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Adam Smith and the Character of Virtue
Abstract
Recent years have witnessed a renewed debate over the costs at which the benefits of free markets have been bought. This book revisits the moral and political philosophy of Adam Smith, capitalism’s founding father, to recover his understanding of the morals of the market age. In so doing it illuminates a crucial albeit overlooked side of Smith’s project: his diagnosis of the ethical ills of commercial societies and the remedy he advanced to cure them. Focusing on Smith’s analysis of the psychological and social ills endemic to commercial society – anxiety and restlessness, inauthenticity and mediocrity, alienation and individualism – it argues that Smith sought to combat corruption by cultivating the virtues of prudence, magnanimity, and beneficence. The result constitutes a new morality for modernity, at once a synthesis of commercial, classical, and Christian virtues and a normative response to one of the most pressing political problems of Smith’s day and ours. Ryan Patrick Hanley is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Marquette University. His research in the history of political philosophy has appeared in the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, the Review of Politics, History of Political Thought, the European Journal of Political Theory, and other academic journals and edited volumes. He is also the editor of the forthcoming Penguin Classics edition of Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, featuring an introduction by Amartya Sen, and a co-editor, with Darrin McMahon, of The Enlightenment: Critical Concepts in History.
... Though in some measure obliged to them all, therefore, he is not absolutely dependent upon any one of them" (WN, p. 420). In these ways, we see that commercial society extends, rather than restricts, the independence of both customers and workers by diminishing the leverage any particular employer can have over them (Rasmussen 2008;Hanley 2009). ...
... Smith had argued in his Theory of Moral Sentiments that our moral sensibilities are not present at birth; neither are they transcendent truths awaiting to be apprehended by reason. Instead, they are learned by our interactions with others (Otteson 2002;Hanley 2009;Forman-Barzilai 2011;Weinstein 2013). 12 Smith believes, however, that all of us do have an innate desire for "mutual sympathy of sentiments" (TMS, pp. ...
Elizabeth Anderson claims that the prevailing culture of business is one of domination. “Most workplace governments in the United States are dictatorships, in which bosses. . don’t merely govern workers; they dominate them” (2017, p. xxii; italics in the original). If this diagnosis is correct, then the culture of business poses a significant threat to human liberty, as each year millions of people in the employ of businesses spend hundreds or thousands of hours on the job. This essay provides a further argument supporting Anderson’s analysis, by extending her treatment of Adam Smith and drawing on his claim about the potentially mind-numbing effects on workers of extreme division of labor. Smith’s analysis, though consistent with Anderson’s, implies that the problem is more worrisome than she allows, and accordingly that Anderson’s own remedy might be insufficient. Our Anderson/Smith argument suggests that worker unfreedom might warrant more aggressive institutional remedy.
... Elsewhere, scholars have emphasised that Smith endorsed the pursuit of wealth for its societal benefit (Hill, 2017). Hanley (2009) and Griswold (1999) observe a "comic irony" (p. 222) in Smith's view that while the wealth of nations increases through the pursuit of wealth, in practice, we see how the pursuit of wealth leaves individual people constantly dissatisfied. ...
... He advocated for the pursuit of wealth bounded by the rules of justice, given his wariness of the flaws and virtues that could exist in commercial society. Hanley (2009) suggests that Smith understands happiness beyond surface-level interpretations. The process of wealth acquisition by honest means is essential for the pursuit of happiness. ...
In the face of global economic volatility and widening socioeconomic disparities, there is a growing call to reevaluate prevailing economic models. Heterodox economists and management scholars increasingly emphasise the significance of happiness and subjective well-being, advocating for a well-being economy that prioritises human welfare over traditional growth-centric approaches. This article contributes to this discourse by critically examining Adam Smith's seminal works, particularly "The Wealth; of Nations" and "The Theory of Moral Sentiments." It argues for a nuanced; understanding of economic growth and progress, integrating subjective well-being and ethical considerations into contemporary management frameworks. Despite limited attention in management literature, Smith's ideas about the relationship between wealth and happiness offer valuable insights for modern management and the emerging field of well-being economics. This article explores how the relationship between wealth and happiness in Smith's works holds promise for contemporary debates.
... Smith focuses specifically on the self-actualization of society. These thoughts of Smith will radically change the modern theory of justice (Sen, 2010;2009). In addition, Smith differs from the advocates of social contracting by laying the groundwork for the realization of both social and economic justice with the impartial spectator element he developed. ...
... Time spent on two different types of work is not always enough to determine this proportion. An hour of hard work may involve more effort than an easy two-hour job (Hanley, 2009). How will the absolute labor expended here be known? ...
... Und wo schon diese Abgrenzungen im Abstrakten alles andere als trivial sind, ist die Interpretation von Smiths eigenem Umgang mit den Begrifflichkeiten erst recht kontrovers: Manchmal liefert er sehr präzise Definitionen, manchmal hält er sich an den umgangssprachlichen Gebrauch der Wörter (vgl. unter anderem Force 2003, Fleischacker 2004, S. 84-103, Mehta 2006, C. Smith 2006, Brown 2009, Hanley 2009, S. 104, Forman-Barzilai 2010a, S. 37, und Maurer 2019; ein guter Gesamtüberblick findet sich bei Heath 2013). ...
... Das verwische nur die realen Unterschiede. Hanley (2009) hingegen betont die Verbindungen. Die Tugend der Klugheit, die das Eigeninteresse trägt, kombiniere rationale Voraussicht und Selbstbeherrschung. ...
