ArticlePDF Available

Equipment failures and their contribution to industrial incidents and accidents in the manufacturing industry

Article

Equipment failures and their contribution to industrial incidents and accidents in the manufacturing industry

Abstract and Figures

Accidental events in manufacturing industries can be caused by many factors, including work methods, lack of training, equipment design, maintenance, and reliability. This study is aimed at determining the contribution of failures of commonly used industrial equipment such as machines, tools and material handling equipment, to the chain of causality of industrial accidents and incidents. Based on a case study which aimed at the analysis of an existing pulp and paper company's accident database, this paper examines the number, the type and the gravity of the failures involved in these events and their causes. Results from this study show that equipment failures had a major effect on the number and the severity of accidents accounted for in the database: 272 out of 773 accidental events were related to equipment failure, where 13 of them had direct consequences in human labours. Failures that contributed directly or indirectly to these events are analyzed.
Content may be subject to copyright.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=tose20
Download by: [Universite du Quebec a Trois - Rivieres] Date: 10 February 2016, At: 10:46
International Journal of Occupational Safety and
Ergonomics
ISSN: 1080-3548 (Print) 2376-9130 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tose20
Equipment failures and their contribution
to industrial incidents and accidents in the
manufacturing industry
Dominic Bourassa, François Gauthier & Georges Abdul-Nour
To cite this article: Dominic Bourassa, François Gauthier & Georges Abdul-Nour (2016)
Equipment failures and their contribution to industrial incidents and accidents in the
manufacturing industry, International Journal of Occupational Safety and Ergonomics, 22:1,
131-141, DOI: 10.1080/10803548.2015.1116814
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10803548.2015.1116814
Accepted author version posted online: 14
Dec 2015.
Published online: 05 Feb 2016.
Submit your article to this journal
Article views: 9
View related articles
View Crossmark data
International Journal of Occupational Safety and Ergonomics (JOSE), 2016
Vol. 22, No. 1, 131–141, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10803548.2015.1116814
Equipment failures and their contribution to industrial incidents and accidents in the
manufacturing industry
Dominic Bourassa, François Gauthierand Georges Abdul-Nour
Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, Canada
Accidental events in manufacturing industries can be caused by many factors, including work methods, lack of training,
equipment design, maintenance and reliability. This study is aimed at determining the contribution of failures of commonly
used industrial equipment, such as machines, tools and material handling equipment, to the chain of causality of industrial
accidents and incidents. Based on a case study which aimed at the analysis of an existing pulp and paper company’s accident
database, this paper examines the number, type and gravity of the failures involved in these events and their causes. Results
from this study show that equipment failures had a major effect on the number and severity of accidents accounted for
in the database: 272 out of 773 accidental events were related to equipment failure, where 13 of them had direct human
consequences. Failures that contributed directly or indirectly to these events are analyzed.
Keywords: accidents; safety; reliability; maintenance policy; availability; pulp and paper company; safety and failure
database; manufacturing
1. Introduction
1.1. Incidents, accidents and occupational safety
Occupational safety is a concern for many companies
worldwide. It contributes not only to protect the most
important asset of companies, workers, but also to increase
productivity and efficiency. Despite the fact that companies
are primarily seeking to eliminate accidents, especially
those leading to workers’ injuries, it is generally accepted
that occupational accident prevention is also achieved by
reducing the number of minor incidents that occur in a
workplace.
Based on data gathered from 297 companies and deal-
ing with 1,753,498 accidental events (accidents and inci-
dents or mishaps), an extensive US study, carried out in
the 1960s, shows that the probability of a serious accident
occurring increases with the number of incidents.[1]This
study produced the well-known Bird’s pyramid (Figure 1),
widely used by safety professionals. Therefore, for a com-
pany to succeed in reducing the number of dangerous
events located at the top of the pyramid it has to lower
the number of incidents at the bottom by identifying their
causes and implementing corrective actions to eliminate
them. The fewer the number of incidents, the lower the
probability of serious and fatal accidents.
It is known that accidental events are generally the
result of a combination of different causes in a more or
less complex causal chain.[2] Numerous investigations
*Corresponding author. Email: francois.gauthier@uqtr.ca
undertaken after incidents or accidents in workplaces show
that factors that contribute to these sudden and unforeseen
events are mostly related to human errors, work meth-
ods and procedures, lack of training, and poor equipment
reliability and design.
1.2. Reliability and safety
Equipment and system reliability is widely studied in the
literature in regard to the optimization of production and
maintenance activities; but when it comes to commonly
used production equipment’s safety, research papers on
the effects of reliability on this matter become scarce and
very rare. It is true that when talking about system proper-
ties and modeling, reliability and safety are considered as
distinct matters.[3] A system can be reliable and unsafe,
or safe and unreliable. Nevertheless, good maintenance
practices resulting from a culture that focuses on equip-
ment reliability in general have the effect of increasing
machine efficiency while improving occupational safety by
reducing accident rates.[4,5]
However, significant differences exist between pro-
duction sectors when considering equipment reliability
improvement practices. The relationship between reliabil-
ity and safety has been an integral part of the culture in
the nuclear power plants and aviation and space sectors for
several decades now.[68] In fact, risk analysis practices
are widely used in those areas. This preoccupation is also
© 2016 Central Institute for Labour Protection – National Research Institute (CIOP-PIB)
Downloaded by [Universite du Quebec a Trois - Rivieres] at 10:46 10 February 2016
132 D. Bourassa et al.
Figure 1. Bird’s pyramid.
seen in the commercial fishing sector,[9,10] the mining
industry [11,12] and in the hazardous materials storage
sector.[13] The chemical, petrochemical and all process
industries also seem sensitized to this issue.[1416]The
reasons are the cost of failures and risk for peoples’ safety
are very high in those areas.
Research concerning reliability effects on machine
safety in the manufacturing industry is rare, despite the
fact that a significant number of incidents and accidents
affect this sector. In Canada, even if the global number
of accidents per 1000 workers went down from 43.8 in
1982 to 14.7 in 2010, the manufacturing sector is still at
risk with 24 accidents per 1000 workers.[17] A study car-
ried out in Finland [18] related to accidents that occur in a
manufacturing environment, places this activity sector far
ahead of the others. The literature is in fact very complete
regarding occupational accidents related to equipment and
machinery in this sector, but very few studies mention the
impact of equipment failures on the occurrence of these
accidental events. A study by the INRS in France [19]
on automated machines concluded that 20% of injuries
are due to untimely operation of automatic control. The
same study mentions that guard failures to operate are due
to malfunctioning in 11% of cases and 4% are related
to wear.[20]D´zwiarek analyzed 700 occupational acci-
dents and concluded that 54 (7.7%) were caused by control
system malfunction.
2. Objectives of the study
Equipment reliability, maintenance and availability are fre-
quently used in production planning optimization models,
but not safety. This research will focus on the effect of
equipment failures (due to lack of a formal preventive
maintenance policy) on manufacturing workers’ safety and
production line efficiency and productivity. The impact of
failures of common industrial equipment such as machines,
tools and material handling equipment in the chain of
causality of accidents and incidents (or mishaps) will be
analyzed based on a case study. The analysis of a large pulp
and paper company safety database was used to perform
the study.
