No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
The Politics of Self-Determination: Beyond the Decolonisation Process
Abstract
Since the formation of the UN in 1945 the international community has witnessed a number of violent self-determination conflicts such as the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Chechnya, Kashmir, and South Sudan that have been a major cause of humanitarian crises and destruction. This book examines the scope and applicability of political self-determination beyond the decolonisation process. Explaining the historical evolution of self-determination, this book provides a theoretical examination of the concept and background. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, the author analyses self-determination in relation to contemporary conflicts, which inform and drive a coherent theoretical framework for international responses to claims for self-determination. Built upon an examination of the conceptual foundations of self-determination, this book presents a new understanding and application of self-determination. It addresses the important question of whether self-determination claims legitimate armed violence, either by the self-determining group's right to rebel, or by the international community in the form of humanitarian intervention. The Politics of Self-Determination will be of interest to students and scholars of political science, international relations, security studies and conflict studies.
... Despite contending interpretations of its conceptual content and political potential since its original inception after World War I (see Brownlie 1970;Pomerance 1984), the right to selfdetermination was, during the era of decolonisation, unanimously recognised as the right to be free from colonial rule. However, once it became apparent that demands for self-determination were no longer limited to the colonial context, the question turned to the much more complex issue of ascertaining the scope and limits of the principle of self-determination in a postcolonial world (Christakis: 1999;Roepstorff 2012;Fabry 2015). As aptly expressed by French (2013: i): ...
... Others, conversely, seek to determine the conditions for the legitimate use of force, either to facilitate or to impede any secession attempt (e.g. Roepstorff 2012). However, the realisation of the ambiguities and limits of the right to self-determination discussed above also explains the ostensible decline of its political appeal (Abulof 2016) interpretation of the so-called 'right decide' so long as its exercise is understood and implemented within the limits that the Spanish constitution clearly establishes, or within those resulting from its possible reform, well understood that this reform shall be conducted in due form (cf. Ridao i Martín 2014; Ferreres Comella 2014). ...
The idea of a perfect national political community, entirely confined within the contours of a corresponding state, is one of the foundational fictions of global modernity. Its formal crystallisation in the legal grammars of the right to self-determination has been however, particularly in the post-colonial era, highly problematic and full of ambiguities. Drawing on this background, this article contends that diplomacy offers frequently a more promising venue for dealing with the challenge of political pluralism than appealing to either the unstable grammars of the right to self-determination or a reified understanding of the principle of territorial integrity of states. In so doing, firstly, the right to self-determination is critically examined. Instead of attempting to articulate its formal content, the malleability of its legal grammars and political realities, will be emphasised. Secondly, based on the discussion of a variety of historical cases, the notion of ‘constituent diplomacies’ will be advanced, aiming to show how the agonistic accommodation of political and territorial pluralism through diplomacy was crucial not only in the formative processes of modern sovereign states but also nowadays. Finally, this relational understanding of the historical forms of governance of political pluralism within and beyond state boundaries will be re-examined, beyond its ethno-political dimensions, through the prism of the complex interplay between the material and ideational conditions for the co-production of sovereignty in the context of new global capitalism.
... The leftist opposition to war was claiming the new right to self-determination. Rightist opponents were claiming the cost of war, as developed during World War I. Notwithstanding this twofold opposition, the French government engaged in a 17-year-long war to preserve its colonies (Roepstorff, 2012). Humanism on the leftist side and economics on the rightist side were uniting to oppose and denounced the war effort. ...
This chapter builds upon accounting history research to show how management has served any types of purposes over centuries, some being laudable and others raising moral and ethical questions. When revealed by God to mankind, accounting appeared as a practical and religious way of solving world dualism. Soul accounting was aimed at reconciling world dualism. Capitalist accounting served as a tool of economic rationality as bureaucracies arose. War accounting was a tool associated with military strategy to win a war. But also, management accounting served dark purposes: rationality and efficiency in the service of the Shoah and colonial oppression.
... The leftist opposition to war was claiming the new right to self-determination. Rightist opponents were claiming the cost of war, as developed during World War I. Notwithstanding this twofold opposition, the French government engaged in a 17-year-long war to preserve its colonies (Roepstorff, 2012). Humanism on the leftist side and economics on the rightist side were uniting to oppose and denounced the war effort. ...
This chapter addresses an important issue at the intersection of management accounting and ethics: trust. Borrowing from Pascal’s writings, this chapter highlights these contradictions that cannot be solved when it comes to trust: the impossibility of knowing ex ante the one to be trusted. Thence, the imperative of transparency generally associated with trust is also called into question through Pascal’s works. This chapter argues that actual trust is a moral wager whereby the giving party demonstrates confidence in the other: one entrusts one’s faith to the other, expecting the best from this trustworthy person to be.
... The leftist opposition to war was claiming the new right to self-determination. Rightist opponents were claiming the cost of war, as developed during World War I. Notwithstanding this twofold opposition, the French government engaged in a 17-year-long war to preserve its colonies (Roepstorff, 2012). Humanism on the leftist side and economics on the rightist side were uniting to oppose and denounced the war effort. ...
This chapter engages in a philosophical discussion on ethics by questioning its learnt or innate nature. Building upon Lévinas’ works, it reasons that the discussion is rather on immanence of transcendence and shows that ethics, by proceeding from aesthetics, appears as the offshoot of the self’s ontological construction. Thereby, ethics is immanent and innate but learnt through self-discovery. Ethics becomes transcendental and keeps being learnt through interactions with other selves. Forms of ethics education, even though not compulsory in this construction, can help inform the ethical self on what society values.
... The leftist opposition to war was claiming the new right to self-determination. Rightist opponents were claiming the cost of war, as developed during World War I. Notwithstanding this twofold opposition, the French government engaged in a 17-year-long war to preserve its colonies (Roepstorff, 2012). Humanism on the leftist side and economics on the rightist side were uniting to oppose and denounced the war effort. ...
