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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Parapsychological Phenomena as Examples of Generalized
Nonlocal Correlations—A Theoretical Framework
HARALD WALACH
Europa-Universität Viadrina, Institute for Transcultural Health Studies, Frankfurt (Oder), Germany
walach@europa-uni.de
WALTER VON LUCADOU
Parapsychological Counseling, Freiburg, Germany
HARTMANN RÖMER
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Institut für Physik, Freiburg, Germany
Submitted October 7, 2014; Accepted October 11, 2014; Published December 15, 2014
Abstract—Scientific facts are constituted as consensus about observable
phenomena against the background of an accepted, or at least plausible,
theory. Empirical data without a theoretical framework are at best curiosi-
ties and anomalies, at worst they are neglected. The problem of parapsy-
chological research since its inception with the foundation of the Society
of Psychical Research in 1882 was that no sound theoretical basis existed.
On the contrary, the proponents of the SPR often indulged in a theoretical
model that ran contrary to the perceived materialism of mainstream science,
and many tried to use the data of parapsychological research to bolster the
case of “mind over matter,” yet without producing a good model of how such
effects could be conceptualized. In general, parapsychological (PSI) research
has been rather devoid of theorizing and, if anything, assumed a tacit signal-
theoretical, local-causal model of some sort of subtle energy that would be
vindicated, once enough empirical data were amassed. History, and data,
proved this stance wrong. We will present a theoretical approach that chal-
lenges this local-causal, signal-theoretical approach by proposing that para-
psychological phenomena are instances of a larger class of phenomena that
are examples of nonlocal correlations. These are predicted by Generalized
Quantum Theory (GQT) and can be expected to occur, whenever global
descriptions of a system are complementary to or incompatible with local
descriptions of elements of such a system. We will analyze the standard
paradigms of PSI-research along those lines and describe how they can be
reconceptualized as instances of such generalized nonlocal correlations. A
direct consequence of this conceptual framework is that misrepresentations
of these phenomena as local causes, as is done in direct experimentation,
is bound to fail long-term. Strategies to escape this problem are discussed.
Journal of Scienti c Exploration, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 605–631, 2014 0892-3310/14
606 Har al d Wa la ch, Wa l ter v on Lu cad ou , a nd Ha rt man n Röm er
Introduction
What Is a Scientific Fact and Why Parapsychological Data Are No Such Facts
One of the biggest misunderstandings of science by popular writers and
indeed empirical researchers is the assumption that a scientific fact is
exclusively constituted of trustworthy and replicable observations by
competent observers (Dawkins 2006, Loughlin, Lewith, & Falkenberg
2013, Martin 2004, Sheldrake 2013). One could not be more mistaken,
and readers, as well as authors, of this Journal are among those who have
experienced this truism (Gernert 2008, Martin 1998). This view has been
haunting science since the heydays of neopositivism at the beginning of the
20th century in the Vienna circle, when philosophers of science thought
that the kernel of science is observation, and that many observations are
joined together to arrive at theories (Smith 1994). This crudely and purely
inductive view of science has since proved plainly wrong (Suppe 1977).
Hanson showed that each and every observation is theory-laden, and that no
such thing as naïve, objective observation exists. Popper argued that only a
deductive way of reasoning, starting from theory, or at least a hypothesis,
a daring conjecture, would enable science to progress, because every
inductive model of science would not be able to solve the Humean problem
(Popper 1976). This consists of a circular argument: Each inductivist model
has to stipulate at least one non-empirical sentence, the induction principle
itself, in order to be able to use inductive observation in the first place. More
historical and pragmatic approaches to science proved Popper insufficient
(Kuhn 1955, Putnam 1975, Laudan 1977), and if there is any consensus
among Science and Technology Study scholars at all, then it is a historical
social consensus about how science operates (Toulmin 1985). It is a largely
social enterprise, within which those observations are counted as facts that
can be communicated well, because they are made against the background
of an accepted theory, have been shown to be reasonably robust against
modifications, and can be replicated by competent observers. Social–
historical studies, like those of Bruno Latour, have shown that consensus
about theories and observation is only a minimal requirement (Latour 1999,
Latour & Bastide 1986). A scientific agent needs to be able to also draw
on the benevolence of important communicators and political agencies. In
the examples studied by him these were elite groups such as the French
National Academy, or political decisionmakers, or important newspaper
editors.
In our day, these opinion leaders outside the scientific community
proper are powerful science editors of journals, newspapers, and TV
magazines, funding agencies, and political decisionmakers (Emerson,
Par as psy ch olo gi cal P hen om ena a s N on loc al Co rrel at ion s 607
Warme, Wolf, Heckman, Brand, & Leopold 2010, Henderson 2010, Lee,
Sugimoto, Zhang, & Cronin 2013, Ritter 2011).
A successful scientific theory for any class of phenomena thus consists
of at least of three components:
1) There is a good theoretical model that is accepted by a majority
of scientists active in the investigation of these phenomena.
2) There is a repeated and replicable observation that can be shared
by competent observers and replicated within reasonable limits
by them.
3) There is a communicative consensus within the scientific
discourse and among those who wield the wands of power therein.
This consensus has to pertain both to the acknowledgement of
the observations and the acceptability of the theoretical model.
1) without 2) and 3) is only a toy model, interesting to play with, but
without consequences. 2) without 1) and 3) is an anomaly at best, but
normally just a nuisance. 1) and 2) without 3) constitutes a scientific fringe
culture.