Zusammenfassung
Vor 300 Jahren, im Juni 1723, kam Adam Smith auf die Welt. Aus dem Sohn eines schottischen Anwalts und Zollkommissars wurde ein großer Aufklärer, der vor allem mit seinen moralphilosophischen und ökonomischen Schriften Berühmtheit erlangte. Mit seinem zweiten Hauptwerk, dem „Wealth of Nations“ (1776), etablierte sich die Volkswirtschaftslehre als eigenständige akademische Disziplin. Das Buch entfaltete nicht nur theoretische, sondern in zahlreichen Ländern auch praktische Wirkung. Freilich ging die Rezeptionsgeschichte mit erheblichen Vergröberungen und Verzerrungen einher. Gegen diese Klischees stemmt sich seit einigen Jahren eine interdisziplinäre Gruppe von Smith-Forschern. In diesem Überblicksartikel aus Anlass des Jubiläums stellt Karen Horn einige der Einsichten aus der jüngeren Literatur der Smith-Forschung vor und zeigt, wie reizvoll und fruchtbar die Auseinandersetzung mit dem großen Schotten weiterhin ist – auch für die hier unterrepräsentierten Ökonomen.
... This text is a preliminary version of the article accepted for publication, made available in the SciELO Preprints database. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0103-6351/7560. closer, to varying degrees, highlighting the possible influence of Rousseau's diagnosis of the evils of inequality and self-love on Smith's thinking, despite their major divergences (Force, 2003;Rasmussen, 2006;Hanley, 2008;2009;Hont, 2015;Stimson, 2015;Griswold, 2018) 1 . Sagar (2018a), in turn, holds that Rousseau's ideas were not an important influence to Smith's theoretical development and did not pose a serious challenge to his thought, since they were neither novel nor sophisticated in comparison to Mandeville's and Hume's moral theories. ...
... 29-32), who presents some of the most important criticisms of Smith's moral theory made by Adam Ferguson, Thomas Reid, and Dugald Stewart.27 It is important to note that, according toRaphael (1975) andHanley (2009), Smith developed this aspect of his theory of the impartial spectator throughout his life, and made substantive changes to the editions of TMS, particularly the second and sixth editions. ...
This paper aims to show that Smith’s theory of sympathy and the impartial spectator can be understood as an attempt to overcome the selfish anthropology advocated by Mandeville and denounced by Rousseau. In Smith’s view, if Mandeville’s theory of the psychology behind commerce and exchange was correct, then Rousseau would be right in his denunciation of the moral evils of civilization. However, for Smith, Mandeville’s theses were wrong, and thus Rousseau’s critiques were largely unfounded, because, quite paradoxically, they relied on Mandeville’s description of sociability. Therefore, the often emphasized sympathies of Smith for Rousseau’s arguments should be mitigated.
... Given how consequential Smith believes our interactions with others are for shaping and forming our intellectual habits, our moral sensibilities, and our character, and how substantially he believes this "education" influences who we become and are, Smith could not but be concerned about ensuring that we get it right. His numerous and repeated discussions throughout TMS demonstrate that this is an abiding concern of his (Griswold 1999;Hanley 2009). Yet he does not advocate public provision of education. ...
... For discussion of Smith's notion of an "impartial spectator," seeRaphael (2007). 7 For accounts of this process, seeOtteson (2002),Hanley (2009), Forman-Barzilai (2011), and Weinstein (2013. ...
Most Adam Smith scholars hold that Smith endorsed public provision of education to offset deleterious consequences arising from the division of labor. Smith’s putative endorsement of publicly funded education is taken by some scholars as evidence that he tends more toward progressive than classical liberalism, or that this is a departure from, perhaps an inconsistency with, Smith’s otherwise strong presumption against government intervention in markets. This paper argues that these interpretations are flawed because Smith ultimately does not advocate public provision of education. He raises the idea and explores its potential benefits, but he ultimately does not endorse it. Smith also provides reason to be skeptical of public provision of education, which suggests that his final position may have inclined against it.
... To begin, it is worth recalling a distinction made in the first edition of TMS between "the common degree of the moral," which deserves mere approval, and virtue as "excellence, something uncommonly great and beautiful, which rises far above what is vulgar and ordinary" and deserves "to be admired and celebrated" p. 25). In the 1790 edition of TMS, Smith places a greater emphasis on the pursuit of true moral excellence (Dickey 1986;Hanley 2009). Most importantly, he adds a new part depicting the character of virtue (TMS VI,, and he insists that human beings naturally desire not only praise but praiseworthiness (TMS III.2,. ...
... The interpretation developed here of the poor man's son and commercially ambitious individuals like him as misguided pursuers of excellence is influenced by Ryan Hanley's (2009) reconstruction of Smith's vision of moral excellence in the 1790 edition of TMS. While Hanley (2009, pp. ...
What explains the ambition to get rich? Adam Smith is clear that commercial ambition, the passionate desire for great wealth, is not simply a desire to satisfy one’s material needs. His argument on what underlies it, however, is not obvious. I review three possibilities suggested by Smith’s work and the scholarly literature—vanity, the love of system, and the desire for tranquility—and conclude that none of them captures the underlying motive of commercial ambition. Instead, I argue that Smith understands commercial ambition as a misguided desire for excellence. Ambitious pursuers of wealth are driven by the desire to deserve and to enjoy recognition for their excellence, but their judgment of what is truly excellent is corrupted by the standards of a wealth-worshipping society. Instead of appealing to the moral standpoint of the impartial spectator, they construct in their minds and follow a corruptive moral guide: the wealth-worshipping spectator.
... Uno de los aspectos a considerar, a la hora de analizar este pasaje, es que pertenece a la sexta parte de TSM, sección enteramente nueva en la sexta edición, es decir, forma parte del conjunto de cambios que Smith agregó poco antes de su muerte y que reflejan una mirada crítica sobre el avance de la sociedad comercial. Tal como nota Hanley (2009), los estudios sobre la sexta edición apuntan a que Smith se habría desilusionado del avance del capitalismo para fines del siglo XVIII, particularmente en la medida en que los principios de socialización, que la propia simpatía habilitaba, dificultaban el desarrollo de la virtud genuina (p.85). ...