This chapter questions the conditions of possibility of ethics’ happening. In answering this question, it builds on Alain Badiou’s approach to ethics, showing that discourses on the subject are characterised by intrinsic unresolved contradictions making ethics impossible. Ethics appears as the negative response to problematic situations and not as positive and performative programme. Such can be the case, probably because such discourses on contemporary ethics and associated issues (governance, accountability, trust etc.) are grounded in one particular cultural and political context, that of North American democracy. Ethics is mission possible, provided discourses on its nature are adapted to the situation.
... The leftist opposition to war was claiming the new right to self-determination. Rightist opponents were claiming the cost of war, as developed during World War I. Notwithstanding this twofold opposition, the French government engaged in a 17-year-long war to preserve its colonies (Roepstorff, 2012). Humanism on the leftist side and economics on the rightist side were uniting to oppose and denounced the war effort. ...
This book responds to key issues in strategic management control by studying the interplay between ethics, social and environmental performance and governance. Grounded in research but written with practitioners and students in mind, it addresses the most up-to-date issues pertaining to ethical insights into management accounting and accountability.
... In other words, self-determining units are not seen as resisting and protecting themselves from external interferences but they are redefined as "open-systems" that have gained an awareness that internal-external dichotomy has become obsolete in the global era (Buhari-Gulmez 2016b). In this context, rather than secession (external self-determination), self-determination claims start to focus on internal self-determination implying democratic and multi-level governance mechanisms that allow shared ruling (Roepstorff 2013). ...
Current Ukrainian gender order was reflected in the modes of men’s and women’s participation in Euromaidan protests that took place in November 2013–February 2014. Despite presence of both men and women, gendered aspects of their participation have been visible in division of labor and functions performed by women and men during the protests. The modes of women engagement into the protests varied significantly during different stages of the protests—from peaceful demonstrations to violent clashes. Taking into account the existing controversy in the perception of women’s role into the protests, we will argue that there were different gender role scenarios of women’s participation into the protests according to functions they performed and the way they represented themselves.
... In other words, self-determining units are not seen as resisting and protecting themselves from external interferences but they are redefined as "open-systems" that have gained an awareness that internal-external dichotomy has become obsolete in the global era (Buhari-Gulmez 2016b). In this context, rather than secession (external self-determination), self-determination claims start to focus on internal self-determination implying democratic and multi-level governance mechanisms that allow shared ruling (Roepstorff 2013). ...
A classic definition of crisis within IR refers to crisis in terms of something that happens—an unexpected event—and has to be dealt with, managed, to be put managed and put under control. Perhaps, this is why the word “crisis” is simultaneously employed to designate momentary emergencies as well as opportunities, for they are moments in which interventions are possible. The aim of this chapter is to suggest a dialogue with concept of the “Event”—which Gilles Deleuze characterizes as “pure,” “true” events in relation to ordinary, superficial, historical events, while Alain Badiou claims it a rupture in being—to help us to navigate a sea of crisis discourses. I will argue that Deleuze’s use of the imagery of scars and wounds clarifies how he differentiates event from Event, which will lead us to a better understanding of the ontology of crisis and change. Based on 2013/2014 events in Ukraine, I will reflect upon the currently unfolding dynamics in post-Soviet space to, finally, characterize the end of the Ages of Empire in global politics as the Event.
Children have, historically, played a significant role in protests across the world, often contributing to adult-led movements, or leading child-centric protest actions. Yet, following India’s accession to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), in 1992, children’s role in this aspect of political participation has remained understudied in the Indian context. Considering this context, this thesis has engaged with the following themes across its chapters. In the analysis of core participatory rights in protests, this thesis has identified Article 13 and Article 15 and has found that normative scope of these provisions has different implications in the context of participatory expression, associations and assemblies involving children. The analysis demonstrates the increasingly interdependent ways in which these multidimensional rights operate within the socio-political contexts of India, and some of the underlying tensions that exist in terms of facilitating children’s participation while factoring in their best interest and vulnerabilities. In the context of state limitations on these rights, this research has argued the ways in which application of state limitations in protests in India, undermines the legal framework stipulated under the Convention, which espouses a restrictive approach to limitations. Additionally, it has been argued that the State’s neglect of its obligations to protect children cannot effectively displace these obligations upon parents, given the inherently public nature of protest spaces involving children. This thesis has analysed and identified key tensions between children’s participatory rights, parental responsibility and state obligations. In relation to the issue of balancing the imperatives of protection and participation, this research has found that there is an imperative to reimagine the relationship between the State’s positive and negative obligations, so as to understand the interdependencies between the State’s different obligations, parental responsibility, and children’s participatory rights. Finally, this thesis has utilised the analysis of children’s participation in protests to build upon an alternate difference-centred conception of child citizenship, that is pivotal in the socio-political context in India.
The aim of this article is to provide an analysis of the ICJ’s advisory opinion of 25 February 2019 on the Chagos Archipelago. It will endeavour to answer the following questions: (i) is it consistent with the letter and the spirit of international law for the ICJ to issue advisory opinions in cases involving a dispute between states, which, due to the lack of consent from one of the states, cannot be brought before the ICJ and be settled by a judgment of that judicial body?; (ii) is such a ruling the right way to settle the issue of decolonization?; and (iii) did Brexit play any role in the case under discussion? The article begins by describing the background to the dispute between the UK and Mauritius. The focus of the analysis then shifts to the nature of advisory opinions and the 2019 ICJ advisory opinion on the Chagos Archipelago. Next, the authors discuss the possible impact of Brexit on the dispute between the UK and Mauritius itself, as well as on the UK’s international standing in general. The article concludes with reflections on voluntarism in international law. The authors conclude that de lege lata an authorized body or organization may ask the ICJ for an advisory opinion in situations where it believes that such an opinion would be useful for its work. However, such advisory opinions should not have the character of authoritative court statements made in pending disputes between sovereign states. As a consequence, such opinions should refer only to abstract legal problems, which means that in some cases the ICJ should refrain from issuing them.
