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DEFINING THE PROTECTED GROUPS OF GENOCIDE THROUGH THE CASE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS

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In defining the four protected groups of genocide, the international criminal tribunals have gradually shifted from an objective to a subjective approach, or a combination of these approaches with an emphasis on the subjective approach. The group membership is accordingly not determined by means of dubious objective parameters such as skin color, but by the perception of the group's differentness. Predominately, the courts determine the perpetrator's perception of the group that he wishes to single out and destroy. The Genocide Convention, however, exclusively protects four groups and a broadening of this protection to include any group created by the imagination of the perpetrator has consistently been rejected. The perpetrator's perception has therefore to be limited to what he understands to be a racial, national, ethnical or religious group. This analysis is primarily based on the case law of the international criminal courts, in particular the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia. It considers furthermore the case law of the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice and also includes the findings of the Darfur Commission.
ICD Brief 18
December 2015
DEFINING THE
PROTECTED GROUPS OF
GENOCIDE THROUGH THE
CASE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL COURTS
Carola Lingaas
www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org
1
ABSTRACT
In defining the four protected groups of genocide, the international criminal tribunals have gradually
shifted from an objective to a subjective approach, or a combination of these approaches with an
emphasis on the subjective approach. The group membership is accordingly not determined by
means of dubious objective parameters such as skin color, but by the perception of the group’s
differentness. Predominately, the courts determine the perpetrator’s perception of the group that
he wishes to single out and destroy. The Genocide Convention, however, exclusively protects four
groups and a broadening of this protection to include any group created by the imagination of the
perpetrator has consistently been rejected. The perpetrator’s perception has therefore to be limited
to what he understands to be a racial, national, ethnical or religious group. This analysis is primarily
based on the case law of the international criminal courts, in particular the ad hoc tribunals for
Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia. It considers furthermore the case law of the International
Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice and also includes the findings of the Darfur
Commission.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide
Convention) of 1948 protects four exclusive groups: the national, ethnical, racial and religious
group.
1
However, the Convention fails to define these groups. Its Art. II reads:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such (…).
2
This definition of genocide is reproduced verbatim in Art. 6 Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC),
3
Art. 2 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY)
4
and Art. 4 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
5
. They all
encounter the same definitional difficulties in identifying the members of the protected victim groups
of genocide.
6
1
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment (2 August 2001), para. 554.
2
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, UN GA Res. 260 (III) A (1948).
3
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (17 July 1998).
4
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
5
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
6
The author published an article with the title: The Elephant in the Room: The Uneasy Task of Defining
‘Racial’ in International Criminal Law”, 3 International Criminal Law Review 2015) on which this brief partially
builds.
2
While the crime of genocide is characterized by an intent to destroy a group, the question of who
is protected within the ambit of these groups is one of the most complicated ones.
7
Indeed, it has
been claimed that the “major problem with the convention is its narrow definition of what constitutes
a victim group”
8
and a United Nations (UN) Study on Genocide accordingly noted that [t]he lack of
clarity about which groups are, and are not, protected has made the Convention less effective and
popularly understood than should be the case”.
9
In recent years, however, the jurisprudence by
international and domestic criminal tribunals has significantly transformed the understanding of the
protected groups. From initially defining the groups in an objective manner, courts increasingly
determine the group membership subjectively, by relying on the perception of the group’s
differentness. This groundbreaking shift, which will be analyzed in the following sections, radically
changed the approach to the group definition of genocide. In particular, it will be demonstrated how
a reliance on perception challenges the exclusivity of the four protected groups. Simultaneously, a
perpetrator-based subjective approach to defining the victim group is in coherence with any pre-
genocidal process. This Brief ends by suggesting a release of the group notion from the actus reus
and instead to fully incorporate it into the mens rea.
A. Group Membership
The crime of genocide distinguishes itself from other international crimes by protecting a group.
10
It is not the victim in his
11
individual capacity, but as a member of a certain group that determines
the crime of genocide. For the perpetrator, the individual victim is “a means to an end: a step further
along the path of destroying the group”.
12
The perpetrator believes that his victims have an
enhanced value to the physical or biological survival of the group and therefore wants to destroy
them.
13
The victim of the crime of genocide is therefore the group itself and not the individual alone;
the individual is just an element of the group.
14
7
Scott Straus, Contested Meanings and Conflicting Imperatives: A Conceptual Analysis of Genocide,
Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 3 (2001), p. 365.
8
Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide (New Haven/ London: Yale
University Press, 1990), p. 11.
9
Benjamin Whitaker, Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6, para. 30.
10
It is to be noted that the crime against humanity of apartheid (Art. 7(2)(h) Rome Statute) and the crime
against humanity of persecution (Art. 7(1)(h) Rome Statute) also protect victims as members of a group.
11
For reasons of readability and simplicity, the masculine form will be used when referring to unspecific
individuals. This shall, however, have no implications as to the gender of a victim or perpetrator.
12
International Law Commission (ILC), Draft Code of Crimes (1996), UN Doc. A/51/10, Art. 17, Commentary 6.
13
David Nersessian, Genocide and Political Groups (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 45.
14
ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR- 96-13-A, Trial Judgment (27 January 2000), para. 165.
Furthermore: “the victim is singled out not by reason of his individual identity, but rather on account of his
being a member of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group (ibid.).
Already in 1946, the General Assembly proclaimed genocide a deprivation of a group’s right to exist (GA
Res. 96 (I), UN Doc. A/64/Add. 1 (1946), p. 188).
