Editor's and guest editor's preface

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Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XVI, 2014, 2, pp. 201-216
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Editor’s and Guest Editor’s Preface
Giovanni Giorgini
Università di Bologna
Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche e Sociali
giovanni.giorgini@unibo.it
Elena Irrera
Università di Bologna
Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche e Sociali
elena.irrera2@unibo.it
One of the charges that have most frequently been levelled at Marcus Tullius
Cicero (106-43 B.C.) by contemporary readers is a supposed inability to work out
an authentically original set of philosophical views1. In the opinion of many
commentators, the exquisiteness of his oratorical style and the shrewdness he
displayed in his political and forensic activity are not matched by equally
remarkable achievements in the domain of theoretical reflection, especially when
it comes to matters of political thought. Such a conviction might be fostered by a
number of factors. In the first place, Cicero himself declared that there are many
to whom he yields precedence in knowledge of philosophy, and that he could
rather lay claim to the orator’s peculiar set of abilities (De Officiis I, 1.2). Also, his
frequent and explicit reminders to the doctrines of thinkers like Plato, Aristotle,
the Skeptics and the Stoics in his written works have often led scholars to charge
him of mindless eclecticism. Most notably, his political views have often been
judged in terms of a simple projection of his life and active commitments in the
turbulent period of factional strife preceding the death of the Roman Republic,
and not as stances substantiated by an authentic philosophical outlook.
1 See for instance V. Pöschl, Römischer Staat und griechisches Staatsdenken bei Cicero, Berlin,
Junker und Dünnhaupt Verlag, 1936: 173, who sees Cicero’s political works (the Republic in
particular) as depending heavily on the work of Plato. See also M.I. Finley (Politics in the
Ancient World, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983: 128) who deems Cicero’s work as
lacking innovative aspects, both in the philosophical and in the historical sphere. More to the
point, with regard to the Republic, he takes (in agreement with the German historian
Mommsen) the central idea of the De Republica to be “as unphilosophical as unhistorical”. Cf.
J.G. Powell (ed.), Cicero. The Philosopher, Oxford, Clarendon Paperbacks, 1999: 2-3. Powell,
however, explains that the fact that Cicero was not a particularly original thinker makes him
interesting in different respects. In particular, Cicero presents himself as “an attentive student
of philosophy with a mind of his own, who could additionally bring to bear a wide experience of
Roman life, politics and law, which was outside the normal purview of many contemporary
Greek philosophers”.

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This special issue of Ethics&Politics aims to shed a new light on Cicero as
political thinker and to foster an appreciation of his thought by bringing into
focus some of its main theoretical underpinnings. The general idea that inspires
the collection of paper here collected is that Cicero’s voluminous corpus of writings
allows the reader to trace the seeds of an authentically pioneering political theory,
one that might give us insights into a network of key philosophical questions to
which he seems to give pride of place: justice (iustitia), equity (equitas), the nature
of the res publica and its most desirable internal arrangement (the best regime),
the role of natural law and individual virtues in shaping the moral texture of the
members of the societas humana.
Cicero’s philosophical examination of the nature and purpose of politics is the
result of a complex personal and professional path, which combines his dedication
to literary and philosophical studies with his military, legal and political
engagements. Cicero was born in 106 BC in Arpino in a rich family who belonged
to the equestrian order; since his childhood he studied rhetoric, law and
philosophy in Rome and then went on to study in Athens, Rhodi and Smyrna
between 79 and 77 BC. Between 90 BC and 88 BC he is with the legati Gneus
Pompeius Strabo and Lucius Cornelius Silla engaged in the “social war” fought by
Rome and the Italic people who asked for Roman citizenship (which entitled them
to many rights, such as access to public positions and the possibility to become a
subject of ius civile). Some years afterwards he starts his activity as a lawyer and
orator2. His official entrance in the legal arena is in 81 BC, when he delivers his
first oration Pro Quinctio, although he becomes a famous orator only with the Pro
Roscio Amerino3, delivered in defence of a citizen of Ameria accused of parricide.
Cicero’s apprenticeship as a lawyer and orator in those days enables him to
understand the functioning of Roman political institutions and to notice the
incipient contrasts between optimates (who supported senatorial auctoritas and its
hegemonic role in ancient Rome’s political life) and populares (who supported the
sovereignty of people and the necessity to implement policies which favoured the
people). These contrasts issue in a phase of civil wars raging from 86 BC (when the
conflict between Lucius Cornelius Sulla and Gaius Marius deflagrates) up to the
beginning of Augustus’ principality4.
It is in such a historical context, characterized by a profound political and
social instability, that Cicero’s cursus honorum develops starting from the year 75
BC (when he became quaestor; he was then senator in 74, aedile curule in 69,
praetor in 66 and consul in 63). In 60 BC Julius Caesar, Pompey and Crassus
formed the First Triumvirate and took control of Roman politics. They tried to
2 For a study of Cicero forensic speeches as examples of practical advocacy see J. Powell and J.
Paterson (eds.), Cicero the Advocate, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004.
3 See Plutarch, Cicero 3,5. Cf. E. Rawson, Cicero. A Portrait, London, Allen Lane, 1975.
4 For the historical context see G. Brizzi, Roma. Potere e Identità. Dalle origini alla nascita
dell’impero cristiano, Bologna, Pàtron, 2012.