Parapsychology (PSI), since its inception which can be dated to the
foundation of the Society of Psychical Research in 1882 (Society for
Psychical Research 1882), is at best such a scientific fringe culture, without,
however, really agreeing on a good and accepted theoretical background.
If there was any commonality among the founders of PSI-research then it
was a tacit opposition against what was perceived as the crypto-materialism
of the mainstream scientific model. However, 130 years of research,
some at high-profile university institutions, have not really brought us
any further toward some acceptance by the mainstream. The reasons for
this are debatable. Mainstream science is not convinced by a vague and
undifferentiated rejection of materialism.
Moreover, critics normally point to the fact that a lot of the evidence is
purely anecdotal and some of the experimental evidence fails some crucial
tests, such as independent replicability and stability of observations under
changed framework conditions (Alcock 2003, French 2003, Milton &
Wiseman 1999). Although meta-analyses of experimental models in PSI
research are generally positive overall, with stunning odds, even though
effect sizes are sometimes small (Mossbridge, Tressoldi, & Utts 2012,
Schmidt 2012, Schmidt, Schneider, Utts, & Walach 2004, Storm, Tressoldi,
& Di Riso 2012, Tressoldi 2011), it cannot be denied that some decisive
replication studies have failed spectacularly, pouring water on the mills
of critics (Jahn et al. 2000, Milton & Wiseman 1999, Ritchie, Wiseman,
608 Har al d Wa la ch, Wa l ter v on Lu cad ou , a nd Ha rt man n Röm er
& French 2012, Schmidt, Erath, Ivanova, & Walach 2009, Schmidt,
Tippenhauer, & Walach 2001).
Apart from this, very little attention has been paid to the theoretical
background models that might hold for parapsychological effects. After
some popularity of observational theories in the 1970s, most researchers
seem to have turned back to a tacit local, signal theoretical concept of PSI-
effects. We will explain in the following section what we mean by that. By
now it should be clear why PSI is at best fringe, scientifically speaking:
x The observations communicated within and outside the PSI
community are not really stable and replicable enough.
x There is no accepted/acceptable background theory.
x There is no consensus about those purported facts within the
PSI-community, let alone within the larger scientific community.
In what follows we will tackle the issue of a sufficient background
theory that offers a model which is, at least potentially,
1. communicable and acceptable, because it connects to the core
of mainstream science,
2. capable of making clear why the empirical pattern of overall
effect and failure to replicate in decisive experiments repeats
itself,
3. able to make the varied phenomenology of PSI phenomena
understandable.
We will use the model of Generalized Quantum Theory (GQT), which
we have developed as a theoretical frame (Atmanspacher, Filk, & Römer
2006, Atmanspacher, Römer, & Walach 2002, Filk & Römer 2011). From
it we can derive generalized entanglement correlations (GET) as predicted
theoretical consequences, which can in turn, at least potentially and in
principle, explain PSI phenomenology (Lucadou, Römer, & Walach 2007,
we also refer to this publication for technical details omitted in this note).
We will show with a few examples what this means. We will finally mention
some framework conditions for future empirical work that can be derived
from our model.
The Local-Causal Model of PSI and the Signal-
Theoretical Assumptions of the Experimental Approach
Experiments are the final arbiter and authority of modern-day science,
ever since Galileo and others paved the way in practical terms and Francis
Par as psy ch olo gi cal P hen om ena a s N on loc al Co rrel at ion s 609
Bacon laid the theoretical foundations. Experiments are precise questions
to Nature, and experimental results are Nature’s answer to us. Two decisive
presuppositions often go unnoticed, which we should recall. One was
already made explicit by Francis Bacon, the other seems trivial but is rarely
discussed. Bacon defined experiments as explicitly sought experiences.
“Experience remains. If it happens just in passing, we call it accident. If we
seek it out, we call it experiment” (Bacon 1990:182). Experiments are willful
manipulations of Nature. Observations are naturally occurring experiences,
experiments are manipulated experiences. Thus experiments make the
presupposition that we can actually manipulate something and still receive
a valid answer. The second, even more important, presupposition is that
experiments presuppose a continuity and stability in Nature. No matter by
whom, where on earth, or when an experiment is made, we expect, grosso
modo, the same results. We do this because we assume that experiments
are detectors of stable causes, and those causes, we assume, are regular. If
something works only on Mondays, and some other days, we would not
count it as a regular cause. Hume had made regularity one of the hallmarks
of the notion of a cause, the other being temporal precession and local
contiguity (Hume 1977:Section IX:109ff). Experiments are detectors for
such stable, replicable, regular causes, or at least for conditions of that type
which we can use to analyze causes from them. An astronomer who observes
a red-shift in a certain stellar region of a certain magnitude will expect to
see this through any good telescope on earth on any good observation night,
and if he communicates his observation to other astronomers he will be
confident that they will also see the same amount of red-shift. This is a
regular phenomenon that can be used to infer potential causes, for instance
the speed of a retracting light source, or the magnitude of some deflecting
source, depending on the theory.
