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Aristotle's De Anima
Abstract
Aristotle's De anima is the first systematic philosophical account of the soul, which serves to explain the functioning of all mortal living things. In his commentary, Ronald Polansky argues that the work is far more structured and systematic than previously supposed. He contends that Aristotle seeks a comprehensive understanding of the soul and its faculties.
... II 1.412b25-413a2. 33 Polansky (2007) pp. 166-7. ...
... Both the boy and the general are in dunamis with respect to the actual exercise of warfare, but in different ways. See Polansky (2007) pp. 244-5. ...
... I will do so 56 Cf., for example, Aristotle (1999) pp. 166-7, 211;Menn (1994) pp. 100-1; Polansky (2007) pp. 149-50;and Shields (2016) pp. 12 n. ...
... When referring to Polansky (2007), the authors assert various distinctions between Form and Matter in Essence, when they say: "[F]orm (which is Essence) and Matter, [is] the embodiment of the moral virtues within persons". Form and Matter fuse together in what Aristotle calls hylomorphism or "the unity of the two" (Song et al., 2025, p. 7). ...
This article is a commentary on the question of whether or not a definitional drift within the scientific study of forgiveness has hindered its advancement through the development of more precise quantitative assessment tools. For this purpose, the author proposes a tripartite, interdisciplinary model of evaluation, which is (a) philosophically grounded; (b) morally, theologically, and spiritually oriented; and (c) social sciences informed. This expanded exposition of the topic aims to support and enhance the existing construct within the purview of an understanding of Aristotelian Thomism and theological grace.
... Yet, there is more to the Aristotelian approach to understanding Essence. He makes the distinction between Form (which is Essence) and Matter (the embodiment of the moral virtues within persons; Polansky, 2007). Form and Matter fuse together in what Aristotle calls hylomorphism or the unity of the two. ...
Over twenty-five years ago, Enright et al. (1998) challenged scholars regarding the social scientific study of forgiveness. They used the term “definitional drift” to anticipate that the definition of forgiveness would undergo changes to such an extent that perhaps the construct of forgiveness would become distorted. That prediction has come true as there are myriad definitions of forgiveness, with the lament by some scholars that the lack of clarity regarding the definition of forgiveness is hindering scientific advancement in this important field. To clear up the confusion regarding what the essence of forgiveness is, we use the philosophical method of Aristotelian classical realism to define forgiveness. We then examine eight different views in the published literature, starting from 2013 and working up to 2023, to show the divergence, and actual philosophical errors, regarding what scholars are saying about what forgiveness is. Those eight conceptualizations of forgiveness include the following: (1) forgiveness as a split between decisions and emotions; (2) forgiveness as centered on the regulation of emotions only; (3) forgiveness as reducing only in negative reactions (whether that is affect, cognition, behavior, or any combination of these); (4) forgiveness as a split between state and trait characteristics; (5) forgiveness as motivational aspects only; (6) forgiving situations such as tornadoes; (7) other categories rarely specified; and (8) comprehensive forgiveness: reductions in negative affect, cognition, and behavior and the increase in positive aspects of these toward the offender. The philosophical errors are critiqued, and the way forward is suggested.
... 37 Cf. Scaltsas (1996), Miller (1999), Caston (2004), Polansky (2007). 38 The literalist interpretation has been advanced in Sorabji (1971) and defended in Sorabji (1992), (2001) and Everson (1997). ...
I propose a revision of the received lexicography of μεσότης with regard to Plato’s and Aristotle’s use of the word. In their works, μεσότης never indicates something that merely ‘lies in the middle’, and rather hints at what establishes a reason-grounded, ἀναλογία-like relationship between two extremes. Particularly controversial occurrences of the word μεσότης are connected to the introduction of Aristotle’s ethical and perceptual doctrines of the mean, in Nicomachean Ethics II and De Anima II.12. In this regard, I shall briefly mention some promising directions of inquiry that seem worthy of further investigation.
... This was certainly largely understood within natural science or physics, especially in terms of the distinction between motion (kinêsis) and activity (energeia) in On the Soul 3.7 (431a4-7), where perception is considered an activity rather than a motion (Polansky, 2007, xii, referring to Burnyeat, 1995. Other interpretations, also important here, concentrate on the hylomorphic (matter + form) unity of soul and body and the relationship between the soul as actualization (entelecheia) of the natural body (sôma physikon)-the body being also interpreted as "instrumental" or "tool-like" or "equipped with tool-like parts" (that is, with organs; organikon) beyond being Stanciu . ...
