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Conflict, Negotiation and European Union Enlargement
Abstract
Each wave of expansion of the European Union has led to political tensions and conflict. Existing members fear their membership privileges will diminish and candidates are loath to concede the expected benefits of membership. Despite these conflicts, enlargement has always succeeded - so why does the EU continue to admit new states even though current members might lose from their accession? Combining political economy logic with statistical and case study analyses, Christina J. Schneider argues that the dominant theories of EU enlargement ignore how EU members and applicant states negotiate the distribution of enlargement benefits and costs. She explains that EU enlargement happens despite distributional conflicts if the overall gains of enlargement are redistributed from the relative winners among existing members and applicants to the relative losers. If the overall gains from enlargement are sufficiently great, a redistribution of these gains will compensate losers, making enlargement attractive for all states.
... The main idea of the EU is to develop political and economic stability so that the expansion of the territory is considered as a necessity to give more benefit to the members by integrating more countries in the region into the institutional framework. Hence, in looking at the status of Bulgaria's membership under the help of CVM, it is essential to see it using the gains of EU enlargement (Schneider, 2009). ...
... Furthermore, regarding the expansion of the EU in the political aspect, the use of gains of EU enlargement would be more profitable when compared to the benefits in economics. The contemporary EU regionalism currently argues that limiting the acceptance of developing countries into institutions is considered to pose a severe threat, that is detrimental to EU political stability (Schneider, 2009). Migration due to poverty, crime, and the risk of conflict and war will be considered for further expansion. ...
... In the Gains of EU Enlargement, consideration after the dissolution of the USSR in acceptance of Bulgaria's membership would provide an absolute political advantage to the institution. Schneider (2009) argues that ignoring unstable countries in the region can pose a severe threat to the EU's political stability. Migration due to poverty, crime, the risk of conflict, and war will become the primary considerations in seeing the existence of Bulgaria. ...
This research aimed to describe the political map of the European Union (EU) in expanding its territory after the fall of the Berlin Wall. EU never granted membership status with special assistance to any country before. However, Bulgaria had received special membership assistance called the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM). The granting of this membership status was controversial because it was given when Euroscepticism was on its peak. Member countries such as the United Kingdom, Netherlands, and Germany considered that granting different membership status to fulfill the EU’s standards would aggravate the institutional performance. This case employed The Gains Of EU Enlargement to analyze what interests the EU wanted to gain in providing CVM assistance to Bulgaria. This approach explained, the EU wants to accelerate the Europeanization process of Bulgaria to reach the stabilization of European region security both internally and externally. However, external interests dominate the most, in order that EU can control the influence of Russia to Bulgaria. So, Bulgaria’s membership makes Russia unable to use its former ally as a propaganda tool to interfere in European affairs, especially regarding Russia's imported gas policy towards Europe.
... Yet they struggle to explain why Central and Eastern European States ultimately achieved NATO and EU membership. Purely rationalist perspectives would suggest outcomes such as the Partnership of Peace instead of NATO membership or association agreements for the case of the EU; however, it is worth noting that Schneider (2009), Vachudova (2005), and others disagree with Schimmelfennig (2003) in this respect. ...
... Different theories apply to different stages of the EU's parliamentarisation process (Rittberger, 2012). If the general decision to enlarge to the East resulted from rhetorical action, the further process was shaped by accession conditionality (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005a) and intergovernmental bargaining about the terms of accession (Schneider, 2009). Moreover, Daniel Thomas describes how the membership norms of the EU have changed over time. ...
... European integration has been accompanied by debates on differentiated integration (DI). Notions such as 'multi-speed' Europe, 'flexible integration', 'unity in diversity', or 'core Europe' have emerged, all of which share the idea that the member states integrate to different degrees with the European Union (EU) (e.g., Dyson and Sepos, 2010;Holzinger and Schimmelfennig, 2012;Hvidsten and Hovi, 2015;Jensen and Slapin, 2012;Leuffen et al., 2013;Schneider, 2009). The European Monetary Union (EMU) represents the most prominent case of DI: while some member states refused to participate, others were not permitted to join the club (see, e.g., Sandholtz, 1993). ...
... Based on case-study evidence, Ko¨lliker argues that an ultimately broader integration is more likely in policy areas involving excludable network effects and less likely in areas dealing with common pool resource problems. Schneider's (2009) approach to DI deviates from the previous studies in two ways. Firstly, she applies the concept of DI to the EU enlargement process and addresses a situation in which bargaining occurs between accession aspirants and the EU, arguably in the presence of power asymmetries in favour of the latter. ...
With Brexit imminent, the debate on the need for differentiated integration (DI) by means of opting-out has gained new momentum. At the same time, non-member states decide to adopt European Union (EU) rules as exemplified by the European Neighbourhood Policy. In light of these opposing observations, we examine the EU's disposition to supply DI. We outline the strategic interactions of the EU member states or non-members in the context of two forms of DI: opting-out and inducing-in. In the case of opting-out, EU member states can refrain from adopting EU rules; inducing-in refers to providing non-member states with incentives to adopt EU rules. We show that the information asymmetries inherent to the strategic interactions result in a situation in which the EU is likely to supply opportunities to opt-out for member states to a much greater extent than necessary. Furthermore, the EU is likely to offer more compensation to non-member states in exchange for adopting EU rules than it would actually need to.
... In this context, the purpose of this article is to reconstruct conceptually the course of eastern enlargement, taking into account the reality of national interests that determined the direction, speed and content but, no less important, the specific nature of the European integration process during this phase. In accordance with this purpose, our approach analyses the compromises achieved among member states in relation to the EU's enlargement policy towards the post-communist countries of eastern Europe, presenting these as an outcome of the balance between different national preferences based on the national interests of EU countries themselves -whether geopolitical, economic or normative (O'Brennan, 2006b;Skalnes, 2005;Vachudova, 2003, 2005;Schneider, 2009;Sjursen, 2006Sjursen, , 2017. These compromises have led to certain outcomes in relation to enlargement policy, which should indicate a general solution to the tasks the EU faces in defending the general interests of member states. ...
... Third, studies that focus on the impact of the specific national interests of member states on the course of the enlargement process treat them, on the one hand, partly within a chronological framework (as a separate phase of the process) and in a particular field (economic and budgetary matters); while, on the other, ignoring the specific role of the policy of conditionality (Torreblanca, 2001;Papadimitriou, 2002;Smith, 2003;Skalnes, 2005;Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2005;Schneider, 2009). This is actually a direct consequence of the lack of attention being paid to the specifics of central and east European countries, justifying a particular political approach to the eastern enlargement of the EU. ...
This article aims to present a clear picture of the attempts towards the normalisation of relations in the western Balkans between the Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia via the process of the dialogue, facilitated by the UN General Assembly and mediated by the EU, which began more than eight years ago. The dialogue has produced different results for both countries so far, including various consequences and implications which have a constitutional nature. Taking this into account, this article offers an analysis of the perspective and the constitutional dimensions of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, drawing on the legal and factual actions that have been undertaken by the parties in the process thus far. The article analyses this dialogue and draws conclusions regarding the ending of the process and, in practice, how the final normalisation of relations should look, including the drawing up of a final agreement of reconciliation between the Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia. The constitutional consequences which can be the product of such an agreement are also examined.