Precisely because experiments have been so pivotal and successful
in the history of modern science, it is not surprising that PSI researchers
turned their hopes to experimentation. While early-days PSI research was
mainly observational in nature, mapping PSI experiences of the population
and observing mediums and séances, J. B. Rhine and others introduced the
experimental paradigm. Thereby they transposed the tacit presuppositions
of experiments—regularity, locality, availability at will—onto the subject
matter of PSI. It is important and worthwhile to note that the early-days
researchers did not necessarily hold such a crypto-causal theory of PSI
effects. Barrett, for instance, wrote, in what was the first call to the public
to help with research by offering instances of “thought reading” in the
[London] Times:
610 Har al d Wa la ch, Wa l ter v on Lu cad ou , a nd Ha rt man n Röm er
I shall be glad to receive communications . . . on two points—of cases of the
direct action of one mind upon another giving rise to an apparent transfu-
sion of thought or feeling, occurring either in abnormal conditions . . . or of
cases where, under normal conditions, perceptions may seem to occur inde-
pendent of the ordinary channels of sensation. (Barrett 1882:48, italics ours)
Note that he spoke of “transfusion of thought or feeling” presupposing
some sort of correlational or connectedness model. Fifty years later he
explicitly criticized his colleagues for adopting a crypto-signal theoretical
model, when he wrote:
The phrase thought transference is apt to be misleading, as it seems to sug-
gest a transmission of ideas between two persons across material space; but,
as I said, space does not seem to enter into the question at all. Here it may
be interesting to note that in the first publication of the discovery of this
super-sensuous faculty, I called it not thought transference, but transfusion of
thought. We are now coming back to this idea, for telepathy is probably the
intermingling of our transcendental selves or souls. (Barrett 1924: 294)
Barrett notes correctly that “thought transference” adopts a theoretical
model that assumes some signal travelling through space from one mind
to another, and criticizes it for its theoretical assumptions. It is exactly
this theoretical assumption that has then inspired experimental research in
PSI. It has not only inspired it, it was the tacit presupposition on which
experimental work is predicated in very general terms.
Such a model assumes, tacitly, that PSI effects (Lucadou 1995)
1. are regular
2. are accessible at will
3. are transported by some, as yet unidentified, local-causal carrier
4. can be accumulated statistically
5. are in principle independent of meaning.
All these assumptions are in our view problematic, probably even
wrong, but have rarely been debated critically. What is most important
among them, though, is the locality assumption.
The Locality Principle and the Difficulties of a Local Model of PSI
“Locality” means that regions in our universe that influence each other
causally need to be connected by a physical signal that exchanges energy
in order to make the influence real (Reichenbach 1957). Since, according
to Special Relativity, signals can only travel at the finite speed of light of
Par as psy ch olo gi cal P hen om ena a s N on loc al Co rrel at ion s 611
approximately 300,000 km/sec, all potentially known signals in the universe
take at least some time to reach from an agent to its target. If distances are
large, and if the signal is not radiated into a fixed direction but rather emitted
in all directions, then signal dilution and the inverse power law come into
play: The energy of a signal as collected by a detector decays by the inverse
squared distance between source and detector, i.e. the further away a cause
of influence, the stronger the signal has to be initially to reach its target.
This is why mobile phone signals need repeaters to boost their energy.
Now, any cause that can be conceived of in our current physical world
model needs to conform to this generic model and obey these presuppositions
to be called a cause. In other words, in our mainstream model causes are
always some kind of signal. In addition, all signals can be described by
the transmission of particles, either usual particles or field quanta if the
signal is conceived as the field effect. For instance, photons are the quanta
of the electromagnetic field. As for the gravitational field, gravitational
interactions are ubiquitous, the existence of gravitational waves is well-
established by indirect evidence, for instance from double pulsars, and as a
result of intensive large-scale research over several decades, gravitational
detectors are expected to register gravitational waves in the near future.
The detection of single quanta of the gravitational field, called gravitons, is
hardly feasible: Because of the low frequencies of all known gravitational
fields, the energies of the gravitons must be extremely low.
In addition to electromagnetic and gravitational interactions, the
current standard model of physics knows two more kinds of fundamental
interactions: so-called weak and strong interactions. Both of them have a
very short range, much less than the diameter of an atom. Gravitational
effects under laboratory conditions are very small indeed. So, on the
basis of the Standard Model of the universe, apart from the transmission
of ordinary matter, currently only the electromagnetic force is a candidate
for an effective local-causal model of PSI effects. Such influences can
experimentally be shielded off easily and effectively.
Every local model of PSI based on known established facts has to face
very serious problems.
If any local cause is presupposed, and just for argument’s sake we
assume the electromagnetic force is seen as a candidate, then it becomes
very difficult to understand how effects at a large distance can be
conceptualized. Granted that there may be a weak signal being emitted by a
brain—and the invention of the EEG was in fact predicated on just such an
assumption following a telepathic experience of its inventor, Hans Berger—
we can assume it is weak, in fact it is on the order of some microvolts, and
hence will decay rapidly. How do we explain telepathic effects over many
612 Har al d Wa la ch, Wa l ter v on Lu cad ou , a nd Ha rt man n Röm er
thousands of miles, as have been documented? How do we explain distant
healing that has been documented at least anecdotally to be independent of
distance?
Any local signal is bound—by the current standard model—to travel
forward in time. A vast array of PSI effects are independent of time, or even
reach backward in time or forward in time. Precognition is a communication
of a mind with its future state. Using a local model would mean that we
can communicate faster than light. This, in turn, gives rise to paradoxes of
intervention into the past that were demonstrated 40 years ago to arise if a
local model of signal transfer violates Special Relativity (Fitzgerald 1971).
Hence local signal-theoretical models of PSI run into severe difficulties,
when it comes to explaining precognition.