The new approach in cognitive science largely known as “4E cognition” (embodied/embedded/enactive/extended cognition), which sheds new light on the complex dynamics of human consciousness, seems to revive some of Aristotle's views. For instance, the concept of “nature” ( phusis ) and the discussion on “active intellect” ( nous poiêtikos ) may be particularly relevant in this respect. Out of the various definitions of “nature” in Aristotle's Physics, On the Parts of Animals and Second Analytics , I will concentrate on nature defined as an inner impulse to movement, neither entirely “corporeal,” nor entirely “incorporeal,” and neither entirely “substantial,” nor entirely “accidental.” Related to that, I will consider the distinction in On the Soul between the “active” and the “passive” intellect, which Aristotle asserted as generally present in “nature” itself. By offering a conceptual and historical analysis of these views, I intend to show how the mind–body problem, which is essential for the explanation of consciousness, could be somewhat either eluded or transcended by both ancients and contemporaries on the basis of a subtle account of causation. While not attempting to diminish the impact of the Cartesian paradigm, which led to the so-called “hard problem of consciousness,” I suggest that the most recent neuroscience discoveries on the neurophysiological phenomena related to human consciousness could be better explained and understood if interpreted within a 4E cognition paradigm, inspired by some Aristotelian views.
... Aristotle wrote about the concept of "becoming aware of what is like itself". The most striking examples to assert this assumption are given by Empedocles: "For by earth, we see earth, by water, water,… we see love by love, and strife by mournful strife" [30]. It is inevitable to see in Empedocles' examples the connection with empathy and how they navigate between "being and becoming". ...
The power of the imagination ( al - khayāl ) is decisive to the constitution of Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī’s virtuous city. The imagination enables the citizens of the virtuous city to effectively distinguish between certain images as a necessary means to attaining happiness. The imagination is cultivated through a regimen of civic education which prepares citizens to engage in political deliberation. The realization of the virtuous city is determined by the exercise of the imagination beginning with the philosopher-ruler-imām who receives and translates intelligibles ( ma‘qūlāt ) from the Active Intellect into images ( muḥākāt ) communicated to the political community. In what follows, we shall seek to demonstrate how the power of the imagination contributes to al-Fārābī’s cosmopolitical imaginary and the inception of his cosmopolitanism.
My aim in this paper is to examine Aristotle’s assertion in De Anima 1.3, 406b1-3 that the soul engages in the same motion as the body, focusing particularly on the puzzle and contentious phrase at 406b2, κατὰ τὸ σῶµα . By clarifying Aristotle’s specific notion of sameness and the argument’s context, I will attempt to demonstrate that it is still possible to defend the traditional interpretation of the phrase κατὰ τὸ σῶµα without emending the text. As I shall show, Aristotle’s assertion here is neither a repetition of his previous major premise nor an inappropriate generalization that hinders him from reaching a further conclusion. Instead, it serves as a crucial step in demonstrating the incoherence of the Platonic view, which posits that the soul is essentially a self- moving entity.
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind is an annual publication of some of the most cutting-edge work in the philosophy of mind. The themes covered in this fourth volume are twenty-first-century idealism, acquaintance and perception, and acquaintance and consciousness. It also contains a book symposium on David Chalmers’ Reality+, and a historical article on Aristotle’s philosophy of mind.
This research examines such attributes of divine perfection as ‘knowing’, ‘wise’, ‘real’ (in its substantive and etymological similarity with the concept of ‘true’) and ‘living’ (also in its semantic similarity with the term ‘life’). According to al-Farabi, these attributes have no underlying causes for their appearance, since there is nothing that could precede the First himself. Since these attributes are attributes of perfection and by their nature, definition and characteristics belong to the First, that is, they express the very perfection of the First, and then these attributes do not have any basis for their appearance. The very basis of their existence is their belonging to the First, as qualities of a descriptive and at the same time substantive nature. So here, al-Farabi describes these attributes based on the very pre-existence of the First as such. Al-Farabi describes the above-mentioned qualities of being the First in paragraphs 7-10 of his On the Perfect State. In these four paragraphs, al-Farabi gives the most general describing of the perfection of God, referring to the attributes of an existential and cognitive nature that are a priori inherent in the divine nature of the First Being. This means that the existence of the First is determined, first, by the existence of those attributes that, in a fundamental sense, indicate its original and unconditional perfection. Key words: the First, perfection, omniscient beginning, true being, divine attributes.