In this paper we propose a reading of Smith’s political philosophy, based on his theory of political obligation, as a critique of contractarianism. The author will reject the hypothesis of the state of nature and the consent of individuals, proposing, instead, a theory based on opinion, but, above all, on the illusion that commercial society will lead us to happiness. We will trace these ideas in three of his most important texts: The Theory of Moral Sentiments, The Wealth of Nations, and the Lectures on Jurisprudence.
... One of the discoveries of recent Smith scholarship has been his indebtedness to Aristotle (Hanley, 2009;Vivenza, 2001Vivenza, , 2009). ...
In recent decades, Alasdair MacIntyre has developed a style of moral philosophy and an argument for Neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics that has deeply influenced business ethics. Most of the work inspired by MacIntyre has dealt with individual and organisational dimensions of business ethics rather than the market economic environment in which individuals and organisations operate. MacIntyre has been a fierce critic of capitalism and economics. He has read Adam Smith an advocate of selfish individualism, rule‐based ethics and the banishment of teleology. This reading is seriously defective, and Smith in fact offers much of what MacIntyre calls for in economics. MacIntyre's ethical framework can be made more powerful and useful to business ethicists by incorporating Smithian insights, especially Smith's account of market virtues and teleological account of markets as extended cooperation directed towards the common good of wealth creation. Aside from issues of the interpretation of MacIntyre and Smith, this analysis opens new pathways for dialogue between business ethicists and economists.
... Certains voient chez Smith soit une évolution de l'économie allant contre l'éthique, soit la vision opposée, soit enfin l'appel à des réformes pour remédier à des évolutions négatives, possibles mais non certaines (Bassiry & Jones, 1993;Werhane, 2000;Wilson, 1989 (Kennedy, 2011;Sen, 2011;Woller, 1996) : (1) Smith ne s'arrête pas à cette critique, à cette « corruption-dégradation de la cité » rencontrée précédemment. Par son étude des mécanismes de l'économie, il distingue plusieurs formes de ce qui peut être appelé des qualifications pénales (paiement de pot-de-vin, favoritisme, népotisme, prévarication) qu'il lie à la croissance de l'empire britannique et l'évolution des relations entre secteur marchand et l'État (Hanley, 2009;Mueller, 2021 Angleterre et Hollande est complète après la disparition de l'empire maritime hollandais au XVIIe siècle puis un début de la révolution industrielle en l'Angleterre presqu'un siècle avant la Hollande (Pleijt & Zanden, 2020). 29 Des indicateurs plus récents comme l'extraction ratio (part de l'inégalité maximale possible en fonction du revenu moyen par habitant) et le inequality possibility frontier (quotité disponible d'inégalitéqui soustrait le minimum nécessaire à la survie des plus pauvres à un calcul de la répartition des richesses) ne montrent pas, au contraire, de dégradation significative avec la révolution industrielle (Milanovic, 2013;Milanovic, Lindert, & Williamson, 2007 (Wood, 2015). ...
Corruption is an ever more prevalent issue. Laws and regulations are multiplying, as are scandals, with no indication of any improvement. How can a European company implement anticipation and prevention solutions? Moral philosophy places man's responsibility towards the city and its limitations at the center: its corruption. The schematization of the ethical engine and its intersection with the models of the theories of attention (TA) and contingency (TC), allow the reconciliation of several conceptual sets. The comparison between these paradigms, and a qualitative study conducted in 19 countries and 4 continents amongst corporate decision-makers with firsthand experience in corruption, lead to a partial constructivist validation. The succession of three tools - factorial correspondence analysis, qualitative analysis and competing hypotheses analysis - allows for the extraction of empirically effective actions. They call upon two of the principles of the TA: situated attention and focus of attention. The necessary condition is that the ethical foundation can be mobilized. This foundation is independent of cultural, sociological, or doctrinal contexts. It allows for the internal valuation of information about corruption and the search for a necessarily complex ethical solution.
... 23. For useful discussions see Muller (1993); Young (1997); Otteson (2002);Fleischacker (2004); Hanley (2009). ...
... Liberality or generosity is a prominent virtue in Aristotle and for Ames it is the final part of the virtue of thrift. For Smith, generosity is part of the greater virtue of beneficence (Hanley, 2009), and occupies a similar relation to thrift: once some measure of one's own livelihood is achieved, then generosity is possible (Campbell, 1967). ...
Thrift is a historic virtue which is enjoying a necessary revival in the context of the climate crisis and wider concerns about sustainability. Here, thrift is explored from the perspective of its traditional association with Presbyterianism in Scotland, with the aim of clarifying the concept. A review of the broad history of thrift and its connection with Protestantism is given. This is then supported by empirical data from leaders in Scottish banking gathered in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007/2008, which is shown as a failure of financial stewardship. The significance of thrift is discussed in relation to the views of these banking leaders and its application to contemporary problems of sustainability. Thrift emerges, not as a compulsion to save, but as a virtue which underpins justice.KeywordsThriftProtestantismBankingSustainabilityJustice
... Liberality or generosity is a prominent virtue in Aristotle and for Ames it is the final part of the virtue of thrift. For Smith, A. Robson generosity is part of the greater virtue of beneficence (Hanley, 2009) and occupies a similar relation to thrift: once some measure of one's own livelihood is achieved, then generosity is possible (Campbell, 1967). ...