Incidents and accidents reported in the database were
analyzed, and the study focused on the number, types and
importance of failures involved in these events. Specific
objectives of the study were:
(1) To determine the rate of accidental events caused
by equipment failure.
(2) To characterize equipment failure effects on acci-
dental event severity.
(3) To categorize these failures in order to develop
adapted maintenance.
3. Methodology
The following section gives a description of the database
involved in this case study. Identification of accidental
events related to equipment failures, determination of the
importance of the failures in the chain of causality of
these events and classification of equipment failures are
also discussed. The analysis and classification process was
undertaken by two researchers independently and their
results were compared. Discrepancies were discussed to
reach a consensus.
3.1. Description of the database
The database used in this case study contains accident
and incident reports from a pulp and paper manufacturing
plant in Québec (Canada) that is part of a large com-
pany with many plants in North America and Asia. The
plant is characterized by the fact that it has been in opera-
tion for more than 125 years. Clearly, several improvement
projects have been carried out over the years in order to
update the plant and to make it more competitive. Consid-
erable effort has been invested in the last decade in imple-
menting a health and safety culture, and more recently,
a culture focused on equipment safety, reliability and
availability.
This electronic database contains reports of 773 acci-
dental events (incidents and accidents) for the entire
plant from 2010 to 2012. These reports are generally
filled out by managing or by unionized employees with
the status of replacement managers. When a worker
is involved in an accident or incident, he reports to
his immediate supervisor to complete an event analysis
report. Event analysis reports are completed via the plant’s
intranet. The author must give the following information:
worker identification, description of the event, immedi-
ate action to control the hazards, potential severity of
the accident, immediate causes of the accident, funda-
mental causes, corrective measures and some additional
information.
Downloaded by [Universite du Quebec a Trois - Rivieres] at 10:46 10 February 2016
International Journal of Occupational Safety and Ergonomics (JOSE) 133
Amongst the immediate causes, the author can tick
many that are related to the task (work pace, unsafe behav-
ior of an employee or tiers, methods, instructions or work
procedures, non-compliance with safety rules, improper
posture, absence of or inappropriate protection mechanism,
faulty or incongruous tool or equipment, hazardous sub-
stances, unprotected risky area, etc.) or with the working
environment (unfit planning, extreme ambient conditions,
inappropriate lighting, confined space, dirtiness, cluster,
etc.).
Amongst the fundamental causes, the author can tick
the ones related to the organization (incongruous task
assignment, poor communication, unfit conception, bad
maintenance, insufficient training, lack of accurate instruc-
tions, poor planning, unfit or absent regulation, lack of
supervision, missing or insufficient maintenance program,
etc.) or with the individual (poor acknowledgement of
danger, unfit physical condition, irresponsible behavior,
consumption of alcohol or drugs, poor analysis of the risks,
etc. – with supporting comments for more details).
The author of the report or any other individual allowed
to modify the reports can add adequate corrective measures
aiming to fix the immediate and/or fundamental causes.
As for major incidents or accidents, deeper investigations
are to be performed by the Health and Safety Coordinator,
the managers of the affected department or even the plant
manager. Finally, monitoring of the corrective measure
implementation progress is regularly done by the directors
during their performance management meetings.
3.2. Identification of accidental events related to
equipment failures
Figure 2shows the decisional algorithm applied to each
accidental event in the database in order to determine
whether the event was caused by equipment failure.
Specific criteria had to be established in order to ensure rig-
orous differentiation of accidental events related to a failure
from other events. Four key fields in the report were used
to determine whether the event was related to a reliability
problem or not:
description of the event;
immediate causes of the event;
fundamental causes of the event;
recommended corrective measures.
In the four fields mentioned above, it was possi-
ble to link the accident to equipment failure when the
text included elements suggesting a failure. Many key-
words could be associated with failures, e.g., leak,bro-
ken,ripped off,unhooked,cracked,overheated,smoke,
jammed,unscrewed, etc. The following is an example of
an event linked to a failure taken from a description in the
database:
During the L-11 interruption, I had to plug back the suc-
tion press. The 2 inch braided flexible hose that supplies
the unit in rinsing water was broken and many SS wires
protruding from the envelope broke through my glove and
pricked me.
Figure 2. Decisional algorithm for determining the link between an accidental event and equipment failure.
Downloaded by [Universite du Quebec a Trois - Rivieres] at 10:46 10 February 2016
134 D. Bourassa et al.
The breakage of the hose envelope, its failure, is clearly
indicated in the report.
3.3. Determination of the importance of the failures in
the chain of causality of accidental events
In order to identify the importance of the failure in the
chain of causality of accidental events, the next step con-
sisted of establishing the link between the accidental event
and the failure (Figure 2). For an event to be directly linked
to equipment failure, the failure in question needed to be a
causality factor of the accidental event, which means that
by eliminating the failure of the chain of causality, the acci-
dental event would not have occurred, or its effects would
have been considerably reduced. These causal factors are
the key events or conditions that could have prevented the
accident from happening or could have notably diminished
its effects if they had been suppressed.[2,21] The following
is an example:
Due to metal fatigue, the 4 rods used to support the con-
veyor broke and the conveyor fell on the empty trailer that
was parked under it; the 4 rods are those that support the
centre and the tail end of the conveyor.
In this example, the accident would not have occurred
without the failure of the rods. Hence, that failure directly
contributed to this accidental event.
However, if the failure had not been a causal factor in
the accident, the event would be considered as indirectly
linked to the failure. In other words, if by eliminating the
failure of the chain of causality of the accidental event, it
could still have happened, the event was considered indi-
rectly linked to the failure. Moreover, if the event had
resulted from an intervention required following a fail-
ure, the event was also considered indirectly linked to the
failure. The following is an example:
While removing the lock in order to change the roll cylin-
der, I had to take the positioning locks off. I realized
that a hydraulic hose was leaking on the rear cylinder.
I investigated and I tried to tighten the connectors, but
they were still leaking. An external mechanic came by. He
checked the second connector, but it broke. The roll made
a fall of 10 inches and touched my safety helmet. Some oil
splashed in my face.
In this example, the failure of the hose caused a series of
interventions that led to an accidental event, but it was not
the leak that was responsible for the accident. Moreover,
the action of taking off the lock and the breakage could
have occurred in other circumstances.
3.4. Classification of equipment failures related to
accidental events
Once identified, the accidental events and the failures
that contributed to them were classified according to dif-
ferent parameters. The consequences of the events were
Table 1. Summary of the failure classification criteria.
Classification of the failures
according to:
Typical kinds of failure
Their speed of occurrence Progressive or sudden
Their scale Partial or complete
Their speed of occurrence
and their scale
Catalectic or by deterioration
Their causes Primary, secondary or control
characterized according to their nature (with or without
human consequences, i.e., injuries) and their severity (from
first aid to days away from work) based on plant crite-
ria. Failures were classified according to the classification
criteria proposed by Villemeur [22] and by the French
association of normalization (AFNOR).[23] Table 1sum-
marizes the failure classification criteria used. Failures
were also classified according to the type of component
involved (mechanical, electrical, control system, building
or infrastructure).
