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Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative Versus Participatory Democracy
Abstract
‘Religion and politics’, as the old saying goes, ‘should never be discussed in mixed company.’And yet fostering discussions that cross lines of political difference has long been a central concern of political theorists. More recently, it has also become a cause célèbre for pundits and civic-minded citizens wanting to improve the health of American democracy. But only recently have scholars begun empirical investigations of where and with what consequences people interact with those whose political views differ from their own. Hearing the Other Side examines this theme in the context of the contemporary United States. It is unique in its effort to link political theory with empirical research. Drawing on her empirical work, Mutz suggests that it is doubtful that an extremely activist political culture can also be a heavily deliberative one.
... The majority of previous research on political discussion focuses on the effects of exposure to disagreement (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004;Mutz 2006), but most of this work does not directly examine how the interpersonal dynamics of a political conversation affect the choices that people make about political expression. Carlson and Settle (2022a) build on extensive qualitative research (Eliasoph 1998;Walsh 2010) to argue that social and psychological impediments in interpersonal conversations-namely, people's desire to preserve their esteem and relationships-might structure how forthcoming they are about their political opinions. ...
... One answer is that people seek to avoid conflict; therefore, in the face of expected political disagreement, they will be less likely to express their true opinions. Previous research has shown that people are more likely to avoid disagreeable conversations (Settle and Carlson 2019), have more homogeneous discussion networks (Mutz 2006), and silence or censor their opinions when they expect disagreement (Carlson and Settle 2022a). We expect to observe that participants would be less likely to express their true opinions to someone who disagrees with them. ...
... Finally, consistent with recent work demonstrating the social considerations that people make while navigating political discussions (Carlson and Settle 2022a), we examined the strength of the social relationship between discussants. Research on political discussion suggests that the strength of social relationships is a primary driver of whether political discussions occur (Ahn, Huckfeldt, and Ryan 2014;Mutz 2006;Walsh 2010). We expect that people would be less forthcoming with their opinions in conversations with people that they do not know well to avoid damaging a potentially fragile relationship. ...
... Drawing on scholarship on interpersonal communication we transcend this narrow perspective. We acknowledge that it may also have a 'phatic' dimension (Thornbury and Slade, 2006: 19-20;Senft, 2009) that concerns its function of managing the social bonds between those communicating with one another (Rosenberg, 1954;Eliasoph, 1998;Conover et al., 2002;Cramer, 2004;Mutz, 2006;Watzlawick et al., 2011: 29-52). We accordingly examine the interplay of individual political dispositions, on the one hand, and two kinds of social factors, on the other: interpersonally relevant psychological dispositions and interpersonal contexts. ...
... Over the years, other (mostly qualitative) studies voiced similar concerns. From varying vantage points they converged on the diagnosis that discussing politics with one's peers can be a quite stressful and adverse experience that many people find uncomfortable and prefer to avoid (Scheuch, 1965;Schudson, 1997;Eliasoph, 1998;Conover et al., 2002;Cramer, 2004;Mutz, 2006). Two aspects, in particular, have been highlighted by this literature: that political views may be considered too personal and private to be shared with others, and that discussing such matters may lead to unpleasant or even painful controversies. ...
... It is defined by the opposing poles of conflict aversion (dislike of political confrontation and argument) and conflict seeking (feelings of excitement and enjoyment about dispute and contention). Since everyday political talk may lead to conflictive experiences, conflict aversion can be expected to lead to unfavorable attitudes toward this behavior, whereas conflict seeking should stimulate positive views (Mutz, 2006;Neblo, 2015: 129-144). ...
As deliberative democracy is gaining practical momentum, the question arises whether citizens’ attitudes toward everyday political talk are congruent with this ‘talk-centric’ vision of democratic governance. Drawing on a unique survey we examine how German citizens view the practice of discussing politics in everyday life, and what determines these attitudes. We find that only a minority appreciates talking about politics. To explain these views, we combine Fishbein and Ajzen’s Expectancy-Value Model of attitudes toward behaviors with perspectives from research on interpersonal communication. Individuals’ interest in politics emerges as the only relevant political disposition for attitudes toward everyday political talk. Its impact is surpassed and conditioned by conflict orientations and other enduring psychological dispositions, as well as contextual circumstances like the closeness of social ties and the amount of disagreement experienced during conversations. The beneficial effect of political interest dwindles under adverse interpersonal conditions. The social dimension of everyday political talk thus appears to outweigh its political dimension.
... Indeed, the claim of "hearing the other side" has been deemed central to democracy. As Mutz (2006) noted, theorizing in sociology and political philosophy is consistent with that claim: Listening to others, including to those expressing dissimilar views, can make the viewpoints of others present in a citizen's mind (Arendt, 1968), encourage greater interpersonal deliberation and intrapersonal reflection, thus benefitting the public sphere (Habermas, 1989), and may allow for clearer truth perceptions, even when disagreeing (Mill, 1859(Mill, /1956. ...
... We offer two starting points. First, the importance one attributes to political listening may partly depend on the conception of democracy one has-that is, deliberative versus participatory democracy (see Mutz, 2006). Having a conception of participatory democracy in mind, one may claim that highly diverse political listening may instead discourage political participation, particularly among those who are averse to conflict. ...
Recent theorizing on deliberative democracy has put political listening at the core of meaningful democratic deliberation. In the present experiment (N = 827), we investigated whether news media can improve diverse political listening in the United States via a reduction in party cue salience. Although Republican (Democratic) participants showed a strong preference for listening to speeches given by Republican (Democratic) politicians when party cues were highly salient, this bias in selective political listening was reduced or even absent when news items provided no or only low-salience cues. Conditional process analysis indicated that (automatically activated) implicit and (overtly expressed) explicit party attitudes mediated this effect. There are important implications: Current journalism practices tend to exacerbate tribal us-vs-them thinking by emphasizing partisan cues, nudging citizens toward not listening to political ideas from the other political camp. A more helpful news-choice architecture tones down partisan language, nudging citizens toward more diverse political listening.
... No entanto, as pessoas se comportam de maneira tribal. Agem como times de futebol, onde os grupos rivais são vistos a partir de identidades políticas, o que leva a um tratamento discriminatório das pessoas pertencentes aos grupos rivais (TAJFEL e TURNER, 1979;TAJFEL, 1981;TAJFEL, 1982;COHEN, 2003;MUTZ, 2006;IYENGAR et al., 2012;KAHAN et al., 2013;SOMIN, 2016;IYENGAR e WESTWOOD, 2015). Ademais, tende-se a ver os grupos rivais como mais corruptos, egoístas e estúpidos (MUTZ, 2006;CHONG, 2013). ...
... Agem como times de futebol, onde os grupos rivais são vistos a partir de identidades políticas, o que leva a um tratamento discriminatório das pessoas pertencentes aos grupos rivais (TAJFEL e TURNER, 1979;TAJFEL, 1981;TAJFEL, 1982;COHEN, 2003;MUTZ, 2006;IYENGAR et al., 2012;KAHAN et al., 2013;SOMIN, 2016;IYENGAR e WESTWOOD, 2015). Ademais, tende-se a ver os grupos rivais como mais corruptos, egoístas e estúpidos (MUTZ, 2006;CHONG, 2013). Devido a este comportamento, as pessoas votam a partir de sua identidade, e não a partir do conhecimento político. ...
