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RUSSIA, CHINA AND A
MULTIPOLAR WORLD ORDER:
THE DANGER IN THE UNDEFINED*
Susan Turner
Since the late 1990s, the concept of multipolarity has
gained prominence around the globe. Russia and China, in
particular, have repeatedly agreed on this ill-defined term and
subsequently have included it or alluded to it in nearly all of
their joint declarations, statements, and treaties dating from
the mid-1990s to the present. At a time when American hege-
mony is declining and speculation abounds as to which
among the world’s burgeoning nations will rise to power, it is
important to examine the renewed Sino-Russian relationship
and one of its foundational pillars—the promotion of multipo-
larity. This article deconstructs the definition of multipolarity
as it applies uniquely to Russia and China in an effort to deter-
mine the depth of the two countries’ agreement. Though the
two may agree upon the same “solution” to the next world
order, China and Russia employ very different strategies to
achieve it.
Key words: China, Russia, international security, multipolarity
* I would like to thank Dr. Mark Katz for his guidance and encouragement
in regard to this project.
ASIAN PERSPECTIVE,
Vol. 33, No. 1, 2009, pp. 159-184.
Introduction
Nearly two decades ago, Charles Krauthammer prophesized
that “multipolarity will come in time . . . in perhaps another gen-
eration or so there will be great powers coequal with the United
States, and the world will, in structure, resemble the pre-World
War I era.”1Since the beginning of the 21st century, and espe-
cially within the past couple years, the seeming actualization of
Krauthammer’s prediction has caused many to believe that the
world now stands on the precipice of a multipolar order. China
and Russia have long been in the forefront of nations advocating
for this order and have included multipolarity as a joint cause in
many of their statements, declarations, and treaties. Despite
their frequent use of the term, however, China and Russia have
failed to elaborate upon how they believe multipolarity is best
achieved.2
Considering the power of these two countries and their
tumultuous pasts (vis-à-vis one another and the rest of the
world), it is crucial to examine the depth of their supposed agree-
ments. As such, this article examines Russia and China’s joint
campaign for a multipolar world order in the 21st century and the
dangerous potential for similar rhetoric to disguise dissimilar
methods and objectives. The first part will examine the joint state-
ments, declarations, and treaties of China and Russia advocating
multipolarity, the second will analyze their separate discourse on
the subject, and the third part will study their separate foreign
policies and actions in order to illustrate the different means each
country has chosen to achieve the same end—multipolarity.
A Shared Perspective
Due to China’s and the Soviet Union’s prominent roles in the
160 Susan Turner
1. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 70,
No. 1 (1990/1991), pp. 23-33.
2. See most recently Richard Haas, “The Age of Nonpolarity,” Foreign Affairs,
vol. 87, No. 3 (May-June, 2008), pp. 44-56; Kishore Mahhuhani, “The
Case against the West,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 87, No. 3 (May-June, 2008),
pp. 111-24; Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2008).
bipolar world order, the end of the cold war and the exclusion of
both countries in the subsequent unipolar world left leaders in
both countries feeling disillusioned. China, in particular, experi-
enced what Dong Yuan describes as an “identity crisis,” because
it no longer had leverage in the “superpower balancing game.”3
Instead, China, like the rest of the world, was subject to one
“policing” superpower—one with the self-proclaimed authority
to encroach upon the domestic affairs of other states. China first
experienced the ramifications of this in the aftermath of the
Tiananmen Square massacre, when the U.S. Congress suspend-
ed arms sales to China and attempted to make China’s most
favored nation (MFN) status contingent upon the improvement
of its human rights record.4Although China’s MFN status was
renewed, Bush incorporated Congress’s concerns in his “construc-
tive engagement” policy toward China in 1991.5China’s foreign
minister, Qian Qichen, declared the following year that “The
USA’s hegemonic stance and its attempts to interfere in the
internal affairs of other states pose the greatest danger to socialist
China,” and suggested that in order to “weaken pressure from
Washington, China must broaden relations with Japan, Russia,
South Korea, and other neighboring countries.”6Two years
later, China turned to Russia—a country with its own qualms
with U.S. ascendance.7
Russia, China and a Multipolar World Order 161
3. Jing-dong Yuan, “Threat Perception and Chinese Security Policy after
the Cold War,” Pacific Focus, vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring, 1998), p. 56.
4. Approximately six bills were introduced to link China’s human rights
record to its MFN status. For a complete listing and timeline of the legal
and economic actions taken by the United States against China after the
1989 massacre, peruse the Peterson Institute for International Economics
case study 89-2, U.S. v. China, online at: www.iie.com/research/topics/
sanctions/china.cfm.
5. Yangmin Wang, “The Politics of U.S.-China Economic Relations: MFN,
Constructive Engagement, and the Trade Issue Proper,” Asian Survey,
vol. 33, No. 5 (May 1993), pp. 441-62.
6. Michael Levin, The Next Great Clash: China and Russia vs. the United States
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2008), p. 98.
7. Consequently, Mark Katz notes that Foreign Minister and later Prime
Minister Evgeny Primakov “hoped that Russia could emerge as the
leader of an alliance of such countries [countries opposed to American
hegemony]. The list of countries that the Russian press regarded as actual
or potential members of this alliance varied, but included China, India,
Compared to China, Russia’s “identity crisis” in the post-
cold war era was more severe and took the form of an acute
(and prolonged) case of schizophrenia, with its foreign policy
oscillating between allying with the West and allying with the
East. Russia’s first inclination after the cold war was to reconcile
its relations with the United States and join it in world domi-
nance. Unfortunately for Russia, however, the U.S. government
did not share this ideal, but seemed to undermine Russian
power by providing fewer post-war funds than Russia wanted
and by keeping the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
intact despite Russian objections.8Primakov also believed that
the United States was directly responsible for the International
Monetary Fund’s stringency in extending loans to Russia for
bridge construction.9These events caused many of Russia’s politi-
cal elite to agree with the conclusion of the Izvestiya Politklub that
Russia was “too big and too Russian for the West.”10
It was in the context of their “identity crisis” that China and
Russia established a “constructive partnership” in September
1994. In 1996, the word “strategic” replaced “constructive” in
defining the two countries’ partnership and Evgeny Primakov
replaced the pro-Western Andrei Kozyrev as the new foreign
minister of Russia. These two exchanges indicated not only the
advancement of Sino-Russian relations in general, but also the
direction their relationship was heading—away from the West.11
Thereafter, the official rhetoric of the two countries oscillated
between promoting a multipolar world order and denouncing the
162 Susan Turner
Iran, Iraq (under Sadaam), Syria, Serbia (under Milosevic), most of the
CIS countries, and even France and Germany. Primakov seemed willing
to build as broad and inclusive alliance of countries as possible.” Mark
Katz, “Primakov Redux? Putin’s Pursuit of ‘Multipolarism’ in Asia,”
Demokratizatsiya, vol. 14, No. 4 (Winter, 2006), p. 145.
