pour les acteurs de la justice, de la police, de l’administration pénitentiaire et du travail social. Contrairement au silence qui demeure en France à ce sujet, d’importantes institutions internationales, telles que le Conseil de l’Europe et les Nations unies, ont créé des programmes de veille et de soutien aux dispositifs d’intervention en matière de réintégration sociale des extrémistes violents .
Ce numéro des Cahiers de la sécurité et de la justice analyse les principaux enjeux de la réintégration sociale des personnes condamnées pour terrorisme et s’articule autour de trois objectifs. Le premier est d’appréhender le processus de réintégration sociale à partir des ressources collectives et individuelles de désengagement de l’extrémisme violent. Le deuxième est d’étudier les nouvelles logiques décisionnelles dans la gestion des risques de violence terroriste. Enfin, le troisième objectif de ce numéro est de mettre en perspective les enjeux de l’évaluation sur la réintégration sociale des personnes condamnées ou suspectées de terrorisme et de radicalisation menant à la violence.
... But it has also shown the need to provide a convincing definition of the difference between radicalization as an attitude and its embodiment in actual violent behaviour (Pugliese, 2018). For not all harmful or violent actions stem from violent radicalization, not all terrorist actions embrace radical ideologies, and therefore violent radicalization should not be confused with terrorist behaviour (Francis, 2014;Horgan, 2009;Striegher, 2015). ...
This article distinguishes between attitudes towards extremism and attitudes towards violence and illegal acts. It operationalizes both groups of attitudes based on the proposed scales by Ozer and Bertelsen (2018), which are validated for the Spanish case. The combination of the two sets of attitudes favours the use of violence to pursue radical ideological, religious, or political views. The literature on the subject is reviewed, and the results of an exploratory study based on a questionnaire administered to adolescents attending 4 schools in Almería and 1 in Madrid (n = 1170), carried out in May 2022, are presented. The results of two multiple regressions on the indices of extremism and pro-violent and illegal acts, allow us to conclude that the boys, the youngest, of foreign parents, of mothers with a low educational level, right-wing, those who most frequently attend religious centres, show more extremism, and pro-violence and illegal acts attitudes. Those who believe that there is discrimination against LGTBI+ people are more extremist but not more pro-violence. Finally, those who belong to poor families, use many social networks a day, and have suffered physical violence show more pro-violence attitudes and illegal acts, but ABOUT THE AUTHOR PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT Our multidisciplinary research group (Investigación Internacional Comparada) is interested in exploring current social problems and in elaborating proposals of intervention to tackle the identified issues. This article presents the results of our survey on extremist and pro-violence attitudes of Spanish adolescents in secondary schools. The main objective of our research is to better understand the development of dangerous attitudes in teenagers in order to develop an intervention programme for preventing these attitudes. Our research allowed us to identify certain characteristics of young people which increase the possibility of developing extremist and pro-violence attitudes, such as male gender, foreign parents, mothers with a low educational level, right-wing, those who most frequently attend religious centres, among others. Interventions aimed at preventing extremist attitudes should focus on adolescents with these features. Rodriguez Martinez et al., Cogent Social Sciences (2023), 9: 2239542
... Some authors have identified the type of questions that should be included, some tips for understanding the significance of interviews, how framing initial meetings and reactions, the different interview styles, and also the benefits, challenges and limitations of interviewing terrorists (see Horgan, 2009Horgan, , 2012. However, we have learned through our experience that the ability to talk to radicals is not merely a list of recommendations for the face-to-face encounter, but that involves more requirements that would facilitate the work of the investigator. ...
Imagine that you are a researcher interested in disentangling the underlying mechanisms that motivate certain individuals to self-sacrifice for a group or an ideology. Now, visualize that you are one of a few privileged that have the possibility of interviewing people who have been involved in some of the most dramatic terrorist attacks in history. What should you do? Most investigations focused on terrorism do not include empirical data and just a handful of fortunate have made face-to-face interviews with these individuals. Therefore, we might conclude that most experts in the field have not directly met the challenge of experiencing studying violent radicalization in person. As members of a research team who have talked with individuals under risk of radicalization, current, and former terrorists, our main goal with this manuscript is to synopsize a series of ten potential barriers that those interested in the subject might find when making fieldwork, and alternatives to solve them. If all the efforts made by investigators could save the life of a potential victim, prevent an individual from becoming radicalized, or make him/her decide to abandon the violence associated with terrorism, all our work will have been worthwhile.
... She adds that they treated her 'like any other person', despite her swastikas and other Neo-Nazi tattoos. Having bombed a mosque while with the Norwegian Nasjonalt Folkeparti, 'Lars' similarly observes that (quoted in Horgan, 2009): ...
This report focuses on interventions designed to promote and facilitate exits from ideologically justified violence – often referred to as ‘tertiary’ interventions. The beneficiaries of these programmes include individuals convicted of terrorism charges, as well as those who voluntarily disengaged. Relying on the authors’ Attitudes-Behaviours Corrective (ABC) Model of Violent Extremism (Khalil et al., 2022), and drawing from their extensive professional experiences of providing technical support to such interventions, this report presents a novel framework to help practitioners develop and implement these programmes.
... Finally, there is the issue of counterradicalization and de-radicalization in counter-terrorism. Some argue that both are viewed as a complex process consisting of a variety of interdependent push and pull factors and triggering events that drive people into and out of terrorism (Horgan, 2009). ...
Following September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the world trade centre in the United States of America, the phenomenon of terrorism has attracted increasing global attention. Coupled with this is the observable trend in the proliferation of terrorist groups in many parts of the world. To tackle these issues, nation-states, sub-regional, regional and continental bodies face the daunting task of evolving effective strategies for checkmating or containing the phenomenon. Indeed, many African countries have come to be faced with the problem of how to curtail the activities of terrorist groups, most of who operate on an established external link with notable and wealthy global insurgency groups. The overarching effects of these threats have become unprecedented and worrisome in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the search for practical solutions has been a challenge to scholars, state functionaries, and even attack victims. The paper provides an overview of the apparent vulnerability of the continent to increasing terrorist-related activities and the weak capacities of African countries’ leaders to respond to the unwholesome trend. Hence the call for developing a continental-counter terrorism strategy for the African continent.