3
The ICTY explained the importance of group identity:
Article 4 (…) defines genocide as one of several acts ‘committed with intent to destroy in
whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such’. The term “as such”
has great significance, for it shows that the offence requires intent to destroy a collection of
people who have a particular group identity.
15
The International Law Commission (ILC) in its Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security
of Mankind of 1996 rightfully emphasizes that it was the membership of an individual in a particular
group rather than the identity of the individual that was the decisive criterion in determining the
immediate victims of the crime of genocide.
16
The individual’s destruction becomes a stepping
stone on the path to eliminating the group he belongs to.
B. Group Selection: a Historical Review
The Polish-Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin coined the term genocide in 1944 in response to still
ongoing crimes committed against Jews and other minorities by the Nazi regime during the Second
World War.
17
He aimed at protecting individuals from actions against them “not in their individual
capacity, but as members of the national group”.
18
Lemkin advocated for the creation of an
international multilateral treaty protecting “minority groups from oppression because of their
nationhood, religion, or race”.
19
In 1946, Lemkin’s call for an international treaty criminalizing genocide was heard. The General
Assembly Resolution 96 (I) affirmed genocide as an international crime, whether “committed on
religious, racial, political or any other grounds”.
20
This Resolution provided the basis for the first
draft of the Genocide Convention by the UN Secretariat. By including “racial, national, linguistic,
religious or political groups of human beings”, it was designed to offer the widest possible protection
for groups.
21
Subsequently, the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide prepared a second draft that
limited the protection to national, racial, religious and political groups.
22
Political groups were
inserted following a tight vote of four to three.
23
This group was criticized for not being permanent
15
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Judgment (22 March 2006), para. 20
(emphasis in original).
16
ILC, Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1996), UN Doc. A/51/10, Art. 17,
Commentary No. 6, p. 45.
17
John Quigley, The Genocide Convention: An International Law Analysis (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 4-5.
18
Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for
Redress (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, 1944),
p. 79.
19
Ibid., p. 93.
20
UN Doc. A/RES. 96 (I) of 1947.
21
First Draft of the Genocide Convention, Prepared by the UN Secretariat, UN Doc. E/447 (1947), Art. I(I).
22
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, UN Doc. E/794 (1948).
23
UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.13 (1948), p. 4.
4
and for being “based on a body of theoretical concepts whereas sentiment or tradition bound the
members of a national, racial or religious group”.
24
The Sixth Committee thereafter chose to
exclude political groups from the protection of the Genocide Convention.
25
The racial and the national group were subject only to a limited debate during the drafting of the
Convention. These two categories were included at an early stage and thereafter endorsed in Art. II
without a vote, their meaning apparently being self-evident to the drafters.
26
It was purposely
decided to only enumerate the protected groups, leaving a more detailed definition to the
implementing legislation as foreseen in Art. V of the Convention.
27
The Genocide Convention was
approved by unanimous vote in the General Assembly on 9 December 1948 and came into force
in January 1951 with its twentieth ratification.
28
As per December 2015, 147 States have ratified
the Convention.
29
Ever since the creation of the Genocide Convention, the definition of the four protected groups has
remained unclear for three reasons. First, the Genocide Convention was long believed to be a dead
letter. It was not applied until fifty years after its creation, when in 1998 for the first time an
international tribunal convicted a person for the crime of genocide.
30
Second, the understanding of
race, ethnicity, nationality and religion has changed parallel with technological, scientific and
sociological developments. Thirdly, as has been shown above, the interpretation of the protected
groups was on purpose left to the implementing governments of the Genocide Convention.
The following section will analyze the first ever genocide trial and how it defined the racial, ethnical,
national and religious group.
24
UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.13, p. 2.
25
UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.128, pp. 659-661.
26
Fanny Martin, The Notion of ‘Protected Group’ in the Genocide Convention and Its Application, in Paola
Gaeta (ed.), The UN Genocide Convention A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009),
pp. 114-115.
27
Lawrence LeBlanc, The United Nations Genocide Convention and Political Groups, 13 Yale Journal of
International Law (1988), pp. 271-272.
28
William Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2. ed. 2009), p. 3.
29
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&lang=e (last
accessed 14 December 2015).
30
ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (2 September 1998).
5
II. AKAYESU: DEFINING THE FOUR PROTECTED GROUPS
In 1998, with the judgment against Akayesu by the ICTR, for the first time ever an international
criminal tribunal convicted an individual for the crime of genocide.
31
Akayesu set a number of
important legal precedents and is still now considered a yardstick for the definition of genocide, as
frequent references to it prove.
32
Being the first genocide trial in history, the ICTR was forced to
analyze the requirements of the genocide provision and went into great detail in defining the four
protected groups. The Tribunal reasoned that since the special intent to commit genocide lied in
the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, it was
necessary to objectively determine the meaning of these social categories.
33
The objective
determination of the protected groups of genocide, however, proved to be a challenge. For the
outcome of the trial, it was of paramount importance to correctly define the Tutsi victim group. Had
the Tutsis not been classified as members of one of the four protected victim groups, the atrocities
committed in Rwanda in 1994 could not have been legally qualified as genocide. The primarily
objective definition of the protected groups by the Tribunal was later heavily criticized.
A. The Definition of a National Group
The ICTR in Akayesu defined a national group as follows:
Based on the Nottebohm decision rendered by the International Court of Justice, the
Chamber holds that a national group is defined as a collection of people who are perceived
to share a legal bond based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and
duties.