8. Ibid.
9. Levin, The Next Great Clash, pp. 99-100.
10. “Analysts Discuss Russian Foreign Policy Strategy Following Putin’s
Munich Speech,” unidentified author, comprising direct quotations
from a number of political analysts: “What Does the West Mean to Us
After Munich?” Izvestiya Politklub (March 1, 2007). Accessed via World
News Connection.
11. Nicklas Norling, “China and Russia: Partners with Tensions,” Policy
Perspectives, vol. 4, No. 1 (2007), pp. 33-36.
current unipolar system. An example of the latter appeared in a
1996 statement by Primakov to the Kremlin News Broadcast:
Russia in her transition from the bipolar world to the multipolar
one should play the role of a counterweight to the negative trends
that are appearing in international affairs. In the course of this
transition not all power centers, determining this multipolarity,
have yet formed. And somebody wants to dominate in this situa-
tion (emphasis added).12
The 1997 “Joint Russian-Chinese Declaration about a Multipolar
World and the Formation of a New World Order” reiterated Pri-
makov’s sentiment (albeit more diplomatically), and was first
among a string of statements emphasizing multipolarity and
denouncing U.S. hegemony.13
The negative trends alluded to in Primakov’s statement in
1996 and in the first 1997 declaration materialized in 1999 in the
U.S. invasion of Kosovo and the “accidental” bombing of the
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. In response, China and Russia
issued another joint statement on December 10, 1999 outlining their
continued joint commitment to combat the “negative momentum”
that had been developing in the international arena over the past
year, particularly the intrusive U.S. actions in Kosovo, its consider-
ation of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system, and its
refusal to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.14 In
2001, China and Russia formalized their relationship by cosign-
ing the Sino-Russian Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Friendship,
and Cooperation, a twenty-year renewable treaty outlining their
joint resolve to promote “a just and fair new world order.”15
Russia, China and a Multipolar World Order 163
12. “Russia is Looking for a New Place in the World,” Official Kremlin Interna-
tional News Broadcast (March 6, 1996), in Thomas Ambrosio, Challenging
America’s Global Preeminence: Russia’s Quest for Multipolarity (Chippenham,
Wiltshire: Antony Rose Ltd, 2005), p. 86.
13. These include: the “Sino-Russian Joint Statement” of November 10,
1997, the “Joint Statement on Sino- Russian Relations at the Turn of the
Century” and the “Joint Press Communique on Sino-Russian Summit
Results” of November 10, 1998.
14. “PRC, Russia Leaders Issue Joint Statement,” Xinhua, December 10,
1999. Accessed through World News Connection.
15. The treaty’s text, signed July 24, 2001, is available online at www.fmprc.
gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/dozys/gjlb/3220/3221/t16730.htm.
Although the treaty does not elaborate upon the necessary con-
ditions of a “fair and just” society, the Joint Statement signed the
following July clarifies that both governments believe that such
a society can only be the consequence of a multipolar world
order.16
The call for multipolarity was silenced a few months later
with the terrorist attacks against America on September 11, 2001,
which brought international terrorism to the forefront of the
international agenda and was followed by the multilateral back-
ing of the U.S. war in Afghanistan in March 2001. This interna-
tional solidarity was shaken, however, in 2002 when the United
States petitioned the United Nations to invade Iraq and was
shattered in 2003 when it did so without UN sanction. To many,
the Iraq war demonstrated the peril of an unchecked superpower
—a peril that China and Russia had continuously tried to high-
light in their promotion of multipolarity.17
China’s and Russia’s cooperation over the past decade and
their joint opposition to U.S. unipolarity has caused some west-
erners to predict an impending clash between a Sino-Russian
alliance and the United States.18 Others, however, discern several
discrepancies between Chinese and Russian motives in the prop-
agation of multipolarity, and thus question the durability of
such an “alliance.”19 The next section of my analysis addresses
this question more deeply by delving into the separate rhetoric
of China and Russia’s vis-à-vis multipolarity in order to identify
if, in fact, the two countries have the same or separate agendas
for constructing a new multipolar world order.
164 Susan Turner
16. “Joint Statement Signed by Chinese and Russian Heads of State,” July
16, 2001, online at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/dozys/gjlb/
3220/3221/t16731.htm.
17. “President Jiang Zemin Meets Russian Foreign Minister,” February 28,
2003, online at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/dozys/gjlb/3220/
3222/t16799.htm.
18. See, most recently, Levin, The Next Great Clash.
19. See Elizabeth Wishnick, “Russia and China: Brothers Again?” Asian
Survey, vol. 41, No. 5 (2001), pp. 797-821, and Gilbert Rozman, “Sino-
Russian Relations: Will the Strategic Partnership Endure?” Demokrati-
zatsiya, vol. 6, No. 2 (Spring, 1998), pp. 396-415.
Dissimilar Definitions
Russia
Perusing the plethora of summits, statements, declarations,
and exchanges that have occurred between China and Russia
over the past decade, it seems the two countries have estab-
lished a successful and solid friendship founded on a shared
world perspective. Analyzing the sub-text, however, tells a very
different story. First, one must not forget the context in which
China and Russia first turned toward one another—the end of
the cold war. As mentioned, after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, Russia had initially wanted to cooperate with the United
States. Only after Russia’s stint of attempting to court the West
did Russia turn its aspirations eastward. Seven summits were
held with China between 1992 and 1999, during which the
Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation was
signed in 2001.20
Russia again tried to join forces with the United States
immediately after September 11 (this time against international
terrorism), but to little avail. So fervent was Moscow in its
attempt to gain Washington’s favor that the Russian Foreign
Policy Council actually advised Putin to drop the “multipolarity
emphasis” in foreign policy altogether and acquiesce to the U.S.
position on missile defense. Balancing American power, the
council concluded, would be “too costly and unpragmatic” for
Russia.21 Latent in Russia’s switch in position was the hope that
a U.S.-Russia alliance, or at least Russia’s inclusion in a broader
coalition against international terrorism, might allow for allevia-
tion of some of its Soviet-era debts and provide it with the nec-
essary leverage to join NATO, which the council believed would
then “grow into a universal organization of European and
international security and shed its destabilizing features.”22
Despite Russia’s internal debate, China maintained its posi-
Russia, China and a Multipolar World Order 165
20. Norling, “China and Russia,” p. 35.
21. “Russian Foreign Policy Council Advocates Dropping of ‘Multipolarity’
Emphasis,” Vremya MN, November 1, 2002. Accessed via World News
Connection.
