No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the authors.
Ingenuity in Isolation: Poland in the International History of the Internet
Abstract
The popular understanding of the invention of the Internet is that it was the work of researchers in the United States working in relative isolation. However, the Internet is about connection, and so its success required the independently developed networks of the international community. By analyzing early network development in politically isolated Poland toward the end of the Cold War, one sees development concurrent to the development of the Internet but separated technologically through CoCom trade embargoes. By analyzing information technology periodicals, FidoNet newsletters, and other sources, a number of projects have been identified: data distribution over radio and the use of computer networks to protest communist propaganda. In addition to these amateur efforts, we learned about commercial products and academic research. While these efforts were not successful in a conventional sense, they do demonstrate how the computer industry and network research in Poland played an important role despite the political restrictions. © IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2014.
... Similar to the developments in the USSR and Hungary, the development of computing has already been reported for Poland, where academic research networks and a rich community of amateur computing enthusiasts grew in spite of CoCom restrictions [53]. ...
The well-known restrictions on exports of computing equipment to the USSR and its allies at the end of the cold war had a curious history. Although the legacy of CoCom is that it seems natural to restrict technology from potential belligerents, it is difficult to determine the policy’s efficacy. Started as a corollary to the plan to rebuild Europe after World War II, CoCom originally had nothing to do with computers. High-profile failures brought the usefulness of the economic blockade into question at the same time a new academic definition of technology became popular: technology is not just a material device, but it is also a means of getting something done. Computers were at the center of the quandary: does a device provide an inevitable strategic advantage, or is it the innovation culture that surrounds the device what needs protection? What is more, protecting the institutionalized knowledge from antagonists would require reducing the openness of the academic and scientific institutions that had provided innovation in the first place. When the personal computing revolution was underway, the computing embargo was at the forefront of CoCom, even though PCs had not been prominent at its inception. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the USSR, it might seem as if CoCom had been successful, yet contemporary critics and practitioners think otherwise. The determinism that underwrote CoCom then operated in reverse: policies granting access to computing networks were imagined to inevitably bring about cultural and political changes. The failure of CoCom to achieve a meaningful hindrance to technology and the unintended consequences of its implementation failed to make an impact in the political arena, but the lessons about technology transfer grained from the evaluation of the embargo deserve greater attention to guide policy today.
... Similar to the developments in the USSR and Hungary, the development of computing has already been reported for Poland, where academic research networks and a rich community of amateur computing enthusiasts grew in spite of CoCom restrictions [53]. ...
The well-known restrictions of exports of computing equipment to the USSR and its allies at the end of the cold war had a curious history. Although the legacy of CoCom is that it seems natural to restrict technology from potential belligerents, it is difficult to determine the policy's efficacy. Started as a corollary to the plan to rebuild Europe after World War II, CoCom originally had nothing to do with computers. High-profile failures brought the usefulness of the economic blockade into question at the same time a new academic definition of technology became popular: technology is not just a material device, but it is also a means of getting something done. Computers were at the center of the quandary: does a device provide an inevitable strategic advantage, or is it the innovation culture that surrounds the device what needs protection? What is more, protecting the institutionalized knowledge from antagonists would require reducing the openness of the academic and scientific institutions that had provided innovation in the first place. When the personal computing revolution was underway, the computing embargo was at the forefront of CoCom, even though PCs had not been prominent at its inception. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the USSR, it might seem as if CoCom had been successful, yet contemporary critics and practitioners think otherwise. The determinism that underwrote CoCom then operated in reverse: policies granting access to computing networks were imagined to inevitably bring about cultural and political changes. The failure of CoCom to achieve a meaningful hindrance to technology and the unin-tended consequences of its implementation failed to make an impact in the political arena, but the lessons about technology transfer grained from the evaluation of the embargo deserve greater attention to guide policy today.