Human society is currently facing multipronged grand challenges whose impacts transcend national and regional boundaries. Of these, environmental degradation is an increasingly complex challenge with grave consequences for the social and economic realms of life. It is being increasingly recognised that the existing approaches to solving the environmental crisis are insufficient and piecemeal, and there is a dire need to explore new philosophical paradigms to charter a sustainable development pathway. In consonance with other major religions of the world, Sikhism is increasing taking a “green turn” through re-interpretation of scriptural sources and drawing on elements of Sikh philosophy. The field-based research documents the role of Sikh organisations in promoting ecological consciousness and creating new forms of environmental governance.
The article's novelty is its focus on the role of Smith’s theory of beauty and its implications for utility, systems, and morality in the narrative of “The Poor Man’s Son”. From his enlightenment worldview, the narrative contains Smith’s criticism of the misguided or reductionist view of the beauty of utility and affirmation of harmonious systems. Adam Smith’s narrative of “The Poor Man’s Son” in his book, The theory of moral sentiments [1759], has received significant attention from scholars. Three modes of interpretation can be distinguished. The first group follow a mode of interpretation from the world of the text, which is literal and regards the narrative as Smith’s support of beneficence. The narrative is perceived as Smith’s criticism of commerce and consumerism in pursuing happiness. The second group, reading from the world behind the text, pay more attention to historical and material aspects and argue that the narrative warns against misplaced ambition and affirms the virtue of commerce. The third group, reading from the world in front of the text, focus on the reception of the text, and the emphasis shifts to the tension between beneficence and commercial prowess in Smith's work. The problem with all three interpretations is that the interrelated nature of beauty, utility, and commerce has not been explored. Consequently, an analysis of the narrative from Smith’s theory of beauty underscores that the poor man's son's anguish resulted from a lack of appreciation of the beauty of the economic system and not solely the pleasure of consumption. This unlocks the connection between beauty, utility, and commerce, affirming the common good and societal harmony of systems when artefacts function correctly.
This is the first of five exploring public services strategically and begins by analysing the changing nature of the welfare state: the state as value creating, the state as value distributing—a battle for reforms; the state as the executive committee of the ruling class and the state and public value (PV) production and distribution. Under each heading, key ideas from research and bourgeois theory are criticised from a Marxist viewpoint and the relevance of ideas and policies to developing countries pointed out, contrasting welfare states in Africa, Asia and Nordic countries. From a Marxist value-flow perspective, new public management is critiqued with issues of inequality and responsibility considered.
By exploring Adam Smith’s considerations of arts, this paper stresses that the philosopher establishes a profound connection between music and sympathy. In his essay “Of the Nature of that Imitation which takes place in what are called The Imitative Arts,” Smith delves into esthetic theory, dedicating a significant portion of the text to music and its role in eliciting pleasure and emotions. While previous studies have acknowledged the presence of art-related vocabulary and an esthetic dimension in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, they have not comprehensively mobilized his art essay to illuminate his moral theory. Following this unexplored path, this paper rallies the parallel Smith creates between emotions and musical aspects, such as rhythm and melody, to find a connection between his esthetic and moral ideas. In essence, it reveals how the human esthetic sensibility to look for regularities and order serves as a foundational element in Smith’s understanding of sympathy and social harmony .
In his essay, “Of the Nature of That Imitation Which Takes Place in What Are Called the Imitative Arts,” Adam Smith discusses two examples, topiary and false jewels, apparently coming to opposed conclusions: that aesthetic value is, and that it is not, independent of market value. I unpack the reasoning behind these conclusions, arguing that Smith’s position is consistent: he recognizes that aesthetic value can be occluded by market prices—as when one dismisses the beauty of something cheap out of snobbery—or heightened by them, as in the case of the aesthetic value of magnificence. Because aesthetic value can thus be heightened or corrupted by market value on Smith’s analysis, I suggest, speculatively, that for Smith the bad influence of economic considerations in aesthetic matters (faulty snobbery or an economically-derived corruption of taste) is identified by reference to moral, not purely aesthetic criteria.
El texto se propone reconstruir el concepto smithiano de obligación política, a partir de la revisión crítica de tres de sus principales obras: Teoría de los sentimientos morales, Lecciones de jurisprudencia y La riqueza de las naciones. Si bien no se trata de un concepto central en su teoría, la propuesta del autor, en continuidad con la de Hume, presenta una lectura alternativa a las lecturas dominantes basadas en el consentimiento. Aunque este cuestionamiento tiene potencial crítico, el apego del escocés a las jerarquías heredadas como garantes del orden social, tendrán efectos conservadores que serán refutados por los hechos históricos posteriores.
How are we to understand the contemporary preoccupation—at least in many English‐speaking societies—with ‘random acts of kindness’ and the idea of kindness more generally? Should this be seen as a challenge to the logic of capitalism or reinforcing of it, an example of commodification of emotion within our everyday lives? By introducing and mapping the contours of an emergent ‘kindness industry’, placing emotion (and enchantment) at the heart of how attachment to the idea of kindness is theorised, and marshalling existing empirical research on contemporary framings of everyday kindness, I argue that there is a need for a critical sociological engagement with the ‘pro‐social’ that does justice to its profound ambivalence. In the case of contemporary kindness this involves understanding both the regulatory nature of the enchantment sold by a kindness industry and the problem‐solving potential of the enchantment of kindness in the everyday, where it both helps address contemporary feelings of hopelessness and shame and facilitates the possibility of making life materially liveable.
