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Between legitimacy and illegality: Informal coal mining at the limits of justice

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SPECIAL ARTICLE
Economi c & Politic al Weekly december 8, 2007 57
Illegal Coal Mining in Eastern India:
Rethinking Legitimacy and Limits of Justice
Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt
Comm only pr esente d as ari sing fr om poo r polic ing
and corruption, and as destroying the environmental
commons, “illegal” production and marketing of coal
is a significant aspect of everyday life in eastern India.
Representations of illegalit y hide unpleasant social
realities of the coal mining tracts: poor environmental
performance of the state-owned mining sector, social
disruption and displacement of communities, and a
general decay in the traditional subsistence base. This
pap er work s thro ugh the comple x layer s of mini ng laws
and investigates whether the laws protect the interests
of the disadvantaged. It offers a rethinking of what
causes and constitutes illegality when a large number of
peo ple’s li velihoods depend on this kind of mining .
Illegal mining usually makes sensational news in popular
media. News of such mining represents a mix of human-
interest stories peppered with (often serious) environmental
concerns, shady businesses outside the boundaries of law-making
huge profits, and in general, paints a frightful future. Media tell
us of those coal “thieves” whose relatives fear to claim the dead
bodies of their loved ones who have died in roof collapses, of local
politicians preventing the police from enquiring into the cave-
ins, of the mafia involvement and the complicity of company or
government officials in dishonest dealings in coal, of the threat to
the environment from these mines, and the imminent dangers,
risks and hazards to our roads and rail tracks that these mines
are posing. The accidents, in particular, make excellent stories;
and often make it to the front page, especially, if there are large
numbers of dead or if the security of our comfortable middle class
lives seems to be t hreatene d.
Unintended Collieries
Illegal mining indeed is a reality of life in the coal-bearing tract
stretching from Raniganj in West Bengal westward to Dhanbad-
Ranchi-Hazaribagh where the collieries extend into Jharia and
North Karanpura areas in Jharkhand. Three subsidiary compa-
nies1 of Coal India (CIL), with different histories and problems
are responsible for the mining operations. Illegal mines are found
in the older mining areas of Raniganj-Asansol-Dhanbad with
more working or abandoned underground mines; it has also ex-
panded rapidly around the large open cut coal mines that have
come up in the last decade or so in to the Ranchi-Hazaribagh
area. This paper deals with only eastern India, but informed
obser vers say that such mining is common throughout the coal
tracts of India. We may call them the “unintended” collieries
the extension of the informal practices, which, according to
Harriss-White comprise 88 per cent of India’s economy, into
India’s coal mining sector.2
Once a furtive activity like the rice-traders in Calcutta’s sub-
urban trains in 1960s, the illegal coal mining now openly in habits
the public space. It is now impossible to drive along any length of
the highway from Raniganj region to Ranchi or Hazaribagh
towns without encountering evidence of illegal mining in the
myriad ant-like processions of ragtag men – “the cyclewallahs” –
pushing bicycles laden with sacks of coal weighing over 150 kg.
To query the scale of unintended collieries, I jointly undertook
a field survey of the small-scale distribution of illegal coal in east-
ern India [Lahiri-Dutt and Williams 2005]. The cyclewallahs of-
ten cover up to 20-25 km in a day of work and their numbers may
well be 2,000 or mo re on a n a verage day on t he road s around the
I thank a number of people who provided me wit h data, insights and an-
swers to dif ficult questions. The late Sunil Basu Roy of CITU and Harad-
han Roy of Colliery Majdoor Sabha India (CMSI); Ton y Herb ert of P rer ana
Re sourc e Ce ntre, Haz ari bagh; Bina Sta nis of C hho tan agp ur Adi vas i Seb a
Samiti, Hazaribagh; Bulu Imam of Sanskriti, Hazaribagh; and Xavier
Dias of BIRSA deserve many thanks. Thanks particularly to Joydeb Ban-
nerjee for his local insights and to David Williams for accompanying me
to some difficult locations, to Colin Filer and A J Gunson for their critical
readin g of va riou s dra fts , and to N itin Gupta for h is re searc h assis tanc e.
Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt (kuntala.lahiri-dutt@anu.edu.au) is at the Research
Sc hool o f Pac ific a nd As ian S tudi es, A ustr ali an Nat iona l Unive rsit y.
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december 8, 2007 Economi c & Politic al Weekly
58
edge of the coalfields between Ranchi and Hazaribagh. The
survey found that about 2.5 million tonnes of coal was transpor ted
by cycles in 2003-04. This amount is equivalent to the production
of a reasonably large colliery. Yet, this coal is just the tip of the ice-
berg; add to this marketing and distribution by the trucks all over
the coal-bearing tracts of India, each one of which can carry up to
70 cycles weight of coal, and one can assess the immense size of
the black economy. A veteran from the coal industry felt that
around 70-80 million tonnes of coal is produced in India annually
in addition to the official production figure of about 350 million
tones.3 This illegal coal – black, invisible and underground in eve-
ry sense of these terms – forms a part of an economy that has in-
tricate networks and complex linkages going deep into every as-
pect of life in the coal producing regions of India.
These unintended collieries pose a challenge to our under-
standing of the social changes engulfing coal mining (and proba-
bly all mineral-bearing) tracts. These mineralised lands since
economic reforms have seen a flurry of activities as a result of the
enormous demand for energy, minerals and industrial or build-
ing materials. Local people have often been unable to take full
advantage of the new economy, whereas the environmental or-
ganisations have risen in unqualified critique of all kinds of min-
ing, even calling for a “moratorium” on all of mining [see Vagho-
likar et al 2003]. In my view, the causes are buried under layers
of complexities of outdated colonial laws of land acquisition and
state-ownership of coal resources, lack of safeguards and protec-
tion of poor people, despicable social and environmental practi-
ces by formal mines, the disregard for social impacts by mining
engineers and technologists, a continuity of licence ‘raj’ in CIL,
and the overall trend informalisation of the economy. Illegal coal
mines are an expression, locally, of unjust national mineral laws
that fail to ask simple questions such as “who owns the mineral
resources, since when and why”, “who controls their use”, and
“who is looting and under what circumstances”?. They also speak
volumes about the performance of CIL as a mining company t hat
represents the state and its interests. Above all, such collieries
and the cycle-borne delivery also reflect several inescapable glo-
ba l trends – in minin g, in m ineral prices – and ind icate a c omplex
fut ure in v iew of inc rea sing p res sur e to l ibe ral ise the coal m inin g
sector. The possible answers would depend on asking the right
questions, and this paper aims to draw attention to the possibility
of rethinking India’s mineral resource management and the min-
ing laws through questioning illegitimacy itself.
In dealing with mining in moonlighting mode, the invocation
of macroeconomic theories of resource dependency is inadequate
to fully explain the phenomenon of illegality. The theories of
“resource cur se” or “ re source wa r” tend to reduce the comple xit y
of mining livelihoods to a singular element and factor without a
pol it ic al an d h is tor ic al co nte xt [ see L e Bi ll io n 2007 ; O me je 2 00 6;
Lahir i-Dutt 2005 for more on t his li ne of thought].4 Conventional
understandings of mining-related social change or even the
most sophisticated “Environmental Impact Analysis” techniques,
are inadequate for developing a socially-sensitive, politically-
engaged, historically-informed and locally-embedded under-
standing of the phenomenon. Clearly, a rethinking is urgently
needed; this review would involve challenging the picture of
lawlessness repeatedly painted by the urban-based middle class,
a picture that accepts the laws as immutable, and state’s interests
as preceding over those of local people. One can then proceed to-
wards revisiting the “commanding heights” philosophy-based coal
mining laws and the monopoly that they have given to CIL. In this
paper, I have attempted to use a “thick” geographical and histo-
rical contextualisation, and avoided citing too many international
comparisons.5 Let us first take a brief look at the informalisation of
the economy and illegitimacy in mining in other countries.