This chapter discusses the global transformations at the interrelated levels of polity, policy, and politics by following three views of globalization as (1) a “re-” process or the continuation of an old system in disguise, (2) a “de-” process underlying the dismantling of old borders and systems, and (3) a “post-” process that focuses on the emerging phenomena and new, hybrid structures. The first section explores the changing nature of the international system with a special focus on global, national, and European polities, respectively. It covers the debates about world order, national sovereignty, and self-determination and looks at the complex relationship between European integration and globalization. Secondly, at the policy level, the chapter focuses on changing security policies with a special emphasis on new wars, new terrorism, human security, and securitization. After discussing the polity and policy dimensions of globalization, the chapter focuses on politics in terms of ideologies, including the political stances toward globalization. Overall, the study suggests looking at political globalization as a complex and multidimensional phenomenon that involves not only “re-” and “de-” processes but also “post-” processes that transform and go beyond the taken-for-granted understandings about polity, policy, and politics at global, regional, and national levels.
Following Nabers’ seminal work that establishes a “missing link” between crises and transformations, this study focuses on the changes in the Crimean Tatar discourses about Crimean Tatar identity, crises, and Russian and Ukrainian “Others” with a special emphasis on the question of national self-determination. It suggests that a discursive shift of emphasis from the “Deportation crisis” to “Annexation crisis” among Crimean Tatars operates as a “myth” to deal with the inherent divide within the Tatar political movement and conceals the ongoing “hegemonic struggles” over the Crimean Tatar identity and its political representation. Exploring the multiplicity of discourses about Crimean Tatar self-determination, the study emphasizes the need to trace the universalizing and particularizing processes through which Crimean Tatar subjectivities are reconstructed.
The tension between the right to self-determination and the principle of state sovereignty has important implications for national liberation struggles all around the world. During the 1960s and 1970s, liberation movements came to be widely recognised as legitimate. In later decades, however, this international support waned. Decolonisation had offered a unique window of opportunity: not only did it provide a normative framework that could unite disparate groups from all over the world, it also created additional opportunities for mobilising support and expanding dissidents’ pool of resources. Once this normative framework had disappeared, the movements were no longer able to unite in their struggle. As ‘lone warriors’, they could not generate the same level of support and sovereignty re-emerged as the dominant principle of global order.
The paper discusses the norm of self-determination as a core element of and a difficult challenge to international democracy promotion. Collective self-determination is part and parcel of the promise of democracy and, hence, of democracy promotion. Yet, at the same time, the idea that political communities should determine themselves clashes with democracy promotion's aim to shape political orders from the outside. Given the scarce attention to the question of self-determination in the academic and political debates about democracy promotion, the paper is mainly of a conceptual and theoretical nature: Its aim is to review the literature on self-determination in order to clarify the concept – or, in fact, the competing concepts – of self-determination and discuss its relation with democracy in general and democracy promotion in particular. The paper (1) shows that the claim to collective self-determination constitutes a common normative denominator between contemporary opponents and sup-porters of democracy promotion; (2) reviews the range of conceptions of collective self-determination from a maximalist notion of liberal-democratic self-rule to a minimalist understanding of self-determination based on a rather broad notion of popular sovereignty; and (3) discusses implications for democracy promotion understood as the promotion of democratic self-determination.
At the time this article was written - autumn 2002 - peace talks were underway between the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Government of Sudan (GoS) in Machakos, Kenya. For the first time since the outbreak of the conflict nineteen years ago, the July 20th Protocol reached between the belligerents under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) at Machakos raised the possibility of a negotiated resolution of the conflict. Sudan's civil war has been part of the political landscape of Africa for so long, that most people believe it to be intractable. Even more difficult to envisage is an effective government, autonomous or independent, in Southern Sudan. Therefore, it is time to consider the issue of governance in the South, taking into account the administrative and political capacity of the SPLM/A, as well as the challenge posed by a host of rival armed movements loosely grouped under the umbrella of the South Sudan Democratic Front (SSDF), plus a dozen or more tribal militias
Whether we choose to view autonomy as an evolving right or a limited State grant, it is important to ask the question as to how the internationalization of rights is linked to the flexibility of autonomy. In other words, if autonomy now constitutes a generally acceptable and flexible option for resolving intra-State conflicts among minority groups, should we view its flexibility in terms of the evolution of a democratic (internal) right to self-determination? Or should we see its flexibility as a practical and positive manifestation of globalization in which autonomy represents an increasingly efficient mechanism for managing the global dimensions of conflict between and among minority groups (e.g. immigration and refugee flows)? In addressing these questions, I argue that an evolving universal right of cultural autonomy needs to be viewed as a practical mechanism for resolving global and local conflicts between and among minority groups. On a historical level, I contend that cultural autonomy, while constituting an international mechanism during most of the 20th century, has only recently emerged as an effective flexible option for resolving cultural conflicts. Thus, for instance, during the inter-war period, the League of Nations implemented various treaties in Eastern European States, which contained provisions stipulating minority rights protection. Yet it was not until the post-Cold War era that autonomy emerged as an arguably desirable universal option for accommodating the needs of minority groups.
This article examines the politics of naming in one of the longest-running and most intractable conflicts in the world: that between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (ltte) and the Sri Lankan state. While the narratives presented by the ltte and the state in support of their respective positions are complex and range across a number of issues, this paper is primarily concerned with the politics of the ‘terrorist’ label as applied to the ltte. In particular, it examines how the characterisation of the conflict as a form of terrorism has affected its evolutionary course. While the Sri Lankan state has deployed the language of terrorism to further its strategic aims in both the domestic and international spheres, the label has not necessarily impeded the growth of the ltte's military capability but has, by denying the ltte international legitimacy, undermined the organisation's stated political project—Tamil self-determination. The article also outlines the contradictions between prevailing international attitudes to terrorism and the conduct of key international actors with regard to the protagonists in Sri Lanka and demonstrates how the sustained rhetoric of terrorism has become a serious impediment to reaching a permanent resolution of the conflict.
This article appraises the impact of the Advisory Opinion of 7 July 2004 on the development of self-determination as a legal principle. The plight of the Palestinians being widely understood as a textbook self-determination struggle, the Court had to address the issue in its examination of the case at hand. Self-determination left an indelible mark upon the Opinion, from the decision to allow Palestine to participate, through the use of the principle as applicable law, to the elucidation of the violations and the erga
omnes character of the obligations breached. The article examines the Court's positions, which, however sparsely elaborated, may have serious repercussions on the understanding of the principle and on its handling in future judicial proceedings.
