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© 2008 The Authors
Journal Compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Social and Personality Psychology Compass 2/5 (2008): 2049–2070, 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2008.00147.x
Why We Need Interdependence Theory
Caryl E. Rusbult* and Paul A. M. Van Lange
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Abstract
The exceptional sociability of human life colors nearly every phenomenon in the
social and behavioral sciences. However, most psychological theories continue to
adopt a within-person perspective, analyzing human behavior by reference to
individual-level biological processes, personal dispositions, or cognitive experiences.
Interdependence theory is an important antidote to this actor-focused bias.
Interdependence theory identifies the most important characteristics of interpersonal
situations via a comprehensive analysis of situation structure and describes the
implications of structure for understanding intrapersonal and interpersonal processes.
Situation structure matters because it is the interpersonal reality within which motives
are activated, toward which cognition is oriented and around which interaction
unfolds. This paper describes key principles of interdependence structure and
processes, and illustrates the utility of an interdependence theoretic analysis via a
review of four phenomena – regulatory fit, persistence in the face of dissatisfaction,
tit-for-tat versus generosity, and the origins and consequences of trust.
Most psychological theories adopt a within-person perspective, analyzing
human behavior by reference to individual-level biological processes,
dispositions, or cognitive experiences. In most psychological work, the
actor is the centerpiece – most research seeks to illuminate individual-level
traits, skills, cognitions, or emotions. This is well and good, in that knowledge
of intrapersonal processes is – and should be – one fundamental goal of
the field. But where is the social animal in this enterprise? Humans have
lived in groups since the earliest stages of evolution, sustaining themselves
through collective hunting and gathering, gaining security through
association with one another, and raising children in concert with other
families. People spend about two thirds of their waking hours in the
presence of others, including family, friends, and coworkers. The exceptional
sociability of human life colors nearly every phenomenon studied in the
social and behavioral sciences, including mental and physical health,
personal dispositions, and cognitive and affective experiences (Reis, Collins,
& Berscheid, 2000).
We suggest that the field of psychology would benefit from an inter-
personal analysis of human psychology and propose that interdependence
theory can play an important role in this respect. Interdependence theory
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Journal Compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
is one of the few extant theories to provide a comprehensive analysis of
interpersonal structure and processes (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Kelley
et al., 2003; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Analogous to contemporary physics
– where the relations between particles are as meaningful as the particles
themselves – in interdependence theory, between-person relations are as
meaningful as the individuals themselves. In the following pages, we outline
key principles of the theory, describing the main properties of interde-
pendence situations, reviewing the implications of situation structure for
core intrapersonal and interpersonal processes, and presenting several
illustrations of the ways in which an interdependence-based analysis can
illuminate our understanding of human psychology.
Interdependence Structure
Interdependence theory analyzes the relations between people in terms of
situation structure, describing structure using variables such as dependence,
covariation of interests, and information certainty. The theory proposes a
taxonomy of interdependence situations and outlines the implications of
situation structure for intrapersonal and interpersonal processes. In short,
situation structure is the interpersonal reality within which cognition,
affect, and motivation transpire, and for which such processes are functionally
adapted.
Outcomes, interactions, and interdependence situations
Interdependence theory uses two formal tools to represent the outcomes
of interaction – matrices and transition lists (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978;
Kelley, 1984b). The purpose of these formal representations is to precisely
specify the character of situation structure – to describe the ways in which
people can affect one another’s outcomes during the course of interaction.
Interaction (I) describes two people’s (A and B) needs, thoughts, and
motives in relation to one another in the context of the specific interde-
pendence situation (S) in which their interaction transpires (Kelley et al.,
2003). Expressed formally, I = f (S, A, B) (a.k.a. the SABI model). To
predict what will transpire in an interaction between John and Mary, we
must consider (a) what situation they confront (e.g., are their interests at
odds; does one hold greater power?); (b) John’s needs, thoughts, and
motives with respect to this interaction (e.g., which traits or values are
activated?); and (c) Mary’s needs, thoughts, and motives with respect to
this interaction.
The precise outcomes of an interaction – the degree to which John and
Mary experience it as satisfying – depend on whether the interaction
gratifies (vs. frustrates) important needs, such as security, belongingness,
and exploration (cf. Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Fraley & Shaver, 2000;
Kenrick & Trost, 2000). Interaction not only yields concrete outcomes, or
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Why We Need Interdependence Theory 2051
immediate experiences of pleasure versus displeasure, but also symbolic
outcomes, or experiences that rest on the broader implications of interaction
(Holmes, 1981; Kelley, 1979). For example, if John and Mary generally
disagree about where to dine, yet John suggests that they dine at Mary’s
favorite restaurant, Mary not only enjoys the concrete benefits of good
food and wine, but also enjoys the symbolic pleasure of perceiving that
John is responsive to her needs.
By analyzing how each person’s possible behaviors would affect each
person’s outcomes, we can discern the structure of a situation with respect
to degree and type of dependence, examining: (a) actor control – the impact
of each person’s actions on his or her own outcomes; (b) partner control – the
impact of each person’s actions on the partner’s outcomes; and (c) joint
control – the impact of the partners’ joint actions on each person’s
outcomes. In addition, by examining the within-cell association between
outcomes, we can discern (d) covariation of interests, or the extent to which
the partners’ outcomes are correlated. These components define four
structural dimensions; two additional dimensions are also identified (all
six are described below; Kelley et al., 2003). Most situations are defined
by their properties with respect to two or more dimensions. For example,
the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, ‘hero’, and ‘chicken’ situations involve moderate
and mutual dependence along with moderately conflicting interests,
but these neighboring situations differ in magnitude of actor control,
partner control, and joint control, as well as in their implications for
interaction.