... Parallel to the development of the idealistic version of the Member States behavior in relation to the Eastern Enlargement, a limited range of authors analyze the dynamics of the process from the perspective exactly of the specific national interests, dictating the great gap in the positions of the countries regarding the EU enlargement (Torreblanca, 2001;Papadimitriou, 2002;Skalnes, 2005;Moravcsik, and Vachudova, 2005;Schneider, 2009). ...
... She criticizes the research results of Sedelmaier and Schimelfennig, according to which the enlargement process runs smoothly and predictably and she aims at presenting a new framework for its understanding through an alternative answer to the question why the Eastern enlargement succeeds, despite the losses of some of the countries. In pursuance of this objective, she focuses on the process of negotiations concerning the conditions of accession (Schneider, 2009). ...
The much-awaited Western Balkans Strategy entitled “A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans” comes eighteen years after the introduction of the Stabilisation and Association Process for this region. The Strategy aims to provide a credible enlargement perspective for the Western Balkans besides the fact that still the candidate countries are far from membership.
The paper gives critical explication of what “credibility of enlargement” actually means in practice and if there is a realistic perspective for membership of the candidate countries of the Western Balkans by the projected year 2025. There is a disagreement among the EU foreign ministers over the projected year of integration, but the front-runners according to the Commission's assessment are Serbia and Montenegro, while Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia could join later.
The Strategy does not leave a lot of space for optimism because it detects the key issues that have to be targeted, such as poor rule of law performance, organized crime and corruption at all levels of government and administration, etc. Besides that, it emphasizes on the non-functioning market economy among “Western Balkan Six”. And last but not least is the key issue of adopting binding solutions for bilateral disputes prior to their accession, which means that the Greek-Macedonian name dispute should be solved before the accession, without offering involvement of any EU Member States. The Strategy fails to address the idea of grouping countries of the Western Balkans as a whole and offering a package for membership, but instead, it favors individual accession of countries. Besides the good opportunity for the Balkans, the Strategy does not spread much optimism for the region.
... Poorer member states are in stronger need of exemptions to facilitate their adaptation to the internal market and the costs of EU policy regulation. They are also more likely to be discriminated against by old member states fearing migration pressure, wage competition, and high agricultural and infrastructural subsidization (Schneider 2009). In sum, treaty-law differentiation exhibits the following patters: first, it increases as a result of enlargements and treaty revisions, most strongly since the early 1990s; second, differentiation varies across accession cohorts and policy areas. ...
... Poorer member states are in stronger need of exemptions to facilitate their adaptation to the internal market and the costs of EU policy regulation. They are also more likely to be discriminated against by old member states fearing migration pressure, wage competition, and high agricultural and infrastructural subsidization ( Schneider 2009). In sum, treaty-law differentiation exhibits the following patters: first, it increases as a result of enlargements and treaty revisions, most strongly since the early 1990s; second, differentiation varies across accession cohorts and policy areas. ...
Differentiated integration in the European Union (EU) has been primarily discussed and analysed at the treaty level, whereas lack of systematic data has hampered the examination of secondary-law or legislative differentiation. We present a new data set of differentiation in EU legislation from 1958 to 2012, a descriptive analysis and a comparison of the patterns of primary- and secondary-law differentiation across time, member states and policies. We find that differentiation facilitating the accession of new members and constitutional differentiation accommodating the opposition against the integration of core state powers drive both primary- and secondary-law differentiation. In addition, we find complementarity between differentiation in treaty law and secondary legislation depending on the availability and salience of differentiation opportunities.
... Second, poor new members have weaker bargaining power than wealthier candidates because they are less attractive candidates, are more dependent on the benefits of membership, and are less likely to do well outside the EU. For these reasons, the old member states are not only more interested in but also more capable of imposing differentiated integration on them (Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2005;Plümper & Schneider, 2007;Schneider, 2009). ...
In response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, enlargement has moved back to the top of the European Union’s policy agenda. At the same time, it appears to changing from a transformative “Europeanisation” logic to a security-driven geopolitical logic. The chapter asks how can we understand geopolitical enlargement, and how it differs from the conventional transformative model. Has enlargement become more geopolitical, indeed, and why? Which are the specific challenges and trade-offs that the EU faces in its enlargement policy? And, finally, how can geopolitical enlargement be implemented despite these challenges? I argue that recent enlargement decisions have followed a geopolitical rationale, indeed. However, rather than shifting completely to a geopolitical logic of enlargement, the EU has merely added a geopolitical layer on top of an official enlargement strategy that remains obliged to its transformative approach. This layering creates difficult trade-offs for the EU. To mitigate these trade-offs and maximise the geopolitical potential of enlargement, I suggest that fast-track legal membership combined with extensive institutional and policy differentiation is the most appropriate strategy.
... Democratic IOs also engaged in a broader set of activities to promote democracy including observing elections, conditioning membership in international institutions on a commitment to democratic norms, adopting democracy clauses and mandates, suspending or sanctioning member states for violating democratic norms, and conditioning foreign aid, trade and investment on human rights and even democracy commitments. 4 Not only is the membership in the EU conditional on countries adhering to democratic norms, but it has also used its economic heft to force parties to accept democratic rules as a precondition for various association agreements (Börzel & Risse, 2009a, 2009bSchimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008;Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2002;Schneider, 2009;Vachudová, 2005). The World Bank, followed by many other regional and international development organizations, started to apply broad democracy and good governance conditionality to its programs in the late 1990s (Ferry et al., 2020). ...
Illiberal regimes have become central players in international organizations. In this introduction to the special issue, we provide a unified framework for understanding their effects. We start by outlining the theoretical foundations of this work, focusing first on why regime type matters for international cooperation. We then show how differing memberships and decision-making processes within international organizations affect the influence illiberal regimes can wield, the activities they undertake, and the impact that they have on domestic political outcomes. Collectively and individually, the contributions to this special issue broaden the theoretical literature on illiberal regimes in international organizations and produce novel data about how they are implicated in the politics and operations of multilateral and regional IOs. This research has important implications for how democracies can and should cope with the challenges to global governance that arise from illiberal regimes.
... These policies, which we refer to as mandates, include the 1999 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention making the bribery of foreign public officials involved in international business transactions a crime (Elliott, 1997, 7-27); the Southern African Development Committee has adopted extensive democracy governance principles to implement the requirements of that organization's founding treaty (Pevehouse, 2002a, 212-13); and the many IOs that formally link human rights policies to their other economic or political missions (Hafner-Burton et al., 2015). Most famous in this regard is the EU, where good governance is explicitly used to ensure applicants' suitability for membership along many dimensions, including democracy and human rights (Kelley, 2004;Schimmelfennig, 2008;Schneider, 2007Schneider, , 2009. ...
