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MARCHING TOWARDS
EURASIA
The Kremlin connections of the Slovak far-right
Péter Krekó
Lóránt Győri
Daniel Milo
Juraj Marušiak
János Széky
Anita Lencsés
Political Capital is a Budapest-based, independent political research and consul-
tancy institute with a decade of experience, a strong international network and
reputation. The basic values of the institute are parliamentary democracy and
market economy. The institute’s main elds of interest are political radicalism,
extremism and its social background, conspiracy theories, prejudices, election
research and Russian political inuence within the EU. Political Capital has strong
expertise in quantitative analyses.
Social Development Institute is a non-prot research institute sharing its values
with those of Political Capital. In the past years, the institute performed research
on the social impact of the global nancial crisis in Central and Eastern Europe,
the rise of the extreme right in Hungary, the new Hungarian electoral system, and
on innovative methods for comparative research on violent radicalization among
the youth.
On the authors:
Péter Krekó, PhD. is the Director of the Political Capital Institute, and an assistant
professor at the Eotvos Lorand University of Sciences.
Lóránt Győri is a sociologist and political analyst. Studied at the Eotvos Lorand
University of Sciences in Budapest, earned his MA in 2008, currently nishing PhD
at ELTE Faculty of Social Sciences, Doctoral School of Sociology. His areas of ex-
pertise cover far-right movements, new media and network research, sociology
of science, discursive political science.
Daniel Milo studied law at the Comenius University in Bratislava and holds a
Doctor of Law degree in criminal law. His main eld of expertise is extremism,
radicalization, cyber hate and hate crimes. Currently, he works at the Oce of the
Minister of Interior as the National coordinator of anti-extremist policies.
Mgr. Juraj Marušiak, PhD. (1970) is a senior research fellow at the Institute of Po-
litical Science, Slovak Academy of Sciences in Bratislava (Slovakia). Author of the
monograph „Slovenská literatúra a moc v druhej polovici päťdesiatych rokov“ (Slo-
vak Literature and the Power in the second half of the 50´s; Brno 2001) and “Dez)
integračná sila stredoeurópskeho nacionalizmu (The (Dis)Integration Power of Cen-
tral European Nationalism: A Study of the Visegrad Group Countries - together with
Ivan Halász and Mateusz Gniazdowski, Bratislava 2015).
János Széky is an editor at Élet és Irodalom (“Life and Literature”), a weekly Hun-
garian newspaper about literature and politics.
Anita Lencsés studies at the Eotvos Lorand University of Sciences, graduated as
a Philologist in Russian Studies in 2010, currently nishing her BA studies as a
Human Behavior Analyst at the ELTE Faculty of Education and Psychology. She
focuses more on social and intercultural psychology, migration and refugees, and
psycholinguistics.
3
This study is part of the project
“Strategies against far-right extremism”,
which was implemented in 2014 and supported
by the Heinrich Böll Foundation.
Latest revised edition: 2015
© Copyright 2015 Political Capital Kft.
and Social Development Institute Kft.
Published by Political Capital Kft.
and Social Development Institute Kft.
Design by Splendidea Communications Kft.
4
MARCHING TOWARDS
EURASIA
The Kremlin connections
of the Slovak far-right
Péter Krekó
Lóránt Győri
Daniel Milo
Juraj Marušiak
János Széky
Anita Lencsés
SDI
Social
Development
Institute
2015
5
Contents
Acknowledgements
A note on methodology and terminology
Disclaimer
Executive summary
Political, economic and social environments
Slovakia’s geopolitical position
Slovak-Russian relations in a historical context
Slovak-Russian economic ties
Slovakia’s energy dependence
Nuclear energy dependence
Other sources of economic inuences
Military cooperation
Slovak-Russian diplomatic relations
Russia’s perception in the Slovak public
Slovak mainstream politics in the 2013 – 2015 Ukraine crisis
Kremlin’s inuence on today’s Slovak far-right
Slovak National Party (SNS)
The People’s Party − Our Slovakia (LSNS)
Nation and Justice party (Národ a spravodlivosť − NaS)
Pro-Russian far-right extremist movements
and paramilitary organizations
Russia in the contemporary Slovak public discourse
Political discourse
Kremlin’s propaganda in the Slovak media
Signicant pro-Kremlin media sites in Slovakia
Pro-Russian Facebook groups
Slovak radicals in the Russian online media
6
7
9
9
13
13
14
17
20
21
22
23
26
27
32
36
36
38
40
43
49
49
51
54
55
57
6
Acknowledgements
This study would not have been possible without the generous support
of the Heinrich Böll Foundation, for which we are deeply grateful. In par-
ticular, we would like to thank the Director of the Foundation’s Prague
Oce, Eva van de Rakt and Programme Assistant Zsóa Deák for their
continuous support, insight and helpful feedback.
At Political Capital Institute and Social Development Institute we would
like to thank all colleagues who contributed to the study and helped the
authors with their fruitful feedback and views. Our special thanks go to
Csaba Molnár and Bulcsú Hunyadi. We thank Katya Dunajeva and Marie
Macauley in particular and Róbert László for proofreading the text.
We also thank experts, academics, journalists and anonymous sources
whose contribution was inevitable for doing an extensive and balanced
research that looks under the surface of daily news. Among those who
shared their insights and knowledge with us during in-depth interviews,
the following experts agreed to be named in the study:
• Balázs Jarábik, Associate Fellow at European think tank, FRIDE; for-
mer adviser to the Parliament and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs of
Slovakia, the European Parliament, the UN and OSCE
• Peter Morvay, foreign policy commentator for the daily Dennik N
• Milan Nič, managing director of the Central European Policy In-
stitute; former Senior Adviser to the State Secretary at the Slovak
Foreign Ministry
All errors and omissions are our own.
Péter Krekó
Lóránt Győri
Daniel Milo
Juraj Marušiak
János Széky
Anita Lencsés
7
A note on methodology and terminology
The idea of the current research emerged during our earlier analysis1 on
East European far-right parties’ orientation towards Russia in 2009 and
the study2 on the promotion of Kremlin’s interests through European
far-right and far-left parties’ pro-Russian policies in 2014. The ndings
of these papers led us to the hypothesis that certain far-right (and part-
ly far-left) organizations within the EU have specic functions imposed
by the Russian state and actors close to it. These functions include: (1)
destabilization of the EU, its member states and the transatlantic rela-
tions; (2) legitimization of the Putin regime and its policies; (3) gather-
ing information and spreading disinformation. In order to reveal these
functions and to analyze the role of far-right parties and organizations
within the EU, we launched a series of publications that focus on individ-
ual member states (Hungary, Slovakia, France, Greece and Bulgaria) and
EU institutions. This piece of the series, with the support of the Heinrich
Böll Foundation, provides an in-depth analysis of the Slovak far-right’s
pro-Kremlin’s stance. The time scope of the study reaches from the early
90’s to current developments. The focus, however, is on the time before
and during the Ukraine-Russia conict.
During the study we refer many times to the terms “Russian inuence”
or “Russian state inuence” or “Kremlin’s inuence.” These notions are
connected with the term “Russian inuence through power,” by which
we mean explicit and implicit actions by the Russian state and related
actors (including intellectuals, businessmen, journalists, etc.) or organi-
zations aiming at creating political changes in the behavior and/or po-
litical agenda of certain political actors through political means and/or
nancial instruments.
The main goals of the research are the following:
1) Identify the relevant connections between Slovak far-right and far-left
stakeholders and Kremlin stakeholders.
2) Collect and analyze the most important pro-Russian declarations and
actions of the relevant radical political players in Slovakia.
1 Péter Krekó and Krisztián Szabados: „Russia’s Far-Right Friends. In-depth analysis.” Risk and
Forecast, December 3, 2009, accessed October 20, 2014, http://www.riskandforecast.com/
post/in-depth-analysis/russia-s-far-right-friends_349.html
2 “The Russian Connecon”, Political Capital, April 10, 2014, accessed October 20, 2014, http://
www.riskandforecast.com/useruploads/les/pc_ash_report_russian_connection.pdf
8
3) Create a list of the meetings and links between radical players and
Kremlin stakeholders and analyze their relations.
4) Reveal personal, organizational, media and other linkages between
the far-right and Kremlin stakeholders.
We used the following research methods:
1) Desktop research to collect the necessary information, restore the or-
der of developments and events and gather statements and quotes.
2) In-depth interviews with experts from academia, politics and media
to gather non-public and background information, and deeper view on
certain actors and events.
3) Methods of investigative journalism in order to gain condential and
background information from actors within or close to the far-right
scene (e.g., condential talks). In order to protect their identity, sources
of such information remain anonymous in the study.
4) Analysis of Slovak far-right media outlets and Facebook pages.
5) Analysis of Russian online media in order to examine how Slovak far-
right actors are presented to the Russian public. For ensuring the com-
parability of the results, each national case study applied, where possi-
ble, identical structure for analysis and presentation, including the same
questions during interviews with experts.
In the rst part of the study the political, economic, and social environ-
ments of the relations between Slovakia and Russia are presented. In the
second part we analyze Slovak mainstream politics amidst the Ukraine
crisis. In the third part we present the Kremlin’s inuence on today’s Slo-
vak far-right scenery assessing both parties and paramilitary organiza-
tions. The fourth part of the study elaborates the contemporary Slovak
public discourse about Russia including Kremlin’s propaganda in the Slo-
vak media. In the last part of the study, we provide a detailed assessment
of the Slovak National Party’s and The People’s Party – Our Slovakia‘s in
Russian online media.
9
Disclaimer
Since this study does not intend to give more space to or propagate ex-
treme and/or illegal views and sites, the authors have decided upon a
certain referencing principle regarding far-right sites and materials used
in the analysis. Links are only provided to expert analyses, databases,
and mainstream press articles. Contents on the ocial website of far-
right parties are also referred to by links since those have or had elected
ocials in dierent political institutions. All other far-right, extreme, or
illegal contents and sites mentioned or quoted in the study are referred
to by the name and date of the source in the text. The exact references
with screenshots for the latter sources are stored in a separate document
at author institutes, Social Development Institute Kft. and Political Capi-
tal Kft., and may be requested for expert and academic use.
Executive summary
• In 2009, Political Capital was among the rst to call attention to
East European far-right parties’ orientation towards Russia.
Subsequently, in an analysis generating widespread international
attention, in April 2014 we indicated that with the assistance of
far-right parties’ pro-Russian policies “the promotion of Russian in-
terests couched in national colors is proliferating throughout Eu-
rope,” and we also demonstrated that with their votes cast in the
European Parliament, far-right and far-left parties had pledged
allegiance to Putin and his regime. All this makes it patently clear
that the Russian state’s political influence across Europe has
increased in recent years. The European extreme right, with its
Eurosceptic and anti-Western ideology, provided a fertile ground
for the double-faced foreign policy of Russia – ideologically hos-
tile, yet economically cooperative – towards Europe. Moreover,
the current Ukrainian crisis clearly highlights the “vectors” and
tools of Russian inuence in Europe, as well as in Slovakia.
• Traditionally, because of the religious (Orthodox Church),
and ideological links (Pan-Slavism), Slovak relations with
Russia has generally been strong. Furthermore, the current
Slovak government is considered to be among the “doves”
of the EU’s foreign policy when it comes to taking a harder
stand against Russia, for example during the debates on impos-
ing sanctions to retaliate against Russia’s actions in the Ukrainian
crisis. While it is true that PM Robert Fico has opposed sanctions
against Russia many times, the Slovak government is in fact walk-
10
ing a ne line of political pragmatism. While it tries to avoid open
confrontation with the Kremlin, it also conforms to common Eu-
ro-Atlantic foreign policy by supporting the Eastern Partnership
program and Ukrainian territorial sovereignty, providing reverse
gas ow and military, as well as humanitarian aid to Ukraine.3 The
Slovak governmental party Smer follows the Russia-critical main-
stream stance of the center-left S&D political group in the Europe-
an parliament.
• This kind of foreign policy pragmatism is supported by pub-
lic opinion, which is divided in two parts: on the one hand,
it favors Ukraine’s independent democratic path and disap-
proves Russian intervention, and, on the other hand, rejects
sanctions and confrontation with the Russian Federation.
While there are some obvious attempts to reinforce pro-Russian
attitudes in the public in the traditional and social media with an
intense information warfare,4 the impact of these eorts on the
broader public is limited. The Ukrainian-Russian conflict has
changed the Russophile Slovak public, which perceives Rus-
sia as the main threat to Slovakia nowadays, at least in the
short run. At the same time, the Kremlin’s inuence on the far-
right and extreme right in Slovakia still relies on the Russia-friend-
ly and Slavophil roots.
• With the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conict, the Kremlin’s
attempts at inuencing the extreme right became more appar-
ent. The political formations on the Slovak extreme right pursue
Russia-friendly politics; both Slovak National Party (SNS) and
The People’s Party - Our Slovakia (LSNS) blame the EU or NATO
for the conict, while evoking Slavophil sentiments. Some of the
leaders of these parties can be linked to Russia on the basis of
their personal and cultural networks.
• The unique feature of the Slovak case is that Russia is en-
dorsed not only by the political parties on the right, but also
by some Slovak paramilitary organizations with far-right
ideology. In the case of the paramilitary Slovak Conscripts, we
can assume that active measures5 and transfer of political know-
3 Furthermore, these steps do not add up to a consistent anti-EU or anti-West economic and
political ideology, as it is the case for example with Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán.
4 The manifestations of the positive attitudes to the foreign policy of Russian Federation are
very often connected not so much with the approval of Kremlin’s coarse of actions, foreign
policy, etc, but with the protests against some policies implemented by the Slovak or “West-
ern” political elites.
5 Through the “active measures” (aktivnye meropriyatiya) dating back to the USSR, political
support is provided by the Kremlin to “friendly” parties and organizations. This has three ma-
jor components: (1) proactive political measures, (2) “NGO-diplomacy ” and (3) funding friend-
11
how plays a direct role, since its leader gained his position after
attending a training in Russia conducted by ex-Spetsnaz (Russian
Special Purpose Forces) instructors. In this case, it seems that
there are some successful attempts of some Russian circles to ex-
port possibly violent extremism to an EU member state.
• In general, the military trainings delivered by ex-members
of the Russian special forces in Slovakia and Russia unite
the various figures of the extreme right paramilitary scene,
presenting a security threat in the region, as (with the par-
allel Russian support for the Slovakian and Hungarian far-
right) age old territorial claims might become militarized
and revived again in the CEE-region.
• The specicity of the Slovakian case is the direct role of far-right
parties and movements participating in the Eastern Ukrainian
conict, which is an important problem not only for Slovakia
but the entire region. Slovak volunteers are fighting on the
side of pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine. A notable exam-
ple is a former member of the paramilitary far-right Slovak
Conscripts, Martin Keprta, who has been fighting for the 15th
international brigade of the DPR Army since autumn 2014.6
The Slovak involvement in direct fighting means that not only
military training is put to use by far-right military actors, but
the Kremlin’s influence in the Slovak extremist scene proves
to be a geopolitical and international security risk, playing
on the edge of Eastern-European national animosities dating
back to WWI. The Hungarian (and also pro-Russian) Jobbik
and its paramilitary satellite organizations harbor revisionist
endeavors against Slovakia, Romania, and, first and foremost,
Ukraine, basically wherever Hungarian minorities are present.
