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God and natural order: Physics, philosophy, and theology
Abstract
In God and Natural Order: Physics, Philosophy, and Theology, Shaun Henson brings a theological approach to bear on contemporary scientific and philosophical debates on the ordered or disordered nature of the universe. Henson engages arguments for a unified theory of the laws of nature, a concept with monotheistic metaphysical and theological leanings, alongside the pluralistic viewpoints set out by Nancy Cartwright and other philosophers of science, who contend that the nature of physical reality is intrinsically complex and irreducible to a single unifying theory. Drawing on the work of theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg and his conception of the Trinitarian Christian god, the author argues that a theological line of inquiry can provide a useful framework for examining controversies in physics and the philosophy of science. God and Natural Order will raise provocative questions for theologians, Pannenberg scholars, and researchers working in the intersection of science and religion.
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We will briefly review the historical and intellectual background needed to situate Kepler's work in his time; we will then argue that Kepler's first book cannot be understood without acknowledging its religious dimensions and go on to show that similar issues underlie Kepler's demonstration that the orbit of the planet Mars is an ellipse.
Revolutionary developments in both science and theology are moving the relation between the two far beyond the nineteenth-century “warfare” model. Both scientists and theologians are engaged in a common search for shared understanding. Eight models of interaction are outlined: scientism, scientific imperialism, ecclesiastical authoritarianism, scientific creationism, the two-language theory, hypothetical consonance, ethical overlap, and New Age spirituality. Developments in hypothetical consonance are explored in the work of various scholars, including Ian Barbour, Philip Clayton, Paul Davies, Willem Drees, Langdon Gilkey, Philip Hefner, Nancey Murphy, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Arthur Peacocke, John Polkinghorne, Robert John Russell, Thomas Torrence and Wenzel van Huyssteen.
Through close readings of a number of classic texts, this book develops the thesis that classic Christian theology is thoroughly shaped by pastoral and moral purposes. The book's aim is to show contemporary theologians how to teach the faith in a morally constructive fashion, transcending the current destructive opposition between 'academic' and 'pastoral' theology.
In attempting to clarify the problem of personality integration the writer gained the impression that the difficulty of such a task does does not lie alone in the paucity of usable factual data but it is due, even to a greater extent, to the inadequacy of our logical tools. Such a handicap is felt not only in the study of personality, but in the study of wholes in general. Here the attempt will be made to develop some concepts which may be useful for the understanding of the structure of wholes.
This article explores the state of the art in theories of special divine action by means of a study of the Divine Action Project (DAP) co-sponsored by the Vatican Observatory and the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences in Berkeley. The basic aim is to introduce the DAP and to summarize its results, especially as these were compiled in the final “capstone” meeting of the DAP, and drawing on the published output of the project where possible. The subsidiary aim is to evaluate criticisms of theories of special divine action developed within the DAP.
Defining physics as inclusive of the whole of the physical world and metaphysics as a total worldview, physics provides constraints on metaphysics such as economy, scope, elegance or simplicity, and fruitfulness. Metaphysics itself needs to review its own fundamental assumptions and address six issues: (1) the intelligible order of the universe; (2) fruitful cosmic history; (3) a relational universe; (4) true becoming; (5) consciousness and value; and (6) the eventual futility of the physical universe. A "thick" Trinitarian belief meets the metaphysical challenge by providing a satisfying degree of consonance with natural science.
Nancy Cartwright discusses the concept of scientific law and makes some illuminating points concerning laws as true descriptions of what is observed in nature and scientific laws that are used to explain what occurs in nature. The two concepts do not always coincide. She thinks that the identity of truth with explanation is fostered by the D-N Model of explanation. We argue that Cartwright misrepresents the nature of the D-N Model and that Hempel’s treatment of scientific explanation can accommodate Cartwright’s criticisms.
The recent debates concerning divine action in the context of quantum mechanics are examined with particular reference to the work of William Pollard, Robert J. Russell, Thomas Tracy, Nancey Murphy, and Keith Ward. The concept of a quantum mechanical “event” is elucidated and shown to be at the center of this debate. An attempt is made to clarify the claims made by the protagonists of quantum mechanical divine action by considering the measurement process of quantum mechanics in detail. Four possibilities for divine influence on quantum mechanics are identified and the theological and scientific implications of each discussed. The conclusion reached is that quantum mechanics is not easily reconciled with the doctrine of divine action.
According to Nancy Cartwright, a causal law holds just when a certain probabilistic condition obtains in all test situations which in turn satisfy a set of background conditions. These background conditions are shown to be inconsistent and, on separate account, logically incoherent. I offer a corrective reformulation which also incorporates a strategy for problems like Hesslow's thrombosis case. I also show that Cartwright's recent argument for modifying the condition to appeal to singular causes fails.Proposed modifications of the theory's probabilistic condition to handle effects with extreme probabilities (0 or 1) are found unsatisfactory. I propose a unified solution which also handles extreme causes. Undefined conditional probabilities give rise to three good, but non-equivalent, ways of formulating the theory. Various formulations appear in the literature. I give arguments to eliminate all but one candidate. Finally, I argue for a crucial new condition clause, and show how to extend the results beyond a simple probabilistic framework.
“Critical realism” is one of the most important positions in the current science and theology debate. An analysis of its origin and meaning leads to the question if this position mostly propagated by physicist-theologians could miss an intrinsic feature of the personal dimension of reality. A deeper meaning of the personal dimension sets human science apart. Taking into account social science's insight that persons responsible for their conclusions and actions drive the process of science, the moral dimension of science has to be emphasized. To integrate these aspects into a coherent position, a more differentiated epistemological model is needed. The solution proposed in this paper is to modify critical realism to constructive-critical realism. Theologically interpreted, constructive-critical realism remembers humankind's purpose to shape nature in cooperation with God and with the means of culture toward increasing realization of freedom in relationship. The argument is widely influenced by an analysis of the works of John Polkinghorne.
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The enterprise that I am undertaking in this article has been severely discouraged by contemporary philosophers. They do not deny that the imagination can produce new ideas which help the pursuit of science or that our personal hunches and intuitions are often to the point. But since our imagination can roam unhindered by argument and our intuitions cannot be accounted for, neither imagination nor intuition is deemed a rational way of making discoveries. They are excluded from the logic of scientific discovery, which can deal then only with the verification or refutation of ideas after they have turned up as possible contributions to science.