... Con el tiempo, se observa un cambio importante en las políticas de protección, sobre todo con menores de edad, viéndose la necesidad de fortalecer el núcleo familiar desde una perspectiva más preventiva (Chaffin et al., 2001;Minuchin et al., 2000 ;Rodrigo et al., 2008;Trigo, 1997). Aquí es donde entra en juego la prevención primaria, cuya principal ventaja es el logro del éxito en el momento más temprano posible ante el desconocimiento de otras vías y alternativas (Horgan et al., 2009). ...
El objetivo principal de este manuscrito es presentar una nueva metodología de abordaje en la radicalización violenta usando como herramienta principal la metodología Scrum, la cual ha sido ampliamente usada en entornos de construcción de software. Se plantea una metodología de trabajo centrada en los destinatarios de la intervención: los adolescentes. Así, el método Scrum se ha mostrado, en multitud de ocasiones, muy eficaz como estrategia de aprendizaje colaborativo, habiéndose utilizado en entornos universitarios para el desarrollo de proyectos de gran calidad durante breves periodos de tiempo. Abordando la carta de valores e interviniendo hacia valores incompatibles con la violencia se pretende lograr la disminución de la radicalización en este colectivo.
... Bjørgo 2009, p. 140; see also Christensen, 2015b;Christensen & Mørck, 2017). They also suggest that the process of disengagement and deradicalisation from an extremist group is as complex as that leading to the initial radicalisation (Horgan, 2009b). People who leave extreme environments, groups and gangs generally struggle with confusing feelings of who they are, who to become, of what to do and where to go in order to establish an alternative lifestyle and identity (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009;Horgan 2009a;Barrelle, 2010;Christensen, 2015b;Christensen & Mørck, 2017 When Eva decided to leave, she had been involved in the extreme right for several years. ...
Inspired by a neo-Vygotskian approach, this article discusses the use of a mentoring scheme at EXIT, a Swedish organization supporting neo-Nazis’ disengagement from the extremist right. EXIT links mentees – individuals in the process of leaving the extremeright – to mentors – employees who are former neo-Nazis. The article illuminates why good intentions and a shared past between mentor and mentee are not enough for a development-oriented relation to occur; supporting mentees struggling with the outcomes of their involvement in the extremist right requires a deliberate practice. The main argument of the article is that for mentors to contribute to mentees’ development and reintegration into democratic society, they need to have contextualized and reinterpreted their own narrative of (dis)engagement and to combine it with a deliberate practice when interacting with mentees.
... Joining or supporting a terrorist group is often preceded by a process of radicalization, which can be understood as a multilayered and complex psychosocial process that is influenced by a variety of factors and mechanisms (Horgan, 2009). The motives for joining terrorist organizations are as heterogeneous as the motives to leave those. ...
Individuals belonging to terrorist organizations accept and often use violence as an instrument of their strategies to achieve their goals. The present study focuses on the motivational dynamics of three contrastively selected paradigmatic cases of extremists that grew up in Germany, joined and supported terrorist organizations abroad, and later disengaged and distanced themselves from the jihadist ideology. An innovative multi-methodical approach was applied to the interviews that combines a biographical reconstruction of the lived experiences with a psychoanalytically informed interpretation of the narratives. First, the biographical trajectories were analyzed on the manifest level: How have the former terrorists experienced their own pathways? What were relevant factors for their engagement in and disengagement from terrorism? Second, to gain a deeper understanding of the unconscious motivational dynamics for involvement in terrorism, key sequences of the narrative interviews were interpreted scenically in a psychoanalytical interpretation group: How did the interviewees express their lived experiences (and why in this particular way)? What latent meanings can be extrapolated that provide deep insights into the motivational backgrounds of their decisions? Based on the results of the triangulation process, characterizing structural hypotheses about case dynamics including protective and risk factors are presented and implications for prevention and intervention approaches are given.
... From a criminal justice perspective, a greater understanding of offender types may help with targeted treatment policies and risk assessments (Tracy and Kempf-Leonard, 1996). From a research perspective, it will ultimately help with our understanding of who takes part in particular violent offenses, the nature of their involvement with others and ultimately how they desist or disengage from violent activities (Horgan, 2009). Investigating whether particular variables more closely correlate with particular offender types also concerns the very nature of how we theorize about terrorist involvement and whether general models of 'radicalization' or 'pathways' into terrorism are appropriate, It also highlights whether research on pathways into violence should be tailored for particular manifestations of terrorist or violent activity. ...
The study found little to distinguish these two violent offender types in their socio-demographic profiles. Their behaviors, on the other hand, differed significantly in the degree to which they had interacted with co-conspirators, their antecedent event behaviors, and the degree to which they lacked information prior to their attack. Unlike lone terrorists, mass murderers' violence was spontaneous due to unplanned physical or emotional conflicts. Lone terrorists, on the other hand, were motivated to commit violence due to ideologically based conflicts or differences with potential target victims. Regarding threat or risk, there are a number of overlapping questions that must be considered, including what type of action is most likely, under what conditions is a particular mass violence attack likely to be perpetrated, and what interventions are likely to be effective in preventing or mitigating the perpetration of violence. Lack of predetermined intent and strategy distinguishes mass murderers and lone terrorists. The lone terrorist tends to engage in more observable behaviors and planning than the mass murderer, which presents more of an opportunity to observe and assess preparatory actions and intervene to prevent the planned violence from occurring. 3 figures and approximately 100 references
... Menurut John Horgan deradikalisasi bagian dari proses mengubah paham radikal, akan tetapi yang terjadi sebaliknya yakni memicu radikalisme itu sendiri. Di sini yang dibutuhkan bukan mengubah pemikiran radikal, melainkan harus adanya hidup yang mandiri misal akses ekonomi dimudahkan dan menghindari perbuatan kekerasan (Horgan, 2009 (Tribunnews.com, 2017). ...