Editor’s and Guest Editor’s Preface
203
enrol Cicero on their side but he refused, stating that he preferred to remain loyal
to the Senate and the Republic. This fact angered the triumviri and in 58 BC a
satellite of Caesar, the tribune Clodius, proposed a retroactive law which
sentenced to exile and to the loss of citizenship anyone who killed a Roman citizen
without due trial. The law was devised against Cicero, who had Lucius Catilina
killed without trial after denouncing his conspiracy in 63 BC. Cicero spent one and
a half years away from Rome, mostly studying philosophy; after his return, being
still forbidden to take part in politics, he wrote some of his major works. In 49 BC
Caesar crossed the Rubicon and Cicero sided with Pompey, after whose defeat he
was pardoned by Caesar, remained in Rome and wrote more works. After Caesar’s
murder Cicero sided with Octavian against Mark Antony, but the two politicians
found an agreement which included getting rid of their respective enemies. Cicero
had attacked vehemently Antony, who had him killed in 43 BC.
Beside his active political engagement, Cicero devoted his energy to the
project of devising new ethical and political foundations to the Roman res publica,
which in his days was waning to the point of disappearing. Cicero considered his
reflections on politics an instrument to change the contemporary practical reality,
the institutions of Rome and the mores of the Romans. He took the opportunity
to write when he found himself excluded from active participation in politics and
exiled from Rome. Works such as the De republica, the De legibus and the De
officiis were written when Cicero was not institutionally engaged in politics and
wanted to contribute to the regeneration of the republic. One of his main insights
is the idea that, by identifying the theoretical reasons of the crisis of the republic,
it is also possible to begin the process of renovating it through virtue. A
comprehensive reflection on the entire institutional history of Rome enables him
to identify the causes of the current situation and to meditate on the original link
between knowledge of human nature and practical ends of human beings as well
as the relation between human beings, god and final ends.
By critically engaging with the reasons of the decline of the Roman republic,
Cicero does not intend to confine himself to a theoretical work on politics but
rather wants to contribute to a genuinely philosophical re-founding of Rome. He
strives to find an ideal balance between conserving the traditional ethical and
political traditions and modernizing the institutions of the Roman republic. He
also pioneers a redefinition of the concept of optimus vir, who does not simply
possess a generic ethical and intellectual virtue but can also face the new situation
with a capacity for analysis and initiative5. Cicero ardently believes in the
principle of Concordia ordinum, which he conceives as agreement and coordination
between the senatorial and the equestrial orders; in a subsequent stage of his
thought he thinks of a Concordia omnium bonorum, that is an agreement between
5 See E. Lepore, Il pensiero politico romano del I secolo, in A. Momigliano-A. Schiavone (ed.),
Storia di Roma, Vol. II/1, Torino, Einaudi, 1990: 858.

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all virtuous citizens in the name of a justice that enforces a real res populi (Cf. De
republica 1.39): this is an agreement on the law which all citizens must respect
(iuris consensu) in the name of the search for a common interest (utilitatis
communio).
This special issue is divided in two parts. The first part (titled “Anatomy of
the Virtuous Res Publica: Law, Human Nature and Political Institutions in
Cicero”), aims at identifying some central aspects of Cicero’s political thought by
investigating such ethical issues as natural law, the mos maiorum and the virtue of
the vir bonus. The second part (titled “The Modern and Contemporary Reception
of Cicero”) explores Cicero’s legacy in the thought of some modern and
contemporary authors.
Notably, most studies on Cicero’s thought aim at reconstructing his vision of
man and the res publica by investigating the philosophical sources of his main
ideas. One of the most studied topics is Cicero’s vision of natural law, its origin
and its implications on governing a republic. The notion of lex naturae has a
central place in Cicero’s political thought, especially in the political projects of the
De re publica and the De legibus. The first essay proposed in this collection of
papers, La noción de ley natural en Cicerón by Francisco Lisi, opts for a different
approach to this question from most interpreters, who trace the notion of natural
law to a direct influence of Stoic philosophy Cicero6; Lisi, on the contrary,
explores the possibility that the decisive influence on Cicero be Plato’s doctrines in
the Republic and in the Laws. Lisi emphasises how Plato searches for a superior,
transcendent grounding for his political constructions. The true universal law, or
“reason in the universe”, is identified with the mind of the divine legislator.
Cicero, according to Lisi, takes his bearings from Plato and maintains that the
universal intrinsic in nature is converted into human law inside the man’s mind.
Considering natural law as a set of rules founded on the equality of all human
beings and valid everywhere, Lisi makes a fundamental conceptual distinction
between the lex naturalis or naturae and the lex secundum naturam. The former is a
law directly deriving from nature whereas the latter conforms to nature. This
distinction between natural law and law according to nature is already present in
Plato’s thought and Cicero tries to revive it and to adapt the Platonic model to
historical circumstances of the Roman republic.
The issues of the fundamentals of “natural law” and the role played by such
a concept in the De republica and in the De legibus are also addressed in the second
essay proposed here, David Fott’s Skepticism about Natural Right in Cicero’s De
republica, which moves from an accurate analysis of the characters in these
dialogues and their respective positions. The very dialogical structure of these
works is not just a homage to a literary convention but means to emphasise the
6 Some interpreters maintain that Cicero assimilated ideas from Antiochus of Ascalon, while
others find in Philo of Alexandria, Antiochus’ former teacher, his main source of inspiration.