22. Ibid.
tion on the benefits of multipolarity in ensuring world peace and
stability and promoted multilateralism as the primary means for
fighting terrorism.23 In 2002, Russia reverted back to its previous
position and once again jumped on the multipolarity bandwag-
on, with President Putin claiming that “Russia and China have
always stood for the establishment of a multi-polar world and
the strengthening of the role of the UN.”24
Putin exemplified his renewed dedication to multipolarity
with his vehement opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq the fol-
lowing year. To China and Russia (and much of the international
community), the invasion of Iraq eerily paralleled its actions in
Kosovo. To this end, Russian rhetoric did not extend any leniency
to the United States. At a trilateral summit of Russia, Germany,
and France in April 2003, for example, when Putin was asked at
a Russian press conference about the possibility of relinquishing
Russian servicemen to fight in Iraq, he retorted: “Find idiots
elsewhere.”25
Fortunately for the United States, there were “idiots” aplenty
willing to join forces, including the new members of NATO—
Estonia, Latvia, and Slovenia—and several of Russia’s newly
democratic neighbors.26 As the United States continued to occu-
py Iraq well after 2003, the military and political support of
these and other countries significantly waned. While the United
166 Susan Turner
23. “Multipolarity Remains Key Base for World Peace: Chinese Vice Presi-
dent,” Xinhua, November 5, 2001. Accessed via World News Connection.
24. “President Jiang Zemin Held Talks with Russian President Vladimir
Putin” Xinhua, February 12, 2002, online at www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cese/
eng/xwdt/t101551.htm.
25. “Putin Says Conditions Not Yet Ready in Iraq for Active Russian Partic-
ipation,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, November, 2003. Accessed via World
News Connection. It is important to note that Putin’s harsh words were
directed at what Russia considered was the U.S. defiance of international
law in taking unilateral military action against a sovereign, independent
country. Russia still prioritized combating international terrorism at
large, albeit via different means, such as with the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization.
26. This later contingent of support included those countries in the post-
Soviet space which had recently turned democratic, including Georgia
with the Rose Revolution (2003), Ukraine with the Orange Revolution
(2004), and Kyrgyzstan with the Tulip Revolution (2005). See Levin, The
Next Great Clash, p. 116.
States justified its presence by reiterating the importance and
difficulty in establishing a democratic government in the Middle
East, Russia increasingly questioned U.S. motives and called for
a withdrawal date.27
Even in the midst of such tensions, however, the rhetoric of
the United States and Russia remained tame.28 That is, until Feb-
ruary 2007, when President Putin spoke at the 43rd Munich
Conference on Security Policy. At the start, Putin promised to
avoid “excessive politeness.”29 A few minutes later, he explained
the danger he believed was latent in the current unipolar world
system and lambasted the United States explicitly for defying
international law and “overstep[ing] its national borders in every
way.”30 Additionally, Putin emphasized that a world ruled by
one power is definitively undemocratic—regardless of rhetoric to
the contrary. Just as he promised, he avoided diplomatic niceties.
China
China responded to Putin’s impassioned comments with
calculated equanimity, making sure to reiterate the importance
of peace and prosperity for all. This common refrain has caused
several American analysts to suspect that beneath China’s rhetoric
of a “harmonious world” and its “peaceful rise” lies a hegemonic
agenda.31 Is there a foundation for such speculation? Rhetoric
Russia, China and a Multipolar World Order 167
27. “U.S. Should Announce Date of Withdrawal From Iraq,” Agentstvo Voyen-
nykh Novostey, October 18, 2007. Accessed via World News Connection.
28. Examples of Russo-U.S. discourse (and its docility) obtained through
the World News Connection:
“Russia: Putin Meets Bush in Santiago, Says Will Discuss Iraq, Other
Problems,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, November 20, 2004; “Russia: Putin, Bush
Discuss Work on Iraq Resolution,” Moscow Interfax, May 28, 2004; and
“Russia’s Putin, Bush Discuss Iraq, Kosovo, Afghanistan,” Moscow ITAR-
TASS, April 8, 2004.
29. “Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy,” Munich
Conference on Security Policy, February 10, 2007, online at www.security
conference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?sprache=en&id=179.
30. Ibid.
31. See: G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the Rest:
Can the Liberal System Survive?” Foreign Affairs, vol. 87, No. 1 (January-
February, 2008); Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People’s Republic
Targets America (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2000).
alone indicates not.
Unlike Russia, China had great success in establishing a rap-
port with America after the cold war. As such, China has justifi-
ably exerted extreme caution in propagating the cause of multipo-
larity and directly criticizing U.S. hegemony. Furthermore (and
also in contrast to Russia), China has exemplified a general regres-
sion of its overall use of anti-hegemony and unipolarity rhetoric.
Although Deng Xiaoping was the first to formally express
China’s view on multipolarity, his successor, Jiang Zemin, offi-
cially incorporated the concept of duoji shijie (multipolar world)
into Chinese foreign policy in 1992 at the 14th Party Congress.32
During Jiang’s presidency, China’s foreign ministry asserted its
strongest position on the issue of multipolarity and the dangers
of unipolarity, stating:
[Multipolarity] helps weaken and curb hegemonism and power
politics, serves to bring about a just and equitable order and con-
tributes to world peace and development. . . . At present, by virtue
of its economic, technological and military advantages, an individ-
ual country is pursuing a new “gunboat policy” in contravention
of the United Nations Charter and the universally-acknowledged
principles governing international relations in an attempt to estab-
lish a unipolar world under its guidance.33
After 2003, and with the appointment of Hu Jintao, China’s mul-
tipolar position subtly changed to include the disclaimer that it
was not “targeted at any particular country, nor . . . aimed at re-
staging the old play of contention for hegemony in history,” but
should be viewed as a means to ensure “world peace, stability,
and development.”34
These positions were later clarified in an article by a leading
policy adviser, Zheng Bijian. Writing in Foreign Affairs, he empha-
sized China’s conciliatory emergence onto the world stage as a
prominent economic and political power (and served as a for-
168 Susan Turner
32. Michael Alan Brittingham, “China’s Contested Rise: Sino-U.S. Relations
and the Social Construction of Great Power Status,” in Suijian Guo and
Shiping Hua, eds., Dimensions of Chinese Foreign Policy (Lanham, Md.:
Lexington Books, July 2007), p. 99.