4. Results
4.1. Accidental events related to equipment failures
and the importance of these failures in the chain
of causality of these events
Of the 773 accidental events contained in the database,
272 (35.2%) were the result of equipment failure, while
the other ones occurred for other reasons such as human or
operational errors. Of the 272 accidental events resulting
from equipment failure, 187 (68.8%) were the direct con-
sequences of equipment failure, compared to 85 (31.2%)
that were the indirect result of a failure. Figure 3shows
these results.
4.2. Relationship between equipment failures and
consequences of accidental events
The reports contained in the database included a classifi-
cation based on the consequences of the accidental events
Figure 3. Distribution of the accidental events based on their
correlation with equipment failures.
Downloaded by [Universite du Quebec a Trois - Rivieres] at 10:46 10 February 2016
International Journal of Occupational Safety and Ergonomics (JOSE) 135
in terms of severity. The company relies on a classifica-
tion system that includes five categories based on the US
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
general recording criteria [24]:
incident (no consequence on human, with or without
material damage);
first aid;
medical treatment beyond first aid;
restricted work or transfer to another job;
days away from work.
Table 2. Consequences of accidental events related or not
related to equipment failures.
Without any
human
consequences
With human
conse-
quences
Total
(100%)
Type of
accidental
events n%n%n
Accidental events
linkedtoa
failure:
259 95.2 13 4.8 272
Directly 182 97.3 5 2.7 187
Indirectly 77 90.6 8 9.4 85
Accidental events
not linked to a
failure:
441 88.0 60 12.0 501
Entire database 700 90.5 73 9.5 773
Table 2summarizes the results of the data analysis.
Amongst the 272 accidental events linked to equipment
failure, 259 (95.2%) events were considered as incidents,
in other words they did not cause any human consequences.
In total, 13 events (4.8%) had human consequences, from
first aid to days away from work. For comparative pur-
poses, of the 501 accidental events that were not linked
to equipment failure, 60 (12%) involved human conse-
quences. A hypothesis test shows the significance of this
difference with α<.05. This result is not surprising since
many studies have confirmed the impact of behavioral and
organizational aspects on the occurrence of work-related
accidents.[25,26]
It is interesting to note that these results are comparable
to Bird’s pyramid concept (Figure 1). Indeed, according
to this concept, the proportion of accidents with lesions is
established at 6.2% (40 out of 641) of the total of accidental
events.
Besides, by separately dealing with the 187 acciden-
tal events that are directly linked and the 85 accidental
events that are indirectly linked to equipment failure, one
can see that 2.7% of the directly related events had human
consequences, in comparison to 9.4% of the indirectly
linked ones. The detailed analysis of human consequences
between the directly and indirectly linked events also
shows important variations between the proportions of
human consequence types (Figure 4). The indirect events
Figure 4. Proportion comparison of the events directly and indirectly linked to the failures based on the type of human consequences.
Downloaded by [Universite du Quebec a Trois - Rivieres] at 10:46 10 February 2016
136 D. Bourassa et al.
have more important human consequences and have led to
time loss (days away from work) in 37.5% of the cases,
compared to 20.0% of the direct events. On the other hand,
when considering only the events that show a low level of
severity (first aid and medical treatment beyond first aid),
the percentage is 80.0% (80% +0%) for the direct events
and 62.5% (50% +12.5%) for the indirect events. One
can see that the events that are indirectly linked to equip-
ment failure are less numerous but often have more serious
consequences than directly linked events.
4.3. Classification of the failure related to accidental
events
For each report on the events related to equipment fail-
ure, the involved failures were classified according to the
criteria indicated in Section 3.4 (Table 1). Although the
reports contained in the database were documented in order
to explain the accidental events, but not the failures, they
included in most cases enough information to be classi-
fied. The different types of equipment failures linked to
accidental events are summarized in Table 3and are pre-
sented in the next sections. It is important to note that it
was impossible to classify certain failures due to a lack of
information.
4.3.1. Event distribution according to the speed of
occurrence of the failure
The failures were firstly classified according to speed of
occurrence, sudden or progressive. As its name reveals,
a sudden failure is caused by a sudden loss of perfor-
mance of a unit. As for a progressive failure, it is due to
an evolution in time of the unit’s characteristics. When the
potential failure could have been identified through preven-
tive maintenance before becoming a functional failure, it
is considered progressive. Otherwise, it is a sudden fail-
ure. The expertise of the plant’s reliability engineer was
sought in order to ensure the classification consistency. It
must be noted that generally a progressive failure shows
aging signs, while a completely random and sudden failure
indicates that the machine is on useful life.
Amongst the 272 accidental events related to equip-
ment failures, 71.0% are linked to sudden failures, while
25.7% are linked to progressive failures. When individu-
ally dealing with the direct and indirect events, the propor-
tions slightly differ. Although the progressive failures are in
a minority on both sides, they are slightly more present in
events that are indirectly linked to failure (31.8% vs. 23%).
4.3.2. Event distribution according to the scale of failure
The failures were afterwards classified according to their
scale, partial or complete. A partial failure causes the inca-
pacity of a unit to accomplish certain required functions.
When the unit could still function despite the failure, it
was considered partial. The following is an example of a
partial failure described in an event report taken from the
database:
‘When passing next to the transfer arm located at the rear
of the machine on the winding frame side, Daniel stepped
in an oil puddle coming from the cylinder used to raise and
lower the transfer arm, and slipped without any gravity.’
Corrective measure: ‘Repairing the cylinder in order to
stop the leak.’
The leak of the cylinder is a partial failure since the
impermeability is altered without preventing it from per-
forming its main function, which is to ensure the movement
of the transfer arm.
A complete failure causes the total incapacity of a unit
to accomplish any function. The following is an example
of a complete failure:
While trying to blow in the drying section the air hose dis-
connected from the new black fitting quickly and started to
sway on the floor until we turn off the air. Fortunately, the
operator was not hit by the hose.
In this case, the failure is complete since the unit,
namely, the blowing system of the drying section, is not
operational anymore. The unit has lost all of its functions.
Of the 272 accidental events related to equipment fail-
ures, 82.4% are associated with complete failures while
15.8% with partial failures. We can also note that partial
failures are almost three times more frequent for events
indirectly linked to failures than for directly linked events
(28.2% vs. 10.2%).
4.3.3. Event distribution according to the speed of
occurrence and the scale of the failure
The failures have also been classified according to a com-
bination of their speed of occurrence and their scale,
catalectic and by deterioration. The catalectic failure is
sudden and complete (random) while the failure by dete-
rioration is progressive and partial (aging). Despite the fact
that this classification method is the result of the two pre-
ceding methods, its level of importance is considerable
since it flags the proportion of catalectic failures, which
can be hazardous. It also allows the quality of the main-
tenance strategy implemented at the studied facility to be
highlighted.
An analysis of the 272 accidental events related to
equipment failures, according to their speed of occurrence
and their scale, shows that in 62.1% of the cases, the fail-
ures are catalectic, in comparison to 6.3% for the ones by
deterioration. For 28.3% of the cases, this classification is
not applicable and for 3.3% of the cases, the failures are
impossible to classify due to a lack of information.
The catalectic failures are hence the majority of both
direct and indirect events. We nonetheless note that the pro-
portion of the failures by deterioration is four times more
in the case of indirectly linked events (12.9% vs. 3.2%).