Neste artigo discuto alguns problemas epistêmicos que a democracia enfrenta. Apresento, inicialmente, o argumento segundo o qual a ignorância e a irracionalidade política afetam de maneira substancial as democracias atuais. Em seguida, exponho os princípios que suportam um sistema alternativo: a epistocracia. Segundo os epistocratas, devemos preferir a estrutura institucional que tende a produzir as melhores decisões. Além disso, as decisões políticas são legítimas e autoritativas somente quando produzidas por um corpo político competente de um modo competente e de boa fé. Após expor os princípios que suportam a epistocracia, considero algumas formas de implementação desse sistema. Na última seção, detalho uma resposta epistêmica aos argumentos que questionam a legitimidade da democracia. Sustento que a resposta não diminui a força das críticas, de modo que os problemas epistêmicos permanecem como uma questão a ser enfrentada pelos democratas.
... Han sido muchos los autores que, sobre todo a partir del año 2000, han profundizado en la teoría de la selección mediática, con multitud de estudios y con el desarrollo de nuevas metodologías (Hart et al., 2009;Iyengar y Kahn, 2009;Mutz, 2006;Mutz y Martin, 2001;Mutz y Young, 2011;Stroud, 2008Stroud, , 2010. Asimismo, no han sido pocos los expertos que han objetado la teoría y han matizado la intensidad de sus efectos (Kinder, 2003;D'Alessio y Allen, 2002;Zaller, 1992;Klappler, 1960). ...
... There have been many authors who, especially since 2000, have conducted research into the theory of media selection, including many studies and the development of new methodologies (Hart et al., 2009;Iyengar and Kahn, 2009;Mutz, 2006;Mutz and Martin, 2001;Mutz and Young, 2011;Stroud, 2008Stroud, , 2010. Numerous experts have also objected to the theory and have qualified the extent of its effects (Kinder, 2003;D'Alessio and Allen, 2002;Zaller, 1992;Klappler, 1960). ...
La teoría de la exposición selectiva sostiene que los individuos tienden a informarse a través de aquellos medios que coinciden con sus convicciones. La presente investigación examina la exposición selectiva cuando el debate público se sitúa en el campo de la tensión entre identidades nacionales y, en este caso concreto, en el debate entre los partidarios de la independencia de Cataluña y los contrarios a ella. Los resultados muestran que en Cataluña existe una fuerte correlación entre la postura sobre la independencia y la elección de canal televisivo. Otro factor determinante es la lengua. Asimismo, se apunta que el grado de exposición selectiva se intensificó levemente en aquellos momentos de mayor polarización social a lo largo del periodo estudiado (2015-2020).
... So können sich z. B. Kontroverse und Partizipation (Mutz, 2006) sowie Argumentation und Reziprozität bei empirischer Beobachtung ein zelner Kommunikationsbeiträge oder einzelner Diskussionen korrelativ ausschließen (Bächtiger et al., 2009;Esau et al., 2017). Nachdem die Unidimensionalität von Deliberation verworfen oder zu mindest stark in Zweifel gestellt wurde, lag der nächste, darauf aufbauende Schritt in der theoretischen Definition unterschiedlicher Dimensionen und Teilprozesse des Deliberationsprozesses. Input, Throughput und Out put werden dabei entweder als Teilprozesse, Dimensionen oder auch als Phasen bezeichnet. ...
... Darauf aufbauend könnten Annahmen aus bisherigen deli berativen Demokratietheorien herausgearbeitet und mit anderen theoreti schen Ansätzen ergänzt werden, um z. B. wie Mutz (2006), die ebenfalls mit Bezug auf Merton (1968) argumentiert hat, zu deliberativen Theori en und theoretischen Konzepten mittlerer Reichweite zu gelangen, die empirisch überprüft werden können. Mit Bezug auf Neuberger (2014Neuberger ( , 2017 lässt sich argumentieren, dass Bottom-up-Ansätze besonders vielver sprechend erscheinen, die zunächst die Mirkoebene deliberativer Dynamik beleuchten, um davon ausgehend zu weiteren Erklärungsebenen zu gelan gen. ...
This book is dedicated to the dynamics of public deliberation online. Based on a critical examination of the traditional concept of deliberation, it discusses narration, expressions of emotion and humour as deliberative forms of communication in addition to argumentation. In addition to classic counter-argumentation, it considers empathy, constructiveness, reflection and genuine questions to be components of deliberative reciprocity. Empirically, relational content analysis and sequence analysis of two online participation platforms are used to investigate to what extent different forms of communication influence subsequent traditional and inclusive deliberative reciprocity.
... Yet in practice, political talk can be a social achievement in itself (Ekström, 2016). As it operates without clear rules and routines (Warren, 1996), it often evokes anxiety and discomfort and is feared to jeopardize otherwise harmonious relationships (Eliasoph, 1998;Mutz, 2006). While social risks impede political talk, they can be attenuated or amplified by communication settings and the kind of sociability they scaffold (Ekström, 2016;Kligler-Vilenchik, 2021;Lane et al., 2019;Thorson, 2014). ...
... In other words, it operates in spaces of uncertainty, which often evokes social anxiety and discomfort that overrides motivation to talk about politics. Evidence from both qualitative and quantitative research corroborates this view, suggesting a general tendency of avoidance where people fear that talking about politics would offend others, result in social sanction or conflict, and jeopardize otherwise amicable social relations (Eliasoph, 1998;Mutz, 2006). All in all, concern for social safety is a main reason why political talk is a social achievement in itself (Ekström, 2016). ...
Instant messaging (IM) platforms are believed to foster intimate and controlled conversations within small groups and hence provide safe social settings for political conversations, and yet we know little about how political talk emerges from the everyday social interactions in these environments. To fill the gap, this study examines how sociability within small, private WhatsApp groups shapes the extent and forms of political talk among young adults. Relying on in-depth interviews conducted in the Netherlands, we find that young people perceive politics as personal, offensive, divisive, and depressing, hence unsafe for WhatsApp groups where they find comfort in communicating care and phatic exchanges. Nonetheless, rules, relationship qualities, and strategies enacted in these groups allow some political talk to become temporarily possible. However, they perceive that what makes political talk safer also makes it unproductive. Our findings thus contribute to a finer-grained understanding of political talk in the closed digital spaces.
... People are not particularly willing to hear the other side, and democratic discourse systematically tends to produce opinions that disregard the best available evidence as defined by the relevant scientific disciplines (see, e.g. Sunstein 2002, Pincione and Tesón 2006, Mutz 2008b. ...
... This makes experts less capable of understanding the modus operandi of democratic politics and the motives of their fellow citizens: most people who engage in politics have particular attachments and identities and seek communities of like-minded. For instance, when citizens engage in political parties or in campaigns, their primary motivation is not to "hear the other side" or to find the best solution for all involved parties, but to engage in a genuinely partisan way for the interests and values of their "folks" (Mutz 2008b). This logic comes out most clearly in the United Kingdom, the United States and other adversarial two-party systems, and populists obviously thrive on this "us" and "them" discourse. ...