This article highlights the philosophical contribution of an existential reading of Adam Smith’s narrative of ‘The poor man’s son’ that opens transdisciplinary research themes. The narrative in Adam Smith’s 'The Theory of Moral Sentiments' [1759] deals with the issue of labour and happiness in commercial society, an important contemporary topic in meaningful labour research. This field is dominated by research on labour’s personal or moral value, which may lead to personal and workplace conflicts in case of ethical dilemmas. Recent research advocates
existentialism, underscoring authenticity in workplace meaningful labour. The problem is that some of these studies limit meaning of employees’ reception of workplace policies and other events, resulting in a dualism between surface and deep existentialism. I will argue that an existential reading of the narrative ‘The poor man’s son’ contributes to transdisciplinary research by advancing research in commerce, specifically existential meaningful labour, by advocating an integrative theory of labour and happiness. The insights from Jean-Paul Sartre concerning anguish, authenticity, freedom, and facticity challenge the assumption that the son’s labour was meaningless because of the misery he experienced during old age, supporting
a view that his choices were an expression of his freedom of choice and authenticity, and not determined by circumstances that provide important insights for an integrative theory of meaningful labour that prioritises the anguish of ontological freedom, consciousness as the source of freedom and facticity as hurdles to be surmounted on the path to fulfilment.
This chapter focuses on a particular kind of education in Smith’s moral philosophy. Specifically, it describes in what sense Smith’s understanding of human beings would be based on an idea of harmony between oneself and others that mature through natural education. In Smith, ‘natural education’ consists of those natural educational consequences of the sympathetic consideration and emulation of others and their judgments by human beings, since childhood. This natural education concerns both the self-correction of the human being in the sense of a spontaneous self-command in infancy, and the condition of possibility of the moral conscience in the sense of an impartial spectator.
For Smith, natural education is the basis of the first stage of the formation of moral conscience, which underlies the moral development of the self and the emotional expression associated with the moral judgment by the internal and external spectators on human conduct. In this context, for Smith, sympathetic human beings would correct themselves in order to be deservedly approved by others and by their own internal impartial spectator.
This chapter describes in what sense Smith’s conception of human nature can be defined in different ways, and how it is related to some tendencies and desires, such as sociability, language, the human propensity to exchange, self-love, harmony, the desire to gain deserved approval from real and imagined spectators, the desire to improve one’s condition and happiness. In particular, I describe how, in Smith’s moral philosophy, these desiderative and motivational dimensions, across several categories of discourse (philosophical, psychological and anthropological), are all linked to the possibility of harmony between oneself and others in society.
This chapter shows in what sense sympathy would be central to understanding Smith’s conception of harmony between oneself and others. Specifically, assuming the centrality of the concept of immediacy, I describe in what sense sympathy would be central to understanding human nature, mind and the self in relation to Smith’s conceptions of the origin of moral judgment, the moral development of the self, and emotional expression. Firstly, I analyse the fundamental role of the passions as the object and origin of moral judgment in human beings, showing their immediate dimension. Then I consider the crucial role of the imagination in the articulation of the imperfect and perfect degrees of sympathy, understanding this imagination as a mental process consisting of two moments: a natural-immediate, linked to sensory perception; a moral-rational, marked by an intellectual effort. Thus, imperfect sympathy is defined as that related to the perceptual dimension, which a person experiences only when he has a general idea of the cause that provokes the feeling with which she sympathises; perfect sympathy is described as that which a person has when, considering the other’s situation, she expresses a moral judgment on the character and conduct of the other. Finally, the chapter offers an inventory of Smith’s main qualifications of the concept of sympathy in his moral theory.
This chapter outlines the aim of this work, the questions that motivated it, the structure of the book and the expected results. In particular, the aim of the book is to problematise what it means to be ‘human’ in Adam Smith’s moral philosophy from a historical and theoretical perspective. To do this, I explore in what sense Smith’s moral conception of human beings would be based on an idea of harmony between oneself and the others. This kind of harmony will be examined in the light of a reconstruction of the main aspects constituting Smith’s conceptions of human nature, mind and the self, as part of a broader investigation of Smith’s conceptions of nature, history, morality and natural education. Specifically, I reconstruct Smith’s conception of human nature, mind and the self by reconsidering the notion of immediacy as an important aspect of understanding Adam Smith’s moral philosophy of the human being.
This chapter demonstrates the importance of immediacy as a philosophical problem for understanding Smith’s conception of the human being and Smith’s model of the mind. First, I argue that imagination underlies the possibility of harmony between oneself and others and the moral, cognitive and perceptual experience of others. I analyse the concept of ‘imagination’, showing how natural aspects in terms of perception have an immediate moral connotation in terms of morality, thanks to two conceptual devices: ‘perception’ and ‘aesthetics’.
I then show the link between pleasure and moral displeasure and physical pleasure or pain in order to: (1) link the natural dimension of imagination (perception and sympathy) to the moral context of conscious and responsible control over the expression of certain natural passions in society; (2) underline the importance for Smith of the desire to be deservedly approved and the centrality for the human being of the corresponding pleasure that derives from it. Then, I consider the psychological origin of the self in Smith’s philosophy and I explore what prudence and impartiality mean for Smith.
Starting from the idea that a person judges as his own what he can naturally sympathise with, I focus on Smith’s investigation of the principle of approbation the character and conduct of an ordinary human being. I argue, therefore, that for Smith, the principle of approbation would be based on the immediate sympathy of the impartial spectator. The impartial spectator is the perspective from which a human being strives to judge and think impartially as a spectator, without fully identifying themselves with their passions or emotions, accepting without reducing to a single part the coexistence of passion and reason, nature and morality, unintentional and conscious aspects.
Butler and Smith had similarities in their moral philosophy. Butler's conscience resembles Smith's impartial spectator in that both were to direct sentiments and passions. However, unlike Butler, Smith's impartial spectator was not hierarchical. This was relevant to their difference in political thought. In addition, because, unlike Butler, Smith did not think that the political or moral supreme principle should control other principles, he did not think of society as hierarchical. He did not think that hierarchical religious order was necessary for the maintenance of society. Instead, the ordinary could be prudent.