Objectivism about perceptible qualities like colors and sounds is the view that perceptible qualities are ontologically and conceptually independent from perception. We ordinarily think of Aristotle as an objectivist about perceptible qualities – even the arch-objectivist. Yet this consensus has long been threatened by various thorny passages, including especially De anima III.2, 425b26–426a28, which appear to suggest that Aristotle is no objectivist, but a subjectivist. I show that recent attempts to make sense of these passages by appeal to Aristotle’s three-stage distinction between first potentiality, second potentiality/first actuality, and second actuality commit Aristotle to a subjectivism that he cannot consistently endorse. I argue for an alternative that vindicates Aristotle’s objectivism.
أهداف الدراسة: من أهم أهداف هذه الدراسة محاولة ترجيح المسلك الردي المادي في تفسير الطبيعة الوجودية للظواهر الذهنية على غيره من المسالك الفلسفية، وهو ترجيح قائم، أولاً، على قراءة معينة لتصور أرسطو لعلاقة النفس بالبدن، وثانياً، على عدم كفاية التفسير الوظيفي للظواهر الذهنية والخاصية الكيفية التي تنسب إليها، وثالثاً، على ملاحظة وجود خلل في الافتراضات الأساسية التي استندت إليها الاعتراضات الفلسفية الرئيسة التي وجهت إلى المدرسة الردية، ورابعاً، على ملاحظات فلسفة الأعصاب ونتائج علم الأعصاب، وعلم الأعصاب المعرفي، وعلم النفس العصبي السلوكي، وعلم أعصاب الشبكة، وعلم الأحياء العصبية، وعلم النفس. المنهج المتبع: تقوم منهجية الدراسة على النظر الفلسفي القبلي مدعوماً بنتائج العلم التجريبي البعدي وتفسيراته ومسترشداً بها. ولا تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى ترجيح الموقف الردي المادي على غيره من المواقف اللا ردية فحسب، بل أيضاً إلى تزويد القارئ العربي بنبذة عن مختلف المدارس الفلسفية في حقل فلسفة الذهن وتعريفه بما استجد من نتائج الأبحاث العلمية حول طبيعة العلاقة ما بين الظواهر الذهنية والعمليات العصبية والحيوية الكيميائية. النتائج: تعد طبيعة العلاقة بين الظواهر الذهنية والعمليات والنظم العصبية الكيميائية الحيوية من أهم المسائل المطروحة في فلسفة الذهن وربما أكثرها إثارة للجدل؛ إذ ذهب أتباع المدرسة الردية المادية إلى اتحادهما وعدم تغايرهما، بينما ذهب أتباع الرؤية الثنائية واللا ردية إلى تغايرهما وعدم إمكانية رد الظواهر الذهنية رداً مادياً صرفاً.
In Xingxue cushu, Aleni devotes himself to elucidating Aristotle’s theory of perception as presented in De Anima and Parva Naturalia. The challenge in this endeavor lies in understanding the essence of Aristotle’s perception, with physicalism and spiritualism holding opposite positions. To reconcile this contradiction, some scholars approach it from the perspective of dualism and the impurity principle. Nevertheless, these interpretations fail to resolve the inherent dilemma of perception. This article employs the pattern of combination and separation to propose that Aleni’s interpretation of this dilemma is effective and clarifies the controversy. Perception encompasses both psychological and physical dimensions, and the two are based on each other in the process of actualization. Nonetheless, psychological and physical activities are separated in the definition. Influenced by Confucianism, Aleni associates human perception with morality, further emphasizing the necessity of definitional separation.
In the ethical texts, Aristotle claims that all instances of choice ( prohairesis ) must be preceded by deliberation, but it is not clear why he believes this. This paper offers an explanation of that commitment, drawing heavily from the De Anima and showing that the account emerging from there complements that of the ethical texts. The view is that the deliberative faculty has the capacity to manipulate reasons combinatorially, while the perceptual/desiderative faculty does not, and choice requires the combinatorial manipulation of reasons.
This is a case report of one patient experiencing psychotic symptoms in the setting of Charles Bonnet syndrome (CBS). Case description is included, and patient has been deidentified. Patient’s consent could not be obtained for the submission of the report. The case report focuses on understanding and formulating key psychological issues addressed in this case. It is important to identify that the absence of psychotic illness is classical in patients presenting with psychotic symptoms in CBS and the role of antipsychotic medication is uncertain. A literature review on the management of CBS guidelines published across the world and summarization of the management approach applicable to this case. Visual hallucination is a perception of a visual stimuli when none exists. CBS is characterized by the presence of complex visual hallucinations experienced by the visually impaired, i.e., in an individual with ocular pathology causing vision loss without having true psychosis or dementia. Furthermore, the person having these experiences has a preserved insight into the unreal nature of the perceptions and the absence of mental disorders. An introduction to the terminology “atypical CBS” or “CBS plus” was done to consider visual hallucinations in individuals with low level of insight in a setting of possible cognitive deficits or other hallucinatory modalities.