All combinations of the six properties define a very large number of
patterns. However, 20 to 25 prototypes can be identified (Kelley et al., 2003).
Everyday situations resemble these abstract patterns, sharing common
interpersonal problems and opportunities. For example, the twists of fate
situation is one wherein each partner, at some point, might unexpectedly
find himself or herself in a position of extreme unilateral dependence; this
sort of situation is characteristic of health crises and other reversals of
fortune. Also, the prisoner’s dilemma is a situation wherein each person’s
outcomes are more powerfully influenced by the partner’s actions than by
his or her own actions; this sort of situation is characteristic of interactions
involving mutual sacrifice, trading favors, and free-riding. Everyday
situations that share the same abstract pattern have parallel implications for
motivation, cognition, and interaction.
Importance of interdependence structure
Why should we care about interdependence structure? To begin with,
structure in itself reliably influences behavior. For example, situations with
structure resembling the threat situation reliably yield demand-withdraw
patterns of interaction – demands for change on the part of the lower
power actor, met by avoidance and withdrawal on the part of the higher
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Journal Compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
power partner (Holmes & Murray, 1996). Also, situations with structure
resembling the chicken situation reliably yield interaction centering on
establishing dominance and sustaining one’s reputation (Nisbett & Cohen,
1996). In short, structure often directly shapes behavior above and beyond
the specific goals and motives of interacting individuals.
Moreover, specific structural patterns present specific sorts of problems
and opportunities, and therefore (a) logically imply the relevance of
specific goals and motives, and (b) permit the expression of those goals and
motives. Affordance describes what a situation makes possible or may activate
(see Figure 1). For example, situations with uncertain information afford
misunderstanding and invite reliance on generalized schemas regarding
partners and situations; generalized schemas carry less weight when infor-
mation is complete. In short, situation structure matters because it is the
interpersonal reality within which motives are activated, toward which
cognition is oriented, and around which interaction unfolds.
Dimensions of interdependence structure
Level of dependence describes the degree to which an actor’s outcomes are
influenced by the partner’s actions. If Mary can obtain good outcomes
irrespective of John’s actions (high actor control), she is independent; she
Figure 1 Situation structure and affordances (modified from Holmes, 2002).
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Why We Need Interdependence Theory 2053
is dependent to the extent that John can unilaterally cause her pleasure
versus displeasure (partner control) or can behave in such a manner as to
govern her behavioral choices (joint control). Increasing dependence
tends to cause increased attention to situations and partners, more careful
and differentiated cognitive activity, and perseverance in interaction (e.g.,
Fiske, 1993; Rusbult, 1983). As noted in Figure 1, dependence affords
thoughts and motives about trusting and depending on others versus
remaining independent of others. For example, high dependence situa-
tions will activate Mary’s trait-based reluctance to rely on others, her
discomfort with dependence will strongly shape her behavior, and the fact
of her discomfort will be particularly evident to others; in low dependence
situations, this trait will be less visible and less relevant to predicting her
behavior.
Mutuality of dependence describes whether two people are equally
dependent upon one another. Non-mutual dependence entails differential
power – when Mary is more dependent, John holds greater power. The
less dependent partner tends to exert greater control over decisions and
resources, whereas the more dependent partner carries the greater burden
of interaction costs (sacrifice, accommodation) and is more vulnerable to
possible abandonment; threats and coercion are possible (e.g., Attridge,
Berscheid, & Simpson, 1995; Drigotas, Rusbult, & Verette, 1999; Murray,
Holmes, & Collins, 2006). Interactions with mutual dependence tend to
feel ‘safer’ and are more stable and affectively serene (less anxiety, guilt).
Situations with non-mutual dependence afford the expression of comfort
versus discomfort with vulnerability (dependent partner) along with comfort
versus discomfort with responsibility (powerful partner; see Figure 1). For
example, unilateral dependence will activate John’s insecurity, and his
insecurity will powerfully shape his behavior and be highly visible to
others; in mutual dependence situations, his insecurity will be less visible
and less relevant to predicting his behavior.
Basis of dependence describes precisely how partners influence one
another’s outcomes – whether each person’s impact on the other rests on
partner control versus joint control. With partner control, the actor’s
outcomes rest in the partner’s hands, so interaction often involves promises
or threats as well as the activation of morality norms (‘this is how decent
people behave’); common interaction patterns may include unilateral
action (when partner control is non-mutual) or tit-for-tat or turn-taking
(when partner control is mutual; e.g., Clark, Dubach, & Mills, 1998;
Fiske, 1992). In contrast, joint control entails contingency-based coordination
of action, such that ability-relevant traits become more important, including
intelligence, initiative taking, and strategic skills; rules of conventional
behavior carry more sway than morality norms (‘this is the sensible way
to behave’; e.g., Buss & Craik, 1980; Finkel et al., 2006; Turiel, 1983). Basis
of dependence affords the expression of dominance versus submissiveness
and assertiveness versus passivity (see Figure 1).
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Covariation of interests describes whether partners’ outcomes correspond
versus conflict – whether the partners’ joint activities yield similarly
gratifying outcomes for John and Mary. Covariation ranges from perfectly
corresponding patterns through mixed motive patterns to perfectly con-
flicting patterns (zero-sum). Given corresponding interests, interaction is
easy – John and Mary simply pursue their own interests, simultaneously
producing good outcomes for the other. In contrast, situations with
conflicting interests tend to generate negative cognition and emotion
(greed, fear) and yield more active and differentiated information seeking
and self-presentation (‘can Mary be trusted?’; e.g., Surra & Longstreth,
1990; Van Lange et al., 1997). Situations with conflicting interests afford
the expression of cooperation versus competition and trust versus mistrust
(see Figure 1) – in such situations, John may demonstrate his prosocial
motives as well as his trust in Mary.