This Element applies a new version of liberalism to international relations (IR), one that derives from the political theory of John Locke. It begins with a survey of liberal IR theories, showing that the main variants of this approach have all glossed over classical liberalism's core concern: fear of the state's concentrated power and the imperative of establishing institutions to restrain its inevitable abuse. The authors tease out from Locke's work its 'realist' elements: his emphasis on politics, power, and restraints on power (the 'Lockean tripod'). They then show how this Lockean approach (1) complements existing liberal approaches and answers some of the existing critiques directed toward them, (2) offers a broader analytical framework for several very different strands of IR literature, and (3) has broad theoretical and practical implications for international relations.
Despite the differences, there is some convergence between Adam Smith's and Immanuel Kant's theories of moral motivation. Both rely on a peculiar feeling, respect, as the proper source of motive in moral matters. An analysis of Smith's and Kant's conception of respect shows that both recognize that it has a specific normative import and plays a decisive role in morality. This convergence offers some support to the idea that Smith's sentimentalism and Kant's rationalism are compatible, at least as far as moral motivation is at issue.
Adam Smith was born 300 years ago, in June 1723. The son of a Scottish lawyer and customs commissioner grew to become a great Enlightenment thinker who gained global fame for his writings in moral philosophy and political economy. His second major work, the “Wealth of Nations” (1776), enabled economics to establish itself as a separate academic discipline. In numerous countries, the book had not only a theoretical but also a practical policy impact. Yet many distortions crept into the reception history of Smith’s oeuvre. For some years now, an interdisciplinary group of Smith scholars has taken on the received wisdom to challenge the clichés. In this survey written on the occasion of the Adam Smith tricentenary, Karen Horn presents some insights from recent Smith scholarship and shows just how inspiring and fruitful an engagement with the great Scot continues to be – even for economists, who are so far remarkably underrepresented in this activity.
En la Teoría de los Sentimientos Morales (1759), Adam Smith propone una ética fundada en los sentimientos. Esto parece sugerir un relativismo moral, pues los sentimientos, al ser relativos a cada sujeto, no poseen una validez transcultural. Aunque algunos comentaristas de Smith sostienen esa lectura de su ética, en este artículo se sugiere ahondar en los elementos que nos permiten alejar esta teoría de dicha posición. En efecto, a partir de nuestra igual naturaleza psicológica, Smith propone una común estructura formal de juicio que da origen a normas materiales universalmente vinculantes.
This article analyses Adam Smith's and Sophie de Grouchy's accounts of sympathy to show how they arrive at strikingly different views on whether inequality is a threat to, or precondition of, social order. Where many scholars have recently sought to recover Smith's egalitarianism, I instead focus on how his account of sympathy in The Theory of Moral Sentiments naturalises socioeconomic inequalities, while also highlighting the wider inegalitarian implications of his analysis. I demonstrate that Grouchy was alert to these implications and reveal how her own account of sympathy challenges the moral psychology underlying Smith's position on inequality. By reconstructing Grouchy's response to Smith, I illustrate how retrieving the insights of long‐overlooked thinkers can reorient the way we understand key debates in the history of philosophy, since Grouchy was far more concerned than Smith with exposing how economic inequality imperils the prospects of relating to one another as equals.
“ This disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the powerful, and to despise, or, at least, to neglect persons of poor and mean condition, though necessary both to establish and to maintain the distinction of ranks and the order of society, is, at the same time, the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments.”
TMS I.iii.3.1
This article analyzes the relationship between competition and justice in Adam Smith in order to determine to what extent competition can promote and undermine justice. I examine how competition features in two basic motivations for human action, “the propensity to truck barter and exchange,” and “the desire of bettering our condition.” Both can be traced back to the desire for recognition, but they operate in very different ways. The former manifests itself in social cooperation, chiefly commercial exchange and the division of labor, and while it can take a competitive form, competitive success produces benefits for everyone. In contrast, the latter may manifest itself in win-lose social competition. Commercial society harnesses both motivations, and both have negative as well as positive effects. However, while Smith explicitly addresses the negative effects of excessive specialization in the division of labor, it is less clear how he thinks the negative effects of social competition can be addressed. I argue that competition can undermine justice when (i) it pits people against each other and (ii) leads to psychological corruption. I conclude with some reflections on what a focus on competition adds to our understanding of Smith’s work.
Among the various attempts to re-humanize economics, the ‘humanomics’ proposed by Vernon Smith and Bart Wilson stands out. We contribute to the “humanomics project” by mapping its territory – core, periphery and frontiers – with an eye, also, on future explorations. First, we critically study the core: Smith and Wilson’s interpretation and experimental application of Adam Smith’s ideas on beneficence and injustice. Using the distinction between reciprocal cooperation and reciprocal kindness, we provide a different interpretation of Smith which helps to better understand the difference between exchange and trust, based on mutual advantage, and (reciprocal) beneficence proper. Secondly, we turn to the periphery, going beyond the ‘dichotomous representation of the human personality’ – personal-social/impersonal-economic – and showing other possible worlds: nuances of humans equally worthy of study, such as the personal-economic and the impersonal-social. Thirdly, we argue that the humanomics project should keep its frontiers as open as possible to human diversities and frailties.
The Angels Won’t Help You is a book about the uniqueness and primacy of help, particularly in relation to care, love, and caritas. It relies heavily on psychoanalytic and philosophical accounts of help and care and finds that help requires the establishment of a real relationship between persons, where help is given and received in a transitional space that is collapsed by care, unity, or love, which are mental constellations that, while profound, remain within the individuals involved. It contains reflections, memoir, and prose poetry, with an emphasis on psycho-philosophical examinations of help.
In trying to understand help, especially in the ways that it is not a synonym for care, Bowker turns to diverse sources and topics, including treatments of children in a helpless world, as featured in the literature of Kathy Acker and Jerzy Kosiński, a first-person account of help in psychiatric hospitals, an analysis of the phenomenon of Japanese hikikomori (“shutting oneself in”), anxiety and helplessness, an exploration of the nature of help and helplessness in Wilfred Bion’s “Attacks on Linking,” a rethinking of trauma in light of the circuital structure of the self, and more.