Furthermore, there are Slovak and Ukrainian far-right organi-
zations with actual military experience to counter Jobbik and
its affiliates –one Ukrainian nationalist paramilitary organiza-
tion called Karpatska Sic Guard has already threatened to an-
nihilate Jobbik and the revisionist Sixty-Four Counties Youth
Movement, which is close to Jobbik, in April 2015.7
ly media operations. See: Sinikukka Saari: “Pun’s Eurasian Union Iniave: Are the premises
of Russia’s post-Soviet policy changing?”, UIbrief NO9, 1 Nov 2011, accessed February 15, 2015
– hp://www.ui.se/upl/les/65793.pdf
6 “Spoveď Slováka, ktorý bojuje za proruských separatistov,” aktuality.sk, February 23, 2015,
accessed, February 25, 2015, http://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/271050/nevzali-ho-do-arma-
dy-siel-k-separatistom/
7“ Likvidálással fenyeget Jobbik-akvistákat egy ukrajnai csoport”, index.hu, April 24, 2015, ac-
cessed, April 27, 2015, hp://index.hu/kulfold/2015/04/24/likvidalassal_fenyeget_jobbik-ak-
vistakat_egy_ukrajnai_csoport/
12
• Russia is operating a remarkable (wartime) propaganda ma-
chinery on the extreme right-wing and/or conspiratory online
platforms and social media pages created in 2013 and 2014,
which combine pro-Russian attitudes with conspiracy theories
and anti-Western sentiments. One of the Russia-friendly media
personalities is known to have close ties with the godfather of the
Eurasianist ideology, Alexander Dugin.
• On the other hand, the Slovak extreme right is aorded little expo-
sure in the Russian media, as opposed to Hungary’s Jobbik, prob-
ably due to their weak institutional position and political support,
and their consequently weaker ability to lobby and spread pro-
paganda.
• However, the extensive Russian influence on the entirety
of the Slovak extreme right indicates that Russia has long-
term plans with the Slovak extremists. The colorful palette
of far-right players in itself fulfills the three major functions
of Russian influence:
1. smaller far-right parties legitimize the Russian regime;
2. neo-Nazi and paramilitary formations have an import-
ant potential for destabilization;
3. the different media channels connected to the Russian
far-right spread direct pro-Kremlin propaganda.
• Since a significant proportion of the Slovak public is known
to harbor Russia-friendly sentiments for historic and cultural
reasons, the pro-Russian messages, coming to them from the
extreme or the mainstream, have a receptive audience.
13
Political, economic and social environments
Slovakia’s geopolitical position
In Slovakia, we can nd a strong pro-Western and pro-Russian public at-
titude beside each other, and both have strong historical, political, and
social bases. While in the EU membership referendum back in 2004, up
to 92 percent of the participating voters voted for the EU membership,
and the majority of the Slovaks are still supportive of Europe,8 there is
a high level of popular sympathy to Russia within Slovak political elites
and population, even 25 years after the collapse of Communism. Where-
as the importance of the EU membership seems to be a matter of con-
sensus, popular support to NATO membership was lower in 1990s and at
the beginning of 2000s. However, since 2000 the overwhelming majority
of the political elite expressed their commitment to Slovakia´s accession
to NATO.9
At the same time, in terms of its relations with the Russian Federation
Slovakia was considered as a “friendly pragmatist” state; i.e. a country
with good relations with the Russian Federation, interested in economic
cooperation and avoiding open criticism towards Russia´s domestic and
foreign policy.10 The reluctance of Slovakia´s government to get involved
in any confrontation between the EU and Russia reects the public opin-
ion in the country.
Due to this crisis, the Slovak-Russian relations have become (once again)
a point of disagreement between the government and the opposition,
regarding the appropriate foreign policy attitude in Slovakia. Nonethe-
less, unlike before 1999 (in the Meciar-era) currently there is no political
party in the parliament that assumes open pro-Russian and anti-West-
ern position. The main pro-Russian political party represented in the Na-
tional Council of the Slovak Republic was the Slovak National Party (see
below).
8 According to the last public opinion survey carried by Eurobarometer (Autumn 2014) and
described in the “European Citizenship” report, 54 percent of respondent from Slovakia feel
attached to the European Union, i.e. above the EU average of 45 percent. Standard Euroba-
rometer 82 / Autumn 2014 – TNS opinion & social. Available online: hp://ec.europa.eu/pub-
lic_opinion/archives/eb/eb82/eb82_cizen_en.pdf, p. 10., accessed February 15, 2015
9 Therefore, this issue hasn’t become the matter of political conict in 2004, when Slovakia
joined the Alliance.
10 Leonard, Mark & Popescu, Nicu: “A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relaons.” Brussels: ECFR. , No-
vember 7, 2007, accessed February 15, 2015, hp://www.ecfr.eu/arcle/commentary_pr_rus-
sia_power_audit/, p. 36.
14
Still, in this reconguration of the geopolitical playing eld, the rela-
tionship between Eastern European states and Russia draws a greater
attention internationally as it is being reevaluated. Considering their in-
ternational position, due to their size, Poland and Romania carries the
most weight in Eastern Europe. At the same time, somewhat similar to
Hungary, Slovakia has merited greater attention among the V4 countries
because of its strongly critical attitude towards the EU sanctions against
Russia.
Slovak-Russian relations in a historical context
The Slovak public’s positive attitude towards Russia is shaped by the his-
torical role that Russia played in Slovakia’s past.
Relations with Russia played an important role in the shaping of Slovak
nationalism, which had emerged as non-state nationalism. As before
1918 Slovakia was a part of the multi-national Austria-Hungary, and
more precisely an integral part of the Hungarian Kingdom without a
distinct legal status, Slovak nationalism couldn’t be based on the tra-
dition of the statehood, but rather on the right for self-determination.
Tsarist Russia was perceived as the single independent Slavic nation at
that time, and Slovak political elites tried to seek their political allies
predominantly among other Slavic nations within or even outside Aus-
tro-Hungarian Monarchy. Therefore, the idea of Pan-Slavism, according
to Slovaks and other Slavic nations, is the union of Slavic nations – ini-
tially cultural11, later also political: Ľudovít Štúr was one of the leaders
of Slovak national revival after the defeat of the Slovak uprising in 1848-
1849. “Slavdom and the World of the Future”—was a political testament
written in 1851 by Ľudovít Štúr, who was the leader of the rst Slovak
National Council in 1848. This piece is considered to be one of the rst
declarations of the political and cultural unication of all Slavic peoples.12
Therefore, Pan-Slavism was not only a tool in the geopolitical strategy
of the Slovak national movement, which perceived Russia as a potential
11 Ján Kollár and Pavol Jozef Šafárik were the main ideologists of Pan-Slavism in the rst half of
19th century.
12 Subsequently, the ideas of anti-Western social conservatism contained in this book became
an inspiration for further generations of Slovak politicians in 19th and at the beginning of
20th centuries, associated with the Slovak National Party (e.g., Svetozár Hurban Vajanský). The
Slovak National Party had been established in 1871, predominantly as the political represen-
tation of Slovak protestant intellectuals and it ceased to exist in 1938. There is no institution-
al, political, ideological, or personal continuity between the historical Slovak National Party
(SNS) and the Slovak National Party, founded in 1990. Kopeček, Lubomír: Polické strany na
Slovensku 1989 až 2006. Brno : CDK 2007, p. 414. Štúr, Ľudovít: Slovanstvo a svet budúcnos.
Bratislava: SIMŠ 1993.
15
ally to help Slovak nationalism against the Hungarian government, but it
was considered to be an integral part of the Slovak national and cultural
identity at the time.
Another signicant historical development, which continues to inu-
ence Slovak-Russian relations to this day, is the liberation13 of Slovakia
by the Red Army and the political and material support provided by
the Soviet Union to the Slovak National Uprising in August 1944. As op-
posed to Hungary or Poland, Soviet troops left Czechoslovakia after the
war. However, the deportations of thousands of citizens of Slovakia to
the GULAG in 1944-1945, the Stalinist persecutions against the Catholic
Church and other churches, the persecutions of peasants and the old,
pre-war “intelligentsia” heavily aected Slovak society. Even the Slovak
national communists (later Secretary General of Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia and President of Czechoslovakia), such as Gustáv Husák,
Ladislav Novomeský and others who were among the leaders of the Slo-
vak National Uprising, became the victims of Stalinist persecutions.
On the other hand, the years following World War II were a period of
rapid industrial modernization of the country. These developments con-
tributed to the change of the initially negative perception of Commu-
nism within the Slovak society. Despite the fact that the last free election
in 1946 was won by the non-communist Democratic Party, reaching 63
percent of the votes,14 ten years later, during the Hungarian revolution,
the Slovak society remained passive and support for democratization in
1968-1969 during the uprising was much lower in Slovakia compared
to the Czech Republic.15 The critical distance to the Communist regime
in certain segments of the Slovak society was not transformed into an-
ti-Russian nationalism. Moreover, the anti-Westernism and anti-liberal-
ism, which were the components of some parts of the Slovak nationalist
politics in 19th century and in the rst half of 20th century, coincided with
the hardline communist ideology.
While there were intensive protests against the Soviet intervention
in August 1968 on the streets of Bratislava and other Slovak cities and
towns, the federalization of Czechoslovakia and the establishment of
the Slovak Socialist Republic in October 1968, just two months after the
occupation, contributed to the passive reaction of the Slovak society to
the upcoming period of so-called “Normalization.” The intensity of purg-
13 The fact that it was liberation rather than occupation was never questioned. Košice (hither-
to occupied by Hungary) was liberated on January 19, 1944; Bratislava on April 4; and on the
following day the Czechoslovak government was established in Košice.
14 Barnovský, Michal: Na ceste k monopolu moci. Bratislava : Archa 1993, p. 97.
15 Sikora, Stanislav: “Rok 1968 apolitický vývoj na Slovensku.” Bratislava : Pro Historia – His-
torický ústav SAV 2008.
16
es under “Normalization” in Slovakia was lower, and the real opponents
of the regime were weaker compared to the Czech Republic. However,
even the dissident movement in Slovakia was weaker than in the Czech
Republic, and it was caused by the continuation of the positive social
and economic trends of 1950s and 1960s in the modernization of Slo-
vakia. On the other hand, the federalization of ČSSR became a window
of opportunity for a high number of younger and educated people to
secure jobs in Slovak national or federal institutions.16
As a consequence of the modernization, the nostalgic sentiments to-
wards communism remained strong. While about 90 percent of Slovak
citizens agreed with the departure of the Soviet troops, the end of the
communist regime in 1989 was viewed positively only by 57 percent of
respondents in 2000.17 The period of 1970-1989 was assessed as the best
period of the Slovak history.18,19 Other data reect that the extent of ap-
proving the necessity of both political and economic reforms in 1989
was also lower in Slovakia compared to the Czech Republic and Poland,
but it was slightly higher than in Hungary.20
Consequently, current Slovak-Russian relations represent a multi-layer
phenomenon, which contains not only foreign policy, but also histori-
cal elements of economics and security. After 2000, in connection with
the upcoming EU-accession of Slovakia the role of Russian Federation in
Slovakia´s domestic politics arguably decreased. Since the emergence
of Ukrainian crisis in 2013-2014 the relations with Russia became an
important and divisive topic again. The current Slovak government is
aware of the need to stabilize the situation in Ukraine, as well as protect
16 Marušiak, Juraj: “The Normalisaon Regime and its Impact on Slovak Domesc Policy aer
1970”, Europe-Asia Studies. December 2008, Volume 60, Issue 10, pp. 1805- 1825.
17 Gyarfášová, Oľga: “Individuálna historická pamäť.” In: Gyárfášová, Oľga – Krivý, Vladimír –
Velšic, Marián et al., Krajina v pohybe. Bratislava : Inštitút pre verejné otázky 2001, pp. 251
– 264.
18 Pekník, Miroslav et al.: Verejná mienka a polika. Historické vedomie slovenskej spoločnos.
Bratislava: Veda 2006, p. 44.
19 According to the public opinion polls conducted by the Institute of Political Science of the
Slovak Academy of Sciences in 2003. Saimilar data was presented in the survey conducted
by the non-governmental Institute of Public Aairs, according to which in November 2004
the number of the respondents who perceived the communist regime positively before
the regime change in 1989 was slightly higher (39 vs. 38 percent). Source: Bútorová, Zora –
Gyárfášová, Oľga – Velšic, Marián: “Verejná mienka.” In: Kollár, Miroslav – Mesežnikov, Grigorij
(eds.): Slovensko 2004. Súhrnná správa o stave spoločnosti. Bratislava : Inštitút pre verejné
otázky 2004, pp. 301 – 334.
20 Bútorová, Z., Gyárfášová, O. (2009) “Return to Europe. New freedoms embraced, but weak
public support for assisting democracy further aeld” (Prague: PASOS), available at: http://
www.ivo.sk/6387/sk/studie/return-to-europe-new-freedoms-embraced-but-weak-public-
support-for-assisng-democracy-further-aeld, accessed February 15, 2015
17
its territorial integrity and its pro-European orientation. At the same time,
the government’s priority is to keep close and correct relations with the
Russian Federation as well.
Slovak-Russian economic ties
The Kremlin’s main economic inuence in Slovakia still relies on ener-
gy dependence, which Slovakia has not been able to really challenge
in order to diversify the country’s energy supply after the Communist
period. At the same time, there is a slight suspicion that another source
of economic inuence can be traced back to the surviving structures of
the Communist era, that are interested in keeping good economic ties
for their own benets. After the transition, Slovak-Russian trade rela-
tions remained signicant and active in terms of energy supplies, since
Slovakia is almost unilaterally dependent on Russian oil, gas, and nucle-
ar-fuel imports. However, in the last decade, especially after the gas crisis
with Ukraine, some successful attempts have been made to increase the
share of gas supply between the CEE countries.
Trade
Russia belongs to the most signicant trade partners of Slovakia and the
economic dimension has been the only crucial component of the bilat-
eral relations, in particular in the post-accession period.
Taking into account the import of energy resources, Russia is the third
largest trade partner of Slovakia and it covers 7.5 percent of total trade
turnover of the country,21 while Slovakia belongs to the top 20 trade
partners of the Russian Federation. Due to the supply of energy and raw
materials, Russia´s share in Slovakia´s import was 8.2 percent in 2014.