33. Jing Men, “Changing Ideology in China and Its Impact on Chinese For-
eign Policy,” ibid., pp. 30-31.
34. Ibid.
mal rebuttal to foreign allegations of a “China threat”). Zheng
explained that unlike Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, China
does not harbor an ideological agenda or vie for global domi-
nance, but instead seeks “a new international political and eco-
nomic order . . . achieved through incremental reforms and the
democratization of international relations.”35 Within the year,
China’s “peaceful rise” became a part of its official political dis-
course, with Hu and other senior officials incorporating the
phrase into their domestic and international dialogues.36
Even buffered by disclaimers, however, the term “rise” made
many Americans uneasy, especially as it supplemented China’s
growing strategic partnerships around the globe. In response,
China soon substituted “peaceful development” for “peaceful
rise” so as to less blatantly assert China’s ascendance as a future
pole of power.37 Today, with China’s GDP projected to surpass
that of the United States, and with its dramatic increases in mili-
tary expenditures, Beijing has even more reason to retain its cau-
tious rhetoric. It has also shifted from solely promoting multipo-
larity to actively defending itself against those who might claim
that its strengthening political, economic, and military circum-
stances are indicative of hegemonic interests.38
Russia, China and a Multipolar World Order 169
35. Zheng Bijian, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great Power Status,” Foreign
Affairs, vol. 84, No. 5 (September-October, 2005), pp. 18-24.
36. Jing Men, “Changing Ideology in China and Its Impact on Chinese For-
eign Policy,” p. 47.
37. This transition is exemplified by the welcome remarks of Ambassador
Wu Hongbo at the Conference on China’s Peaceful Emergence in East
Asia on February 25, 2005. “Many scholars use the term ‘peaceful rise’
or ‘peaceful emergence’ to define this phenomenon. I personally would
prefer the term ‘peaceful development,’ for it can describe more accu-
rately the present situation in China and its development strategy.”
Online at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zwjg/zwbd/t184690.htm.
38. A sample listing of official documents and speeches indicating China’s
shift from simply opposing hegemony to reiterating that it does not
have hegemonic aims (accessed through the Chinese foreign ministry’s
database) includes: Speech by Chinese President Hu Jintao at Waseda
University, June 8, 2008, online at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t446200.
htm; Opening Address by State Counselor Tang Jiaxuan at the Interna-
tional Seminar on China’s Peaceful Development and the Harmony of
the World (August 11, 2007), online at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/
wshd/t380100.htm; Joint Interview Given by Premier Wen Jiabao to
Although Russia and China both seemingly share the cri-
tique of hegemony and agree on the justice, peace, and stability
inherent in a multipolar world order, the individual tone of each
country’s leaders in doing so indicates a discrepancy in the
means by which they might want to achieve this order. As exem-
plified in the previous analysis, linguistic oscillation persists
between advocating multipolarity and denouncing unipolarity
and hegemonism. Still, neither China nor Russia is quick to
define these terms strategically. Instead, the pursuit of a multi-
polar world order (without mention as to how to achieve it) has
become a ready-referenced point of agreement between the two
countries in joint statements, treaties, and declarations. Another
indicator of a discrepancy in China and Russia’s perception of
multipolarity is the actions each country has taken since first
adopting the term. In the next section, I will explore their actions
in three areas: arms acquisitions and sales, regional alliances,
and the U.S. invasion of Iraq. I will also explore the implications
of Russia’s recent invasion of Georgia and China’s response, as
this event illustrates a dramatic rift in the two countries’ posi-
tions on sovereignty—a formerly agreed upon principle incor-
porated into their mutual definition of multipolarity.
Independent Actions
Arms
Although the 2001 Sino-Russo Treaty on Friendship and
Cooperation did not establish a formal alliance between China
and Russia, it did include rhetoric indicating the anticipated mili-
tary cooperation of the two countries. Article 7 of the treaty
states that each signatory should look after its nation’s security
by “maintaining reasonable and adequate weapons and armed
forces.”39 Additionally, both countries should “consolidate each
170 Susan Turner
Japanese Press, April 5, 2008, online at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/
t309115.htm; Wen Jiabao, “Our Historical Tasks at the Primary Stage of
Socialism and Several Issues Concerning China’s Foreign Policy,” April 3,
2007, online at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t300995.htm.
39. Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between the
People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation.
other’s security” by pursuing “confidence building measures in
the military field.”40 The last clause of that article attempts to
assuage any suspicion of ill intent, explaining that neither of
these two objectives is aimed at a third party. This disclaimer,
however, did not ease the anxiety of the United States, which
classified both China and Russia as “global peer competitors” in
the Pentagon’s 2001 defense report.41
Not long after the ink dried on the Sino-Russian Friendship
Treaty in August 2001, China procured forty Su-30MKK jetfighters
from Russia’s primary arms export company, Rosoboronexport.42
Also within the year, China imported 168 Russian missiles and
missile launchers, including $400 million in S-300PMU-2s (mis-
sile systems with long-range anti-aircraft capabilities). The fol-
lowing year, China purchased two Project 956EM destroyers
and eight Project 636 vessels. In 2003, China procured twenty-
four additional Su-30MKKs.43 Overall, according to the UN Reg-
ister of Conventional Arms, Russian exports to China between
2001 and 2007 totaled 3,857 missiles and missile launchers, nine
warships, and 120 aircraft.44
Although many question such liberal arms exports to China,
President Putin has repeatedly emphasized the importance of
China’s defense capabilities in establishing a multipolar world
order. China has also defended its military modernization, saying
it is only attempting to “catch up” to the “international military
evolution,” and that despite its increased expenditures, China’s
military arsenal pales in comparison with that of other major
countries.45
Russia, China and a Multipolar World Order 171
40. Ibid.
41. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (2001), online
at www.srwolf.com/reports/qdr2001.pdf.
42. Ariel Cohen, “The Russia-China Friendship and Cooperation Treaty: A
Strategic Shift in Eurasia?” Backgrounder No. 1459 (July 18, 2001), online
at www.heritage.org/research/russianandeurasia/bg1459.cfm. This
number contradicts Russia’s report of thirty-eight total aircraft being
exported to China in 2001 in the UN Register for Conventional Arms.
43. Sergei Blagov, “More Russian Weapons Go to China,” CDI Russia Weekly,
No. 242, in Asia Times, January 29, 2003, p. 16, online at www.cdi.org/
russia/242-16.cfm.
44. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, UN Register for Conven-
tional Arms, online at http://disarmament.un.org/UN_REGISTER.nsf.
45. “To Keep Your Words Is Really Good Faith and To Stop the Use of
Perusing comparative data on military expenditures and
capabilities, one finds that China’s claim is correct, especially
when one compares China to the United States. According to a
2005 study conducted by the RAND Corporation, the maximum
amount China will be able to spend on researching, developing,
and procuring weaponry between 2003 and 2025 is $490 billion
dollars. This amount, while substantial, is only half of what it
would take for China to develop or acquire weaponry as sophis-
ticated as the current arsenal of the United States.46 This particu-
lar approximation also assumes China’s continued economic
growth, which is no longer a safe assumption due to the dramat-
ic effect of the American financial crisis on Chinese exports.
Additionally, due to China’s over-employment in the military
sector and the lack of financial incentives it offers for military
innovation, its military evolvement relies predominantly on
Russian intelligence and technology rather than on indigenous
production.47 Any serious prediction of China’s “catching up”
to developed nations, or any serious claim of a Chinese military
threat, must thus include an explanation of how China will
overcome its weapons dependence and how it will substantially
increase its military budget.
Russia has a considerable head start on China in military
modernization due to the prominent role of the Soviet Union in
World War II, its “Chief Designer” program in the 1960s, and its
arms race with the United States during the cold war. Russia’s
consequent acquisition of human and material resources pro-
pelled it to the fore of the arms industry, and today, although
Russia’s own (aging) military is not seen as a direct threat to the
United States, its role as the world’s primary arms dealer allows
it a leading role in building up militarized powers that can collec-
tively rival the United States. It also allows Russia the authority to
say which among those powers gets what. Russia’s weapons allo-
cation is telling. Though China and Russia may be “friends” in
172 Susan Turner
Weapons and Avoid War Is Truly Military—Speech of Ambassador
Wang Yi at the National Defense Academy of Japan,” November 2,
2005, online at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t219989.htm.
46. Keith Crane, Roger Cliff, Evan Medeiros, James Mulvenon, and William
Overholt, Modernizing China’s Military: Opportunities and Constraints
(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2005), pp. 235-36.
47. Ibid., pp. 144-50.
the strategic sense, and Russia sells most of its arms to China, its
most advanced weapons actually go to India, China’s global com-
petitor, exemplifying Russia’s own “check” on Chinese power.48
Alliance Politics
Prior to their agreement to a strategic partnership in 2001,
China and Russia were already cooperating in the context of the
“Shanghai Five,” a group comprised of China, Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan that focused on regional security and
border disarmament. The grouping also stood against the interna-
tional “tendency” to unipolarity and subsequently to balancing
the U.S. presence in Central Asia. With the expansion of NATO
and the U.S.-led invasion of Serbia in 1999, the group signed the
Bishkek Declaration, emphasizing a regional commitment to con-
tinued political and military cooperation in the context of a
“general trend” of the world toward multipolarity.49 Although
the declaration included diplomatic rhetoric, Russian President
Boris Yeltsin, who was less keen on euphemistic language, stated
bluntly that he was “ready to fight, especially with the Western-
ers.”50 Yeltsin employed milder rhetoric in his joint statement
with Jiang subsequent to the summit, stating: “The two sides
agree to work together with the rest of the world to oppose the
tendencies currently preventing the establishment of a just multi-
polar structure for international relations.”51
On June 7, 2001, Uzbekistan became the sixth member of the
Shanghai Five, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) was established. The SCO posited its objectives against
the backdrop of multipolarization, but it remained ambiguous
as to the full extent of the military cooperation and economic
cooperation the members thought necessary to achieve multipo-
larity. The organization’s charter, signed in 2002, was similarly
vague, stating in its preface that the SCO’s purpose was “to
Russia, China and a Multipolar World Order 173
48. Leszek Buszynski, “Russia and the CIS in 2003,” Asian Survey, vol. 44,
No. 1 (January-February, 2004), pp. 158-67.
49. “Shanghai Five States Issue Bishkek Declaration,” Moscow ITAR-TASS,
August 25, 1999. Accessed via World News Connection.
50. Ambrosio, “Challenging America’s Global Preeminence,” p. 86.
51. Ibid.
jointly contribute to the strengthening of peace and ensuring of
security and stability in the region in the environment of devel-
oping political multi-polarity and economic and information
globalization.”52
Agreeing to “develop multipolarity” leaves much up for
debate—including how a multipolar world order would best be
achieved. Perhaps beneath the diplomatic rhetoric lies a fuller
explanation as to each country’s definition of multipolarity—and
thus, whether or not there should be concern about the unde-
fined. The SCO exemplifies China’s and Russia’s commitment to
the concept, as well as their first joint-effort to breach the rhetor-
ical; but agreeing on a vehicle to balance unipolarity is still not
synonymous with defining the means by which to do so. And
even if the SCO’s charter and declaration seemingly outline the
agreed-upon means, evidence indicates that the prioritization of
these means very much differs as between China and Russia.
Mark Katz has identified the discrepancy between the Chi-
nese and Russian perspectives on SCO by saying: “Instead of
seeing the SCO as developing into a politico-military alliance [as
does Moscow], Beijing views it more as an economic cooperation
zone.”53 The chasm Katz highlights in the Sino-Russian perspec-
tive is exemplified by distinctive Chinese and Russian rhetoric
regarding the SCO and also in the separate regional “alliances”
they have chosen to participate in over the past decade.
Of course the term “alliance” in and of itself is a much con-
tested term in the international community, especially when it
suggests a counter to the West’s NATO. This is also the reason-
ing behind Beijing’s and Moscow’s continual protestations that
the SCO is not an exclusive military bloc.54 The Russian presi-
dential envoy for SCO affairs, Vitaly Vorobyov, emphasized this
point in 2006, stating: “”All the SCO’s founding documents are
open. I do not think you can find any signs of a military-political
174 Susan Turner
52. Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, June 7, 2002, online
at www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/12/content_614628.htm.
53. Mark Katz, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” in Iwashta Aki-
hiro, ed., Toward a New Dialogue on Eurasia: The Shanghai Cooperation
Organization and Its Partners (Hokkaido University: Slavic Research
Center, December 2007), p. 15.