One can always stipulate other or new kinds of signals that are as yet
undiscovered. Such a theoretical stance comes at high cost: The scientific
community is reluctant to accept such an assumption a priori, because it
would mean that the whole well-proven standard model that is complex
enough as it stands would have to be reworked, and no one wants to do that
without a very good reason. Thus there is bound to be wild resistance against
such a proposal. This is in part a social, but very important argument. Some
such models have been proposed, for instance assuming multi-dimensional
geometries that would allow for other types of regular signals (e.g., Zöllner
1922, Heim 1984, 1989). But for competent physicists, they can clearly be
seen not to be state of the art and/or contradicting established physical facts.
We think that the locality-principle fails in PSI research for various
reasons: (1) The empirical database is incompatible with its basic
assumptions. PSI effects are independent of distance and time. This is a
strong argument against any local model, at least within the constraints of
the standard model. (2) PSI effects are also not in the same sense regular
and available at will as local-causal effects are normally assumed to be.
Hence, we feel, it is time to search for a nonlocal and non-causal model.
Generalized Quantum Theory, Generalized
Entanglement, and a Non-Local Model of PSI
Generalized Quantum Theory
Generalized Quantum Theory was born out of two impulses: For one,
there was the intuition that a theoretical structure that was so successful
in explaining the material world might also be useful in other contexts. In
addition, we wanted to see what a minimal theoretical frame would look
like that could call itself quantum-theoretical and yet would be free of
the restrictions that are typical for physical quantum theory proper. So, if
Par as psy ch olo gi cal P hen om ena a s N on loc al Co rrel at ion s 613
one generalizes quantum theory and asks the question: Exactly what is it
that defines a theory as “quantum-theoretical”?, then there is a simple and
surprising answer: It is the capability of the theory to handle incompatible,
or complementary, or non-commuting operations (Atmanspacher, Filk, &
Römer 2006, Atmanspacher, Römer, & Walach 2002, Filk & Römer 2011,
Walach & Stillfried 2011, Walach & von Stillfried 2011). Our normal,
classical, theories do not have that requirement: We can measure the
trajectory of a cannonball and then determine its momentum, or the other
way round. The measurement of one variable is independent of that of the
other variable, and neither measurement necessarily disturbs the measured
object or invalidates previous measurements. This is the type of theory that
is applied in nearly all branches of science currently, except in the quantum
realm. We call such a theory a classical theory.
However, we assume that there are many other instances where
quantum-type theories are necessary. Whenever a measurement necessarily
and inevitably impacts on the measured object and changes its state, we
have a non-classical situation that needs to be described by a quantum-
type, or a non-classical theory. In psychology this is obviously the case
rather frequently. For instance, whenever a therapist directs the attention of
a client to his or her as-yet-undefined bad feelings and the client then comes
up with a precise description, the feeling itself has changed. This is the
gist of good therapy. Whenever a patient uses the items of a questionnaire
to describe some state of affairs, the answering of the questionnaire will
have changed the state to some extent. Any introspection is bound to change
the state of mind of the participant. Thus, a lot of psychology is in fact
a good candidate for a quantum-like theoretical treatment. Learning and
understanding, for instance, are non-commuting operations. Normally,
we learn first and then understand, and we cannot willfully change the
sequence. Clinically speaking it will make a difference whether we first try
to understand a patient and then apply a battery of questionnaires or vice
versa. All those operations, where sequencing effects are of importance and
where a different sequence of events will yield different results, are non-
classical, or quantum-type, in nature, and a quantum-like theory is useful
to model them.
As already mentioned, a general formalism providing a minimal
scheme in which the essential notions of incompatibility, complementarity,
and entanglement (to be described later in this note) can be defined in a
clear and meaningful way, without employing additional structural features
necessary for quantum physics in the narrow sense, was developed under
the name of “Generalized Quantum Theory” (GQT), initially called “Weak
Quantum Theory” (Atmanspacher, Filk, & Römer 2006, Atmanspacher,
614 Har al d Wa la ch, Wa l ter v on Lu cad ou , a nd Ha rt man n Röm er
Römer, & Walach 2002, Filk & Römer 2011). By shedding features that
are specific for quantum physics, the formalism of GQT is applicable and
in fact has found many applications beyond the realm of physics. Filk and
Römer (2011) provide a list of applications, and Atmanspacher and Römer
(2012) applied it to sequencing of questions in questionnaires. If necessary,
the formalism of GQT can be enriched stepwise to again yield the full
quantum theoretical formalism.
It turns out that in fact the only and most important decisive marker
of a quantum-like theory is exactly its capacity to model incompatible
operations. For a complete description of GQT we refer to the original
publications (Atmanspacher, Filk, & Römer 2006, Atmanspacher, Römer,
& Walach 2002, Filk & Römer 2011). Here we restrict ourselves to a few
hints. In GQT the notions of “system,” “states,” and “observables” are taken
over from physical quantum theory. An observable A of a system is a feature
of the system which can be observed, i.e. “measured” in a meaningful
way, yielding a result that has factual validity. This means the following:
If a measurement of A has yielded a result, say a, then immediately after
the measurement the system is in an “eigenstate,” in which a repeated
measurement of A would yield the same result a with certainty. After a
measurement of B following A the system is in an eigenstate of B, and after
a measurement of A following B the system is in an eigenstate of A. Two
observables A and B are called complementary or incompatible, if there are
measured values of one of them, say value a of A, such that no eigenstate
of A to the value a can be an eigenstate of B. A and B are justly called
incompatible, because we cannot always define their values precisely at
the same time. For incompatible observables A and B the order in which
they are measured will matter. In this sense, A and B do not “commute”
with each other. Observables A an B are called compatible if they are not
complementary, i.e if their measurements are interchangeable and do not
disturb one another. In a classical setting every observable is compatible
with all the others. In (Generalized) Quantum Theory two observables need
not be compatible but may be complementary. Whenever one of the two
incompatible observables is precisely defined, our knowledge of the other
observable may be reduced in precision. In quantum physics proper the
Heisenberg uncertainty relationship is an expression of this situation. Yet
such incompatible or complementary observables have to be employed at
the same time to describe one and the same object or situation. For particles,
the classical example is given by location and momentum. Previous
classical theories had no need of such concepts. It was Nils Bohr and his co-
researchers who were the first to discover that in order to model quantum-
physical effects one had to employ two concepts at the same time that are in
Par as psy ch olo gi cal P hen om ena a s N on loc al Co rrel at ion s 615
conflict, yet both necessary. Bohr imported the notion “complementarity”
from psychology to describe this situation conceptually (Rosenfeld
1953, 1963). Through the precise definition within quantum mechanics,
complementarity became a clear notion and is in fact operationalized as
incompatible or non-commuting operations. The result of our analysis of
generalizing quantum theory yielded the somewhat surprising, but easy to
grasp result:
The defining element of any quantum-theoretical approach is the capacity
to handle non-commuting, or incompatible, or complementary operations.