... Any group, organization, or movement offers diverse roles, some more central to a public identity (and more involved in constructing it) than others. In a study of extremist movements, Horgan (2009) refers to role migration as recruits first join, pursue a kind of apprenticeship, sometimes become central members, but also-after defeat, disagreement, or disillusionment-find roles outside the group. ...
This chapter examines the interplay of collective identities and emotions in a variety of processes involving participation: avoiding it, engaging others, continuing and making strategic decisions, and disengaging from it. The term “collective identity” refers to how individuals feel and think about groups. Collective identities are emotional as much as they are cognitive: they involve feelings about the ingroups and outgroups, but also shape many other emotions that people experience. Group pride, hate for opponents, compassion for others, yearning for our strategic objectives, shock at threats to our groups: these are abiding emotions that are symbolically elaborated and embodied in arguments, ideologies, and books as part of even the most “rational” of thinking–feeling processes. A full range of emotions is at play in political action, both directed at groups and shaped by group identities, as individuals move in and out of political participation.
This chapter sets the scene for the entire book, which is based on a qualitative study involving fifty-one in-depth interviews with American Muslims from nine states of the United States of America. It investigates why some young American Muslims have joined terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and what American Muslims think about the radicalization of some Muslims. It discusses the literature on identity and radicalization and seeks to understand why some Muslims endorse the jihadi ideology. It frames the radicalization discussion within the broader framework of Muslim–Christian relations from a historical and geopolitical point of view. The chapter includes a discussion of the research methodology, challenges, and limitations of the study. It also discusses the structure of the book in a thematic manner.
Terrorism experts continue to debate how and why people become radicalised and commit violence. Significantly less emphasis and coherence of thought has been deployed to understand those processes in reverse. From the perspective of counterterrorism practitioners within both government and civil society, the question has tended to bifurcate around two contrasting conceptual approaches: should the focus be on ‘deradicalization’ (an internal or philosophical outcome seeking change in beliefs, values and attitudes) or ‘disengagement’ (a social or temporal outcome seeking change in behaviours away from violence)? This article seeks to contribute to the debate about how disengagement functions and stands as a practical and effective counterterrorism methodology, and is based on detailed analysis of field work and project implementation in Indonesia. This article and the methodologies implemented and tested are grounded in previous research on disengagement of Indonesian jihadists and countering violent extremism (CVE) projects conducted by several of the authors over many years, and extends and codifies the findings of a valuable body of earlier academic literature. The authors argue that a disengagement process grounded in the social methodology of personal mentoring (defined infra this paper by a process we have called ‘Hearts, Hands and Heads’) can achieve a measurable and meaningful change in how individuals withdraw from violent extremist networks. This article will further show why disengagement programs in Indonesia should prioritise targeting specific at-risk groups, including returned foreign fighters, who have been known to conduct terrorist activities in Indonesia as well as advocate for their cause and recruit more effectively than those that have never been to Syria or other conflict zones. With the proper implementation, disengagement can be an effective preventive tool in Indonesia in addition to preparing the groundwork for later, more formal deradicalization processes and programs.
Despite the extraordinary support of so many people, any mistakes or omissions in the text remain our own.
Radicalisation leading to violent extremism is a multidimensional y complex challenge, which can only be overcome through a combination of actions in various policy fields. Individual action y factors outside the school, including individuals y groups, but also structural injustices, family conditions y parental values, etc., must be taken into account. For a long time, international organisations y national governments have prioritised security measures over preventive ones. Education is being used in both approaches, but its preventive function is only beginning to develop since the adoption of the UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. However, the direct effect of education on radicalisation depends not only on what is taught in the classroom but also on how it is taught, which is why the content of curricula, the pedagogical methods used y the values instilled in educational institutions are equally relevant. This research analyses the international y European frameworks that address education as a tool for preventing violent extremism y contrasts them with the recently approved Islamic religion curriculum, in order to comply with the competency-based approach inspired by Organic Law 3/2020, of 29 December, which amends Organic Law 2/2006, of 3 May, on Education (LOMLOE). The final balance of the curriculum analysis is positive. It does not contain «specific» curricular elements for the prevention of violent extremism, but it does contain many aspects «related» to the phenomenon, as well as valuable alternative narratives that focus on shared values y behaviours that help to prevent radicalisation La radicalización que conduce al extremismo violento es un reto multidimensional y complejo, que solo puede superarse mediante una combinación de acciones en diversos ámbitos políticos. La acción del individuo y los factores externos a la escuela, incluidos los individuos y los grupos, pero también las injusticias estructurales, las condiciones familiares y los valores de los padres, etc., deben tenerse en cuenta. Durante tiempo, las organizaciones internacionales y los gobiernos nacionales han priorizado las medidas securitarias sobre las preventivas. La educación está siendo utilizada con ambos enfoques, pero su función preventiva solo empieza a desarrollarse a partir de la aprobación del Plan de Acción para Prevenir el Extremismo Violento de la ONU. Ahora bien, el efecto directo de la educación en la radicalización depende no solo de lo que se enseña en el aula sino de cómo se enseña, por eso son igualmente relevantes el contenido de los planes de estudio, los métodos pedagógicos empleados y los valores que se inculcan en las instituciones educativas. Esta investigación analiza los marcos internacionales y europeos que abordan la educación como herramienta de prevención del extremismo violento y los contrasta con el currículum de religión islámica recientemente aprobado, para dar cumplimiento al enfoque competencial que inspira la Ley Orgánica 3/2020, de 29 de diciembre, por la que se modifica la Ley Orgánica 2/2006, de 3 de mayo, de Educación (LOMLOE). El balance final del análisis del currículo es positivo. En él no figuran elementos curriculares «específicos» de la prevención del extremismo violento, pero sí constan abundantes aspectos «relacionados» con el fenómeno, como también valiosas narrativas alternativas que inciden en los valores compartidos y en los comportamientos que ayudan a prevenir la radicalización
This article considers an unlikely source for non-militarized approaches to disrupting war and other forms of violence: fighters themselves. How can engaging with fighters/former fighters realize novel forms of violence/war disruption across various contexts, and what are the barriers to and implications of such engagement? Fighters’ exit from their armed organizations can be a source of violence/war disruption in two ways: first, through the sheer act of leaving and thereby diminishing the fighting capability of an armed organization, and, second, through using their credibility as former fighters to engage in activism to influence other current fighters, as well as the broader public, to refuse participation in or support for violence/war. Examining the work of “credible messengers,” “formers,” and anti-war veterans to disrupt street violence, extremist violence, and wartime violence, respectively, reveals surprising commonalities among them, as well as strikingly different reactions to their respective forms of disengagement/refusal and the policies they require.