Informalisation and Illegitimacy in Mining
Illegal mining is prevalent throughout the mineral-bearing tracts
of the developing world. Martinez-Castillo (1999: 31) has de-
scribed such mining as “traditional” and “informal”, resulting
fr om a range of pre ssure s:the econom ic cri sis, urban u ne mploy-
ment in the cities, povert y in the agricultural areas and the vio-
lence that prevailed in the 1980s gave rise to a growing social
phenomena – individual, family or collective migration to zones
other than the place of origin, searching for safety and economic
survival”. The use and extraction of minerals by different means
such as digging, panning, sorting and amalgamation comprise an
integral part of the vast informal economy on which little or no
official data exists. In terms of sheer numbers, these people are
not insignificant; a recent estimate of the World Bank suggests
that over 20 million people in the world depend on mineral re-
source extraction for their living, a figure that is immensely more
than those employed by the large and formal mining industries
[CASM 2005]. Indeed, employment in the formal mining sector
has been steadily declining, whereas the numbers in informal
mining have increased manifold [ILO 2002]. A s ignific ant a mou nt
of minerals are produced this way, and can often account for a
greater segment of a countr y’s mineral production. For example,
the informal mining generated up to 65 per cent of Peru’s gold
production in 2005-06. The representations of those engaged
in informal mining vary: they are known as the wildcat
‘Garimpeiros’ in Brazilian Amazonia, the ‘Galampseys’ in
Ghana, Barranquilas’ in Bolivia, ‘Ninjasin Mongolia, and the
‘Gurandils’ (literally, “those who jump from cliff to cliff”) or PETIs
(acronym for those mining without licence” in Bahasa
Indonesian) in Indonesia. Only sparse data is available on China
but according to experts, the number of people engaged could
reach 15-16 million, if cheap industrial minerals such as sand,
stone and gravels are included.6
Whereas some countries might have a long artisanal tradition of
mining, in most contemporary cases, informalisation of mining
can be related to increasing poverty in rural areas that bear miner-
als or gem stones. International decision-making circles have now
developed a nuanced understanding that this kind of mining is “a
poverty issue which must be addressed by a comprehensive ap-
proach” [CASM 2005: 22]. As people enter the informal mining
sector as an alternative or supplement to subsistence agriculture,
families may have marginally better access to cash incomes for the
maintenance of their livelihoods. Hilson and Potter (2005) noted
that the policies associated with the Structural Adjust ment
Programme of Ghana has fuelled the uncontrolled growth of
poverty-driven gold mining and have further marginalised its
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Economi c & Politic al Weekly december 8, 2007 59
impoverished participants. However, in almost all ex-colonial
countries the legal framework is such that mine rals are owned
only by the states. Consequently, throughout the third world, the
phenomenon of illegal mining is increasing and greater numbers
are taking up this profession. For example, in Mongolia, a semi-
desert country and one of the last frontiers of human settlement,
the number of Ninja miners increased from 10,000 to 1,00,000
bet ween 2000 and 2004 [MBDA 2003]. This represented around
20 per cent of the rural workforce [ILO 2006]. During the same
time, the Mongolian government has aggre s sively wooed foreign
mining capital. As the major mining companies entered the fray,
the ninja miners were pushed into more marginalised environ-
ments, panning for gold in harsh wintry cold often only at night to
avoid being caught by the police [Appel 2004].
Hi stori cal ly, we have seen suc h “rush” c ondit ions i n the A mer i-
cas and Australia; although the early gold rushes in these coun-
tries of white settlement are now glorified as heroic elements of
the colonial frontier economy. By contrast, in the third world
countries, the lawless chaos envisioned in “contemporary rushes”
ha s emphas ised t he illega lit y of suc h mi ning a nd sugges ted cur se
and war theorisations.7 Sierra Leone is the most remarkable case
where the illegal mining of diamonds had funded warring rebel
groups. However, attention to the pure economics of mineral
reve nues in isolation, leaving aside questions of justice and politi-
cal ecology can give impressions that all conflicts over resources
are because of the minerals as such, making them the problem,
and eroding our historic understanding of resources as nature’s
endowments. For example, the Central Intelligence Agency
de sc ri b ed t he le ak in g of petrol eum f ro m oi l pip el ine s b y “m il itant
impoverished ethnic groups” in Nigeria – an “archetypal oil
nation” – as violent expressions of conflict. Summoning a broad
“resource war” in this case, according to Watts (2004), draws at-
tention away from the fact that the different ethnic groups have
consistently tried to expand their access to and control over re-
source revenues occurring within their territories and have re-
sisted the governmental control over resources that is rooted in
the colonia l his tory of t he country.
Of S mall Min es an d Majo r Mi nera ls
To explore the question of legitimacy in Indian coal mining, let us
first t urn to the legal or regulatory framework of coal (and other
minerals) in India, and the licensing and policing systems. We
wi ll t hen go on to ex amin e how r esp onsiv e our l egal a nd polit ica l
str uctures have been to t he social and economic issues arisi ng in
mining regions. This section shows how coal, the mineral itself,
is categor ised as a major mine ral , and t hen min es a nd mini ng a re
classified into different categories according to size.8 In this clas-
sical and seemingly watertight classificatory mode, there is no
space left for small mining of a major mineral such as coal. But
first let us obtain a snapshot view of mines classification in India.
The Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development
(MMRD)) Act of 1957 is the principal legislation governing mineral
prospecting, exploration and mining, besides the Indian Mines
Ac t of 19 52 wh ic h i s pr i ma ri ly me ant for la bo ur we lf ar e a nd sa fe ty
and health issues. According to MMRD, a “m ine” mea ns any exca-
vation where any operation for the purpose of searching for or
obtaining minerals has been carried on and includes many other
specific activities and operations. “Minerals” according to this act
means all substances which can be obtained from the earth by a
variety of mining, digging, drilling, etc, and includes mineral
oils, hich in turn include natural gas and petroleum. The MMRD
Act and any other mining development plans are guided by the
overall National Mineral Policy (NMP) 9rst outlined by the gov-
ernment of India in 1993, and then revised in 2002. The objec-
tives of the NMP are primarily “mineral development” through
explorations of “mineral wealth” in the land and off-shore areas,
to develop the wealth taking into account the national and strate-
gic considerations, and ensure their adequate supply and best
use. The NMP is m eant to promote t he mine ral indust ry a s well as
research, training and development in mine rals, keeping in view
the present needs and future requirements, but with minimal
ad ve rs e ef fect s on fo rest, e nv ir on me nt a nd ec olo gy, a nd to ensu re
safety a nd he alth of a ll concerned.
These objectives can raise a few important questions. First, if
the ordering of the objectives reflect the priorities of the state, then
where does one place the interests and well-being of ordinary
people who fail to get a mention except in their being a part of the
“all concerned”. Second, where, in this policy, does the state place
the possibility and the need for undertaking assessments and miti-
gations of social impacts? Third, how does the state consider the
governance, and regulation of the mineral producers including
voluntary regulation? Finally, where do we place the informal
mines and how do we deal with the phenomenon of illegitimacy
under the current laws? According to Chakravorty (2002), an
expert on small mines, such mines together consti tute about 88
per cent of the reported mines producing about 10 per cent of the
total value of mineral production of the country.
The informal mines comprise a repository of the poorest people
toiling at the lowest wages in the worst security, health and safety
conditions, and which come nearest to the subject of my dis-
cussion. Here one must remember that whatever the size, all mines
in India come under a plethora of government rules and regula-
tions – the MMRD Act, Mines Act, Forest Act, Environment Act. The
Minerals Conservation and Development Rules (MCDR) (1988) di-
vides all minerals into “major” and “minor”, and rests the respon-
sibility of mining the major minerals (such as coal) with the state.
The Indian Bureau of Mines (IBM), working under the MMRD Act
identified, according to Rule 42 of MCDR, 1988, further two cate-
gories: A or B category mines, determined on the basis of labour
employment and the standard of mechanical equipment used.
Whereas the “minor” minerals are defined by MMRD Act as
“building stones, gravel, ordinary clay, ordinary sand other than
sand used for prescribed purposes, and any other mineral which
the central government may, by notification in the official gazette,
de clare t o be a mino r mine ra l”, t here i s som e co nf usi on r ega rd ing
the definition of B class mines.10 The outstanding feature in this
definition is scale: small production, small capital investment,
labour intensiveness, shallow nature of deposits and low
tec hnology deployment. Thus, some of the coal mining opera-
tions on privately owned land would come under this category of
mining. On the other hand, some labour-intensive underground
collieries of the Eastern Coal Fields (EC L) could also qualify as
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december 8, 2007 Economi c & Politic al Weekly
60
“small” mines. Clearly, the current policies and regulations on
the mining of minerals are not built to deal with the complex re-
alities of informal or illegal mining and attempts to simplify
mines, mining and minerals.
It is worse when mines are classified according to production
amounts only; the National Institute of Small Mines (N ISM) de-
fined the categories of mines in India according to their produ-
ction.11 It is clear that the legal definitions hinge upon “size” fac-
tor. The size of operation determines the duration of a mine;
however, for an economic activity like mining with close social
linkages, such legal definitions are not helpful because they give
the impression that a large colliery is just a scaled-up version of a
small quarry. This reductionist concept uses the popular lan-
guage of scale classification and obscures the unity or diversity of
mining practices or linkages across scales. As large or the formal
processes tend to appear as the only acceptable forms of mineral
extraction, processing and use, those practices that cannot be
fitted w ithi n the categories tend to be rejec te d and i llegiti mised.
