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Time, Space & German Soft Power: Toward a spatio-temporal turn in diplomatic studies?
Abstract
Soft power is an increasingly important concept that attempts to explain how states and organisations shape shared interests across national borders and between political, economic, social and cultural spaces. However, many of the theoretical and methodological flaws identified by scholars engaging with the term are familiar to Media & Communications research, and particularly to the sub-field termed 'cultural imperialism' during the 1970s and 1980s. This article builds upon the insights of research that explores contemporary theoretical innovations upon the cultural imperialism field, and applies it to a case study of German soft power. The aim is to explore the usefulness of the 'spatio-temporal turn' as a way of interpreting the epistemological and ontological consequences of German soft power strategies. The study includes empirical material on the recent Land of Ideas and Year of Germany campaigns.
... The use of soft power tools in foreign policy, such as economic success and cultural appeal, is a key aspect of global competition . The spatio-temporal turn in diplomatic studies provides a useful framework for understanding the epistemological and ontological consequences of soft power strategies, as seen in the case of German soft power (Pamment, 2013). ...
This essay's first section defines hard and soft power and how they work together to create soft power. Next, various instances of the two principles' application in the formulation of foreign policy are discussed in order to evaluate their efficacy. There are also instances of the application of smart power in this discussion. According to the article, soft power's durability and longevity make it a more effective and efficient notion in modern global politics. Hard power, however, is becoming less valuable as the world order shifts against it. In the modern international system, smart power tactics are just as significant as soft power tactics. Nye proposed the concept of hard power and soft power distinctions almost twenty years ago. He characterizes command or hard power as coercive power used through inducements or threats, and power as the "ability to affect others to get the outcomes one wants" in general. Hard power depends on concrete power resources like armed troops or financial resources and is based on economic sanctions , forceful diplomacy, and military action. Hard power examples include the German invasion of Poland in 1939 and the UN economic sanctions imposed on Iraq in 1991 after the first Gulf War. Because of all of the above, it is important to analyze the types of power and their effectiveness, what is the impact of soft and hard power in modern international relations, both separately and in tandem.
... 277-78). In 1908, the Schulverein was replaced by the Association of Germans Abroad (Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland), which coordinated educational and cultural exchanges involving both public and private actors (Pamment 2013a). Cultural nationalism and an anti-assimilationist approach distinguished German public diplomacy in this first phase, during which external cultural policies were employed 'to prevent expatriate or same-language communities from being integrated into foreign states, and to maintain them as potential foreign policy instruments, either in relation to territorial claims or to the procurement of economic and political advantage' (Paschalidis 2009, p. 278). ...
This article explores Russian and German public diplomacy efforts in Central Asia through the example of Kyrgyzstan. Due to a difficult economic and socio-political situation, Kyrgyzstan remains open to externally funded programmes and projects, including initiatives funded by foreign governments, and thus offers a unique environment for the study of public diplomacy. The article looks at transnational public diplomacy actors such as German political foundations and Russian-sponsored organisations active in the country. Overall, the article offers interesting insights into the nature and substance of the soft power policies pursued by Germany and Russia that are relevant for Kyrgyzstan and beyond.
... poder blando (seducción y persuasión) (cfr. Wilson 2008;Pamment 2013). En este sentido cobran importancia los parámetros de atracción, intereses compartidos y cooperación, donde el poder blando se cristaliza en la habilidad y la capacidad de guiar y estructurar las preferencias de los otros estados para "conseguir los efectos que uno desea" (Nye 2008: 95, traducción propia). ...
German-Spanish relations are currently creating new spaces for cultural and economic cooperation that open opportunities for exchange. The aim of this thesis is to describe the role of translation in the cultural and economic exchange between Germany and Spain and to examine which social factors influence the language strategies of the international actors. The methodological novelty of the study consists on exploring the function of translation from the perspective of internationalized companies: publishers and exporters. To this end, the research follows demolinguistics, economics and sociology methods, and develops an interdisciplinary framework that can be applied to the empirical study of translation in internationalization processes. From the perspective of cultural relations, the thesis analyzes translation flows in the book industry between Germany and Spain from 1979 to 2015. The empirical analysis shows that the translation flows during this period heavily depended on how publishers adapting their publishing strategies to the dynamics of both markets. In particular, translation served as a resource for publishers to a) accumulate cultural capital (publication of classics), b) to specialize their catalog in particular subject areas whose domestic book market does not meet demand, and c) to specialize their activities in foreign literature. From the perspective of international trade relations, the language patterns of Spanish firms exporting to Germany were analyzed on the basis of a remote questionnaire (N = 241). The results of the data analysis show that translation is a specialized activity mainly outsourced by companies that are either: large or multinational companies, at the initial phase of their activity abroad, and those whose activities are of a high communicative intensity. The case of study also shows that the main field of translation involves marketing material like descriptions of products to get better positioning in the new market, especially among small companies with low communication intensity. In cases of more complex products, marketing campaigns adapted to the needs of the new market were required and these are not usually outsourced to external translation agencies.