Editor’s and Guest Editor’s Preface
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importance of dialectics and dialogue in searching for the truth about justice. In
the De republica Cicero seems to enter an ideal dialogue with Philo, Laelius and
Scipio, leaving the reader to wonder what is the position he embraces on the
matter.
Fott maintains that Cicero is actually quite sceptic both concerning the role of
natural law and the question of who benefits from political activity (the rulers or
the ruled?). Fott examines Cicero’s treatment of natural law in books I-III of the
De republica and the three different positions maintained by the characters in the
dialogue. The first speaker, Philo, denies the existence of a natural law inborn in
men which can benefit all human beings. In his opinion, the real unwritten law
prompts wise men to increase their wealth, to enjoy pleasures and to rule over
other people even to their detriment. The second speaker, Laelius, has a positive
view of natural law. He subscribes to the typical Stoic position and maintains that
natural law, which is the “true law”, is according to nature, inborn in all human
beings, eternal and based on God’s will. Against such notion is the third speaker,
Scipio, who believes in the existence of a natural law but denies its divine origin.
He focuses, rather, on its use and argues that virtue consists in the contemplation
of what is eternal.
Cicero’s positions concerning such fundamental topics as natural law, the
destiny of man’s soul and the importance of political engagement are elaborated
in a critical comparison to the doctrines of the most important Greek
philosophers. In his Epicurean Philosophy in Cicero’s De Republica: Serious Threat
or Convenient Foil?, Walter Englert explores the contribution of Epicurean
philosophy in moulding Cicero’s view of nature and the ends of the virtuous man.
Englert emphasises that Cicero’s approach to Epicurean philosophy was not
hostile7, since in his childhood he befriended people like the Epicurean Phaedrus,
who remained a lifetime friend. Nevertheless, in his writings (both philosophical
and rhetorical and also in the letters) Cicero shows his disagreement with certain
aspects of Epicurean philosophy. For instance, in the Somnium Scipionis he
attacks the Epicureans for their criticism of Plato’s Myth of Er. More specifically,
Englert contends, it seems that Cicero is arguing against a specific Epicurean,
Colotes, who maintained the mortality of the soul. From a practical point of view,
Cicero seems to believe that the members of the Roman political élites find a
reason for not engaging in political activity in the Epicurean view of happiness as
otium and ataraxia8.
Cicero’s insistence on the risks entailed by a political life lacking the support
of moral virtue may prompt the reader to inquire into the qualifying traits of the
7 For a different view see J.C.B Gosling and C.C.W. Taylor, The Greeks on Pleasure, Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 1982: 382-388.
8 This idea was maintained both by Epicurus and by Lucretius, a philosopher by whom Cicero
was fascinated, as he told his brother Quintus in a letter dated February 55 BC.

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excellent man. In his essay Un dittico esemplare nel primo pensiero politico di
Cicerone: Il comandante militare nella De Imperio Cn. Pompei (66 a.C.) e il
governatore provinciale nella prima lettera al fratello quinto (59 a.C), François Prost
examines two Ciceronian texts (an oration and a letter) which disclose an in fieri
view of the virtuous man. Prost finds an early view on the nature of the virtuous
man in the oration De imperio Cn. Pompei9, in which it is possible to see Cicero’s
early political thought. His points of reference for the image of the good man in
this work is Pompey himself; subsequently Cicero refined his ideas and included
the experience of his own brother Quintus, who had important positions in the
administration of Asia minor between 62 and 59 BC.
Generally speaking, according to Prost, the portrait of the vir bonus has a
double function: (i) a practical-strategic function, which consists in identifying a
viable solution to the crisis at hand; (ii) an ‘exemplary’ function, namely that of
suggesting a model for ruling in the interest of the State, respecting traditional
institutions. The fundamental point for a virtuous man resides in a balance
between the (ordinary and extraordinary) powers implicit in the ruler’s imperium
and the moral virtues of the exceptional man, whose actions aim at the well-being
of the State. More specifically, as it is testified by the Virtutes Pompei, military
competence (scientia rei militaris) is less important than moral virtues, among
which wisdom in decision (consilium in providendo), ingenuity (ingenium),
temperance (temperantia) and humanitas stand out; this last virtue has a pre-
eminent role in Cicero’s ideal portrait of Pompey. The importance of humanitas,
which is similar to the Greek ideal of philanthrôpia, is finally elaborated in Cicero’s
first letter to his brother Quintus. By incorporating ideas of benevolence, justice
and other-regardingness, humanitas represents a core value within a vast array of
human excellences championed by authoritative men of old, i.e. men whose main
concern was to convey a paradigm of justice and to encourage attitudes of respect
for the common interest. Such excellences, which contribute to mould the kernel
of the traditional morality of ancient Rome, generally come under the heading of
mos maiorum.
The notion of mos maiorum and its political significance are examined in Anna
Iacoboni’s essay, titled Il significato politico del mos maiorum in Cicerone. Iacoboni
shows how this notion is actually multifaceted, ranging from the moral to the
legal sphere: it originates in a religious realm and then expands to the political
sphere. In the ancient literary tradition mos maiorum is considered as a set of
judgements and principles which issue in consuetudo. Mos originates from the
principles which guide the actions of the maiores and – as certain writers (such as
Varro) maintain – it becomes common consensus for all members of the political
community. The custom of the forefathers has the same dignity as the leges, it has
9 This oration was delivered in support of Manilius’ proposal to replace Lucullus with Pompey
in the war against Mitridates.