Thus, the Russian Federation is in the third place, after Germany (14.9
percent) and the Czech Republic (10.4 percent). However, due to the
negative trends in Russian economy and the sanctions, the volume of
Russia´s import in 2014 dropped to 80 percent of the level in the previ-
ous year, 2013. The share of the Russian Federation in Slovakia´s export
is signicantly lower, only 3.2 percent (2014)22 , and it dropped to 81.5
21 Overview of Slovak Foreign trade for 2013, Ministry of Economy, accessed February 15,
2015, http://www.economy.gov.sk/zahranicny-obchod-2013/140725s
22 The main export destinations for Slovakia are Germany (22,1 percent), Czech Republic (12.8
percent), and Poland (8 percent), however exports to Russia are even lower than to Hungary
and Austria (both 6.1 percent), Italy (4.6 percent), France (4.9 percent) and the United King-
dom (5,2 percent).
18
percent compared to previous year. The persistent problem though is a
negative balance of Slovakia´s trade with Russia, and its amount in 2014
was 2836,5 million USD (approximately 2 529,6 million EUR).23
According to the ocial data provided by the Embassy of the Russian
Federation in Bratislava, the amount of Slovak foreign direct investment
in Russia during 2013 was 24 million USD (21,4 million EUR), the amount
of Russian investment in Slovakia was 34 million USD (30,3 million EUR).
Generally, despite the already important economic relations, and the
attempts of the Slovak government to increase the volume Slovakia´s
export to Russia, Russian investment into the Slovak economy is at quite
a low level.
Economic cooperation between Russia and Slovakia is coordinated on
the ocial level by the bilateral Slovak-Russian Intergovernmental Com-
mission for Economic, Scientic and Technical Cooperation (ISESC), co-
chaired by Russian Minister of Industry and Trade, Denis Manturov and
Slovak Minister of Economy, Pavol Pavlis.24 Activities of ISESC are supple-
mented by the Slovak-Russian Entrepreneurs Council (Slovensko-ruská
Podnikateľská rada - SRPR), founded in May 2007.25 The Council is com-
posed of entrepreneurs and companies interested in the development
of Slovak-Russian economic cooperation. Activities of the Council in-
clude legal and economic assistance, organizational support to various
events, support to and implementation of investment projects.
23 “Foreign trade detailed data in 2014.“ Bratislava: Statistical Oce of the Slovak Republic
2015; Ministry of Foreign and European Aairs of the Slovak Republic 2015; Obchodná ahos-
podárska spolupráca. Bratislava: Embassy of the Russian Federation in Slovakia 2015.
24 “Comment by the Informaon and Press Department on Sergey Lavrov’s working visit to Slo-
vakia”, The Ministry of Foreign Aairs of the Russian Federation, April 3, 2015, accessed July
31, 2015, hp://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/026E1EB919A30B6343257E1C00528ACA
25 SLOVENSKO - RUSKÁ podnikateľská rada , see at: http://srpr.sk/o-nas/
19
Table 1. Slovak imports from Russia26
2013
Imports from Russia(€) 6 064 352 470
Total imports (€) 61 598 493 086
Russian imports as a percentage of overall imports (%) 9.84%
The relevance of Russian imports (in order of importance) 3.
The most important products imported from Russia (based on BEC rating)
Fuels and lubricants – from materials (BEC 310) 91.97%
Industrial raw materials – processed (BEC 220) 3.89%
Industrial raw materials – from materials (BEC 210) 2.14%
Table 2. Slovak exports to Russia
2013
Exports to Russia (€) 2 554 872 126
Total exports (€) 64 652 411 452
Exports to Russia in percentage of overall exports (%) 3.95%
The relevance of Russian exports (in order of importance) 9.
The most important products exported to Russia (based on BEC rating 27)
Transport equipment and parts and accessories thereof / Parts
and accessories (BEC 530) 30.16%
Transport equipment and parts and accessories thereof / Pas-
senger motor cars (BEC 510) 24.05%
Capital goods/Parts and accessories (BEC 420) 17.75%
Capital goods (BEC 410) 11.27%
26 Our own calculation is based on Eurostat (EU trade since 1988 by BEC [DS-032655]) data-
base.
27See description of the rating process here: “Classication by Broad Economic Categories,”
unstats.un.org
20
Slovakia’s energy dependence
Unlike some other countries in the region, Slovakia did not diversify its
energy imports after the fall of communism. The country is almost unilat-
erally dependent on the supplies of crude oil and natural gas, but it also
needs the nuclear fuel to the power plants in Mochovce and Jaslovské
Bohunice. About 90 percent of Slovakia´s total consumption of energy
resources (oil, natural gas and nuclear fuel) is provided by the Russian
Federation.
There is a long-term contract for delivery of Russian gas is in place, signed
in November 2008 and valid until 2029. The Slovak government signed
a bilateral oil deal as well recently, in December 2014, which will provide
up to 6 million tons of oil to Slovakia for the next 15 years. 27 The new-
ly-signed deal took eect on January 1, 2015 and is scheduled to expire
on December 31, 2029. The contract also proposed an annual transit of
another 6 million tons of crude oil via Slovakia to third countries. The
oil will be delivered through the Druzhba pipeline (Friendship pipeline),
while – as a typical feature of the energy contracts with Russia – the oil
price was not revealed in the contract. The latest oil contract could not
only boost Slovakia’s oil revenues, but it also increases Slovakia’s impor-
tance as a regional energy hub, especially after the failure of the South
Stream pipeline project. During his 2015 June visit to Moscow, PM Rob-
ert Fico announced the connection of the gas pipeline Eastring linking
Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria to the Russian-sponsored
Turkish Stream and its prolongation, the Tesla pipeline28 through the Bal-
kan states in spite of the fact that the (Slovakian) EU commissioner for
energy issues Maroš Ševčovič announced that the Turkish Stream would
be blocked on the territory of EU. The initial aim of Eastring, presented
by the Slovak company Eustream, was to deliver gas from Central Eu-
rope to the Balkans and from the Black Sea coast to Central and Western
Europe29. The main aim of the PM’s trip to Moscow was to receive guar-
antees about the continuation of the payments for gas transit through
Slovakia after 2020, when Gazprom will stop the transit of Russia´s gas
through the territory of Ukraine.
27 “Russia, Slovakia ink major oil supply deal”, globaltimes.cn, December 5, 2014, accessed Feb-
ruary 15, 2015, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/895212.shtml
28 Tesla pipeline is the continuation of the planned Turkish Stream pipeline across the terri-
tories of Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Hungary, reaching the Baumgarten gas hub in Vienna.
29 Hirman, Karel:“Studený plynový závan z Moskvy. Konzervavny výber”, June 6, 2015, ac-
cessed July 31, 2015, http://www.konzervativnyvyber.sk/karel-hirman-studeny-plynovy-za-
van-z-moskvy/4140/
21
Table 3. Slovak and EU 28 imports of petroleum oil30 and
natural gas31 from Russia in 201332, 33
Value (€)
Share of imports
from Russia in total
extra-EU28 imports of
petroleum/gas (%)
Share of imports
from Russia in total
imports of petro-
leum/gas (%)
Slovakia,
petroleum 3 398 776 696 100.0% 99.7%
EU28, petroleum 99 160 929 595 33% 29%
Slovakia, gas 2 097 852 244 100.0% 82%
EU28, gas 17 472 466 881 46.0% 24%
Nuclear energy dependence
According to an analysis by the Atlantic Council,34 for most Eastern European
countries Russia holds a second ace in the energy politics game: nuclear fuel.
Five countries – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Ukraine
– rely almost entirely on Russian state-owned companies to fuel their nuclear
power plants. For these 80 million Europeans, the Russian state provides ser-
vices essential for around 42 percent of electricity production.
Slovakia continues to operate two nuclear power plants built on Russian tech-
nology. Additionally, the Russian company Rosatom participates in the con-
struction of the 3rd and 4th blocks of the nuclear power plant in Mochovce, and
is interested in enhancing the capacities of nuclear power plant in Jaslovské Bo-
hunice. Delivery of nuclear fuel is based on long-term contract signed in Novem-
ber 2008 valid until 2015, with the total value of the nuclear fuel to be delivered
amounting to 300 million USD (270 million EUR). The share of nuclear energy
was 52% of the total electricity production in 201335; for this, based on 2014 data,
392 tons of Uranium is required36. The main fuel supply provider is Russia.
30 Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, crude.
31 Natural gas in gaseous state.
32 Calculations based on the Eurostat (EU trade since 1995 by HS6) database.
33 Calculations based on the Eurostat (EU trade since 1995 by HS6) database.
34 “Europe’s Dependence on Russian Energy: Deeper Than You Think”, Atlantic Council, April 27,
2014, accessed February 15, 2015, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/
eastern-europe-s-russian-energy-dependence-deeper-than-you-think
35 “Slovak Republic”, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), accessed February 15, 2015,
http://www.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=SK
36 World Nuclear Association, accessed February 15, 2015, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/
Facts-and-Figures/World-Nuclear-Power-Reactors-and-Uranium-Requirements/
22
Other sources of economic inuences
The main Russian investment in Slovakia is Sberbank, which also ob-
tained the Central and Eastern European branches of the Austrian bank
Volksbank in February 2012. Another widely discussed possible Russian
investment in the Central European region is the project of the broad-
gauge rail from Košice to Vienna.37 Such a project was initially discussed
in the second half of 1990´s during the era of Mečiar. The idea came back
to life in 2005 and it was promoted by the rst government of Robert
Fico. However, the center-right governments and recently the opposi-
tion parties criticized this project, arguing this is not protable for Slo-
vakia.38,39 The general concerns are that the Russian-Slovakian economic
relations are connected predominantly with Russian state-owned com-
panies; therefore, they could be aected by the political decisions of the
Russian government.
The continuation of economic sanctions could heavily damage some
branches of Slovakia´s industry, e.g., the production of vehicles, as at
least a quarter of them is exported to Russia.40 Consequently, Slovakian
ocials have a critical attitude towards intensifying of sanctions. Accord-
ing to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of the Slovak
Republic, the direct impact of Russian embargo on European food ex-
port is 6 million EUR41. In some segments, the impact of sanctions is easy
to see: already in March 2015 the Railway Casted Components Compa-
ny announced the layo of 200 employees from its factory in Prakovce
(Eastern Slovakia) producing railway carriages for Russian Railways.42
The decreasing demand from the Russian Federation aected other
companies in Slovakia as well, some of which are situated in regions with
high unemployment rate (e.g., Prakovce, Tisovec, etc.).43
37 The section from Ukrainian-Slovak borders (Matovce) to Haniska near Košice has been con-
structed already in the communist era and recently it was used for transportation of iron ore
to the U.S. Steel Košice steelwork.
38 Liptáková, Jana: “The saga of broad-gauge rail line connues.” Slovak Spectator, 1. 9. 2014.
39 Broad-gauge railway is discussed in the Chinese “New Silk Road” program as well, however
until now China is rather skeptical of that project. Kaczmarski, Marcin: The New Silk Road: a
versale instrument in China’s policy. Warsaw : Centre for Eastern Studies (February 10, 2015);
Jedinák, Juraj: “Projekt širokorozchodnej železnice. Rozhlasová stanica Slovensko”. Rádiožurnál
Slovenského rozhlasu, June, 6. 2014.
40 “Sankcie pro Rusku by Slovensku uškodili“. STV 1, Správy RTVS, March 19, 2014, accessed
February 15, 2015, http://www.rtvs.sk/televizia/archiv/1/34837
41 “Sankcie pro Rusku stáli slovenský agrosektor 6 miliónov eur“, TASR, October 15, 2014
42 Krajanová, Daniela: Zlievareň v Prakovciach prepustí vyše polovicu ľudí. Denník N, 18. 3.
2015.
43 The unemployment rate in Slovakia was 13.95 percent in February 2015.Central Oce of
Labor, Social Aairs and Family. Bratislava 2015.
23
Military cooperation
Since Slovakia inherited some Russian military equipment, such as ght-
er jets and helicopters, Russian companies continue to provide services
and upgrades in order to keep them operational. Slovak Ministry of De-
fense and RSK MiG signed a contract in October 2011 for servicing and
upgrading of a eet of 10 Slovak MIG-29 ghter jets.
There was also a protable business in arms imports from Russia as part
of the compensation for Soviet-Russian government debt. As Milan Nič,
managing director of the Central European Policy Institute noted, “this
was done by the same people who have been around since Mečiar’s
time,” the most famous of them being Miroslav Výboh,44 who made
deals with most of the governments since Mečiar (including Dzurinda’s).
Výboh is often mentioned as one of the chief sponsors of the ruling
Smer-SD. The military cooperation was the topic of the Slovak-Russian
bilateral talks during R. Fico´s visit to Moscow in June 2015.45
Slovak-Russian diplomatic relations
Slovak diplomacy after the Communist regime change used to be geo-
politically double-faceted for many years, since the political leadership
and elite both endorsed the country’s integration into the Western struc-
tures, and its own path of a “bridge”-like role between East and West –
with the Western geopolitical integration prevailing after 2000.
Generally, the diplomatic relations between Slovakia and the Russian
Federation have been good. There has been a bilateral visa agreement
between the two nations since 2001; it was adjusted to the Schengen
rules in 2007.
Since the rst years of Slovakia´s independence, there were two main
foreign policy approaches. The rst one, which was shared by the nation-
al-populist political parties (Slovak National Party and the anti-Western
44 In 2013, the Austrian Public Prosecutor’s Oce began to investigate a bribery case involv-
ing Výboh; even well-informed Slovak sources knew nothing of the outcome.
45 As some military systems, as for example mechanized infantry combat vehicle, missile sys-
tem S-300 and Mi-17 helicopters are still part of the Slovakia´s military equipment, Slovakia is
interested in their servicing and upgrading. “R. Fico: Spolupráca s Ruskom bude pri vojenských
systémoch, ktoré máme”, teraz.sk, June 5, 2015, accessed February 15, 2015, http://www.teraz.
sk/slovensko/r-co-spolupraca-s-ruskom-bude-iba-p/138887-clanok.html
24
wing of the Movement for Democratic Slovakia, led by Vladimír Mečiar46)
and by the leader of Christian Democratic Movement (1990-2000), Ján
Čarnogurský, advocated the vision of Slovakia as a geopolitical bridge
between the East and West, promoting the neutrality of Slovakia47.
The second concept of the opposition against Mečiar’s authoritarian
rule rather promoted membership with the EU and NATO. For Mečiar
the policy of close relations with Russia compensated for deteriorating
relations with the USA and EU member states. Already in July 1992 even
Mečiar suggested the possible closer cooperation with Russia. After the
adoption of the Declaration of Sovereignty of Slovakia he admitted that
“if they don’t want us in the West, then we´ll turn to the East.”48 Howev-
er, Mečiar´s calculations, grounded on Slovakia´s supposed geopolitical
“added value,” failed and Slovakia was not invited to the pre-accession
negotiations with NATO and EU in 1997, unlike her Visegrad neighbors,
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. According to the Slovak po-
litical scientist Alexander Duleba, Slovakia in 1994-1998 bought into
a “Russian view of the security architecture in Europe.”49 Additionally,
the former president of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin openly ex-
pressed the support of his country to Mečiar on the eve of parliamentary
elections in Slovakia in September 1998,50 which ultimately led to the
end of the Mečiar-era.