In this article I explore some ancient issues of political theory in the light of some contemporary social and cultural issues. After developing a check list of the virtues and vulnerabilities of constitutional democracy (Section I), I go on to discuss some types and symptoms of difference, conflict, fragmentation and heterogeneity (Section II). I then proceed to a critical review of a particular set of strategies and institutional solutions—political group rights—that are often thought promising devices for strengthening the virtues and overcoming the vulnerabilities of the constitutional democratic form of regime (Section III).
Much of the contemporary philosophical and political discussion of these issues is enchanted by the post-modern spirit of “multiculturalism,”“diversity” and “identity.” It tends to neglect issues of citizenship and social justice. It also tends to fixate on North American examples, neglecting some of the less benign West European and, in particular, Central East European varieties of identity politics. The discussion here, while mostly raising questions rather than claiming to provide definitive answers, nevertheless tries to overcome some of these biases.
The very idea of collective rights has for a long time now been regarded with suspicion by moral and political philosophers. In recent years, however, this attitude has become more difficult to sustain, for the language of collective rights has come to dominate some of the most contentious political issues of our day. Consider, for example, the controversy surrounding the alleged injustices suffered by the indigenous peoples of North America. The arguments that best capture the core of these allegations appeal to collective rights. These arguments maintain that the injustices commonly suffered by an indigenous people involve the violation of rights held collectively by them rather than by particular individuals.
The continuing crises today in multi-national, plural-ethnic states often put together, hurriedly, and with only casual regard for future long-range historical consequences by victors in great wars or similar confiicts, have suggested the re-publication, in expanded and augmented form today, of lectures given in the Annual Session of The Hague Academy of International Law in 2002. [published in Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de la Haye, volume 294 (2002), pp. 167-263]. I am grateful to The Hague Academy and its then Secretary-General, Genevieve Bastid-Burdeau, and its present Secretary-General, Yves Daudet, for the privilege of lecturing to its Annual Session and for the permission to publish the present much revised and expanded text. The most immediate illustration then of the ultimate perils of imposed "Victors' Peace Treaties" was the ?nal breakdown and dis-solution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) after a decade of internecine struggle throughout the 1990s, marked by civil war between its internal regimes (constituent republics) that seemed encouraged, at least in part, by outside, (non-Balkan) players re-living past, pre-1914 Imperial rivalries. The consequences included the forced expulsion, on a massive scale, of civil populations, across pre-existing internal, ethno-culturally-based, regionally-structured territorial boundaries; and also a tragically large loss of innocent, non-combatant civilian lives (sometimes as a result of aerial bombardments by outside (non-Balkan) players. © 2007 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. All rights reserved.
This chapter discusses the place of Kosovo in between main principles of international law: self determination, on one hand, and sovereignty and territorial integrity, on the other. It tries to discuss the Kosovo conundrum in between these principles to develop a case where the people of Kosovo would be eligible to use the right to self-determination and secede, as a last resort, from a state where their fundamental human rights and freedoms were denied persistently. The chapter approaches legal, historical and political development of Kosovo from the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire up to its current status. It focuses on the challenges to Kosovo after the declaration of independence and its struggle to enter into international relations. It also discusses the prospects of entering some of the most important international organizations for Kosovo; the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, European Union and NATO. Keywords:European Union; international law; International Monetary Fund; Kosovo Conundrum; NATO; Ottoman Empire; Sovereignty; territorial integrity; United Nations; World Bank
national law, has been support by some governments for the legitimacy of the use of force by peoples subjected to oppressive regimes. This support has extended into the negotiation of international treaties aimed at defining terrorist acts as crimes, and determining forms of international co-operation to punish such crimes. A clear illustration of such support can be found in the Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) on Combating International Terrorism of 1999: Article 2(a) Peoples' struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination in accordance with the principles of international law shall not be considered a terrorist crime. This definition of what is not a terrorist crime, of course only applies in the context of this particular Convention, but other non-universal Conventions include similar exclusions. Consider the 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism 1999: Article 3(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1, the struggle waged by peoples in accordance with the principles of international law for their liberation or self-determination, including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign forces shall not be considered as terrorist acts. Lastly, consider also Article 2 of the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 1998: All cases of struggle by whatever means, including armed struggle, against foreign occupation and aggression for liberation and self-determination, in accordance with the principles of international law, shall not be regarded as an offence.
On 6 April 1994, President Habyarimana of Rwanda and several top government officials were killed when their plane was shot down by a surface-to-air missile on its approach to Kigali airport. Within hours, members of the Hutu-dominated government, presidential guard, police, and military started rounding up and executing opposition politicians. The army set up roadblocks at 50 to 100 meter intervals throughout Kigali. The airport was surrounded and sealed. Telephone lines were cut. Military intelligence distributed lists of the government's political opponents to death squads: “every journalist, every lawyer, every professor, every teacher, every civil servant, every priest, every doctor, every clerk, every student, every civil rights activist were hunted down in a house-to-house operation. The first targets were members of the never-to-be-constituted broad-based transitional government.” Once the Tutsi leadership and intelligentsia were killed, the army, presidential guard, and the Interahamwe militia, the youth wing of the ruling Hutu party, began executing anyone whose identity cards identified them as Tutsis. When checking identity cards became too time-consuming, they executed anyone with stereotypical Tutsi features. On 9 April, the Interahamwe militia directed by presidential guards hacked to death 500 men, women, and children who had taken shelter in the Catholic mission in Kigali. In another incident, the Interahamwe shot 120 men and boys who had taken refuge in St. Famille Church in Kigali. Soldiers killed any wounded Tutsis who made it to hospital. One killer went so far as to thank hospital staff for providing a “Tutsi collection point.”