Editor’s and Guest Editor’s Preface
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real legal validity, although it is founded only on orality and memory10 and is
legitimized by its repeated application in time so that it becomes a constitutive
part of ius. Iacoboni shows the resilience and flexibility of this notion, which
evolves in time, and owes its political significance exactly to this characteristic.
She finds the reason for its crisis in the social and economic transformations which
followed the second Punich war, which brought great wealth into Rome and
corrupted Roman mores, especially by generating a form of individualism which
was unknown in the past. Cicero advocated the importance of philosophy in order
to give new ethical content to the mos maiorum and in order to find a solution to
the political crisis. He associates the mos maiorum to the notion of antiquum,
which is not to be identified with a specific time in the past but rather with a
proximity to divine perfection, which becomes the criterion of ethics. The appeal
to the mos maiorum is used by the optimates to find in the tradition of their
eminent maiores the legitimate foundation of their power in their struggle against
the populares.
The characteristic flexibility of the mos maiorum might prompt questions on
the issue of the legitimacy of innovation in matters of morals. Lex Paulson’s
essay, titled Conservative or Radical? The Constitutional Innovations of Cicero's De
legibus, critically engages with the key aspects of the constitutional agenda set up
by Cicero in his De legibus and proposes to answer the following questions: what
are the theoretical and practical boundaries between innovation and attachment
to traditional values in Cicero? Is there a theoretical framework in the light of
which the innovations made in the constitutional project outlined in the De
legibus may result compatible with the attachment frequently displayed by Cicero
to the long-established institutional setting of the Roman republic? Paulson
suggests that the compound of prescriptive ideals that inform the contents of the
De legibus, by persisting against the backdrop of a declining res publica, provides
the seeds for the development of a constitutional vision in which the inner
tensions between innovation and preservation can be recomposed in compliance
with the principle “to refresh the colours of the republican canvas” expounded in
De republica 5.1.2 (and taken in its turn by a passage of Plato’s Laws, 769c). Like
a painter being asked to reinvigorate the pale colors of a beautiful painting, the
political man should renovate the original colors of the constitution while
preserving its initial configuration.
Cicero supplies a portrait of the virtuous constitution that, being inspired by
the attempt to reconcile political realism and the search for an ideal perfection,
turns out to be widely divergent not only from his own moral absolutism, but also
from the Gracchi’s reformist solutions and the military realpolitik staged by
leaders like Marius, Sylla, Pompeus and Caesar. Among the constitutional
10 For a detailed study of the mos maiorum see H. Rech, Mos maiorum; la tradizione a Roma, a
cura di V. Vernole, Settimo Sigillo, Roma, 2006: 20.

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innovations proposed by Cicero we find the introduction of new and enforced
powers for the censors, of a senate with straightforwardly eligible members and of
new sanctions against political violence. In the last analysis, Cicero’s political
project appears to be grounded on the Senate’s authority and on the principle of
the concordia ordinum11. The search for a balance between the various social and
institutional components of the res publica finds its ground in strategic political
measures designed to promote cooperation between the tribunate and the boni.
By resting on the consensus of the good people, the concordia ordinum requires
that political leaders be equipped with a distinctive set of interrelated virtues
(both intellectual and ethical) and values able to mould a vision of the decent man
and leader. As suggested in Colotte’s essay (Le De officiis: un manuel de vertu
pratique?), such propensions and values are extensively illustrated in the De
officiis. Written in the second half of the year 44 BC., the De Officiis – inspired by
Panethius’ philosophy – may be considered Cicero’s philosophical testament, since
it is written for his son Marcus, who was about to start his studies in Athens. The
word officia, which is usually translated as “duties”, refers to the Stoic notion of
καθήκοντα, what is appropriate, what one has to do, in other words to the duties
of the honest man. Colotte’s essay aims at examining not only the moral and
political perspectives of the honestum in Cicero – considered with respect to the
Stoic morality – but also at investigating the relation between these theories and
Cicero’s own political action. The central question of the De officiis is: how, in a
“real” situation, i.e. one necessarily complex and impossible to be fully controlled,
can one make a decision that proves not only useful and practical, but also moral
and universally paradigmatic? Colotte’s contention is that, on Cicero’s view, there
is a specific, ideal that succeeds in reconciling claims for universal moral validity
with the idea of an appropriateness grounded in the contingency of situations: the
honestum.
The honestum, as it is described in the first book of the De officiis, has four
parts: in order to quench our thirst for knowledge (veri cognitio), there is wisdom;
to orient our social activity there is justice (justitia); to appease our desire of
independence and domination there is courage (fortis animus et magnus) and to
satisfy our love for order and harmony there is temperance (decorum =
temperantia, verecundia, modestia). To these four domains of morality correspond
four cardinal virtues, which are critically examined by Cicero.
By grounding his view on a philosophy of action and on a concept of practical
virtue, Cicero explores the conditions for a “just action”, considered in the usual
situations of the life of a man who wishes to hold a high responsibility in the
administration of the State. In Cicero’s thought, the search for “the right thing to
do” finds expression not only in an investigation of strategies of political conduct
11 For a study on the principle of the concordia ordinum see H. Strasburger, Concordia ordinum,
Eine Untesuchung zur Politik Ciceros, Bern, 1931, repr. Amsterdam, Hackert, 1956.