Within the concept of German foreign cultural policy, this article investigates the engagement of the Goethe-Institut in transitional Tunisia through the eyes of cultural activists on the ground. Since the Arab uprisings, the new policy framework of the German-Tunisian “Transformation Partnership” has been established, and extended approaches of the Goethe-Institut have been defined. The starting point of this article is to analyze how local cultural activists on the ground perceive the Goethe-Institut, and whether the engagement of the Goethe-Institut responds to the identified local needs. By taking the theoretical concepts of public diplomacy and soft power, the study examines policy and practice of the Goethe-Institut in times of the Tunisian transition, its role as well as its partnership approach and engagement in the fields of qualification, participation and networking. The main findings are that the Goethe-Institut contributes to the development of the cultural scene in Tunisia mainly through supporting cooperation-based projects, qualification and cultural management training as well as supporting international exchange.
Die Ergebnisse dieser Forschungsarbeit zeigen, dass trotz einer progressiven Anpassung der Zusammenarbeit mit Ländern im demokratischen Umbruch insbesondere in Transformationsprozessen die Notwendigkeit existiert, einen Paradigmenwechsel deutscher auswärtiger Kulturpolitik sowie neue Konzepte und effektive Implementierungsmodelle internationaler kultureller Zusammenarbeit zu etablieren. Existierende Arbeitsparadigmen, Strategien und Kooperationsformen gilt es zu überdenken und neue Ansätze zu formulieren. Anhand einzelner Bereiche wird exemplarisch aufgezeigt, wie dies umgesetzt werden kann. Zuerst werden Reformen der politischen Strategien im Kontext von Transformationspartnerschaften (Abschnitt 7.1), dann Kriterien für Kulturarbeit zur Unterstützung von Transformationsprozessen (Abschnitt 7.2) und Dekonstruktionsprozesse auswärtiger Kulturpolitik (Abschnitt 7.3) erläutert. Abschließend erfolgt eine Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse unter dem Titel Von Kooperation zu Ownership (Abschnitt 7.4). Die Ergebnisse basieren auf den vorangegangenen Analysen und dem exemplarischen Fall Tunesiens.
In January 2014, it emerged that manufacturer Saab had provided financial backing to the “yes” campaign for a referendum on whether Switzerland should purchase 22 JAS-Gripen aircraft. Although the funds were immediately returned, a second story broke in February revealing the detailed involvement of the Swedish Embassy in the broader coordination of a public diplomacy campaign to support the “yes” vote. Under the heading “Sweden, Inc”, leaked documents demonstrated the close cooperation between corporate actor Saab, the Swedish ambassador, defence attaché and other governmental actors, and Swiss politicians and military associations in creating a diplomatic, political and media climate conducive to a successful vote. This article provides a close analysis of the scandal in order to contribute to the broader understanding of public diplomacy and nation brands theory and practice in a number of relevant areas. First, it addresses the role of ethics in funding influence campaigns. Second, it analyses the practical relationship between PD and place branding. Third, it investigates the ways in which collaboration and competition are invoked in the campaign. Fourth is an analysis of the roles of public and private actors to better understand their impact on campaign agendas.
Nation brands are intended to act as vehicles for economic development. However, the role of the nation brands of developed countries in shaping the economic development of developing countries has not been explored to the same degree. Using the example of Britain’s 2010 National Security Strategy, this article argues that the two-decade long decline in conditional aid has been superseded by efforts to influence developing countries through coordinated aid, diplomatic, commercial and security strategies. Such strategies seek to use brand identities to transpose influence between different societal sectors of developing countries, thus pursuing structural influence over developing societies through post-conditional techniques. This article therefore positions nation brands as a key component of contemporary soft power strategies, which are intended to stimulate growth, instigate infrastructural reform, assert ideational norms, and promote the donor country as a partner of choice. As such, it presents a unique perspective on the coordinated application of brands and aid as complementary tools of soft power.