Este artículo examina la posición de Aristóteles frente a la teoría del alma como entidad automotriz a la luz de una concepción menos negativa de la discusión de Aristóteles con sus predecesores. Para ello, exploro la hipótesis de que Aristóteles está produciendo los conceptos necesarios para su propia investigación a través de una crítica de la tesis de Platón. Muestro que, más que a una crítica, a lo que asistimos es a un proceso de apropiación conceptual en el que Aristóteles filtra la opinión para hacer un mejor uso de ella. Para fundamentar mi argumento, muestro cómo funciona el dispositivo exegético de Aristóteles y cómo podría conectarse en su propio procedimiento definicional del libro II del De Anima.
The article continues our study of the reception of aristotelian psychology in the philosophy of the greatest thinker of classical Islam — Ibn Sina (Avicenna, 980– 1037), which has been begun in this journal (2021, No. 4). Endowing aristotelism with an immortological dimension, the Muslim philosopher transforms hylemorphism into entelechism, justiϐies the substantiality of the soul, its incorporeality and incorruptibility. In avicennian reconstruction of aristotelian treatise “On the Soul” primary attention is paid to criticism of the opinions on the soul as harmony or mixture, as well as to the interpretation of Stagirite’s thesis about the non-magnitudeness of mind in a sense of assertion about soul’s immateriality resulting from its status as a substratum of intelligibles. The article also highlights Ibn-Sina’s modiϐication of the relevant statements regarding the organs of the rational soul.
Aristotle is more straightforward than his interpreters. A number of scholars have championed an Aristotle guided by pure inductive observation to reach a theory of the inferiority of women and slaves. This view, however, is contrary both to Aristotle’s expressed method and his stated purpose. He begins from the phainomena and his explicit goal is to defend them and the advantages of master and husband. The current power structure is founded on nature and is and must be logically and genetically superior to the arguments he makes in its favor. In general, scholars have explicated either the argument about slaves or that about women. However, each is inescapably fettered to the other. The unquestioned inferiority of slaves is the analogical basis for the hierarchy of male over female (e.g. 1252a31). The unquestioned natural inferiority of women the basis of the proof of the existence of the natural slave (54b12-16). Aristotle reveals the uncertain heart of his argument in a series of unanswered rhetorical questions (59b23-37). There are three parts to his defense. The philosophical move is to reject Plato’s unity of virtue. Mere difference in quantity (Plato’s solution) provides contingent not absolute rule. The teleological move argues from different virtues to different essences for women and slaves. Aristotle creates separate entities to be ruled. The rhetorical move is to blend analogies based on the “natural” difference between male and female with the hierarchical difference between master and slave. Thus we reach the master trope of Western philosophy: man is spirit/culture, woman is matter/nature. A series of misreadings of Aristotle’s purposes and arguments reveal how successful he has been in anchoring ideology in a politicized nature. Philosophy is not a purely intellectual exercise; it is also a call to moral action. We must ask and answer Aristotle’s rhetorical questions.
This article focuses on the treatise De immortalitate animae (Paris, 1491) written by Guillaume Houppelande, one of the most famous members of the Faculty of Theology of the University of Paris in the fifteenth century. Houppelande’s treatise, which refers to ancient, patristic, and medieval sources, contains several arguments on the immortality of the soul. Special attention is first given to Houppelande’s attitude towards those philosophical and theological theories that supported his own arguments before focus is turned towards an analysis of Houppelande’s relationship to medieval philosophy.
Este texto presenta la traducción española anotada de Temistio, In libros Aristotelis De Anima paraphrasis 98.12-109.3 (ed. Heinze), las páginas que dedica a su interpretación del “intelecto agente” en el marco de la noética de Aristóteles. En la primera parte del artículo se ofrecen algunos datos biográficos de Temistio, se explica brevemente el método de la paráfrasis por él empleado y se considera su aporte general al complejísimo problema que presenta Aristóteles en De anima III.5 en la distinción entre el intelecto que lo es por llegar a ser todas las cosas y el que lo es por llegar a producirlas a todas. Este estudio también suministra una breve discusión del significado de la distinción “intelecto agente-paciente” en Aristóteles y procura aclarar cuál es la posición adoptada por Temistio al respecto, haciendo hincapié en sus desarrollos constructivos de la noética aristotélica.