Downloaded by [Universite du Quebec a Trois - Rivieres] at 10:46 10 February 2016
International Journal of Occupational Safety and Ergonomics (JOSE) 137
4.3.4. Event distribution according to the causes of the
failures
The failures have been classified based on their causes:
primary failure, secondary failure and control failure. A
primary failure is a failure that is not caused by a failure
of another unit. Being associated with the defaulting unit
itself, it hence results from a defective conception, pro-
duction or installation, or from the aging phenomena. The
following is an example of a primary failure taken from an
event report in the database:
‘When blowing on the strip of paper wound around a dry-
ing cylinder, I felt heat on my forearm when it touches the
handrail on top of the fence. I then noticed that the pro-
tection felts of the metal bars were all ripped.’ Corrective
measures of this event report: ‘Changing the protection felt
in the drying section during the next programmed stop.’
This corrective measure allows us to link this event to
a primary failure, being the deterioration of the insulation
felt.
A secondary failure is the failure of a unit for which the
direct or indirect cause is the failure of another unit, and
for which it has not been qualified or sized. Consequently,
a secondary failure is the result of excessive conditions and
pressure coming from other components, the environment
or human operational errors. The following is an example
of a secondary failure:
‘At night, many concrete tiles detached from the ceiling
and fell on the floor near the decker #2.’ Many corrective
measures are associated with this event: ‘Inspection of the
roof and the beams of the roof, installation of a roof in
order to protect the workers, repairs of the faulty ceiling
beams.’
In this example, the tiles detached due to the beam fail-
ure, hence because of the failure of other components of
the system.
A control failure results from wrong control signals
coming from other components, the environment or human
operational errors. The analyzed database did not include
any event reports related to this type of failure.
Amongst the 272 accidental events related to equip-
ment failures, 68.4% are associated with primary failures,
while 27.2% with secondary failures. As for the other fail-
ures, it was impossible to classify them due to a lack
of information. Table 3also shows that the distribution
of the failure causes is almost the same for both events
that are directly and indirectly linked to these equipment
failures.
4.3.5. Event distribution according to the defaulting
function
The failures have finally been classified according to the
defaulting function: primary or secondary function. The
following is an example of a primary function failure:
When I was in the elevator of the thermal power plant, I got
stuck between two floors. It stopped working between the
3rd and 2nd floors. I had my radio so I contacted the thermal
plant operator to let him know. The electrician intervened
rapidly to get me out of there.
In this situation, it is clear that the failure caused the
breakdown of the primary function of the elevator, that is,
to bring people from one floor to another. The following is
an example of the failure of a secondary function:
During the L-11 interruption, I had to plug back the suction
press. The 2 inch braided flexible hose that supplies rinsing
water was broken and many SS wires protruding from the
envelope broke through my glove and pricked me.
In this situation, the primary function of the flexible
hose, which is to supply the suction press with water, is
Table 3. Distribution of the 187 events directly linked and the 85 events indirectly linked to a failure based on the
different failure classification methods.
Directly linked Indirectly linked Total
Classification method Category n%n%n%
Speed of occurrence of the failure Sudden 139 74.3 54 63.5 193 71.0
Progressive 43 23.0 27 31.8 70 25.7
Total 182 97.3 81 95.3 263 96.7
Scale of the failure Complete 164 87.7 60 70.6 224 82.4
Partial 19 10.2 24 28.2 43 15.8
Total 183 97.9 84 98.8 267 98.2
Speed of occurrence and scale of the failure Catalectic 126 67.4 43 50.6 169 62.1
By deterioration 6 3.2 11 12.9 17 6.3
N/a 50 26.7 27 31.8 77 28.3
Total 182 97.3 81 95.3 263 96.7
Causes of the failures Primary 131 70.1 55 64.7 186 68.4
Secondary 48 25.7 26 30.6 74 27.2
Total 179 95.7 81 95.3 260 95.6
Faulty function Primary 170 90.9 75 88.2 245 90.1
Secondary 17 9.1 10 11.8 27 9.9
Total 187 100 85 100 272 100
Downloaded by [Universite du Quebec a Trois - Rivieres] at 10:46 10 February 2016
138 D. Bourassa et al.
not affected. However, the structural integrity and safety
of the hose are defective since many structural wires are
damaged.
Amongst the 272 accidental events linked to equip-
ment failures, 90.1% are related to the failure of a primary
function, while 9.9% are associated with the failure of a
secondary function. The distribution of the faulty func-
tion types is similar for directly linked and indirectly
linked events.
4.4. Analysis of accidental events involving human
consequences
In order to try to determine if a typical failure pattern exists
leading to accidental events with human consequences,
a combined analysis was conducted using some failure
classification criteria showcased earlier. Table 4shows that
the 13 accidental events that had human consequences are
not presented as typical cases. We can indeed note that a
great variety of failure types can directly or indirectly lead
Table 4. Classification equipment failures linked to accidental events with human consequences.
Speed of
occurrence of
the failure
Scale of the
failure
Speed of
occurrence and
scale of the failure
Causes of
the failures
Defective
function
Number of accidental
events involving
human consequences
Failure classification
Sudden Complete Catalectic Primary Primary 2
Sudden Complete Catalectic Secondary Primary 1
Sudden Partial n/a Primary Primary 1
Progressive Complete n/a Primary Primary 1
Accidental events directly linked to the failures: total 5
Sudden Complete Catalectic Primary Secondary 2
Sudden Complete Catalectic Secondary Primary 2
Unclassifiable Complete Unclassifiable Primary Unclassifiable 1
Sudden Complete Catalectic Unclassifiable Primary 1
Sudden Partial n/a Primary Secondary 1
Progressive Partial By deterioration Primary Primary 1
Accidental events indirectly linked to the failures: total 8
Accidental events involving human consequences: total 13
Figure 5. Proportion comparison of the events directly and indirectly linked to the failures based on the type of components.
Downloaded by [Universite du Quebec a Trois - Rivieres] at 10:46 10 February 2016
International Journal of Occupational Safety and Ergonomics (JOSE) 139
to accidental events that involve human consequences. The
only considerable element is that all the failures directly
linked to these accidents affected the primary function of
the faulty unit.
4.5. Correlation between accidental events related to
equipment failures and the types of faulty
components
Globally, the 272 events were in the majority caused by
mechanical components (65%), followed far by building
components (15%), by electrical components (10%), by
instrumentation and control components (8%), and finally
by infrastructure components (1%).
Amongst the mechanical components, the defective-
ness of pneumatic connectors was frequent, the majority
being related to the equipment used for the manual blow-
ing of papermaking machines with compressed air. As for
the building components, wall and ceiling covering fail-
ures were also quite common. The frequent detachment
of coverings is probably due to the aging and the poor
maintenance of the building. Regarding the electrical com-
ponents, the repetitive failures of forklift and pallet truck
batteries have directly caused many accidental events,
without necessarily involving human consequences. As for
the instrumentation and control components, sensors are
the parts that led the most to accidental events following
a failure.
Figure 5shows the different percentages for the 187
direct events and for the 85 indirect events. One can see
that the proportion of mechanical failures is greater for
the indirectly linked events (76.5% vs. 59.9%) and the
building-related failures are twice as important for the
directly linked events (18.2% vs. 9.4%). The instrumenta-
tion and control component failures are almost three times
higher for the directly linked events (9.6% vs. 3.5%).