Editor’s and Guest Editor’s Preface
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suitable to specific circumstances, but – at a more general level – also in the
attempt to answer the question of the best life to live. An exploration of the issue
of the most preferable life conducted in the light of the Ciceronian notion of
officium is provided by Arianna Fermani in her essay Tra vita contemplativa e vita
attiva: Il De officiis di Cicerone e le sue radici aristoteliche. As Fermani maintains,
the concept of officium seems to retain the semantic potentialities of the Greek
ergon, and evokes the idea of a human “function” that can be exercised according
to sapientia and prudentia. Such virtues, in Cicero as well as in Aristotle, prove
capable to bring the distinctive potentialities of human beings to a full-fledged
realization, either in the direction of a life of contemplation or towards a practical
and political life. On Fermani’s view, Cicero attempts to develop exquisitely
Aristotelian insights12 so as to convey the idea that nature itself constitutes a
prescriptive principle for human beings, one that encourages them to root their
natural inclination in a well-thought path of human perfection.
So conceived, nature reveals itself as a source of assessment of human agency
and, most importantly, as an inspiring principle for the life-choices of individuals.
At any rate, Cicero does not establish a full axiological equivalence between
theoretical and practical interests in human life. On his view, primacy ought to be
accorded to political life over an existence purely (or mostly) devoted to the
pursuit of philosophical speculation. Above all, theoretical activity should not be
understood as an alternative to the political, but as one able to shape virtuous and
efficient plans of action. An analysis of the interactions between the two and the
corresponding kinds of life is offered by Gastaldi in her Vita politica e vita filosofica
nei proemi del De republica di Cicerone. Gastaldi makes use of the three proems of
the De republica as a privileged observation point with respect to a variety of
issues, such as the relationships between theoretical and practical life (ranging
from difference up to complementarity), the axiological primacy held by practical
life with respect to the contemplative one, and the most suitable strategy to
identify concrete political problems and engage with them13. As Gastaldi points
out, Cicero addresses a fierce criticism against those (like Epicureans and the
Stoics) who held a departure from political life to be the precondition for a happy
life. Cicero invites his readers not to follow such philosophers as paradigmatic role-
models, and suggests them to express devotion to the city, which ought to be
regarded as a nurturing mother. On his view, the opposition between the
philosophical and the practical life staged by other theorists should be overcome
by the ideal of theoretically wise men committed to political science. Also,
12 On the topic of Aristotle’s influence on Cicero see for instance W.W. Fortenbaugh and P.
Steinmetz (eds.), Cicero’s Knowledge of the Peripatos, New Brunswick and London, Rutgers
University Studies in Classical Humanities, 1989. See also O. Gigon, ‘Cicero und Aristoteles’,
Hermes 87 (1959): 143-162.
13 For a study of the issue of the relationships between practical and contemplative activity in
the proems cf. A. Grilli, I proemi del De republica di Cicerone, Brescia, Paideia, 1970.