A rich array of personal computers was developed in Eastern Europe during the later years of the Cold War. Because computer science would not be the same without personal computers, these devices deserve greater attention in the history of computing. The story in the West, the so-called PC revolution, started in the late 1970s: it was rooted in hobbyist and do-it-yourself clubs and brought the discipline closer to many people. A revolution took place also on the other side of the Iron Curtain: it happened a few years later, yet in a comparable way. Faced with an embargo that limited the availability of the first western PCs, Eastern Europe companies and hobbyists innovated on their own, providing the users with a number of home and personal computers. Today, the scenario of personal computing has completely changed; however, the computers of the 1980s are still objects of fascination for a number of retrocomputing fans who still enjoy using, programming and hacking the old 8-bits. Yesterday’s hobbyists have become today’s retrocomputing enthusiasts: they provide an important window into these Eastern Europe PCs, which otherwise would have been forgotten.
This article is an attempt to analyse the most important phenomena in two decades, from the viewpoint of the development of the media market. First decade (1989-1999) is the period in which only the “old media” was used (to a small extent - the "new"); in the second period (first decade of the XXI century) the development of new technologies has accelerated, and the growth of the Internet began to determine most of the changes occurring in this period. These changes were in the areas of media system, communication, culture and new social habits. In this terms, the real growth came with the development of broadband Internet connections at the end of XX century. But for some reasons its dissemination was not as dynamic as in many other European countries.
Niniejszy artykuł jest próbą konfrontacji najważniejszych z punktu widzenia rozwoju rynku polskich mediów po 1989 roku zjawisk, związanych z rozwojem Internetu. Analiza obejmuje dwie dekady. Pierwsza obejmuje lata 1989-1999, czyli okres użytkowania głownie „starych mediów” (w niewielkim stopniu mediów "nowych"); druga (pierwsza dekada XXI wieku) dotyczy dynamicznego rozwoju nowych technologii i samego Internetu, który zaczął określać większość zachodzących wówczas zmian, przede wszystkim w obszarze systemu mediów, komunikacji, kultury oraz nowych zachowań społecznych. W tym ujęciu, realny przełom nadszedł wraz z upowszechnieniem się szerokopasmowych łączy internetowych, choć, z kilku wskazanych w tekście powodów, rozwój sieci nie był tak dynamiczny, jak mogliśmy to obserwować w innych krajach europejskich.
One way to make the history of computing relevant is to explain how different histories are in competition with each other and how they support quite different technology policy. The prevalent history that the US military created the Internet hides the international spirit of goodwill and cooperation that made a particular implementation of Internet happen. This is not just an academic issue. The success of the Internet encourages us to ask how we can continue to innovate the technologies of the Internet or new technologies of a similar power. The myth that the military created the Internet also supports the idea that it was designed on purpose according to a plan. This could not be further from the truth. In fact, the most interesting thing about the Internet is that, in its history, it had a tendency to violate the plans set forth. The international community invigorated the kind of inquiry that would lead to the Internet, not the United States in isolation. In order to create something like the Internet, then, we need to provide an environment for international exchange and cooperation, not maintain proprietary secrets and work in a disciplined environment of practical research.
It seems to be a generally accepted belief that the adoption rate of the Internet has exceeded that of earlier mass communication technologies by several magnitudes. This article reviews the historic data related to some of these technologies, draws on actor-network theory as a framework for interpreting such data, traces the transformations and translation of this data throughout the public, political, and scientific discourse, and discusses the use of "facts" in modern society.
One way to make the history of computing relevant is to explain how different histories are in competition with each other and how they support quite different technology policy. The prevalent history that the US military created the Internet hides the international spirit of goodwill and cooperation that made a particular implementation of Internet happen. This is not just an academic issue. The success of the Internet encourages us to ask how can we continue to innovate the technologies of the Internet or new technologies of a similar power. The myth that the military created the Internet also supports the idea that it was designed on purpose according to a plan. This could not be further from the truth. In fact, the most interesting thing about the Internet is that, in its history, it had a tendency to violate the plans set forth. The international community invigorated the kind of inquiry that would lead to the Internet, not the United States in isolation. In order to create something like the Internet, then, we need to provide an environment for international exchange and cooperation, not maintain proprietary secrets and work in a disciplined environment of practical research.