Temporal structure is a fifth important structural dimension – one that
captures dynamic and sequential processes. As a result of interaction, some
future behaviors, outcomes, or situations may be made available and
others may be eliminated. John and Mary may be passively moved from
one situation to another, or they may be active agents in seeking such
movement. Extended situations involve a series of steps prior to reaching a
goal (e.g., investments leading to a desirable outcome). Situation selection
describes movement from one situation to another, bringing partners to
a new situation that differs in terms of behavioral options or outcomes.
For example, Mary may seek situations entailing lesser interdependence,
or John may confront the juncture between a present relationship and an
alternative relationship by derogating tempting alternatives (e.g., Collins
& Feeney, 2004; Miller, 1997). Temporally extended situations afford the
expression of self-control and the inclination to ‘stick with it’ – dependability
versus unreliability, as well as loyalty versus disloyalty (see Figure 1).
Information certainty is the final structural dimension: Do John and Mary
possess certain versus uncertain information about: (a) the impact of each
person’s actions on each person’s outcomes; (b) the goals and motives
guiding each person’s actions; and (c) the opportunities that will be made
available versus eliminated as a consequence of their actions? Certain
information is critical in novel or risky situations and in interactions
with unfamiliar partners. Accordingly, partners engage in a good deal of
information exchange during the course of interaction, engaging in
attributional activity to understand one another and the situation (e.g.,
Collins & Miller, 1994). People may also use representations of prior
interaction partners to ‘fill in the informational gaps’ in interaction with
new partners, or may develop frozen expectations that reliably color their
perceptions of situations and partners (e.g., Andersen & Chen, 2002;
Holmes, 2002). Thus, uncertain information affords the expression of
openness versus the need for certainty, as well as optimism versus pessimism
(see Figure 1).
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Why We Need Interdependence Theory 2055
Interdependence Processes
Recall that interaction (I) is shaped not only by interdependence structure
(S), but also by partners’ needs, thoughts, and motives in relation to one
another (A and B) in the context of the situation in which their interaction
unfolds (the SABI model). Thus, we must add to our structural analysis a
complementary analysis that describes how John and Mary react to the
situations they encounter. How do they psychologically transform specific
situations, responding on the basis of considerations other than self-interest?
What role do mental events and habits play in shaping this process, and
how do partners seek to understand and predict one another? How do people
develop stable tendencies to react to specific situations in specific ways?
Transformation process
To describe how situation structure affects motivation, interdependence
theory distinguishes between: (a) the given situation – preferences based on
self-interest (the ‘virtual structure’ of a situation); and (b) the effective
situation – preferences based on broader considerations, including concern
with the partner’s interests, long-term goals, or strategic considerations
(Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Van Lange, De Cremer, Van Dijk, & Van Vugt,
2007). Psychological transformation describes the shift in motivation from
given to effective preferences. Of course, people sometimes behave on the
basis of given preferences; this is likely in simple situations for which no
broader considerations are relevant, when people lack the inclination or
wherewithal to take broader considerations into account, and in situations
involving time pressure or constrained cognitive capacity. But more
typically, people behave on the basis of transformed preferences – that is,
considerations other than immediate self-interest guide our actions.
Transformation constitutes an implicit rule that a person adopts during
interaction. People may follow rules that involve sequential or temporal
considerations, such as waiting to see how the partner behaves, or adopting
strategies such as tit-for-tat or turn taking. Other rules reflect differential
concern for one’s own and a partner’s outcomes, including altruism, or
maximizing the partner’s outcomes; cooperation, or maximizing combined
outcomes; competition, or maximizing the relative difference between one’s
own and the partner’s outcomes; and individualism, or maximizing one’s
own outcomes irrespective of the partner’s outcomes.
Transformation is particularly visible when the structure of the given
situation dictates one type of behavior, yet personal traits or values dictate
another type of behavior. When people act on the basis of transformed
preferences, we are able to discern their personal traits and motives. For
example, when Mary helps John with yard work rather than going out
with her friends, she communicates concern for his welfare. The trans-
formation process is thus the point at which the ‘rubber meets the road’,
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Journal Compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
or the point at which intrapersonal processes – cognition, affect, and
motivation – operate on specific situations in such a manner as to reveal
the unique self.
Cognition, affect, and habit
Human intelligence is highly interpersonal. Cognitively and affectively,
humans are well prepared to construe the world in terms of interdependence
(Kelley, 1997). Cognitive processes are geared toward discerning what a
situation is ‘about’, evaluating that structure in terms of one’s own needs
and motives, perceiving partners’ needs and predicting their motives, and
forecasting implications for future interactions (Kelley, 1979, 1984a).
Situation structure partially shapes cognition and affect. For example, the
prisoner’s dilemma entails a choice between benefiting the partner at low
cost to the self versus benefiting the self at substantial cost to the partner.
The characteristic blend of fear and greed that is afforded by this situation
serves as a rather automatic indicator of the essential opportunities and
constraints of this type of situation.