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Put differently, The Angels Won’t Help You is a cruel helpless hopeless book raised in Texas roped ridden waddled clowned it developed catastrophic methods of coping. Angels’ mama split her tongue and hissed her words like silent / soldier / crisis in the torment of her sunken trailer in the summer where Angels practiced lighting cigarettes with her eyes fetching fireflies making tinctures of dead tissue becoming extraordinarily promiscuous. Angels’ nature was to hide in dark places to ride with abandon to sink in the spurs to gnash silver teeth to kick up tipped boots ruining every square dance. Angels, you make me need like a choke rope dream of being sick from head to foot. You are the petaled froth on every steep lapel. You are original and dilapidated depilatory and inflationary ovulary and delusional. O Angels, the scholars will say I failed to know you address you presage you protect you protest you, but we know the truth.
A partir da leitura da introdução da História da Astronomia, o presente artigo propõe uma generalização do sentimentalismo moral de Adam Smith, tal qual apresentado e defendido na Teoria dos sentimentos morais, onde as distinções morais têm sua origem na sensibilidade. Nessa obra póstuma, Smith aponta que o sentimento do espanto (wonder) está na base do discernimento das distinções que organizam taxonomias e permitem o encadeamento de séries explicativas, de modo a formar teorias a respeito do funcionamento do mundo (moral e natural). Nossa análise foca no modo as duas operações básicas de síntese, comparação e conjectura, que sustentam esse processo estão enraizadas no espanto. Também discutimos as condições sociais que permitem o aparecimento e o desenvolvimento do espanto e em que medida a noção de ordem que resulta desse sentimento pode ser qualificada de liberal.
This essay uses concepts from Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments to develop ideas about choice and welfare. I use those ideas to offer several challenges to common approaches to behavioral welfare economics and new paternalist policy making. Drawing on Smith’s dialectical concept of practical reason, which he develops in expositing ideas about self-awareness and self-judgment, I first argue that inconsistency need not be viewed as pathological. Inconsistent choices might indicate legitimate context-dependencies as individuals reflect over disjointed perspectives and act accordingly. Understanding inconsistency as reasonable raises epistemic difficulties for identifying errant choices and designing corrective policies. Second, I draw on Smith’s theory of the impartial spectator to discuss dynamic aspects of welfare. Welfare is not simply a matter of preference satisfaction but involves a sense of progress and improvement towards better preferences. Smith’s account suggests that economists interested in welfare should focus on institutional arrangements that facilitate self-development.
Smith’s statements on wealth and happiness are paradoxical. On the one hand, Smith states that individuals’ pursuit of wealth is beneficial for society because it leads to economic growth and establishes rank and order in society. On the other hand, he appears to say that pursuit of wealth leaves individuals unhappy. Griswold refers to this as ‘comic irony’. In this paper, by examining what Smith says about wealth and happiness, we attempt to resolve this paradox. Towards this end, we analyze the unconscious that is implicit in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. As we will describe, analyzing Smith’s statements by considering the role of the unconscious implies that the pursuit of great wealth can make individuals happy.
Adam Smith (1723–90) and Adam Ferguson (1723–1816) shared a keen interest in the social, economic and individual effects of specialization. Though this mutual interest led to a protracted priority dispute between them, nevertheless their approaches differed significantly. Ferguson was generally more negative in his attitude and was also less interested in the economic effects of specialization , focusing instead on its adverse social ramifications. In fact, his work on the subject probably constitutes the first fully developed sociological account of the topic. Karl Marx quoted Ferguson approvingly and declared that he had been inspired by the latter's insights. But Smith too made some extremely negative and apparently pessimistic observations about the division of labour, giving rise to suggestions that his comments also 'constitute a major source of inspiration for the socialist critique' of commercialism. This paper compares and contrasts the respective approaches of the two Scots. It also pays particular attention to claims that there are parallels with Marx in their thinking. To what extent is this true? Further, if it is true, do they anticipate him in the same way? The division of labour, 1 and its social and economic effects, has long been an important theme in the history of economic and sociological thought. In this paper I highlight and contrast the work of thinkers whose contributions exerted considerable influence over subsequent elaborators of the concept. Though Adam Smith (1723–90) and Adam Ferguson (1723–1816) were neither the first nor last to discuss the effects of the division of labour, 2 it would not be an exaggeration to
Philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries who worked within the tradition of modern natural law became interested in political economy in part as they attempted to reconcile two conflicting images of economic activity. On the one hand, from the legal point of view economic activity was understood as a morally neutral and benign activity that could be regulated by simple and clear rules of justice. On the other hand, it was seen as a realm of political struggle, manipulation, deceit and the exercise of hidden forms of domination. This article examines the legal and moral contexts of Adam Smith's excursion into political economy by interpreting the roles played by these two images of the market in the theory of value articulated in book I of The Wealth of Nations.
Gabriel Richardson Lear presents a bold new approach to one of the enduring debates about Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: the controversy about whether it coherently argues that the best life for humans is one devoted to a single activity, namely philosophical contemplation. Many scholars oppose this reading because the bulk of the Ethics is devoted to various moral virtues--courage and generosity, for example--that are not in any obvious way either manifestations of philosophical contemplation or subordinated to it. They argue that Aristotle was inconsistent, and that we should not try to read the entire Ethics as an attempt to flesh out the notion that the best life aims at the "monistic good" of contemplation. In defending the unity and coherence of the Ethics, Lear argues that, in Aristotle's view, we may act for the sake of an end not just by instrumentally bringing it about but also by approximating it. She then argues that, for Aristotle, the excellent rational activity of moral virtue is an approximation of theoretical contemplation. Thus, the happiest person chooses moral virtue as an approximation of contemplation in practical life. Richardson Lear bolsters this interpretation by examining three moral virtues--courage, temperance, and greatness of soul--and the way they are fine. Elegantly written and rigorously argued, this is a major contribution to our understanding of a central issue in Aristotle's moral philosophy.