A large and growing number of international organizations (IOs) are made up and governed by illiberal or outright authoritarian regimes. Many of these authoritarian IOs (AIOs) formally adopt good governance mandates, linking goals like democracy promotion, anti-corruption policies and human rights to their broader mission. Why do some AIOs adopt good governance mandates that appear to conflict with the norms and standards these regimes apply at home? We argue that AIOs adopt good governance mandates when they face substantial pressure from inside or outside the IO to adopt them. Central to our argument is that not all aspects of good governance are inherently or equally threatening to autocratic regimes. They pursue strategies that minimize the threat by externalizing policy outside the membership and strategically defining the goals to avoid or enact. This allows autocratic governments to uptake good governance talk but lessen any deep commitment to the norms and sometimes even to use them strategically to project their own power outside of the organization. Using data on 48 regional IOs with primarily autocratic membership between 1945 and 2015, we demonstrate that AIOs facing pressure from external good governance promoters will adopt good governance mandates but strategically shape those mandates in their favor if they can form bargaining coalitions with like-minded governments. The findings have sobering implications for the future of good governance promotion through IOs.
... The first category can be defined as internal differentiation within EU law (Chang 2016;De Witte, Ott, and Vos 2017;Howorth 2014;InDivEu 2021;Keukeleire and Delreux 2014;Ripoll Servent and Trauner 2018;Schneider 2009). It includes a variety of different forms, such as Treaty-based differentiations (e.g. the permanent opt-outs of Denmark, Ireland, and Poland or post-accession temporary provisions), the special regimes in the field of economic and monetary policy (e.g. the Euro area), justice and home affairs (e.g. the Schengen acquis), and foreign and defence policy (e.g. ...
The present paper provides an overview of past, present, and proposed models of differentiated integration (DI) in the European Union. First, it reviews the quantitative and qualitative evidence on the historical use of differentiation from 1958 to 2020, finding that it is a common but relatively secondary feature of European integration and that the three idealtypical models identified in the literature (multi-speed, multi-tier, and multi-menu) are deployed in an eclectic, versatile, and constrained manner, which could be termed ‘reluctant differentiation’. Second, it examines and assesses a sample of 21 reform proposals covering the full range of possibilities for the future development of the EU: from total disintegration to a federal union, from maximum uniformity to sustained differentiation, the use of different differentiation models, and other design elements. It finds that differentiation plays an important role in most proposals and may represent an essential tool to increase their effectiveness, popular support, and legal-political feasibility, even though any radical shift toward a more differentiated Europe is unlikely to be implemented.
Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/74191
... Moreover, powerful member states can exclude those that do not share their integration preferences or have insufficient integration capacity. For instance, the old member states have repeatedly used their superior bargaining power in accession negotiations to impose discriminatory transition arrangements on new member states such as restrictions on the free movement of persons or agricultural subsidies (Schneider 2009). ...
This chapter introduces intergovernmentalism as a theory of European integration. We begin the presentation of intergovernmentalism by explicating its theoretical roots in rationalist institutionalism in International Relations and by identifying four more middle-range rationalist theories that intergovernmentalism uses to explain international cooperation: endogenous trade theory, bargaining theory, club theory and the functional theory of institutions. We then apply this framework to European integration in general and specify liberal and realist intergovernmentalist hypotheses about integration preferences, intergovernmental negotiations and their integration outcomes. Finally, we extend intergovernmentalism to the phenomenon of differentiated integration.
... As a result, actual external DI schemes tend to be less tailored, beneficial, and frequent than theoretical ones, increasing the comparative attractiveness of both no integration and full integration. When comparing alternative models, scholars typically highlight the superior economic and functional benefits of EU membership (Schneider 2009) as well as its democratic advantage, which enable the acceding country to exert a stronger influence on the future development of shared commitments (Fossum 2015). The empirical literature tends to confirm these assumptions, even though the economic gap between full membership and comprehensive agreements is often relatively small. ...
Despite a considerable scholarly interest in differentiated integration (DI) as a design option, the literature on the topic is fragmented and unsystematic. The present paper fills this gap by developing a novel analytical framework to inform the assessment and design of international integration schemes based on seven evaluative criteria (feasibility, overall benefits, substantive fairness, procedural fairness, acceptance, sustainability, and overall desirability) and related design principles (maximization or satisfaction) and empirical indicators. It then applies it to the available theoretical and empirical literature on various models of international integration to identify the comparative strengths and weaknesses of internal DI and external DI. In light of the predominantly normative and highly controversial nature of the assessment process, the analysis suggests that the best way to design efficient and legitimate DI schemes is to ensure their responsiveness to democratic preferences and decision-making procedures at the national or EU level.
Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/72858
... The partisan politicization approach goes against the focus of an older literature on EU enlargement, which emphasized either intergovernmental conflict or international norms as the main factors of enlargement decisions. The intergovernmentalist approach draws on the differential national exposure to the costs and benefits of enlargement in order to explain which governments push for and resist enlargement (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2005;Schneider 2009). By contrast, the normative approach claims that EU enlargement is a meritocratic process, in which the EU bases its enlargement decisions on the candidate states' compliance with the EU's political (liberaldemocratic) conditions (Schimmelfennig 2003;Vachudova 2005). ...
Enlargement is the most significant debordering policy of the European Union. In an analysis of debates in the European Parliament and a sample of member state national parliaments, this article examines whether EU enlargement discourse has been characterized by a politicized rebordering process since the mid-2000s. We find that enlargement discourse has become more ‘rebordered’ in the course of the 2010s. Moreover, enlargement has lost salience and become more contested. In a regression analysis of enlargement positions and frames, we further show that the enlargement discourse is systematically politicized along cultural partisan lines. Members of culturally conservative and nationalist parties are more opposed to enlargement and use more restrictive frames. Finally, we observe that cultural boundary gaps based on the dominant religion of potential member states reinforce the cultural divide in the discourse.
... While states may use security linkages to overcome the initial cooperation challenges, they could focus strictly on policy when establishing the rules of the game and only later politicize membership. Prior work on screening members has been limited to enlargement (Kydd 2001;Schneider 2009;Stone 2011;Donno et al. 2015). Through separate analysis of each stage, we test how geopolitics shapes membership at founding and enlargement. ...
The link between security and economic exchange is widely recognized. But when and how much do geopolitical interests matter for economic cooperation? While existing work focuses on bilateral trade and aid, we examine how geopolitics shapes membership in multilateral economic organizations. We demonstrate that substantial discrimination occurs as states welcome or exclude states based on foreign policy similarity. Biased selection of members can politicize economic cooperation despite multilateral norms of non-discrimination. We test the geopolitical origins of institutional membership by analyzing new data on membership patterns for 231 economic organizations from 1949 – 2014. Evidence shows that security ties shape which states join and remain in organizations at both the formation and enlargement stages. We use a finite mixture model to compare the relative power of economic and geopolitical considerations, finding that geopolitical alignment accounts for nearly half of the membership decisions in economic institutions.
... Based on public goods theory and game theoretic approaches some authors focus on centripetal effects of DI and multi-track arrangements (Kölliker 2001;Hvidsten and Hovi 2015), whereas others emphasize the importance of centrifugal effects (Jensen and Slapin 2012). Schneider (2009) addresses forced and discriminatory 2 DI: in the course of Eastern enlargement, the EU had denied new members the adoption of certain rules. Holzinger and Tosun (2019) use a signalling game to explain the supply of DI by bargaining power and asymmetric information. ...