American Quarterly 57.2 (2005) 309-333
On October 14, 2001, President George W. Bush complained at a prime-time press conference, "I'm amazed that there is such misunderstanding of what our country is about that people would hate us. I, like most Americans, I just can't believe it, because I know how good we are." The president's plaintive remark, made only a month after a global outpouring of sympathy for the United States but only a week since American bombs had started falling upon Afghanistan, captured a tension between values and security that is at the heart of the U.S. pursuit of the "war on terror." Strategic goals of "national security" might be achieved with military force, but would the goal of spreading "freedom, democracy, and free enterprise" be assured or jeopardized by the pursuit of military projects? This remains a crucial question for the United States as it seeks to extend the "unipolar moment" of global hegemony in which it has unprecedented power. It is also the defining question in the regeneration of public diplomacy as a strategic tool of U.S. national security.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, ignited media discussions about the merits and failings of American public diplomacy and hastened a political review of its role in the planning and execution of foreign policy. U.S. Congressman Henry Hyde, chair of the House International Relations Committee, underlined this role in introducing the Freedom Promotion Act of 2002: "Public diplomacy—which consists of systematic efforts to communicate not with foreign governments but with the people themselves—has a central role to play in the task of making the world safer for the just interests of the United States, its citizens, and its allies." In the last few years, U.S. public diplomacy has undergone intensive reorganization and retooling as it takes on a more prominent propaganda role in the efforts to win the "hearts and minds" of foreign publics.
This is not a new role, for the emergent ideas and activities of public diplomacy as the "soft power" wing of American foreign policy have notable historical prefigurations in U.S. international relations. In this essay we situate the history of the cold war paradigm of U.S. public diplomacy within the broader framework of "political warfare" that combines overt and covert forms of information management. However, there are distinctive features to the "new public diplomacy" within both domestic and international contexts of the contemporary American imperium. It operates in a conflicted space of power and value that is a crucial theater of strategic operations for the renewal of American hegemony within a transformed global order. We consider the relation of this new diplomacy to the broader pursuit of political warfare by the state in its efforts to transform material preponderance (in terms of financial, military, and information capital) into effective political outcomes across the globe. In a post-9/11 context, we argue, public diplomacy functions not simply as a tool of national security, but also as a component of U.S. efforts to manage the emerging formation of a neoliberal empire.
The term "public diplomacy" was coined by academics at Tufts University in the mid-1960s to "describe the whole range of communications, information, and propaganda" under control of the U.S. government. As the term came into vogue, it effectively glossed (through the implication of both "public" and diplomatic intent) the political...
Events since 11 September 2001 have encouraged renewed debate on a dimension of diplomacy that, in varying forms, has a considerable pedigree. But, as with earlier debates concerning what is ‘old’ and ‘new’ in the practice of diplomacy, there is a danger here in failing to set the key issues within the framework of broader changes in world politics. More precisely, in the context of the theme of this book, current preoccupations with implementing public diplomacy strategies and developing new mechanisms within foreign ministries for overseeing them lead to the danger of misunderstanding the significance of public diplomacy and confusing its role as a mode of exercising power with the changing environments in which power is projected.
in the first part of a major engagement with David Harvey's New Imperialism, Giovanni Arrighi sets out the interlocking dynamics, spatial and temporal, of capitalist development and imperialism. Should us difficulties in Iraq and the ballooning current-account deficit be read as symptoms of a deeper-lying crisis, a shift from hegemony to dominance presaging the rise of a new East Asian challenger?.
An overview of Germany's concept, and underlying theories, of public diplomacy. Since 1990, the newly united Federal Republic of Germany has been grappling with the task of defining the country’s new role in the world: is it still a giant in economic terms (the world’s number three as per gross domestic product), but a dwarf in the political arena? What should Germany’s currently carefully limited contributions to international military interventions (in Afghanistan and elsewhere) look like in the future? What will become of the country’s aspirations towards a permanent seat on the UN Security Council? Will a united Europe be dominated by Germany, the European Union’s most populous member state (82 million inhabitants), economic powerhouse, and cultural bridge between western and eastern Europe? And what is, or should be, Germany’s modern identity, her image, and her message to the world? ***
[Note: An updated and fully rewritten version of this chapter has been published in 2020 as: Oliver Zöllner: Germany's public diplomacy: Translating domestic discourses of modernity and culture, past and present, in: Nancy Snow & Nicholas J. Cull (eds.): Routledge handbook of public diplomacy. 2nd ed. New York, London: Routledge, 254-263.]