Who are scientists? What kind of people are they? What capacities and virtues are thought to stand behind their considerable authority? They are experts—indeed, highly respected experts—authorized to describe and interpret the natural world and widely trusted to help transform knowledge into power and profit. But are they morally different from other people? The Scientific Life is historian Steven Shapin’s story about who scientists are, who we think they are, and why our sensibilities about such things matter. Conventional wisdom has long held that scientists are neither better nor worse than anyone else, that personal virtue does not necessarily accompany technical expertise, and that scientific practice is profoundly impersonal. Shapin, however, here shows how the uncertainties attending scientific research make the virtues of individual researchers intrinsic to scientific work. From the early twentieth-century origins of corporate research laboratories to the high-flying scientific entrepreneurship of the present, Shapin argues that the radical uncertainties of much contemporary science have made personal virtues more central to its practice than ever before, and he also reveals how radically novel aspects of late modern science have unexpectedly deep historical roots. His elegantly conceived history of the scientific career and character ultimately encourages us to reconsider the very nature of the technical and moral worlds in which we now live. Building on the insights of Shapin’s last three influential books, featuring an utterly fascinating cast of characters, and brimming with bold and original claims, The Scientific Life is essential reading for anyone wanting to reflect on late modern American culture and how it has been shaped.
The USA persuaded its European allies under the terms of the Marshall Plan to agree to embargo exports to the Soviet bloc in 1947 and to the PRC when it was established in 1949. This ban took the form of an East/West trade war and literally banned the export of everything from needles to anchors. As the West invented new technology such as coaxial telephone cable or scientific instruments, these were embargoed, although the Soviets were able to develop their own versions of those products. The Americans were early developers of the electronic computer, supported greatly by extensive sales to the military. The British looked to sell their computers in external markets, including the Soviet bloc and China. The Americans objected, but their officials did not wish to alienate the British from continuing to support the East/West trade embargo and allowed a small number to be sold. US support for such sales was important because the British machines contained some essential US equipment. The Wilson government sought to expand the development and export of British high technology, including computers. This article highlights the tension between Britain and the USA, particularly under the Nixon administration, over how the British computer firms struggled to obtain sales in the communist countries.
From the Publisher:The Internet is the most remarkable achievement of humankind since the pyramids. A millennium from now, historians will look back at it and marvel that a people equipped with such clumsy tools succeeded in creating such a leviathan. Yet even as the Net pervades our lives, we begin to take it for granted. Many have lost the capacity for wonder. Most of us have no idea where the Internet came from, how it works, or who created it and why. And even fewer have any idea what it means for society and the future. John Naughton has written a warm and passionate book whose heroes are the visionaries who laid the foundations of the postmodern world. A Brief History of the Future celebrates the engineers and scientists who implemented their dreams in hardware and software and explains the values and ideas that drove them. Although its subject seems technical, the book in fact is a highly personal account. John Naughton writes about the Net the way Nick Hornby writes about soccer -- as a part of life, and as a key influence on his own voyage from solitary child to established academic and writer. A Brief History of the Future is an intimate celebration of vision and altruism, ingenuity and determination, and above all of the power of ideas to transform the world.
From the Publisher:Millions tuned into the Internet to access the Starr Report. Now Nerds 2.0.1, the first detailed history of computer networking, tells the dramatic story of how we have come to be wired together by the Internet and the World Wide Web.
Stephen Segaller's timely book draws on detailed interviews with more than seventy of the pioneers who have user their technological genius and business skills to make incompatible systems work together, to make networking user-friendly, and to create a new global communications medium that rivals the telephone system or television in its scope and reach.
This article portrays the first decade of Internet connectivity in Israel. It focuses on the technology of the Internet, i.e. on the cables and wires that carry the Internet around the world, and on the bureaucratic processes that are called into play as the Internet reaches a new country. While the Internet appears to be a supranational technology, its institutionalization in Israel – and indeed throughout the world – can be seen to have been heavily dependent on state-level machinations, thereby inviting a somewhat more Westphalian approach than might be considered appropriate when dealing with such a global phenomenon as the Internet.
Information technology spread around the world faster than most other technologies in recent centuries. A combination of eight approaches made this happen, each occurring simultaneously in varying degrees between the 1950s and the present.