Clearly, the existing laws are neither comprehensive nor ade-
quate to handle the informal mining sub-sector, part of which is
licensed but part of which is i llegal, part of which has a long ar ti-
sanal tradition extending back into pre-colonial days and part of
which has been an offshoot of recent developments in mineral
tracts. The illegal miners cannot lobby for recognition, and the
current laws offer very few practical possibilities for them to mine
coa l legally, a situation th at has resulted in serious consequence s
for the well-being of local populations and the environment.
Coal: Only for the Big Boys
Under the amended Coa l Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1993, only
two groups are eligible to mine coal: a central or state govern-
ment company or corporation and “a person to whom a sub-lease
has been granted by the above mentioned government company
or corporation having a coal mining lease, subject to the condi-
tions that the coal reserves covered by the sub-lease are in
isolated small pockets or are not sufficient for scientific and eco-
nomic development in a coordinated manner and that the coal
produced by t he sub -lessee wil l not be required to be t ransported
by rail[GoI nd]. The rule is unambiguous: there is clearly no
space for individual operators for mining coal. CIL, e stablishe d in
the euphoric and heady days of nationalisation in early 1970s, has
the full responsibility of mining coal, the ownership of which is
vested in the state. Consequently, over the years, CIL has come to
represent the quintessential “greater common good”.
The decision-making on the mineral resources in India has
been characterised so far by a preponderance of engineers, geolo-
gists and bureaucrats, with politicians claiming they represent
the entirety of “people’s interests”.12 The governance of coal re-
sources is vested almost entirely with CIL. The Coal Mines
(Nationali sation) Amendment Bill, 2000 allows state govern-
ments or undertakings to mine coal from smaller deposits only if
CIL provides a certificate of no intention to mine – another vestige
of licence raj times. The ministry of coal (MoC) has awarded CIL a
near-monopoly, giving rise to a highly institutionalised, hierar-
chical and tight bureaucratic control over India’s coal resources.
An opening of the coal sector to genuine competition – attempted
by the World Bank and hinted by the Planning Commi ssion re-
port – will not necessarily solve its problems. The point I want to
make is that there is a need is for policymakers to connect to so-
cia l realities in mining areas and explore how to keep the wealth
generated from mining within the region, how to benefit people
from mining expansion, how to make laws that do not render
people and their livelihoods illegitimate. Till 1993 or so, jobs were
being given as compensation for land, but with increasing mec h-
anisation and preference for open cut mining technologies, the
number of available jobs have dwindled. At the same time, large
pr oje cts h ave nec ess ita ted res ettle ment and reh abi lit atio n (R & R)
policy rst in 1994 and revised in 2000 but “income resto-
ration” as envisaged in the policy has primarily meant insecure
jobs with contractors and some form of assistance towards non-
land based self-employment.
Social Impacts
In spite of ministry of environment and forest controls, the CIL
subsidiaries have vandalised the environment with little or no
concern for the social implications. Environmental degradation
associated with new mining projects has had serious social con-
sequences: decay in forest-based livelihoods, crumbling social
order, declining farming and shift of the peasantry from farm-
based to livelihoods, to say nothing of physical relocation or dis-
placement by mining. Even without environmental degradation,
large mining projects are well known internationally to have
caused significant social changes with serious implications for
the livelihoods of local communities. Yet this is an area that
seems to be remained beyond the periphery of the mineral gover-
nance in India. Social impacts in India are particularly associated
with new mining expansion. Rao (2005) noted that displacement
from traditional occupations has forced people into scavenging
in Jharkhand. The neglect of social and cultural issues around
minerals and mining has created a space for extreme leftist or
Maoist movements – as observed by Chandra Bhusan, the asso-
ciate director of Centre for Science and Environment in the dia-
logue on mining held by them in New Delhi in April 2007. Chan-
dra showed that India’s mineralised tracts are co-terminus with
“conflict zones”. Company officials, bureaucrats and technical
experts including mining engineers have not sincerely engaged
with the social issues, including the fact that the legal instru-
ments are of colonial vintage, anti-poor, and are unable to deal
with contemporary realities.13
Civil society groups have also adopted peaceful paths to use
existing control mechanisms, such as public interest litigation
(PI L), to bring justice to local people. These include the PILled
by Haradhan Roy of Colliery Mazdoor Sabha which went to the
Supreme Court against poor environmental care by ECL. The
non-governmental organisation (NG O) concern for the environ-
ment is understandable given that the current legal framework
allows for at least some amount of concern. In the absence of
legal measures for social care, such as social impact assessments
made by social scientists, or community engagement systems,
resettlement and rehabilitation policies and practices have be-
come the main plank of action by NGOs to give voice to local
people and attempt to seek justice.14 The complaint made by
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Economi c & Politic al Weekly december 8, 2007 61
Chhotanagpur Adivasi Seba Samiti (CA S S) to the inspection panel
of the World Bank on Parej East open cut project against poor
social concern provides an example. Parej East was one of the 25
projects funded by the World Bank under its Coal Sector Reha-
bilitation Project.15 However, although the panel lashed the bank
management and CIL, both remained unresponsive [Lahiri-Dutt
and Herbert 2004]. Even these measures have been largely un-
able to take up social issues in useful ways or claim mineral re-
sou rce r ig hts for landow ners.
CIL’s Monopoly in the Context of Globa l Changes
The Indian coal industry currently occupies the third position in
the world, mining about 400 mtpy with the US second at about
1,100 mtpy and China by far the largest at 2,400 mtpy in 2006.
Within the country, coal mining is seen largely as equivalent to
national interest, a crucial means for achieving economic growth
and indu str ial is ati on a nd fo r me et ing th e ri si ng a spi ration s or th e
comforts of urban residents; indeed nearly 60 per cent of our
electricity is from coal. Outside of the country, India’s coal min-
ing industr y is perceived as highly inefficient in terms of produc-
tivity: the mining cost of coal in India is 35 per cent higher than
other coal exporting countries such as Australia, Indonesia and
South Africa, the cost of mining is not recovered by coal sales,
and poor productivity (about 3 tonnes/manshift as compared to
12,00 0 i n Australia).
State o wner ship of co al mini ng in I ndia i s importa nt bec ause it
can put a significant amount of control over the volatile nature of
mineral sector revenues and prevent booms and slumps from oc-
curring at intervals. It was presumed at the time of nationalisa-
tion that state ownership would effectively modify the negative
roles played by the in numerable “private” ow ners, but the role of
the state-owned company in the post-liberalisation economic
context ha s not been quite clarified. Cu rrent ly, we h ave a vol at ile
combination of rising coal demand, rising coal prices in the inter-
national market (in response to which the ministry of coal (Mo C)
has deregulated the coal pricing), of interested multinational
companies (M NCs) attempting to invest in India (only sub-
contracts are being given out at present to such large interna-
tional companies such as Thiess, although several other com-
panies are waiting behind the wings). Rethinking illegiti-
macy becomes important at this crucial juncture of India’s coal
in dus t r y.
To deal with the challenges facing the Indian coal mining
industry, we need a greater awareness of the changes in the extr-
active industries sector elsewhere in the world, mainly in the
“mining countries” (a major part of whose gross domestic pro-
duct (GDP) comes from mining and minerals) such as Australia,
Papua New Guinea and Canada. The challenge of mining coal
stems from the fact of nearly 500 million or more people thirsting
for access to electricity. No matter what the NGOs believe, coal
mining will keep playing a major part in satisfying the demand
for electr icit y for the fore seeable future. C oal consu mp tion i n t he
country is expected to reach somewhere between 800 and 2,000
mtpy by 2030 [the different crystal ball gazers are IEA 2006;
Grover and Chandra 2006; Reuters 2007]. There are obvious
global implications concerning climate change and the Kyoto
Protocol, enhanced imports and investments by Indian compa-
nies in coal mining in other countries. The implication on the
gro und i s a de fin ite inc re ase in info rm al c ollie ri es w hich w il l con -
ti nue to meet t he de mands of sm all , loca l c on sumers.