This article explores the mythic nature of television news in a global-newsroom context. News routine analysis of newscast producers and ethnographic data from a case study of the English-language newsroom at Germany's Deutsche Welle point to the existence of sociocultural filters influencing news decisions and, in turn, mythmaking. These filters reveal a uniquely German myth—the Past—not shared and even resisted by English-language (Anglo) producers framing stories and constructing newscasts from a German news organization for a global audience.
The practice of 'branding' has invaded all aspects of public and private life. Increasingly, cities, regions and states are using the services of PR and branding consultants to strengthen their ties with so-called stakeholders, aiming to achieve economic and political benefits. This essay studies the intersection between the two worlds of PR and IR theory; two epistemic communities that have little real contact with each other, despite the fact that they share an interest in concepts such as globalisation, identity and the changing nature of power in international politics. This essay offers numerous concrete examples of the phenomenon of location branding to describe how and why territorial entities have decided to jump on the `brandwagon'. It relates the trend of location branding with some strands of constructivist thinking and explores the possible consequences for the study of nationalism and democracy. In this, it sketches the outlines of a potential new research agenda.
This article critically examines the emergence of nation branding as a commercial practice at the end of the Cold War by conceptualizing it as a means for nations to redefine and reposition themselves within the master narrative of globalization. It examines the industry literature of the nation branding movement, which seeks to legitimate the practice. It argues that nation branding is an engine of neo-liberalism that explicitly embraces a reductive logic, which privileges market relations (market fundamentalism) in articulations of national identity; also contends that nation branding is a risky business that can backfire, since its success depends, in large part, on the intuitive knowledge of individual industry ‘creatives’. It maintains that the methodology of nation branding, qua methodology, is profoundly anti-democratic. It offers recommendations for making nation branding more transparent and accountable to democratic values, but also explores Umberto's concept of ‘semiotic guerrilla warfare’ as a possible strategy for disrupting nation branding and redirecting initiatives to rethink national identity in more democratic directions.
Beliefs in the coming of the global era confuse our understanding of the complexity of contemporary processes of world integration. Absorption in the latest that high-tech IT has to offer is conjoined with the flourishing of mythologies that celebrate the virtues of techno-global networks. By resituating the planetary process of unification in the longue durée, we may escape a one-sided vision of the destiny of the so-called ‘great human family’. It is against this fatalism that the new social movements are presently mobilizing themselves.
This article analyses German public diplomacy efforts via international broadcasting to the Arab world post-9/11. After defining the field’s major relevant concepts and models and pointing out the conceptual convergence of public relations and public diplomacy, the article presents a critical analysis of the requirements of dialogue drawing on Habermas’s (1984) Theory of Communicative Action. For the time being, the question whether Germany’s broadcast public diplomacy in the Arab world is based on ‘dialogue’, as has been posited by the main protagonists, needs to be answered cautiously. What is visible is a determination of Deutsche Welle to at least present a quest for dialogue as a projection of the country’s national values, policies, self-image and underlying myth. The invocation of ‘dialogue’ via DW may reflect a reassertion of the very self-image Germany feels most comfortable with: that of the Open-minded Society of Consensus as the country’s grand narrative.
For the second time in this century, political developments in Germany are posing a challenge to widely accepted assumptions about democracy. On the first occasion, optimism was shattered by experience. This time, however, it may be pessimism that falls before the facts.
The devastating transformation of the homeland of Kant, Goethe, and Beethoven into the Nazis' Third Reich provided the limiting case for most postwar theories of what makes democracy work. Explanations focusing on psychology, economic and social conditions, or culture have alternately vied with and complemented one other, always with the German experience either at center stage or waiting in the wings.1 Each explanation, especially if it shows optimism concerning the future of democracy, must confront the question: Why did democracy fail in Germany? A substantial body of persuasive scholarship—regularly represented and cited in the pages of this journal—now stands in implicit if not explicit response to that question.
The second challenge to prevailing views about democracy—the one posed by events since 1989—stems from the relative success of the recent German experience. The evidence for this success is strong enough to warrant the belief that united Germany is doing better than might have been expected, especially given the initial pessimism that flowed from prevailing hypotheses about what makes democracy work. [End Page 30] Much of the relevant evidence comes from post-1989 survey research, which suggests that the political soil of the former GDR is more fertile than expected; that democratic norms have taken root there and are growing steadily; and that the differences between citizens in the east and west are narrower than many have supposed.
Committed democrats cannot help but wish the Germans well as they strive to achieve the political and economic transformation of that part of their country which was once the communist German Democratic Republic (GDR). Nonetheless, a positive report on the health of postunification democracy is not, at first blush, an obviously warranted or intellectually comfortable assessment.