Introduction: Secession attempts sometimes provoke external interventions. Such interventions can take various forms. They can take place by armed force, by economic coercion, or by political means, such as by means of recognition. Interventions can also originate from different actors. They can be undertaken by the United Nations, by another international organization, by a State or a group of States, or by Non-State actors. This article does not cover all possible forms of external intervention within secession processes, rather it concentrates on describing some general rules of international law that are applicable in such situations and on providing a few pertinent examples from international practice. The focus will be on the role of the United Nations (section II) and on armed intervention by third States, both at the invitation of the government concerned and without (section III). Secession, as a legal term, means the – not necessarily forceful – breaking away of an integral part of the territory of a State and its subsequent establishment as a new State. This chapter, however, only deals with the rules that apply to a narrower concept of secession. Thus, we are not concerned with conflicts about internationally disputed territories, e.g. the cases of the Baltic States, Kashmir, Palestine, East-Timor, or the divided States such as China, Germany, Korea, Yemen. Cases of domestic conflict which merely contain a remote possibility that they will turn into a serious secession attempt such as the Basque country, Corsica and Scotland are also beyond the scope of the present work.
The first part of this article places United Nations human rights action in historical perspective so that the efforts for recognizing indigenous rights are seen in a global context. The second part traces the specific steps of interaction between indigenous peoples and the United Nations human rights system and describes their mutual reinforcement towards the protection and promotion of indigenous rights. The third part briefly refers to some key issues in the international debates on indigenous peoples. -from Author
In an earlier attempt to compare federalism and consociationalism, I found that, both conceptually and empirically, they do not coincide but that they do overlap to a significant extent. In this second comparison, my point of departure is that both concepts entail a rejection of majoritarian democracy. Eight characteristics of non-majoritarian democracy—or consensus democracy—can be identified: (1) executive power sharing, (2) balanced executive-legislative relations, (3) strong bicameralism, (4) multiparty system, (5) multi-dimensional party system, (6) proportional representation, (7) federalism and decentralization, and (8) a written constitution and minority veto. Consociational theorists tend to emphasize the non-majoritarian attributes of power sharing, proportional representation, and multi-partyism, whereas federal theorists stress the non-majoritarian characteristics of strong bicameralism and rigid constitutions, in addition to federalism itself. A similar pattern is revealed by a factor analysis of these variables in twenty-two democratic regimes. Although consociationalism and federalism are non-majoritarian in nature, they represent clearly different dimensions of non-majoritarianism.
Federalism and consociationalism are useful means of understanding political systems. Federalism and consociationalism are both based on compound majoritarianism rather than simple majoritarianism, and both represent modern attempts to accommodate democratic complexity and pluralism, but the two systems are not quite symmetrical, and territorial organization is not the only characteristic that differentiates them. Instead, it can be said that federalism relates to the form of a polity, while consociationalism relates to the character of a regime. To the extent that federalism may also function as the character of a regime, then federalism and consociationalism may be more symmetrical. One of the ambiguities of federalism is that it is often both form and regime. Consociationalism, however, relates only to regime.
L'A. s'interroge sur la nature possible des groupes sociaux et conclut a l'impossibilite d'une action morale de ceux-ci en tant qu'agents. Examinant le statut des corporations comme personnes morales en reference aux travaux de P. A. French, l'A. montre que la reconnaisance de structures decisionnelles ne suffit pas a attribuer une decision morale au groupe.
Federal systems decide by territorial decentralization who has what power, what sover eignty. The institutions of federalism are ideologically neutral, and serve to decentralize a state or protect ethnic identities within it. Marxists have favored unitary governments, accepting federalism as a means to avoid breakup of the state. Cases of federalism and mixed cases are examined. Secession is usually resisted by force-and in the Third World cannot occur lest the East-West power balance be affected. Federalism has a future!
Interest in conflict prevention blossomed throughout the 1990s, and so did the literature on the subject. Moreover, conflict prevention is rapidly becoming a prominent focus of the new global security and global governance agenda with advocacy of preventive policies by international and regional organizations and nongovernmental actors, and the implementation of conflict prevention within many long-term development and post-conflict assistance programs. Nevertheless, the question of how to move from the rhetoric of conflict prevention to one of institutionalized practice still remains the major concern. Following an overview of conflict prevention in historical and contemporary perspective, this article surveys some of the major themes currently found in the literature on conflict prevention. While there are still skeptical views on the viability, legality, and effectiveness of conflict prevention, some significant strides have already been taken in the direction of creating a new normative international climate that permits increasingly the implementation of preventive action.
Colonialism, imperialism, and neocolonialism are terms that remain undefined despite the enormous literature devoted to the phenomena. Within the academy and without, a critical evaluation of colonialism, imperialism, and neocolonialism is going on-and definition is a pre-requisite for critical evaluation. A model for generating definitions that are logically consistent is offered in this paper. The model first identifies the variables relevant to colonialism and imperialism and then hierarchically orders the variables, with definitions resulting at each level. A procedure by which the definitions may be modified by future research findings is offered. Finally, it is suggested that the relationship between social stratification systems and colonialism and imperialism may be defined through a further articulation of the model presented here.
'Internal colonisation' is a poorly defined term, but no other phrase so accurately captures the full nature of the complex interactions involved. Here the term 'internal colonisation' is used in a broad but quite specific sense, to designate the process by which, on the pretext of 'development', large parts of many Southern states are still in effect being colonised by their own ruling elite. The process parallels in all important respects external colonisation and is in essence the same process, differentiated only by its geographical location. Just as towns formed a key link in colonisation, the use of political power to bring about enclosure and encourage the growth of settlements gives the elite the ability to develop both town and countryside. The urbanisation of the countryside and the expansion of towns are therefore each special cases of the desire to control land and use its capacity to generate wealth. The accelerated growth of urban settlements in the South has, however, serious implications for the environment. Thus the concept of internal colonisation helps explain the distinctive nature of environmental politics in the South.
Territorial secession and dissolution of empire means a challenge to the established system of states. How are the criteria for recognition of new states worked out? How is the gatekeeping to statehood performed? We shall sort out the answers by putting the new post[hyphen]Cold War challenge into historical perspective. It is not only a question of changing criteria of entry to the system of states, but also one of a change in the state system whereby the quest for became meaningful. The question of is therefore intrinsically linked up with the modern evolution of the state system as such. The article is structured in a way that will specify this linkage historically.