This book offers a concise and accessible introduction to debates about expertise, policy-making and democracy. It uniquely combines an overview of recent research on the policy role of experts with discussions in political philosophy and the philosophy of expertise. Starting with the fact that well-functioning democracies require experts and expert knowledge, the book examines two types of objections against granting experts a larger role in policy-making: concerns that focus on the nature and limits of expert knowledge, and those that concentrate on tensions between expertization and democracy. With this, the book discusses how expert arrangements can be organized to ensure the epistemic qualities of policies and democratic credentials, at the same time. The book will be of interest to scholars and students of political theory and democracy, public policy and administration, and to anyone interested in the role of expertise in society.
... Scholarship finding heterogeneous engagements has noted an important role for online interactions in providing cross-cutting views, especially given polarization in the other spheres of modern political and social life (Bakshy et al., 2015;Barberá et al., 2015;Barnidge, 2017;Dubois & Blank, 2018;Eady et al., 2019). Such crosscutting interactions may mitigate intergroup biases (Bond et al., 2018;Marchal, 2021), which, from the perspective of normative democratic theory, may be essential in reducing the discord in highly polarized political systems (Mutz, 2006;Pettigrew, 1998). ...
We develop a broadly applicable class of coevolving latent space network with attractors (CLSNA) models, where nodes represent individual social actors assumed to lie in an unknown latent space, edges represent the presence of a specified interaction between actors, and attractors are added in the latent level to capture the notion of attractive and repulsive forces. We apply the CLSNA models to understand the dynamics of partisan polarization in US politics on social media, where we expect Republicans and Democrats to increasingly interact with their own party and disengage with the opposing party. Using longitudinal social networks from the social media platforms Twitter and Reddit, we quantify the relative contributions of positive (attractive) and negative (repulsive) forces among political elites and the public, respectively.
... In broad brushstrokes, we may speak of a development in which classical Weberian public administrations have been partly substituted and supplemented by the New Public Management (NPM), as well as by more inclusive, participatory and collaborative forms of governing, which some scholars have termed the New Public Governance (NPG) (Osborne, 2010;Pestoff, Brandsen and Verschuere, 2012;Torfing et al., 2012). As criticism has mounted against NPM, attention has been drawn to NPG-type approaches known under headings such as co-creation (Bason, 2010;Voorberg, Bekkers and Tummers, 2015;Farr, 2016), co-production (Boyle, Slay & Stephens, 2010;Bovaird and Löffler, 2012;Alford, 2016); participatory (Grote and Gbikpi, 2002;Escobar, 2013) or deliberative democracy (McGrath, 2005;Mutz, 2006;Floridia, 2017); and in the planning field in connection with terms such as collaborative or communicative planning (Healey, 1997;Huxley, 2000;Innes and Booher, 2000). ...
Street-level bureaucrats (SLB) play a crucial role in ensuring better policy implementa- tion and generating trust between the system and citizens, according to the literature. In this article, we argue that Lipsky’s distinction between public managers and SLB needs an update. Today, public managers are increasingly expected to work closely and directly with affected stakeholders in order to solve cross-cutting ‘wicked problems’. Interactive and participative collaborative policy processes require public managers to move from back-office work to front-office work, in effect converting public managers into SLB. The key question raised is, thus: what kind of skills and capabilities do SLB need to engage in today’s more interactive forms of public policy-making? And what are the implications for how universities educate these groups?’ Drawing on a study of 32 urban professionals who work on the frontline in deprived neighbourhoods, we scrutinise the challenges and dilemmas that professionals face in their work with interactive processes. By distinguishing between ‘academic specialists’ and ‘academic generalists’, we are able to pinpoint and differentiate between skills needed for each of these groups in order to secure transparent processes that abide by the rule of law and support well-functioning local communities and, more broadly, the skills needed to secure democracy and econom- ic efficiency.
... Although cross-cutting news exposure is often considered beneficial (Mutz, 2006), some research finds that it can increase polarization (Bail et al., 2018), so we leave this for future work. ...
Concern over online news echo chambers has been a consistent theme in recent debates on how people get news and information. Yet, we lack a basic descriptive understanding of how many people occupy bounded online news spaces in different countries. Using online survey data from seven countries we find that (i) politically partisan left-right online news echo chambers are real, but only a minority of approximately 5% of internet news users inhabit them, (ii) in every country covered, more people consume no online news at all than occupy partisan online echo chambers, and (iii) except for the US, decisions over the inclusion or exclusion of particular news outlets make little difference to echo chamber estimates. Differences within and between media systems mean we should be very cautious about direct comparisons between different echo chambers, but underlying patterns of audience overlap, and the continued popularity of mainstream outlets, often preclude the formation of large partisan echo chambers.
... The analysis of integration phenomena in Chapter 4 offers an empirical investigation into how group context affects people's talk about potentially highly charged opinions. This is crucial both for the question of the ontological status of public opinion, which the authors address, but also for more recent concerns with the possibility and desirability of deliberative democracy, in which demo cratic decision making is a discursive pro cess as opposed to simply an aggregation (e.g., Mendelberg 2002;Sunstein 2000;Mutz 2006). ...
... The main of these models then are the models of participatory democracy, which is mainly associated with the theoretical work of Carole Pateman (2000) and which is now being built upon around the world with the so-called participatory budget, and the second model is deliberative democracy, the elaboration and popularisation of which has been stimulated by Jürgen Habermas (2005). However, several theorists have now argued that the two models of democracy have de facto similar starting points and goals, a point that Diana Mutz (2006) has elaborated on in more detail. As a rule, these much discussed models today run into the fact that they are very difficult to implement at the national level, which is why, from our point of view, the so-called third generation of deliberative democracy might seem to be the most relevant one, which has started to intensively address the question of the practical implementation of so-called deliberative forums, which could eliminate the conceptual shortcomings and problematic moments of the implementation of the deliberative process (and indeed of the process of direct democracy) in the setting of mass democracies. ...
The present study focuses on the use of the local referendum instrument in the Czech Republic between 2000 and 2020. This form of citizen participation in political decision making has become widely and widely used. Based on a complete overview of referenda, an analysis of the distribution of referenda in individual regions is carried out, which clearly shows that referenda are held significantly more often in some regions, which is determined by specific issues of safety or the location of nuclear power plants. In line with Robert Dahl's assumption, it turns out that the highest percentage of referenda are held in smaller municipalities, but this does not usually mean a higher turnout. It turns out that the importance of the issue is often more crucial than other factors. For example, the combination with an election has been shown to be a factor that does not have a major impact on overall participation. The ratio of binding to non-binding referenda shows that this instrument is used very effectively and efficiently, so that most of the referenda held are binding and are used to address issues that have the potential to mobilise citizens.
... According to Anderson et al. (2014), people who participate in online forums set a tone for public opinion, and can influence the tone of future comments. Mutz (2002Mutz ( , 2006 suggests that users are enticed to use online comment sections because they allow them access to people outside their usual social network and because talking to others helps them to fully crystalize their opinion. ...