34
Interestingly, the Trial Chamber based its definition on the Nottebohm decision by the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), as well as on the perception of a shared legal bond. It thereby combined
objective (Nottebohm approach) with subjective (perception) criteria. In Nottebohm, nationality was
determined on effective factual ties between the person and the State concerned.
35
The ICJ thus
31
ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (2 September 1998).
32
Virtually every single judgment of the ICTR refers to the Akayesu trial judgment. See for example: ICTR, The
Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment (21 May 1999), para. 95; ICTR,
The Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment (1 December 2003), para. 804 or ICTR,
The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment (6 December 1999), para. 47.
Also the ICTY referred to Akayesu in several cases: ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A,
Judgment (14 December 1999), para. 51; ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment
(1 September 2004), para. 728. Further references are found, amongst others, in the Report of the
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, UN Doc. S/2005/60 (25 January 2005), para. 501.
33
ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (2 September 1998), para. 510.
34
ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T. Judgment (2 September 1998), para. 512.
35
ICJ, Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Second Phase, Judgment (6 April 1955), ICJ Reports
1955, p. 22.
6
took an objective view of nationality that prevailed over the subjective views of the individual. By
referring to Nottebohm, the ICTR apparently juxtaposed nationality with citizenship. This approach
is not uncontested. Indeed, there are discrepancies with regard to the definition of a national group,
which range from national minorities to citizenship and even to homeland as a broader concept.
36
Historically, nation simply meant a group of people. It is only in modern times that it has become
associated to the nation-state.
37
The Spanish National Court, for example, ruled that a national
group was not limited to a collectivity formed by people belonging to the same nation, but instead
was a national human group, comprised by a larger community of people.
38
Similarly, scholars have
claimed that national groups were not required to have the nationality of the State they live in, but
could also be the inhabitants of a nation’s territory, which would further challenge the Akayesu
definition.
39
At its extreme, even “auto-genocide”, viz. the destruction of the perpetrator’s own group,
has been suggested included into the protection of a national group.
40
Lemkin’s notion of nationality embraced a wider concept than citizenship, whereby the destruction
of the national pattern of the oppressed group was essential for the commission of the crime of
genocide.
41
To Lemkin “the idea of a nation signifies constructive cooperation and original
contributions, based upon genuine traditions, genuine culture, and a well-developed national
psychology”.
42
By merging nationality with tradition and culture, Lemkin approaches the notion of
ethnicity. Its definition will be discussed subsequently.
B. The Definition of an Ethnical Group
According to the ICTR in Akayesu, “an ethnic group is generally defined as a group whose members
share a common language or culture”.
43
The Tribunal determined that the Tutsi victims were an
ethnical group, despite the fact that they shared a common language and culture with the
predominantly Hutu perpetrator group. This conclusion was only possible due to the Tribunal’s
creation of a ‘stable and permanent’ threshold, which was made in an attempt to assign the group
36
David Lisson, Defining “National Group” in the Genocide Convention, 60 Stanford Law Review (2008),
pp. 1459-1496; David Luban, Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name, 7 Chicago Journal of International Law
(2006), p. 318; M.N. Shaw, Genocide in International Law, in Yoram Dinstein, Mala Tabory (eds.),
International Law at a Time of Perplexity: Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne (Dordrecht/Boston/London:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989), p. 807
37
Eric Weitz, Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2003),
p. 17.
38
Maria Del Carmen Marquez Carrasco, Joaquin Alcaide Fernandez, In Re Pinochet, 93 American Journal
for International Law (1999), p. 693
39
Claus Kress, The Crime of Genocide Under International Law, 6 International Criminal Law Review (2006),
p. 476; Luban, supra n. 36, p. 318.
40
Caroline Fournet, The Crime of Destruction and the Law of Genocide: Their Impact on Collective Memory
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), p. 49.
41
Lemkin, supra n. 18, pp. 79-80 and 91.
42
Lemkin, supra n. 18, p. 91.
43
ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (2 September 1998), para. 513.
7
some objectivity.
44
It has been heavily criticized for expanding the definition of genocide, thereby
breaching the principle of legality.
45
Only a few later judgments followed the Akayesu approach,
thereby limiting the effect of this newly created generic category.
46
Ethnic groups are composed of individuals who conceive themselves “as being alike by virtue of
their common ancestry, real or fictious, and who are so regarded by others”.
47
While ethnicity
largely depends on self-identification of its members, dominant groups may also assign ethnic
labels pejoratively to other groups with the aim of denying them participation in the system.
48
Ethnicity is a permeable and fluid form of identity, since outsiders are usually able to assimilate into
an ethnic group.
49
The inclusion of ethnic groups into the Genocide Convention was narrowly accepted with eighteen
to seventeen votes and eleven abstentions.
50
The concept of an ethnical group has continuously
developed, as will be demonstrated in Section III.
C. The Definition of a Religious Group
In Akayesu, the ICTR defined a religious group as “one whose members share the same religion,
denomination or mode of worship”.
51
Others have defined religious groups as a community united
by a single, spiritual ideal.
52
Atheistic or agnostic groups challenge the concept of religion, because
they precisely do not share a denomination or mode of worship, but instead denounce or deny the
existence of any deity. Some legal scholars assert that they were not included since the freedom
not to practice a religion was not protected by human rights law.
53
However, it has to be questioned
whether a reference to recognized human rights in dealing with the protected groups of genocide
is useful. Other scholars include atheistic, agnostic or sectarian groups under the protection of the
44
Barbara Lüders, Die Strafbarkeit von Völkermord nach dem Römischen Statut für den Internationalen
Strafgerichtshof [The Criminal Liability for Genocide in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court]
(Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2004), p. 53
45
Gerhard Werle, Florian Jessberger, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3. ed.