If everything else is relaxed, definitions given up, precisions dropped,
and the final element left intact that is necessary to define a quantum-
theoretical approach, it is the handling of such incompatible variables or
operations. Thus, the stipulation and the challenge of generalized quantum
theory is that other situations might require such a description as well. We
have above pointed to some examples from psychology. There are quite a few
other areas that might require such quantum-like descriptions. For instance,
it has been shown that the switching behavior of bistable images follows
a dynamic that can be predicted and modeled using GQT (Atmanspacher,
Bach, Filk, Kornmeier, & Römer 2008, Atmanspacher, Filk, & Römer
2004). Others have found that using a quantum-like formalism for modeling
results of cognition experiments makes the modeling more precise and more
closely conforming to empirical results (Pothos & Busemeyer 2013). One
can speculate that other situations of our lived world contain incompatible
descriptors. Typical candidates for such pairs could be
x goodness and justice
x form and content
x structure and function
x individual and community
to name but a few.
What is important to understand here is that complementary or
incompatible concepts cannot be located on the same conceptual plane.
Contradictory pairs of opposites can be formally modelled as negations: a
= ¬b; b = ¬a such as in “warm is not cold”, or “false is not true”. Figuratively
speaking, they can only be located on an orthogonal conceptual system, and
none can be reduced to the other, but of course not all orthogonal concepts
are complementary.
Whenever such candidates for complementary or incompatible pairs
616 Har al d Wa la ch, Wa l ter v on Lu cad ou , a nd Ha rt man n Röm er
are necessary, we are dealing, by default, with a quantum-like system, and a
generalized quantum theory (GQT) is applicable to handle such situations.
Entanglement
One interesting consequence of GQT is of particular importance: GQT, as
well as physical quantum theory, predicts a generalized form of nonlocal
correlations.
Schrödinger had discovered this phenomenon in 1935 in the formalism
of Quantum Theory and named it “entanglement“ (Schrödinger 1935). It
denotes a situation whereby elements of a quantum system remain correlated
no matter how separated they are in space or in time. Suppose we have
a quantum system, two twin-photons say, that have been down-converted
through a beam-splitting crystal, and we were able to send one photon
to alpha-centauri and the other photon to some other star, and we had a
measurement apparatus on alpha-centauri that measures one of the photon’s
properties, say its polarization in a given direction, then we would have
immediate knowledge about the corresponding polarization of the second
photon that is, by definition, several light years away. Thus, no potential
local signal could travel and convey the information between the two
measurement apparatuses. This phenomenon occurs because the so-called
entangled state of the total system is well-determined, but the polarization
of neither of the single photons is determined until it is measured. Exactly
which polarization value will be measured for one photon is uncertain, but
once there is one value defined by measurement, the other one is immediately
known. This holds independent of space and time. This correlation is called
entanglement, or EPR-correlation (for Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, who
were the first to use this situation for a thought experiment), or nonlocal
correlation.
Entanglement has long remained a kind of a theoretical nuisance of
quantum mechanics, but now it is an established fact with emerging technical
applications. Moreover, Bell (Bell 1964, 1987) derived inequalities for
correlations between disjoint parts of certain composite systems such that
these inequalities should always be fulfilled in classical systems but are
violated for some entangled states of quantum systems. These inequalities
are experimentally testable and are indeed found to be violated, a strong
argument for quantum theory and against an exclusively classical world
view (Aspect, Dalibard, & Roger 1982, Aspect, Grangier, & Roger 1982).
Because the experimental setup was such that a communication between the
measurement apparatuses was excluded by principle, these correlations are
nonlocal: No classical signal mediates this corresponding behavior. Rather,
it is a consequence of the systemic setup. It has been shown meanwhile
Par as psy ch olo gi cal P hen om ena a s N on loc al Co rrel at ion s 617
that photons, electrons, or multi-particle systems can be entangled, and
entanglement has been experimentally shown to hold over many kilometers
(Gröblacher, Paterek, Katenbaek, Brukner, Zukowski, Aspelmeyer, et al.