... Desde a década de 1940, os estudos sobre a decisão do voto consideram o vínculo dos eleitores ou de grupos sociais com os partidos como elemento-chave na explicação do voto. Além disso, como uma espécie de eixo de graviestá presente nas mais diversas áreas, tais como estudos sobre socialização política (SEARS; VALENTINO, 1997), sobre participação política (ROSENSTONE; HANSEN, 1993;OPP;FINKEL, 1991;HEIDAR, 2006) e sobre persuasão política (MUTZ, 2006;HUCKFELDT;SPRAGUE, 1995). organiza grande parte dos debates sobre comportamento eleitoral, desde aqueles sobre determinantes do voto até os que abordam a competência política do eleitor. ...
De cunho teórico e analítico, a presente obra tem como objetivo fortalecer a reflexão sobre a Ciência Política praticada no Brasil e sobre o Brasil como caso concreto. Seu amplo escopo reflete o engajamento das diferentes áreas ou subdisciplinas da Ciência Política nacional. O eixo principal do livro, comum a todos os capítulos, se baseia no levantamento das principais teorias (em perspectiva comparada) que têm sido mobilizadas para compreender o caso brasileiro, acompanhado de reflexões e análises sobre como as características específicas do nosso contexto incidem ao mesmo tempo na utilização, aplicabilidade e limitações dessas teorias. Dessa forma, o livro serve ao duplo propósito de realizar um levantamento dos principais argumentos usados pelos pesquisadores nacionais, oferecendo ao leitor um estado da arte da pesquisa em Ciência Política, e mapear as principais características do Brasil como caso concreto e como essas características importam para a avaliação das teorias produzidas aqui e no exterior.
... Teaching students these skills can have a positive impact on political conversations. Exposing students to diverse political views has the potential to stimulate respect for contrasting opinions (Mutz, 2006), political knowledge (Eveland & Hively, 2009), and reception of political differences (Moy & Gastil, 2006). The experimental programming options outlined in this reflection essay provide guidance for how to support the productive engagement of heterogeneous viewpoints among students engaged in online discussion. ...
As college campuses expand co-curricular approaches to civic engagement, faculty and staff are challenged to consider how to develop and support students' online civic engagement through experimental programming. This essay focuses on the instructive component of conversing in online spaces by offering recommendations for assisting students' online civic engagement through strengthening their abilities to enact civility online, recognize and respond to polarization, and navigate today's media ecosystem. Grounded in literature, this essay suggests that by participating in these activities, students become familiar with diverse viewpoints, learn strategies for engaging in heterogeneous conversations, achieve media literacy and source criticism skills, and discover how to respond to misinformation. Faculty and staff can replicate the experimental programming ideas provided in this essay to help students prepare for meaningful participation in civic and political life.
... Jedna od opsežnijih empirijskih studija na ovu temu dolazi od Diane Muc (Mutz 2006). Muc je istraživala izloženost oprečnim argu mentima unutar društvenih mreža i zaključila da oni koji su veoma politički aktivni retko izlažu sebe oprečnim perspektivama, već se okru žuju istomišljenicima; oni pak koji su uključeni u dobrovoljne orga nizacije civilnog društva retko učestvuju u političkim raspravama sa neistomišljenicima; građani češće učestvuju u političkim aktivnostima ako je njihovo okruženje konzistentno s njihovim političkim vrednosti ma. ...
... These findings are consistent with Kozielecki's conception (Kozielecki 1987(Kozielecki , 2001(Kozielecki , 2004, in which social transgression is described as the ability to reach out to others in pro-social activities in many spheres of social life, including the religious sphere. The ability to enter into dialogue with people who hold different views is highly valued socially as it fosters good relations between groups and the exchange of ideological values, enriching people's own vision of the world/universe, helping them develop awareness of different perspectives from which to define the same reality, maintain social ties, create a social identity, and avoid misunderstandings or explain their causes (e.g., Byrka et al. 2016;Hamilton and Wills-Toker 2006;Kozlovic 2003;Mutz 2006). Our results suggest that a higher level and spiritual intelligence in the dimension of social transgression may favour the development of a readiness to engage in interreligious dialogue. ...
One of the key aspects of an individual’s spiritual intelligence is the ability to transcend, which allows one to identify dimensions of reality that go beyond the boundaries of the material world. In the present study, we look at transcendence from the theoretical perspective of a conception proposed by Kozielecki, who defines human transgressive behaviour as all those actions and acts of thinking which exceed the limits of an individual’s existing material, symbolic and social capacities, and achievements and which constitute a source of new important values. One important social value is the readiness to engage in dialogue with people of other faiths. We wanted to investigate the associations between transgression and young people’s readiness to enter into such dialogue. Rydz and Bartczuk, departing from a psycholinguistic definition of dialogue, developed a definition of readiness to engage in interreligious dialogue, describing it as a person’s mental readiness to exchange views about religious topics with people of other religions. We hypothesised that there was a relationship between transgressive behaviours and dimensions of readiness to engage in interreligious dialogue among young adults. To verify these hypotheses, 528 people aged 18–25 were surveyed using the Readiness to Engage in Interreligious Dialogue Test (REID) and the Alternative Behaviours Checklist (ABC) based on Kozielecki’s conception of transgression. The results we obtained show that the dimensions of social transgression, creative transgression, and psychological transgression were positively related to dimensions of readiness to engage in interreligious dialogue.
... This separates deliberative field experiments from studies of what Mansbridge (1999) labels 'everyday political talk ' (e.g. Cramer Walsh 2004;Mutz 2006), because outputs of ordinary political conversations are not expected to be considered by decision makers. To be clear, we believe that educational forums and everyday political talk are important elements of a civic culture. ...
Research Methods in Deliberative Democracy is the first book that brings together a wide range of methods used in the study of deliberative democracy. It offers thirty-one different methods that scholars use for theorizing, measuring, exploring, or applying deliberative democracy. Each chapter presents one method by explaining its utility in deliberative democracy research and providing guidance on its application by drawing on examples from previous studies. The book hopes to inspire scholars to undertake methodologically robust, intellectually creative, and politically relevant research. It fills a significant gap in a rapidly growing field of research by assembling diverse methods and thereby expanding the range of methodological choices available to students, scholars, and practitioners of deliberative democracy.
... Telling people they have to justify their opinion to others (Bolsen et al., 2014) or having them discuss alternative policies with people with contrasting perspectives (Klar, 2014) diminishes biased information processing. These results provide a degree of optimism with respect to people's ability to make more deliberative and reasoned decisions, but of course only so far as people actually engage in these types of discussions with people from the 'other side' (e.g., Mutz, 2006). ...
Rational choice theory explains and evaluates how individuals choose among alternative instruments to achieve their goals and objectives. Although much research on political decision-making highlights psychological biases that appear to interfere with rationality, the contrast between rational choice and the psychology of information processing is often narrowed by individual and contextual conditions that reduce cognitive biases and promote rational decision-making. This argument is developed by analysing research on heuristics (i.e., shortcuts and cues), motivated reasoning, and framing that pose challenges to rational choice. Three themes emerge from this review. First, there is systematic variation across individuals in the extent to which heuristics, biased reasoning, and framing produce unreasonable and suboptimal decisions. Second, there are definable informational and social contexts that provide incentives for people to engage in deliberate and accurate processing of information. Third, normative evaluations of empirical results have been hampered by inconsistent criteria for what constitutes good decision-making.