Social Licence to Operate
Let me come back to the changes that are occurring in the global
minerals industry, which provides the “big picture”, the backdrop
within which to evaluate CI L’s p er for ma nce a s a co mpany. Inc rea -
sed and concerted global efforts have been under way since 1998
beginning with the formation of Global Mining Initiative (GM I)
and the subsequent design of Mines, Minerals and Sustainable
Development (MMS D) project supported by nine major mining
companies. The International Council for Mining and Metals
(IC MM) has been established as an industry peak body and the
recently completed Extractive Industries Review (EI R) findings
have led to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EI T I), although the World Bank has not been fully supportive of
all these i nitiat ives. These processes were the direct responses to
the increasing charges of environmental destruction and the
irresponsibility of mining projects to care the social and cultural
changes caused by them around their areas of operation. These
global processes have forced some of the global mining compa-
nies to accept that legal compliance alone is not enough; they
also need a “social licence to operate” in developing countries
where mining has been “breaking new grounds” [see MMSD
20 02].16 The main objective was trust building; the MMSD report
noted (2003: 5-6): The mining and minerals industry faces some
of the most difficult challenges of any industrial sector – and is
currently distrusted by many of the people it deals with day to
day. It has been failing to convince some of its constituents and
stakeholders that it has the “social licence to operate” in many
parts of the world, based on the many expectations of its poten-
tial contributions.
The Bougainville rebellion in Papua New Guinea has now
achieved a mythical status in mining lore; poor attention to com-
munit y dev elopme nt and en gagement wit h the l ando wners t her e
caused the closing down of a large copper mine [see Filer 1990].
Such ex amples are available closer home: the Phulbar i coal mine
pr oject i n B angla de sh w as sh el ved in 200 6 becau se of com mun it y
agitations for alternative livelihoods. Yet the mining industry
unused to examining the complexities in social relations and ter-
ritorially embedded nature of communities – has remained insen-
sitive to the validity of increasing resentment against mining
projects. For the mining engineers who make almost all plans,
the mining project itself assumes great importance, subsuming
people into disposable “overburdens” of mining operations.17 T h is
is exemplified by the views of an ex-director of Indian School of
Mines, Bannerjee, who in a 2004 article even suggested the ere-
ct ion of bou ndar y wa ll s ar ound t he en ti re l eas ed la nd af ter acq ui-
ring it a la urban gated community style. In the absence of a
nuan ced understanding of the society within which the mine
ope rates, CIL falls back upon the legal system and the rationale
that “The Land Acquisition (LA) Act or the Coal Bearing Areas
(CBA) Act does not provide any assistance for” the local people
affected by mining. Mining areas are characterised by heigh tened
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december 8, 2007 Economi c & Politic al Weekly
62
cash flows, influx of migrants, rapid urbanisation and the forma-
tion of new social alliances. Unused to analysing and addre-
ssing these social changes, mine planners complain: “not all
people who live in communities occupying or using land re-
quired by the mine are land-owners” and resent that these
people often “provide the leadership to those opposed to the land
acquisition programmes”.
As compared to this “social blindness”, the global mining in-
dustry is changing its approach, at least at the level of policy, lan-
guage and organisational processes. Many corporate policies
now explicitly address broader social justice objectives, local and
indigenous employment, security and human rights, sustainable
livelihoods, culture and heritage, the need for undertaking
social impact assessments, ethical procurement and stake-
holder and/or community consultation [Kemp et al 2006: 391-92].
Many inter national mining companies now regularly hire
social scientists, anthropologists and even gender spe cialists,
for adv ising on good practice of integrated management of
soci al and environmental is sues around thei r mi ne site s.
Illegal Coal and Illeg al Mining
It is important to differentiate between illegal mining of coal and
the il leg al mark eting a nd dist ri but ion o f il leg ally (o r eve n leg al ly)
mined coal. Not all illegal coal is illegally mined. Often legally
mined coal may “fall off the back of truck”, is thrown out of rail
wagons, or sourced by scavenging from mines and/or sale
dumps,18 and can become illegal. Before prescribing any meas-
ure, one needs to remember that there are in fact two separate
(but not unrelated) aspects of the black” coal business: illegal
mines and mining (without licence) and illegal marketing/distri-
bution of coal. Neither are the two entirely homogeneous, nor do
they have similar histories and organisational structures.
Illegal mining takes three main forms in eastern India: small
shallow-dug village mines on private land, mining on re-opened
abandoned or orphaned government mines, and scavenging on
the leasehold land of official operating mines. This is just based
on the sou rce; there m ay not be any majo r diffe rence in t heir p ro-
duction amounts. There are also a few “unregistered” mines:
those that somehow escaped enlistment during nationalisation
and became illegitimate. The lands on which mines are dug ille-
gally are usually privately owned in Raniganj, but in Jharkhand,
these are often village commons or ‘gair majurwa’19 lands. The
mines are dug into outcrops exposed at the sides of steep hills or
rivers. Coal may be extracted through a series of small open-cut
holes, which may extend underground. A lternatively, they may
be sha llow u nderground op erat ions, e ntered via a dr ift or a shaf t
to a de pth o f ab out 10- 15 m , and whic h c an e xt end for up t o 20 0 m
horizontally. Small brickworks – the customers – are located
nearby synergistically. Coal is removed by pick-axe by the coal
cutter after which loaders put the pickings into metal dishes or
baskets carried on the head about 25 kg at a time. Some of these
mines can operate throughout the year; others become unstable
during monsoons; overall, the rainy season is the slack time as
workers tend to take up employment in the fields. Some of these
village mines can be extensive, where four or five thousand
people work on a n ave rage day.
Scavenging from old abandoned mines is another important
source of coal. The eastern colliery tracts have a 200 year, poorly
documented, history of underground and incline mining. The en-
tire Raniganj-Jharia region is dotted with small abandoned mines,
some of them orphaned by mining companies owned by individu-
als. As collieries were brought under stateownership, no one
picked up the bill for rehabilitating the remains of old mines. The
shafts of these pits provide ready access to underground leftover
coal. More importantly, poor environmental care in rehabilitating
the mines encourage scavenging. It is common for CIL subsi diaries
to neglect filling up of voids with sand as per regulation [Lahiri-
Dutt 1999], and consequently, villagers have ready access to any
coal that is left. Breakage of sealed underground mines is quite
common, the carbon monoxide present in such abandoned under-
ground colliery often kill those entering to scavenge coal. The
“board and pillar” system of coal mining in most underground col-
lieries means that the entire amount of coal can never be lifted and
significant amounts of coal is left behind. The company tends to
leave a mine as soon as it becomes “uneconomic”, thus leaving
the rest for local villagers to scavenge upon thus throwing
them into seriously risky jobs. The ecological footprint left by
open cut mines is more serious; so far there have been only a
few cases of filling up and rehabilitation, re-contouring and reveg-
etation of large pits after mining.
Scavenging can occur in both underground and/or inclines, but
assumes great significance in open cast mines. First of all, there
are cases like the Samdi and Sangramgarh collieries in Raniganj,
both among the oldest collieries of this area, where mining opera-
tions have been going on since late 18th century. Sangramgarh is
an open cast operation where a 2m thick coal seam near the sur-
face has been left by the ECL, choosing instead to work on the
lower, 6m thick layer. This upper, thinner layer of coal has been cut
into a maze of honeycomb-like labyrinths, often extending to con-
siderable distance under the surface. Scaven ging of small amounts
of coal, stealing and pilfering occur regularly from nearly all open
cast mines. Poor security in mines, storage and transportation area
provides opportunities for scavenging. In working underground
mines, this happens from the coal loading area: coal is loaded by
head baskets into awaiting trucks. Scavenging during transporta-
tion is not only small pilfering, but can also reach significant scale.
Coal India also delivers coal to both the local sale dumps located
near the mines and big dumps, and pilferage can take place on
major highways from long-distance trucks or railway wagons.
Trucks are “hijacked” regularly and at times significant amounts of
coal can be offloaded from rail wagons.
Though uncommon, there are some cases of oversight by officials
in which the existence of some collieries was forgotten during the list-
ing at the time of nationalisation. For example, Pahargora is a mine
that did not make it to the official “list” of private collieries to be
brought under government ownership. It continues to thrive till to-
day. A similar case was Saltora in the Purulia district of West Bengal.
Pauperisation in Mining Areas
The significant amount of social and environmental transforma-
tion in colliery tracts stems largely from the monopoly of CIL ove r
coal ownership, mining and marketing. The notion that coal is
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Economi c & Politic al Weekly december 8, 2007 63
being utilised for the greater national good by a central,
government-owned body which represents people’s interests has
allowed its painful lack of attention to social impacts of mining
coal. The social transformations have come to characterise min-
ing areas: decay of social fabric, changes in power relations, ero-
sion of traditional livelihoods, migration from surrounding re-
gions and rising levels of urbanisation. The social impacts vary
according to the physical proximity of the mine, and are felt diffe-
rently within the society, varying according to gender, class and
caste. For example, in Raniganj region between 1971 and 2001,
bot h agricultural la nd and t he representation of peasa nt r y i n t he
w or k fo rc e ha v e s te a di l y d e cl i ne d ev e n i n th e no n- c ol l i er y vi l l a ge s .