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Gastaldi holds, Cicero shows special appreciation towards those philosophers who,
although never straightforwardly engaging with political activity, handle the
issue of political science from a purely theoretical point of view. In this respect,
Cicero seems to follow the path of Panetius, who endorses the importance of a
commitment to political activity informed by the philosophical knowledge of
human nature. When understood in this way, the figure of the wise man stops
being detached from the social and political dimension.
A different stance on the relationships between contemplative and practical
life is offered by Schütrumpf in his Cicero’s View on the Merits of a Practical Life in
De republica 1 - What is Missing? A Comparison with Plato and Aristotle.
Schütrumpf suggests that Cicero seems to endorse a “strong” view of engagement
in political life, that is, one according to which those intellectuals who devote
themselves to a theoretical study of politics cannot be regarded themselves as
actively involved in the field. As Schütrumpf argues, Cicero criticizes Plato for
failing to show the risks entailed by a political reflection unable to end up in
concrete agency. Schütrumpf’s approach emphasizes aspects of divergence
between Cicero and Plato, especially with reference to the model of practical
philosophy avenged by Plato’s Socrates in the Gorgias. Being charged by Callicles
with avoiding the public arena, Socrates replies by presenting himself as a true
politician in virtue of his dialogical activity with young people interested in
apprehending virtue (Gorg. 485d3-e2). Cicero critically confronts with the
paradigm of relationship between philosophy and politics exemplified by the
Platonic Socrates, that is, the one in which politics finds an expression in
pedagogical action, and opts for a more vigourous model of practical life: one that
exhalts the virtue and the specific identity of individual beings and their
excellence, the latter encompassing their military skills and gestae. By so doing,
Cicero rejects the idea that philosophy can be a form of politics, and his De
republica, in this respect, can be read as philosophical counterpart of Plato’s
Republic.
A more reconciling perspective between Cicero and the ancients is instead
suggested by Havlíček, whose essay sheds light on the positive role that Greek
philosophy has played on the shaping of Cicero’s thought. Havlicek holds that
there are two different ways of understanding the relationship between politics
and philosophy: on the one hand, to consider politics as an activity able to exert a
true monopoly over an intrinsically valuable philosophic speculation; on the
other, to suppose that a relationship of reciprocal collaboration can subsist
between politics and philosophy, being exemplified in its most complete form in
the nature of the optimus civis. Although in De republica 3.6 Cicero has expressed
the axiological priority of politics over philosophy, his works (in particular the
Tusculanae Disputationes) present some significative passages in which philosophy
is praised for its capacity to invite individuals to the pursuit of self-knowledge,
and not necessarily for its practico-political implications. Plato and Aristotle’s

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influence would be predominant here. In particular Cicero would acquire the
meaning of “common good” and the image of a city in which politicians do not
prioritize their own interest. The criticism addressed to Plato would not lead
Cicero to totally denty the role that philosophy can have in practical life, even
though the latter has primacy over speculation. In the last analysis, Havlíček
maintains that a correct understanding of Cicero’ thought ought not identify a
rupture between philosophy and politics, but rather trace a fundamental
interdependence between the two aspects, so suggesting a philosophic-dialectical
foundation of politics itself.
The second part of this special issue focuses on Cicero’s intellectual legacy and
on the intersections between his thought and that of modern and contemporary
thinkers. The contributions in this section deal with the relation between ancient
and modern in two different ways: firstly, by showing how Cicero’s thought had a
seminal role in modern and contemporary authors; secondly, by suggesting how
contemporary philosophy can improve our understanding of Cicero’s thought and
of his philosophical premises. In his essay Giovanni Giorgini (Cicero and
Machiavelli: Two Visions of Statesmanship and Two Educational Projects
Compared) moves from the consideration that it is impossible to overestimate the
importance of Cicero’s writings or his historical significance as an example in
politics and in rhetoric for Italian Humanist and Renaissance culture.
Machiavelli, well-educated in the classics, drew from Cicero the inspiration for
embarking on a project of education of a new ruling class: Machiavelli’s “principe
nuovo” is new when compared to his contemporary counterparts, imbued with
Christian and Humanist notions of virtue; however, the “principe nuovo” has an
old soul, since the new notion of prudence elaborated by Machiavelli has its roots
in classical images of ethical and political virtue, in Plato, Aristotle and Cicero.
Machiavelli, just like Cicero, felt that what he had not been able to do in deeds
with his political action at the service of the Florentine republic, he could do
through his writings: putting his knowledge of men and politics, his expertise
gained through practical experience and constant reading of ancient authors at
the service of his fellow-countrymen and of his patria. The novelty of
Machiavelli’s teaching consists in advocating a new kind of prudence, which
consists in the capacity to do evil in view of a good and elevated purpose: to save,
preserve and aggrandize the State. In a similar vein, Fausto Pagnotta (in his
Cicerone nell’opera e nel pensiero politico di Machiavelli: alcune considerazioni
introduttive) compares and contrasts Cicero and Machiavelli in order to show
similarities and dissimilarities between the two authors. The influence of Cicero in
Machiavelli’s works is most clear in the Prince and in the Discourses. Both authors
are considered homines novi, since their political success was not due to their
belonging to the aristocratic class but rather to their ability to have connections
with many diverse people in power. Pagnotta maintains that for Cicero the