2014), para. 794; William Schabas, The Crime of Genocide in the Jurisprudence of the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in Horst Fischer, Claus Kress, Sascha Rolf
Lüder (eds.), International and National Prosecution of Crimes Under International Law (Berlin: Berliner
Verlag, 2001), pp. 451-452.
46
Alexander Zahar, Göran Sluiter, International Criminal Law: A Critical Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008), p. 161; William Schabas, Genocide, in Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2. ed. 2008), p. 149.
47
Tamotsu Shibutani and Kian Kwan, Ethnic Stratification: A Comparative Approach (New York: Macmillan
Company, 1965), p. 42.
48
Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism (London: Pluto Press, 3rd edition 2010), p. 39.
49
Weitz, supra n. 37, p. 21.
50
UN Doc. A/C.6/SR. 75, pp. 115-116.
51
ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (2 September 1998), para. 515.
52
Matthew Lippman, The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 15
Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law (1998), p. 456.
53
Werle, Jessberger, supra n. 45, para. 802.
8
Genocide Convention if they are an organized congregation of people with primarily spiritual beliefs,
thus not dominated by economic, political or other characteristics.
54
D. The Definition of a Racial Group
Lastly, the Tribunal defined a racial group:
The conventional definition of racial group is based on the hereditary physical traits often
identified with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious
factors.
55
According to a dictionary, hereditary means “genetically transmitted or transmittable from parent to
offspring”.
56
By relying on hereditary physical traits, the ICTR seemingly suggests the identification
of people by means of their physical appearance. However, it has long been recognized that there
is no gene for race.
57
Referring to the genetic transmission of physical traits is not only scientifically
wrong, it also preserves contentious and antiquated means of classifying people. The Tribunal
weakens its statement by referring to “the conventional definition”, without taking any position as to
its accuracy. At the same time, “identified with a geographical region” points to a subjective
approach, with the perpetrator’s perception of the racial affiliation of another group relating to its
geographical origin. The Akayesu definition of a racial group has been criticized for its objective
reading of race by relying on physical and biological criteria, instead of considering the group’s
social and historical context.
58
It will subsequently be shown that the larger societal context of a
group has become increasingly more important and currently dominates the legal determination of
the victim group membership for the crime of genocide.
The meaning of a ‘racial group’ has changed dramatically. In 1948, the drafting parties did not
perceive the term as problematic. Nowadays, however, it is considered highly controversial. Its
meaning at the time of drafting of the Genocide Convention was significantly broader and to a large
extent synonymous with national, ethnic and religious groups.
59
The term was affected by the then
54
Nersessian, supra n. 13, p. 24.
55
ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (2 September 1998), paras. 514 and
516.
56
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hereditary (last accessed 17 December 2015).
57
Michael Yudell, Race Unmasked: Biology and Race in the Twentieth Century (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2014), p. 204; Richard S. Cooper et al., Race and Genomics, The New England Journal
of Medicine, (20 March 2003), pp. 1166-1170; Leda Cosmides, John Tooby, Robert Kurzban, “Perceptions
of Race”, 7 Trends in Cognitive Sciences (April 2003), p. 173.
58
Richard Ashby Wilson, Crimes against Humanity and the Conundrum of Race and Ethnicity at the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in Ilana Feldman, Miriam Ticktin (eds.), In the Name of
Humanity: The Government of Threat and Care (Durham/ London: Duke University Press, 2010), pp. 33 and
37.
59
William Schabas, Groups Protected by the Genocide Convention: Conflicting Interpretations from the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda”, 6 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law (2000),
9
common understanding of race. Lemkin’s study “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe” demonstrates that
European subgroups such as the Germans, Poles and Jews were seen as different races.
60
But
the concept of race was also influenced by the recent Nazi experience. As such, the Dutch and
Norwegians were considered of related blood to the Aryan race and therefore worthy of live,
whereas the Jewish ‘race’ was to be destroyed completely.
61
With significant achievements in DNA-
coding, we can now ascertain that there are no biologically different human races.
62
III. THE OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE APPROACH IN DEFINING THE PROTECTED
GROUPS
While Akayesu employed a predominately objective approach in defining the protected groups of
genocide, nearly all later judgments by international criminal tribunals chose to rely on subjective
elements. The reason for this gradual shift was correctly recognized by the ICTY Trial Chamber in
the case of Jelisić:
to attempt to define a national, ethnical, racial or religious group today using objective and
scientifically irreproachable criteria would be a perilous exercise whose result would not
necessarily correspond to the perception of the persons concerned by such categorisation.
63
This progressive move towards a subjective approach entails the avoidance of objective,
scientifically verifiable parameters. Instead, the currently prevailing (partially) subjective approach
refers to the perpetrator’s perception of the victim group. The perpetrator defines the victim as a
member of one of the protected groups of genocide.
64
The perpetrator’s perception of a group thereby becomes the defining element for the crime of
genocide and as such considerably challenges international criminal jurisprudence. The reason for
this is the principle of legality that demands a clear and specific designation of the victim groups.
The elements of specificity and foreseeability of criminal norms contradict a subjective perpetrator-
based approach. Indeed, a reliance on the perpetrator’s mental state hinders tribunals in an
objective and uniform determination of the victim group because each perpetrator will perceive his
p. 381; Diane Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, 2 International Criminal Law Review
(2002), p. 98.