Researchers interested in expanding our understanding about individuals, who are silenced by majority societies or those who willingly position themselves close to condemned standpoints, need to also think about ways of approaching and encouraging potential research participants. The current paper frames that need as an act of curiosity and an ethical responsibility. With that framing in hand, the paper explains the process of overcoming difficulties related to recruiting radicalized subpopulations of youngsters (154 self-identified Muslim youth with migration backgrounds and 153 native youth who support movements labeled as far right) in a transnational qualitative research conducted in four different countries (Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands) in 2020–2022. Because both groups are subject to the labels imposed on them by the majority societies (e.g., Muslim, Salafi, conservative, fascist, right wing, etc.), the researchers felt the need to be flexible in the ways they address and approach each participant. In the field, the purposeful efforts of recruitment wording for each individual appeared very useful in encouraging this by nature skeptical group of people. The current paper documents the development of this flexible strategy, which I hope will be useful to many qualitative researchers to facilitate their data collection efforts to identify and reach youth that is on the path of radicalization. We would like to encourage academics to stay curious about these two subpopulations of youth and other marginalized, singled out, and stigmatized groups, and consider interviewing as many individuals as possible in order to discover the radicals.
The study of terrorism represents one of the major turning points in criminology of the twenty-first century. In the space of just two decades, research on terrorism and political extremism went from a relatively uncommon niche to a widely recognized criminological specialization. Terrorism research now appears in nearly all mainstream criminology journals; college courses on terrorism and political violence have been added to the curricula of most criminology departments; and a growing number of criminology students are choosing terrorism as a suitable topic for class papers, research topics, theses and dissertations. The purpose of this book is to explore similarities and differences between terrorism and more ordinary forms of crime. This Element considers the ways that criminology has contributed to the study of terrorism and the impact the increasing interest in terrorism has had on criminology. This Element also provides empirical comparisons of terrorist attacks to more ordinary crimes and criminal offenders. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
United Nations Counter Terrorism
Terrorism presents one the biggest criminal justice postmodern challenges worldwide. The way criminal justice systems proact and react to mitigate and prevent such criminality raises a plethora of legal, socio-political, and strategic hurdles relating to how terror crime is defined, the human rights of the accused, protecting due process when using secret courts, the use of special advocates, the use of national security courts, civil rights i.e., freedom of association, cross-jurisdictional information sharing, and the requirement or right to prosecute etc. In this article, which is influenced by criminological theory, the definition of terror crime in the United Kingdom and at an International level is examined to ascertain whether common definitional elements exist, and the complex and competing local and International interests that are being balanced in preventing and/or prosecuting such crime.
Rhetorical contests about how to frame a war run alongside many armed conflicts. With the rise of internet access, social media, and cyber operations, these propaganda battles have a wider audience than ever before. Yet, such framing contests have attracted little attention in scholarly literature. What are the effects of gendered and strategic framing in civil war? How do different types of individuals - victims, combatants, women, commanders - utilize the frames created around them and about them? Who benefits from these contests, and who loses? Following the lives of eleven ex-combatants from non-state armed groups and supplemented by over one hundred interviews conducted across Colombia, Framing a Revolution opens a window into this crucial part of civil war. Their testimonies demonstrate the importance of these contests for combatants' commitments to their armed groups during fighting and the Colombian peace process, while also drawing implications for the concept of civil war worldwide.
Alors que l’engagement dans les organisations terroristes et les mouvements sociaux a suscité une littérature pléthorique, peu de travaux existent sur la sortie de ces deux types de collectifs. Pour saisir la pluralité des facteurs intervenant dans ces processus, nous nous sommes appuyés sur une enquête de sociologie empirique menée auprès de 64 militant.e.s du Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK). En effet, ce parti a connu une importante vague de départs de la guérilla au début des années 2000. L’étude microsociologique des trajectoires de désengagement conduit à nuancer le rôle de l’idéologie mis en avant par l’analyse méso-sociologique comme facteur explicatif des sorties de la violence. Elle est en outre utile pour mettre en évidence l’effet de la synergie entre facteurs méso (tels que les dysfonctionnements organisationnels) et facteurs micro (raisons personnelles, dissonances cognitives induites par l’identification de contradiction avec les valeurs qui motivent l’enrôlement et la réalité de la vie au sein de la guérilla) pour justifier la sortie de la clandestinité.
This book offers a comprehensive analysis of the multifaceted dimensions of violent extremist groups in South Asia, attending especially to the relationships between the local and regional forces influencing their emergence and activities. In addition, research in the book shows how political, security-sensitive events and processes are framed, and the factors responsible for such framing. Similarly, it discusses prevalent discourses on anti-violent extremism policy and the on-the-ground militarized preventive/reactive interventions they guide, which are inspired by ideologies that increasingly reflect controversial understandings of the experiences of people within conditions of state fragility. In doing so, the book balances attention to local conditions that frame the rise and fall, or persistency, of incidences of violent extremism. The systems-based ecological framing of issues in the book is influenced by a concern for the broader questions of securitization, global governance, poverty, (under)development, and armed conflicts in South Asia.