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distinctive trait of human beings is their capacity to realize their rational nature
in a path which emancipates them from their original animal origins. Cicero’s own
writings have a pedagogical and educational purpose, since they aim at promoting
a renewal of roam society and of its ruling class starting with the young
generations. For Cicero sentiments such as liberality, love for the country, piety
“have their source in the fact that we are by mature inclined to love human
beings” (Leg. 1, 43); Machiavelli seems to adopt a completely different approach,
for he maintains that by nature men are “more prone to evil tan to good” (Disc. I,
IX, 8). His realism and his anthropological pessimism prompt him to find efficient
and durable for the conservation and stability of political power, without the
ambition to create a virtuous character in the “classical” sense.
Besides general analogies between ancient and modern thinkers, there are
some key concepts of modern European political thought whose development is
influenced by Cicero’s political doctrines. One of these concepts is the “sovereignty
of the people”, upon which Neschke focuses her attention (in her essay Il
contributo di Cicerone alla nascita della dottrina moderna della “sovranità del
popolo”). The author emphasises that the modern idea of sovereignty of the
people, founded on the idea that a people is composed of rational individuals, is
not medieval and is rather the result of the secularization of the political realm of
the XVII century. This concept, which originated in Catholic political theory
before and after the Council of Trento, is forcefully defended by the neo-scholastic
author Francisco Suarez against the king of England, James I, who defended the
idea that the king represents God’s power on earth without intermediaries.
Neschke shows that Suarez’s notion of the sovereignty of the people is not derived
from Catholic doctrines but rather from Cicero’s republicanism. Against James’
idea that the people is unable to get together by itself, and it is the king’s duty to
unify it thanks to his individual will, Suarez advances a revolutionary doctrine for
his times: the political community is autonomous in its decisions already before
the creation of a sovereign power, for it is not a physical body without head, as
James thought, nor a shapeless entity which needs to be moulded by regal power,
as Vitoria maintained. According to Suarez the people is a moral person capable of
making decisions through a will which is already unified even before electing a
government, to which the original power is transferred in order to reach the
highest good. Neschke maintains that Suarez adopts the Stoic doctrine used by
Cicero according to which all human beings are equal, endowed with reason and
capable of living in harmony. Suarez takes very seriously Cicero’s view that the
“populus” is composed of rational individuals who want political justice and who
reason in order to attain the common good; as such the people is created through
consensus, without the intervention of a unifying external element – as Vitoria
and Bellarmino had argued.
Cicero’s contribution to shaping the intellectual development of modern
thinkers and active politicians is also explored by Martelli and Tossani in La

Editor’s and Guest Editor’s Preface
213
Retorica del tradimento. Pensiero e technē ciceroniano nell'orazione di Saint-Just il 13
Novembre 1792. More to the point, the two authors explore the role Cicero’s works
had in of Saint-Just. They maintain that there is a direct influence which emerges
at two different levels: the first level is that of the conceptual framework, both
concerning the legal and the political aspects of institutions; the second is that of
the literary style. The discourses delivered at the Convention on November 13th
and on December 22, 1792, are the most explicit examples of this re-elaboration
and adaptation of Cicero’s thought to the revolutionary context. France had
legally and in point of fact become a republic but it still had a king, who was not
trusted by the nation. During the trial for high treason held by the National
Convention against the king, Saint-Just offered a revolutionary justification
against the idea that a sovereign power could not be tried in court. In his opinion,
Louis XVI was guilty not according to the loi civile, i.e. the Constitution of 1791,
which provided immunity to the king, but only in front of a higher form of right,
namely the Droit des gens. St Just observes that there formally is a sort of political
contract between king and nation, as the republic itself reiterated, but this
contract is voided by the fact that it does not prescribe any duty to the king.
Instead, the relation between rulers and ruled must be founded on mutual
acknowledgment of moral and political authority; in emphasising this fact, St
Just appeals to Cicero’s republicanism, from whom he gets the idea that absolute
monarchy degenerates in a tyrannical power legally unaccountable. Saint-Just
even uses rhetorical devices and compares Louis to Catilina, and underplays the
notion of regicide through the example of Caesar.
A coexistence of rhetorical and philosophical influences of Cicero’s works can
also be traced in American modern political thought. In her essay Americanus sum
nec quidquam Americani a me alienum esse puto. I classici latini e la nuova identità
statunitense in John Adams, Elena Tosi examines the role that Cicero had at the
end of the Eighteenth century in the intellectual formation of one of the founding
fathers of American democracy, John Adams, second president of the United
States of America. Cicero’s influence can be traced at three different levels. There
is first an influence on Adams’ literary style, which can be noticed in his letters
and political discourses. Cicero’s letters Ad Familiares and his rhetorical
techniques inspired Adams in his activity as a lawyer. Secondly, Cicero affected
profoundly Adams’ political thought to the point that he believed that the
Roman res publica was an example to replicate in the US. Adams is particularly
interested in Cicero’s notion of natural law, in his view of decency and honour and
in his ideal of civil concord to be achieved through the pursuit of a common good
by all citizens. Indeed, Adams finds in Cicero’s ideal of iustitia the criterion for
distinguishing between a good government and a tyranny. Finally, Adams himself
can be considered a homo novus, since he is foreign to any “inherited greatness”
received from the ancestors. These two elements of “individual initiative” and
refusal to appeal to ancestral nobility are the distinctive traits of the modern