The establishment of the broad right-left coalition government led by
M. Dzurinda abandoned the course of rapprochement with the Russian
Federation, and its priority became an acceleration of the integration to
EU and NATO. Closer ties with Russia were pursued by only two minor
parliamentary political parties – Slovak National Party or SNS and rad-
ical-left KSS (Communist Party of Slovakia). However, the pro-Western
turn of Slovakia’s foreign policy and its accession both in the EU and
NATO were not followed by deteriorating relations with the Russian
Federation. Relations remained good but pragmatic, focused mostly
on economic relations, and continued in spite of Slovakia´s active sup-
port of the EU and NATO integration eorts of Ukraine and activities of
democratic opposition in Belarus. In the “Medium-Term Foreign Policy
46 Vladimír Mečiar was the Prime Minister of Slovakia in 1990-1991, 1992-1994 and 1994-1998.
47 In fact, Čarnogurský promoted the EU-membership, while opposing Slovakia´s NATO mem-
bership.
48 Marušiak, Juraj: “Slovakia´s Eastern Policy – from the Trojan Horse of Russia to ‘Eastern Mul-
tivectoralism’.” Internaonal Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Aairs, Vol. XXII, No. 1–2, 2013, p. 43.
49 Duleba, Alexander: The blind pragmasm of Slovak eastern policy. The actual agenda of Slo-
vak–Russian bilateral relaons ., Braslava: Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Asso-
ciation, 1996, pp. 28- 29.
50 Jeľcin Mečiarovi: “Chceme, veľmi-veľmi chceme, aby ste vyhrali voľby”, Sme, May 29, 1998,
pp. 1, 2, 5, 7.
25
Strategy of the Slovak Republic until 2015,” the Russian Federation was
mentioned only in the context of supporting EU eorts to create four
common spaces.51 Slovakia actively backed the U.S. invasion of Iraq and
its military troops participated in the post-war administration of Iraq.
Furthermore, Slovakia supported the Orange Revolution in Ukraine as
well. Both cases were perceived by the Russian Federation in a negative
way, but did not make a negative impact on the bilateral Slovak-Russian
relations. This was one of the reasons why the summit of the presidents
George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin took place in Bratislava in February
23-25, 2005.
In spite of the replacement of the center-right government of Dzurinda
by a center-left one, led by the leader of Direction – Social Democracy
party Robert Fico, after the parliamentary elections in 2006 the main
trends of Slovakia’s foreign policy continued.
The main change took place on a symbolic level with Prime Minister Fico
underlining the common Slavic identity of both countries in the bilateral
Slovak-Russian relations. Fico’s government also supported some proj-
ects of the bilateral economic cooperation, mainly in the eld of energy
and infrastructure policy (for example, broad-gauge railway from Košice
to Vienna, supply of the nuclear fuel for Slovakia´s power plants, creation
of the research facility “Cyclotrone centre,” etc.).
At the same time, Slovakia has become an active promoter and partic-
ipant of the EU Eastern Partnership Program.52 The eort of Slovakia´s
diplomacy in 2009 was to overcome the negative stance of Russia to
this program. The Minister of Foreign Aairs of Slovak Republic Miroslav
Lajčák repeatedly described Eastern Partnership as a “pragmatic project”
and he didn’t exclude the participation of the Russian Federation in cer-
tain activities within its framework.53,54 At the beginning of 2009, bilateral
relations between Slovakia and Ukraine came to a crisis, as Fico blamed
51 “Medium-Term Foreign Policy Strategy of the Slovak Republic unl 2015”, National Council of
the Slovak Republic, Bratislava, 2004.
52 The EaP‘s aim is the enhancement of the cooperation of the former European republics of
USSR (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) with the EU.
53 “Vystúpenie M. Lajčáka na Moskovskom štátnom inštúte medzinárodných vzťahov”, Ministry
of Foreign Aairs of the Slovak Republic (September 8, 2009). 56 “Vystúpenie ministra zah-
raničných vecí SR M. Lajčáka na Univerzite Mateja Bela v Banskej Bystrici”, Ministry of Foreign
Aairs of the Slovak Republic (November 4, 2009).
54 Probably Lajčák´s statements had a certain impact on the position of the Minister of Foreign
Aairs of RF Sergey Lavrov, as in November 2009 he admitted Russia´s involvement in certain
projects of the EaP.- “Lavrov: Rusko by sa mohlo zapojiť do Východného partnerstva EU,” SITA
(November 25, 2009).
26
Kyiv for the gas conict that resulted in cuts of gas supply to Central
European countries. These events had an impact on Fico´s stance on
Ukraine even during the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, when he characterized
Ukraine as a non-reliable partner.55
Both governments of Iveta Radičová (centre-right, 2010–2012) and Fico,
who came back to power after the early elections in March 2012 and
received an absolute majority in the parliament, continued the policy
of active Slovak involvement in the Eastern Partnership and support-
ed the dialogue between EU and Ukraine regarding the signing of the
EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. The manifesto of the current Slo-
vak government understands the Eastern Partnership as a framework
for “enlargement of the area of stability” and it recognizes it as a foreign
policy priority. Furthermore, according to the document, Ukraine is per-
ceived to be on an equal level as other neighboring EU member states,
while the government declared its aim to develop bilateral relations with
the Russian Federation and other BRICS countries as well.56 Almost im-
mediately after the early election of 2012 PM Fico dened the EU as “the
source of political, economic and social security of Slovak citizens” and
he highlighted the commitment to continue to honor Slovakia´s obliga-
tions to NATO.57
Although Fico was interested in keeping the good relations with the
Russian Federation, the Minister of Foreign Aairs of Slovakia Miroslav
Lajčák and Minister of Culture Marek Maďarič criticized the punishment
of Pussy Riot members58 Paradoxically, the previous government led
by Radičová, which was regarded as much less pro-Russian than Fico’s,
didn’t address any critical remarks regarding presidential and parliamen-
tary elections in the Russian Federation in 2011 and 2012.
55 “Na sankcie voči Rusku nie je dôvod, tvrdil Fico v Bruseli”, SITA (May 28, 2014).
56 “Manifesto of the Government of Slovak Republic.” Bratislava : Government Oce of the
Slovak Republic, May 2012.
57 Statement by H.E. Robert Fico, Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic at GLOBSEC 2012.
Braslava : Global Security Forum, April 12, 2012, accessed February 15, 2015, hp://www.
vlada.gov.sk/prejav-predsedu-vlady-sr-roberta-ca-na-fore-globsec-v-anglickom-jazyku/
58 Tódová, Monika: “Fico o rozsudku pomlčal, ostatní nie”, Sme, August 17, 2013.
27
Russia’s perception in the Slovak public
While the Slovak public may be cast as being one of the most Russophile
among the European countries under normal circumstances, the recent
crisis in Ukraine seems to have seriously altered this positive sentiment
for the time being. This being said, nationalist and far-right actors can
still use this sentiment to their political advantage.
After the Velvet Revolution and its drastic economic changes, the
re-structuring of the whole economy resulted in a high level of unem-
ployment and nostalgia for the stability in the communist era, mixed
with nationalism, anti-Americanism, and hidden anti-Semitism in certain
parts of the Slovak population. This rejection of “Western culture and val-
ues” (often portrayed in a distorted way) prompted a search for alterna-
tive societal models and values. After 2000, Putin as a strong authori-
tarian leader, describing the world events through the prism of conict
between the Euro-Atlantic (Western) and Euro-Asian (Russian) doctrine,
provided a perfect model for groups that buy into this anti-Western nar-
rative due to its conservativism, protection of “traditional Christian val-
ues” and rejection of certain aspects of modern society (rights of LGBT
people, liberal values, etc.). As a result, Russia became a very attractive
model for relatively large segments of population.
According to available public survey results, Slovaks are in general less
inclined to be pro-US and more inclined to have pro-Russian attitudes
than Europeans on average. These nding are well demonstrated in a
2013 GMFUS Transatlantic trends survey: only 38 % of Slovaks described
strong U.S. leadership in world aairs as desirable, compared to 55% of
Europeans. On the other hand, almost the same percentage of Slovaks
(39%) described strong Russian leadership in world aairs as desirable,
compared to 27% average on EU level. Overall Russia was favored the
most in Slovakia (58%) among all the surveyed countries.59
However, the Ukrainian crisis highlighted certain political polarization
regarding Slovak-Russian relations, not only on the level of political elites,
but also within the society. According to a public opinion poll conducted
by Focus agency and the Slovak think-tank Institute for Public Aairs in
July 2014, the majority of respondents (83%) think that “Ukraine should
choose its future in a democratic way and Russia should not intervene in
59 “Transatlantic Trends, Country Summaries 2013”, GMFUS, 2013, accessed July 17, 2015,
http://trends.gmfus.org/les/2013/09/Country-summaries-edit2.pdf
28
it.”60 Only 19 percent of Slovaks agreed with the statement that Ukraine
is a part of Russia´s sphere of inuence and approved Russia´s right of
intervention, while almost two-thirds of respondents (64%) disagreed
with it. At the same time, 59 percent agreed that NATO membership for
Slovakia is the guarantee for security;61 however, only 46 percent agreed
with enhancing of the NATO military presence in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, whereas 36 percent were against it.62
Similar contradicting data about Ukrainian changes and confrontation
with Russia was conrmed by the survey conducted again by Focus
agency and Slovak Foreign Policy Association in October 2014. Accord-
ing to the study, it seemed that Slovak citizens accept Ukraine’s pro-Eu-
ropean choice, however they are rather skeptical of the Ukrainian gov-
ernment’s capacities to manage this mission, and thus the public was
reserved to Slovakia´s active contribution to this process.63
On the one hand, 66 percent of respondents agreed with the statement
that the Ukrainian government has the right to implement reforms,
which will bring Ukraine closer to the EU. On the other hand, almost half
of Slovakia´s population (48%) thought that Ukraine should grant high
degree of autonomy to the eastern regions of Ukraine with the high
share of Russian-speaking population. However, the issue of Slovakia
actively backing Ukraine´s approach of the EU has a support of only 45
percent of respondents.
However, the Slovak society is not willing to confront Russia; only 25
percent of the population think that the Slovak politicians “should be
more critical and decisive to Russia,” whilst 54 percent disagree with such
statement. In spite of eventual evidences of a direct Russian interven-
tion in Ukraine, almost one half of the respondents (49 percent) suppose
that Slovakia should keep active relations with Moscow. Sanctions are
supported only by 27 percent of the population, and the deployment of
NATO facilities in Slovakia was approved only 17 percent of respondents.
60 Including 81.2 % of the voters of the ruling party Smer-SD.
61 The same number of respondents accepted Slovakia´s duty to participate on the defense of
any NATO member state in case of Russian aggression.
62 Diversification of the unilateral energy dependence on Russia was supported by 71
percent of respondents. Piško, Michal: “Ruské zasahovanie na Ukrajine Slováci neschvaľu-
jú”, Sme, June 23, 2014.
63 Duleba, Alexander: Kríza na Ukrajine ako impulz pre východnú poliku SR a EÚ. Bratislava:
RC SFPA 2014, p. 8-19.
29
Another public opinion poll, conducted in Autumn 2014 by the Insti-
tute of Sociology of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, focused on anoth-
er geopolitical ambiguity in the foreign policy orientation of the Slovak
population. More than one half of Slovak citizens (and the majority of
the voters of Smer-SD) preferred a foreign policy approach based on
the balance between East and West (59.5% of the entire population
and 50.3% of respondents under 35 years). In spite of the high support
of this position, only 3 percent of respondents considered Russia as
culturally most similar to Slovakia (compared with 4% in 1996), while
almost 24 percent of the population considered Russia as the coun-
try that represents the main threat to Slovakia (34% in 1996). These
results clearly reect the ongoing conict in Ukraine and its ambient
impact on public opinion, as almost the same number of respondents
(22%) perceived Ukraine as the main threat. At the same time, the fear
caused by the war in Eastern Ukraine overshadowed the historically
rooted perception of Hungarian menace. Whereas in 1996 as high as
40 percent of Slovak citizens perceived Hungary as the main threat, in
2014 their number dropped to 5 percent.64
Ipsos carried out a survey in the V4 countries in May 2014, commissioned
by Greenpeace,65 focusing on energy dependence. One of the questions
referred to the extent to which the respondents thought the energy de-
pendence of their country on Russian import was problematic. 79 per-
cent of Hungarian respondents thought this dependence to be prob-
lematic, while an even greater percent of Polish people (88%) shared this
opinion. Among the Slovaks (70%) and the Czechs (65%), fewer respon-
dents thought that such dependence was a denite a problem.
64 “Prvé výsledky výskumu ISSP Slovensko 2014“, Instute of Sociology, Slovak Academy of Sci-
ences Braslava,(March 3, 2015).
65 “Energetics – international poll”, Greenpeace-Ipsos, June 2014, accessed February 15,
2015, http://www.greenpeace.org/hungary/PageFiles/619385/Ipsos_for_Greenpeace_re-
port-17062014.pdf
30
Figure 1. Energy dependence attitudes in V4 countries, 2014
To what extent do you think that your country’s dependence on Russian im-
port of energy carriers (natural gas, petroleum, coal, uranium) is a problem?
As a consequence of the crisis, the Eurosceptic tendencies of Slovak
public opinion have strengthened for a while, then started decreasing
sharply after June, 2014. According to a Eurobarometer survey con-
ducted in May 2015, almost half of Slovakia’s population tended to trust
the European Union, while 28% said that they tend not to trust the EU
(Eurobarometer surveys – Trust 2015).66 Although, the lack of trust has
been on the rise since the accession, particularly between 2009 and
2013, the latest crises (for example the war in Ukraine) must have made
the case for common European institutions, so lately more Slovaks tend
to have condence in the EU. In terms of membership, the opinion of
the Slovak population is not as divided: in May 2011, 72% of the respon-
dents thought that all in all Slovakia beneted from EU membership,
while only 22% shared the opposite viewpoint (Eurobarometer surveys
– Membership, 2011).67
66 Standard Eurobarometer Surveys 19-82, 1983-2015, accessed November 25, 2015, http://
ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/showchart_line.cfm?keyID=2193&nationID=26,&start-
date=2004.10&enddate=2015.05
67 Standard Eurobarometer Surveys 19-82, 1983-2014, accessed February 15, 2015, http://
ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/showchart_line.cfm?keyID=6&nationID=26,&start-
date=2004.10&enddate=2011.05
31
Figure 2. Eurobarometer survey - Trust, 2015
The ambivalence of the Slovak public regarding the international rela-
tions, the above mentioned anti-Western sentiments create a fertile
ground for the Kremlin’s information warfare in Slovakia, often echoing
conspiracy theories blaming the West.