The transformation process is often driven by the cognition and affect
that a situation affords. For example, Mary is likely to exhibit self-centered
or antisocial transformation when she experiences greedy thoughts and
desires (‘it’d be nice to take a free ride’) or feels fearful about John’s
motives (‘will he exploit me?’). Cognition and emotion are also shaped
by distal causes – by the values, goals, and dispositions that are afforded
by the situation. For example, Mary’s reaction to situations with conflicting
interests will be colored by the value she places on fairness, loyalty, or
communal norms (greed vs. prosocial motivation), as well as by whether
she trusts John (fear vs. trust). Thus, the cognitive processes that underlie
transformation are functionally adapted to situation structure and take
forms that are relevant to that structure.
At the same time, the transformation process does not necessarily rest
on extensive mental activity. As a consequence of adaptation to repeatedly
encountered patterns, people develop habitual tendencies to react to specific
situations in specific ways, such that transformation transpires with little or
no conscious thought (Kelley, 1983; Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996). For
example, following repeated interaction in situations with prisoner’s dilemma
structure, John and Mary may automatically exhibit mutual cooperation,
with little or no thought. Mediation by cognitive processes is more prob-
able in novel situations with unknown implications, in risky situations
with the potential for harm, and in interactions with unfamiliar partners.
Communication, attribution, and self-presentation
During the course of interaction, partners convey their goals, values, and
dispositions using both direct and indirect means. Communication entails
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Why We Need Interdependence Theory 2057
self-presentation on the part of one person and attribution on the part of
the other. As noted earlier, the material for self-presentation and attribution
resides in the disparity between the given and effective situations, in that
deviations from self-interested behavior reveal an actor’s goals and motives
(Kelley, 1979). Thus, the ability to communicate self-relevant information
is limited by interdependence structure – that is, specific situations afford
the display of specific motives. For example, it is difficult for people to
convey trustworthiness (or to discern it) in situations with correspondent
interests, in that in such situations, ‘trustworthy’ behavior aligns with
‘self-interested’ behavior.
People engage in attributional activity to understand the implications of
a partner’s actions, seeking to predict future behavior and to explain prior
behavior in terms of situation structure versus underlying dispositions.
Expectations are not particularly accurate in interactions with new partners,
in that they must be based on probabilistic assumptions about how the
average person would react in a given situation; in longer-term relationships,
expectations can also be based on knowledge of how a partner has behaved
across a variety of situations. Self-presentation describes people’s attempts to
communicate their motives and dispositions to one another. Of course,
self-presentation may sometimes be geared toward concealing one’s true
preferences and motives. Moreover, given that people do not always hold
complete information about their partners’ given outcomes, they may
sometimes mistakenly assume that a partner’s behavior reflects situation
structure rather than psychological transformation. For example, Mary’s
loyalty or sacrifice may not be visible if John fails to recognize the costs
she incurred.
Adaptation
When people initially encounter specific situations, the problems and
opportunities inherent in the situation will be unclear. In such novel
situations, Mary may systematically analyze the situation and actively reach
a decision about how to behave, or she may simply react on the basis of
impulse. Either way, experience is acquired. If her choice yields good
outcomes, she will react similarly to future situations with parallel structure;
if her choice yields poor outcomes, she will modify her behavior in future
situations with parallel structure. Adaptation describes the process by which
repeated experience in situations with similar structure gives rise to habitual
response tendencies that on average yield good outcomes. Adaptations
may be embodied in interpersonal dispositions, relationship-specific motives,
or social norms (Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996).
Interpersonal dispositions are actor-specific inclinations to respond to
particular classes of situation in a specific manner across diverse partners
(Kelley, 1983). Dispositions emerge because over the course of development,
different people experience different histories with different partners,
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confronting different sorts of interaction opportunities and problems.
As a result of adaptation, John and Mary acquire dispositional tendencies
to perceive situations and partners in specific ways, and specific sorts of
transformations come to guide their behavior. For example, if John’s
mother employed her power in a benevolent manner, gratifying his
childhood needs and serving as a secure base from which he could explore,
John will have developed trusting and secure expectations about dependence,
and will more reliably exhibit trusting and prosocial transformations (for
a review, see Fraley & Shaver, 2000). Thus, the ‘self ’ is the sum of one’s
adaptations to previous situations and partners.
Relationship-specific motives are inclinations to respond to particular classes
of situation in a specific manner with a specific partner (Holmes, 1981).
For example, commitment emerges as a result of dependence on a partner
and is strengthened by high satisfaction (John gratifies Mary’s most important
needs), poor alternatives (Mary’s needs could not be gratified independent
of her relationship), and high investments (important resources are bound
to her relationship; Rusbult, Coolsen, Kirchner, & Clarke, 2006).
Commitment colors emotional reactions to interaction (feeling affection
rather than anger) and gives rise to habits of thought that support sustained
involvement (use of plural pronouns; e.g., Agnew, Van Lange, Rusbult,
& Langston, 1998). In turn, benevolent thoughts encourage prosocial
transformation. For example, strong commitment promotes prosocial acts
such as sacrifice, accommodation, and forgiveness (e.g., Finkel, Rusbult,
Kumashiro, & Hannon, 2002; Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus,
1991; Van Lange et al., 1997).
Social norms are rule-based, socially transmitted inclinations to respond
to particular classes of situation in a specific manner (Thibaut & Kelley,
1959). For example, most societies develop rules regarding acceptable
behavior in specific types of situation; rules of civility and etiquette
regulate behavior in such a manner as to yield harmonious interaction.
Partners frequently follow agreed-upon rules regarding resource allocation,
such as equity, equality, or need (Deutsch, 1975). Such rules may govern
a wide range of interactions or may be relationship specific (e.g.,
communal norms in close relationships; Clark et al., 1998; Fiske, 1992).
Norms not only govern behavior, but also shape cognitive experiences.