Women – especially those from poorer, lower caste and adivasi
communities – have found themselves more negatively impacted
on as a group. In Jharkhand, a process of gradual pauperisation
of the local residents has taken place in which the traditional
land and water rights have been lost and few of the benefits of
mining have accrued to local indigenous communities.
To exemplify my point, let us now focus our attention on a
spot on the highway to Ranchi. Amid a procession of cyclewal-
lahs loaded with sacks and bags of coal chunks I meet Nirjal
Birhor. I first met Nirjal in his leaf hut some distance away from
Hazari bagh town in the early 1980s. At the time, his livelihood
conti nued to be based on hunting and catching animals and
making rope from ‘chop’ creepers, despite the dwindling
reserves of the surrounding Chhotanagpur jungles. In the last
20 years, his world has been turned upside down by the advanc-
ing coal mines. He has been evicted from his home, and in the
absence of the forest resources that had offered him subsistence,
has now turned to digging for coal. He describes his living as
“coal collection”, but to others Nirjal is a petty thief, stealing and
delivering stolen coa l.
The links between the legal and illegal coal mines go beyond
this simple evidence of pauperisation. The mining companies are
the largest owners of land in the coal tracts, the prime employer
of people and mover of resources. They choose to either overlook
the coexistence of illegal mining with their operations, or see it
as a law-and-order problem to be dealt by the district administra-
tion. To complaints of “theft” from its premises, the bureaucratic
reply is usually that the company should look after its own
premises and property with its own considerable resources. More
of ten tha n no t, t he mat ter end s af ter a fe w excha nge s of le tte rs o r
at b est “h igh level committ ee” meet ings. 20
In Jharkhand, illegal coal mining has followed the expansion
of formal coal mining in recent years. This is primarily due to fact
that CBA Act supersedes the non-transferability of tribal land
which was a basic protective instrument for poor and indigenous
peoples [Bengara 1996]. In Raniganj and Jharia, occupational
displacement due to the degradation of cultivable land has caused
people to turn to this profitable economic activity. Formal and
informal coexist in this part of India; at times the legal collieries
have had to adapt their practices at times to the coexistence of il-
legal mines. In Khaerbad colliery in Raniganj, leakage of oxygen
into the underground coal seams – caused by locally dug “rat
holes” – has caused extensive mine fires. To keep the fire under
control Jambad, previously an underground colliery, has now
been turned into an open cast mine, regularly needing hosing to
que nc h there.
The links are also evident in a subtle tolerance of illegal coal
mining – both from private lands and scavenging from offi-
cial mines and small-scale transport and distribution of illegal
coal by company officials and district administrations. The
metropolitan-based media has been concerned in recent years
about the possibility of subsidence of the main railway track pass-
in g thro ugh the r egi on. Con cer n on the p art o f the dis tr ict adm in -
istration and the subsidiary company of CIL is usu al ly d eter mi ne d
by the degree of media exposure received by major accidents.
District collectors view the problem of illegal coal mining as one
of law and order, yet avoid taking direct responsibility for pre-
venting theft from company-owned land. They also tend to ig-
nore t he la rger op erations on pr ivately owned land as long as the
owners maintain peace with local power structures. Police of-
ci als tend t o var y in their v iew s rega rdi ng illegal coal; the di str ict
superintendent of police often tries to control the larger opera-
tions, both mining and truck transportation, but tends to ignore
the cyclewallahs. Mine managers also appear to be fully aware of
the exact locations of large illegal operations.
Understanding these perceptions is important before giving
out a prescription. For example, according to a journalist based in
Hazaribagh, both large-scale (by trucks) and small-scale trans-
portation (by cycles) occur in a centrally controlled manner that
resembles the illegal ‘satta’ (gambling) business, run by the
under ground kingpins in the big cities. Although the mafia’s
omni presence is noted by everyone in the coalbelt, in my view,
the mafia operations comprise a different – I emphasise not
necessa rily unconnected – system of production and distribution
of coal than that performed by the cyclewallahs. In my interviews
wi th coa l cy clewa lla hs, it wa s clea r th at the mafia-co ntrol led sy s-
tem of illegal coal transport operates in trucks. Part of the prob-
lem also lies in how coal is marketed by CIL: coal is not freely sold
to small and domestic consumers, and the entire coal-producing
region in eastern India does not have a single distribution depot
to cater to small and domestic consumers. Factories use coal by
obtaining “linkage” from the mining companies. Often, a local
coal-based industry-owner applies to the central government for
a grant of coal to fire its furnaces. Till recently, this permission
paper was rather hard to obtain and might require multiple bribes
at various levels. Once granted, these permission papers can be
repeatedly used to obtain tax-free coal from sale dumps of the
Central Coalfields (CCL) even though the indust ry may have sub -
sequently shut down and is only a front. In interviewing the
cyclewallahs, we repeatedly asked whether their supplies were
meant for fixed customers or not. Local chimney ‘bhattas’ or brick
kilns can be major consumers of this coal throughout the dry
mont hs. In mos t cases , the c yclewa lla hs a re it ine rant s eller s, sell -
ing coal to local chimney bhattas or brick kilns and even smaller
consumers like individual homes. Thus a fundamental reason for
delivery of coal by bicycle in the coalfields is lack of any regular
delivery system to small local users. In the eastern parts, up until
the 1960s, the urban households situated around the coalfields
c oo k ed w it h co a l. S ma l l c o a l d u mp s w e re e st a bl i sh e d a n d l i ce n s ed
within a town, the coal being delivered by truck or rail. When
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64
liquid fuels (LPG and kerosene) became routinely available, use
of coal in the middle class households was phased out in their fa-
vour. Being demand-driven in this case, the coal supply-chain
ex te nded as far as Kolkata or beyond.
Regulatio n, Regularis ation or Revisiting the Laws
As the district administrations in Burdwan, Dhanbad and Hazari-
bagh set up committees to control and curb illegal coal mining,
the main debates centre upon the options of regulation, regulari-
sation and formalisation. Regulation would mean total blockade
of all illegal mining on private lands, operational and abandoned
mines. A mine manager even suggested that the entire upper 20
feet layer of coal be razed as a preventive measure. As noted ear-
lier, policing has so far been the preferred choice for CIL and its
subsidiaries, although responsibility remains a thorny issue.
Th e possibi lity o f reg ula ris at ion ha s been dis cussed recent ly in
the Raniganj fields of West Bengal, where it has been proposed to
bring the local illegal mines under a cooperative management of
sorts. This is not new; in Indonesia, Soekarno’s government
recognised the long artisanal tradition of mining and created
space for them in “People’s Mines” which are allowed to operate
at their low production levels. In people-friendly China, such vil-
lage coop erat ive mines have existed in desig nated areas. Howev-
er, responses to West Bengal government ’s proposal so far have
be en u nen thu sia stic . The propos al, a ltho ugh the best ava ilable s o
far, is also unrealistic; cooperatives could include only the “ille-
gal mines on privately owned land”. Cooperativism would also
not cha llenge t he ex ploitati ve produc tion st ruc tures w ithin the se
mines, perpetrate inequalities within and reinforce existing pro-
duction relations in the absence of a good understanding of how
the labour supply works. The important area of scavenging, pil-
fera ge and such other s ou rcing of coal – of ten involv ing th e poor-
est of the poor – would then receive the main policing attention.
With co al prices rising an d d ema nd soa ring, the opportun ity cost
of illegal mining would remain favourable to the diggers. Block-
ing the top end restricting market access or certification – would
also not help under the dualistic market situation in which small
consumer s predominate and large-scale sales is central ly contro-
lled by CIL. Abo ve a ll, isol ated measur es tar gete d at sto ppin g ille -
gal mining would not work as long as the state and its represen-
tative – CIL – are not pe rceived as fai r a nd ef cient.
In my view, neither regulation nor regularisation would be
possible unless the current legal framework around minerals is
changed. However, the views expressed by the high level com-
mittee of Planning Commission which devoted a full sub-section
on the implications of illegal mining, although suggesting many
changes focuses on the revenue losses to the state and suggests
(2006, p 131) that for checking illegal mining there can be no
substitute for improved standards of governance”. In my view,
the existing mineral ownership and land acquisition laws are
antiquated and unresponsive to concepts of social justice, and the
regulatory system itself is in need of change to respond to the
emerging soc ial rea lity.