That said, this book is distinctive in as much as it constitutes the first-ever attempt to analyze South Asian countries through the lens of the state fragility framework and to examine how issues of state fragility contribute to violent extremism. Through case studies drawn from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, this collection suggests that fragile states have not only created conditions for extremist groups but that some states at times also adopt violent populist policies to marginalize minorities, pushing those minorities to resort to
violent means.
The notion of lifecycle was first used in the social sciences in the 1930s and remained prominent until the end of the 1960s in political behavior studies, despite its lack of empirical consistency. The basic idea is that stage‐specific needs result in the adoption of particular political attitudes. Based largely on Freudian psychodynamic theory, the lifecycle approach has mainly been interested in explaining adolescent rebellion (and, more rarely, the conservatism of the elderly) and attempted to attribute social protest in the 1960s to young people's lifecycle characteristics and needs, and to deep‐seated emotional conflicts between youth and adults. In a more structuro‐functionalist perspective, lifecycle theory has given birth to a cohort‐generational perspective, in which youth unrest is viewed as a product of a rapidly changing social order and unique growing‐up experiences that exacerbate age‐group relations, and may generate organized protest behaviors. However, contemporary research has found no clear diminution with age in the number of left‐oriented attitudes nor any rush to conservatism more generally, as lifecycle theories would suggest. Here, the main result is that social unrest is not causally linked to chronological age and that people do not seem to become more conservative with age.
In Pakistan, Violent Extremism (VE) is both the cause and outcome of state fragility. Pakistan’s existing Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) framework involving de- radicalization of ex-militants, counter-radicalization messaging, outlawing of militant groups, and criminalization of hate speech needs to be enhanced to address the long-term root causes of VE. Hence, beyond corrective and preventive PCVE approaches, the country also needs to focus on the more structural causes of VE linked to its efforts to construct religious nationalism while supressing more organic forms of ethnic and regional sub-nationalism. Divided into three sections, the first part of this chapter conceptualizes VE within the broader context of state fragility and applies it to the Pakistani experience. This context-specific experiential analysis provides a spatial appraisal of the fragility-induced VE in the country. The second section outlines Pakistan’s hard PCVE initiatives. The final section analyses soft PCVE measures and how they are addressing VE in the context of state fragility.
Left-wing terrorism and extremism have received limited scholarly attention beyond a focus on large terrorist groups and violent campaigns between the 1970s and 1990s (e.g. German Red Army Faction, Italian Red Brigades, or Weather Underground in the United States). This article discusses the contribution of German research regarding disengagement from left-wing terrorism and extremism, as well as field experiences from Germany in the field of preventing and countering violent left-wing extremism. Significant research and prevention practice gaps severely limit knowledge in this regard. Available evidence mostly stems from highly structured and strategically operating groups from past decades.
This chapter describes ten major reasons as to why children become terrorists: (1) state failure, (2) cultural arena, (3) social media influences, (4) total institution, (5) kinship factors, (6) identity crises and psychological factors, (7) susceptibility and naïveté, (8) kidnapping or forced recruitment, (9) easy prey for suicide missions, and (10) gender-related and sexual reasons. This chapter is important because it validates the complexity of the problem; terrorist actors do not operate in a vacuum. Some reasons are more prevalent or influential than others, depending on the region or circumstances. Children can also join terrorist movements for more than one reason; they can be exposed to the same hazard in various ways and, therefore, encounter different problems and opportunities during their journeys.KeywordsCultureGenderIdentityIndoctrinationKidnappingKinshipRecruitmentSocial mediaState failureTotal institution
This chapter is a detailed thematic analysis of 260 verbal and written statements made by the 24 subjects in this study to interpret their child terrorist and peace activist experiences (through their narratives available in the public domain). Thematic analysis identifies, examines, and interprets patterns of meaning (“themes”) within data. It is well suited to study time and change in a person’s life. Three research questions were formulated to understand the commonalties and differences in the way the five groups infused their experiences of child terrorism with meanings and how they communicated them to the world. Overall, this thematic analysis followed six steps: (1) familiarization with the data, (2) creation of codes, (3) theme search, (4) theme definition, (5) data analysis, and (6) conclusions.
This chapter discusses the methodological challenges and possibilities associated with trying to uncover the changing motivations and experiences of jihadists through interviews. It argues that contacting potential interviewees, conducting the interviews, and analyzing the data are uniquely challenging when conducting research on jihadists, especially active ones. Interviewing as a method usually gives the researcher access to rich data, but the price of getting access can be a sense of disorder, for example, when the roles of the researcher and interviewee are reversed. Unlike in many other interview situations, the researcher is not in a position of power. Under these circumstances, the ideal of having minimal contact with the subjects of the interview study may have to be replaced with an approach that often borders on ethnographic research. Such interviews are probably the best method for gaining access to the processes of change or jihadiship.
This chapter analyzes how fighting for IS changed jihadists, as socialization to apocalyptic ideas could override, for example, an initial desire to help local Muslims in Syria and thus altered the nature of jihad. What previous studies have often neglected is that the radicalization process does not always end when an individual joins a jihadist group. Moreover, while most previous research has argued that radical ideas lead to radical behavior, this chapter reverses the causal path and uses cognitive dissonance theory to explain how radical behavior also can give rise to radical ideas, which may lead to a self-reinforcing circle or radicalization.