60
Lemkin, supra n. 18, pp. 87-88. Amann confirms that race was used in the then-current fashion to describe
European subgroups, like the Germans, Poles and the Jews (Amann, supra n. 57, p. 98).
61
Lemkin, supra n. 18, p. 81, pp. 86-87.
62
The 1950 UNESCO Statement on Race emphasizes: “For all practical social purposes, ‘race’ is not so much
a biological phenomenon as a social myth”, in UNESCO, Four Statements on the Race Question (1969),
p. 33.
63
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Judgment (14 December 1999), para. 70.
64
Nersessian, supra n. 13, p. 28; Schabas, supra n. 28, p. 125; Werle, Jessberger, supra n. 45, p. 297;
Guglielmo Verdirame, The Genocide Definition in the Jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, in 49
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2000), p. 589.
10
victims differently. Since the provisions on genocide assign protection to the national, ethnical,
racial and religious group only, the perception of the perpetrator cannot go beyond these four
categories. In other words: if the perpetrator, for example, perceives blue-eyed people as inferior
and wishes to destroy them, his victims would not fall under one of the four categories, unless they
also manifest national, ethnical, racial or religious characteristics.
The international judicial trend towards a subjective perpetrator-based approach is coherent with
any pre-genocidal process. Essential to every genocidal act is the perpetrator’s prejudice towards
a group other than his own. The perpetrator identifies, names and stigmatizes the members of this
out-group.
65
He then aims at their destruction. This phenomenon is widely-recognized as “othering”
in the social sciences.
66
With the recognition of the perpetrator-based approach, the pre-genocidal
process of othering has been translated into law. It is therefore of significance who the perpetrator
perceives as victim. The examples in the next section will demonstrate how international criminal
tribunals have come to favor the perpetrator-based subjective approach.
A. Defining the Protected Groups Post-Akayesu: The Subjective and Objective
Approaches taken by the ICTR and ICTY
In 1999, the ICTR pronounced two judgments that gradually distanced themselves from the
primarily objective approach taken by Akayesu. The first case, Rutaganda, highlighted:
the concepts of national, ethnical, racial and religious groups have been researched
extensively and that, at present, there are no generally and internationally accepted precise
definitions thereof. Each of these concepts must be assessed in the light of a particular
political, social and cultural context.
67
The membership of a group was a subjective rather than an objective concept. The Tribunal went
on to note:
The victim is perceived by the perpetrator of genocide as belonging to a group slated for
destruction. In some instances, the victim may perceive himself/herself as belonging to the
said group.
68
65
Alexander Laban Hinton, The Dark Side of Modernity, in Alexander Laban Hinton (ed.), Annihilating
Difference: the Anthropology of Genocide (Berkeley/ Los Angeles/ London: University of California Press,
2002), pp. 6 and 13.
66
Anthonie Holslag, The Process of Othering from the Social Imaginaire” to Physical Acts: an Anthropological
Approach, 9 Genocide Studies and Prevention (2015), p. 96.
67
ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment (6 December 1999), para. 55.
68
Ibid.
11
The ICTR performed a case-by-case analysis, accounting for the relevant evidence as well as its
political, cultural and social setting.
69
It did not openly reject the Akayesu approach, but instead
made a subtle shift towards a subjective approach, thereby setting aside some important
precedents.
70
In essence, Rutaganda allowed for either a perpetrator- or a victim-based perception
(subjective approach) with due consideration of objective elements. A subjective definition alone
was deemed not sufficient, because the groups had to be relatively stable and permanent.
71
The other judgment of 1999, Kayishema and Ruzindana, suggested either an objective or a
subjective definition of an ethnic group:
An ethnic group is one whose members share a common language and culture; or, a group
which distinguishes itself, as such (self identification); or, a group identified as such by others,
including perpetrators of the crimes (identification of others).
72
The use of semicolons and the word ‘or’ show that three distinct methods of identifying an ethnical
group were deemed possible: an objective approach (common language and culture), a victim-
based subjective approach (self-identification) or a perpetrator-based subjective approach
(identification by others). This innovative subjective definition of the protected groups promptly led
to criticism amongst legal scholars for letting the perpetrator’s intent define the crime of genocide.
73
Others welcomed the Tribunal’s approach of taking into account the socio-historic environment,
such as the criteria of stigmatization employed by the perpetrator, even if the victim group
objectively was not one of the four protected groups of genocide.
74
In Jelisić, the ICTY chose to follow the subjective approach taken by the ICTR in Kayishema and
Ruzindana.
75
It emphasized that
[i]t is the stigmatisation of a group as a distinct national, ethnical or racial unit by the
community which allows it to be determined whether a targeted population constitutes a
national, ethnical or racial group in the eyes of the alleged perpetrators.
76
69
ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment (6 December 1999), para. 57. ICTR,
The Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment (1 December 2003), para. 811 uses the
same criterions as the Rutaganda case in determining the protected group.
70
Lisson, supra n. 36, p. 1465; Verdirame, supra n. 64, pp. 592 and 594. It is to be noted that the same bench
of judges who decided Akayesu also rendered the Rutaganda judgment. This explains their cautiousness in
applying a more progressive approach.
71
ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment (6 December 1999), para. 57.
72
ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana., Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Trial Judgment (21 May
1999), para. 98.
73
As examples: Zahar, Sluiter, supra n. 46, p. 162; Kress, supra n. 39, p. 474.
74
Ronald Slye and Beth Van Schaack, International Criminal Law: The Essentials (Austin/ Boston/ Chicago/
New York/ The Netherlands: Wolters Kluwer, 2009), p. 226.