2007, Hackermüller, Uttenthaler, Hornberger, Reiger, Brezger, & Zeilinger
2003, Kwiat, Barraza-Lopez, Stefanov, & Gisin 2001, Pan, Bouwmeester,
Daniell, Weinfurter, Zeilinger, et al. 2002, Salart, Baas, Branciard, Gisin,
& Zbinden 2008, Stefanov, Zbinden, Gisin, & Suarez 2002). Futuristic
applications such as quantum computing and encryption are founded on this
phenomenon, and proof-of-principle studies have already been conducted
(Duan, 2011, Nielsen & Chuang 2000, Niskanen, Harrabi, Yoshibara,
Nakamura, Lloyd, & Tsai 2007, Olmschenk, Matsukevich, Maunz, Hayes,
Duan, & Monroe 2009, Parigi, Zavatta, Kim, & Bellini 2007, Petta,
Johnson, Taylor, Laird, Yacoby, Lukin, Marcus, Hanson, & Gossard 2005,
Reichle, Leibfried, Knill, Britton, Blakestad, Jost, Langer, Ozeri, Seidelin,
& Wineland 2006, Svozil 2001, Tóth & Lent 2001).
For what follows it is important to note that we do not assume that
quantum-mechanical, physical entanglement correlations are magnified
and transported into the macroscopic realm. Although not impossible in
principle, such a scenario is unlikely, because these correlations decay fast,
as soon as interactions with other systems are happening.
In quantum physics, entanglement is normally discussed by constructing
the state space of a composite system as a tensor product of the state spaces
of its components, and entangled states are defined as not being factorizable
with respect to the tensor product. The notion of tensor products is not
available in the most general form of GQT. But, in fact, even in quantum
physics the core of the notion of entanglement is independent of these
technical details. The decisive feature is a complementarity relationship
between global observables pertaining to the system as a whole and local
observables pertaining to its parts. In the two-photon example, the global
observable is an observable having the entangled global state as an eigenstate.
This observable is complementary to the local polarization observables of
the individual photons, whose values are in fact indeterminate in the global
entangled state. Measuring one local polarization changes the entangled
global state.
Now, the notion of entanglement can readily be taken over into GQT,
a consequence of complementarity between global and local observables
(Atmanspacher, Filk, & Römer 2006, Atmanspacher, Römer, & Walach
2002, Filk & Römer 2011, Lucadou, Römer & Walach 2007. For a detailed
discussion of entanglement in GQT with many examples, see Römer 2011a,
2011b).
The genuinely quantum theoretical phenomenon of entanglement can
618 Har al d Wa la ch, Wa l ter v on Lu cad ou , a nd Ha rt man n Röm er
and in general will show up also in GQT if the following conditions are
fulfilled:
1) A system is given, inside which subsystems can be identified.
Entanglement phenomena will be best visible if the subsystems
are sufficiently separated such that local observables pertaining to
different subsystems are compatible.
2) There is a global observable of the total system, which is comple-
mentary to local observables of the subsystems.
3) The total system is in an entangled state. For instance, eigenstates of
the global observable are typically entangled states.
Given these conditions, the measured values of the local observables
will in general be uncertain because of the complementarity of the global
and the local observables. However, entanglement correlations will be
observed between the measured values of the local observables. These
correlations are nonlocal and instantaneous. Einstein, trying to argue for an
incompleteness of quantum mechanics, spoke about “spooky interactions”
in this connection. Entanglement correlations are not due to causal
interactions between the subsystems. Rather, such correlations without
interactions are a witness of the holistic character of composite quantum
systems: The states of the subsystems in general do not determine the
state of the total system. Vice versa, the holistic state of the total system
does not determine the measured values of local observables pertaining to
the subsystems. The holistic character of the total quantum state resides
in entanglement correlations between the subsystems which enter into the
common pattern of a global entangled state.
It is not difficult to show that in quantum physics entanglement
correlations cannot be used for signal transmission between different
subsystems. This must also hold in GQT in order to prevent bizarre
intervention paradoxes, and is formulated as an axiom “NT” (“Non
Transmission”) (Lucadou, Römer, & Walach 2007) in GQT. One may even
turn the argument around and state that whenever correlations between
subsystems can be used for signal transfer, they must be of a causal nature
and entanglement must be absent or at least not dominant. Like quantum-
mechanical entanglement correlations, GET correlations are not bound by
space and time. Theoretically they can be even quite strong because they are
not necessarily subject to the tendency of rapid decay prevailing in quantum
physics.
Note two important corollaries here: The setup of GET is strictly
driven by the systemic setup of the whole system and independent of its
Par as psy ch olo gi cal P hen om ena a s N on loc al Co rrel at ion s 619
physical makeup. The system in question could be a physical system, a
mental system, or a mix of two different systems. But they have to be
joined together by a strong common systemic boundary, for instance by
meaning or pragmatic information (PI) that defines the system (Weizsäcker
1974). Second: The GQT model makes no predictions as to whether such
correlations are ontic in nature, as in quantum physics proper, or epistemic,
i.e. due to our lack of knowledge or our epistemic condition. For practical
purposes this is irrelevant, but it should be noted. Some experimental PSI
phenomena appear to be ontic (Schmidt 1976, Lucadou, Römer, & Walach
2007).
Application to PSI Research
Thus, whenever we have a clearly defined system that binds together
subsystems whose description is complementary to the description of
the whole system, we expect nonlocal correlations between the systemic
elements. Let us probe the model for particular situations. We start with the
usual parapsychological terminology, but it goes without saying that these
concepts are attached to the model of signal-transfer, and thus the empirical
and theoretical basis to use them is questionable as we argued above. The
following discussion will put these phenomena in the framework of our
GET non-signal model.