32
Slovak mainstream politics in the 2013 –
2015 Ukraine crisis
The Slovak government’s behavior in the Ukrainian crisis clearly showed
the limits of the pro-Kremlin politics in Slovakia. While PM Robert Fico
does rhetorically support Moscow on several issues, he also complies
with the common European policies. Slovakia provided, without publi-
cally advertising it, substantial energy, humanitarian and non-lethal mil-
itary aid to the Ukrainian government and society.
Slovakia, as one of the like-minded countries of Eastern Partnership,
supported the process of EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, provided
transformation aid to Ukraine and together with Poland insisted on the
need to keep a “critical dialogue” with Ukraine, even during the malfunc-
tioning of democratic institutions and violation of human rights during
the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych since 2010. The decision of his ad-
ministration from November 2013 not to sign the Association Agreement
on the upcoming Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius was initially met
with surprise; however, the National Council of the Slovak Republic (Slo-
vak Parliament) declared the support of the EU integration ambitions of
Ukraine, articulated by the protesting citizens on Maidan Square in Kyiv.
Slovak parliamentarians stressed their demand for a peaceful solution of
the political situation in Ukraine.68 In the meantime, Fico stated that the
decision regarding EU membership is Ukraine’s domestic aair, and he
indirectly criticized the policy of EU towards Kyiv due to the loans and
projects oered to Ukraine.69
The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation also raised nega-
tive reactions among Slovak political elites. Both the government and
the parliament expressed their support for the territorial integrity of
Ukraine; the National Council of the Slovak Republic didn’t recognize
the Crimean referendum as it was “in contradiction with the constitution
of Ukraine.” At the same Slovakia, in accordance with other EU member
states, condemned the incorporation of Crimea as the “violation of in-
ternational rights by the Russian Federation.”70 In sum, territorial integ-
rity of Ukraine and support of its pro-European orientation is a matter
68 Vyhlásenie NR SR ksituácii na Ukrajine. Uznesenie č. 956. Bratislava: NR SR, December 13,
2013.
69 “Fico: EÚ je do seba taká zamilovaná, že nič iné neexistuje”, SITA (December 3, 2015).
70 “Vyhlásenie NR SR k situácii na Ukrajine”, Uznesenie č. 1060. Braslava: NR SR, March 18,
2014.
33
of consensus among Slovakia´s political representation. Slovakia, as an
EU member state, joined the sanctions against the Russian Federation
as well. Prime Ministers of Slovakia and Ukraine Robert Fico and Arsenyi
Yatsenyuk, launched the reverse ow of gas from Slovakia to Ukraine on
September 2, 2014 through the gas pipeline Vojany – Uzhhorod, which
might provide 10 billion m3 of gas per year.71 The Slovak Prime Minister,
during his ocial visit to Kyiv, promised to increase the gas ow to 14.5
billion m3 per year.72 Fico also oered to increase transformation aid to
Ukraine as well as the number of scholarships to Ukrainian students at
Slovak universities.73
The Slovak government, in accordance with the position of Germany
and the Czech Republic, assumed a reluctant stance regarding Ukrainian
demands for supply of weapons, while Slovakia provides training to
Ukrainian military experts.74 Slovakia´s ocial humanitarian aid is desig-
nated to the Ukrainian Ministries of Defense and Health.75
However, the ocial standpoint of Slovakian authorities is to try to avoid
open confrontation with the Russian Federation. Slovakia was also reluc-
tant to support the sanctions, and opposed the intensication of sanc-
tions introduced against the Russian Federation. Milan Nič, managing
director of the Central European Policy Institute, explains this with the
fact that Smer’s leadership is divided on the Russian issue. Minister of
the Interior Robert Kaliňák and, interestingly, Minister of Culture Marek
Maďarič, leader of the nationalist faction, are both “Euro-Atlantists,” while
the post-communist “old guard” of Slovak foreign policymakers and for-
mer Speaker of the House Pavol Paška, who is rumored to have Russian
business ties, are, on the contrary, pro-Russian.
During the Slavkov summit on January 29, 2015 with the Prime Minis-
ter of Czech Republic Bohuslav Sobotka and Austrian Chancellor Werner
Faynmann, Fico again criticized the policy of sanctions against Russia
71 The reverse gas ow through the territory of Slovakia is a signicant contribution to the en-
ergy security of Ukraine in the conditions of potential attempts of the Russian Federation to
block gas import to Ukraine. The estimated amount of Ukrainian gas needs is about 25 billion
m3 per year. “Fico aJaceňuk spustili reverzný tok plynu na Ukrajinu,” SITA (September 2, 2014).
72 Which promise was reasserted by PM Fico to President Petro Poroshenko of Ukraine in June,
2015 before the Slovak PM’s visit to Moscow.
73 “Fico: Odmietame dať Ukrajine zbrane, konikt by sa len prehĺbil,” Pravda (February 6, 2015).
74 “M. Glváč: Slovenskí vojaci budú v rámci pomoci pre Ukrajinu školiť odmínovačov.” Braslava:
Ministry of Defense (September 25, 2014).
75 Čaplovič, Miroslav – Stupňan, Igor: “Slovensko pomohlo ukrajinským vojakom.” Pravda (Sep-
tember 12, 2014).
34
because they “didn’t stop the slaughter in Ukraine” up to that point.76
In February 2015, Fico stepped forth in favor of lifting the sanctions
against Russia in order to support the ceasere in Minsk II.77 During his
visit to Moscow in June 2015, the Prime Minister repeatedly opposed
the sanctions comparing the situation to the embargo against Cuba.78
A dierent stance towards the conict in Ukraine was presented by the
Slovak president Andrej Kiska, elected in 2014 with the support of cen-
ter-right opposition. During the NATO summit in Newport in September
2014, he expressed that “there is no doubt that in Eastern Ukraine, Rus-
sian soldiers are ghting.” He promised the creation of a NATO logistics
center in Poprad, which would include ammunition storage as well.79
However, PM Fico rejected the proposed idea to establish a permanent
military base.
Fico also opposed Ukraine’s potential membership in NATO. According
to him, the best solution for the conict would be economic and politi-
cal stabilization of Ukraine, but without the country’s accession to NATO.
The prime minister described the conict in Ukraine as a geopolitical
struggle between Russia and the USA. Furthermore, he stressed that the
bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 was a crime. Slovakia did not even rec-
ognize Kosovo.80
Fico argued that Slovakia had no chance to aect the extensive conict
in Ukraine,81 and therefore there was no need to increase military spend-
76 Palata, Luboš: “Slavkov, bermudský trojúhelník české diplomacie. Zahraničná politika”, zah-
ranicnapolitika.dennikn.sk, February 20, 2015, accessed February 15, 2015, http://www.zah-
ranicnapolitika.sk/slavkov-bermudsky-trojuhelnik-ceske-diplomacie/
77 Koník, Juraj: “Fico by zmiernil sankcie voči Rusku, veď vyrokovali prímerie.” Denník N, February
22, 2015.
78 “Fico: Sankcie Rusku škodia, zrušme ich”, spravy.pravda.sk, June 2, 2015, accessed July 31,
2015, http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/357071-co-v-rusku-nepotrebujeme-rin-
canie-zbranami-ani-sankcie/
79 “Kiska z útoku viní Rusov, NATO sme ponúkli sklad munície“, Sme (September 5, 2014).
80 However, Balázs Jarábik, associate fellow at the Spanish think tank FRIDE, said that it is com-
mon knowledge that “Slovakia’s rejection of Kosovar independence was borne out of sheer
domestic policy” (due to a suspicion of Hungarian initiatives for territorial autonomy, however
subdued they might have been).
81 Also Miroslav Lajčák, Slovakia´s Minister of Foreign and European Aairs of Slovak Republic,
who generally holds a pro-European Union view, in November 2014 stated that the EU un-
derestimated the political dimension of the situation in Ukraine. According to him “Russia is
too big than that it could be ignored”, while the policy of sanctions against RF is a tool of the
peaceful solution of the conict and he stressed that “Slovakia is a friend of both Ukraine and
Russia.”“Situáciu na Ukrajine sme nepochopili. Únia mala reagovať inak, vyhlásil Lajčák“, TASR,
November 2, 2014; “Slovak minister: All of EU should share burden of sanctions“, B92.net, Sep-
tember 18, 2014.
35
ing,82. Another gesture from Fico towards the Kremlin manifested itself
in the attendance of the celebrations of Victory Day in Moscow along
with the other only European leader, President of Czech Republic Miloš
Zeman. However, they didn’t attend the military parade, but chose to
take part in a bilateral meeting instead.83
Thus, the main desire of the current Slovak government is to keep at least
cordial relations with Russia to avoid confrontations, while, at the same
time, Fico is interested in stabilizing the political and security situation in
Ukraine. Additionally, Fico, and rather his party Direction – Social Democ-
racy, demonstrated their desire to become an acceptable partner both
for the Russian Federation and Ukraine by hosting the conference “Path
to Peace” on March 6–7, 2015 in Košice, organized by the German-Rus-
sian Forum, led by the former chairman of SPD Matthias Platzeck, who
is considered to be pro-Russian politician and chairman of the Ger-
man-Russian Forum business lobby. Representatives of pro-Russian
separatists from Donbass were present at the conference as well. Vague
results of the conference were caused by the absence of relevant SPD
representatives, who didn’t support the conference in an ocial way, as
well as by the absence of Fico, who withdrew his participation in the last
minute.84 Representatives of the Russian Federation, however, declared
their interest in the continuation of negotiations within the framework
of the conference. Indeed, according to member of State Duma Alexan-
der Petrov, Slovakia might play a role of mediator in the conict between
Russia and Ukraine85.
82 “Fico: Na Ukrajine hrozí veľký konikt, nemyslím ten vojenský“, Sme, December 2, 2014.
83 The representatives of other opposition par ties didn’t condemn Fico´s trip to Moscow, they
appreciated his decision to ignore the military parade on the Red Square in the context of
Russia´s involvement in the Ukraine crisis. “Provokace i splněný slib. Slováci hodno Fica v
Moskvě různě”, tyden.cz, May 11, 2015, accessed July 31, 2015, http://www.tyden.cz/rubriky/
zahranici/evropa/provokace-i-splneny-slib-slovaci-hodnoti-fica-v-moskve-ruzne_342468.
html#.VaEUVfntmko
84 “Pro-Russia conference to open in Košice”, Slovak Spectator (March 5, 2015); “The Košice
conference about Ukraine ended vaguely”, Slovak Spectator (March 9, 2015).
85“Ukrajina: Podľa Rusov by Slovensko mohlo byť mediátorom vzťahov “, June 6, 2015, accessed
July 31, 2015, http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/357569-ukrajina-podla-rusov-by-slov-
ensko-mohlo-byt-mediatorom-vztahov/
36
Kremlin’s inuence on today’s Slovak far-
right
The Slovak far-right political spectrum is quite fragmented due to the fact
that its most signicant party, and member of several governments in the
past, the Slovak National Party fell out the parliament in 2012 and from the
European Parliament in 2014 as well. Therefore, Russian inuence needs to
be assessed across several smaller parties and far-right organizations, all try-
ing to win over the nationalistic electorate which has been successfully mobi-
lized by the SMER-SD populist ideology during the last elections. The colorful
palette of far-right players in itself fullls the three major functions of Russian
inuence: smaller far-right parties legitimize the Russian regime; neo-Nazi
and paramilitary formations have an important potential for destabilization;
lastly the dierent media channels connected to the Russian far-right spread
direct pro-Kremlin propaganda. Currently, as a result, the most important de-
velopments mainly occur outside of the party arena with dierent paramil-
itary organizations being active in the current Ukrainian conict. Of course,
with the return of the nationalist, pro-Russian SNS in the 2016 elections (it
seems like it will happen) the political representation of strong pro-Russian
far-right can gain importance again.
Slovak National Party (SNS)
From the early ‘90s until this day, one the most vocal supporters of strong
Slovak-Russian ties was the Slovak National Party - SNS. SNS, which used to
be for many years the most important political subject of the nationalist far-
right, was re-established in 1990 as a continuation of the party originally es-
tablished in 1871 and discontinued during the Slovak wartime state in 1938.
SNS used to have a stable support around 5-8 percent in the parliamentary
elections, and was a member of several governmental coalitions, for example
during times of Meciar in the ‘90s, but also in the 2006-2010 period as a part-
ner of SMER-SD. Currently SNS is not represented in the Parliament, since its
support dropped below 5 percent in the 2012 elections.
SNS and its leaders may be characterized as openly anti-EU, anti-American,
xenophobic and pro-Russian. In the ‘90s, SNS was strongly against joining
the NATO and openly voiced preference for pro-Eastern and pro-Russian
orientation of the Slovak Republic. At this time, the party even had a coop-
eration agreement with the Russian Liberal Democratic Party.86
86 Bilateral relations of the Slovak Republic and the Russian Federation in context of integration
37
The pro-Russian orientation of SNS became even stronger after 2000, main-
ly through personal connection of then SNS chair Anna Belousovova, who
married a Russian businessman Alexander Belousov in 2001. Belousovova
also used to be the chair of the Administrative Board of Slovak-Russian
association until 2011, and she was awarded for her activities in this orga-
nization by the President of the Russian Federation Medvedev the Award
of Friendship among Nations. However, when it was part of the ruling co-
alition with Smer-SD and People´s Party - Movement for the Democratic
Slovakia (HZDS) from 2006 till 2010, it weakened its pro-Russian rhetoric
and didn’t argue against Slovakia´s membership in the NATO and EU.
In the context of the Ukrainian conict, SNS criticized the “one-sided ap-
proach of the EU,”87 was critical of EU sanctions against Russia,88 and used
the rhetoric of geopolitical conict and new Cold War with Russia.