75
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Judgment (14 December 1999), para. 70, footnote 95.
76
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Judgment (14 December 1999), para. 70.
12
The Trial Chamber acknowledged that instead of using objective and scientifically irreproachable
criteria, “it is more appropriate to evaluate the status of a (...) group from the point of view of those
persons who wish to single that group out from the rest of the community.
77
Thus, the perpetrator’s perception of the group was considered the defining element. The ICTY
Trial Chamber in Brđanin confirmed the Jelisić decision, but went further by noting that the
protected group:
may be identified by means of the subjective criterion of the stigmatization of the group,
notably by the perpetrators of the crime, on the basis of its perceived (…) characteristics. In
some instances, the victim may perceive himself or herself to belong to the aforesaid
group.
78
The Court thereby approached Kayishema and Ruzindana by allowing for a subjective approach
by the perpetrator or the victim. It nevertheless demanded certain objective criteria.
79
The ICTY Tolimir case of 2012 referred to both Brđanin and Jelisić. It confirmed that the group must
have a particular, distinct identity and be defined by its common characteristics rather than a lack
thereof.
80
The Tribunal failed to specify whether the perpetrator or the victims defined these
characteristics. However, with its reference to Brđanin, in which the perpetrator’s identification of
the group members was decisive, it can be concluded that Tolimir equally favors a subjective
perpetrator-based approach.
81
The ICTR judgment in the case against Bagilishema of 2001 confirmed the difficulties of an
objective group definition:
the perpetrators of genocide may characterize the targeted group in ways that do not fully
correspond to conceptions of the group shared generally (…). In such a case (…) the victim
could be considered (…) as a member of the protected group (…).
82
The judgment emphasized the social, political, historical and cultural context of the four protected
groups. An individual’s membership to a particular group - and the group itself - had to be objective
factors of the society. In other words, the group is considered a distinct racial, ethnical, national or
religious group by the society at large and therefore becomes a social reality. In addition to the
overarching societal context, the perpetrator’s perception of the group becomes crucial: he intends
77
Ibid.
78
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Trial Judgment (1 September 2004), para. 683.
79
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Trial Judgment (1 September 2004), para. 684..
80
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, Trial Judgment (12 December 2012), para. 735.
81
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, Judgment (12 December 2012), p. 325, footnote
3095.
82
ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Trial Judgment (7 June 2001), para. 65.
13
to destroy its members for perceived or real characteristics. Bagilishema thereby primarily applied
subjective elements and further consolidated this new approach.
The Kajelijeli judgment by the ICTR confirmed the difficulties of objectively defining the protected
groups:
the said concept [of national, religious, racial or ethnical groups] enjoys no generally or
internationally accepted definition, rather each concept must be assessed in the light of a
particular political, social, historical and cultural context (…) [M]embership of a group is (…)
a subjective rather than an objective concept [where] the victim is perceived by the
perpetrator of genocide as belonging to a group slated for destruction. A determination of
the categorized groups should be made on a case-by-case basis, by reference to both
objective and subjective criteria.
83
The Tribunal applied a primarily subjective approach with the perpetrator’s perception as the
decisive element. It nevertheless demanded a case-by-case categorization, with due reference to
the objective elements. It remains unclear whether these objective elements are the political, social,
historical and cultural context that the Trial Chamber refers to, or whether there are other relevant
criteria.
In Semanza, the ICTR acknowledged the incoherence in its jurisprudence regarding the protected
groups:
The Statute of the Tribunal does not provide any insight into whether the group (…) is to be
determined by objective or subjective criteria or by some hybrid formulation (…) [T]he
determination (…) ought to be assessed on a case-by-case basis by reference to the
objective particulars of a given social or historical context, and by the subjective perceptions
of the perpetrators. The Chamber finds that the determination of a protected group is to be
made on a case-by-case basis, consulting both objective and subjective criteria.
84
The ICTR in Gacumbitsi used a similar wording:
Membership of a group is a subjective rather than an objective concept. The victim is
perceived by the perpetrator of genocide as belonging to a group slated for destruction, but
the determination of a targeted group must be made on a case-by-case basis, consulting
both objective and subjective criteria. Indeed, in a given situation, the perpetrator, just like
83
ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A, Trial Judgment (1. December 2003), para. 811.
The Kamuhanda judgment of 2004 uses nearly the exact same wording (ICTR, The Prosecutor v.
Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T, Trial Judgment (22 January 2004), para. 630).
84
ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Trial Judgment (15 May 2003), para. 317
(emphasis in original).
14
the victim, may believe that there is an objective criterion for determining membership of an
ethnic group (…).
85
Gacumbitsi initially seems to take a purely perpetrator-based subjective approach, but then
nevertheless demands certain objective criteria. It further confuses things by referring to the victim’s
perception, thereby seemingly opening to a victim-based subjective approach too.
Similarly to Gacumbitsi, the ICTR Trial Chamber in Muhimana demanded either an objective
determination of the victim group or a reliance on the perpetrator’s perception of the group.
Rightfully, it recognized that the classification of the victim group was essentially a matter of proof:
The Prosecution also has the burden of proving either that the victim belongs to the targeted
ethnic, racial, national, or religious group or that the perpetrator of the crime believed that the
victim belonged to the group.
86
This analysis ends with the Krstić case. The ICTY acknowledged that the differentiation of the victim
groups on the basis of scientifically objective criteria would be inconsistent with the object and
purpose of the Genocide Convention.