It is important to note that only the mechanical com-
ponent failures and the building failures had human con-
sequences, for a combined total of 13 accidental events
with human consequences. The electrical, instrumentation
and control component failures are exclusively related to
events without any human consequences.
5. Discussion
The impact of equipment failures on accidental events in
the manufacturing industry, classification of failures and
their impact on the maintenance strategy are presented in
this section.
5.1. The impact of equipment failures on accidental
events in the manufacturing industry
In this case study, a little more than a third (35.2%) of the
accidental events show equipment failure in their chain of
causality. The percentage of the accidental events related to
equipment failure is therefore significant. In addition, it is
clearly more likely that a failure directly causes an acciden-
tal event (incident or accident), with 68.8% of the cases.
Equipment failures are hence an important causal factor
in the accidental event chain of causality, which fulfils the
initial objective of this study.
The analysis of the database also demonstrates that
nearly 18% (13 out of 73) of the accidental events that
involved human consequences were related to equipment
failures. By way of comparison, a study conducted in
France found that failure of guards or protective devices
on automated machines led to 15% of the accidents with
lesions.[19]
However, such comparisons are difficult to make in the
manufacturing industry. Although an important amount of
research regarding work accidents in manufacturing has
been carried out, studies concerning the effects of relia-
bility on worker safety are still rare and the impact of
equipment failure on safety is under-quantified. Further-
more, it should be emphasized that many manufacturing
companies operate complex processes that require a great
variety of equipment, similar to those we find in a pulp and
paper mill. This first assessment opens the door to a new
research topic that has not been explored much yet. Cor-
relations between equipment reliability in manufacturing
plants and worker safety within different industries’ sectors
need further analysis.
The detailed comparative study of the accidental events
directly linked or indirectly linked to equipment failures
also steers interesting observation. Indeed, the data show
that the accidental events indirectly linked to equipment
failures lead to human consequences in 9.4% of the cases,
in comparison to 2.7% for the directly linked ones. There-
fore, even though in most cases failures directly cause the
accidental events, the events indirectly caused by failures
are more likely to occasion injuries. Moreover, the serious-
ness of human consequences is globally more important
for the events indirectly linked to failures. This case study
clearly demonstrates that the indirect effects of equipment
failures have greater impact on workers’ safety than the
direct ones.
This can suggest amongst other things that the required
interventions following a failure could cause more acci-
dents with injuries than the failures themselves. While the
failures can be the direct cause of events that can some-
times have human consequences, the interventions applied
to the equipment further to failures also come with a con-
siderable level of risk. We can think of these failures as
generating bad equipment functioning, which promotes
unusual operational interventions or deviations which can
cause accidents. It is also largely admitted that corrective
maintenance interventions are more risky than preventive
maintenance.[27] Different approaches to reduce the risks
related to these interventions can be implemented, e.g., the
Downloaded by [Universite du Quebec a Trois - Rivieres] at 10:46 10 February 2016
140 D. Bourassa et al.
global improvement of equipment reliability through bet-
ter design or a good preventive maintenance program.[28]
By minimizing equipment breakages, we increase their
availability and reduce at the same time the odds of caus-
ing direct events and the necessity for post-failure inter-
ventions, hence reducing the chance of indirect events
occurring.
This statement is important and deconstructs the gen-
eral idea stating that serious accidents are generally directly
caused by brutal and spectacular failures. In the manufac-
turing industry, it would most likely be the most banal
failures that would cause accidents involving injuries with
their indirect effects. This should contribute to the promo-
tion of the improvement of reliability and preventive main-
tenance measures in the manufacturing sector, not only for
the benefits of these approaches in terms of productivity
but also for their impact on the workers’ safety.
5.2. Failure classification and impacts on the
maintenance strategy
Classifying the failures allowed a few interesting facts to
be highlighted. Not surprisingly, mechanical failures are
the most common with a proportion of 65%, followed by
building-related failures with a proportion of 15%. The
13 accidental events involving human consequences were
all caused by mechanical and building component fail-
ures. It is hence clear that these components should be
addressed as a priority due to the number of events that are
associated with them and the seriousness of their human
consequences.
The data analysis also shows that catalectic failures,
which are sudden and complete, are more common for both
direct and indirect events, and maybe more dominant for
direct cases. Catalectic failures hence present a high level
of risk since they involved a great number of accidental
events, of which 8 of the 13 had human consequences.
Catalectic failures are generally a random phenomenon.
Consequently, the prevention of these failures is possible
through a system of preventive maintenance, an improve-
ment regarding the identification of hidden failures, the use
of fail-safe systems and the analysis of the root causes of
repetitive failures.
While failures by deterioration (both progressive and
partial, Table 3) represent only 6.3% of the cases, pro-
gressive failures are the cause of 25.7% of accidental
events, of which two cases involved human consequences.
This observation challenges the adequacy of the preven-
tive maintenance strategy of this facility. Indeed, we can
think that many of these potential failures could have been
identified before the advent of the functional failure with
the use of an appropriate preventive approach since they
result in an evolution in time of the features of a produc-
tion unit. If it were the case, it would have been possible
to respond before the emergence of a complete failure. In
the field, the impact would be to increase the availability
of the equipment since it is mostly their primary func-
tions (90.1%) that are affected by these failures causing
accidental events. A complementary study of this aspect
could allow making specific recommendations regarding
preventive and predictive maintenance programs to this
company.
6. Conclusion
The achievement of a world-class status in occupational
health and safety is most definitely made possible through
preventive activities implemented by companies. Based
on Bird’s pyramid principle discussed earlier, the results
of this study suggest that improving equipment liability
would be a pertinent and beneficial preventive measure
for the manufacturing industry. The research obviously
warrants to be continued in order to deeply explore this
path. It would also be interesting to conduct a compara-
tive research of similar plants in the pulp and paper sector,
but that have different implementation levels regarding
liability and preventive maintenance approaches. A com-
parison with other manufacturing sectors could also allow
deepening the knowledge on the subject.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
References
[1] Bird FE, Germain GL. Damage control: a new horizon
in accident prevention and cost improvement. New York:
American Management Association; 1966.
[2] Sklet S. Methods for accident investigation. Trond-
heim: Norwegian University of Science and Technol-
ogy, Department of Production and Quality Engineering;
2002.
[3] Leveson NG. Applying systems thinking to analyze and
learn from events. Saf Sci. 2011;49:55–64.
[4] Moore R. Making common sense common practice: mod-
els for manufacturing excellence. 3rd ed. Burlington (MA):
Elsevier; 2004.
[5] Moubray J. Reliability-centered maintenance. 2nd ed. New
York: Industrial Press; 1997.
[6] Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Morbidity and
mortality weekly report: occupational aviation fatalities –
Alaska, 2000–2010. Atlanta (GA). 2011;60:837–840.
[7] Baker SP, Shanahan DF, Haaland W, et al. Helicopter
crashes related to oil and gas operations in the Gulf of
Mexico. Aviat Space Environ Med. 2011;82:885–889.
[8] Sovacool BK. Questioning the safety and reliability of
nuclear power: an assessment of nuclear incidents and
accidents. GAIA: Ecological Perspectives for Science &
Society. 2011;20:95–103.
[9] Antão P, Almeida T, Jacinto C, et al. Causes of occupa-
tional accidents in the fishing sector in Portugal. Saf Sci.