The past and arguably the future of the European Union (EU) are characterized by Differentiated Integration (DI). Whereas a number of studies examine country variance in the realization of DI due to state-level characteristics, scholars have rarely addressed sector-specific differentiation. We select Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for such an analysis – the policy domain with the largest budget, most contestation in the Council of Ministers, most redistribution, and most differentiated legal acts. Building on liberal intergovernmentalism, we develop a demand and supply model to explain the number of opt-outs a country realizes in CAP legislation. We hypothesize that the member states’ demand for differentiation is driven by agricultural lobbyism and by the political receptiveness of governments; the supply-side is driven by member states’ voting or bargaining power; and the realized differentiations are a consequence of the interaction of demand and supply. Using all differentiations in new CAP legal acts from 1993 to 2012, we test these hypotheses in a time-series cross-section design. We find that the domestic level of agricultural protectionism, conservative parties in government and voting power are robust predictors of the realization of differentiation in CAP. Our results support the general claim of liberal intergovernmentalism, that domestic societal and economic interests and political bargaining power shape the course of (differentiated) integration.
... Transitional arrangements are used as an instrument to overcome impasse in accession negotiations deriving from conflict about the distribution of gains and losses from new members (Plümper and Schneider 2007;Schneider 2009). Old member states, or powerful interest groups in these states, fear economic and financial losses. ...
... Yet whereas analyses of DI focusing on intergovernmental heterogeneity suffer from 'demand-side reductionism' (Moravcsik, 1993: 482), Kölliker's analysis leans toward 'supply-side reductionism'. Finally, Christina Schneider (2009;see also Plümper and Schneider, 2007) focuses on differentiation in accession negotiations. In line with the conventional story of DI, governments use 'discriminatory membership' as an instrument to overcome deadlock -in this case, deadlock in accession negotiations deriving from conflict about the distribution of gains and losses of EU enlargement. ...
On the intergovernmentalist account, differentiated integration is an institutional design helping to overcome negotiation deadlock caused by international heterogeneity. Heterogeneity of state preferences, dependence and capacity creates demand for differentiated integration. Whether differentiated integration will actually be realized, however, also depends on the supply of viable and mutually beneficial solutions for all participants in differentiation. The size of the integrationist group needs to be large enough to provide the collective good and achieve economies of scale; externalities between the differentially integrated groups must be weak; countries need to be in a favourable institutional bargaining position. The article focuses on theory, but also discusses empirical findings and policy proposals on differentiated integration.
... Transitional arrangements are used to overcome impasse in accession negotiations deriving from conflict about the distribution of gains and losses from new members (Plümper and Schneider 2007;Schneider 2009). Old member states, or powerful interest groups in these states, fear economic and financial losses. ...
... In general, candidate countries for the European Union need to strengthen and adapt their internal law with the common rules of the European Union (Schneider, 2009). This right is already known with the term "aquis". ...
p> Compared to other Western Balkan countries, the Kosovo case is of particular importance, on the one hand, by the fact that it is the youngest state in the region and, on the other hand, the integration of Western Balkan countries could not be sustained without resolution of Kosovo’s status.
This paper aims to analyze the progress made in the relations between the two countries. The normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is an important factor in regional co-operation, as well as an important condition for stabilizing the Balkans.
To make possible the realization of this objective Kosovo has undertaken a number of initiatives, which could facilitate the process of European integration. National Strategy for European Integration aims at supporting Kosovo’s aspirations for membership and EU integration, so that by 2020 Kosovo may have “completed its homework” for EU integration.
Following the declaration of independence, Kosovo’s main objective is Euro-Atlantic integration. Mainly, the journey towards the EU has been influenced by a number of factors, such as the overall situation, the political situation in the country, and the close relationship between Kosovo and Serbia. Following the signing on 19 April 2013 of the historic agreement by Prime Minister Hashim Thaci on the Kosovo side and Ivica Dacic on the Serbian side, the situation between the two countries apparently “improved”. But what is different is the fact that this agreement was implemented thanks to the influence of EU representatives after a series of failed attempts.</em
... Although EU enlargements were presented to depict the well-functioning of European integration, this was not always the case. The duration of pre-accession negotiations would be largely determined by differences in the fulfilment of various membership criteria and the implementation of the acquis communautaire which was often difficult to apply [9]. After the failed attempt in 2004 to ratify the proposed Constitutional Treaty [10] because of lack of popular support, the Member States signed in 2007 the Treaty of Lisbon which was perceived as opening a new chapter for European integration. ...
The paper provides an overview of the past, present and future perspectives of space policy developments in Europe. In the past decade, the EU enlargement has been subjected to various crises that threaten the European integration project. At the same time, the space sector is changing rapidly. In response to these challenges, on 26 October 2016, the European Union (EU) and the European Space Agency (ESA) signed a Joint Statement on “Shared Vision and Goals for the Future of Europe in Space” demonstrating their commitment to further strengthening their cooperation on space. The common European vision is that Europe remains a world-class actor in space and a partner of choice on the global level. The shared vision and goals of the Joint Statement are reflected in the European Commission Communication on its “Space Strategy for Europe”. ESA subsequently adopted on 2 December 2016 the Resolution “Towards Space 4.0 for a United Space in Europe”. In light of these space policy developments, the future creation of an all-encompassing European Space Strategy can underpin the future of Europe in space and beyond. Such strategy shall seek to address Europe's particularities, needs and responsibilities and ultimately reinforce European integration.
... For instance, Moravcsik (1998Moravcsik ( , 1991 argues that major reforms of the EU were shaped through bargaining between the Union's three most powerful members, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, which bought off minor powers through side-payments. In a similar vein, Schneider (2009Schneider ( , 2011 shows that each round of EU enlargement brought with it side-payments to the perceived losers of enlargement. More diffuse forms of reciprocity are also common in international organizations: Heisenberg (2005, 69) explains that the prevailing consensus in the Council of the EU is "shorthand for 'selling' preferences that are not strongly held for advantages in other issue areas or in future negotiations ('favor bank')." ...
... Beyond studies of the "Europeanization" debate, which investigates integration among the member states and integration of candidate states into the EU, the existing literature on the theoretical analysis of the EU's rule and policy transfer using other models remains either descriptive or limited. The literature on the gradual extension of EU policies to non-members, which significantly influences the integration process, tends to be defined and associated with many interconnected notions, such as "external governance" (Lavanex, 2004;Lavanex and Schimmelfennig 2009), "Europeanization" for candidate states (Grabbe 2002;Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005a;Sedelmeier, 2011), or "differentiated integration" (Stubb, 1996, Kölliker 2006, Schneider 2009) for both candidate and non-member neighbouring states. ...
... However, it may result in identity conflicts if a potential new member is perceived as not sharing the basic values of the Community. It may also provoke fears of a re-distribution of resources when countries seeking admission are economically less developed (Schneider 2009). In both instances, enlargement may increase politicisation. ...