This chapter focuses on motivations for jihad. The attractiveness of foreign fighting is generally based on framing a distant conflict as threatening to a transnational identity group. However, it is not always clear what draws potential recruits to such frames. This chapter offers such a causal mechanism with the help of cognitive dissonance theory. Moreover, it uses cognitive dissonance theory to examine how individual jihadists’ jihadiship is characterized by change—from the early stages of radicalization to fighting as part of a jihadist group and finally leaving jihad. While some scholars have emphasized how ideas contribute to behavioral radicalization, a focus on cognitive dissonance and how it interacts with the impact of the social setting and ideas such as fard al- ‘ayn (individual duty) refines our understanding of the role of ideas. The question is not whether ideas matter, but how and when they matter.
Social movement approaches have explored how protest movements transition into terrorist organizations. However, there has been little academic work examining potential causal mechanisms that drive the movement of individuals from nonviolent organizations to violent ones. This study uses priming theory to explain how nonviolent organizations can function as inadvertent gateways that facilitate the movement of individuals into violent organizations. Rather than elaborating on social contacts between nonviolent and violent organizations, priming shifts the analytical focus to socialization processes inside gateway organizations and how they can be exploited by violent organizations through framing. The study also analyzes priming in gateway organizations as a gendered process. Although the examples provided are drawn from the Islamist context, the priming process applies to all religious, far-left, far-right, and nationalist/separatist groups.
Violent extremism is an ambiguous and politically loaded concept, and – at the national level – the parameters used to define it are usually framed by the state, powerful ruling elites, and members of the international community, either directly or indirectly through donor-funded projects. Although different types of violent extremism and extremist movements exist in Kenya, donors and the state often focus on religiously-inspired groups such as Al-Shabaab, the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, and affiliated networks such as the Al-Muhajiroun, Al-Hijra, and Jaysh Al-Ayman. However, at a community level, participants in our body map workshops highlighted gang violence, police brutality, ethnically motivated violence, marginalisation, discrimination, and gender-based violence as priorities in defining violent extremism. We conclude that constructions of violent extremism at the local level are shaped by lived experiences of everyday insecurities influenced by gender, ethnicity, social status, location, and interactions with the state. To effectively address violent extremism in Kenya and beyond, its definition needs to be contextualised in ways that take into consideration local perspectives and everyday experiences of violence and insecurity.
This article assesses the strengths, weaknesses, and gaps in the discipline of counterterrorism studies since al-Qaeda’s catastrophic attacks against the United States on 9/11 along 10 dimensions: defining terrorism, group and lone actor typologies, causes of terrorism, terrorist psychologies, radicalization and recruitment, organizational dynamics, modus operandi, incident chronology databases, forecasting and predicting terrorism, and countering terrorism.
Radicalization is a major challenge of contemporary global security. It conjures up images of violent ideologies, “homegrown” terrorists and jihad in both the academic sphere and among security and defense experts. While the first instances of religious radicalization were initially limited to second-generation Muslim immigrants, significant changes are currently impacting this phenomenon. Technology is said to amplify the dissemination of radicalism, though there remains uncertainty as to the exact weight of technology on radical behaviors. Moreover, far from being restricted to young men of Muslim heritage suffering from a feeling of social relegation, radicalism concerns a significant number of converted Muslims, women and more heterogeneous profiles (social, academic and geographic), as well as individuals that give the appearance of being fully integrated in the host society. These new and striking dynamics require innovative conceptual lenses. Radicalization in Theory and Practice identifies the mechanisms that explicitly link radical religious beliefs and radical actions. It describes its nature, singles out the mechanisms that enable radicalism to produce its effects, and develops a conceptual architecture to help scholars and policy-makers to address and evaluate radicalism—or what often passes as such. A variety of empirical chapters fed by first-hand data probe the relevance of theoretical perspectives that shape radicalization studies. By giving a prominent role to first-hand empirical investigations, the authors create a new framework of analysis from the ground up. This book enhances the quality of theorizing in this area, consolidates the quality of methodological enquiries, and articulates security studies insights with broader theoretical debates in different fields including sociology, social psychology, economics, and religious studies.
This article explores the intersubjective dynamics that foster desistance from crime. It explains that the concepts of ‘identification’ and ‘recognition’—as defined by Jessica Benjamin—illuminate how psychic change can come about despite social continuity within offenders’ lives. The value of Benjamin’s approach is illustrated through the analysis of the case of a former far-right activist. The article shows that in order to desist from crimes that involve a symbolic ‘othering’ (e.g. hate crimes) offenders have to reclaim the psychic parts of themselves that are projected onto victims. The article concludes that when those deemed ‘other’ are able to withstand and survive hostile projections the possibilities for psychic change among desisting offenders are enhanced.
A nationalist hard-line party, Batasuna of Sozialista Abertzaleak, Basque region, which consists of northern Spain and parts of southwestern France, has asserted Basque independence for the previous 40 years. This party has been fighting for the autonomy of three of northern Spain's Basque provinces, but it has been declining in power since being formally banned by the conservative People's Party government in 2003. The organization that is commonly assumed to be its military wing, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), has been responsible for the deaths of over 800 people since 1968. The numerous arrests of over 400 ETA members seem to have greatly shaken the internal structure of Batasuna. It is uncertain whether Batasuna's proposed political methods will bring peace to this troubled region and whether the Spanish government, which has long been debating the issue of Basque self-determination, will ever believe Batasuna's claim. The People's Party, which was in power until March 2004, refused negotiations with ETA due to its unwillingness to renounce the use of violence. The lack of clarity in Batasuna's overtures and the internal squabbles have weakened its credibility, thus the only only apparent path toward peace remains with ETA.
Despite savage killings in Algeria and intermittent attacks on government officials and foreigners in Egypt, the Islamist advance has come to a halt in both countries. Revolutionary Islamists no longer represent a real threat to the survival of the secular authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. Brutal as their methods have been, militant Islamists could not match the counter-violence unleashed by these regimes. The regimes' military successes have not, however, led to peace, and their campaigns have yet to crush Islamist insurgency. Authoritarian policies from Cairo and Algiers have marginalised and alienated the militant Islamist opposition, pushing it towards the politics of terror. In the absence of substantive political and economic reforms, low-intensity conflict is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.