2008;46:885–899.
[10] Wang J, Pillay A, Kwon YS, et al. An analysis of fishing
vessel accidents. Accid Anal Prev. 2005;37:1019–1024.
[11] Kecojevic V, Radomsky M. The causes and control of
loader- and truck-related fatalities in surface mining oper-
ations. Int J Inj Contr Saf Promot. 2004;11:239–251.
Downloaded by [Universite du Quebec a Trois - Rivieres] at 10:46 10 February 2016
International Journal of Occupational Safety and Ergonomics (JOSE) 141
[12] Md-Nor Z, Kecojevic V, Komljenovic D, et al. Risk
assessment for loader- and dozer-related fatal incidents
in US mining. Int J Inj Contr Saf Promot. 2008;15:
65–75.
[13] Chang JI, Lin CC. A study of storage tank accidents. J Loss
Prev Process Ind. 2006;19:51–59.
[14] Uth HJ, Wiese N. Central collecting and evaluating of major
accidents and near-miss-events in the Federal Republic
of Germany – results, experiences, perspectives. J Hazard
Mater. 2004;111:139–145.
[15] Konstandinidou M, Nivolianitou Z, Kefalogianni E, et al.
In-depth analysis of the causal factors of incidents reported
in the Greek petrochemical industry. Reliab Eng Syst Safe.
2011;96:1448–1455.
[16] Vaidogas ER, Juoceviˇ
cius V. Sustainable development and
major industrial accidents: the beneficial role of risk-
oriented structural engineering. Technol Econ Dev Eco.
2008;14:612–627.
[17] Government of Canada. Indicators of Well-being in Canada
[Internet]. 2015. Available from: http://www4.hrsdc.gc.ca/
.3nd.3c.1t.4r@-eng.jsp?iid=20.
[18] Nenonen S. Fatal workplace accidents in outsourced oper-
ations in the manufacturing industry. Saf Sci. 2011;49:
1394–1403.
[19] Dei-Svaldi S, Charpentier P. Une étude des accidents
en automatisme à partir de la base de données EPICEA
[An accident study in process control using the EPICEA
database]. Nancy: Institut nationnal de recherche et de
sécurité; 2004. (INRS publication; no. 2216–196-04).
[20] D´zwiarek M. An analysis of accidents caused by improper
functioning of machine control systems. Int J Occup Saf
Ergon. 2004;10(2):129–136. doi:10.1080/10803548.2004.
11076601
[21] Myers J. Risk-based decision-making guidelines – volume
3. Washington, DC: US Department of Homeland Security,
US Coast Guard; 2010.
[22] Villemeur, A. Sûreté de fonctionnement des systèmes indus-
triels: fiabilité, facteurs humains, informatisation [Depend-
ability of industrial systems: reliability, human factors,
computerization]. Paris: Eyrolles; 1988.
[23] Association française de normalisation. Terminologie rela-
tive à la fiabilité – maintenabilité – disponibilité [Terminol-
ogy relating to reliability, maintainability and availability]
(AFNOR standard No. X 60–500). La Plaine Saint-Denis:
Association française de normalisation; 1988.
[24] Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Record-
ing and reporting occupational injuries and illness (OSHA
standard No. 1904). Washington, DC: US Department of
Labour, Occupational Safety and Health Administration;
2013.
[25] Chi SA, Han SB. Analyses of systems theory for construc-
tion accident prevention with specific reference to OSHA
accident reports. Int J Project Manage. 2013;31:1027–1041.
[26] Khanzodea VV, Maitib J. Occupational injury and acci-
dent research: a comprehensive review. Saf Sci. 2012;50:
1355–1367.
[27] Lind S. Types and sources of fatal and severe non-
fatal accidents in industrial maintenance. Int J Ind Ergon.
2008;38:927–933.
[28] Main B, Cloutier DR, Manuele FA, et al. Maintenance risk
assessment – survey report. Ann Arbour (MI): Design safety
engineering; 2002.
Downloaded by [Universite du Quebec a Trois - Rivieres] at 10:46 10 February 2016
... PPE can be identified as safety clothes, safety gloves, safety boots and, safety equipment. Labours do not use PPE due to discomfort and this results in areduction of workers' performance (Bourassa et al., 2016). ...
Conference Paper
Full-text available
Detection freshness quality of the selected two tuna varieties “Yellowfintuna – Kelawalla(S) (Thunusalbacares)” and “Frigate tuna- Alagoduwa (S) (Auxisthazard)” along the supply chain
... As a consequence, pipeline leakage is very likely to have an impact on the availability and productivity of the plants resulting in economic losses [6], health and safety hazards, and environmental damage [7,8]. Such factors highlight how it is necessary to improve the maintenance inspection capabilities by carrying out fluid leakage detection to ensure the reliability and safety of the equipment [9]. ...
Article
Full-text available
Industrial pipework maintenance inspection can be automated through machine vision-based effusion monitoring. However, colorless effusions such as water can be difficult to detect in a complex industrial environment due to weak illumination and poor visibility of the background. This paper deploys the reflective characteristics of effusion and its lower temperature compared to the environment in order to develop an automatic inspection system for power plant pipeworks’ maintenance. Such a system is aimed at detecting the colorless fluid effusion based on dual source images and a contour features algorithm. In this respect, a visible light source unit highlights the reflective features of the effusion edge. Meanwhile, high-definition images of the potential effusion are acquired under both visible and infrared lights. A customized image processing procedure extracts the potential effusion features from the infrared image to retrieve the region of interest for segmentation purposes and transfer such information to the visible light image to determine the effusion contour. Finally, a decision-making support tool based on the image contour closure is enabled for classification purposes. The implementation of the proposed system is tested on a real industrial environment. Experimental results show a classification accuracy up to 99%, demonstrating excellent suitability in meeting industrial requirements.
... Similarly, studying 700 accidents revealed that 7.7% of them were cause by malfunctioning equipment. The reported high number of accidental events due to equipment failure has a likelihood of causing accidents at workplaces [30]. The existing occupational accidents indicate lack of support that workers are receiving at the bricks manufacturing industry in the Polokwane municipality. ...
Article
Full-text available
Occupational hazards of any nature are a threat to the health and safety of any worker at the workplace. The employer and workers should ensure that the physical work environment is free from any hazard that could pose a threat to the health and safety of workers.
... On the one hand, public and private companies are exposed to dangerous incidents and risks crucial for their operations and development (Păunescu et al., 2018). On the other hand, Bourassa et al. (2016) study revealed that incidents in the industrial sector, construction of machinery, including operating methods, maintenance, and integrity, may be caused by various factors and lack of training. According to Păunescu et al. (2018), a malfunction of equipment occurs in 272 of the 773 cases, with 13 of them having immediate human consequences. ...