While there is increasing evidence that European integration has been politicised, knowledge of the driving forces of this process is still limited. This article contributes to the research by examining the importance of authority transfers to the EU as drivers of politicisation. It innovates in two ways. First, it extends the authority transfer argument by highlighting the mobilising power of membership conflicts; second, it analyses the relevance of national opportunity structures, referenda in particular, and mobilising strategies for politicisation. Empirically, it traces politicisation in public debates on every integration step (treaty reforms and enlargement) from the 1970s to the late 2000s in six West European countries (Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland), based on a quantitative content analysis of newspaper coverage.
ENLARGEMENT PERSPECTIVE AND REFORM OF THE EUROPEAN UNIONEnlargement policy is one of the most important in the functioning of the European Union (formerly the European Communities). Since the first accessions in the 1970s, the admission of new countries has been accompanied by actions aimed at reforming the EC (EU). Some of them ended in failure, but the connection between enlargement and reforms, which de facto meant deepening integration, is very clear. In the third decade of the 21st century, the enlargement process is being continued. And as with previous enlargements, attempts to reform the EU will undoubtedly be made now. However, this time it may prove even more difficult to implement them than in the past. Therefore, the main goal of this article is to try to answer the question of whether it is possible – and if so, how – to introduce reforms in the EU that would pave the way for the admission of new countries. In the absence of the possibility of revising the treaties on which the functioning of the EU is based, four variants of solving such an impasse and introducing changes in the functioning of the EU are theoretically possible. However, some of them are difficult and may actually represent very significant changes in the character of the EU.
The article provides an innovative, comprehensive quantitative analysis of legal integration and differentiation in the European Union (EU) from 1958 to 2020. Building on a streamlined analytical framework and new or revised datasets on EU primary, EU secondary and EU‐related international law, it challenges or qualifies several aspects of the received wisdom on European integration. Specifically, it delivers the first‐ever quantitative estimate of integration in terms of integration opportunities, shows that differentiation is deployed in a reluctant and eclectic manner and offers clear measurements for the prevalence of various modes of temporal, spatial and policy differentiation. These methodological and empirical findings confirm the fruitfulness of the quantitative approach to the study of European integration and point to promising avenues for future research on international integration and comparative regionalism.
Accession of a third country to the EU (or EU enlargement) is a complex process that places both procedural and substantive constraints on Member States in the context of drafting the Accession Agreement of the country concerned. This chapter identifies the procedural constraints on Member States that flow firstly, from the wording of Article 49 TEU itself; secondly, established practice; and thirdly, from principles of negotiation that were consistently applied in every subsequent accession wave. A closer analysis of the enlargement process and past practice reveals that the procedure laid down in Article 49 TEU is perhaps not as precise as the Court claimed it to be in Mattheus v. Doegeo (C-93/78, ECLI:EU:C:1978:206, para. 7). While it establishes the main framework to be followed by the institutions operating within its scope, Article 49 TEU does not go beyond laying down the basic contours of the process. Therefore, to provide a fuller and clearer account of how it works in practice, this chapter provides an overview of the evolution of past enlargement practice starting from the precedent set by the first enlargement. Next, the chapter establishes the main principles that governed past processes of accession and negotiations taking place therein. Identifying these principles and verifying their consistent application over past enlargement waves demonstrates the existence of further constraints on Member States in this context, even if those are, not strictly speaking, of legal nature.
Sosyalist Federal Yugoslavya döneminde Sırbistan’a bağlı bir özerk bölge iken 2008 yılında bağımsızlık ilan eden Kosova Cumhuriyeti diğer Batı Balkan ülkeleri gibi Avrupa Birliğine üye olmayı hedeflemektedir. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde eski Doğu Bloğu ülkelerini üye olarak bünyesine alan AB, daha sonra Batı Balkanlara yönelerek bölge ülkeleri ile gelecekte üyeliği öngören ortaklık anlaşmaları yapmıştır. Doğu Bloğu ülkelerinin üye alınması sürecinde Kopenhag kriterlerini yürürlüğe koyan AB, Batı Balkan ülkeleri için Kopenhag kriterlerine ilave olarak İstikrar ve Ortaklık Sürecini yürürlüğe koymuştur. AB tüm Balkan ülkeleri gibi Kosova ile de İstikrar ve Ortaklık anlaşmaları imzalamış olmakla beraber Kosova’nın üyelik süreci pek nedenle diğer Batı Balkan ülkelerinden farklı ilerlemektedir. Bu bağlamda çalışmanın amacı Kosova Cumhuriyeti’nin Avrupa Birliği(AB) üyeliği bağlamında Kosova-Avrupa Birliği(AB) ilişkilerini incelemektir. Bu makale, AB'nin Batı Balkanlara yönelik izlediği politikayı incelemesinin yanı Kosova-AB ilişkilerini incelemektedir. AB genişlemesini teşvik etmek için tasarlanmış tüm ilgili politika ve mekanizmaların değerlendirilmesine ve incelenmesine ek olarak, bu sürecin önemli anlarının bir açıklaması verilecektir. Makale aynı zamanda Kosova’nın AB üyeliği sürecindeki zorlukları da değerlendirecektir.
The chapter describes and explains vertical and horizontal integration and differentiation as related to the Single Market. After sketching out the historical development of this core area of European integration, we test the explanatory power of the four integration theories covered in this book, by applying them to selected steps of market integration. The chapter also addresses the issue of Brexit and thereby disintegration.
This chapter adopts both a historical and a comparative approach in studying EU enlargement. The aim here is to identify ‘whether' and ‘when' a country joins the Union, with an emphasis on the currently ongoing enlargement process in the Western Balkans. It starts with an overview of the conceptual and theoretical framework for studying and explaining EU enlargement. It then reviews how EU enlargement has proceeded over time by looking at its successful and unsuccessful cases, with a particular focus on the motivations and explanations associated with each of them. The chapter considers the successful rounds of enlargement, the reluctant and the awkward cases, and the ongoing (laggard) Southeastern Enlargement round. It discusses the main EU enlargement dilemmas and their implications for the current (unfinished) enlargement round in the Western Balkans in detail.
This chapter reviews differentiated integration (DI) as a model seeking to explain the political economy of European integration since the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Over half of recent EU initiatives have been estimated to exhibit some form of DI. “Two-speed” and “multispeed” Europe have emerged as related concepts. President Macron has endorsed DI as a vehicle for taking forward radical integration with a sub-set of member states. The chapter reviews the literature, and some of its concepts. It questions some of the quantitative results. It notes that much DI has a normative basis, with full integration seen as the goal. “Differentiation” by contrast recognizes that differences may be indefinite. The chapter expands the concepts of vertical and horizontal DI to include functional DI—where closely related functions are treated differently, for instance, banking and insurance, and contrasts internal DI with external DI. With the EU characterized by DI or differentiation, it is far from a federal state. The chapter looks at the EU as a demoicracy, a union of peoples.