Analyses abound suggesting that two generations of authoritarian rule polluted to the point of infertility not only the soil but also the soul of the former GDR. To the direct, poorly estimated costs of reunification must be added the hardships of the broader recession of the early 1990s, for which many in the European Community (EC) hold the Germans responsible. Finally, one must reckon the longer-term price likely to be incurred through fundamental industrial change, whereby economic growth either will be drastically curtailed or will carry with it increased structural unemployment. Economic conditions do not seem to enhance the chances for the roots of democracy to sink deeper.
Likewise, these analyses claim that the postunification social and psychological climate may not be the best for democracy. On 18 March 1990, East Germans voted in an election for the first time since 1933. Only people 78 or more years old could have voted in both 1933 and 1990, A well-tested body of research holds that attachment to a particular political culture is formed early in life, thus justifying pessimism about the prospects for the speedy growth of a democratic civic culture in the former GDR.2 Then too, there is still some popular doubt in many countries about whether the West Germans ever really developed a solidly anchored and resilient civic culture.
Such doubts have drawn strength from recent outbreaks of violence against foreigners, accompanied by skepticism among Germans themselves about their own future well-being. Finally, there is the apparent solidity of the Mauer im Kopf—the "wall in the mind" that is so often cited as a feature of contemporary German life.3
But how congruent with reality are these analyses? A raft of survey data accumulated by social scientists, marketing firms, the news media, and political organizations over the last three years provides some strong clues. The tentative conclusions we draw from them touch on three key topics: 1) The bases for a democratic value system among the citizens of the former East Germany; 2) The sociopsychological sources of right-wing extremism and xenophobia; and 3) The size and shape of...
Understanding, planning, engagement and advocacy are core concepts of public diplomacy. They are not unique to the American experience. There is, however, an American public diplomacy modus operandi with enduring characteristics that are rooted in the nation's history and political culture. These include episodic resolve correlated with war and surges of zeal, systemic trade-offs in American politics, competitive practitioner communities and powerful civil society actors, and late adoption of communication technologies. This article examines these concepts and characteristics in the context of US President Barack Obama's strategy of global public engagement. It argues that as US public diplomacy becomes a multi-stakeholder instrument and central to diplomatic practice, its institutions, methods and priorities require transformation rather than adaptation. The article explores three illustrative issues: a culture of understanding; social media; and multiple diplomatic actors. It concludes that the characteristics shaping the US public diplomacy continue to place significant constraints on its capacity for transformational change.
The continued rise of the non-state actor in twenty-first century international politics issues a potent challenge to state primacy in the area of diplomacy. Diplomacy's statist tradition, once the bedrock organising institution for pursuing international politics, is ceding influence to non-state actors—the “new” diplomats—who have displayed impressive skill at shaping policy through means that foreign ministries fail to grasp. To the chagrin of established scholars and practitioners, this paper claims that nothing has transpired to suggest the diplomatic profession is doing anything but pluralising. Furthermore, the process by which the foreign ministry opens itself to the public increasingly resides with the latter. Does this revolution mean the evolution of the “new diplomacy” has materialised? The contents in the following pages suggest so, and the main reason for this is built upon a radical view of agency: the age of diplomacy as an institution is giving way to an age of diplomacy as a behaviour. Yet despite who dominates in the art of influence, caveats remain and it appears likely that each side will need the other to achieve successful statecraft in the years to come.
The foreign image policy of states, that is their efforts to influence how they are seen by foreign publics, is an under-researched aspect of International Relations (IR) and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). This is wrong, argues this article. As foreign image policy reflects states' self-understandings, its examination provides inside insights into the transformation of states. The analysis of the foreign image policy of Germany brings to light a remarkable transformation. Until the mid-1990s, Germany cared about its image mostly for security reasons and used traditional instruments of foreign cultural policy for its image projection. Since the mid-1990s, its image policy pursues commercial goals — promoting the Standort — and for this purpose relies on public relations and marketing instruments such as the ‘Land of Ideas’ nation-branding campaign. This new policy has been enabled by the globalization discourse and its construction of a ‘global competition’ between ‘competition states’. At the same time, Germany's new foreign image policy re-produces the globalization discourse and its key concepts. Foreign image policy and globalization are mutually re-enforcing. This interconnectedness with the globalization discourse points to the wider significance of foreign image policy. Therefore, research along these lines carries the promise of bringing FPA back into the agenda of IR.Journal of International Relations and Development (2009) 12, 293–316. doi:10.1057/jird.2009.12