54. “‘SCO Not Eastern Version of NATO’: Organization Chief,” June 8,
2006, online at http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t257075.htm.
bloc in them, even with a microscope.”55 Still, despite the pro-
fessed openness (or ambiguity) of the SCO’s founding docu-
ments, Vorobyoy admitted that its activities have a prominent
“political component” that “logically” leads to “cooperation
between the member-states’ defense and other security agencies
. . .”56 Examples of such military cooperation include the China-
Kyrgyzstan antiterrorist exercises in October 2002, the five-state
exercises in August 2003, and the comprehensive military exer-
cise dubbed “Peace Mission 2007” in July 2007.57 This last exer-
cise was the most organized SCO operation to date; not surpris-
ingly, Russia and China took the lead.
“Peace Mission 2007” was also the largest of the joint-mili-
tary operations conducted by the SCO. It involved over 4,000 sol-
diers from all six member-states, including 2,000 from Russia and
1,600 from China. Along with infantry, much of China’s Russian-
procured arms accompanied China back into Russia for the oper-
ation.58 Despite the size of the affair, China was quick to assert
that there was no intention of forming an alliance. An article
written shortly after the exercise in Jiefang junbao, the Chinese
People’s Liberation Army newspaper, explained: “China has
conducted more than 17 joint military exercises with ten-plus
countries. Does it mean to say that China is entering into military
alliance with any of these countries? The answer is certainly neg-
ative.”59 China similarly dismissed the notion that the SCO
Russia, China and a Multipolar World Order 175
55. “Russia: SCO Envoy Says Group Not Developing as Alternative to
NATO,” Interfax, June 13, 2006.
56. Ibid.
57. Complete timeline and additional information can be located on the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s website: www.sectsco.org.
58. According to reports, China brought over eight Chengdu J-10s, sixteen
Mi-17s, sixteen WZ-9s attack helicopters, and six Il-76MF troop-trans-
port planes. China also came equipped with forty infantry fighting
vehicles, fourteen armored personnel carriers, and eighteen artillery
mounts. Russian reports indicate that even this large arsenal was a step
down from what China initially proposed, but that concessions were
made. Viktor Litovkin, “Chinese Subplot of Peace Mission 2007: the
Participants in the SCO’s August Exercises Have Reconciled All Issues
but the Main One,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, June 18, 2007.
Accessed via World News Connection.
59. “Four Key Words Enable You to Have Understand of ‘Peace Mission
2007,’” PLA Daily, July 20, 2007, online at http://english.peopledaily.com.
would ally or collaborate with other regional security mecha-
nisms in the affair, and rejected the proposal of General Yuriy
Baluyevskiy for the involvement of the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO).60
The CSTO emerged out of the Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States’ (CIS) Collective Security Treaty in 1992; it includes
Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajik-
istan. The organization’s intent, as posited by the then-CIS duma
committee chairman, is to become “a functioning security orga-
nization with its own secretariat and rapid deployment force.”61
The role of this force is, in part, to quell international terrorism.
Russia’s role in particular, as the largest and militarily strongest
signatory, is to protect the other CSTO member states—and thus
counteract the continued military presence of the United States
in Central Asia.
At its embryonic stage, the CSTO’s rapid deployment force
consisted of a Russian military base in Kant, equipped with 15
SU-25s and SU-27s and 500 soldiers supplementing the Tajik-
istan force.62 In 2003, the CSTO requested to join forces with
NATO, the justification being that while “NATO and the CSTO
might be in different weight categories . . . in essence they are
similar organizations because they include military components,
political components, and components that deal with today’s
challenges.”63 Despite the supposed benefits of NATO-CSTO
cooperation, however, NATO remained reluctant to cooperate
with the CSTO.64 The CSTO continued on without NATO’s
176 Susan Turner
cn/90001/90776/6220335.html.
60. Although the SCO did not agree to joint military exercises at this time,
the two organizations formally agreed to deepen their relations with one
another at the 2007 CIS summit in Dushanbe. See www.globalsecurity.
org/military/library/news/2007/10/mil-071005-rferl01.html.
61. The original six states to sign the CSO Treaty were Russia, Armenia,
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Azerbaijan,
Georgia, and Belarus joined soon thereafter, but later withdrew.
62. Buszynski, “Russia and the CIS in 2003,” p. 161.
63. Breffni O’Rourke, “NATO: Alliance Praises Efforts of CSTO States, But
Cool to Offer of Cooperation,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (2003),
online at www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2003/12/mil-
031203-rferl-164831.html.
64. M. K. Bhadrakumar, “Russia’s Search for Collective Security,” Asia Times
Online, March 6, 2006, online at www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/
endorsement, determined to become its own regional alliance.
General Baluyevsky further explained that the CSTO was in
response to “NATO’s attempts to involve CIS states in the bloc’s
activity and to weaken their relations with Russia.”65
In 2006, Russia announced that it planned to double both its
infantry and military arsenal at Tajikistan. In July 2006, Russia
and Tajikistan held a joint military exercise on the coast of the
Caspian Sea, followed by a similar Russo-Kyrgyzstan exercise in
October. In 2007, “Peaceful Mission Rubezh-2007” was held, in
which Russia test-launched several of its missiles and the orga-
nization declared its intent to develop a more extensive military
force—including four or five of the CSTO states.66 In 2008, Russo-
Armenian forces participated in “Rubezh-2008” command war
games, and Russia proposed that Article Four of the Coopera-
tion Security Treaty be revised to encompass nuclear weapons,
so as to further protect CIS states.67
While the SCO and CSTO might seem to have similar aims,
and did sign an agreement of mutual cooperation at the CIS
summit in 2007, the discrepancies between the two are telling,
and reflect differences between Chinese and Russian strategy
when it comes to multipolarity and security. First, the intended
scope of the CSTO is much broader than that of the SCO, as
exemplified by its ambitions to mimic NATO. Second, the CSTO
was established as more of a military alliance than the SCO,
whose charter only gives cursory mention of the military impli-
cations of the organization. What one might argue is that despite
these differences, Russia and China share the view that multipo-
larity means respect for a state’s sovereignty. After all, both the
SCO and the CSTO emerged, in part, as a response to perceived
U.S. encroachment on Central Asian territory. But do they truly
hold the same view of sovereignty?
The internal rhetoric of Russia and China surrounding the
Russia, China and a Multipolar World Order 177
HE31Ag01.html.
65. O’Rourke, “NATO.”
66. Ria Novosti, “CSTO Plans to Expand its Military Contingent,” May 14,
2007, online at www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2007/
05/mil-070514-rianovosti01.htm.
67. Ria Novosti, “Russia Must Use Nuclear Deterrent to Protect its Allies,”
December 3, 2007, online at www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/
news/russia/2008/russia-080312-rianovosti02.htm.