Sınırların kontrolü söylemi üzerinden ulusal egemenliğe bir tehdit olarak gösterilen ve halkın endişelerini tetikleyerek siyasi amaçlar için araçsallaştırılan göç konusu, Birleşik Krallık’ın (BK) Avrupa Birliği’nden (AB) ayrılmasında en temel belirleyici unsurlardan biri olmuştur. BK, Avrupa Birliği’nin göç, sığınma ve sınır yönetimi alanındaki politikalarının büyük ölçüde dışında kalmasına ve bu politika alanlarını kendi ulusal egemenliği kapsamında düzenlemesine rağmen, Brexit süresince ülkedeki Avrupa-şüpheci partiler göçmen karşıtı popülist söylemleriyle göç konusunu daha da siyasallaştırmıştır. Brexit, Avrupa bütünleşme sürecinin geleceği için de kuramsal bağlamda incelenebilecek somut bir örnek teşkil etmektedir. Son dönemlerde daha sık tartışılmaya başlayan “farklılaştırılmış entegrasyon” kavramına özellikle göç politikalarına katılım bağlamında örnek gösterilebilecek BK, Brexit tecrübesiyle Birliğin geleceğinin “farkılaştırılmış dağılma” kavramı üzerinden yeniden tartışılabileceğini de göstermektedir.
The European Union provided a mixed response to the 2008 financial crisis. On the one hand, it refused to pursue fiscal integration through a common budget; on the other, it introduced significant transfers between countries that were designed to produce financial stabilization. The authors analyze this response as the outcome of democratic constraints on EU leaders. Given the EU’s current institutional structure, citizens’ preferences pose a binding constraint on what leaders can do as these preferences limit the scope of risk-pooling among members and the degree of political tolerance for different courses of action. The authors show that citizens’ preferences reflect differences in the geography of income, production regimes, and institutional organization. The heterogeneity of constituencies’ redistribution preferences combined with a diverse economic geography helps to explain why political constraints on national governments prevent them from engaging in further fiscal integration. By contrast, externalities among member states shift the preferences of citizens who may experience negative effects and make international redistribution politically feasible. The authors analyze these two mechanisms and present novel empirical results on the determinants of preferences for fiscal integration and international redistribution in the aftermath of the eurocrisis.
The history of the European Union [hereinafter the EU] is characterised by numerous events that changed how the EU works. Among all the political, legal, and social ‘events’ that form part of EU history, this research paper discusses the ‘game changer’ that shifted the EU enlargement process. Throughout the paper the terms ‘game changer’ and ‘new classics’ are commonly used. The definition given to them is based on the work of Antoine Bauchez in ‘EU Classics in the making’. Specifically, theconcept defended by the author is that the particular events that changed history‘should [always] be considered as a continuous process’. However, within any historical process ‘one can hope to seize windows of opportunities’. In that sense, the following paper details a historical process, the accession to the EU of what has been called the Central and Eastern countries [hereinafter CEEs] highlighting some specific decisions related to their accession that would come to define history.
This chapter traces the contextual, social, political and historical developments of Ireland’s accession to the European Union, then the ECSC, from 1973 to present. It offers an overview of the developments in the four and a half decades that precede it which have been deemed necessary to understanding Ireland’s relationship to ‘Europe’. To this end, the chapter examines the specific events that are oriented towards the Irish community abroad, the difficulty in employing that term notwithstanding. It offers an overview of the conditions by which Ireland is thought to derive a ‘parity of esteem’ from its peers and whose examination will allow us to probe, conversely, the way in which ‘Europe’ has become Hibernicised. The chapter provides an anthropologically sensitive account of these phenomena by relating the experience of the conceptual-metaphorical levels of Ireland and Europe to how they are experienced by Irish people who reside in Brussels.
Even though differentiation has become a core feature of the EU, the grand theories have focused almost exclusively on uniform integration. In this article, we derive hypotheses about differentiated integration from liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism, and postfunctionalism. In an analysis of EU treaty making between 1992 and 2016, we find evidence that heterogeneity of both wealth and identity, integration in the area of core state powers, and pre-existing differentiation drive differentiated integration. A comparison of the explanatory power of the grand theories shows that neo- and post-functionalism explain the differentiations that member states obtain in EU reform treaties more convincingly than liberal intergovernmentalism. A synthetic model performs best, however. The grand theories also leave noteworthy variation unexplained.
This article focuses on the Portuguese application for membership to the European Economic Community, seeking to demonstrate that Portuguese accession was delayed as a result of the simultaneity of Portugal and Spains accession negotiations. It also analyses the fact that although Member States were theoretically in favour of further enlargement, they dealt with the process at their own pace, and in accordance with their own specific requirements; we therefore show how the interests of the Member States conditioned the accession process.
Regional integration theory seeks to explain the establishment and development of regional international organizations. Key questions are why and under which conditions states decide to transfer political authority to regional organizations, how regional organizations expand their tasks, competencies, and members, and what impact they have on states and societies in their regions. Whereas regional integration theory started with a broad comparative regional and organizational scope in the 1950s and 1960s, it has since focused on European integration and the European Union. The main (families of) theories explaining the development of European integration-rather than decision-making and policy-making in the EU-are intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism and postfunctionalism. The key debates in regional integration theory have taken place between variants of intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist integration theory. Intergovernmentalism assumes national governments to be the key actors in regional integration. Governments use regional integration to maximize their national security and economic interests in the context of regional interdependence. Integration outcomes result from intergovernmental bargaining and reflect the regional preference and power
Budućnost Zapadnog Balkana u svjetlu evropske integracije umnogome poči- va na nizu različitih faktora koji nijesu dominantno i jedino vezani za same dr- žave ovog regiona. Iako sam proces integracije u EU presudno zavisi od spre- mnosti i sposobnosti država kandidata i potencijalnih kandidata da sprovedu sve potrebne reforme, transponuju pravnu tekovinu i ostvare tzv. evropski standard u zakonodavstvu i u praksi, on se ne odvija u vakuumu. Prije svega treba imati na umu da će razvoj situacije unutar Evropske unije imati značaj- nog uticaja na brzinu, dubinu i kvalitet ulaska preostalih balkanskih zemalja u Uniju. Evropska unija odnosno njezine države članice su te koje određuju i postavljaju pravila, te i snose najveću odgovornost za politiku proširenja. Pored toga ne smiju se zanemariti ni uticaji trećih strana koji su sve primjet- niji i akutniji u regionu. Usporavanje reformi, evropsko upravljanje krizama, pojačana ili slabija uloga trećih aktera, sve to će bitno odrediti kakav proces evrointegracije predstoji u narednim godinama te, u skladu s time, i način na koji će on uticati na stabilnost i budućnost samih zemalja proširenja. U tom smislu, Zapadni Balkan istovremeno živi u promjenljivim stvarnostima koje donose različite ishode i mogućnosti. Ovaj članak, pored pregleda stanja na Zapadnom Balkanu, stoga daje i moguće scenarije za budući period.
Ključne riječi: Evropska unija, Politika proširenja, Zapadni Balkan, treći ak- teri, Evropske integracije
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a systematic analysis of the forces working for and against the political sustainability of the EU’s enlargement policy. Sustainability analysis offers an alternative to conventional theorizing of the process conceptualized as policy stability and institutional continuity. The chapter draws on Eric Patashnik’s work on political sustainability in the case of policy reform and nonincremental change. Building on the historical record of prior EU enlargements, it examines the continued implementation of the policy in the aftermath of the East-European accession (2004–2007). The chapter concludes with an overall assessment of the risks of policy reversal and provides an evaluation of the usefulness and limitations of the political sustainability approach.