For example, in interactions guided by communal norms, partners neither
monitor nor encode the extent of each person’s contributions to the
other’s welfare.
Why is an Interdependence Analysis Useful?
To comprehend the utility of these concepts it is important to ‘see them
in action’ – to perceive the theoretical and empirical benefits of these
concepts in advancing our understanding of specific psychological
phenomena. In the following pages, we illustrate the character of an
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Why We Need Interdependence Theory 2059
interdependence analysis via a review of five phenomena – regulatory
fit, persistence in the face of dissatisfaction, tit-for-tat versus generosity,
and the origins and consequences of trust. Of course, these examples
represent a subset of the full range of phenomena that have been
examined using an interdependence analysis. At the same time, these
examples illustrate four core arguments for the utility of an interdependence
theoretic analysis.
Understanding goal pursuits and regulatory fit
Our first example illustrates a simple point: Interdependence matters. In
fact, interdependence shapes many psychological processes that might
seem to be thoroughly actor-based and intrapersonal, such as individual
goal pursuits. Goals are end states that give direction to behavior, either
as overarching life plans or as simple everyday endeavors. Traditional models
of goal pursuit have employed intrapersonal explanations, examining
individual-level processes such as goal-plan directed behavior, self-regulation,
or goal-behavior disparities (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1998; Gollwitzer &
Bayer, 1999; Higgins, 1987). The success of goal pursuit has been argued
to rest on actor-level variables such as goals, traits, skills, and motivation.
Regulatory focus theory is an important contribution to this literature,
suggesting that people are more likely to achieve goals when they
approach tasks in a manner that fits their regulatory orientation – when
they approach ideal self goals with promotion orientation and approach
ought self goals with prevention orientation (Higgins, 1997).
An interdependence analysis shares some of these assumptions. Theory
and research regarding the Michelangelo phenomenon concerns the
manner in which people pursue ideal self goals (Drigotas, Rusbult,
Wieselquist, & Whitton, 1999). The theory suggests that to the extent
that an interaction partner is affirming – that is, the partner perceives the
actor’s ability to achieve core components of the ideal self and behaves in
such a manner as to elicit ideal-congruent behaviors from the actor – the
actor will enjoy greater movement toward his or her ideal self. Here, too,
it is argued that success – or actor movement toward the ideal self – is
more probable when people pursue tasks under conditions of intrapersonal
regulatory fit. But importantly, this interdependence-based perspective
suggests that success is also shaped by interpersonal fit, or the degree to
which a partner supports and affirms the actor’s goal pursuits. As such,
John’s movement toward his ideals will be enhanced not only when: (a)
John’s regulatory orientation is consistent with his own goals (intrapersonal
fit); but also when (b) Mary’s regulatory orientation is consistent with
John’s goals; and (c) Mary’s regulatory orientation is consistent with John’s
orientation (interpersonal fit).
Indeed, research using diverse empirical techniques has revealed that in
ongoing relationships, people enjoy greater movement toward their ideal
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selves not only when (a) they, themselves, possess strong promotion
orientation (actor control), but also when (b) their partners possess strong
promotion orientation (partner control; parallel negative associations are
evident for prevention orientation; Righetti, Finkenauer, & Rusbult,
2008). Indeed, partners with strong promotion orientation promote the
actor’s movement toward the ideal self because such partners more reliably
elicit key components of the actor’s ideals. Some empirical support has also
been obtained for a third form of fit: Above and beyond the above-noted
actor and partner effects, there is some evidence for a joint control effect,
such that (c) actor-partner commonality in regulatory orientation also
influences each person’s movement toward the ideal self.
In this and other research regarding interdependent properties of goal
pursuit, we have observed reliable evidence that interpersonal regulation
may be as important as self-regulation (Kumashiro, Rusbult, Finkenauer,
& Stocker, 2007; Righetti et al., 2008). Individual goal pursuit might
superficially appear to be a thoroughly actor-based, intrapersonal phenomenon.
Indeed, the psychological processes underlying goal pursuits traditionally
have been represented as primarily actor-driven phenomena. The fact that
goal pursuit and attainment are powerfully and reliably influenced by
interdependence processes suggests that there is much to recommend in
an interdependence theoretic analysis. Interdependence matters.
Understanding persistence in the face of dissatisfaction
Our second example illustrates the fact that interdependence structure
matters. Indeed, structure can often help explain otherwise inexplicable
phenomena, such as why attitudes do not always predict behavior, or why
people sometimes persist in situations that are not particularly satisfying.
Traditionally, persistence has been explained by reference to positive
affect: People persevere in specific endeavors because they have positive
explicit or implicit attitudes about the endeavor; people persevere in specific
jobs or relationships because they feel satisfied with them (e.g., Ajzen,
1991; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The affect construct has
been operationally defined in terms of satisfaction level, positive attitudes,
liking, or attraction.
An important challenge to this ‘feel good’ model of persistence (‘so
long as it feels good, I’ll stick with it’) is to be found in situations wherein
people persevere despite the existence of negative affect. Clearly, people
sometimes persevere, even though they hold negative attitudes about
behavior-relevant attitude objects; people sometimes stick with jobs or
marriages despite feelings of dissatisfaction. Persistence in an abusive
relationship is a particularly telling illustration: Surely, people do not
persist because they are delighted with such relationships. Some authors have
sought to account for such inexplicable persistence in terms of trait-based
explanations – by reference to a victim’s low self-esteem or learned
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Why We Need Interdependence Theory 2061
helplessness (e.g., Aguilar & Nightingale, 1994; Walker, 2000). Inexplicable
persistence is thus assumed to be an actor effect – people persevere
because of something peculiar or unhealthy about themselves.