In the last few decades, the ethics of care as a feminist ethic has given rise to extensive literature, and has affected moral inquiries in many areas. It offers a distinctive challenge to the dominant moral theories: Kantian moral theory, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics. This chapter outlines the distinctive features and promising possibilities of the ethics of care, and the criticisms that have been made against it. It then examines the ethics of care's recognition of human dependency and of the importance of responding to needs; its interpretation of the roles of emotion and reason in moral understanding; and its critique of liberal individualism and development of a conception of the person as relational. The ethics of care contrasts care with justice, tries to integrate them, and reconceptualizes public and private life and morality.
The heart of Rousseau's thought, as he himself declared, is the claim that society (especially bourgeois society), while necessary now to man's preservation, corrupts the life it fosters. What, then, is this corruption? What, in Rousseau's view, is the problem of bourgeois society? The corruption, I argue, is disunity of soul, through which men lose the fullness of existence they seek by nature. Unity of soul, which is natural, is lost in society through the contradiction of personal dependence: using others entails serving them. Thus modern or bourgeois society, which builds on this contradiction by deriving men's sociability from their selfishness, necessarily divides their souls. There can be no psychic unity in society without true social unity. (Hence Rousseau's analysis of unity is also his defense of justice.) Psychic and social unity are more or less attainable in the just state through patriotism and virtue (@'morality@'), but perfect psychic unity is possible only beyond society and morality.
"I was lately reading the Dialogues of Lucian," [Smith reported Hume to have said on his death-bed] "in which he represents one Ghost as pleading for a short delay till he should marry a young daughter, another till he should finish a house he had begun, a third till he had provided a portion for two or three young Children, I began to think of what Excuse I could alledge to Charon in order to precure a short delay, and as I have now done everything that I ever intended to do, I acknowledge that for some time, no tolerable one occurred; at last I thought I might say, Good Charon, I have been endeavouring to open the eyes of people; have a little patience only till I have the pleasure of seeing the churches shut up, and the Clergy sent about their business; but Charon would reply, O you loitering rogue; that won't happen these two hundred; do you fancy I will give you a lease for so long a time? Get into the boat this instant-Adam Smith to Alexander Wedderburn.
We probe the connections linking the market, speech, and sympathy in the work of Adam Smith, stressing how individuals strive for social esteem and ethical credit while competing in markets. We demonstrate how Smith approached speech and rhetoric as constituting attributes of markets, the modern analogue of previous institutional foundations for social order. Thus, markets are not simply, or exclusively, arenas for the instrumental quest by competitive and strategic individuals to secure their material preferences. They are a central mechanism for social integration derived not from strategic self-interest but from the inexorable struggle by human agents for moral approbation. Part One retranslates the master concept of Moral Sentiments into a modern theory of recognition. Part Two considers how Smith, in his Rhetoric , established the mutual constitution of recognition and speech. Part Three carries this understanding to his Jurisprudence , the most integrative of his texts, which relocates these impulses inside the market itself.
The pivotal second chapter of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations , “Of the Principle which gives occasion to the Division of Labour, ” opens with the oft-cited claim that the foundation of modern political economy is the human “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.” This formulation plays both an analytical and normative role. It offers an anthropological microfoundation for Smith's understanding of how modern commercial societies function as social organizations, which, in turn, provide a venue for the expression and operation of these human proclivities.
Modern virtue ethics is commonly presented as an alternative to Kantian and utilitarian views—to ethics focused on action and obligations—and it invokes Aristotle as a predecessor. This paper argues that the Nichomachean
Ethics does not represent virtue ethics thus conceived, because the discussion of the virtues of character there serves a quasi-Platonic psychology: it is an account of how to tame the unruly (non-rational) elements of the human soul so that they can be ruled by reason and the laws it imposes. This is explicitly stated in Book X, where it is also affirmed that the question of which laws reason should impose is addressed in The
Politics. The Ethics and
Politics can therefore be seen as a unity—as Aristotle's version of Plato's Republic—and it is the failure to recognize this that explains Aristotle's misappropriation by the modern virtue ethicists.
Etude de la figure du spectateur impartial developpee par A. Smith dans le sens d'une prise de distance avec le modele empirique du jugement esthetique. Examinant l'idee de jugement consensuel et de sympathie mutuelle, l'A. montre que Smith soumet la moralite des sentiments a l'acte de juger, par analogie avec le jugement de gout kantien.
Contemporary theories of Virtue Ethics are often presented as being in opposition to Kantian Ethics and Consequentialism. It is argued that Virtue Ethics takes as fundamental the question, "What sort of character would a virtuous person have?" and that Kantian Ethics and Consequentialism take as fundamental the question, "What makes an action right?" I argue that this opposition is misconceived. The opposition is rather between Virtue Ethics and Kantian Ethics on the one hand and Consequentialism on the other. The former two are concerned with, respectively, the development of a virtuous character and a good will, whereas Consequentialism is essentially a doctrine that just provides a justification of the right option without specifying how this is to be achieved. Furthermore, I show that Consequentialism, interpreted as a justificatory doctrine, is both an impoverished doctrine and one that cannot be enriched by taking a "pick and mix" approach to other ethical theories in the way that Consequentialists advocate. I argue that there is at least one reason to prefer Kantian Ethics: Kantian Ethics necessarily avoids the objection of self-centeredness, whereas the avoidance of this objection is only contingent in the case of Virtue Ethics.