The end of Greece's Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N) finally came on 5 September 2002 when the group's leader of operations, Dimitris Koufodinas, turned himself to the police. Unlike Alexandros Giotopoulos, the group's chief ideologue who denied any involvement in 17N, Koufodinas took responsibility for the entire 17N experience and sought to defend and justify their violent actions. Drawing on Koufodinas's court testimony this article suggests that the world of 17N was a closed, self-referential world where terrorism had become for the members a way of life from which they could not walk away. Defending the group's campaign from beginning to end, Koufodinas contended that 17N was an authentic revolutionary alternative to a barbaric, inhumane and vindictive capitalist order that was running amok. An emblematic personality of 17N terrorism, Dimitris Koufodinas embraced the view that Greece's “self-negating democracy” necessitated exactly the kind of political violence they had undertaken.
The internal organizational problems of terrorist groups are analyzed. The purpose is to investigate how violent action by members of such organizations can be triggered by internal organizational problems rather than by external factors exclusively. Two kinds of problems are studied: command problems and political problems. Command problems include the following: reconciliation of security with efficient communication, the clustering of ethnic groups under stress, the role of women, and the quality of the membership. The political problems include the following: the self‐destructive potential in each terrorist organization (especially in case of its victory), the problem of inflated membership, and the role of terrorist leaders as the givers of moral dispensation.
Governments have many means to begin a dialogue with terrorist groups. The offer of talks may lead terrorists’ constituents to reduce their support for violence, and moderates within a group itself may also turn away from violence. Despite these potential benefits, even the consideration of entering discussions carries many risks. Talks with U.S. officials do indeed reward the use of terrorism, tangibly demonstrating that groups can kill innocents and yet become legitimate interlocutors—a reward that is costly both in terms of reducing the prevalence of this tactic worldwide and because it inevitably angers local allies fighting the groups. Moreover, talks often fail in a variety of ways, giving the terrorists a breathing space to rearm and organize and leaving the government looking foolish. Because talks often fail, policymakers should carefully explore whether the conditions are right for any hope of success before they begin a dialogue.
Using informers is a basic tool in preventing terror attacks and the nature of current terror threats makes it even more crucial. This use, however, often leads to human rights violations, both of the informers and by them, and to many problematic ethical questions. Drawing on the Israeli–Palestinian example—where a main strategy of Israeli intelligence activity in the Palestinian areas has been an extensive use of informers—this article presents the main human rights dilemmas in the field, divided into three stages: recruitment, operation and post-operation obligations, and also points to the possible counter-productive consequences of such a use.
This article treats terrorist organizations as political interest groups. Starting from the assumption that terrorists are rational political actors, it follows that organizational considerations will play a role in the formation and decline of terrorist groups, just as is the case in other political organizations. The effects of several factors, including recruitment, ability to provide selective and purposive incentives, the need for entrepreneurial political leadership, competition from other organizations, the ability to attract outside support, and the ability to form coalitions with other groups, are considered.
This article focuses on the reasons why the attempt to achieve the end of ETA's violence in the Basque Country during the mid- to late-1990s was unsuccessful when compared to the IRA's case in Northern Ireland. It argues that the different roles played by Basque and Irish nationalism in that decade and the distortion of the Irish model by Basque nationalist parties and the terrorist organization ETA were decisive in this outcome. The radicalisation of constitutional nationalism in the Basque region, as opposed to the constitutionalisation of radical nationalism that was a key factor in the achievement of the consensus enshrined in the 1998 Belfast Agreement, contributed to the continuation of terrorism. Contrary to the spirit of this Agreement, Basque nationalists moved away from an existing consensus with non nationalist parties around the principle of full development of the Basque autonomy strengthening ETA's will to carry on with their campaign.
In this paper I explore and exemplify the processes through which youngsters become committed insiders of countercultural youth groups and how under-aged (child) soldiers go through a similar process of transformation to become members of what I will call a ‘community of military terror’. Finally, I discuss the extent to which the experience of more extreme counter-cultural groups and communities can be accommodated into the ‘community of practice’ concept (Lave, 1988; Wenger, 1998), and, when not possible, the modifications needed to achieve accommodation.
The Red Army Faction (RAF) has changed the structure of its organisation several times. This happened usually after setbacks in its operations which were regarded by sympathisers and supporters as defeats. Regroupings in the hierarchy were made in the hope to get new energies for the armed struggle. In the last year difficulties in communications developed, particularly between the command level and the prisoners. The attempt to establish a ‘West European Guerrilla’ failed.At the beginning of the 1980s the RAF worked out its ‘MIC‐streategy’ which was aimed at the so‐called ‘Military‐Industrial‐Complex’. Meanwhile this conception is replaced by another target. The enemy of the terrorists now is the ‘European Superpower’. By creating this new hostile figure the RAF is renewing its attempt to form a ‘European Front of the Guerrilla’. But the call for new allies remained without resonance until today.
This article is based on the premise that terrorist organizations are a special class of political interest groups. What separates terrorist organizations from most interest groups is that terrorists use violence instead of lobbying to try to achieve their goals. Terrorist organizations will face the same kinds of organizational problems as other interest groups, i.e., recruitment of members, competing groups, political cohesion, leadership contests, etc. This paper focuses on how these organizational processes inside the terrorist organizations affect the outcome of bargaining between authorities and terrorist organizations. The effects of the internal organizational situation of the terrorist group will be manifest most clearly in the likelihood of achieving a peaceful resolution of a terrorist event and in the amount of the risk premium required to achieve the peaceful resolution.