... Connected to this last research effort, the increasing tendency for individuals to obtain information online (Bachmann & Gil de Zúñiga, 2013;Gaskins & Jerit, 2012) has heightened concern regarding political persuasion in social media. While some have argued that social media and the internet would make individuals more entrenched in their beliefs by creating "echo chambers" that isolate them from information containing views in conflict with their own, leading to a more polarized society (D. C. Mutz, 2006;Sunstein, 2018), other studies paint a somewhat more optimistic picture where social media is a context where at least the possibilities for political persuasion abound. Although social media does make people more susceptible to the influence of others within their social networks (Bode, 2016;Turcotte et al., 2015), and generally individuals are steadily exposed to information consistent with their own political views (Bakshy et al., 2015), studies on information-seeking online have shown that individuals do not systematically avoid counter-positional information . ...
Prior research underscores the utility of political persuasion to sustain more engaged democracies and as a vital element in political campaigning processes. When citizens display increased openness to political attitude change, societies benefit as diverse viewpoints thrive, and less dissonant public spheres may be fostered. This contrasts with today’s contentious political and media environment. With political polarization on the rise, and new social media avenues enabling citizens to curate more diverse news consumption patterns, little is known about how this polarization influences the ability for citizens to be politically persuaded in social media environments. Relying on representative US panel survey data, this study seeks to shed light on this phenomenon by testing the effects of three distinct types of political polarization: Affective, ideological, and perceived societal. Panel autoregressive causal order regression and structural equation models clarify the direct and indirect negative role of polarization in predicting social media political persuasion. Theoretical implications of these findings, limitations of the study, and suggestions for future research are all discussed.
Many people believe that we should not be friends with others if they have bad enough moral and political beliefs. For instance, they think that we should not befriend KKK members or Nazis. However, not all errors in moral and political belief disqualify people from friendship. If so, then there is some line to be drawn somewhere which indicates when a person's beliefs are bad enough that we should not befriend them. This paper considers many candidate proposals for how and why to draw the line, including that beliefs might be extreme, be held irrationally, dehumanize others, are unreasonable, and more. However, upon inspection, each candidate proposal fails. They either provide the wrong kind of reason to reject people as friends, or they fail to explain what counts as ‘bad enough’ beliefs. There are various arguments in favour of rejecting people from friendship on the basis of their bad beliefs, but these arguments also fail to explain what counts as ‘bad enough’. Thus, this paper concludes there is a genuine puzzle: we should indeed blackball some people from friendship when their beliefs are bad enough, but we do not have even a rough specification of what counts as bad enough.
This study suggests a unified framework to examine the third-person perception (TPP) in the context of partisan news use. By amalgamating social identity theories with the elaboration likelihood model or the heuristic-systematic model, Study 1 investigates the role of message features (source cues and content slant), targets (in-group vs. out-group), and audience characteristics (political identity and elaboration) on TPP. Two online experiments conducted in the US and South Korea show that differences between pro- and counter-attitudinal content are larger when the target is an out-group member. TPP is also amplified when audiences have high elaboration. Study 2 explores the interplay between TPP and the hostile media phenomenon (HMP) on news sharing and commenting online. The result reveals that TPP reduces news sharing/commenting intention by decreasing perceptions of news quality. In addition, HMP strengthens the indirect effect of TPP on news sharing/commenting for out-group members, but mitigates it for in-group members.
One of the basic elements that distinguish open democracy is civic participation, understood quite broadly, as it covers all civic activities, including non-election activities. Such a wide range of participatory rights was also included in the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland. However, while in the case of open democracy, there were postulates referring to participation as an obligation of citizens towards the community, in the basic law it is limited to civil rights. The aim of the article is to present the characteristics of the phenomenon on both planes.
Concerns are frequently raised about politicians’ increasing use of incivility. Yet, there is little longitudinal empirical work testing whether politicians’ use of incivility is actually rising, and little is known about the determinants that affect the prevalence of incivility. This study analyzes incivility over time and proposes a multi-layered framework of theoretically-driven incivility-inducing determinants. A quantitative content analysis of 4,102 speech acts in 24 Belgian televised election debates over the course of 35 years (1985–2019) shows that politicians’ incivility did not increase but occurs in a volatile pattern with ups and downs over the years. Confirmed by our analysis of the studied determinants, incivility shows to be highly context-specific. Particularly, incivility levels are affected both by characteristics of politicians, such as populism, incumbency, and gender, and by debate determinants, such as the topic under discussion, the number of politicians simultaneously debating each other, and previous incivility occurrences in the debate.
Artikel ini membahas tentang polarisasi politik dan disinformasi politik dalam rangkaian agenda pelemahan KPK yang berdampak pada perilaku politik masyarakat di Twitter. Artikel ini menggunakan konsep political polarization, political disinformation, dan political behavior. Tulisan ini menggunakan metode big data analysis untuk pengambilan data dan analisis data. Selanjutnya, metode tersebut digunakan untuk mengidentifikasi dan memetakan polarisasi isu, isi wacana, dan aktor sebagai opinion leader. Artikel ini juga melakukan pemetaan dan analisis kritis tentang narasi yang diproduksi di media sosial, khususnya Twitter. Wacana dan aktor dalam rangkaian agenda pelemahan KPK disoroti melalui tiga peristiwa, yaitu peristiwa Revisi Undang-Undang KPK, terpilihnya Ketua KPK Firli Bahuri, dan Tes Wawasan Kebangsaan. Temuan yang disampaikan di tulisan ini, yaitu polarisasi politik di antara kelompok pro pemerintah dan oposisi pemerintah dan disinformasi politik yang diproduksi dengan membawa isu taliban dan isu radikalisme. Pada akhirnya, perilaku politik masyarakat dalam agenda pelemahan KPK cenderung melekatkan diri pada influencer yang memiliki orientasi politik yang serupa.
This article assesses recent attempts to establish the cooperation between normative and empirical studies on deliberative democracy. The past thirty years have seen rapid growth of mini-publics experiments that test the idealized assumptions identified by normative studies. In these experiments, some of the assumptions are affirmed. However, there are results of experiments that deny the idealized assumptions, which pose a question about the cooperation between the normative and empirical studies: how we should interpret the results that contradict the idealized assumptions. The preceding approaches to the cooperation advocate either having the normative assumptions transcend the implications of experiments or reducing the normative assumptions to the status-quo. I argue that the idealized assumptions could be distinguished between the criteria of legitimacy, which is the criteria to judge the legitimacy of a particular decision-making procedure, and the guideline of institutions, which is a guideline to make the consequences of deliberation better. This distinction is necessary to enhance the cooperation between normative and empirical studies.
The emergence of COVID-19 spurred the fastest development of a vaccine in history. Yet, a large proportion of Americans remain hesitant to receive it. Our paper investigates how the social networks we inhabit might explain persistent vaccine hesitancy. We argue that the COVID-19 vaccination status of respondents’ closest associates inhibits or motivates their decision to receive a COVID-19 vaccine. To test our argument, we conduct an original survey asking respondents a battery of questions about the people with whom individuals most frequently discuss vaccines and COVID-19. Our survey reports that individuals’ discussion networks are polarized by vaccination status. Concurrently, there is a strong association between the social network’s vaccination status and the respondent’s vaccination status. This association is so robust that partisanship does not moderate the association between discussants’ vaccination status and respondents’ vaccination status. Together, our results imply that unvaccinated individuals remain hesitant because they face reinforcing social pressure from their closest associates. The unique timing of our survey, during an unprecedented vaccination campaign against a novel disease, offers a snapshot of how relationships may affect attitudes.