p>In Historia animalium VIII 1.588a18 ff., Aristotle describes the cognitive powers of non-human animals as sketches of human cognitive powers. According to the wording he chooses here, the cognitive powers of non-human animals are “traces” or “footprints” (ἴχνη, 588a19) of human ones. In this paper I explore the conceptual framework that lays behind this image, in order to show that it is much more than a rhetorical figure, and that Aristotle’s wording encompasses a whole articulated theory, whose details are set out in De anima and the Parva naturalia . Moreover, I try to clarify some technicalities of the scientific model he devises in order to explain certain features of the sensory-perceptual part of the soul (with particular attention to the perception of the so-called “common” and “incidental” sensory items) that bear a real analogy to the functions of reason and intellect, and that can consequently be considered their precursors.</p
El siguiente artículo se propone realizar una revisión crítica de la interpretación “mentalista” de Aristóteles, específicamente, del minucioso trabajo de Victor Caston en torno a De anima III.2. Se mostrará que su lectura, parcialmente enmarcada en el problema de la percepción/conciencia de primer o segundo orden, puede llegar a obscurecer los términos en los que el propio Aristóteles pensó el problema de la percepción (y, en buena medida, obscurecer el problema mismo). Los diferentes argumentos examinados conducirán a cuestionar, de la mano de otros autores inmersos en distintos contextos interpretativos del De anima, los dogmas modernos que inevitablemente condicionan nuestra comprensión de Aristóteles.
Aristotle’s visual theory plays a pivotal role in De Anima, he specifically analyzes three fundamental elements required for visual activities, namely, color, transparent substance, and light. Color moves and limits transparent substance, thereby transforming transparent substance from potentiality to actuality through light. However, there is a debate between Physicalism and Spiritualism as to the specific implementation of the visual activity. Through the intertwined mechanism, Aristotle’s theory of vision can be clarified. The visual activity is neither purely psychological nor purely physical, it is the “psycho-physical” intertwined mechanism. This is why Aristotle’s visual theory is closely related to contemporary visual psychology.
This chapter considers Sappho of Lesbos an early philosopher of time. It compares the use of temporal markers, especially “now” (nun) in Sappho’s poetry to Aristotle’s usage of the same term in the context of his treatise on time in Physics IV.10–14. Likewise, it looks at Aristotle’s analysis of phantasia in De Anima III and in the Parva Naturalia as well as Eva Stehle’s reading of Sappho’s Tithonos poem to suggest ways that both Aristotle and Sappho account for an ability to experience the past, what was “once” (pota), in the present, now. The chapter concludes that Sappho, like Aristotle, was a thinker primarily engaged with the existence and experience of natural beings and, as such, of the ways natural beings primarily act and interact with each other in the world. From such an engagement developed a theory of time. Sappho may have been a hidden influence on Aristotle’s understanding of the relationship between being, beings, and time; nevertheless, her poetry is instructive to all of us still grappling with these issues today.
En este trabajo se presenta una interpretación sobre la célebre distinción entre el intelecto activo y el intelecto pasivo en De anima III, 5, a partir de “otra modesta propuesta”. Para ello, se expone el núcleo fundamental de esa reciente propuesta, que identifica el intelecto activo con el hábito de los principios y con el contenido de los primeros principios. A continuación, se ponen de manifiesto algunas objeciones a dicha interpretación y, finalmente, se analizan las notas o características del intelecto activo presentes en el texto de Aristóteles. El propósito de este artículo consiste en mostrar una posible comprensión del intelecto activo de Aristóteles, con la intención de que se convierta en una “aún más modesta propuesta”.
This essay challenges the dismissal of nationalist politics in readings of Ulysses by reconnecting the “Cyclops” episode to the aporias of modern political thought. Drawing from Joyce’s neglected notes to the episode, it relocates anticolonial nationalism within the diremption and mutual implication of civil society and state, first articulated by G. W. F. Hegel and developed by Hannah Arendt. The essay rereads Hegel’s state/society diremption through Gillian Rose’s conception of “speculative thinking” and the historical openness of the “broken middle.” It argues that “Cyclops” generates a dynamic interpretative space in which other configurations of the social and political in the nation might be registered. In a contemporary moment when legality and constitutionality are under attack in the name of nationalist populism, this reading suggests an alternative to frameworks that conceive of law only as violence.