1972 was an exciting year in computer networking. The ARPANET, which came to life near the end of 1969, had grown to 29 nodes by August 1972. The National Physical Laboratory in England, under the direction of Donald Davies, had been running a 1-node packet switch interconnecting several NPL computers for several years. In July 1972, three people associ ated with the ARPANET work at BBN formed a new company, Packet Communications, to engage in the business of providing communication services for computer to terminal, computer to computer, and terminal to terminal information transfer.
IBM and Polish Universities Create Computer-Network
- Richard Budd
Budd, Richard. "IBM and Polish Universities Create Computer-Network." (11 June 1991).
Poland Moves Toward Leading Role In Computerization of Eastern Europe
- L Hooper
Hooper, Lawrence. "Poland Moves Toward Leading Role In Computerization of Eastern Europe." Wall Street Journal: A7H. (2 December 1991)
One Year of EARN Networking in Poland
- A Smereczynski
Smereczynski, Andrzej. One Year of EARN Networking in Poland. Pigulki 6. Accessed 19
March 2014 from http://ftp.icm.edu.pl/packages/pigulki/pigulki6.pub (5 June 1991)
Allies Curb Computers for Soviet
- P Lewis
Lewis, Paul. "Allies Curb Computers for Soviet." New York Times, Late Edition (East
Coast): D7. (17 July 1984)
Das Internet in Deutschland -Ein alter Hut
- Claus Kalle
Kalle, Claus. "Das Internet in Deutschland -Ein alter Hut?" Kompass 64 (18 July). Accessed
online from http://mikro-berlin.org/Events/OS/ref-texte/kalle/0InetinDland.html on 5 January
2014. (1995)
Abakus zum Internet: Die Geschicte der Informatik
- F Naumann
- F.. Naumann
Naumann, Friedrich. Vom Abakus zum Internet: Die Geschicte der Informatik. Darmstadt:
Primus Verlag. (2001)
Perspektywy Rozwoju Sieci POL-34/155
- A Binczewski
- C Mazurek
- N Meyer
- S Niwinski
- M Stroinski
Binczewski, A., Mazurek, C., Meyer, N., Niwinski, S., & Stroinski, M. Perspektywy Rozwoju
Sieci POL-34/155. Sieci Komputerowe w Badaniach Naukowych. (n.d.)
Academic Networks in Central and Eastern
- T Hofmokl
Hofmokl, Tomasz. "Academic Networks in Central and Eastern Europe." Accessed 5 April
2009 from http://www.ceenet.org/ceenet_cbyc_anicaee.html (2008)
Polish Bitnet: How It All Started
- Jacek Gajewski
Gajewski, Jacek. "Polish Bitnet: How It All Started." Pigulki 6 (June 5). Accessed 19 March
2014 from http://ftp.icm.edu.pl/packages/pigulki/pigulki6.pub (1991)
IFNA Welcomes Poland to FidoNet
- D Daniels
Daniels, Don. IFNA Welcomes Poland to FidoNet. FidoNews: International FidoNet Association Newsletter, 4.34. (1987)
Dziesieciolecie Dzialalnosci Wroclawskiego Centrum Sieciowo-Superkomputerowego
- J Janyszek
- J.. Janyszek
Janyszek, Jozef. Dziesieciolecie Dzialalnosci Wroclawskiego Centrum Sieciowo-Superkomputerowego 1995-2005. Wroclaw: WCSS. (2005)
In Moscow and Warsaw, Official and Unofficial Press Playing New Roles; Solidarity Weekly Evolves in Scope, Sophistication
- J Diehl
Protokoly w Miedzyuczelnianej Sieci Komputerowj. Wroclaw, Wydawnictwo Politechniki Wroclawskiej
- Eugeniusz Bilski
Bilski, Eugeniusz. Protokoly w Miedzyuczelnianej Sieci Komputerowj. Wroclaw, Wydawnictwo Politechniki Wroclawskiej. (1987)
Protokoly w Miedzyuczelnianej Sieci Komputerowj
- E Bilski
- E.. Bilski