Rafael Rafaj, then vice-chair of SNS,89 stated in April 2014: “The current
centrist leadership of the European Union is likely to have provoked the
conict in Ukraine and continues to support it, even risking political, eco-
nomic and perhaps even local military conict with Russia. This crazy plan
is caused by a real concern of the unionists (EU leaders) from the possible
loss of the majority in European Parliament elections and therefore losing
the European Commission. The reason for this is the growing inuence of
reform and Eurosceptic parties in Europe before the May EP elections.”90
Its current chair, Adrej Danko stated in his October 2014 statement that the
conict in Ukraine is the outcome of geopolitical struggle between Russia and
the US, and added: “The truth is that this conict, embargo and sanctions damage
Slovakia. Therefore, we should jointly and patriotic, regardless of right or left, de-
fend pro-Slovak national interests.”91
(Bilaterálne vzťahy Slovenskej republiky a Ruskej federácie v integračnom kontexte),
Masaryk University, June 17, 2010, accessed July 31, 2015,http://is.muni.cz/th/273714/
fss_b/bakalarka.txt
87“Rafael Rafaj: EÚ neskoro hasí separatistický oheň, do ktorého sama prilievala olej”, sns.sk, July
23, 2014, accessed February 15, 2015, http://www.sns.sk/nazory/rafael-rafaj-eu-neskoro-ha-
si-separatisticky-ohen-do-ktoreho-sama-prilievala-olej
88 “Rafael Rafaj: Slovensko by malo vystúpiť z mechanizmu sankcií proti Rusku”, sns.sk, August 11,
2014, accessed February 15, 2015, http://www.sns.sk/aktuality/rafael-rafaj-slovensko-by-ma-
lo-vystupit-z-mechanizmu-sankcii-proti-rusku/
89 Rafael Rafaj lost his vice-chair status in SNS in September 2014.
90 “Rafael Rafaj: Slovakia should not be dragged into a strategic cold war of Brussel with Russia”
(Rafael Rafaj: Slovensko by sa nemalo dať vtiahnuť do strategickej studenej vojny Bruselu s
Ruskom), sns.sk, April 15, 2014, accessed February 15, 2015, http://www.sns.sk/aktuality/ra-
fael-rafaj-slovensko-by-sa-nemalo-dat-vtiahnut-do-strategickej-studenej-vojny-bruselu-s-ruskom/
91 “Andrej Danko: Ukrajinský konikt nie je čierno-biely!”, sns.sk, August 30, 2014, accessed
38
The People’s Party - Our Slovakia (LSNS)
LSNS became the best known political party of the current Slova-
kian far-right. Its leader, Marián Kotleba is the prime example of a
successful transformation of an extremist with far-right roots into a
successful populist politician.
Originally, LSNS was registered as the party of friends of wine, and
changed its name and statutes in October 2010 into the People`s
Party - Our Slovakia. The official chairman of the party is Martin
Beluský, however the unofficial head, election leader and the best
known public representative of the party is Marian Kotleba. LSNS
used to be closely linked with the civic association Slovak Togeth-
erness (Slovenská Pospolitosť),92 but recently there was a split be-
tween the two due to opposing views regarding the current conflict
in Ukraine. LSNS describes itself as a political party based on (1) na-
tional and Christian traditions and values, with the main objective to
restore the Slovak Republic’s national character, and (2) a legal and
socially just state, based on the principles of direct democracy and
absolute freedom of thought. The party also expressed its strong op-
position to the EU and NATO.
The most important success of LSNS until today was the victory of
Marián Kotleba in the November 2013 regional elections, where he
gained 56% of the votes (70 000 votes overall) beating the SMER-SD
party candidate Vladimir Manka by a great margin.
For years Kotleba has been expressing his open anti-EU, anti-NA-
TO and pro-Russian attitudes. However, at that time it did not re-
ceive much attention. This has changed after he became the head
of Banska Bystrica self-governing region.93 Probably the best known
example of his open public support of the pro-Russian anti-West-
ern stance was his open letter addressed to the former President of
Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych in January 2014:
February 15, 2015, http://www.sns.sk/aktuality/andrej-danko-ukrajinsky-konikt-nie-je-cier-
no-biely/
92 LSNS was originally set up as a political wing of the SP.
93 Slovakia is divided into 8 self-governing regions. Mr. Kotleba was elected leader of the Bans-
ka Bystrica region in November 2013, when he was elected by some 70 000 votes.
39
“As a member of the Slavic nation, I fully understand what is now being
fought for in Ukraine. The European Union needs new markets and the
NATO terrorist organization is trying to move closer to the border of the Rus-
sian Federation. As a citizen of an EU Member State I can responsibly tell you
that the opening to the EU will not bring anything good to the Ukrainian
people. Ukraine will become just another huge market where there is no
place for the original Ukrainian goods. Production will be replaced by im-
ports and consumption, and hundreds of thousands of people will lose their
jobs. At the end of this process there will be anything but totally enslaved
Ukrainian people and the transfer of Ukrainian land into the hands of for-
eign investors.“ 94
This stance was repeated in the July edition of the party newsletter,
which described the situation in Ukraine as the outcome of the scenario
created by the EU and NATO, trying to get closer to Russia and under-
mine Russian security.95
Kotleba conrmed his open anti-American attitude also in August 2014,
when he displayed a banner on the seat of the self-governing region
with the title “Yankees go home - STOP NATO” during the celebration of
70th anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising in Banska Bystrica.
As for the distribution of pro-Russian sympathizers among far-right pol-
iticians, both SNS and Marián Kotleba’s even more extremist LSNS (The
People’s Party – Our Slovakia) have always professed such views. They
arguably “copy Russian narratives,” as Milan Nič, managing director of the
Central European Policy Institute, described their communication.
Despite these open public statements, there is no publicly available di-
rect evidence of LSNS’ links to Russian organizations, be it governmental
structures or others. Experts interviewed for this study agree that there
is no visible evidence of the main radical parties being funded from Mos-
cow; their Russophile and anti-Western declarations might stem mostly
from the political culture of “Slavic nationalism.” Despite the lack of ev-
idence of direct connections at the level of party leadership, there are
various connections of individual party members, or people aliated
with the LSNS, to Russia and pro-Russian organizations.
94 infonoviny.sk, January 31, 2014, accessed February 15, 2015
95“10 rokov paktovania s NATO”, Nase Slovensko, June-July, 2014, accessed February 15, 2015
40
Especially interesting is the alleged participation of Mario Reitman, a
38 year-old far-right extremist from Banska Bystrica, in the conict in
Ukraine on the side of pro-Russian separatists.96 He published on Face-
book a picture of himself in Russian-style military uniform and another
one of his Novorossija passport.
However, it is questionable whether he really fought in Ukraine or mere-
ly posted pictures and messages supporting pro-Russian separatists. Ac-
cording to the experts interviewed, Mario Reitman has ties to the Prešov
branch of LSNS,97 but he seems to simply be an adventurer with a crimi-
nal background, and he is too young to have Russian state security con-
nections in the rst place.
There is not much information about any ocial meeting between LSNS’
members and Russian stakeholders, but as Jarábik noted, it is rather
Smer-SD ocials, who y to Moscow regularly, and the Slovakian rad-
icals have no such spectacular Russian connections as the Hungarian
far-right party, Jobbik. The main reason might be the lack of widespread
national political support for the party.
Nation and Justice party (Národ a spravodlivosť - NaS)
NaS was established in 2011 as a project of Anna Belousovova, after be-
ing ousted from SNS. The party declares itself as “patriotic party” with-
out a left or right leaning. In the party’s campaigns and public speech-
es, Belousovova used rhetoric and issues similar to that of SNS: anti-EU,
anti-Americanism and anti-Roma. Belousovova continues to enjoy close
contacts with representatives of the Russian Federation. Additionally,
ocial Russian representatives participated in several events organized
by Ms. Belousovova, and she attended events organized by the Russian
embassy (a picture with then Ambassador Pavel Maratovič Kuznecov
testies to this).
Close aliation of NaS to Russia could also be illustrated with
the case of European Parliament elections. In preparation for the
EP elections in May 2014, NaS submitted a joint list of candidates
96 This was reported in the national media - TV Markiza on 22 August 2014, see “Ďalší Slovák
na Ukrajine má “za ušami”. Trestne stíhaný bol až sedemkrát!”, tvnoviny.sk, Agust 22, 2014,
accessed February 15, 2015, http://www.tvnoviny.sk/domace/1767982_dalsi-slovak-na-ukra-
jine-ma-za-usami.-trestne-stihany-bol-az-sedemkrat
97Prešovský kraj- Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko (ĽSNS)
41
with “Good Power” movement headed by Sergej Chelemend-
ik, a long-time publicist and journalist of Russian origin advocating
for stronger ties with Russia. The party’s election program stated:
“We are for the neutrality of Slovakia as the life-necessity for survival and
prosperity of the Slovak nation and the state. Neutral Slovakia means peace
for us and our children. We open the issue of real sovereignty of Slovakia
- only a strong and sovereign state [the Russian Federation] could protect
Slovakia. We are for friendly and brotherly relationship with Russia and
we would do everything in order for European Slavic nations would not be
dragged into suicidal war against brotherly Russian nation.”98
Anna Belousovova also confessed in the same election newspaper (in an
interview with Sergej Chelemendikov) her close emotional relation and
admiration of Russia:
“I have a very positive relationship towards Russia simply because my family
lives there, I had a husband from there, but not just because of that. I like the
Russian culture and I consider Russia to be the second country in my heart
after Slovakia. Of course, Slovakia is my homeland, but whenever I am in
Russia, I feel very well there (…). Russians are mentally close to me, unlike
in the West, where they think dierently, there are other priorities, people
behave dierently. In Russian everything is close to me, understandable, it
is simply mine.”
In regard to the conict in Ukraine she stated: “We do not want to be
dragged into a war against Russia for the benet of American capital.”99
Some evidence suggest closer relationship between NaS and the Russian
Orthodox Church, which seems to participate more and more in the infor-
mation (propaganda) warfare.100 In 2002, Russian businessman Alexander
Belousov, the late husband of Anna Maliková (Belousovova), began the
construction of a large Russian Orthodox Church building in Bratislava. Af-
ter his death in 2004, construction went on with unknown sponsors, and it
was nished in 2012. However, the church is unused now.
98 Quote taken from the Nation and Justice party’s 2014 European Parliament Elections Pro-
gram.
99 “BELOUSOVOVÁ: NENECHAJME SA VTIAHNUŤ DO VOJNY PROTI RUSKU V ZÁUJME KAPITÁLU
USA”, nas-ns.sk, accessed February 15, 2015
100 It is important to note that while in Hungary there is a whole diocese under the Moscow
Patriarchate, there is no such religious subordination present in Slovakia.
42
Table 4. Slovak far-right parties’ election results in general
and in European Parliament elections since the transition
(vote %)
Parties SNS LSNS NaS
Elections National European National European National European
1990 13.94
1992 7.93
1994 5.4
1998 9.1
2002 3.3
2004 14.15
2006 11.7
2009 5.55
2010 5.07 1.33
2012 4.55 1.58 0.63
2014 3.61 1.73 1.38
Source: www.statistics.sk
Table 4 clearly showcases that despite the disappearance of the far-right
from the parliament in 2012, the need for such parties did not vanish.
On the contrary, according to Political Capital Institute’s calculations, de-
mand for right-wing extremism in Slovakia has rather been on the rise in
the last years (see gure 3).
43
Figure 3. Demand for Right-Wing Extremism in Slovakia,
2005-2013101
If the Slovakian National Party gains representation in the Slovak parlia-
ment again after the 2016 general elections (which seems to be likely
according to preliminary polls), it can increase the inuence of Russia
on the Slovakian political landscape – most importantly, if they will be-
come a governmental party or support the government from outside,
but even if they will be in opposition.
Pro-Russian far-right extremist movements and para-
military organizations
The Slovak far-right militiamen’s actual participation in the military ac-
tivities in the separatist regions (along with some French, Serbian and
Spanish counerparts) poses a real security threat.
Slovak Togetherness (Slovenská Pospolitosť - SP)
SP was established in 1995 and belongs to one of the oldest far-right
extremist organizations with the status of civic association. In the years
of 2004-2008 the organization was the most important subject of the
extreme right and was a stepping stone for Marian Kotleba—SP’s leader
101 The Political Capital Institute designed the Demand for Right-Wing Extremism (DEREX)
Index using its own theoretical model and data from the European Social Survey (ESS), a
biannual study that tracks changes in societal attitudes and values in more than 30 countries
in Europe and the Middle East. See: hp://derexindex.eu/, accessed December 8, 2015
44
at that time—into the politics. SP became quite famous for its open ad-
miration of the fascist war-time state and the use of uniforms resembling
those of Hlinka Guard, fascist militia during war-time Slovakia. After 2010,
when LSNS was set up, SP leadership was handed over to Jakub Skra-
bak a known far-right radical and activist with links to neo-Nazi groups.
Under his leadership, SP adopted a dierent approach to some of the
world events, intensied its international cooperation with the Czech
Republic, Poland and Hungary. Rising tensions between SP and LSNS
manifested fully in 2014, when SP openly supported the Right Sector
by organizing a symbolic event in their support together with hooligans
from Slovan Bratislava,102 and issued condemnation of Putin as “slave of
the oligarchs.”103 More recently they supported actions of Battalion Azov,
aliated with the Right Sector.104
Slovak Revival Movement (Slovenské hnutie obrody -
SHO)
SHO is a civic association whose official aim is to “awake national
awareness in the Slovak nation.” In its discourse, SHO links its ideol-
ogy to historical public figures such as Ludovit Stur, Andrej Hlinka or
the president of fascist war-time state, Jozef Tiso. Important aspect
of its activities is cooperation with nationalist organizations in other
Slavic countries and the idea of unity of Slavic nations. SHO supports
Russia on both the political and ideological levels, and unlike other
far-right groups also supports president Putin and issued a special
T-Shirt with Putin in its online store.105
SHO interprets actions in Ukraine as a geopolitical necessity, triggered
by the West. Their support for Russia is also explained by the importance
of Ukraine for Russia. Actions of Russian armed forces in Ukraine are de-
scribed as a legitimate protection of the superpower status and Russian
national interests: “We need to understand that this is not just the policy
of Russia, but the policy of all superpowers on the planet. Did not the USA
break the UN Charter and its international obligations in 1999 when they
bombed with their NATO allies Yugoslavia without the mandate of the Se-
102 On 26 January 2014, Ultras Slovan Pressburg (German name for Bratislava used by hooli-
gans) in cooperation with nationalists from Bratislava organized an event to show solidarity
with Ukrainian nationalists ghting against the corrupt regime of Yanukovych, pospolitost.
wordpress, January 26, 2014, accessed February 15, 2015
103 pospolitost.wordpress, April 25, 2014, accessed February 15, 2015,
104 Slovenská pospolitost Facebook Page
105 SHO recently issued a T-Shirt portraying Putin as the hero – see separate resources.
45
curity Council? Was not the creation of independent Kosovo also a breach
of international law by the Euro-Atlantic powers under the guidance of the
US and the EU?106
In November 2010, SHO signed and ocial cooperation agreement with
the Russian umbrella organization Narodniy Sobor (National Union) rep-
resented by the head of Moscow regional department, Alexander Lap-
in.107 SHO was represented by the head of its international relations de-
partment, Marek Rusyniak, who has extended ties to various Russian and
pro-Russian subjects, and he is also an administrator of the Facebook
group called “Russian Combat”108 with some 20000 followers, which is
used extensively for spreading of pro-Russian propaganda.
Members of SHO participated in an extensive military-patriotic training
program organized by Russian paramilitary organization Stjag (member
of the Narodniy Sobor).109 SHO acknowledged cooperation with Stjag
also on its website in the partners section.110
Resistance Kysuce (Vzdor Kysuce – VK)
VK was, until recently, a far-right group with paramilitary character, mix-
ing extreme nationalism, chauvinism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia and
nativism with anti-EU, anti-NATO and anti-US attitudes, topped by con-
spiracy theories. Its best publicly known gure, Marián Magát ran in the
European Parliamentary elections on the Slovak People`s Party list, but
received only marginal support.