In contrast, an interdependence analysis explains persistence more
broadly, by reference to the nature of an actor’s dependence. To the extent
that people are more dependent upon their jobs or relationships, they are
more likely to persist; the greater their dependence upon a distal goal, the
more likely they are to persist in pursuit of the goal. As noted earlier,
dependence is strengthened by increasing satisfaction (are important needs
gratified?), declining alternatives (could important needs be gratified
elsewhere?), and increasing investments (are important resources linked to
the line of action?; for a review, see Rusbult et al., 2006). Furthermore,
it is argued that: (a) dependence level is psychologically experienced in
terms of commitment – a sense of loyalty with respect to a given line of
activity, including intent to persist, psychological attachment, and long-term
orientation; and (b) strong commitment promotes persistence.
Indeed, interdependence-based explanations of persistence have received
good empirical support – in particular, the so-called investment model of
commitment (for reviews, see Le & Agnew, 2003; Rusbult et al., 2006).
For example, people have been shown to persist in relationships because
they are strongly committed to the relationship – not only because they
feel satisfied, but also because their alternatives are poor and they have
invested heavily in a relationship. Thus, Mary may persevere in an abusive
relationship not necessarily because she has low self-esteem or has
acquired a pattern of learned helplessness, but rather, for reasons resting
on structural dependence – because she is heavily invested in remaining
with her partner (e.g., she is married to John or has young children with
him) or has poor alternatives (e.g., she has no driver’s license or possesses
poor employment opportunities; Rusbult & Martz, 1995).
Why should scientists favor an interdependence-based analysis of
persistence? For one thing, positive affect is not particularly reliable – affect
ebbs and flows even in the most satisfying jobs and relationships, such that
‘feeling good’ is not sufficient to sustain long-term persistence. In addition,
actor-based explanations would appear to be limited in light of clear
evidence for dependence-based causes of persistence (e.g., Mary may have
invested too much to quit). Moreover, interdependence-based explana-
tions imply unique intervention strategies. For example, if we seek to
enhance Mary’s freedom to persist versus cease involvement with John,
an actor-based explanation might favor psychotherapy geared toward raising
self-esteem or eliminating learned helplessness. In contrast, an interdependence-
based explanation might inspire interventions designed to reduce
dependence – for example, improving the quality of Mary’s economic
alternatives via driving lessons or job training. Thus, interdependence
structure matters, and can often help to explain otherwise inexplicable
behaviors.
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Understanding noise and generosity
Our third example illustrates that even in well-understood situations, it is
important to take account of the precise properties of interdependence
structure. Our example concerns the best-known and most thoroughly
investigated interdependence situation, the prisoner’s dilemma. Traditional
analyses of situations with this structure have revealed that people enjoy
superior outcomes over the course of long-term interaction when they
behave on the basis of quid pro quo, or tit-for-tat (Axelrod, 1984; Pruitt,
1998): If an interaction partner cooperates, you should likewise cooperate;
if a partner competes, you should compete. Tit-for-tat is functionally
adaptive in that: (a) it is nice, in that it does not initiate non-cooperation;
(b) it is forgiving, in that if a previously competitive partner comes to
behave cooperatively, so will the actor; (c) it is retaliatory, in that it
responds to non-cooperation with reciprocal non-cooperation; and (d)
it is clear, in that partners can readily discern the basis for the actor’s
choice.
But how effective is tit-for-tat under conditions of information
uncertainty – for example, when people are aware of how a partner’s
behavior affects their own outcomes, but are not aware of situational
constraints that may have shaped the partner’s actions? An interdependence
analysis suggests that misunderstanding is often rooted in noise, or discrepancies
between intended outcomes and actual outcomes for a partner that result
from unintended errors (Kollock, 1993). For example, when John fails to
receive a response to an email message that he sent to Mary, it may be
because of a network breakdown in Mary’s workplace rather than to
Mary’s disregard for his well-being. Noise is ubiquitous in everyday inter-
action, in that the external world is not error-free (e.g., networks sometimes
crash), and people cannot lead error-free lives (e.g., Mary may accidentally
delete John’s email note in her daily spam-purge).
Given that tit-for-tat entails reciprocating a partner’s actual behavior – and
not the partner’s intended behavior – responding in kind serves to reinforce
and exacerbate ‘accidents’. If the accident involves unintended good
outcomes, the consequences may be positive. For example, Mary may
receive credit for a positive experience John enjoys which she did not
actually set out to produce. But if the accident entails unintended negative
outcomes, the consequences may be more serious. For example, when
Mary’s actions cause John to suffer poor outcomes, he may respond with
tit-for-tat, enacting a behavior that will cause her poor outcomes. In
turn – and despite the fact that she did not initially intend to harm
John – Mary will react to John’s negative behavior with tit-for-tat, causing
him to suffer reciprocal poor outcomes. John and Mary will enter into a
pattern of negative reciprocity: They will become trapped in an extended
echo effect from which they cannot readily exit – an echo effect that
tit-for-tat simply reinforces.
