Stability and malleability in the self-concept in the perception of others

Abstract

The self-concept literature is characterized by a continuing controversy over whether the self-concept is stable or malleable. In this article we suggest that it is both but that the stability observed for general descriptions of the self may mask significant local variation. In this study the social environment was varied by creating a situation in which subjects found themselves to be either very unique or very similar to others. Following this manipulation, subjects responded to a series of self-concept measures. Although the uniqueness and similarity subjects did not differ in the trait terms they used to describe themselves, they did differ systematically in their latency for these judgments, in positivity and negativity of their word associations, and in their judgments of similarity to reference groups. These findings imply that subjects made to feel unique recruited conceptions of themselves as similar to others, whereas subjects made to feel similar to others recruited conceptions of themselves as unique. The results suggest that very general self-descriptive measures are inadequate for revealing how the individual adjusts and calibrates the self-concept in response to challenges from the social environment.

Full text

Journal
of
Personality
and
Social
Psychology
1986.
Vol.
51,
No.
4,858-866
Copyright
1986
by the
American
Psychological Association, Inc.
0022-3514/86/S00.75
Stability
and
Malleability
of the
Self-Concept
Hazel
Markus
University
of
Michigan
Ziva
Kunda
Princeton University
The
self-concept
literature
is
characterized
by a
continuing
controversy
over
whether
the
self-concept
is
stable
or
malleable.
In
this
article
we
suggest
that
it
is
both
but
that
the
stability
observed
for
general
descriptions
of
the
self
may
mask
significant
local
variation.
In
this
study
the
social
environment
was
varied
by
creating
a
situation
in
which
subjects
found
themselves
to be
either
very
unique
or
very
similar
to
others.
Following
this
manipulation,
subjects
responded
to a
series
of
self-concept
mea-
sures.
Although
the
uniqueness
and
similarity
subjects
did not
differ
in the
trait
terms
they
used
to
describe
themselves,
they
did
differ
systematically
in
their
latency
for
these
judgments,
in
positivity
and
negativity
of
their
word
associations,
and in
their
judgments
of
similarity
to
reference
groups.
These
findings
imply
that
subjects
made
to
feel
unique
recruited
conceptions
of
themselves
as
similar
to
others,
whereas
subjects
made
to
feel
similar
to
others
recruited
conceptions
of
themselves
as
unique.
The
results
suggest
that
very
general
self-descriptive
measures
are
inadequate
for
revealing
how
the
individual
adjusts
and
calibrates
the
self-concept
in response to
challenges
from
the
social
environment.
Two
seemingly
contradictory aspects
of the
self
have
been
emphasized
in the
empirical self-concept literature.
The
self
has
been regarded
as a
stable
and
enduring structure that pro-
tects itself against change (e.g.,
Greenwald,
1980; Markus,
1977;
Mortimer
&
Lorence,
1981;
Swann
&
Read,
1981).
Yet,
it is
also acknowledged that
in
different
social environments
different
selves appear
to
emerge. People
vary
from
one
time
to
another
in
their
self-relevant
thoughts,
feelings,
and
behavior
(e.g.,
Gergen,
1967b;
Savin-Williams
&
Demo, 1983).
One's
feelings
about
the
self
when
talking
to the
boss
are
different
from
those
one has
when
talking
to a
subordinate,
and
one's
feelings
about
the
self
when
being asked
for a
date
are
different
from
those
one has
when being stood
up
for
one.
The
defense
of
an
unpopular
view
engenders
a
very
different
set of
self-relevant
thoughts
than
those
engendered
by a
reluctant decision
to go
along with
the
group.
Most
comprehensive theories
of the
self
have
recognized
these
two
apparently contradictory aspects
of the
self.
Thus
Rogers
(1951)
described
the
self-concept
as
organized
and
con-
sistent
but
also
as
fluid.
Similarly, Turner
(1956)
characterized
the
self
as a
"stable
set
of
evaluative
standards"
but
also
as
quite
variable—"the
picture
the
person
has of
himself
or
herself
at
any
given
moment"
(p.
231).
In
this
article,
we
seek
to
examine
the
means
by
which
the
self-concept
may
remain relatively stable
yet
still
vary
with
the
social environment.
The
Stable
Self-Concept
The
dual nature
of the
self-concept, that
is, its
stability
and
malleability,
has
rarely been
the
focus
of
empirical work. Most
The
research
reported
here
was
supported
by
National
Institute
of
Mental
Health
grant
MH29753.
We
would
like
to
thank
Nancy
Cantor,
Richard
Nisbett,
R.
B.
Zajonc,
and an
anonymous
reviewer
for
valuable
comments
on an
earlier
version
of
this
article.
Correspondence
concerning
this
article
should
be
addressed
to
Hazel
Markus,
Institute
for
Social
Research,
University
of
Michigan,
Ann Ar-
bor,
Michigan
48106.
laboratory research has,
in
fact,
stressed only
one
aspect—sta-
bility.
The
most pervasive
and
least ambiguous
finding
to
emerge
from
the
recent surge
of
research
on the
self-concept
is
that individuals seek
out
consistency
and
stability
and
actively
resist
any
information that challenges their prevailing view
of
themselves.
Swann
and his
colleagues (Swann,
1985;
Swann
&
Hill,
1982;
Swann
&
Read,
1981)
found,
for
example, that per-
ceivers
will
go to
great lengths
to
verify
their self-conceptions
by
attending most closely
to
information that
fits
their
view
of
the
self
and by
trying
to
arrange their
environments
so as to
acquire
further
self-confirming
evidence. Other studies reveal
that
individuals appear
to
ignore
or
reject
those
accounts
of
their behavior that
differ
from
their
own
(e.g., Greenwald,
1980;
Greenwald
&
Pratkanis,
1984;
Markus,
1977;
Wurf
&
Markus,
1983;
lesser
&
Campbell, 1983; Rosenberg, 1979). Together,
these
findings
suggest that
the
self-concept
is
anything
but
mal-
leable
and
mutable.
On the
contrary, they imply
a
stable
sense
of
self
that
is
quite unresponsive
to
variations
in the
social situa-
tion
and
one
that
individuals
are
determined
to
preserve.
The
Malleable
Self-Concept
The
dynamic
and
malleable properties
of
the
self-concept
are
thought
to
derive primarily
from
its
essentially social nature.
In
referring
to the
variable nature
of the
self,
James wrote that
the
individual
has "as
many
different
social selves
as
there
are
distinct groups
of
persons about whose opinion
he
cares"
(James,
1910,
p.
294). Although psychologists
have
extensively
analyzed
self-presentation (Jones
&
Pittman,
1982)
and
impres-
sion management
(Schlenker,
1980)
and
variation
in
self-
esteem (Jones,
Rhodewalt,
Berglas,
&
Skelton,
1981;
Morse
&
Gergen,
1970),
there
are
only
a few
(cf. Fazio,
Effrein,
&
Fal-
lender,
1981;
McGuire
&
McGuire,
1982)
who
have
empirically
broached
the
social malleability
of the
self-concept.
Instead,
re-
search
on the
social nature
of the
self
has
been primarily con-
cerned
with
the
process
of
reflected
appraisal
and
with
the
con-
ditions under which there
is a
correspondence between
how
858
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