Th is n eed for c hang ing the regulato ry s yst em c an even be s een
through a purely economic lens. As noted before, rising prices in
the international market, and the recent deregulation of coal
prices within India means that coal prices will be in the near
future on an upward swing. The demand is arising from the do-
mestic sector as much as from small industries, not only the
urbani sing classes demanding coal but in many parts of eastern
India degrading forests forcing even the villagers to use coal in-
stead of conventional biomass fuels. Besides rising demand and
prices, the other driving forces are the complete alteration of
society and degradation of the environment – both of which are
for cin g p eople to tur n to illegal coal m ining for a livin g.
On the larger, indust rial scene, India will turn increasingly to-
wa rds impor ts of coa l. We s imply w ill not be able to mine enough
coal to meet the kind of demand that has been forecast. Indeed,
India currently imports 35mt coal largely from Australia and
Indonesia [ICRA 2006]. A n exa mple of thi s new trend of Indian
capital moving out of the country in search of securing coal sources
is Tata Power’s recent purchase of Bumi Resources, an Indonesian
coal company with mining leases in eastern Kalimantan.
I envisage that in future the Indian coal industry will operate
in three distinct layers (instead of the current formal-informal
binary). The three layers will be comprised a top globalised sec-
tor, where multinational companies will enter to operate in diffe-
rent garbs and Indian companies will secure coal from abroad for
their industries and power plants; a middle tier of CIL changing
it s modu s op era ndi only ma rgina lly or re fusi ng t o ch ang e quic kly
enough, and a lower tier of unstoppable local private entrepre-
neurs investing and making money at the cost of poor people’s
labour, yet providing a critical livelihood base for the masses and
thus play ing a n i mportant soc ial role.
As things stand now, it is difficult to predict the respective
shares of these segments, but my guess is that in terms of num-
bers and livelihoods involved, this lowest tier will play such an
important role that there will be a forced rethinking of our legal
framework for mineral resource governance.
Limits of Justice
The high level committee on National Mineral Policy (2006)
actually agrees with this point of view albeit indirectly. Although
the repor t unabashedly intends to op en up the minerals sector to
foreign investors, it also notes in critiquing the N M P, that (2006,
p 20) “the issue of compensat ion for local tribal populations as a
primar y charge on the minerals extracted from their land needs
to be built into the policy and given primacy along with the issues
of deforestation, pollution, and other disturbances caused in the
ecology by mining activity”. Quite rightly it points out the various
defects in existing legal framework, particularly the lack of
clarity and transparency (on such issues as the basis for grant or
denial of concessions), conflicting laws at the federal and state
levels (such as that of states imposing additional cess/taxes on
top of royalties) that give a confusing picture to investors, and
cumbersome and time-consuming procedures of obtaining a
mining lease. In adopting a path of prescribing procedural com-
plexities it explored how a “single window” system could be
formed and suggested that coordination-cum-empowered com-
mittees should be set up at the state and central government
levels to hasten the decisions on applications.21 However, it
frames the issue of local community in terms of corporate social
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Economi c & Politic al Weekly december 8, 2007 65
responsibility22 (CSR) which is again a neoliberal jargon term. It
also contradicts itself in noting that “with a soft state apparatus
amounting to a virtual absence of mining policies” will lead to
greater illegal and unregulated mining, but for all practical pur-
poses s ug ge sts a retreat of the state .
Effects of Privatisation
We are now passing through a volatile time when the national-
ised coal mining industry will undoubtedly, eventually, undergo
divestment, and the monopoly of CIL will break. How will we
then deal with the hundreds and thousands of people making a
li ving from illegal m ini ng of c oal? Unle ss we u nderst and this as a
livelihood, and accept the rights of people over mineral resourc-
es, we will neither be able to strengthen our democracy nor uplift
the enormous numbers languishing and threatening our eco-
nomic prosperity. For this, more robust and socially informed
mineral resource laws need to be developed based on an agreed
set of broad principles. The foremost of these principles would be
respect for the rights and interests of all those involved. With our
poor track record of policing the environmental performance, it
is dangerous to invite either foreign investment or open up the
coal sector to private investment. The key question in this stage
is, can the foreign investors rely on national governments to look
after the interests of local communities, or should they do it
themselves through CSR? The other question then would be, is
legal reform the best approach or will the empty rhetoric of CSR
be proven effective in India? Other, liberalising developing coun-
tries that have opened up their minerals sector have banked on
the CSR largesse, with significant resources and attention being
devoted to developing comprehensive CSR pol icie s wit hi n co mpa -
nies and nationally seeing corporations as vehicles of good gover-
nance and sustainable development. For example, in Indonesia
receiving CSR awards has become an attractive deal for mine
managers. Describing this as the “gift of the marketin South
Africa, Rajak (2007) notes most mining companies now have a
package of policies covering various areas which fall under the
broad spectrum of CSR or socio-economic development (SE D).
CIL, molded over the years of its existence into the philanthropic
paternalism, remains far away from such measures. Given the
history of small-scale entrepreneurship in Indian coal sector, it
will be impossible to expect anything but a mushrooming of
small coal mining leases in an open market scenario.
Moreover, the current laws are focused only on mitigating the
negative impacts of mining on the environment and people.
Instead, we need to frame policies and laws that can deliver sus-
tainable benefits for local, regional and even global communities.
This can be achieved only if the laws emphasise the need for a
more participatory and inclusive approach at the process level
that mining companies can adopt. As things stand now, we are
far away from establishing such processes. First of all, we need to
learn more about the production organisation of “illegal” mines,
as well a s th e ma rketi ng c hai ns a nd c hai ns t hro ugh wh ich legal ly
mined coal may be illegally distributed. It is also necessary to
know the extent of involvement of coal smugglers and mafia and
the level at which they operate. It is crucial to identify the stake-
holders of this black economy, and the linkages between the
formal and informal coal mining sectors also need to be under-
stood to identify the social, political and economic forces driving
these unintended collieries.
A revisit of the laws surrounding mineral resource extraction
in India would thus involve a fuller understanding of the role of
the community in local economies, to provide access to resources
to local people, and to integrate community interests in mine
management plans. Access to the land and its natural resources
and food security are at the centre of illegal coal mining. If the
coal resources of India are truly vested in national interest, they
must help us to build and live in a society where opportunities
and ben efits a re equal for eve ryone .
The other urgent needs include the protection of common pool
resources that help poor communities survive in rural economies
in colliery tracts and to find ways to vest the power to co-manage
the minerals with the local communities. If we can develop
working arrangements for joint forest ma nagement or integr ated
wate r re source man ageme nt s ystems, we can als o st art a ret hink-
ing process in India to create a situation where some form of co-
management of collieries can be effectively developed.
Rights of Local Citizens
We need to accept local and indigenous communities as equal
and integral citizens, to acknowledge their rights over local
natural resources, to develop the society also according to their
needs as different from the dominant mining-urban-industrial
econo mic form; and to find ways of decision-making in which
they can take equal part. In India, especially in mining regions,
people such as Nirjal are somehow tolerated, and planning is
done for them, according to what the engineers think is best
f o r t h e m .
It is also important that a wide debate takes place, between
social scientists, planners, international agencies and civil
society, on the issue of justice in coal mining areas. To find a
socially just and forward-looking resolution, and to make sure
that an apparently “modern” but equally authoritarian, restric-
tive “planning” does not get imposed to “control” the “problem”,
which will also enable the growth of Indian society, is a challenge
whic h has yet to be s olved.
Illegal coal mining provides an important entry point to a public
debate on rights over mineral resources – one that is of far more
significant than that might appear to be the case at first sight. Col-
lectively the debate implicitly involves the lives, livelihoods, and
futures of a significant number of people straddling the mineral-
rich tracts of all developing countries. This is not only a large pop-
ulation, but is also amongst the poorest and most exploited in the
region. Our mainstream society has avoided accepting the poor
and disadvantaged as an integral part, isolating them, and flaunt-
ing the environmental impacts of illegal mining a major cause of
concern. It is important that we first of all question the limits of
justice. Notions of legitimate and illegitimate (economic) prac-
tices are grounded upon a consistent traditional view of social
norms and obligations, of the proper economic functions of sev-
eral parties within the community. As the formal coal industry
continues to isolate and exclude local communities from the
formal economy, poor peasants and others can assert their rights.
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66
Notes
1 Th ese ar e E ast er n C oal field s, B ha rat Cok ing Co al
(B CC L) and C entr al Co alfiel ds (CC L).
2 The term ‘Un intended Collieries is inspired by Jai
Sen’s ‘Uninten ded Cit ies article and is gratefully ac-
knowledged.