SCO’s military operations seems to indicate that the two coun-
tries might attach different meanings to sovereignty. As Michael
Levin notes: “While some PRC commentators went as far as to
suggest that the terrain of the exercise areas was similar to Tai-
wan’s coast, the Russian media toyed with the idea of a joint
occupation of North Korea, if necessary.”68 In contrast to the
China-Taiwan situation, North Korea is well outside the territor-
ial jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. Thus, Russia’s allusion
to the occupation of another country shifts the definition of sov-
ereignty away from the territorial (and objective) into the realm
of the moral (and subjective). But is this application universal?
To answer this, I next examine China’s and Russia’s conceptions
of sovereignty in the context of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Rus-
sia’s relations with post-Soviet states, and China’s relations with
Taiwan.
The Inviolability of Sovereignty in Dispute
In September 2002, the United States proposed a resolution
in the UN Security Council (UNSC) accusing Iraq of illegally
concealing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and threaten-
ing military action if the weapons were not surrendered. Russia,
France, and China agreed that this was a rash decision and pro-
posed that the United States await the conclusions of UN weapons
inspectors in Iraq.69 Consequently, an amended resolution was
proposed and passed the UNSC in November 2002. When the
United States continued to press the necessity of invasion even
after the Security Council’s chief weapons inspector issued his
report questioning the U.S. claims, both China and Russia
expressed concern. Russia went so far as to join Germany and
France in issuing a joint statement and later a memorandum to
178 Susan Turner
68. Levin, The Next Great Clash, p. 101.
69. Russia and China reiterated their opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq
when they met in February 2003, with President Jiang Zemin stating
that “Iraq should cooperate with the United Nations weapons inspectors
actively and earnestly” and that, “the Iraqi issue should be resolved
politically, in which the United Nations should play an essential role.”
See “President Jiang Zemin Meets Russian Foreign Minister,” February
27, 2003, online at http://gr.china-embassy.org/eng/xwdt/xw2003/
xw200302/.
the UNSC requiring that the United States give the UN more
time to assess the situation.
Despite Russian, French, and German opposition, Britain
and Spain joined the United States in invading Iraq on March 16,
2003. China adhered to its position on the importance of multi-
polarity and the danger inherent in unilateral action, but did not
choose to align itself with either the Germany-Russia-France or
the U.S.-Britain-Spain coalitions. Kishore Mahbubani explains
China’s silence in relation to its broader understanding of the
United States: “[China] bent over backward to accommodate
U.S. hegemony, bearing in mind the wisdom of an ancient Chinese
proverb, in moments of weakness, swallow your bitter humilia-
tion, and focus on growing stronger.”70 While China was biting
its tongue, Russia was less reserved: “[if] we allow international
law to be replaced by might of the fist, according to which the
stronger side is always right,” stated Putin, “then a key principle
of international law, that of the sanctity of sovereignty of all
states, comes into question.”71
The sincerity of Putin’s words is suspect considering Russia’s
invasion of Georgia on August 10, 2008. Perhaps it is this action of
the Russian Federation that best exemplifies Russia’s inconsistent
rhetoric and the significant rift between the Chinese and Russian
views vis-à-vis multipolarity. Immediately after Russia’s invasion,
President George W. Bush warned that “only Russia can decide
whether it will now put itself back on the path of responsible
nations, or continue to pursue a policy that promises only con-
frontation and isolation.”72 The President’s statement indicates
that Russia had to choose between two paths. But did the Russian
decision to invade Georgia represent a country blazing a new
path, or was it only a stark example of a path already chosen?
As mentioned, Russia has not taken well to the democratic
revolutions of the former Soviet states or their incorporation into
NATO—and Georgia is no exception. Since the Rose Revolution of
2003 and the election of President Mikhail Saakashvili, Georgia has
Russia, China and a Multipolar World Order 179
70. Jing Men, “Changing Ideology in China and Its Impact on Chinese For-
eign Policy,” p. 52.
71. Ambrosio, Challenging America’s Preeminence, p. 156.
72. “President Bush Discusses Situation in Georgia,” August 15, 2008, online
at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/08/20080815.html.
positioned NATO membership among its top foreign-policy prior-
ities. Furthermore, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the
international community formally recognized the contested areas
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as part of Georgian territory.
According to Putin (now prime minister), Russia had every “moral
right” to acquire these territories after Kosovo independence, but
instead agreed to a 1994 UN peacekeeping mandate to protect the
citizens of these breakaway areas (most of whom were Russian).
Consequently, Putin justified his 2008 attack against Georgia as a
response to the Georgian government’s acts of genocide—against
Georgian and Russian citizens.73
Critical analysis, however, indicates that Russia’s actions were
premeditated and were the culmination of a series of provocative
Russian actions against the Georgian government dating back to
2006.74 A recent study of the conflict published by the Central-
Asia Caucus Institute concludes that contrary to Putin’s claims,
Russia’s invasion of Georgia was not a response to human-rights
abuses in South Ossetia, but was a calculated Russian decision
to punish Georgia for seeking collaboration with the West and
to demonstrate to the West Russia’s renewed primacy over the
post-Soviet space.75
180 Susan Turner
73. “PM Putin Spells Out Russia’s Stance on Georgia Conflict to German
TV,” Vesti TV, August 30, 2008.
74. Russian military analyst Palven Felgenhauer told a Georgian newspaper
in June 2008 that Russia had been planning a war with Georgia since
April. Other incidents that occurred prior to that point which indicate
Russia’s ill intent (and are outlined in the Central-Asia Caucus Institute
policy paper) include: a Russian ban on Georgian wine and mineral
water (Spring 2006); Russian construction of a military base in Java
(Spring 2006); a Russian economic boycott of Georgia (September-October
2006); Russian assistance in attacking Georgian-controlled villages in
the Kodori Gorge (March 2007); Russia’s dropping of an undetonated
missile near South Ossetia (August 2007); Russia’s withdrawal from the
1996 CIS Sanctions Treaty (March 2008); Putin’s military decree open-
ing relations with South Ossetia and Abkhazia (April 2008); Russian
destruction of a Georgian UAV (April 2008); establishment of Russian
checkpoints along the Inguri River (April 2008); Russian violation of
Georgian airspace (July 2008); and Russian participation in the military
exercise “Kavkaz-2008” and the positioning of its troops along the
Georgian border (August 2008).