Are there any aboriginal rights? If there are, then what kind of rights are they? Are they human rights adapted and shaped to the circumstances of indigenous peoples? Or are they specific cultural rights, exclusive to members of aboriginal societies? In recent liberal political theory, aboriginal rights are often conceived of as cultural rights and thus as group rights. As a result, they are vulnerable to at least three kinds of objections: i) that culture is not a primary good relevant to the currency of egalitarian justice; ii) that group rights are inimical to the moral individualism of liberal democratic societies; and iii) that pandering to group interests provides incentives for abuse and undermines the conditions required for promoting liberal egalitarian outcomes. My argument is that a successful defense of aboriginal rights will tie them to the promotion of the equal freedom of aboriginal people, both in the formal and substantive senses, and thus to improvements in their actual wellbeing, both as `peoples' and individuals. But rights and norms interact in complex ways, and the translation of particular individual and social goods into the language of rights is always fraught with difficulty.
Ethnic violence pervades the news, from Eastern Europe and the SovietRepublics to Sri Lanka, Eritrea, and India. Although some ethnic strugglesconcern issues of domestic political fairness, many involve secessionistclaims. Secessionist demands, unlike claims about domestic political fairness,cannot be satisfied through domestic political reforms. Instead, theyaim to redraw the political boundaries. Because secessionist movements callfor international recognition of the states they seek to create, they necessarilyconcern the world community. The right to secede is a matter of internationallaw.
A review of the main logical questions arising in connection with the notion of a right held by all peoples, focussing on problems of indeterminacy and of inconsistency.
A more extended treatment may also be found in "Rights of peoples: point of view of a logician", in J.Crawford ed., The Rights of Peoples (Oxford University Press, 1988, 69-92).
This article will not directly address this first line of attack. The debate over the universality of liberal ethics has consumed countless volumes of philosophy with no satisfactory conclusion so far? Those who would simply reject current human rights norms as an imposition of the powerful can and do propose a myriad of alternatives. This article will suggest a way that much of the second line of attack can be accommodated under existing notions of individual human rights. In doing so, this article will borrow from the extensive literature that has centered around the ongoing debate between liberal and communitarian philosophies, and particularly from the debate over the rights of cultural minorities. The argument will be about cultural rights, not political ones. Part II of this article will briefly show the importance that cultural rights have had in the development of international human rights standards and how these rights have fallen out of favor. Part III will then attempt to show how they can be resuscitated without changing international law as it now exists. Part IV will apply the standards developed in Part III to the demands of indigenous peoples, the most extensive and developed area of group rights. The conclusion will suggest some advantages and disadvantages of this new perspective.
Human Rights Quarterly 18.4 (1996) 782-813
In November 1995, the draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (draft Declaration) was subjected to a preliminary political reading by a working group of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR Working Group).
Nine years in the making, the current draft Declaration has essentially been the product of a dialogue between indigenous peoples and the five independent legal experts who comprise the Sub-Commission-level Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP). States gradually withdrew from the drafting process, attending in dwindling numbers. However, regrouped at the level of the Commission on Human Rights (Commission or UNCHR), moreover, member states created a new intergovernmental body (the CHR Working Group) with a mandate to "elaborate a draft declaration, considering the draft" which the WGIP group of experts had already prepared and submitted.
Adoption of a declaration on indigenous peoples is one of the goals of the International Decade of the World's Indigenous People (1995-2004). The General Assembly also emphasized the commitment of member states to "promote and protect the rights of indigenous people" in its declaration on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations. As the following account of the first Commission-level debate on the substance of indigenous peoples' rights demonstrates, however, fundamental philosophical issues remain unresolved.
Indigenous people have always enjoyed unrestricted access to meetings of the WGIP, a subsidiary of the UNCHR Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. Indeed, they have outnumbered government representatives by more than ten to one in recent years, and dominated the public debates. Erica-Irene Daes, chair of the WGIP since 1984, observed that the draft Declaration prepared at these sessions "truly reflects the values, beliefs and aspirations of the peoples concerned" and thus "has come to be regarded, by indigenous peoples themselves, as their own."
In contrast, working groups at the level of the Commission on Human Rights customarily do not admit nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) unless the NGOs have obtained consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), a privilege thus far achieved by only twelve indigenous organizations. Although they may participate in public debates, even properly accredited NGOs cannot ordinarily submit formal proposals at drafting sessions, where decisions are taken by a consensus of the participating governments. In principal, any state can veto an objectionable element of the draft.
The Commission's March 1995 decision to divert the draft Declaration to a new, governmental drafting body therefore raised fears about indigenous access and participation. Although the Commission recognized the need to make procedural exceptions, not least in order to legitimize the process, most states were reluctant to open the door quite as wide as WGIP had. As a compromise, the Commission directed interested indigenous peoples to submit special applications to participate in the new drafting body, for screening by the same intergovernmental committee which reviews applications for consultative status with ECOSOC.
The usual administrative delays in notifying indigenous NGOs of the new procedure, together with limitations on the number and variety of NGOs contacted, undoubtedly diminished the number of applications received. In addition, the ECOSOC committee ordinarily does not meet more than once every other year, and its decisions are unavoidably political, since it is comprised of nineteen UN member states. Special provision had to be made to persuade the ECOSOC committee to convene irregular meetings in the summer and fall of 1995, and informal pressure was exerted on the committee by some governments to discourage denials of indigenous applications.
By November 1995, when the first meeting of the new body was scheduled to take place, the consultative status committee had approved forty-five applications, or about half of those which it received. It deferred action on the application of the Ogoni People of Nigeria, at the request of the Government of Nigeria. Three-fourths of the NGOs which were approved represent indigenous peoples in Western states.
Even though the governments' decision to create a new drafting body came in March...
Human Rights Quarterly 21.1 (1999) 80-107
Can a right borne by a group be a human right? For some analysts, the answer is obviously, "No." They argue that human rights are the rights of human beings and, self-evidently, each human being is an individual being. Groups may have rights of some sort, but, whatever those rights might be, they cannot be human rights. Human rights must be rights borne by human individuals.
Other analysts, unimpressed by that simple logic, insist that human rights can take collective as well as individual forms. They argue that much of what is fundamentally important to human beings relates to "goods" and "bads" that people experience collectively rather than individually: if we insist that human rights must be rights that people can hold only as independent individuals, our conception of human rights will not match the social reality of the human condition.