In aansluiting by en betekenisvol bydraend tot die internasionale navorsing op hierdie terrein, bied hierdie groot werk (in twee volumes) ’n deeglike oorsig oor en oorspronklike insig in die Middeleeuse denke. Toeganklik ook vir die algemene leser, is dit van onskatbare betekenis vir die Afrikaanse teologie en filosofie, taal en kultuur.
In aansluiting by en betekenisvol bydraend tot die internasionale navorsing op hierdie terrein, bied hierdie groot werk ’n deeglike oorsig oor en oorspronklike insig in die Middeleeuse denke. Toeganklik ook vir die algemene leser, is dit van onskatbare betekenis vir die Afrikaanse teologie en filosofie, taal en kultuur.
This book reflects the lively international character of Aristotelian studies, drawing contributors from across the globe, and including a preponderance of authors from the University of Oxford, which has been a center of Aristotelian studies for many centuries. It explores the broad range of activity Aristotelian studies comprise today, including the primarily textual and philological to the application of broadly Aristotelian themes to contemporary problems irrespective of their narrow textual fidelity. In between these extremes one finds the core of Aristotelian scholarship as it is practiced today, and as it is primarily represented in this volume: textual exegesis and criticism. Even within this more limited core activity, one witnesses a rich range of pursuits, with some scholars seeking primarily to understand Aristotle in his own philosophical milieu and others seeking rather to place him into direct conversation with contemporary philosophers and their present-day concerns. The book, prefaced with an introduction to Aristotle's life and works by the editor, covers the main areas of Aristotelian philosophy and intellectual enquiry: ethics, metaphysics, politics, logic, language, psychology, rhetoric, poetics, theology, physical and biological investigation, and philosophical method. It also looks both backwards and forwards: two articles recount Aristotle's treatment of earlier philosophers, who proved formative to his own orientations and methods, and another three chart the long afterlife of Aristotle's philosophy: in Late Antiquity, in the Islamic World, and in the Latin West.
In this paper I discuss passage 403a10-16 from Aristotle’s De Anima. In this passage Aristotle deals with whether the soul could be separate from the body and presents an analogy with geometrical entities. This passage is highly obscure and it presents many textual difficulties. The interpretation I offer resolves the textual problems without requiring emendations to the text as many commentators suggest.
It is now common to explain some of incidental perception’s features by means of a different capacity, called phantasia . Phantasia , usually translated as ‘imagination,’ is thought to explain how incidental perception can be false and representational by being a constitutive part of perception. Through a close reading of De Anima 3.3, 428b10–29a9, I argue against this and for perception first : phantasia is always a product of perception, from which it initially inherits all its characteristics. No feature of perception is explained directly by phantasia , and phantasia is never a part of perception. Phantasia is not imagination or representation, as many have thought, but perception-like appearance. Aristotle thus recognizes alongside three different types of perception three different types of perception-like appearance.
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that both character and reason are responsible for delimiting and implementing the moral actions. The Aristotelian text, nonetheless, brings several exegetical and philosophical issues when one tries to determine exactly which are the roles played by character and reason in moral actions. There is a set of passages in the Nicomachean Ethics in which Aristotle apparently defends the following distribution of roles: the character is responsible for adopting the moral goals while reason has under its responsibility the task of determining how to achieve the goals. This distribution of roles, however, is problematic. It ascribes the role of adopting the moral goals to a capacity that Aristotle classifies as non-rational; furthermore, it restricts the role of reason to find the “means” to achieve those goals. However, in other passages, Aristotle seems to argue in favour of a different distribution of tasks. In such passages, the character is under the sway of reason, which is presented as the character's guide to moral issues. Aristotle's formulations seem to reveal a certain inconsistency in the distribution of roles between character and reason. In this thesis, I investigate Aristotle’s different formulations with respect to the roles played by character and reason in the performance of moral actions. I defend that, in a virtuously structured soul, reason plays the role of guiding character in regard to the goals to be pursued.
In NE III.10, 1118b1–3, Aristotle says that the “most shared of the senses is that according to which intemperance [comes about], and it would seem justifiably to be shameful, because it inheres [in us] not insofar as we are human beings, but insofar as we are animals”. This statement appears to describe the sense of touch as shameful. This may seem like a strange position for Aristotle to hold, since elsewhere he describes human touch as the most accurate among animal species, which corresponds to our superior intelligence, and as necessary for animal life. In this paper, I argue that Maimonides nevertheless succeeds in showing that Aristotle has a strong theoretical reason for maintaining that the sense of touch is shameful. Maimonides shows that, based on principles of Aristotelian psychology, human touch is indeed shameful because it obstructs intellectual activity.