Social networks are meant to be environments of interconnection, but nowadays are emotionally charged and fuelled by polarizing dynamics, particularly on ethical issues. What
appear to be overlooked are the moral motivational systems that can moderate emotional
responses prompted by the communicative online content. Based on the individual Moral
Foundations, namely Care, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, and Purity (Graham et al., 2008),
this quasi-experimental study aims to understand how certain online public messages
structured through different moral framings affect distinct emotions. We explored with
a sample of adult participants (N=306, F=58.5%) the different emotional responses after the
presentation of posts on immigrants' reception in Italy, simulating interactions in an online
context through three different framings: the first focused on the safety, the second on the
relevance of help, and a neutral message. The results confirm distinct emotional responses
according to different frames and within individual moral systems and political orientation. https://medialnistudia.fsv.cuni.cz/front.file/download?file=medialni_studia_3_2022_4.pdf
Scholarship on “stealth democracy” finds that many citizens want to avoid the debate and conflict that often come with democratic governance. This scholarship has argued that citizens adopt this posture because they are uncomfortable with disagreement and desire a more expedient political process that enables leaders to make decisions without discussion or compromise. We revisit this argument in light of recent political developments that suggest another reason why citizens may desire a more expedient political process. We examine the possibility that some citizens are not merely uncomfortable with disagreement but also want leaders who will aggressively protect them and champion their interests. Using a nationally representative survey, we ask citizens about their preferences for stealth democracy. We also ask questions that tap into their willingness to support leaders who would “bend the rules for supporters” and take aggressive action against political opponents. We find that a substantial component of the electorate continues to prefer a stealth version of democracy. However, we also find that many “stealth democrats” are willing to support leadership practices that would threaten or even undermine democratic norms. We argue that this evidence indicates that, in recent years, many citizens who appear to desire “stealth democracy” pose a threat to democracy itself.
Increasing attention has been placed to the societal downsides of social media, and appropriately so. Less attention has been paid to the qualities to which social media should aspire. We contend that this is critically important. Not only must social media, and social media scholars, identify and reduce negative outcomes, but we must also critically engage with what is desirable. The purpose of this theoretical essay is to propose a normative framework for digital public spaces. We lay out four categories, and 14 sub-categories, of normative ideals to which social media could aspire. It is our hope that chronicling these qualities will allow scholars to more critically reflect on their normative assumptions when they research social media and will encourage practitioners to think about how social media could be built with these ideals in mind.
This chapter will set up the main argument of the book by outlining the problems with existing theoretical approaches to polarization in online discussion. It will argue the need to view polarization online beyond a problem caused by technological affordances and examine it holistically as an affective practice. The chapter will conclude by arguing for a conceptualisation of polarization that moves away from viewing this phenomenon as a difference between the policy positions of political parties or even purely an intense dislike of the opposing side. It will argue a different approach from the frame of rational deliberative discussion when examining online political discussion common on social media platforms and instead advocate for understanding polarization as an affective positioning which informs online commenting behaviour through its role in identity performance. It will argue that it is this method of understanding polarization that is more effective for examining its pervasiveness in the interactions of citizens on social media platforms such as Facebook, the central focus of this book
In his overview of recent work on intellectual humility, Nathan Ballantyne (2021) highlights some of the potential ‘dark sides’ of intellectual humility (IH) and calls for a critical study of the ‘value-theory’ of IH. In this article, we sketch out three ways that IH may threaten political conviction. We end our response by arguing that some forms of IH include different kinds of quietism about political convictions, which do not necessarily equate with a lack of conviction.
This book is dedicated to the dynamics of public deliberation online. Based on a critical examination of the traditional concept of deliberation, it discusses narration, expressions of emotion and humour as deliberative forms of communication in addition to argumentation. In addition to classic counter-argumentation, it considers empathy, constructiveness, reflection and genuine questions to be components of deliberative reciprocity. Empirically, relational content analysis and sequence analysis of two online participation platforms are used to investigate to what extent different forms of communication influence subsequent traditional and inclusive deliberative reciprocity.
What makes politically dissatisfied citizens enthusiastic about deliberation? And what makes them hate it instead? Based on a picture task embedded in a series of focus groups conducted in Belgium, we argue that differences in sense-making help to explain why dissatisfied citizens (do not) support deliberation. We focus on two groups of dissatisfied citizens: non-partisan activists and politically disadvantaged citizens. For both groups, we find that when they thought of deliberation as low-key, informal discussion, they linked it to respectful communication and beneficial outcomes; when they thought of it as formalized, structured discussion, their appraisals became much more negative. For researchers of deliberation, our results make clear that we should be careful in asking citizens what they think about 'deliberation' without inquiring into the way they interpret it. For deliberation practitioners, our findings underline the relevance of integrating informal interactions into the design of deliberative institutions.
A study of high school principals that examines ways that political pressures influence the degree to which schools support education for a diverse democracy.
This chapter provides a timeline of the Scottish independence referendum’s long campaign and assesses the extent to which the campaign connected with the public. With a turnout of 84.6%, it is clear that the general public was engaged on one level; however, the chapter demonstrates that Yes and No voters experienced the campaign very differently, with the Yes voters being far more likely to be active participants in campaigning activities. This level of engagement is briefly compared to the public’s enthusiasm for the 2016 Brexit campaign and referendum. Our assessment shows the Scottish public viewed these as very different events—one generated a degree of civic activism rarely seen in Britain and the other seemed hardly to connect with the Scottish public.
There is a striking paradox in EU democracy. The EU is the first jurisdiction to expressly embrace participation as an autonomous, complementary, source of legitimacy. Yet its day-to-day operations remain broadly closed to participation. By building on the extensive scholarship on democracy in the EU, this chapter evaluates the state of EU participatory democracy a decade after its inclusion in the EU treaties, by shedding some light on both its normative and practical realities. Section 2 briefly reconstructs the genesis and evolution of participatory democracy in the EU. Section 3 maps out and systematizes the many participatory mechanisms available to EU citizens—from petitions to the EU Parliament, complaints to the European Ombudsman, to European Citizens’ Initiatives—and illustrates how participatory democracy has been elevated to become one of the foundations of democracy in the EU. Section 4 examines the realities of participation by unveiling how current practices are characterized by unequal access, limited representativeness, and ultimately the disparate influence of participants. Section 5 puts forward some recommendations on how to unleash the democratic potential of EU participatory democracy in light of the Conference on the Future of Europe, an unprecedented, institutionally short-lived democratic exercise, but whose consequences should not be underestimated.KeywordsEuropean UnionDemocracyParticipationParticipatory democracyDeliberationMini-publicConference on the Future of EuropeEU
The article demonstrates how social media activism polarizes and clusters into distinct deliberative and participatory arenas, using the case study of online activism for justice for Roman Zadorov in Israel. Zadorov was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison. Still, an overwhelming majority of Israelis think he is innocent, with the social media obstruction-of-justice campaign in his support having raised overwhelming exposure and engagement. Theorists distinguish between participatory and deliberative public processes. Supporters of participatory processes advocate for the participation of multiple stakeholders in addressing public concerns. Supporters of deliberative processes advocate for a thorough evaluation of arguments for and against any course of action before decision-making. This study demonstrates how people congregate online and polarize into deliberative and participatory clusters. The “deliberative” cluster is characteristic of groups led by admins who advocate reaching the truth through exposing relevant information and conducting fact-based deliberation. The “participatory” cluster is characteristic of groups led by admins who believe that their activities should aim exclusively at generating more attention and engagement with the general public.