3 For example, Meghalaya is a “fifth schedule” state in
Indian nort h-eas t, implying that minera l res ources
there b elong to lo cal landowner s. However, coal,
wh ich is ab und ant the re, is c las sifi ed a s a “m ajo r mi n-
er al ” m ea ni ng th at t ec h nic a ll y it ca n o nl y be mi ne d b y
the st ate or maj or playe rs. Con sequently, the 30,0 00
or so engaged in coa l m ining in Megha laya fall in a
vac uum of non -leg al sp ace.
4 For example, the Movement for the Em ancipat ion
of t he Niger Delta (M END) from January 2006 kid-
nap ped a nd ra nsom ed ov er 50 w orke rs, bl ew up p ipe-
lines, overran of fshore rigs , ki lled Nigeri an sol diers,
de cla rin g a “w ar o n She ll”. The ir de man ds we re r est i-
tuti on for t he enviro nmen tal damag e wrou ght by the
oil industry, greater control over oil revenues for local
govern ment and deve lopment aid to improve livi ng
co ndit ion s. Wa tt s (200 4) h ad pr evi ous ly s howe d how
the bu reaucrat ic and governm ent control over t he oil
resources of Niger delta have actual ly imp overished
pe ople t o a gr eat e xten t.
5 Diamond s in Africa are the best example; seen wide ly
as a “rebel’s best friend” [Buhaug and Rod 2006], and
now preserve d for etern ity by Leonardo de Caprio
film, Blood Diamond.
6 Pe rsona l communicat ion, w ith Shen Li, an authorit y
on ASM i n Chi na and a lso the hea d of C ASM C hina
Network. See http://www.casmsite.org /regional_
CASM-China.htm
7 I do not contri bute to the positivi st theories of re-
so ur ce c onfl ic t, r es ou rce cu rse an d re sou rc e wa rs th at
prophesise doom and gloom in developing count ries,
demonise the rightful needs and livelihoods of poor
people, and pres crib e top-dow n measure s such as
conflic t manageme nt [see Lahiri -Dutt 2006].
8 Such size-based classi fication to govern natural re-
so urc es ha s be en a hal l ma rk of Ind ia. F ore st pr odu cts
wer e sim ila rly c las sifie d int o maj or an d min or.
9 Ava ilable f rom htt p://mine s.n ic.i n/n mp.ht ml ac-
ce ssed on Aug ust 2, 200 7.
10 Sahu (1992) describes th em as “ those whose produc-
tion, or excavation quant ity is limited in tonn age and
not ver y large, mos tly manually oper ated a nd some -
times employ ing machi nes to small capacity. Such
mini ng acti vitie s are us ually c onfine d to deposit s
wh ich a re sh allo w in d epth and s mal l in e xten t”.
11 Small-s cale up to 0.1 mi llion t onnes p er year (mtpy),
medium from 0.1 to 0.5 mtpy, and large- scale being
ove r 0.5 m tpy.
12 A statement in the March 1993 National Mineral Policy
of the government of India exemplies the utopian world
that those in power inhabit: “Small and isolated deposits
of minerals are scattered all over the country. These of-
ten lend themselves to economic exploitation through
small-scale mining with modest demand on capital ex-
penditure and short lead-time, they also provide employ-
ment opportunities for the local population. Efforts will
be made to promote small-scale mining of small deposits
in a scientic and efcient manner while safeguarding
vital environmental and ecological imperatives. In grant
of mineral concessions for small deposits in scheduled
areas, preference shall be given to the scheduled tribes”.
In a scoping study on small mines and quarries, excepting
a few rare cases, I did not nd any small quarry that is
in reality owned by an indigenous person, although many
such mines operate on tribal lands, especially throughout
Jharkhand-Chhotanagpur belt.
13 CIL is aware of its poor social performance, but either
bundles social issues with the environmental ones or
cannot include the social issues within the current
compliance regime that has little or no social content.
Consequently, the Coal Sector Rehabilitation Project
was split in November 1995 in an agreement between
the government of India and CIL to separate the envi-
ronmental and social components. Apparently, it was
meant to assist CIL in the implementation of high prior-
ity environmental and social mitigation programmes,
while providing the GoI with the time to take the neces-
sary legal steps for the implementation of reforms.
14 The Samath a judgment (dated July 1 1, 1997) is an
excepti on in wh ich the Supreme Court acce pted the
right to compensation of loca l population s, not only
in ca sh through usual relief and reha bilitat ion pack-
age s, bu t als o to a f ul ler l ife.
15 Th e panel repor t found severa l instances of non-com-
pl i an ce on t he pa r t o f t h e B an k w i th it s po li c y o n i nv o l-
untar y resett lement, pa rticularly during the proje ct
prepara tion and appraisal phases , a nd w ith its poli-
cies concerning environmental assess ment, consulta-
tion a nd disclosu re of informatio n and timely provi-
sion o f land t itles to resettled persons. The pan el al so
found t hat the r eset tleme nt acti on plan f or Parej East
provide d for th e payment of a s ubsist ence all owance
which has not been paid to eligible famil ies. The
Wor ld B ank Man age men t in r es pon se pr opo sed to t he
govern ment of Ind ia that it would prov ide addit ional
su ppo rt t o add re ss t his sho rtc omi ng. The gov ern men t
of India noted that this allowance wa s not included
in 12 oth er reset tlement action p lans pr epared under
Co al In di a’ s co rp or at e r es et tl em ent an d r eh ab il it at ion
pol icy and w as re luct ant t o est abli sh pr eced ene.
16 A soc ial licence f undam ental ly c hanges t he m anner
in wh ich m inin g compa nies do busi ness. Put simply,
it implies that a means will exist for society to moni-
to r and mea sur e a pr oje ct, and comp any per for ma nce
throug hout the mini ng life cycle. It is an ex tra-leg al,
abstract a nd et hereal conc ept t hat is la rgely outside
t he “ co re bu si ne s s” of m i ni ng . I t h as be en de fin ed as “t h e
recognition and acceptance of a company’s contribution
to the community in which it operates, moving beyond
mee tin g bas ic le gal r equi rem ents towa rds d evel opi ng
and maintai ning the construc tive s takeh older rela-
tionsh ips necessa ry for business to be sustai nable.
Overal l, it comes from striving for relationships based
on honesty and mutu al respec t” [DITR 2006].
17 An example fro m Ban nerje e (2004: 8) w ould b e suf-
fici ent to exemp lif y thi s tun nel v isio n: “As C oal I ndia,
already suf fering from a load of surplus labour, could
not offe r so ma ny jo bs to t he la nd ous tees as dem and-
ed, a large numbe r of dissatisfied land oustee s were
formed a nd many C IL proje cts sta rted fa cing la nd ac-
qu isi tio n pro ble ms. Man y mi nes hav e no t be en ab le t o
advance in t he way it was planned, man y others had
to resort to muffled or controlled bla sting and many
new projects were de layed a nd the econom ic impact
of these disruptions were enormous”.
18 Sale dumps are depots where the mining companies
store their coal after digging it out from differe nt co l-
lieries. These are also distribution points for legal
coal. Therefore, these are spots from where trucks
leave with “linkage” papers to their destinations.
19 ‘Gair majurwa’ literally means “deedles s l and”, that
is, l and t hat is not officially recorded a nd ha s no le-
gal ow nership. Those l iving or cultiva ting such land
may hav e de fac to ownersh ip, although such c ustom-
ary owne rship is not recognised by t he law when the
com pany tak es ove r la nd for min ing.
20 Consid er this. In it s letter N o 9627-P dated Sept ember
20, 1999 the supe rintendent of police of Burdwan dis-
trict wrote o the ch ief managing d irector of EC L: “The
respon se of the ECL author ity in mentioni ng that the
respon sibility and authori ty in curbin g down anti-soc ial
activ ity r ests with the distr ict admi nistration and state
police be ing true but t he ECL authorit y should also not
avoid its res ponsibi lity of guard ing its pr operty lying
abandon ed in open especia lly whe n ECL is provided
with over 1,000 armed central industrial securit y force
person nel and over 5, 500 secur ity personnel. Nearl y
1,700 guns/ revolvers are avail able with the secu rity
staff also”. Note the accura te numbe rs ment ioned but
the over all relu ctanc e to share the responsibil ity of
ta ckl ing t he pr oble m.
21 The report refers to the s ubmiss ion by one mini ng
com pan y tha t it ha d to p ass t hro ugh 7 7 des ks ta kin g a
minimum of 485 days.