87
Instead, the victim group’s characteristics should be
identified within the socio-historic context in which it resides. The Tribunal identified the relevant
groups on the basis of their stigmatization, especially by the perpetrator’s perception of the group
as being national, racial, ethnic or religious.
88
With a partial reliance on subjective elements, the
Krstić case applied a mixed approach, with both subjective and objective criteria.
89
B. Positive and Negative Definition of a Protected Group
A protected victim group can be defined positively or negatively, as Jelisić describes:
A group may be stigmatised (…) by way of positive or negative criteria. A “positive approach”
would consist of the perpetrators of the crime distinguishing a group by the characteristics
which they deem to be particular to a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. A “negative
approach” would consist of identifying individuals as not being part of the group to which the
perpetrators of the crime consider that they themselves belong and which to them displays
specific national, ethnical, racial or religious characteristics.
90
85
ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-T, Trial Judgment (17 June 2004), para. 254.
86
ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-T (28 April 2005), para. 500.
87
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment (2 August 2001), para. 556.
88
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment (2 August 2001), para. 557.
89
Agnieszka Szpak, National, Ethnic, Racial, and Religious Groups Protected against Genocide in the
Jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals, in 23 European Journal of International Law,
(2012), p. 169.
90
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Trial Judgment (14 December 1999), para. 71.
15
In other words: a positive approach refers to a group’s characteristics - and a negative approach
defines the group by what it is not. The negative approach has consistently been rejected, as the
following examples will illustrate.
In Brđanin, the ICTY did not allow for group identification by exclusion, viz. by using negative
criteria.
91
This conclusion was later confirmed by the ICJ in the Case on the Application of the
Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro):
It is a group which must have particular positive characteristics national, ethnical, racial or
religious and not the lack of them (…) [T]he crime requires an intent to destroy a collection
of people who have a particular group identity. It is a matter of who those people are, not
who they are not”.
92
The ICJ thereby confirmed the positive identification of the four protected groups. It remarked that
the ICTY in Stakić had reached the same conclusion for the same reasons. Correctly so:
The term “as such” has great significance, for it shows that the offence requires intent to
destroy a collection of people who have a particular group identity. Yet when a person targets
individuals because they lack a particular national, ethnical, racial, or religious characteristic,
the intent is not to destroy particular groups with particular identities as such, but simply to
destroy individuals because they lack certain national, ethnical, racial or religious
characteristics.
93
The ICTY Appeals Chamber concluded that a negative group definition would be incompatible with
the drafting history of the Genocide Convention.
94
Similarly, the majority of the judges in the ICC
Pre-Trial Chamber in the Al-Bashir case concluded that the targeted group of genocide must have
particular characteristics and not a lack thereof.
95
In accordance with the prevailing jurisprudence
it can be concluded that the protected groups of genocide have to be defined positively: they are
protected for their identity, not for their lack of characteristics.
C. Darfur Commission
The International Commission of Inquiry on Violations of International Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights Law in Darfur (Darfur Commission) was established by the UN Secretary-General
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which
91
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Trial Judgment (1 September 2004), para. 685.
92
ICJ, Case on the Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and
Montenegro), Judgment (2007), para. 193.
93
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Judgment (22 March 2006), para. 20.
94
Ibid., para. 22.
95
ICC, Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of
Arrest against Omar Al-Bashir (4 March 2009), para. 135.
16
requested an inquiry into atrocities, especially genocide, committed in the Western region of Darfur
in Sudan.
96
The Commission’s report suggested that crimes against humanity and war crimes had
been committed in Darfur and recommended a referral of the situation to the ICC. The UN Security
Council referred the situation to the ICC Prosecutor by Resolution 1593.
97
Although the Darfur
Commission was not a legal body and as such did not issue legally binding conclusions, its report
would turn out to be influential on scholarly writing and have a legal impact by later reference. In
particular, the ICC used the Darfur report as a fundament to build a case against the President of
Sudan, Omar Al-Bashir.
The Commission was challenged by the fact that crimes had been committed between tribal groups,
which were difficult to categorize as either racial or ethnical groups. It concluded that tribes were
not a protected group, unless they also constituted a distinct racial, national, ethnical or religious
group.
98
The Commission decided that in case of doubt it should be established whether (i) a set
of persons were perceived and in fact also treated as belonging to one of the protected groups and
(ii) whether they considered themselves as belonging to such a group.
99
In its further analysis, the
Commission clearly took a subjective approach when defining that two groups perceived each other
and themselves as constituting distinct groups.
100
The rebel tribes were perceived as ‘Africans’ and
their enemies as ‘Arabs’, notwithstanding the lack of objective grounds for such a distinction.
101
Indeed, both groups were Muslims, spoke Arabic, and a high level of inter-marriages blurred the
distinctions between them.
102
Despite opting for a subjective approach, the Commission
nevertheless discussed the “outward physical appearance” of the tribes, thereby reverting to
questionable, objective parameters.
103
The Commission stated that the Genocide Convention
hinges on four categories of groups which, however, are no longer identified only by their
objective connotations but also on the basis of the subjective perceptions of members of
groups.
104
It thereby relied on a primarily subjective approach, allowing either a perpetrator or victim
perspective.
96
Security Council Resolution 1564 (18 September 2004), S/RES/1564 (2004).
97
Security Council Resolution 1593 (31 March 2005), S/RES/1593 (2005).
98
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (Darfur Report), UN Doc. S/2005/60 (25 January
2005), para. 496.
99
Ibid., paras. 498-499.
100
Ibid., paras. 500 and 509.
101
Ibid., para. 509.
102
Ibid., para. 508.
103
Ibid., para. 508.