Telepathy
Telepathy, or “thought reading” as Barrett had called it, is the phenomenon
that one mind has access to the content of another mind without classical
means of knowledge or communication. This happens, typically, not with
people we meet by accident, but normally only when the two persons
are somehow related, as with siblings, parents and children, or are
psychologically close, such as lovers or spouses. Also, doctors and therapists
report these phenomena and use them as therapeutic intuition. One could
make a case that therapeutic fantasies, which psychoanalytically trained
therapists often refer to as “transferences,” are in fact instances of such
telepathic connections, and Freud is known to have been interested in these
cases (Simmonds 2006); but this leads us too far astray. In all those cases
we have a clear systemic boundary: The boundary is constituted by kinship
and genetics, or by a ritual, as in marriage, or in a therapeutic situation. The
global observable is connectedness or “organizational closure” (OC) (Varela
1981). The local observables are separation or individuality. These, we hold,
are complementary, and hence the preconditions for nonlocal correlations
between the two systems are fulfilled. Mental content of one system can
620 Har al d Wa la ch, Wa l ter v on Lu cad ou , a nd Ha rt man n Röm er
appear as mental content of the other system, and vice versa. Exactly when
and why such an experience is bound to happen is difficult to predict, as the
model is not precise enough for such predictions. Experience and anecdotal
evidence would suggest that this happens mostly when one individual is in
need or in danger, when the connection is very strong as in couples wildly
in love, or something is bothering a person, as in unprocessed trauma or
dissociation, or in strong unintegrated inner pain.
It is clear from this analysis that the process can be reversed.
Healing
This happens in instances of intentional healing, whether from a distance
or with contact (Walach 2005). Here, a healer forms a strong systemic
bond, normally through a ritual, cultivates an intention in his or her mind,
usually supported by ritual or imagination, and, by virtue of the nonlocal
correlatedness between the two persons, the envisaged situation may occur.
The complementary pair is again connectedness and individuality. Likely,
there is also a second complementary pair operative here: The imagination
of the desired state as actual leads to a complementarity between future
potentiality, or the aim of healing, and current reality, the actual situation.
This may be the vehicle of operation, but clearly we need more conceptual
analysis.
Clairvoyance
In clairvoyance, content is experienced mentally that is physically
available elsewhere, as in remote viewing or when people guess material
that is somewhere present where they have no classical access. Remote
viewing studies have shown this is possible, at least in principle (May
1996, McMoneagle 2000, Puthoff 1996, Targ 1996, Targ & Katra 2000,
Utts 1996). Again, we have a ritual systemic closure (OC) between an
individual and the object, sometimes through a physical ritual that an
envelope or something else has touched, held in the hand, or put somewhere
close to one’s body. Sometimes the ritual is purely mental. The same
complementarity holds as above between connectedness (global variable)
and separation (local variables). And by virtue of GET content may show up
in the mind of the person seeking the information. Again, we do not know
under which circumstances such processes work, and the classified work
of U.S. intelligence has shown that it works but is not precise enough for
espionage (Targ 1996, Puthoff 1996, Utts 1996). But the model can make
plausible why and how this can happen.
Par as psy ch olo gi cal P hen om ena a s N on loc al Co rrel at ion s 621
Psychokinesis
Psychokinesis, spuk, or poltergeist phenomena happen whenever an inner
mental process affects a physical system directly without the mediation
of classical local causes (Lucadou 1995). The more spectacular cases are
called poltergeist, where visible events in the macro-world happen without
apparent causes. Documented cases report tables whirled around and
toppled, bookcases fallen over, fires started and extinguished by themselves,
knives, stones, and other heavy objects thrown around, etc. (Imich 1995,
Roll 2003, West 1990). Phenomenologically speaking, such situations seem
to require an “agent”, someone who suffers from a—usually—unconscious
conflict that cannot be and must not be known and expressed. In such a
situation the poltergeist phenomenon seems to “express” the mental content
phenomenologically. One of us was involved in a poltergeist-resolution
where a young female secretary was strongly focused on her boss, a
relationship which was impossible to express, because the boss was happily
married and had no interest in pursuing a relationship. In short: The spuk
started when the boss had to go on a business trip. He said to his employees:
“Only call me if there is fire!” Sure enough, after the boss had gone on his
trip, fires started in his office. The boss had to return. Later, the shutters of
the windows, without anybody setting them ablaze began to burn when his
wife came to the office. As a funny aside, the German word for shutters is
jalousie, derived from the French, meaning jealous. Thus, this particular
poltergeist also had the phenomenological wisdom to express the inner
dynamics of the jealous secretary, who likely was jealous of the wife.
How can such a strange situation be conceptualized? Again, we have a
strong systemic closure (OC) that ties together various systemic elements.
We normally have poltergeist phenomena within families. Here we have
it within a company and within a subsystem of the company formed by
the boss and his secretary, who, however, has no chance of expressing
and fulfilling, perhaps not even admitting or being aware of her feelings.
This forms a strong subsystem between the secretary and her boss.
Again, complementarity between connectedness and individuality holds,
describing the global and the local observables. Strong emotional material,
usually disavowed or disconnected from the inner life, seeks some form
of expression. As it happens, the expression is found in the outer reality
that bears some symbolic connectedness with the total system. Thus, a
nonlocal correlation becomes operative that exists between elements of
a system by virtue of a strong systemic boundary. Exactly why material
objects are involved, and not, say, only mental content as in clairvoyance,
is a point for debate. One could speculate that, had the boss been more
622 Har al d Wa la ch, Wa l ter v on Lu cad ou , a nd Ha rt man n Röm er
receptive and felt the strong connection, verbalized this, and helped the
secretary express and live through her feelings, the poltergeist would not
have been necessary. In that sense, we conceptualize poltergeist as a more
massive form of nonlocal correlation that is normally felt in telepathy, that
becomes operative if telepathy fails, or perhaps under yet-to-be-defined
other boundary conditions.