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Why We Need Interdependence Theory 2063
Indeed, research examining strategies in mixed-motive situations reveals
that negative noise exerts detrimental effects when people follow a strict
reciprocity rule – partners form more negative impressions of one another
and both people suffer poorer outcomes (Van Lange, Ouwerkerk, & Tazelaar,
2002). In contrast, a more generous, tit-for-tat-plus-one strategy (giving
the partner a bit more than one received from the partner) yields better
outcomes – noise does not negatively affect partners’ impressions of one
another or the outcomes each receives over the course of interaction. Indeed,
in the presence of negative noise, a generous strategy yields better outcomes
for both people than does tit-for-tat. Such findings are reminiscent of the
literature regarding interaction in close relationships, where partners have
been shown to enjoy better outcomes in conflictual interactions when one
or both partners accommodate – when they react to one another’s negative
acts by controlling the impulse toward negative reciprocity, instead reacting
in a constructive manner (e.g., Finkel & Campbell, 2001; Rusbult et al., 1991).
As such, research regarding the impact of noise demonstrates that infor-
mation certainty is an important dimension of interdependence structure.
Uncertainty in the form of noise reliably affects interaction. Indeed, the
behavioral strategies that are highly adaptive in one sort of interdependence
situation (e.g., a mixed-motive situation with information certainty) turn
out to be maladaptive when situation structure is slightly modified (e.g.,
the same situation but with information uncertainty). Sometimes, generous
interaction strategies such as tit-for-tat-plus-one are not only nicer, but
also smarter (i.e., yield better outcomes) than tit-for-tat. Thus, there is
much to recommend a systematic interdependence-based analysis. Even when
researchers have thoroughly investigated how people behave in a specific
class of interpersonal situation, a change in the structural properties of that
situation can yield meaningful changes in behavior.
Understanding trust
Our final example illustrates an important interdependence assertion: A
sophisticated understanding of human behavior frequently rests on processes
that are temporally extended and entail across-partner influence. We illustrate
this point via an analysis of trust. Traditional explanations of trust
characterize this construct as a trait-based phenomenon, or a frozen
expectation – as the generalized belief that others will behave in a benevolent
versus malevolent manner (e.g., Fraley & Shaver, 2000; Rotter, 1980).
As noted earlier, individual differences in trust are argued to result from
developmental histories: If John experiences benevolence in his early
interactions, he will develop a generalized tendency to trust others; if John
experiences insensitive or ruthless treatment, he will develop a generalized
tendency toward mistrust.
An interdependence theoretic analysis shares some of these assumptions
(Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Wieselquist, Rusbult, Foster, & Agnew, 1999).
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Granted, as a consequence of differing interaction histories, people can
develop generalized, trait-based tendencies toward trust versus mistrust.
However, from an interdependence perspective, trust may also be a
relationship-specific adaptation. If Mary is reliably responsive to John’s
needs and is genuinely concerned with his well-being, he will come to
trust her; if she is unresponsive and indifferent to his needs, John will not
trust her. Thus, trust is as much a partner effect as an actor effect – John’s
experience of trust in Mary is as much a reflection of Mary’s contemporary
behavior as a consequence of his own childhood interactions.
For example, the mutual cyclical growth model suggests that actors
become more trusting when they observe a partner exhibit pro-relationship
acts in diagnostic situations – in situations with conflicting interests, wherein
the partner’s interests are pitted against the interests of the relationship
(Holmes & Rempel, 1989). As noted earlier, strong commitment is one
important cause of costly pro-relationship acts such as accommodation,
forgiveness, and sacrifice (e.g., Rusbult et al., 1991; Van Lange et al., 1997).
As such, actor trust is the converse of partner commitment – John’s trust
in Mary is a gauge of the strength of her commitment to him. Indeed,
this model has received good empirical support (e.g., Rusbult, Reis, &
Kumashiro, 2008; Wieselquist et al., 1999): (a) partner commitment
promotes partner pro-relationship acts; and (b) a partner’s pro-relationship
acts promote actor trust. Moreover, as actors develop greater trust in their
partners, (c) actors become increasingly dependent – they feel more satisfied
and are also more willing to invest in their relationships and forego tempting
alternatives. In turn, (d) the actor’s increased dependence yields strengthened
commitment, which in turn promotes further pro-relationship acts, which
acts in turn are perceived by the partner, thereby strengthening the partner’s
trust, and so on, in a congenial pattern of mutual cyclical growth.
We suggest that this interdependence theoretic analysis provides a
deeper understanding of trust. For one thing, it is a powerful predictive
model – in accounting for dependence, commitment, pro-relationship
acts, and trust, interdependence variables account for substantially more
unique variance (over 30%) than do prominent actor-based variables (e.g.,
attachment style accounts for less than 5% of the variance; Wieselquist
et al., 1999). That is, in ongoing relationships, partners’ actions are more
important than are each person’s trait-based, frozen expectations. Second,
whereas trait-based explanations place responsibility for present behavior
entirely in the hands of the actor, an interdependence-based explanation
suggests that contemporary trust phenomena rest in both John’s and
Mary’s hands. Third, the model highlights the fact that trust is not merely
in the mind of the perceiver – there is a reality component to trust, in
that Mary’s actual trustworthiness plays a crucial role in shaping John’s trust
in her. Fourth, the model is dynamic and truly interpersonal, explaining
how each person’s motives and actions influence the partner’s motives and
actions in a dynamic, cyclical process. As such, the model illustrates the
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Why We Need Interdependence Theory 2065
interdependence theoretic goal of explaining behavior via an analysis of
processes that are temporally extended and entail across-partner influence.
Once again, there is much to recommend an interdependence theoretic
analysis.
Directions for future work
Needless to say, the utility of interdependence theory extends well beyond
the four illustrations described above. Moreover, in future work, additional
aspects of the theory may well become important. To begin with, given
that many contemporary empirical studies examine biological aspects of
social behavior, interdependence theory should be exceedingly useful as a
basis for understanding when and why particular neurological networks,
hormonal responses, or complementary psychophysiological responses may
be activated. The adaptive value of biologically based responses should be
understood in terms of actors, partners, and situations – that is, in terms
of the SABI model described earlier. For example, responses associated
with the experience of anger might best be understood via a careful
analysis of others’ norm violations in situations involving conflicting interests.