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concept of “self-made man”. In the last phase of his life Adams, just like Cicero,
wrote letters that showed his disillusion towards his political experience: here
Adams’ philosophical model seems to be the Cato Maior de Senectute.
The last contribution of this section is by Elena Irrera, who uses
contemporary philosophical concepts in order to shed light on a rather unexplored
aspect of Cicero’s thought: the nature of respect. Irrera investigates the question
using the conceptual framework developed by Stephen Darwall in his studies on
respect. Darwall identifies four kinds of respect: (1) a form of respect as
appreciation of the moral excellence of a specific individual; (2) respect as
acknowledgement of specific forms of technical knowledge which make his owner
an authority in his field; 3) respect as reverence for individuals or entities
considered socially or ontologically superior as compared to the respecting subject;
4) a form of equal respect for people who mutually recognize as moral agents.
Through an analysis of passages in the De republica, the De legibus and the De
officiis, the author shows that the forms of respect conceptualized by Darwall are
already present in Cicero’s text, where together they substantiate new forms of
respectful attitude. The first type of respect that can be found in Cicero’s texts is a
form of emulative esteem for the moral and intellectual excellence of someone. Of
particular interest is the concept of asymmetrical respect conceived as “honour”,
which has its foundation in the ideal of aequabilitas – an attitude of respect
proportionate to the social standing of each individual– and in the activity of
“cultivating” the object of respect – expressed by the Latin verb colere. Finally,
Irrera maintains that some of Cicero’s arguments concerning justice and the
common good disclose an early notion of equal respect which neglects the social
and professional standing of individuals. Cicero illustrates this form of respect
through the originally asymmetric concept of reverence, which becomes then part
of the notion of reciprocity.
In conclusion, the two editors hope that the essays here published give a sense
of the rich debate which occurred during the two days of conference in Bologna
and of the current lines of research concerning the thought of Cicero.
This monographic issue of Ethics & Politics contains papers delivered on the
occasion of an international conference entitled Rethinking Cicero as Political
Philosopher, which took place at the University of Bologna on May 30th and 31st,
2013. The conference, the 13th general meeting, was part of the activities organized
by the Collegium Politicum, a thematic network composed by different
universities and research centers, whose main objectives are the study of classical
political theory and its reception in the history of the political thought, especially
its repercussions in Modern Europe. By bringing together a wide range of
competences and approaches, the meeting provided scholars and students from
different countries with an opportunity for a stimulating exchange of ideas on
Cicero’s political thought, with particular reference to his understanding of the

Editor’s and Guest Editor’s Preface
215
idea of political commitment and its philosophical underpinnings. The variety of
interpretive strategies displayed by the speakers articulated the steps of an
intellectual itinerary that attempted, on the one hand, to supply a reconstruction
of Cicero’s original ideas and of the cultural background in which these found a
chance to flourish, and, on the other, to test the theoretical import of such ideas in
modern and contemporary political philosophy. In this issue we shall endeavor to
outline some of the key passages of such an itinerary, touching upon questions like
the origin and implications of natural law, the nature of the best constitution and
Cicero’s critical engagement with ancient Greek philosophers. As the reader will
notice, the collection of essays proposed here does not pretend to offer conclusive
answers to some questions raised by Cicero scholars, but rather sets the stage for
further explorations, in the full spirit of a critical enquiry constantly open to
theoretical challenges and contaminations with present times.
In line with the tradition of events organized by the Collegium Politicum, we
have decided to accord contributors the freedom to write their papers in the
language of their choice. Also, taking advantage of the opportunities offered by an
on-line publication, we left the authors free to develop their arguments with no
restraints in terms of length of their essays. Sadly, among the papers presented in
this issue, one has not been revised by its author: Professor Ada Neschke-
Hentschke, one of the founding members of the Collegium Politicum, passed away
just a few weeks after the conference. Professor Neschke-Hentschke gave us the
text of her communication in Italian, written in a provisional form. We have
decided to publish it and to make corrections only to the Italian form and not to
the content. Professor Neschke-Hentschke did not only have the original idea of
creating a network of scholars interested in classical political thought and its
revival in the modern and contemporary age but also greatly contributed to the
establishment, enlargement and institutionalization of the Collegium Politicum.
Ada will be greatly missed by all members of the Collegium Politicum both as a
great scholar and as an extremely kind person. It is to her loving memory and to
her commitment to the philosophical life that we dedicate this collection of papers
on Cicero.
Many are the debts of gratitude we have incurred both during the
organization of the conference and in the preparation of this issue. We would like
to thank Professor Ermanno Malaspina for his invaluable help in the scientific
organization of the colloquium. Our gratitude also goes to the Comune di Bologna
and the Biblioteca dell’Archiginnasio for granting us the use of the Stabat Mater
room for the inaugural day of the colloquium, which provided us with a beautiful
and congenial location for a discussion of Cicero’s imperishable political works.
Many thanks also to the chancellor of the University of Bologna, Professor Ivano
Dionigi, for his support and for his rich and erudite inaugural address. Many
thanks to the School of Political Science, and its President Professor Daniela
Giannetti, for hosting us during the second day of the colloquium in its beautiful

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lecture rooms. Many thanks also to the Director of the Department of Political
and Social Sciences, Professor Fabio Giusberti, for his support in all phases of the
conference. We would like to thank all the participants to the colloquium for their
contribution to the success of this event and for allowing us to publish their
papers.