Proces integracji, podjęty w Europie Zachodniej po II wojnie światowej, okazał się sukcesem. Kolejne państwa dołączały do Wspólnot Europejskich (WE), a potem do Unii Europejskiej (UE), zaś polityka rozszerzenia WE/UE stała się jednym z najistotniejszych obszarów aktywności tych organizacji międzynarodowych.
Celem artykułu jest identyfikacja i krótka analiza wybranych aspektów, głównie teoretycznych, związanych z kontynuacją rozszerzania UE i stanowiących najistotniejsze czynniki wpływające na dalszy przebieg tego procesu. Główną tezą opracowania jest stwierdzenie, że kontynuacja rozszerzania UE będzie wyglądać wyraźnie inaczej niż do tej pory i będzie procesem trudnym i długotrwałym. Problemem badawczym jest identyfikacja przyczyn takiej zmiany w charakterze procesu rozszerzania UE, który przecież do tej pory generalnie oceniany jest jako jedna z najskuteczniejszych polityk WE/UE. W tym celu zostaną przywołane funkcjonujące w literaturze przedmiotu teoretyczne modele wyjaśniania rozszerzania WE/UE i wskazane czynniki o charakterze
,,praktycznym”, które na rozszerzenie mają wpływ.
Aby lepiej zrozumieć obecne uwarunkowania kontynuowania rozszerzenia UE, przedstawiono także
stan stosunków UE z potencjalnymi nowymi państwami członkowskimi, wybrane dane o charakterze
społeczno-gospodarczym tych państw oraz nastawienie opinii publicznej w UE i w niektórych państwach kandydujących do UE. W pierwszej części wskazano formalne warunki, jakie musi spełnić państwo chcące przystąpić do Unii. Podsumowanie zawiera najistotniejsze wnioski.
Most international organizations (IOs) expand their membership over the course of their lifespan. Although these enlargements tend to be heralded as normatively positive — for the IOs themselves, for the new members, and for cooperative outcomes more generally — expansions can also lead to conflicts in the organization. What conditions lead to enlargement rounds that reshape an organization in unexpected ways? We argue that, depending upon the diversity of the initial group of countries, members may vote to admit new entrants that can tilt organizational decision-making in unexpected directions. We anticipate fewer enlargements with lesser impact on the character of the organization among organizations that have either a smaller range of founding members or a relatively even initial dispersion. We develop an agent-based model that accounts for the complex decision-making environment and social dynamics that typify IO accession processes. The model helps us explain how the nature of decision-making in organizations can shift following enlargement, likely changing the organization’s output and goals.
Један од прокламованих циљева спољне политике БиХ јечланство у ЕУ. Циљ се почео реализовати кроз Процес о стабилизацији и придруживању у којем је ЕУ земљама југоисточне Европе понудила пружање квалитетне помоћи како би омогућио брз и квалитетан напредак у европским интеграцијама. Правни оквир приступања БиХ ЕУ је постављен Споразумом остабилизацији и придруживању 2006. г., који су потписале БиХ и ЕУ. Европска комисија сваке године надлежним органима ЕУ упућује на разматрање извештаје о извршењу постављених критеријума и услова, а у овом раду аутор је покушао да представи шта је на плану приближавања БиХ ЕУ учињено у 2011. години.
The study of European integration has traditionally focused on organisational growth: the deepening and widening of the European Union (EU). By contrast, this article analyses organisational differentiation, a process in which states refuse, or are being refused, full integration but find value in establishing in-between grades of membership. It describes how the EU's system of graded membership has developed, and it explains the positioning of states in this system. The core countries of the EU set a standard of 'good governance'. The closer European countries are to this standard, the closer their membership grade is to the core. Some countries fall short of this standard and are refused further integration by the core: their membership grade increases with better governance. Other countries refuse further integration because they outperform the standards of the core countries: their membership grade decreases as governance improves. These conjectures are corroborated in a panel analysis of European countries.
What impact will the Lisbon Treaty's new system of voting in the Council have? After describing the new voting rules, this study develops a modelling approach to assess their likely impact. The first part of the analysis examines the extent to which procedural rules have affected the decision-making process in the recent past, since this will help assess the likely impact of the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty. The second part of the analysis presents a counter-factual analysis of recent decisions, exploring what would have happened had the Lisbon rules been applied. The main finding is that even under the strong and unrealistic assumption that formal rules define the decision-making process, decision outcomes would have been the same in most cases. The paper concludes by discussing the features of Council decision-making that soften the impact of these rule changes.
Conflicts between European Union (EU) members about enlargement result from its redistributive effects. EU members are more likely to suffer from enlargement if they profit from EU transfers and if they are relatively close to applicant countries in which unemployment is significantly higher than in member countries. Phasing in membership rights serves to compensate the relative losers of enlargement to accomplish EU widening. Using data from all previous enlargement rounds until 2004, we demonstrate that EU members are more likely to demand a discrimination of new members if distributional conflicts arise. The existence of these distributional conflicts in turn increases the odds of EU members and the accession candidates actually agreeing on a phase-in period.
Theoretical studies of EU enlargement have mainly focused on the macro-level of enlargement, namely under which conditions the EU decides to enlarge. We still lack a conceptual framework to analyse the sectoral dynamics of enlargement that specifies under which conditions the preferences of the candidate countries are accommodated in EU policy. I argue that an accommodation of the candidates' preferences depends crucially on policy advocates in the EU. The influence of these policy advocates is structured by the nature of enlargement as a composite policy, in which sectoral decisions are negotiated between the group of policy-makers with primary responsibility for enlargement as such, and various groups of sectoral policy-makers. The policy advocates' impact on sectoral policies thus depends (1) on their access to decision-making, which is shaped by the structure of the policy process , as well as (2) their ability to build alliances with sectoral policymakers. Crucially, alliance-building depends not only on the strength of sectoral interest groups, but also on the compatibility between the candidates' preferences and the sectoral policy paradigms that shape the preferences of the sectoral policy-makers.
This paper examines discriminatory membership in the European Union from a game-theoretical perspective. I argue that discriminatory membership enables the enlargement of international organizations with heterogenous member states. EU members impose discriminatory measures on new members to redistribute enlargement gains from new members to particularly negatively affected EU members as to render expansion pareto-efficient. The empirical findings of a probit analysis on the EU accession negotiations and outcomes of all five EU enlargement rounds support the theoretical claim. The EU grants acceding states restricted membership rights if distributional conflicts emerge. Moreover, the candidate’s bargaining power and the possibility of alternative compensation schemes influence the enlargement outcomes. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007
This article deals with the consequences for the European Structural Policy (ESP) of the extension of the EU with countries from Central and East Europe. It argues that the allocation mechanism of financial assistance from the structural funds must be changed profoundly in order to gain a balanced system of distributing the available funds. In view of the changing Common Agricultural Policy and international trade policy in the framework of the WTO the European Structural Policy will become gradually more important. In order to compensate for the decreasing price support for agricultural products extension of structural assistance in the near future is inevitable.