104
Ibid., para. 501.
17
D. Jurisprudence of the ICC: the Situation of Darfur
In March 2005, the Security Council referred by Resolution 1593 (2005) the situation in Darfur
(Sudan) to the ICC Prosecutor.
105
The referral was largely based on the findings of the Darfur
Commission. The Prosecutor opened an investigation on genocide against President Al-Bashir.
The Pre-Trial Chamber found that the three targeted tribes all appeared to have “Sudanese
nationality, similar racial features, and a shared Muslim religion”,
106
and could therefore not be
qualified as distinct national, racial or religious groups. The tribes were, however, seen as different
ethnicities “as there are reasonable grounds to believe that each of the groups (…) has its own
language, its own tribal customs and its own traditional links to its lands”.
107
The judges refrained
from further exploring the issue of “whether a wholly objective (based on anthropological
considerations), a wholly subjective (based only upon the perception of the perpetrators), or a
combined objective/subjective approach”
108
should be adopted.
Judge Ušacka’s dissenting opinion promises further debate on the contours of the protected
groups.
109
She noted that subjective criteria, like stigmatization of the group by the perpetrators, as
well as objective criteria, like the particulars of a given social or historical context, had to be
considered.
110
Ušacka dissented with the classification of the targeted groups as three distinct
ethnicities. Instead, she suggested defining them as one single ethnic group of the ‘African tribes’,
because all three groups were a “perceived unitary entity, which is in turn comprised of smaller
groups, including the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa”.
111
The future development of the group definition
by the ICC is to be awaited.
IV. CONCLUSION
The first ever genocide judgment, in the case of Akayesu before the ICTR, attempted to define the
national, racial, ethnical and religious groups in a primarily objective manner. Following criticism,
the ICTR, ICTY, as well as the ICC departed from an objective determination of the protected
groups under the Genocide Convention. Instead, they increasingly rely on a subjective approach,
with an emphasis on the perpetrator’s perception of the victim group. Thus, the definition of the four
105
S/RES/1593 (2005) of 31 March 2005.
106
ICC, The Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant
of Arrest against Omar Al-Bashir (4 March 2009), para. 136.
107
Ibid., para. 137.
108
Ibid.
109
ICC, The Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant
of Arrest against Omar Al-Bashir (4 March 2009), Separate and Partly Dissenting opinion of Judge Anita
Ušacka, paras. 24-26.
110
Ibid., para. 23.
111
Ibid., paras. 25-26.
18
protected groups depends on perception, a subjective element that is difficult to establish and to
verify. The perpetrator’s perception of the targeted group becomes a matter of proof. It has to be
recalled that every crime has two elements: the actus reus and the mens rea. In the past, the
protected groups of genocide were subsumed under both elements. This caused definitional
difficulties with regard to the actus reus by demanding an objective determination of the victim
group. Time has come to release the group notion from that hold. By defining the protected groups
as part of the mens rea only, an adherence to the subjective approach will be allowed. It has,
however, to be recalled that the Genocide Convention protects four exhaustive groups only. The
subjective approach should therefore not lead to a broadening of the protected categories. Instead,
a reliance on the perpetrator’s stigmatization because of perceived or even real national,
ethnical, religious or racial characteristics of the victim group is the right way to go. Once the
stigmatization leads to discriminatory acts, the group becomes identifiable. Coupled with its pre-
genocidal existence, in order to avoid the protection of completely imaginary groups, the group has
acquired the objectivity that international criminal law is seeking for and thereby becomes a
protected group under Art. II of the Genocide Convention.
... It thereby combines objective with subjective elements in the form of the internal self-categorization of the victims and the external categorization by the perpetrator. This approach does not cohere to the common practice of the international criminal courts, which generally refer to the perpetrator's perception of his victims only in addition to objective factors (Lingaas 2015). In giving priority to the perpetrator's understanding of his victims, the international judiciary better reflects the process of othering. ...
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The article sets out the nature, the history and the general structure of the crime of genocide and provides a comprehensive analytical commentary of the elements of the crime. Against the current trend of the international case law to expand the boundaries of the definition at the risk of the crime's trivialization this article develops a strict construction even if the results may appear politically unattractive. The article starts from the premise that, for all practical purposes, the occurrence of a crime of genocide entails a collective destructive act. This collective act forms the objective point of reference of the required intent to destroy a protected group in whole or in part; the vain hope of an individual to contribute, by way of commission of one of the underlying offences, to the destruction of a group falls short of this concept of a realistic genocidal intent. The article rejects a purely subjective definition of the various categories of protected groups and cautions against the conversion of the crime of genocide into an unspecific crime of massive human rights violations based on discriminatory motive. At the same time, it is submitted that not every campaign of so-called
The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment
ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment (6 December 1999), para. 55.
ICTR-98-44A, Trial Judgment (1. December 2003), para. 811. The Kamuhanda judgment of 2004 uses nearly the exact same wording (ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T, Trial Judgment
  • The Prosecutor V
  • Case Kajelijeli
  • No
ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A, Trial Judgment (1. December 2003), para. 811. The Kamuhanda judgment of 2004 uses nearly the exact same wording (ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T, Trial Judgment (22 January 2004), para. 630).
The Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T
ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Trial Judgment (15 May 2003), para. 317 (emphasis in original).
International Criminal Law: A Critical Introduction Genocide
  • Alexander Zahar
  • Göran Sluiter
Alexander Zahar, Göran Sluiter, International Criminal Law: A Critical Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 161; William Schabas, " Genocide ", in Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2. ed. 2008), p. 149.