Article
Full-text available
Several studies found that critical asset failure results in delays and downtimes in operation for most industries. One of the studies revealed that 272 of the 773 occurrences involved a critical asset breakdown. Thus, this study aimed to discuss the relevant factors of implementing the Assurance Management System for the industry's selected critical asset. Literature reviews play a significant role in this research through a content analysis review process from different review articles, google scholar, journals, and other social sciences. The result revealed that increasing the organization's knowledge of the processes and asset criticality in the assurance management system offers a high degree of openness to the activities carried out to ensure continued asset reliability and integrity. Relatively, it shows a clear long-term progress pattern of improved equipment reliability, leading to a significant increase in consumer trust due to introducing a system of reliability assurance management. Indeed, the study recommended that implementing an assurance management system is an integral part of the critical asset as it offers trust that the asset will perform as anticipated. Finally, it is an aid in understanding the asset and its relationship between expected and actual performance and efficiency in using a structured approach of the Assurance Management System for Critical Asset, the AMSCAF Framework. Therefore, industry stakeholders should consider the recommendations and best practices to ensure critical asset management systems need to generate value that maintains a competitive advantage in today's highly complicated and challenging market competition through the Assurance Management System.
Article
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) aims to achieve higher operational and management efficiencies by bridging machinery, equipment, human resources, and all other actors involved in an industrial environment. This bridging enables data flow over an often complex and heterogeneous communication network. It enables timely decision-making, which affects various aspects of the organization such as business, operations, maintenance, safety, stock, and logistics. Despite the plethora of works in the domain of IIoT dealing with the above aspects, very few works deal with safety in industries. Industrial safety, especially whenever it is intertwined with the safety of humans, is a critical domain and holds much scope for improvement in the context of IIoT-based solutions for industrial safety management. Through this survey, we provide a comprehensive overview of the safety issues prevalent in the industries. Subsequently, we classify and provide an in-depth analysis of the safety aspects in various application areas of IIoT such as healthcare, transportation, manufacturing, and mining. Finally, we examine the research gaps in various domains and recommend future research directions. We discuss diverse forms of technologies, prototypes, systems, models, methods, and applications to ensure the safety of individuals and the risks associated with them. The primary aim of this work is to analyze and synthesize the existing researches and acknowledge the applicability of these research works towards safety management using IIoT.
Article
Engineering infrastructure incorporate complex systems, hazardous materials and often operated by human beings, making them prone to catastrophic accidents. Continuously improving system safety of the facilities and their operations requires a well-established asset management practices. The history of hazardous events in some domains such as process facilities suggest that many accidents have occurred due to ineffective maintenance planning strategies. Thus, to ensure an acceptable level of system safety and availability, it is essential to adopt optimal programs and practical procedures in maintenance planning engineering assets. The lessons learnt from previous accidents have helped operators, classification societies and regulators to develop viable standards and guidelines for employing quantitative methods in Operation and Maintenance (O&M) planning. The current work aims to present the existing attempts and identify the gaps, needs, and challenges of maintenance planning in engineering facilities. It then integrates the empirical and theoretical conclusions, highlighting the capabilities and drawbacks of the state-of-the-arts and explaining research opportunities and challenges. The decision-makers, operators, and managers in engineering infrastructure can exploit the present work from theoretical and practical perspectives.
Article
Objectives. The analysis of previous research shows that indicators of human factors have not been sufficiently integrated into the models for risk assessment of pressure equipment to date. Therefore, the goal of this article is the creation of a universal measurement scale to assess the current condition of the impacts of human factors on the risk of pressure equipment exploitation in factories and plants. Methods. A research instrument with nine constructs and 61 dimensions was designed and tested on a sample size of 268 companies, by reliability, exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. Results. The final model contains exact quantification of nine constructs described by 27 influencing human factors on risk associated with pressure equipment exploitation. Conclusions. The most influencing construct is 'communication', whereas the construct 'organizational change management' is the least influencing. Also, applying Pareto analysis shows that the most important constructs identified are 'communication', 'safety and health at work', 'potentially hazardous materials and equipment', 'maintenance/inspection', 'human error' and 'trainings and competences of employees for crisis situations'. It is a recommendation for the process industry enterprises, where pressure equipment is in operation, to include the obtained model in the risk assessment processes they are using.
Article
Purpose Nowadays, the Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) in Indonesia with the product’s need for halal certification is limited. The purpose of this paper is to measure the integrated framework of Halal Good Manufacturing Practices (HGMP) in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and to discover the effect of its performance in the food sector. Design/methodology/approach This research conducted focus group discussion in 2 locations with 8 experts and 73 SMEs in the food sector at 2 Indonesian Government agencies. Findings The study indicated 6 variables and 40 indicators on HGMP and its implementation in each agency. Two agencies in this research were categorized as poor, which indicated the need to increase the implementation of HGMP. For the SMEs’ business process policy, there were significantly different variables in the building, employee, storage and maintenance. Research limitations/implications The implementation of the HGMP is examined in this research based on government regulation. It has not been thoroughly tested based on consumer responses. Furthermore, it can consider consumer satisfaction in the halal framework of GMP. Practical implications Government agencies in Indonesia can measure the implementation of HGMP in food sector SMEs and guide SMEs to achieve halal quality standards. Originality/value This research provides an integrated framework for measuring HGMP in SMEs guided by the Indonesian Government’s agency in meeting the standard of halal products.
Article
Full-text available
Today, several industries in the region have adopted an innovative approach to critical asset assurance management implementation to maximize their performance at lower operating costs. This research attempt identifies related factors that influence the selected global industry's performance by implementing the critical asset assurance management system in the United Arab Emirates. By utilizing quantitative analysis, survey questionnaires were administered, and data were collected from 102 respondents from different industry practitioners. Results have been analyzed by descriptive, frequency, correlation, and regression using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS V21x64) and R-software software. The findings revealed that there is empirical evidence that most of the company has experienced a high level of implementation of the assurance management system within the organization. Furthermore, most of the employees have college degrees with more than 16 years of experience in the industry, which indicated that organizations were more likely to hire educated and well-experienced employees in the field. Relatively, more than half of the convincing reasons for an organization to improve its performance level contributed by the Implementation of Integrated Maintenance Management System (IMMS). Therefore, the higher the implementation of the Integrated Maintenance Management System within the organization, the higher the performance score. For a sustainable implementation of the assurance management system, it is recommended that organizations should adopt the structured approach found in this study as their guidance and best practices in the organization through the Assurance Management System for Critical Asset Framework (AMSCAF). Thus, hiring the right talent promoting competitive advantages is significant to organizational growth. Finally, top management commitment to enhancing the Asset Management Policy is required to successfully implement the Integrated Maintenance Management System that successfully improves organizational performance in compliance with regulation and international standards.