22 Rajak (2007: 2-3) has made a scathin g critique of
CSR: “ Corpor ate So cial Respon sibil ity c laims a ra di-
cal break wit h the legacy of corpor ate ph ilanthropy
– charity replaced by the technocrat ic rati onali sm of
‘respo nsible compet itivene ss’ a nd ‘sustain able dev el-
opment’, while stakeholder engage ment a nd pa rtic i-
pat ion ta ke the place of the m ine m anage r’s pa tern al-
ism. …CSR claims the capacity to change the way in
which business it self is done. It assert s the happy co-
incidence of economic imperative a nd moral injunc-
tion – the convergence of economic value and ethical
va lues. It doe s so b y dra wing on a po wer ful p arad igm
of s oci al in vest ment thr ough part ner ship .”
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The economies worldwide have demonstrated a proclivity towards market-oriented, competitive, and globalized value chains (Kuruvilla, 1996; Lakhani et al., 2013; Lane & Probert, 2009). These economic shifts significantly impact the workplace’s industrial relations (IR) scenario. India took the ambitious step of economic liberalization in 1991, and ever since, successive governments have focused on the growth of GDP and rankings in ease of doing business (Chandra, 2018; Sengupta, 2009). Economic liberalization also ushered in the era of competition, global value chains, and production chains. The IR systems and the associated institutions bore the brunt of the massive economic liberalization effort (Milkman, 2020). The economic liberalization and the union decline had a cascading impact on the labour relations in the various sectors of the Indian economy. The Coal Sector is considered an important sector which contributes close to 1% of the country’s GDP and accounts for 55% of the energy needs (World Bank data and Coal Ministry) and consequently contributes to nation development also referred to as ‘King Coal’ (Roy & Schaffartzik, 2021). The coal sector in India has a mix of both permanent and informal workforce. The permanent workforce has almost 95% unionization rates and extensive coverage under collective bargaining. The informal workforce in the coal sector is either at the mercy of the legislation or the judiciary. This enormous gulf provides an excellent opportunity to assess the status of Labor Relations in the coal sector in India. To cement our understanding of IR transformation in the coal sector in India, we rely on the logics of action framework (Frenkel & Kuruvilla, 2002) and anchor our work on Lahiri-Dutt ‘s (2016) framework providing a typology of the coal extraction economy workforce in India Standing on the shoulders of giants, we have conducted the content analysis of the ten industry-wide collective bargaining agreements/Long term wage settlements in the coal industry covering a period of more than five decades (1975-2021) (Besamusca & Tijdens, 2015; Kuruvilla & Li, 2021). Further, we relied on the annual reports, public information, and several RTI (Right to Information Act, 2005) applications to the coal ministry of India and two public sector organizations (i.e., CIL and SCCL) under it. For the informal workforce, we analysed the recommendations of the High Powered Committee (HPC) on wages and working conditions, the provisions of relevant legislation, internal circulars of coal companies, and important judicial pronouncements. In doing so, we are able to get an understanding of the evolution of the IR systems through the lens of collective bargaining. Our results highlight a paradox in the IR transformation of the Indian coal sector compared to the changes in the industry and economy. Paradox alludes to components that might be logical and plausible independently but seem incompatible when combined, and consequently, there is an inherent tension (Lewis, 2000). While the permanent workforce despite its less numbers has five active trade unions, they are able to negotiate better terms including social security benefits and compassionate employment, the informal numbers despite their burgeoning numbers are still dependent on legislation or the judiciary. Based on our analysis we also speculate that the permanent workforce owing to the wage premium that they earn, may be erecting barriers for informal workers in the coal sector to collectivise (Sarkar, 2023). Amidst the transition to a liberal market economy and privatization, the SOEs in the coal sector seem to have adopted a model of adaptive capitalism. Our study provides some significant contributions to the literature. First, we join the debate on IR transformation by testing established measures in a unique context of IR (i.e., the Indian coal sector). So far, extant research has focused on Western and developed economies or India as an overall economy (Bhattacherjee, 2001). This investigation contributes to the IR literature by unveiling one hidden context of IR transformation in a developing economy. Second, we examine the alignment of IR transformation by focusing on one of the critical sectors and comparing it with the trend of the whole country and global context. This study will contribute to the IR literature by highlighting the anomalies in the same economy, which may have a different set of IR though operating in the same economy.
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Although the scholarly debate on industrial relations (IR) transformation is inclined towards the conclusion that the IR transformation is bound to take place with changes in the surrounding business environment, we observe a few exceptions in each economy. The current study investigates one of such curious IR contexts, i.e., the Indian coal sector. We rely on the “logic of the action” framework and the IR transformation measures to assess the sector at an aggregate and micro level. The coal sector in India consists of a mix of both permanent and informal workforce. With respect to the permanent workforce, we analysed the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) spanned over five decades (1975-2021). For the informal workforce, we analysed the recommendations of the High Powered Committee (HPC) on wages and working conditions, the provisions of relevant legislation, internal circulars of coal companies, and important judicial pronouncements. Our analyses revealed vast differences in wages and working conditions between the permanent and informal workforce. Despite a significant decline in the permanent workforce, they could negotiate better terms as the growing size of the informal workforce was yet to form a collective bargaining mechanism for better wages and working conditions. These results are indicative of a paradox which needs to be explored further. Our study advances the thesis of adaptive state capitalism in the coal sector through functional and numerical flexibility despite a politicised multi-union model in India.
Thesis
In the mineral-bearing tracts of Jharkhand, eastern India, coal mining operations have for decades been concentrated in areas inhabited by adivasi, or tribal, populations, and brought about dispossession, displacement, and the erosion of land- and forest-based ways of life. Based on 18 months of fieldwork in a miningaffected adivasi village, this thesis examines the variegated ways in which mining industrialisation has affected different groups of villagers – from informal coal peddlers to colliery employees – and its impact on the community as a whole. By providing an insight into their lives, livelihoods, and perspectives, the thesis challenges common understandings of the effects of mining and dispossession, and contributes to related debates on labour and politics. First, by contrast with prominent critical theories of dispossession, the thesis shows how rather than simply the destruction of rural communities, dispossession can lead primarily to socioeconomic differentiation within them, creating new and enhanced internal inequalities. By exploring these inequalities in relation to the different types of work, formal and informal, that have emerged locally as a result of mining, the thesis contributes to the literature on labour and precarity. It illustrates how different forms of informal labour can carry different degrees of precarity and meanings for labourers – in terms of stability, autonomy, work rhythms, and gender dynamics – that inflect their present and longer-term livelihood strategies. Second, contrary to the prevalent narrative of resistance to mining and dispossession by rural – and especially indigenous – communities, the thesis shows how such processes can produce not protest but acquiescence. By examining local forms of cooption and clientelism in relation to mining operations, the thesis contributes to debates on the politics of dispossession and (non-)resistance. It illuminates how political leaders and potential activists can become brokers between dispossessing projects and villagers, and how this can lead to shifts in everyday sociopolitical relations that act to curb rather than facilitate possibilities of collective action.
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Analyse des causes politiques et sociales du mouvement de rebellion des proprietaires fonciers de Bougainville, archipel des Salomon, qui debuta en 1988 contre les activites minieres installees dans l'ile par l'administration coloniale australienne
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This paper deals with the issue of displacement of the local communities as part of the Coal India mining project in Parej East in Jharkhand. It analyses the report of the World Bank's inspection panel, which examined the complaints regarding the handling of resettlement and rehabilitation of project-affected persons by Coal India. The panel found numerous flaws in the planning and implementation of the project, including several instances of non-compliance with the Bank's directives.
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A characteristic of the Jharia–Raniganj coalfields area is the sight of bicycles carrying sacks of coal, the bike being used as an inanimate packhorse with men pushing them along the roads connecting the mines with the neighbouring towns instead of pedalling. This is one tiny part of an extensive illegal coal supply network involving millions of tonnes annually. Who are these coal cycle wallahs, how much coal do they carry, where does the coal come from, and where does it go? Our objective here is to provide an estimate of one part of the 'black' (or illegal) coal economy in one part of the coal-producing tracts of India by describing the nature and extent of the supply of coal (or coke) provided by bicycles. We recognize that it is indeed a rather tiny part of the entire gamut of illegal coal mining, transportation, and distribution network that is in place in the colliery tracts of India. This paper examines this cycle distribution network and provides an estimate of the amount of coal supplied in this manner throughout the eastern Indian coalfields of Jharkhand and West Bengal. This estimate is based on recent field surveys of the amount of coal loaded onto cycles for transport to a particular town, assuming demand was local-and urban-population driven. The study was supported by previous experience in the field and by interviews with key informants. At the end, the paper attempts to explain the occurrence of the phenomenon of illegal coal mining and tries to provide some policy suggestions.
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