Magát openly admires National Socialism as a model for economic and
social order in the society. In regard to the conict in Ukraine, he labeled
the Ukrainian government as “Jewish Zionist scum”111 and further stated:
“Many think that the Right Sector is neo-Nazi and because it was involved
in the coup, also the government is neo-Nazi. What a mistake my friends!
The Right Sector was nanced by the West and if they could they would be
sweeping the synagogues, they have nothing to do with true nationalism.
106 sho.sk, March 3, 2014, accessed February 15, 2015
107 sho.sk, December 12, 2010, accessed February 15, 2015
108 Rusky styl boja
109 despiteborders.com, October 10, 2011, accessed February 15, 2015
110 See separate resources.
111See separate resources.
46
True nationalists are the separatists, they did not sell out and protect their
land with arms against nancial schemes aimed at forestalling the collapse
of the dollar monetary system.”
Slovak Conscripts (Slovenskí Branci - SB)
Slovenskí Branci (SB) came into existence in early 2012 and quickly be-
came the most important paramilitary group with patriotic and national-
istic character. It was set up by Peter Švrček (at that time 17 years old) af-
ter his attendance at a three week training course organized by Narodny
Sobor with ex-Spetsnaz instructors. Švrček is a prime example of the ac-
tive means used by Russian inuence and the transfer of political know-
how, as mentioned in our earlier Russian Connection analysis.112 SB at
rst accepted among its members several representatives of known far-
right groups and publicly acknowledged the need to prepare for internal
and external military threats. Later they tried to picture themselves as
mere patriots who wish to defend their country in the form of a volun-
tary national guard.
Formally SB was not linked to any other organization or political par-
ty, yet their Facebook page proves their sympathies to subjects such as
LSNS, SP or SHO. Although SB as a group does not carry out any activities
linking it to Russia, the pro-Russian stance is very visible among its indi-
vidual members, such as Jan Dovaľ, Tomáš Bičkoš, and others. Many of
them are fans of Facebook pages linked to Vladimir Putin or pro-Russian
separatist in Novorossija, and publicly display their sympathies.
The most direct link of SB to Russia is participation of Russian instructors
from Narodniy Sobor in several of SB’s trainings in 2012, and participa-
tion of several SB members at seminars of Russian Combat and summer
trainings in Russia.113
In early 2015 SB became a subject of focused media attention, following a
revelation that one of its founders and former members – Martin Keprta –
was interviewed by the Russian First Channel in Donbass as a member of
the International brigade no. 15 ghting in Doneck airport and Debalcevo.
112“The Russian Connection”, Political Capital, April 10, 2014 accessed February 15, 2015, http://
www.riskandforecast.com/useruploads/les/pc_ash_report_russian_connection.pdf
113 Since the SB online presence was reset in 2014 it is not possible to document this, however
at that time their facebook page included pictures of Russian instructors attending some
their trainings.
47
In this interview he stated: “This confrontation does not concern only Don-
bass, this is a war between Russia and NATO. It means that I am ghting here
actually also for my own country.”
After his identity was revealed, he was interviewed by several major na-
tional media114 and subsequently SB as such became a subject of public
scrutiny and debate. In their reaction, SB tried to distance from Kepr-
ta, claiming that their aims are legitimate and that SB resisted attempts
by other Russian organizations to gain control over SB’s organization.115
This might be seen as an attempt to repair their public image, since
other members of the SB leadership were seen at anti-NATO protests in
Bratislava in April 2015 and continued to post pro-Russian propaganda.
Slovak support for pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine
Other than the above-mentioned case of Martin Keprta, there is little
publicly available information regarding Slovaks ghting on the side
of pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine. Besides the cases presented in
the Slovak media (Miroslav Roháč,116 Richard Branicky117 and Mario Re-
itman) the Ukrainian organization “Mirotvorec” (peacemaker) monitor-
ing presence of foreign combatants ghting on the side of pro-Russian
separatists documented three other individuals from Slovakia ghting in
Ukraine or providing direct support to pro-Russian separatists.118
Aside from direct participation in the conict, several individuals orga-
114 “Spoveď Slováka, ktorý bojuje za proruských separatistov,” www.aktuality.sk, February 23,
2015, accessed February 25, 2015, http://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/271050/nevzali-ho-do-ar-
mady-siel-k-separatistom/. Interview with Donetsk People’s Republic army ocers Martin
Keprta – branik.blog.sme.sk, February 24, 2015, accessed July 31,2015
115 Interview with the leader of Slovak Conscripts Peter Švrček – branik.blog.sme.sk, March 8,
2015, accessed July 31, 2015
116 According to interview with Miroslav Rohač published in slovak daily Novy cas in September
2014, he was captured by Ukrainian Army during ghng in Ilovajsk, where he fought for the
DPR separast forces. He was taken prisoner and freed within the prisoner exchange programe.
“Exkluzívna spoveď Miroslava Roháča, ktorého väznila ukrajinská armáda: Bili ma po papuli a
pažbou do hlavy!”, cas.sk, September 23, 2014, accessed February 15, 2015, hp://www.cas.
sk/clanok/294181/exkluzivna-spoved-miroslava-rohaca-ktoreho-vaznila-ukrajinska-armada-bi-
li-ma-po-papuli-a-pazbou-do-hlavy.html
117 Richard Branicky ed Slovakia in order to avoid prison sentence for a fraud and joined DPR
forces. “Slovák Richard bojuje na Ukrajine po boku separatistov: Pre mňa už cesta nazad nie je!”,
cas.sk, September 23, 2014, accessed February 15, 2015, http://www.cas.sk/clanok/294227/
slovak-richard-bojuje-na-ukrajine-po-boku-separatistov-pre-mna-uz-cesta-nazad-nie-je.
html
118 Mirotvorec has his own webpage, see separate resources.
48
nize donations and delivery of material support to the pro-Russian sep-
aratists. One of the most known is “Peaceful Warriors” (Pokojní bojovníci),
whose activities were presented by the pro-Russian and communist me-
dia in Slovakia and Czech Republic119. Another example has to do with
Marián Farkaš, who became an “Ambassador” of the Novorossija in Slo-
vakia in November 2014,120 who provided an extensive account of his
journeys to Doneck with material support from Slovakia in a public event
organized by Zem a Vek magazine in March 2015,121 and was interviewed
by the Voice of Russia.
119 “Slováci pomáhají Novorusku”, halonoviny.cz, October 25, 2014, accessed February 15,
2015; “Slovenští Pokojní bojovníci pomáhají Donbasu”, news.e-republika.cz, February 8, 2015,
accessed February 15, 2015
120 “Marián Farkaš – ambasádor Putinovej Novorossije”, dennikn.sk, March 6, 2015, accessed
July 31, 2015
121 See separate resources youtube.com, March 30, 2015, accessed July 31, 2015
49
Russia in the contemporary Slovak public
discourse
Political discourse
If the foreign policy orientation of Slovakia, including the relations with
Russia, were not a subject of controversy, the recent crisis in Ukraine
would not have seriously challenged the consensus among the politi-
cal parties regarding the country’s active role in the Eastern Partnership
dialogue.
The ocial policy of Slovak government and Smer-SD party is in accor-
dance with the position of EU and NATO. However, another represen-
tative of this party, the head of the European Integration Committee
Ľubomír Blaha, who belongs to the younger generation of Slovak left-
wing politicians, sharply criticized the policy of EU towards Ukraine and
Russia. He highlighted the role of radical right during the Maidan and
the presence of fascist Svoboda (Freedom) party in the Ukrainian gov-
ernment after the overthrowing of Yanukovych.122 Blaha blamed the
West for “arranging a coup in Kyiv and legitimizing the government in
which fascists take part.” He also stressed that the inhabitants of Crimea
have equal rights “to practice disobedience against the government and
occupy the governmental oces.”123
He is opposing the policy of isolation of the Russian Federation and on
June 26, 2014 he took part in the Inter-Parliamentary Forum in Mos-
cow organized by the Speaker of State Duma, Sergei Naryshkin. Blaha
stressed the need for dialogue and suggested that the annexation of
Crimea by the Russian Federation is comparable with the recognition of
the unilaterally proclaimed independence of Kosovo, or the American
control of Guantanamo, or Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights.124 Ac-
cording to him, the sanctions against the Russian Federation are useless
because Russia will not abandon its vital interests, and the collapse of
Russian economy would provide a risk to Slovakia125.
122 Aktuality.sk (February 25, 2014).
123 Noveslovo.sk (March 2, 2014).
124 Noveslovo.sk (June 26, 2014).
125 Aktuality.sk (November 21, 2014).
50
Centre-right opposition criticized Fico and his party for their pro-Russian
stance, and some members of the Parliament from the neo-conservative
party of NOVA, led by the chairman Daniel Lipšic, visited Maidan at the
beginning of February 2014 and met the leaders of the contemporary
opposition.126 Opposition parties requested more radical actions against
the Russian Federation, and they also demanded more active Slovak in-
volvement in the military aid to Ukraine. Leader of the liberal Euro-skep-
tic party Freedom and Solidarity, Richard Sulík accused Fico of being a
threat to national security.127 In the meantime, as mentioned earlier, the
leader of extreme right The People’s Party - Our Slovakia and the chair-
man of Banská Bystrica region, Marián Kotleba expressed support to
Yanukovych in autumn 2013. He condemned Maidan as an attempt to
bring NATO nearer to Russia.128
Besides the traditionally pro-Russian Communist Party of Slovakia, which
has not been represented in the Parliament since 2006, the main advo-
cate of Russia´s policy towards Ukraine became the leaders of the NGO
“Slovak-Russian society,” Ján Čarnogurský and Branislav Fábry. Although
the former Slovakian Prime Minister Čarnogurský (1991-1992) received
only 0.64 percent of the votes in the March 2014 presidential elections
(i.e., less than candidate of KSS, Ján Jurišta),129 his organization received
a signicant coverage in the media. According to him, the annexation
of Crimea was a “return of the historical territory to Russia” and a conse-
quence of the violent overthrowing of Yanukovych.130 The organization
also participates in arranging a series of protest meetings against the
deployment of eventual NATO military bases in Slovakia.131
During the rst months of 2015, there is an observable radicalization of
the public discourse in Slovakia regarding the conict between Russia
and Ukraine. Already mentioned Čarnogurský was labeled by the liberal
daily Denník N (N Daily) as a “public enemy,”132 while the Slovak-Russian
Society, led by him, published a list of the most prominent Russophobes
126 Piško, Michal: “Lipšic rečnil na Majdane, Ukrajincom sľúbil rokovať opomoci.” Sme, 7. 2. 2014.
127 “SaS: Fico je pre národnú bezpečnosť riziko,“ Bratislava: Sloboda a Solidarita (March 24,
2014).
128 Vražda, Daniel: “Kotleba píše list ukrajinskému prezidentovi Janukovyčovi: Neustupujte.” Sme,
31. 1.2014.
129 Election of the President of the Slovak Republic, March 2014. Bratislava: Statistical Oce of
the Slovak Republic 2014.
130 Čarnogurský, Ján:”Krym patrí Rusku”, blog.sme.sk, March 21, 2014, accessed July 31, 2015
131 “V Bratislave sa dnes skandovalo proti umiestneniu základne NATO na našom území“, Aktual-
ity.sk (March 12, 2015).
132 Čikovský, Konštantín: “Je vojna a ľudia ako Čarnogurský nie sú na našej strane.” Denník N,
February 27, 2015.
51
in Slovakia.133 Several prominent persons of the public and intellectual
life, including former mayor of Bratislava Milan Ftáčnik, invited the Pres-
ident of Slovak Republic Andrej Kiska to attend the celebration of the
Victory Day on May 9, 2015 in Moscow.134 Respective internet petition
demanding the president’s attendance on Victory Day has been signed
by more than 700 people. Another group of public intellectuals and civic
activists addressed Kiska not to visit Moscow.135 As a result of this public
controversy, the President decided to celebrate the anniversary in Slo-
vakia at the military cemetery.136 Pro-Russian sentiments or criticism of
the Western involvement in Ukraine are spread not only by media, but
also mostly through social networks. There is a very wide and diversied
spectrum of activists, organization and websites promoting the Russian
view of the situation in Ukraine and the negative relations between the
Russian Federation and the West.
Kremlin’s propaganda in the Slovak media
There are no overt signs of Russian encroachment in the Slova-
kian mainstream media as opposed to some far-right mediums.
Still, as Morvay noted, Andrej Babiš, an ethnic Slovak137 who is
now Minister of Finances of the Czech Republic, has recently
bought Hospodárské noviny, the third largest serious daily paper
in Slovakia. In the Czech Republic, his firm Agrofert had bought
Mafra, the publishing company of the prestigious dailies Lidové
noviny and Mladá Fronta Dnes and incoroporated in that media
group the news portal Česká pozice (ceskapozice.lidovky.cz),
which appears to be a Russian mouthpiece, resembling the Hun-
garian Hídfő.138
133 “Denitívne výsledky ankety – Najhorší rusofóbi Slovenska“. Bratislava : Slovensko-ruská
spoločnosť, February 18, 2015.
134 “Rešpektujte hlas mierumilovných ľudí“, changenet.sk, accessed July 31, 2015
135 “Osobnosti vyzývajú prezidenta Kisku: Pozvanie od Putina odmietnite.“ Pluska, February 20,
2015.
136 “Kiska do Moskvy na oslavy nepôjde. Rusi očakávajú Fica,” (dőlt), aktuality.sk, March 18, 2015,
accessed April 12, 2015, http://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/272509/kiska-do-moskvy-na-oslavy-
nepojde-co-vraj-ucast-zvazuje/
137 Mr. Babiš with an alleged communist state security background won a court process in
June 2014, when a rst degree court ruling cleared him of the connection to communist se-
cret service.
138 A portal formerly operated by a Hungarian Neo-Nazi group, the Magyar Nemzeti Arcvonal
(Hungarian National Front Line) probably fullls an important disinformation role in the Hun-
garian operations of the Russian secret services.
52
In the “mainstream” media, the pro-Russian articles are widely published
on the left-wing website Slovo, close to SMER – Social Democracy, but
also the very popular conservative anti-establishment monthly Zem a
Vek (Earth and Age) is spreading pro-Russian conspiratorial views similar-
ly to internet radio “Slobodný vysielač” (The free broadcaster).