Este ensayo sostiene que uno de los desafíos más apremiantes que debe enfrentar una psicología de inspiración peripatética es el de conservar la relevancia causal del alma en los tres órdenes del cambio físico (traslación, alteración y crecimiento), sin hacer de ella un “motor” interno que desplace al organismo por hallarse en continuidad con él. En caso de no sortear con éxito este escollo, tal psicología no podrá afirmar que el alma sea un ítem inextenso e impasible, sino (a lo sumo) un cuerpo sutil que desplaza a otro más grosero. Mittelmann propone una lectura conjunta de los tratados de Alejandro y Aristóteles acerca del alma, con el fin de presentar la estrategia de Alejandro como un modo exitoso de hacer frente a esa dificultad patente. Según Mittelmann, Alejandro hallaría en los “estados disposicionales” de Aristóteles el paradigma apropiado para concebir la eficacia causal de las formas. Aquellos podrían oficiar de motores inmóviles en la medida en que reúnen una doble condición, que ni las formas platónicas ni los cuerpos sutiles pueden satisfacer: por una parte, su carácter incorpóreo no los convierte en substancias (separadas); por otra, su carácter inseparable no los convierte en cuerpos que desplacen a otros cuerpos por hallarse en contacto con ellos.
Aristotle's theory of perception is complicated by the fact that he recognizes three kinds of perceptible object: special, common, and incidental, all of which have different levels of reliability. Focusing on De Anima 3.3, 428b17–25, this paper discusses why these three sorts of perception are true and false. It argues that perceptions of special objects can be false because of the blind-spot phenomenon and that common objects are typically perceived as predicated of an incidental object. This helps explain why perceptions of common objects are the most error prone. The paper ends with a suggestion about the importance of predicational perception for Aristotle's epistemology.
Aristotle's study of the natural world plays a tremendously important part in his philosophical thought. He was very interested in the phenomena of motion, causation, place and time, and teleology, and his theoretical materials in this area are collected in his Physics, a treatise of eight books which has been very influential on later thinkers. This volume of new essays provides cutting-edge research on Aristotle's Physics, taking into account recent changes in the field of Aristotle in terms of its understanding of key concepts and preferred methodology. The contributions reassess the key concepts of the treatise (including nature, chance, teleology, art, and motion), reconstruct Aristotle's methods for the study of nature, and determine the boundaries of his natural philosophy. Because of the foundational nature of Aristotle's Physics itself, the volume will be a must-read for all scholars working on Aristotle.
Aristotle's study of the natural world plays a tremendously important part in his philosophical thought. He was very interested in the phenomena of motion, causation, place and time, and teleology, and his theoretical materials in this area are collected in his Physics, a treatise of eight books which has been very influential on later thinkers. This volume of new essays provides cutting-edge research on Aristotle's Physics, taking into account recent changes in the field of Aristotle in terms of its understanding of key concepts and preferred methodology. The contributions reassess the key concepts of the treatise (including nature, chance, teleology, art, and motion), reconstruct Aristotle's methods for the study of nature, and determine the boundaries of his natural philosophy. Because of the foundational nature of Aristotle's Physics itself, the volume will be a must-read for all scholars working on Aristotle.
Aristotle's study of the natural world plays a tremendously important part in his philosophical thought. He was very interested in the phenomena of motion, causation, place and time, and teleology, and his theoretical materials in this area are collected in his Physics, a treatise of eight books which has been very influential on later thinkers. This volume of new essays provides cutting-edge research on Aristotle's Physics, taking into account recent changes in the field of Aristotle in terms of its understanding of key concepts and preferred methodology. The contributions reassess the key concepts of the treatise (including nature, chance, teleology, art, and motion), reconstruct Aristotle's methods for the study of nature, and determine the boundaries of his natural philosophy. Because of the foundational nature of Aristotle's Physics itself, the volume will be a must-read for all scholars working on Aristotle.
Aristotle's study of the natural world plays a tremendously important part in his philosophical thought. He was very interested in the phenomena of motion, causation, place and time, and teleology, and his theoretical materials in this area are collected in his Physics, a treatise of eight books which has been very influential on later thinkers. This volume of new essays provides cutting-edge research on Aristotle's Physics, taking into account recent changes in the field of Aristotle in terms of its understanding of key concepts and preferred methodology. The contributions reassess the key concepts of the treatise (including nature, chance, teleology, art, and motion), reconstruct Aristotle's methods for the study of nature, and determine the boundaries of his natural philosophy. Because of the foundational nature of Aristotle's Physics itself, the volume will be a must-read for all scholars working on Aristotle.