The Ulster Defence Association is the largest of the paramilitary organisations in Northern Ireland, yet it has received scant attention in the literature on terrorism. As a paramilitary organisation, it appeared to be in terminal decline in the late 1980s, but it has since then re‐established itself as a significant security threat in Northern Ireland. This article describes in the form of a case study some of the factors that have led to the resurgence of the organisation since 1989. In particular, it describes how a series of events, culminating with the Stevens Inquiry of 1989–90, effectively re‐established the organisation and renewed its deadly capacity for terrorism.1
The Manhattan trial of four men linked to Osama bin Laden was the result of the largest overseas investigation ever mounted by the U.S. government. The trial generated thousands of pages of documents and the testimony of dozens of witnesses with some knowledge of bin Laden's group. What was learned from the trial is that bin Laden's organization experienced severe cash flow problems in the mid-1990s; that the U.S. government has had some real successes in finding informants within bin Laden's organization; that bin Laden has taken steps to acquire weapons of mass destruction; that the training of bin Laden's followers in his camps in Afghanistan is quite rigorous, featuring tuition on a wide range of weapons and explosives and terrorism techniques; and that bin Laden's group operates transnationally, its membership drawn from four continents. Finally, the trial underlines the strengths and limits of the law enforcement approach to bin Laden.
The article looks at Red Brigades (BR) recruitment in the early 1970s via the infiltration and ‘lubrication’ of far left groups based in the factories of Northern Italy. The author describes the passage from extremism to terrorism and the criteria imposed by the BR for entry. Initial imitation of the Latin American guerrilla model was gradually replaced by a series of organizational and disciplinary structures based on first‐hand experience. The strict regulations laid down by the BR were generally adhered to and were a vital factor for survival, although the weakest link was in personal relations. The restrictions of clandestinity created personal and political crises which deepened after 1978, when the battle between state and terrorists intensified. The greater commitment required of members made dissent and exit correspondingly more traumatic. In the end, attempts to preserve unity by increasing discipline proved to be counterproductive.
This commentary examines the issue of global jihadist recidivism and identifies it as a potential long-term international counterterrorism concern. Although there are no comprehensive and accurate statistics on global jihadist recidivism, there is sufficient anecdotal evidence that suggests that the tendency for released imprisoned global jihadist terrorists is to return to terrorist activity. It is important to understand that arresting, indicting, and sentencing a captured global jihadist terrorist is not the end of the counterterrorism skirmish. In fact, the next stages of incarceration and reformation are more crucial to the endgame. The problem of global jihadist recidivism is at the core a manpower issue. Prisons have always been an important front for all types of terrorist groups. Recidivism or the failure of prison rehabilitation programs is simply one component of this front. Terrorist groups do not want their imprisoned members to reform and resign from the organization. Further research needs to be conducted on the recidivism rate for terrorists and whether religious terrorists would have a higher rate than secular ones. The academic, think tank, and U.S. government communities need to examine this issue to determine if it is a long-term international counterterrorism problem. The author believes it will be.
Based on 48 fairly detailed personal case histories, and more limited data on 447 other individuals, this article describes significant patterns in the lives of members of the Basque insurgent organization Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA). The article discusses the age and sex of ETA members, the socioeconomic background of the members and their families, and their ethnic and linguistic characteristics. The article also describes life in ETA, the radicalization of Basque youth, how new members are recruited into the organization, how they live and what they do as members, how ETA members relate to family, friends and loved ones, and how they terminate their relationship to the organization. The study finds ETA members to be not the alienated and pathologically distressed individuals who join other insurgent organizations, but rather they are psychologically healthy persons for the most part, strongly supported by their families and their ethnic community.
Criminological theorists and criminal justice policy makers place a great deal of importance on the idea of desistance. In general terms, criminal desistance refers to a cessation of offending activity among those who have offended in the past. Some significant challenges await those who would estimate the relative size of the desisting population or attempt to identify factors that predict membership in that population. In this paper, we consider several different analytic frameworks that represent an array of plausible definitions. We then illustrate some of our ideas with an empirical example from the 1958 Philadelphia Birth Cohort Study.
Theoretical debates and empirical tests on the explanation of stability and change in offending over time have been ongoing for over a decade pitting Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) criminal propensity model against Sampson and Laub's (1993) life-course model of informal social control. In 2001, Wright and his colleagues found evidence of a moderating relationship between criminal propensity, operationalized as self-control, and prosocial ties on crime, a relationship they term life-course interdependence. The current study extends their research by focusing on this moderating relationship and the developmental process of desistance from crime among serious juvenile delinquents. Contrary to the life-course interdependence hypothesis, the results indicate that whereas self-control and social bonds are strongly related to desistance from crime, there is no evidence of a moderating relationship between these two factors on desistance among this sample. The implications of this research for life-course theories of crime, future research, and policies regarding desistance are discussed.
Most searchers performing unit root tests on terrorism series reject the null hypothesis of unit roots (I(1)) and conclude that terrorism is stationary (I(0)). In this paper we analyze ETA activity in Spain during the last 30 years by means of examining its degree of dependence across time, using fractional integration or I(d) techniques. The results show that the activity of ETA is persistent to some extent, with an order of integration of about 0.40, implying stationarity, but also long memory behavior. We argue that this strong degree of dependence between the observations might be explained by the historical background underlying the political conflict in the area. In addition, the results indicate that the most significant factors contributing to a reduction of violence are those related to political pacts among the political parties in the Basque region. In order to put an end to ETA's violence, these accords should involve both nationalist and non-nationalist groups.
Research on crime-related developmental trajectories is reviewed with outcomes revealing the existence of several trajectories rather than a single general pattern. Each trajectory is marked by transitions that define the pattern's path and direction over time. These anticipated transitions differ from the unanticipated transitions known to precipitate crime deceleration and desistance. Borrowing principles from nonlinear dynamical systems theory--sensitive dependence on initial conditions, chaotic attractors, and self-organization in particular--this article offers a model of crime deceleration and desistance in which belief systems congruent with crime are altered in phases--initiation, transition, maintenance--to create belief systems incongruent with crime. The practical implications of this model are discussed and suggestions for future research are outlined.