The proliferation of conspiracy theories poses a significant threat to democratic decision-making. To counter this threat, many political theorists advocate countering conspiracy theories with ‘more speech’ (or ‘counterspeech’). Yet conspiracy theories are notoriously resistant to counterspeech. This article aims to conceptualise and defend a novel form of counterspeech – narrative counterspeech – that is singularly well-placed to overcome this resistance. My argument proceeds in three steps. First, I argue that conspiracy theories pose a special problem for counterspeech for three interconnected reasons relating to salience, emotion and internal coherence. Drawing on recent work in social epistemology, philosophy of emotion and cognitive science, I then demonstrate that narrative forms of counterspeech constitute an apt response to this diagnosis. Finally, I forestall two objections: the first questions the likely effectiveness of narrative counterspeech; the second insists that, even if it were effective, it would remain unacceptably manipulative. Neither objection, I contend, is ultimately compelling.
Die Energiewende setzt Regionen immer mehr unter Druck. Auf dem Weg in eine klimaneutrale Gesellschaft und zusätzlich befördert durch die angestrebte Unabhängigkeit von fossilen Energien aus Russland müssen die erneuerbaren Energien und Stromnetze massiv und beschleunigter denn je ausgebaut werden. Bei der Planung und Implementierung der Energie-Infrastrukturen kommt es jedoch immer wieder zu lokalen Konflikten, die heftig ausfallen können und lokale Gemeinschaften erzittern lassen. Wie sehen diese Konflikte aus, welche Dynamiken wohnen ihnen inne und welche Konsequenzen zeitigen sie? Die Konflikttheorie schreibt Disputen auch eine vitalisierende Kraft zu, doch scheinen Energiewende-Konflikte hemmend auf die Erreichung der Ausbauziele zu wirken. Offen bleibt, ob demokratische Potenziale im Sinne der agonistischen Demokratietheorie genutzt werden können. Diese könnten indes durch die Etablierung politischer Populismus-Narrative im Feld der Energiewende blockiert werden. Daher stellt sich die Frage, ob die Energiewende ein Spielfeld des Populismus geworden ist und ob lokale Konflikte populistisch geprägt sind? Der Beitrag liefert erste empirische Ergebnisse auf Grundlage der Analyse verschiedener Energiewende-Konflikte in Deutschland. Hierbei wird deutlich: Die Konflikte sind nicht nur sehr stark durch spezifische lokale Kontexte geprägt, sondern zeichnen sich durch ein hohes Maß an Heterogenität und Komplexität aus. Überdies kristallisieren sich mit Blick auf die Frage, wo und wie sich populistische Erzählungen erfolgreich durchsetzen können, Muster heraus, die hier erstmals beschrieben werden. Abschließend skizziert der Beitrag mögliche Ansatzpunkte für eine Konfliktbearbeitung und bietet einen Ausblick auf zukünftige Forschungsperspektiven.
The Energiewende is putting various regions in Germany under increasing pres sure. In addition on becoming climate-neutral, the goal of achieving independence from Russian fossil fuels calls for a faster expansion of renewable energies and power grids than ever before. However, the planning and implementation of energy infrastructures leads to increasingly fierce conflicts within local communities. We therefore focus on the following questions: What characterizes these conflicts? What are their inherent dynamics and their consequences? We presume that even if conflict theory ascribes disputes a vitalizing force, these currently appear to have an inhibiting effect on the achievement of the Energiewende- goals. The question whether the democratic potentials of the conflicts can be positively transformed in the sense of an agonistic model of democracy still remains unanswered. In fact, we suspect that these democratic impacts are being constrained by populist narratives circulating in discourses about the Energiewende. In this paper, we highlight three core issues:
(1) First, we ask whether the Energiewende could be taken over by a populist agenda and to what extent local conflicts are shaped by populist influences.
(2) Second, we discuss whether populist actors could exploit the Energiewende to make their mark and explore the extent to which local conflicts are shaped by populist influences.
(3) Therefore, third, the questions arise whether the Energiewende has become a "playground" for populism and which specific phenomena of an "Energiewende populism" arise.
By analyzing different energy conflicts in Germany, the article provides preliminary em pirical findings on the preceding questions. The paper demonstrates that these disputes are not only characterized by specific local conflict traditions, but also by a high degree of heterogeneity and complexity. Furthermore, it identifies patterns of populist narratives that occur in various conflict settings. Finally, the article outlines possible approaches for conflict management and future research perspectives.
Research Methods in Deliberative Democracy is the first book that brings together a wide range of methods used in the study of deliberative democracy. It offers thirty-one different methods that scholars use for theorizing, measuring, exploring, or applying deliberative democracy. Each chapter presents one method by explaining its utility in deliberative democracy research and providing guidance on its application by drawing on examples from previous studies. The book hopes to inspire scholars to undertake methodologically robust, intellectually creative, and politically relevant research. It fills a significant gap in a rapidly growing field of research by assembling diverse methods and thereby expanding the range of methodological choices available to students, scholars, and practitioners of deliberative democracy.
The Cambridge Handbook of Political Psychology provides a comprehensive review of the psychology of political behaviour from an international perspective. Its coverage spans from foundational approaches to political psychology, including the evolutionary, personality and developmental roots of political attitudes, to contemporary challenges to governance, including populism, hate speech, conspiracy beliefs, inequality, climate change and cyberterrorism. Each chapter features cutting-edge research from internationally renowned scholars who offer their unique insights into how people think, feel and act in different political contexts. By taking a distinctively international approach, this handbook highlights the nuances of political behaviour across cultures and geographical regions, as well as the truisms of political psychology that transcend context. Academics, graduate students and practitioners alike, as well as those generally interested in politics and human behaviour, will benefit from this definitive overview of how people shape – and are shaped by – their political environment in a rapidly changing twenty-first century.
Previous studies have assumed that the relationship between intergroup contact and affective polarization is uniform across political predispositions. We argue instead that party identification serves as a boundary condition for the intergroup contact‒affective polarization relationship. Our findings suggest that: (1) intergroup contact between “in‐party” and “out‐party” supporters reduces affective polarization among nonidentifiers, weak, and moderate party identifiers, and (2) intergroup contact remains unrelated to affective polarization among strong party identifiers. These findings apply to high‐ and low‐quality contact measures alike, meaning that party identification strength is an essential boundary condition capable of obstructing the impact of contact on affective polarization. Analyses were performed on a new sample among Danish citizens. The survey was fielded in 2021 (n = 3638). The findings contribute to both intergroup contact research and to the study of the sources of affective polarization. In terms of broader implications, our study suggests that aside from true partisans, intergroup contact stimulates democratic behavior.