In parallel manner, feelings of guilt may be evoked when individuals,
themselves, violate such norms (e.g., Pinter et al., 2007). Also, processes
involving self-control in interpersonal situations – as well as simple actor-based
affect regulation and self-control – are related to exercising restraint and
inhibiting the temptation toward self-interested behavior.
Second, people not only respond to situations, but also actively seek
some situations and avoid other situations. However, it is one thing to
recognize that people are not slaves of situational forces – that people
select and modify situations in explicit or subtle ways. It is quite another
thing to predict the character of situation selection. Interdependence theory
provides insight in this regard, in that the dimensions underlying situations
should reliably activate and afford specific sorts of goals and motives. For
example, people sometimes avoid situations of dependence – even at some
cost to the self – by working on tasks independently rather than with
other people. Situation selection is frequently functional, in that it helps
people gratify specific needs or promotes people’s long-term outcomes
(Snyder & Cantor, 1998). But of course, situation selection may also initiate
or sustain self-defeating processes. For example, shy children may avoid
interaction, which in turn may limit their opportunities for overcoming
shyness. The interdependence theory typology of situations can fruitfully
be employed to extend predictive specificity in classic psychological
domains, including not only the problem of specificity in predicting how
traits relate to situation selection, but also specificity in predicting person-by-
situation interactions (cf. Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Snyder & Ickes, 1985).
As such, an interdependence theoretic analysis can advance precise predictions
about the inextricable link between persons and situations.
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And finally, interdependence theory typically is employed to analyze
behavior in dyads. However, the taxonomic approach – as well as the
concept of transformation – may be exceptionally important in under-
standing interactions in groups (e.g., performance in groups, intergroup
relations, leader–follower interactions, role-based phenomena). Such
applications of the theory should receive considerable attention in future
work, in that group life frequently appears to be governed by ‘a mind of
its own’. For example, intergroup interactions often exhibit greater
competitiveness than parallel inter-individual interactions (for a review, see
Insko & Schopler, 1998). Moreover, people frequently behave in accord
with the positions that they occupy in society, such that their perceptions
of the social environment, interactions with others, and perceptions of
rights and obligations are colored by their societal position. We believe
that an interdependence theoretic analysis could do much to illuminate
processes such as these.
Concluding remarks
Virtually all psychological theories advance predictions regarding intrapersonal
processes. There can be little doubt that understanding intrapersonal processes
is – and should be – a central goal of the field. At the same time, it is
equally important that we understand interpersonal processes, developing
and employing theories that represent humans as social animals. Interde-
pendence theory provides unique insight into how interpersonal situations
afford specific goals and motives, as well as how situations set the stage for
interpersonal processes and interaction. A comprehensive understanding
of the situation is not only in line with a basic premise of the field of
social psychology, but can also extend our knowledge of important
psychological phenomena, such as the benefits of interpersonal regulatory
fit, the reasons for persistence in the face of dissatisfaction, the functional value
of generosity, and the origins and consequences of trust. Interdependence
theory can thus illuminate our understanding of core intrapersonal and
interpersonal processes in the fields of social and personality psychology.
Short Biographies
Caryl Rusbult’s work concerns interdependence processes in ongoing
close relationships. She has studied the development of commitment as
well as pro-relationship acts such as accommodation, sacrifice, and forgiveness.
Her present research concerns partner affirmation, or the means by which
partners influence one another’s goal pursuits and achievements. Her research
has been published in empirical outlets such as Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, and Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin. Her theoretical papers have appeared in
Annual Review of Psychology and Handbook of Personal Relationships. She is
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Why We Need Interdependence Theory 2067
co-author of An Atlas of Interpersonal Situations. She has served as associate
editor or editorial board member for numerous journals, she has received
the Reuben Hill Award and the New Contribution Award (ISSPR), and
her research has been funded by the National Science Foundation, the
National Institute of Mental Health, the Templeton Foundation, and the
Fetzer Institute. Before coming to the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,
where she is Professor and Chair, she held an endowed chair at the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. She holds a BA in Sociology
from University of California, Los Angeles and a PhD in Psychology from
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Paul Van Lange’s work concerns interdependence and social interaction,
with an emphasis on cooperation, competition, and prosocial behaviour.
He adopts an interdependence theoretical framework for understanding
phenomena such as sacrifice, forgiveness, and generosity, as well as how people
‘should’ behave in response to unintended errors and misunderstandings.
His work is published in journals such as Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology and Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. He is co-author of An
Atlas of Interpersonal Situations (2003, Cambridge), Editor of Bridging Social
Psychology (2006, Erlbaum), and has authored several theoretical articles or
chapters in outlets such as Annual Review of Psychology, European Review of
Social Psychology, and Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles. He has been
Associate Editor of the European Journal of Social Psychology, Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, and Psychological Science, and serves on the editorial
board for various journals. Since 2000 he has been a Professor at the Vrije
Universiteit Amsterdam, and since 1999 he has held a special Chair in
Social Psychology at Leiden University. He has also served on the Policy
Advice Committee for the Dutch Organization for Scientific Research (1999–
2002) and as Scientific Director of the Kurt Lewin Institute (2001–2004).
Endnote
* Correspondence address: Department of Social Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,
Van der Boechorststraat 1, 1081 BT Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Email: ce.rusbult@psy.vu.nl
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