Mainly in the social networks, but also in the media, a discussion
about Slovakia´s membership in NATO and EU arose. The teacher,
blogger, and local politician from the town of Považská Bystrica,
Juraj Smatana prepared a list of 42 websites spreading pro-Russian
or “conspiracy” propaganda. The list contains Slovak and Czech im-
itations of the Russian governmental website Voice of Russia (since
March 2015, Sputnik News Agency and Radio), as well as neo-com-
munist, Pan-Slavic nationalist, and ultra-catholic websites promot-
ing pro-life agenda.139 Some of them are close to marginal NGOs and
protest movements, and others publish anonymous articles. Gener-
ally, the common attribute of these websites is not only criticism of
capitalism, but also the negative attitude to the European Union and
the West as whole, perhaps with the exception of Slovo. The Western
involvement in Ukraine and anti-Russian policy of EU and NATO are
very often criticized by the libertarian left publicist Eduard Chmelár
as well. He accuses Europe of subjugating itself to the pressure of
USA, although “the interest of Europe isn’t to have tensions with Rus-
sia.”140 In May 2015 E. Chmelár launched the pacifist initiative “Unit-
ed for Peace” (Zjednotení za mier), which has the aim to spread a
culture of peace. The initiative is opposed to the violent solution of
international conflicts.141 Chmelár’s double talk can be observed in
his latest initiative which seems to serve Kremlin’s agenda without
mentioning Moscow directly: in July 2015, he announced the es-
tablishment of the new political movement SEN (Solidarity – Envi-
ronmentalism – Non-violence).142 One of its targets is the dissolution
of the NATO and its replacement with the EU territorial defense, but
the relations with Russian Federation are not mentioned in the initial
documents of the movement.143
139 Šnídl, Vladimír: “Proruskú propagandu ozhýralom Západe unás šíri 42 webov.” Denník N (Feb-
ruary 26, 2015).
140 Chmelár, Eduard: “Európa ako pasívna korisť geopolitického zápasu.” Aktuality.sk (August 8,
2014).
141 Until July 2015, support to this initiative amounted to more than 5,170 people, including
prominent Slovak intellectuals and diplomats.
142 The acronym of the new political movement means “Dream” in Slovak.
143 “V deň Deklarácie zvrchovanosti SR začíname náš SEN”, hnutie-sen.sk, July 17, 2015, ac-
cessed July 31, 2015
53
The radical wing of pro-Russian segment of left-wing politics is repre-
sented by the “anti-fascist” non-partisan initiative Charter 2015, led
by the former officer of the communist State Security Peter Nišpon-
ský. Their main message the allegedly aggressive policy of the West
against the Russian Federation.144 However a common pro-Russian
platform shared be leftist and rightist forces cannot be presented
on every issue, so otherwise pro-Russian left-wing activists opposed
the pro-life activists, who organized a referendum “on protecting the
family” and indirectly against the LGBT rights as well on February 7,
2015.145
Activities of the pro-Russian activists intensied in the beginning of 2015,
and they organized several public meetings attended by hundreds of
people. Perhaps the commemoration of Soviet soldiers who died during
liberation of Bratislava was the most controversial event in April 2014,
when the crowd, represented mainly by the followers of the already
mentioned Charter 2015, booed President Andrej Kiska (due to his
pro-western attitudes) and cheered Russian MFA Mr. Lavrov.146
As a sign of activation of pro-Russian organizations in Slovakia, a broad
coalition composed of far-right and far-left organizations and individuals
arranged series of anti-NATO demonstrations in the center of Bratislava
from March 2015. These meetings were characterized by a unique mix-
ture of activists and individuals from all parts of the political spectrum,
ranging from the neo-Marxist Resistance - Party of Work (Vzdor-strana
prace), communists, certain part of left-wing intellectuals, members of
the Slovak-Russian Association up to Eliot Rostas, head of conspiracy
magazine Zem a Vek and leader of the far-right Slovak Revival movement
– SHO and Slovak Conscripts, all united against NATO and the US.147
144 Charta 2015, accessed February 15, 2015
145 Some conservative Christian activists and Čarnogurský described Russia as a protector of
traditional values, including traditional family.Kazharski, Aliaksej: The Rainbow rationaliza-
tion. Ponars Eurasia (November 22, 2013).
146 “Na Slavíne sa zišli stovky ľudí, Lavrova vítali s nadšením”, sme.sk, April 4, 2015, accessed
July 31, 2015, http://www.sme.sk/c/7734300/na-slavine-sa-zisli-stovky-ludi-lavrova-vitali-s-
nadsenim.html;
147 “Kto protestuje proti základniam NATO?”, dennikn.sk, March 16, 2015, accessed July 31, 2015,
https://dennikn.sk/blog/kto-protestuje-proti-zakladniam-nato/
54
Signicant pro-Kremlin media sites in Slovakia
Chelemendik.sk
The web portal was set up and is being operated by Sergej Chelemendik,
a Russian author living in Slovakia, who co-founded the Nation and Jus-
tice Party with Anna Belousovova. He openly propagates stronger ties
with Russia, advocates neutrality for Slovakia and tries to revive the idea
of Panslavism. He stated that Alexander Dugin is his friend, featured an
interview with him on his web site, and presented Dugin`s geopolitical
vision of Euro-Asian doctrine. On his Facebook page, Sergej Chelemen-
dik repeatedly portrays NATO and the US as archenemies and spreads
pro-Russian propaganda.
Slobodný vysielač (The free broadcaster)
The internet-based radio broadcast founded in January 2013 with tens of
thousands of listeners became the medium of choice for a wide range of
alternative world views, leaning to conspiracy theories. The radio broad-
cast frequently airs interviews with representatives of radical far-right
groups, including Vzdor Kysuce, SP, SHO, SB and others.148 In regard to
Russia, it adopted many of the claims spread by the Russian media and
its Facebook page, ooded by pro-Russian propaganda. Ocially it is
funded by voluntary contributions of its listeners.
Zem a Vek (ZaV, Earth and Age magazine)
Set up in 2013 ZaV became the most important media outlet for spread-
ing conspiracy theories, pro-Russian geopolitical views, and anti-EU, an-
ti-American and anti-liberal attitudes. Its editorial board includes people
in the past associated with far-right extremism. Its chief editor, Tibor Eliot
Rostas was granted an ocial audience at the Russian embassy and is
considered the brain behind the whole magazine. The magazine has a
monthly circulation of some 30 000 copies, distributed in mainstream
bookstores and magazine shops, with high visual quality. The chief ed-
itor announced a campaign demanding the referendum on Slovakia´s
withdrawal from NATO.149 An important part of its agenda is the informa-
148medialne.etrend.sk, September 25, 2013, accessed February 15, 2015
149 Benčík, Ján: “Rostás vymýšľa referendum ovystúpení zNATO”, dennikn.sk, February 2, 2015, ac-
cessed February 15, 2015,https://dennikn.sk/blog/rostas-vymysla-referendum-o-vystupeni-z-nato/
55
tion war about Ukraine, according to ZaV ruled by fascists and followers
of Stepan Bandera and a puppet-government controlled by the EU.150.
In June 2015 T. E. Rostas and member of ZaV´s editorial board Dušan
Budzák paid a visit to Moscow. After the roundtable with the represen-
tatives of Russian media and media experts they announced the aim to
create a media house, comprising journal, TV and radio stations, daily
newspaper and online media. T.E. Rostas once again conrmed the close
ties with the Embassy of RF in Slovakia. He stressed “Russia is not an en-
emy of Slovakia”.151,152
Pro-Russian Facebook groups
Alexander Ivanovič Možajev153
This Facebook group, set up in 2014, oers “uncensored information
from Novorossija” but in fact is an outlet for pro-Russian propaganda
regarding the conict in Ukraine. Among its fans are Švrček (SB), Tomáš
Bičkoš-Regec (SB) and Ján Dováľ (SB).
Russian Combat
Facebook page has been dedicated to original Russian martial art Stenka
(Russian box) since 2007, but it also incorporates elements from the Rus-
sian Special Forces, Spetsnaz. It has more than 20000 fans and is an elec-
tronic outlet of the martial arts club. Besides regular activities related to
martial arts, it also displays pictures and messages in support of the Rus-
sian international policies and pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine. One of
its recent seminars154 was attended by former Spetsnaz instructors, Ro-
man Gruzinov and Valerij Majstovoj. These seminars were also attended
by Rusynak from SHO, and several SB leading gures were invited.
150 Smoleňová, Ivana: The Pro-Russian Disinformation Campaign in the Czech Republic and Slo-
vakia. Types of Media Spreading Pro-Russian Propaganda, Their Characteristics and Frequently
Used Narratives. Prague : Prague Security Studies Institute 2015, p. 10-11.
151 konzervativnyvyber.sk, June 24, 2015, accessed July 31, 2015
152 However the announcement of the open cooperation with Russia´s ocial state institu-
tions caused a split within the editorial team and one of the prominent editors Ľubomír Huďo
left ZaV. “ZNÁMY SLOVENSKÝ NOVINÁR ĽUBOMÍR HUĎO OPÚŠŤA MESAČNÍK ZEM A VEK”, nieje-
totak.sk, June 24, 2015, accessed July 31, 2015
153 Alexander Ivanovic Mozajev is a legendary ghting gure among pro-Russian separatists.
See separate resources.
154 Facebook.com, July 23, 2014, accessed February 15, 2015
56
Between August 22 and 27, 2013, Russian association of military-patri-
otic clubs Stjag (member of the Narodniy Sobor) organized the Second
Slavic Patriotic Camp in Moscow. The camp was attended by Rusnyak
from SHO, and Svrček and Bičkoš, both leading gures of the SB, were
among the invited.
Czechs and Slovaks support Russian Crimea155
A Facebook group supporting the Russian stance in the conict, express-
ing solidarity with the separatists.156
155 facebook.com, accessed February 15, 2015
156 See separate resources.
57
Slovak radicals in the Russian online
media157
Table 5. Selected Russian media sites featuring Slovak extremism
News site Lenta.ru Ria.ru Kp.ru Kom-
mersant
Voice of
Russia
Russia
Tod ay
Readership 10 179
million
11 311
million
7 566
million
2 338
million
N/A N/A
Orientation Kremlin-
friendly
Kremlin-
friendly
Kremlin-
friendly
Indepen-
dent
Kremlin-
friendly
Kremlin-
friendly
Readership is defined by the number of clicks every day, based on the data of Web Index Report, 2014.
See: www.tns-global.ru/services.
Russian online media rarely cover stories featuring Slovak radicals; in the
past year they have barely published anything about them. Slovakia also
rarely features in the Russian media although lately it has been men-
tioned in connection with gas trade.
Marian Kotleba at the regional elections
At the end of last November, several news sites covered the victory in
the regional elections of Marian Kotleba, the leader of The People’s Party
– Our Slovakia. Out of the above-mentioned news sites, the Kremlin-as-
sociated Lenta and the independent Kommersant published full-length
articles, while the Kremlin-friendly Ria Novosti adopted a piece from
Kommersant verbatim.
157 The relevance of the Voice of Russia, replaced by Radio Sputnik, part of the Sputnik News
multimedia platform operated by Rossiya Segodnya from November 22, 2014 (the Voice of
Russia merged with RIA Novosti into the Rossiya Segodnya media holding), aimed at a for-
eign audience is based on the fact that with its help the Kremlin tries to inform/inuence
the population of a given country, directly through their own language. Admittedly, Russia
Today competes with CNN, BBC and Al Jazeera in an eort to present the Russian perspective
in a global news competition. However, in some cases its coverage turned out to be rather
biased; e.g., reporting on the Ukrainian crisis, Russia Today claimed that a number of Western
journalists resigned in a public gesture... The examined period focused on the prelude and
the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis, i.e. articles were chosen from the October, 2013 – Oc-
tober, 2014 period.
58
Both articles have a clearly negative view of the Slovak radicals. The news
piece published in Lenta158 refers to Marian Kotleba as a neo-Nazi, and
after detailing the election results, it discusses Kotleba’s training as a
high school teacher, and his role as a representative of right-wing rad-
icals in Slovakia. The article also speaks of his involvement in organizing
and participating in anti-Roma protests, and of being charged of hate
speech. In addition, the article mentions the Slovak Brotherhood (Slov-
enská pospolitost), an organization founded by Kotleba.
The article of the independent Kommersant,159 similarly to that in Lenta, calls
Kotleba a neo-Nazi, and goes one step further: already in the lead, they call
him Hitler’s fan, and in the introduction, the article describes Kotleba’s victory
as a real shock in Slovakia. The Kommersant article provides more details on
Kotleba’s party and on the activity of the banned Slovak Unity Party, while it
also mentions that they wore uniforms much like that of the Nazis and prop-
agated anti-Jewish and anti-Hungarian views.
The Kommersant article also quotes a Slovak political scientist, Pavol Sza-
laj, currently working in the research institute of Sciences Po in Paris, to
the eect that Kotleba’s victory can be attributed to the lack of interest
of people in municipal elections; accordingly, in Slovakia voter turnout
was around 20%.
Other articles on Slovak radicals
Another article published by Kommersant160 discusses the attempts of
Eurosceptics to create a political faction. Here, the Slovak extreme right
appears in a neutral light, as someone “Marie Le Pen counted on, but
could not gain a seat in the European Parliament.”
Another news site, vesti.ru161 published an article in June 2013 about
Slovakia declaring that its constitution denes marriage as between a
man and a woman. The article describes how, contrary to many other
EU member states, Slovakia explicitly prohibits same-sex marriages.
158 “The head of Slovak radicals became the mayor of the county”, Lenta, November 25, 2013,
accessed February 15, 2015
159 “The heirs of partisans voted for a Neo-Nazi. The fan of Hitler has become a Slovak governor”,
Kommersant, November 26, 2013, accessed February 15, 2015
160 “Euroscepc of the world, unite!”, Kommersant, May 30, 2014, accessed February 15, 2015
161 “The denion of tradional marriage has been instuted in the Slovak constuon”, Vesztyi,
June 5, 2014, accessed February 15, 2015
59
The constitutional amendment was proposed by the Christian Demo-
cratic Movement, and supported by the Slovak National Party. As op-
posed to the currently fashionable homophobia in Russia, the article
does not take a stand on the matter and adopts a neutral tone of voice.
The Kremlin-associated news site, Vzgljad, also mentions the Slovak
National Party in an article162 published in January 2013, where a
Greek journalist, Thanasis Karagiannis discusses the radical parties of
Europe. The article was written before the European Parliament elec-
tions, and therefore only took guesses at the future performance of
the radical parties. Karagiannis touched on the leader of the French
National Front, Marine Le Pen’s idea to create a new political alliance,
“A European alliance for freedom,” characterized by Euroscepticism
and racism towards immigrants. Le Pen mentioned the Slovak Na-
tional Party among its possible allies.
Conclusions
Both Kremlin-associated and independent news sources condemn the
Slovak extremists. Although they publish articles that are more neutral in
tone, a negative attitude is more often adopted towards them. The min-
imal attention given to Slovak extreme right-wing parties could mean
that due to their weak institutional position, they cannot be relied on
for Russian international and domestic political purposes. Based on Vzgl-
jad’s article, the possible future membership of the Slovak National Party
in the European Parliament, as part of some coalition created by Nation-
al Front, could potentially alter the Kremlin’s current negligent attitude
towards the party. Consequently, if the Slovak National Party managed
to regain its institutional positions, they would be expected to continue
to represent Russian interests in the parliament as well as in the media.
162 “Europe: “brown menace”. Vzgljad, January 14, 2014, accessed February 15, 2015