Article
Full-text available
Sustainable development can be restricted by major accidents which occur in hazardous industries. Almost every major accident may have negative influence on each of the three constituents of the sustainable development: social, environmental and economic part. A characteristic feature of the most of major accidents is severe damage to the structural systems built inside and outside of the industrial facility in which the accident happens. To avoid such accidents or at least to reduce their consequences, structural systems should be designed using a risk‐based approach. On the level of detailed structural design, a formal measure of risk should be introduced and applied to express the effectiveness of the structural solution in terms of accident mitigation and minimization of potential consequences. The structural design should involve the consideration of possible accident scenarios and positive or negative contribution of structures and structural failures to the escalation or de‐escalation of the accident. This can be done by applying the risk‐oriented structural design. A well‐established methodological framework for such a design is provided by the quantitative risk assessment. A consequent application of a risk‐based approach can be one of the risk management tools which will reduce the number of major accidents and thus their negative influence on sustainable development. Santrauka Darnus vystymasis gali būti stabdomas sunkių pramoninių avarijų, kurių kartkartėmis nutinka pavojingose pramonės įmonėse. Beveik kiekviena sunki avarija gali turėti neigiamą įtaką vienam iš trijų darnaus vystymosi komponentų: socialiniam, gamtiniam ir ekonominiam. Būdingas beveik kiekvienos sunkios avarijos bruožas yra rimti konstrukcijų, stovinčių tiek avariją patyrusioj gamykloj, tiek ir už jos, pažeidimai. Norint išvengti tokių avarijų ar bent mažinti jų pasekmes, konstrukcines sistemas reikia projektuoti taikant rizika grindžiamą požiūrį. Rengiant detalų projektą reikia naudoti matematinį rizikos matą, kuriuo galima išreikšti konstrukcinių sprendimų efektyvumą, užkertant avariją ar mažinant jos pasekmes. Projektavimas turėtų aprėpti galimų avarijos scenarijų analizę bei teigiamą ar neigiamą konstrukcijos įtaką potencialiam avarijos eskalavimui ar deeskalavimui. Tai galima atlikti pasitelkiant projektavimą, kuris yra orientuotas į riziką. Metodologinis tokio projektavimo pagrindas yra kiekybinis rizikos vertinimas. Sistemingas jo taikymas yra vienas iš rizikos valdymo būdų, leidžiančių sumažinti sunkių avarijų skaičių ir neigiamą jų įtaką darniajam vystymuisi. First published online: 21 Oct 2010 Reikšminiai žodžiai: darnusis vystymasis, pramoninė avarija, rizika, mechaninė pažaida, pasekmės, gaisras, sprogimas, susidūrimas
Article
Reliability-centered maintenance is a process used to determine - systematically and scientifically - what must be done to ensure that physical assets continue to do what their users want them to do. Widely recognized by maintenance professionals as the most cost-effective way to develop world-class maintenance strategies, RCM leads to rapid, sustained and substantial improvements in plant availability and reliability, product quality, safety and environmental integrity. The author and his associates have helped users apply RCM and its more modern derivative, RCM2, on more than 700 sites in 34 countries. These sites include all types of manufacturing (especially automobile, steel, paper, petrochemical, pharmaceutical, and food manufacturing), utilities (water, gas, and electricity), armed forces, building services, mining, telecommunications, and transport. This book summarizes this experience in the form of an authoritative and practical description of what RCM2 is and how it should be applied. This book will be of value to maintenance managers, and to anyone else concerned with the reliability, productivity, safety, and environmental integrity of physical assets. Its straightforward, plant-based approach makes the book especially well suited to use in centers of higher education.
Article
Several studies have indicated that outsourcing increases the risk of accidents and presented some explanations for this phenomenon. For example, higher accident proneness of external employees has been presented, but the common causes of accidents have not been reviewed in depth. This paper provides information about typical accidents, the contributing factors, and preventive measures of fatal occupational accidents that occurred in outsourced manufacturing tasks. This paper also compares whether these factors differ from accidents that occurred when tasks were performed in-house in the manufacturing industry. The focus is on operations executed in the factory area for or by an organization operating in the manufacturing business. The accident analysis is based on information gathered from accident reports for fatal workplace accidents that occurred in Finland during 1999–2008. At outsourced operations in manufacturing, accidents occur most commonly when installations or work preparations are being performed. According to the reports, dangerous work practices and insufficient hazard identification most frequently contributed to accidents. In order to prevent typical accidents, e.g., occupational instructional and guidance, hazard identification, work practices, supervision, and task planning should be improved. Statistical differences between outsourced and in-house operations were also found, mainly within the contributing factors. Therefore, the safety of outsourced manufacturing operations should be considered in detail in order to prevent accidents and ensure occupational safety also when operated with other performers.
Article
To enhance workplace safety in the construction industry it is important to understand interrelationships among safety risk factors associated with construction accidents. This study incorporates the systems theory into Heinrich's domino theory to explore the interrelationships of risks and break the chain of accident causation. Through both empirical and statistical analyses of 9358 accidents which occurred in the U.S. construction industry between 2002 and 2011, the study investigates relationships between accidents and injury elements (e.g., injury type, part of body, injury severity) and the nature of construction injuries by accident type. The study then discusses relationships between accidents and risks, including worker behavior, injury source, and environmental condition, and identifies key risk factors and risk combinations causing accidents. The research outcomes will assist safety managers to prioritize risks according to the likelihood of accident occurrence and injury characteristics, and pay more attention to balancing significant risk relationships to prevent accidents and achieve safer working environments.
Article
Nuclear power is reputed to be one of the safest and cleanest sources of modern electricity. Yet in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan, many have begun to question the role of nuclear power in future energy production. A hard look at nuclear power accidents and incidents over the past six decades finds that the historical record gives rise to legitimate concern over the future likelihood of major nuclear disasters.
Article
In this paper, a comprehensive review of the concepts of occupational injury and accident causation and prevention is presented. Starting with hazard identification, the issues on risk assessment, accident causation, and intervention strategies are discussed progressively. The distinctiveness and overlaps in accident and injury research are highlighted. Both empirical research in terms of hypotheses tested and theoretical research such as accident causation models are compared and contrasted. Finally, based on the critical appraisal of the comprehensive review, future research directions on occupational injury research are delineated.
Article
Due to the various work phases in disassembly and assembly, coupled with, for example, the pressure of time and working in close contact with machinery, industrial maintenance operations include several occupational risks. This article presents the results of an analysis based on real accident data. The data consisted of public Finnish accident reports describing fatal and severe non-fatal accidents in Finnish industry. The examination was limited to those accidents that involved full-time maintenance workers executing industrial maintenance operations. In the case of fatal accidents, the examination included the reports that were published during the years 1985–2004. The analysis of severe non-fatal accidents included the publication years 1994–2004. The accident types as well as their sources were examined in the light of Reason's theory on organizational accidents. During the reference periods, a total of 37 maintenance workers died in 33 accident cases. The respective number of victims among severe non-fatal accidents is 90. The findings indicate that the most typical accident types in both fatal and severe non-fatal accidents are crushing, falling, and accidents involving falling objects. The most frequently identified unsafe act leading to fatal accidents is dangerous working method (including conscious risk-taking), while the severe non-fatal accidents occur most often due to working at a running process. Within both types of accidents the most typical latent causes are defects in work instructions and machinery safety equipment. Based on the findings, the most essential roles in accident prevention are played by organizational factors, such as safety management and operations planning.
Article
This paper describes a study aimed at identifying the main organisational and systemic causes of accidents at work within the Fishing Sector. Recent statistics on accidents at work, produced by the Eurostat, clearly show that this economic activity is one of great concern, both in the whole European Union (EU-15) and in Portugal. Compared with other Sectors, the incidence rates are very high, particularly in the case of non-fatal accidents. Given the magnitude of the problem, this work was carried out with the aim of gaining a better understanding of the problem and identifying the most relevant causal factors. To this purpose, a sample of real accidents was investigated and analysed in situ, through field visits to the fishing vessels and interviews with the victims. The paper summarises the methodology used, and presents and discusses the relevant results and main findings. An effort is made to propose some corrective actions and strategies, which are discussed in the concluding section of the article. In summary, this study tries to give a contribution on how to build prevention policies based on factual and realistic information and data, rather than just official statistics and blind incidence rates.