Among those who distinguish between group rights and human rights, a further division is discernible. For some, the reality of the conceptual difference between human rights and group rights does not betoken any antagonism between the two forms of rights. Rather, they regard some group rights, such as the rights of peoples or the rights of cultural minorities, as close complements of human rights. They believe that the reasons that lead us to ascribe rights to individuals are also reasons why we should recognize certain forms of group rights: human rights may be conceptually distinct from group rights, but the two sorts of rights are united by the same underlying values and concerns.
For others, however, the distinction between group rights and human rights is of more than merely analytical significance. They conceive group rights as potential threats to individual rights: group rights are often rights claimed against, or over, individuals. Traditionally, a major purpose of the doctrine of human rights has been to protect individuals from the power of groups, whether or not that power is institutionalized. These theorists contend that revising the doctrine of human rights so that it incorporates group rights entails the risk of defeating that very purpose. Instead of safeguarding individuals against the predations of groups, they argue, a doctrine that legitimates those predations would result.
This article will attempt to clarify these issues by distinguishing between two conceptions of group rights. It will argue that, if one of these concep-tions were to be adopted, there is no case for absorbing group rights within, or assimilating them to, human rights. If, however, the other conception were adopted, some group rights could be conceived as human rights or, at least, as closely akin to human rights. Before embarking on that argument, the general notions of a group right and a human right, as they will be used in this article, need clarification.
A right is a group right only if it is borne by the group qua group. If the individuals who form a group hold rights as separate individuals, their several individual rights do not add up to a group right. For example, scientologists constitute a group whose members might be said to have a right to conduct their lives according to their beliefs (provided that, in doing so, they do not violate the rights of others). In saying that, however, we need not be ascribing a group right to scientologists. Rather, we may be saying only that individuals, including scientologists, have the right to conduct their lives as they choose. Thus, the relevant right is one held by each individual scientologist rather than by scientologists as a collectivity.
In the same way, a right may have a content that relates to a collectivity without its being a group right. An individual can have a right to join a group, such as a trade union, only if there is a group for him to join. Having joined the group, that individual may have rights that he possesses only as a member of the group. In both instances, however, these typically will be rights held in an individual capacity rather than rights that belong to the group. If someone prevents another person from joining the group or prevents an...
Human Rights Quarterly 24.1 (2002) 126-151
Many heralded 1998, which marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as a milestone for universal legal protection of individuals. For others, this anniversary was a time for critical reappraisal of existing human rights instruments and norms. Two pressing issues for critics of existing human rights mechanisms are the lack of progress in promoting universal recognition of group rights and the continued exclusion of indigenous groups from political, economic, and social participation in many parts of the world. For many, the problem lies in the individualistic nature of existing human rights discourse. The concern is that existing instruments emphasize individual needs and entitlements in a way that inadequately compares the collective nature of groups with non-Western world-views and priorities. In this regard the preference of many human rights documents for the language of "populations" and "persons who are members" over the language of "peoples" is one important example of an atomistic bias that does not adequately protect those for whom communal life is vital.
Debate over the limits of existing rights discourse is often pursued within a framework of liberal-individualism versus corporatism. For example, Peter Jones distinguishes two different ways in which a group claim might be incorporated into human rights discourse: 1) as the claim of a collectivity that is ultimately reducible to individual members; or 2) as the claim of a corporate body the reduction of which to constituent members is not possible. Jones, among others, has argued that groups should not be recognized as subjects of human rights that can conflict with and potentially override the claims of individual members. For many proponents of minority claims, however, protecting the ability of groups to determine for themselves the terms on which members interact with outsiders and with one another is an essential part of protecting their right to self-determination and so represents a goal toward which any fight for group recognition must aim. If reducing group claims to those of individuals is incompatible with treating group autonomy as in itself important then liberal-individualist accounts of human rights will be incompatible with not only corporatism but with the political demands of most of the groups actually claiming groups rights around the world.
Local and international rights claims of indigenous peoples often appear as test cases in theoretical discussions of this problem. Indigenous groups tend to practice a political and cultural philosophy in which the connections between individual and group identity are given as much weight as the boundaries. And so their practice seems to offer a good testing group for the theoretical works of both liberal-individualists and corporatists claiming to model their work after indigenous philosophies.
On close examination, however, the ways in which indigenous groups conceive of groups and their relation to respect for individual dignity are not only more complex than the liberal-individualist or corporatist approaches that they have been used to illustrate, but offer a more sophisticated understanding of the relationship between individuals and groups than either theoretical approach. Many indigenous groups emphasize the interdependence of individual and collective claims and gravitate toward solutions such as dual-standing group rights (rights which are predicated of a group but can be claimed by particular members as well as collectivities). As we shall demonstrate below, indigenous peoples generally recognize that collective and individual rights are mutually interactive rather than in competition. Duties of citizenship are grounded in interactions at multiple levels (the host state, indigenous group, and individual members) as are the claims that individuals may make of their governing institutions and of one another.
This practically-grounded perspective on group rights is markedly different from views prevalent in the existing theoretical literature. And, we argue, it offers a more promising avenue for the development of theory in this area. Examining the practical content of indigenous rights claims which have been promoted in several international forums, including the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (UNWGIP) is thus useful for two reasons. First, it allows one to construct a foil of actual group practice against which the adequacy of extant discussions of group rights may be investigated...
This article suggests that viewing the right to self-determination as an enforceable right possibly leading up to secession is no longer tenable, if it ever was. Instead, courts and quasi-judicial tribunals have reconceptualized self-determination as a legal principle rather than a right and have severed the connection with secession. Hence, this article argues that self-determination has been turned into a procedural norm; and this reconceptualization can be defended in terms of republican political theory.
This essay reviews current debates in philosophical liberalism and international law concerning "collective" or group rights and argues that, under certain circumstances, they should be recognized as a means of protecting and preserving ethnic minority cultures from various actions and policies pursued by the states in which they reside. A classification of different ethnic minorities and the rights that adhere to them are suggested. Anthropologists are urged to address rights issues in their writings and provide the ethnographic grounding that is often lacking in discourses on collective rights.