This two-study package theorizes connective democracy as a means of enabling the type of democratic discourse envisioned by deliberative democracy in highly polarized political climates. Using survey data (N = 1,160) and follow-up interviews with survey respondents (n = 56), we theorize connective democracy. We argue that connective democracy offers a less sanitized view of democracy than deliberative democracy where not all types of polarization are equally damaging to democracy. Further, connective democracy prioritizes cross-cutting political conversations and focuses on shared humanity and genuinely listening to divergent points of view. In essence, connective democracy provides a path forward to forge connections between people, thus providing a boundary condition for deliberative democracy. Our findings explore how the public enacts connective democracy, and the role of the professional news media in that enactment. Theoretical implications are discussed in light of recent concerns about affective polarization as well as deliberative democracy’s feasibility.
Why are political conversations uncomfortable for so many people? The current literature focuses on the structure of people's discussion networks and the frequency with which they talk about politics, but not the dynamics of the conversations themselves. In What Goes Without Saying, Taylor N. Carlson and Jaime E. Settle investigate how Americans navigate these discussions in their daily lives, with particular attention to the decision-making process around when and how to broach politics. The authors use a multi-methods approach to unpack what they call the 4D Framework of political conversation: identifying the ways that people detect others' views, decide whether to talk, discuss their opinions honestly—or not, and determine whether they will repeat the experience in the future. In developing a framework for studying and explaining political discussion as a social process, What Goes Without Saying will set the agenda for research in political science, psychology, communication, and sociology for decades to come.
As part of a comparative study of attitudes toward freedom of expression, Americans, Israeli Jews, and Israeli Arabs were
asked about the social contexts in which they feel unfree to speak and about the reasons that inhibit them. Home was the least
inhibiting locus in all three cultures and, for the U.S. respondents, the workplace was most inhibiting. Responding to a battery
of 33 reasons for not speaking out, all three cultures gave highest ratings to items related to the fear of hurting others.
Questions measuring fear of being disapproved or hurt by others—including fear of isolation from the majority and fear of
legal restraint—were ranked lower. An overall index of inhibition items proved highly reliable cross-culturally. Americans
claimed least inhibition and Israeli Arabs most. Males and those with higher education levels and incomes were also less inhibited
across the three cultures. Expression inhibition was negatively, through weakly, related to support for expressive rights
among both Israeli groups and American whites but not American blacks, where the relation was positive. Expression inhibition
was negatively related to political activity among Americans and Israeli Jews but not among Arabs.
Despite often breathless claims in the media, there is little evidence to suggest that the United States is becoming increasingly segregated along political lines. Most Americans continue to live in electorally competitive areas and where they have a great deal of exposure to members of the other party.
Journal of Democracy 10.1 (1999) 112-125
Despite a year that saw violent civil war in the Republic of the Congo, attempts at ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, ethnic and political violence in Indonesia, and severe economic turbulence in many emerging markets, freedom made significant strides in 1998. As the year drew to a close, 88 of the world's 191 countries (46 percent) were rated as Free, meaning that they maintain a high degree of political and economic freedom and respect basic civil liberties. This was the largest number of Free countries on record, and represented a net gain of seven from last year -- the second-largest increase in the 26-year history of the survey. Another 53 countries (28 percent of the world total) were rated as Partly Free, enjoying more limited political rights and civil liberties, often in a context of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic strife, or civil war. This represented a drop of four from the previous year. Finally, 50 countries (26 percent of the world total) that deny their citizens basic rights and civil liberties were rated as Not Free. This represented a drop of three from the previous year.
There were seven new entrants into the ranks of Free countries in 1998, including India, which had been rated as Partly Free since 1991, a year that saw the killing of former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi, intense labor strife, and an escalation of intercommunal violence resulting in thousands of deaths. India's return to the ranks of Free countries was the consequence of greater internal stability, fewer instances of intercommunal violence, and the peaceful democratic transfer of power to an opposition-led government. Other entrants into the ranks of Free countries were the Dominican Republic, where a democratically elected government has made efforts to strengthen the administration of justice; Ecuador, which recently concluded free and fair elections; Nicaragua, where improved relations between civilian authorities and a military formerly dominated by the Sandinistas contributed to the strengthening of democratic stability, and where greater attention was paid to the problems of indigenous peoples on the country's Atlantic coast; Papua New Guinea, which saw a January 1998 peace agreement put an end to a destabilizing nine-year secessionist rebellion on Bougainville Island; Slovakia, where free and fair elections brought to power a reformist-dominated government; and Thailand, where the government of Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai has fostered increasing political accountability.
In addition, three countries formerly ranked as Not Free -- Indonesia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone -- made tangible progress and are now rated as Partly Free. In Indonesia, the downfall of Suharto has led to the reemergence of political parties and civic groups and the promise of free elections. Although the country's economic crisis has sparked ethnic violence targeting the Chinese minority (and some violence has occurred during student demonstrations), some political controls have loosened, political parties and movements have begun to gain strength, and the media have become more outspoken. In Nigeria, the death of military dictator Sani Abacha has led to a political opening that holds out the promise of multiparty elections and already has seen the reemergence of public debate, a resurgence of political parties, the return of exiled leaders, and the rise of an increasingly vibrant press. In Sierra Leone, the defeat of a military coup has put an end to chaos and violence and restored power to the country's democratically elected civilian authorities.
In addition to these shifts from one category to another, the 1998 Survey recorded more modest improvements in freedom in 22 countries. Not all trends for the year were positive, however. The Survey registered modest declines in freedom in 12 countries. These changes are reflected in the Table on pages 124-25 by black upward or downward arrows, signifying upward or downward changes in a country's score on the freedom scale.
Thirteen countries were judged to be the world's most repressive and have received Freedom House's lowest rating: scores of 7 for political rights and 7 for civil liberties. In these states, basic political rights and civil liberties are nonexistent, there is no free press, and independent civic life...
Tested the hypothesis that greater cross-cultural contact would result in greater generalized cross-cultural role-taking ability and more favorable attitudes toward ethnic groups in general. 11th graders in schools with a high proportion of New Canadians were compared with students in a matched group of schools having a relatively low proportion of New Canadians on tests devised to measure cross-cultural role-taking ability, tolerance for diversity in society, and on performance on the Prisoner's Dilemma game. A total of 1,323 Ss were tested. Both Canadian and New Canadian students in high density schools scored higher than comparable students in low density schools on the cross-cultural role-taking test. There was no support for the hypothesis from results of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. (French summary) (17 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
One class of theories explains group induced shifts in individual choice in terms of interpersonal comparison process. By comparing himself with others a member finds out that his position is uncomfortably discrepant, e.g., he is overly “cautious” or overly “risky”. Knowledge of this discrepancy presumably is necessary and sufficient to induce him to change his initial choice. Another class of theories holds that merely knowing one is different from others is unimportant. Shifts in choice occur because during discussion a member is exposed to persuasive arguments which prior to discussion were not available to him. Thus, if in a factorial design one independently varied (a) the number of others' choices available for comparison and (b) the number of arguments others presented in support of these choices, interpersonal comparison theories would predict the magnitude of the shift to be a function of (a) and not of (b), while theories of persuasive argumentation would predict the opposite. When such an experiment was performed the only reliable main effects were based on the number of arguments, (b), as predicted by persuasive arguments. In no instance did effects involving (a) approach significance.