Aristotle's study of the natural world plays a tremendously important part in his philosophical thought. He was very interested in the phenomena of motion, causation, place and time, and teleology, and his theoretical materials in this area are collected in his Physics, a treatise of eight books which has been very influential on later thinkers. This volume of new essays provides cutting-edge research on Aristotle's Physics, taking into account recent changes in the field of Aristotle in terms of its understanding of key concepts and preferred methodology. The contributions reassess the key concepts of the treatise (including nature, chance, teleology, art, and motion), reconstruct Aristotle's methods for the study of nature, and determine the boundaries of his natural philosophy. Because of the foundational nature of Aristotle's Physics itself, the volume will be a must-read for all scholars working on Aristotle.
Come sottolineano Clemens Sedmak e Małgorzata Bogaczyk-Vormayr nella loro introduzione a Patristik und Resilienz (Berlin 2012), la resilienza umana deve essere intesa come la capacità di cambiare sé stessi in risposta a una crisi, non già di tornare a un punto di partenza (Einleitung, 3). Dopo una parte introduttiva sui diversi significati e aspetti della resilienza, questo articolo discute alcuni testi di Cipriano di Cartagine (De mortalitate, AdDemetrianum, De bono patientiae, De dominica oratione) e Gregorio di Nazianzo (Or. 26, Ep. 223, 30-36, 92) che possono essere di qualche interesse per l’attuale discussione sulla resilienza. Entrambi gli autori, infatti, partendo dalla medesima prospettiva escatologica, sembrano condividere una dinamica nozione di resilienza, che non è una mera sopportazione delle avversità, ma la capacità di trasformare una situazione negativa in unarisorsa esistenziale.
This article provides a new account of the role of phantasia, imagination, in Aristotle's political thought. Phantasia plays a key role in Aristotle's psychology and is crucial for explaining any kind of movement and action. I argue that this insight holds for collective actions as well. By offering a reconsideration of the famous “Wisdom of the Multitude” passage, this article shows that the capacity of a multitude to act together is tied to its ability to share a collective phantasma: a mental representation of the practical end or goal of their collective effort as good and thus worthy of pursuit. However, I argue that given the subjective nature of phantasia, acting together can be hard. I conclude that since one's phantasia is shaped by one's moral character, a community can achieve a shared phantasma—and thus secure collective action—by means of persuasion, habituation, and education.
In the de Anima, Aristotle outlines a theory of perception. In de Anima II, 5-12, he considers the basic kinds of sensory perception — seeing, hearing, touching, tasting and smelling. He uses a few basic elements, viz., the five senses and their proper, common and incidental objects, and a few explanatory principles to explain sensory perception. In de Anima III, 1–2, Aristotle turns to apperception, viz. perceptual selfawareness. He considers several basic cases of apperception – the selfconscious awareness of occurrent perceptions and the awareness that the objects of different senses are different.
Etude de la conception de l'odeur et de l'odorat developpee par Aristote dans le traite «De anima» (II, 9). Definissant les sens par leur objet propre, Aristote tente de distinguer les differentes sortes d'odeurs par analogie avec les differentes sortes de saveurs propres au gout. L'A. montre que, contrairement au gout, l'odorat est un sens mediat dans la methodologie mixte d'Aristote
L'A. montre que la doctrine de la separation de l'intellect et du corps constitue une exception par rapport aux principes generaux d'Aristote, et en particulier de l'hylemorphisme. Partant du probleme de la perception, l'A. montre que l'intellect est capable de recevoir n'importe quel objet, qu'il est sans forme et separable du corps. L'A. examine les tensions que cela engendre chez Aristote, concernant la distinction entre âme active et âme passive, en particulier, cette derniere retablissant un rapport necessaire avec le corps
Etude de la relation entre l'activite cognitive et l'alteration materielle dans la theorie psychologique developpee par Aristote dans le «De anima». L'A. mesure la role de l'alteration materielle dans le fonctionnement de la perception chez l'animal en general et dans le fonctionnement de la pensee chez l'homme en particulier
How might bioethics take account of cultural diversity? Can practical wisdom of an Aristotelian sort be applied across cultures? After showing that practical wisdom involves both intellectual cleverness and moral virtue, it is argued that both these components have universality. Hence practical wisdom must be universal as well. Hellenic ethical thought neither depended on outdated theoretical notions nor limited itself to the Greek world, but was in fact developed with constant awareness of cultural differences, so it arguably works as well in other times and places when formulated. Even the eudaemonistic setting for practical wisdom is unproblematic.