In this article, certain problems and dilemmas in the search for a system of managing the European Union (EU) are presented with respect to the problems and dilemmas in identifying one model of regulation that would fit a variety of entities creating a common supranational economic and political system. Based on certain historical lessons from multinational states, it is argued that there are many important factors involved in the creation of a viable and sustainable supranational model of regulation. They include a comparable level of wealth of the socio-political units involved, the democratic principles used in that model, the creation of supranational social integration, the democratic political culture of the political elites in the socio-political units involved and the preconditions for viable elements of consociate democracy. Whereas within the EU a rational approach to the question of managing the deepening and expanding EU has only started to gain in importance as an internal, domestic issue (especially focusing on the homogeneity of the socio-political units involved with regard to their economies and levels of welfare, the fulfilment of political criteria and the acceptance of acquis ), the applicant states seem to be focusing mainly on integration as an international relations issue in becoming part of the EU, which is itself growing as an economic and political world power.
Conflict within the British Conservative Party over the European Union provided a great deal of copy for media political coverage during 1992–94. It was undoubtedly responsible for severely damaging the prime minister's reputation within his party and the country. In July 1993, he could only achieve ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by making voting for it an issue of confidence in the House of Commons, thereby obtaining the support of most ‘Eurosceptic’ Conservative MPs. Nine months later, failure to achieve the United Kingdom's goal regarding voting procedures in the Council of Ministers following enlargement of the EU in 1995 led to several calls for his resignation from among his own party's MPs, including one in the House itself.
Is it possible to integrate states into larger unions without the use of force? Should we think of a continuous “federalizing process” in which economic integration is a first step? Are there certain conditions under which economic integration of a group of nations automatically triggers political unity?
This article is dedicated to the question if and how federal structures have an influence on decisions in fiscal policy. In order to answer this question four countries are selected as case studies that represent on the one hand a more competitive model (Canada, Belgium) and on the other hand a more cooperative model (Germany, Switzerland). We want to know which effect and disturbing potential federal structures in these countries could have on fiscal policy making and if the distinction of federal types explains variations in decision making. The focus will be on intergovernmental relations in fiscal policy making, i.e. the possibility to act of the federal government in the light of the veto-power of member states and parties. The result is: federal structures have in general, without differences according to the type of federalism, a constraining influence for keynesian demand management. They also have, though in different ways, a potential negative influence on deficit reduction. This negative influence can, however, be neutralised by intended and unintended mechanisms which differ between countries.
Trends in migration from the former Soviet Union are examined in light of recent political changes there. The author projects that "the number of departures may go up to 1-1.5 million people a year. This may happen if the present unfavorable socioeconomic conditions and instability continue to exist and if technical problems related to exit arrangements are solved. Once the situation normalizes first and foremost in Russia, the scope of emigration may be maintained at a level of 500,000 to 600,000 people per annum within the next two or three years and then begin to decline."
The author provides a public choice-based explanation of why the European Parliament is sometimes influential in the cooperation procedure. While a conservative Parliament can use its right of rejections to block a decision effectively whenever there is no consent in the Council, a Parliament in favor of change can successfully use its amendment right in the second reading whenever the constraints have been changed unexpectedly since the adoption of the common position such as to create an amendment win set. Then, the European Parliament can choose its most preferred policy in this set which is supported by the Commission, cannot be changed by the Council and is preferred against the status quo by a qualified majority in the Council. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
This paper assesses the consequences of EU enlargement for East West migration. In the theoretical part, we identify several factors in addition to the reduction of moving costs by which EU membership influences migration. Specifically, EU accession affects income gaps. Moreover, if EU membership is refused, fear of future restrictions on immigration will lead to increased current migration. Additionally, casual evidence from the 1980s EU South enlargement is examined. Since then no increases in migration flows from Spain, Portugal and Greece were observed. We conclude that granting EU accession to Eastern European countries will not necessarily induce massive East-West migration.
This essay deals with the challenge that international organizations face at the turn of the millennium. The basic insight from the theory of clubs and information theory is that coordination and cooperation require dominant providers. Cooperation becomes more difficult as players become more equal in economic size. Today's environment is less conducive to cooperation than the environment after World War II. By extension, club theory suggests that Regional Trade Agreements are not flukes. They have proliferated because cooperation is feasible in smaller groups with a few larger players. There is a significant risk, however, that regional blocs may replace the multilateral cooperative process. To reduce this risk we propose the creation of an inter-bloc international organization dedicated to reduce blocs' barriers to trade and finance. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001.
Though substantively important, centralized negotiations have received less theoretical attention than problems of centralized monitoring and enforcement. I address this gap by examining variation in a particular form of centralized negotiations that I call “clustering.” Clustering occurs when a state negotiates with several other states at the same time. Clustering enables states to avoid having to make concessions on the same issue to one state after another, and therefore has important distributional advantages. Clustering also centralizes bargaining within a regime, especially when several states cluster simultaneously in a “macro-cluster.”
I propose several hypotheses about clustering. First, most-favored-nation (MFN) clauses are a necessary condition for clustering. They link the distributional conflicts among many pairs of countries and make centralized bargaining more likely. Second, increasing membership in the trade regime makes clustering more likely. This relationship between membership and centralization echoes Rational Design conjecture C3, centralization increases with number, though the causal mechanism differs significantly. Third, clustering provides distributional advantages to those who cluster. A state that clusters, such as France under the Méline tariff or Germany under Chancellors Leo von Caprivi and Bernard von Bülow, will make fewer concessions than one that does not.
What determines the price of membership in an internationalinstitution? Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidalhypothesize that uncertainty about the preferences of other states willincrease that price, as stated in Rational Design conjecture M2,restrictive MEMBERSHIP will increase with UNCERTAINTY ABOUTPREFERENCES.When states are uncertain about the motivations of other states, theywill demand costly signals of reassurance before being willing tocooperate fully.1 In a multilateral context, thismay take the form of aninstitution with a signi cant barrier to entry, a price of admission.The price of admission serves to separate states who are seriouslyinterested in cooperation from those who have more exploitativemotivations. More cooperative states will be willing to pay the price,and this will reveal their cooperative nature to others, facilitatingcooperation. Less cooperative states will not be willing to pay theprice, and this too will reveal their type, leading others to cooperateless with them.
The integration of the former communist countries of central and eastern Europe into the European Union creates a dilemma for the EU's regional policy. The EU's expenditure on regional policy (its 'active' regional policy) has been guided by political reactions to deepening or enlarging the EU, not by a rational strategy for regional policy. In contrast, the strong EU instrument of state aid control, developed for competition policy (its 'reactive' regional policy) has been relatively successful in avoiding a national race of regional subsidies among the member states. We show that a shift from active regional policy to reactive, competition-oriented, regional policies is the preferred way for the established member states to handle the challenge of enlargement. At the same time, however, this shift is politically difficult for the accession countries to accept, despite the fact that this shift might prove better for them economically. This regional policy dilemma is one of the major obstacles for the full integration of the accession countries into the EU. Copyright 2004 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.