75. Svante E. Cornell, Johanna Popjanevski, and Niklas Nilsson, “Russia’s
The West, in concert, disapproved of Russia’s action.76 Still, on
August 10, 2008, Russia declared the independence of South Osse-
tia and Abkhazia, in opposition to the opinion of the other states in
the G-8 economic group. Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia also contravened the SCO’s commitment to respect
sovereignty and territorial integrity as outlined in Article Five of
its founding charter. Moreover, it violated Article One of the orga-
nization’s 2001 document, the Shanghai Convention on Combat-
ing Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism, which prohibits mem-
ber-states from instigating or abetting separatism. Consequently,
although Russia wanted the SCO to issue a communique endors-
ing its actions, the other members refused to do so. Instead, they
issued the Dushanbe Declaration, which diplomatically reiter-
ates the SCO’s commitment to thwarting separatism and adher-
ing to international law and asks in Article Three that the parties
involved in the South Ossetian issue reconcile their differences
through peaceful dialogue.
Among the SCO member-states, China in particular was
placed in an extremely difficult position. Although China had
established a rapport with Russia promoting a multipolar world,
it could not openly endorse Russia’s invasion of Georgia and its
acknowledgment of the independence of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. Nor could China agree to Russia’s later request for a
Sino-Russian “joint action on security and prevention issues”
without simultaneously appearing to encourage separatism in
Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan.77
The tension between China and Russia in this regard demon-
strates a significant rift between the Chinese and Russian perspec-
tives on state sovereignty. Although China and Russia may seem
similarly situated as aspiring regional hegemons in a multipolar
world order, China’s means of aggrandizing power is by promot-
ing the unification of its country and defending its sovereignty
Russia, China and a Multipolar World Order 181
War in Georgia: Implication for Georgia and the World,” Central-Asia
Caucus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program (August 2008), online at
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/silkroadpapers/0808
Georgia-PP.pdf.
76. “President Bush Discusses Situation in Georgia.”
77. Chang Ching-wei, “HK Commentator Lauds PRC Handling of SCO
‘Embarrassment’ Over Georgia Conflict,” Ta Kung Pao Online, September
11, 2008. Accessed via World News Connection.
against foreign and separatist threats, foregoing peace if necessary.
Russia, on the other hand, with its recent invasion of Georgia,
exemplifies a willingness to forego peace in order to violate a
state’s sovereignty and demonstrate its military prowess to sur-
rounding states and the world.78 As such, China’s position (and
even its military preparation for a conflict with Taiwan) is more
clearly in line with Article Four of the Sino-Russian Friendship
Treaty, in which both sides agree to support each other in “defend-
ing the national unity and territorial integrity,” and Article Five,
which explicitly mentions both countries’ commitment to defend-
ing Taiwan. Russia’s recent actions, in addition to contravening
the SCO charter, also violate Article Twenty of the Sino-Russian
Friendship Treaty, expressing their joint commitment to “cracking
down on . . . splittists.”79
Conclusion
China’s 11th Five Year Plan states: “The trend toward multi-
polarity in international politics is developing amid twists and
turns, and voices for multilateralism are growing in the interna-
tional community, imposing effective constraints on hegemonism
and power politics and making it possible for China to manage
big power relations, oppose foreign interference, and defend the
national interests.”80 Undoubtedly, many twists and turns have
occurred over the past decade, to which China’s promotion of
182 Susan Turner
78. I am not here providing an endorsement of Beijing’s “One China” policy,
but seek only to demonstrate the differences between China and Russia’s
perspective on sovereignty. According to the Chinese government, Taiwan
is an “inalienable” part of China (as are Tibet and Xinjiang), and thus
any military endeavors in this regard are considered by Beijing to be in
defense of the country. Georgia, in contrast, like the other post-Soviet
states, is an independent country, and Russia has made no claim to the
contrary.
79. Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between the
People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation.
80. “PRC Academics Discuss China’s Diplomacy Discussion: ‘China’s Diplo-
macy in the Important Period of Strategic Opportunity,” Renmin Ribao
(People’s Daily, Beijing), January 19, 2006; emphasis added. Accessed via
World News Connection.
multipolarity has remained a consistent subplot. Russia, in con-
trast, with its bellicose demeanor and dramatic policy shifts, has
emerged a quite different champion of multipolarity—one content
with directly challenging the hegemony of the United States and
perhaps even making it possible for China to ascend peacefully.
As the second half of this article illustrates, China and Russia
do not merely have differences of tone when addressing multipo-
larity. They also appear to differ fundamentally in their approach
to it. Elizabeth Wishnick initially explained the Sino-Russian part-
nership by saying that “Russia, a declining great power, aims to
recover its lost status, while China, a rising power, resists efforts
to constrain its emerging global role.”81 Wishnick acknowledged
that China and Russia had different motives in regard to their
partnership. Time has eroded these ambitions. Now, the same
motives that propelled Russia and China toward partnership and
agreement on multipolarity have since driven them toward dif-
ferent means to reach these ends and caused them to employ a
different definition of multipolarity altogether. Considering the
lessons learned in regard to the recent past and the unexpected
Sino-Soviet split, we might not want to overlook the danger in the
undefined.
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184 Susan Turner
Asia (Malaysia, Indonesia). He has recently published Paper Citi-
zens: How Illegal Immigrants Acquire Citizenship in Developing Coun-
tries (Oxford University Press, 2009). (E-mail: kamal@ uci.edu)
Sueo Sudo is Professor of International Relations at Nanzan Uni-
versity, Nagoya, Japan. He has worked as a research fellow in the
Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand,
and as a fellow in the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singa-
pore. He is the author of The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN (Insti-
tute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992), The International Relations
of Japan and South East Asia (Routledge, 2002), and Evolution of
ASEAN-Japan Relations (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005).
(E-mail: sudos@nanzan-u.ac.jp)
Stein Tønnesson has been director of the International Peace
Research Institute (PRIO) in Oslo since 2001. His publications
include The Vietnamese Revolution of 1945 (SAGE, 1991); Asian
Forms of the Nation (edited with H. Antlöv, Curzon, 1996); and two
forthcoming works—a comparative article on “The Class Route to
Nationhood” in Nations and Nationalism, and a book, Vietnam 1946:
How the War Began, to be published by the University of California
Press in 2010. (E-mail: Stein@PRIO.no)
Susan Turner is currently a master’s degree candidate at George
Mason University in Virginia, where she concentrates on Chinese
politics. She studied at Sichuan University in Chengdu in 2005 and
studied in Russia in 2006. In 2007 she interned for the Minorities
at Risk Organizational Behavior Project (MAROB) at the Univer-
sity of Maryland. (E-mail: susan_celeste@ahp.org)
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