Self-determination conflicts outside the colonial context have previously appeared virtually impossible to settle. Long-running
and very destructive internal armed conflicts have been the result. Since the termination of the Cold War, however, there
has been a veritable wave of self-determination settlements. While some of these trade the claim to secession for internal
autonomy in order to safeguard the territorial unity of the state, a number of innovative solutions have been adopted, going
beyond this traditional approach. This article reviews over 40 settlements and draft settlements in order to identify an emerging
post-modern pattern of practice of settling self-determination disputes. The article also assesses the impact of this practice
on the classical, restrictive understanding of the doctrine of self-determination.
The paper makes the liberal argument for intervening by force to end or prevent serious human rights abuses. It relies on twin assumptions of liberal moral and political theory: that the primary purpose of governments is to protect human rights, and that victims of grievous injustice are entitled to outside help. Humanitarian intervention is legitimate when it is directed at suppressing human rights abuses and complies with the doctrine of double effect. The paper considers and rejects well-known objections: that interventions undermine respect for international law, that interventions are comissive acts and thus more objectionable than non-interventions because these are simple omissions, that humanitarian interventions are objectionable because they kill innocent persons, and that humanitarian interventions undermine global stability. Finally, the paper discusses the libertarian objection that humanitarian interventions are illegitimate because governments do not have the right to send persons to fight for the liberty of foreigners. It concludes that this objections has some force against conscription but not against the use of a voluntary army.
The post-communist space continues to generate new internationally recognized states while incubating unrecognized but de facto states. Recent movement in the Balkans—the independence of Montenegro and the arduous deliberations over Kosovo's future —have variously encouraged other secessionist people and would-be states, particularly in the former Soviet Union. This article analyses the impact of developments in Montenegro and Kosovo on several levels, including: their usage by de facto states; the reactions to them by central governments; Russian policy; and western and intergovernmental responses to these challenges. The article further argues that the Russian position on Kosovo and on the so-called ‘frozen’ or unsettled conflicts neighbouring Russia could ultimately backfire on it. Western policy towards both Kosovo and on the post-Soviet frozen conflicts will be best served by signalling to Russia, irrespective of the exact form of Kosovo's independence, that neither its own interests nor broader western-Russian relations are served by using or reacting to any Kosovo ‘precedent’.
The Ahtisaari comprehensive proposal for a settlement of the status of Kosovo met with deadlock in the UN Security Council. It would neither be endorsed nor imposed upon the parties. In view of that position, a new round of negotiations, conducted by the EU, Russia and the US, was launched over a period of 120 days. During these discussions, Serbia's President Boris Tadic revealed a significant measure of flexibility when putting forwards options for wide-ranging self-government for Kosovo. However, these forward-looking positions were undermined by a less advanced proposal emanating from other parts of the Belgrade government, including the Prime Minister. Moreover, the Serbian parliament sought to preempt developments by unilaterally adopting its own constitutional amendments relating to Kosovo, further undermining the credibility of Serbia's position at the international level. However, it could be argued that had Belgrade been willing to begin the previous round of negotiations let by Martti Ahtisaari with the advanced offers it was putting at the very end of the process, a different outcome might have resulted. Such action might have put pressure on western governments to impose an advanced autonomy settlement on Kosovo, rather than putting Belgrade under pressure to accept the Ahtisaari plan. In the end, Kosovo's independence was unilateral in two senses. On the one hand, Kosovo declared independence without the benefit of agreement from Belgrade or cover from the UN Security Council. On the other hand, Kosovo unilaterally accepted the provisions emanating from the Ahtisaari talks. These concessions had been made in the expectation that agreed independence would be forthcoming in return. Belgrade was therefore able to oppose independence and work against its consolidation, while profiting from Kosovo's agreement to the plan it had rejected.
The Rambouillet process sought to re-establish autonomous governance andhuman rights for Kosovo, under the protection of the international community. However, the Kosovo authorities had committed themselves to outright independence while the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consistently rejected any international interest in the affairs of Kosovo, which it considered an entirely domestic matter. To reconcile these irreconcilable views, an initial attempt was made to establish self-governance for Kosovo for an interim period, without touching upon the issue of the status of that territory.As the Rambouillet conference progressed, the Contact Group moved significantly towards the FRY/Serb demand of expressly confirming its continued sovereignty and territorial integrity over Kosovo. While this and other concessions did not help to engage the FRY in the negotiating process, itjeopardized the acceptance of the agreement by Kosovo. The negotiations werebacked by the threat of the use of force, which could only be innovatively justified by reference to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, inasmuch as there existed no formal Security Council mandate. However, the credibility of that threat was initially undermined by splits within the Contact Group during the actual negotiations, which also extended to implementation of the agreementupon acceptance by NATO. Moreover, the negotiations were hampered by thefact that one of the three principal international negotiators openly sided withone of the parties and essentially represented it. Encouraged by these divisions, Belgrade manoeuvred itself into a position of direct confrontation with NATO, which could now genuinely argue that the grave humanitarian emergency in Kosovo could only be addressed through acceptance of the Rambouilletaccord by Yugoslavia, even if sustained military attacks were required to achieve that end.
This issue of The Monist is devoted to the question of how we should gauge the moral significance of distance. "Moral distance," by analogy with "aesthetic distance," may signify degrees of moral indifference, but that is not the theme we are concerned with here. The problem of distance in morality is not the same as that of moral indifference; it is about boundaries. Journal Article
The legal framework surrounding the construction of the Wall in the occupied Palestinian territory has been extensively discussed
in the context of international politics as well as national jurisprudence. The International Court’s advisory opinion is
meant to be an authoritative statement of law aimed at clarifying this much contested matter. This contribution examines the
court’s treatment of the points of substantive international law applicable to the construction of the Wall and the ensuing
legal consequences. Furthermore, it considers the reaction to the advisory opinion by the Israeli Supreme Court’s decision
in the case of Mara’abe. This contribution concludes that the International Court’s treatment of the legal position in strict terms of legality must
be preferred to the application of balancing tests by the Israeli Supreme Court, especially given the latter’s deficient treatment
of the proportionality test.