Micro-PK as is used in experimental realizations, when voluntary
subjects are to influence random processes, is simply a more artificial
setting using the same processes.
Precognition and Presentiment
Precognition is, conceptually speaking, the most challenging phenomenon,
because it defies, by definition, a local explanation. In it a mental system
receives content about its future state. Even if precognition is targeted at
future events, as in classical prophecies, it is still a relationship of a mind
with its future state, as the events can only be relevant as known or otherwise
mentally present. A slight variation is presentiment, where the content is
not consciously known but subconsciously felt and made visible by, for
instance, monitoring autonomic arousal. But if we adopt a wide notion of
“mind” and “mental content” to also comprise subliminal mental material
and all elements processed by our neuronal system, then we can also include
presentiment.
We have again a systemic boundary that comprises the mental system
and its future state. The boundary is set here by meaning (PI). Precognitive
events and presentiment effects are not arbitrary, but happen for a reason. In
presentiment they have been experimentally discovered in a situation where
the individual is about to face potentially threatening situations and can thus
be thought of as a warning system. In other precognitive situations, as in
precognitive dreams, we observe, phenomenologically speaking, the same
thing. They usually either have a warning or a preparatory function that
help the individual deal with dangerous or important situations. Thus the
systemic closure is one of meaning and relevance. As an interesting aside,
this can only be defined by the future event that actually will happen in
the distant future. However, if it forms a systemic boundary with a present
mental system, then, by definition, a future meaning has an effect in the
present, pointing to a deficient current notion of time anyway. But this is just
an aside. Systemic closure is produced by meaning and importance, or the
pragmatic information that is being processed. The complementarity that is
operative here seems to be one between potentiality, the global descriptor,
and actuality, the local descriptor. This forms the basis for the entanglement
between the present moment state of the mental system and its future state.
Par as psy ch olo gi cal P hen om ena a s N on loc al Co rrel at ion s 623
Thus, we have covered the major instances of PSI or anomalous
cognition that form the basis of the various parapsychological
phenomenologies. We have shown that one and the same model can form
the basis of an understanding of such phenomena in terms of generalized
nonlocal correlations within a generalized quantum theory. Obviously,
the key issues are twofold: We need to nominate a clear candidate for a
strong systemic boundary. In all instances, such systemic boundaries are
either given or intentionally set. And we need a pair of complementary
observables that describe the system and its components. In most cases the
complementarity between connectedness and separation will be sufficient
to fulfill this requirement. Wherever some willful or involuntary action in
the real world is part of the phenomenology, it might be the case that a
second complementarity between actuality and potentiality comes into play.
And it might be the case that this acts as a driver.
Consequences, Empirical Observations, Future Directions
One consequence of this model should be immediately obvious: Generalized
entanglement correlations are nonlocal and hence will eschew any detector
system long-term that is geared toward detecting regular, local causality, such
as classical experimentation is. This is the reason why we have postulated
the no-signal-transfer axiom (NT axiom). In quantum physics proper it is
clear and has been proven that entanglement correlations cannot be used to
convey classical signals (Lucadou, Römer, & Walach 2007). If this is done
or could potentially be done, entanglement breaks down. While this can be
formally proven for the quantum physical case, in the generalized case we
simply assume it as an axiom. This has two consequences: Whenever we
set out to “prove” PSI effects using classical experiments, we are in fact
coding a signal. The results of the first experiment can be used, in principle,
to code a signal the second time the experiment is repeated. Suppose we
always see a rise in an EDA-curve (Electro Dermal Activity), shortly before
a threatening image is presented. We develop the smart idea to build a
danger-sensing system for soldiers, for instance, by attaching the EDA of
a subject to an analyzer (Mossbridge, Tressoldi, Utts, Ives, Radin, & Jonas
2014). Whenever the EDA rises repeatedly above a threshold defined by
previous experimentation, we call it a hit. And the hit moves the subject to
stop, for instance. That way, we could use entanglement correlations that
are nonlocal to code a signal that would be causal, and because derived
from nonlocal correlations not bound to the locality conditions of special
relativity. Apparently, nature does not allow such a scenario (due to the
intervention-paradox), and the prediction from the NT-axiom would be: Such
a device will be unreliable. Not in all instances where the EDA-signal goes
624 Har al d Wa la ch, Wa l ter v on Lu cad ou , a nd Ha rt man n Röm er
up, will there be danger, and in some dangerous situations the EDA signal
will instead go down, killing the bearer of the device and demonstrating
that nonlocal correlations cannot and must not be misinterpreted as causal
signals. This is exactly what classical experimentation does, and this is, in
our view, the reason why some decisive replications failed. Granted, overall
and across experiments, meta-analyses show effects, although also here it is
debated whether there is not a decline of effects.
For instance, the largest and longest sequence of comparatively identical
experiments of micro-PK analyzed by Bösch, Steinkamp, and Boller (2006)
clearly exhibits such a decline effect (Figure 1).
One could argue that decline effects are also expected when stricter
control conditions are applied. We don’t think that this is a valid argument
in this case, as the experiments have been conducted the same way most of
Figure 1. Scatterplot of correlation of Effect Size (ES; mean chance expectation
= 0.5) versus publication year, weighted by study size that is indicated
by the size of the bubbles, showing a clear significant negative
correlation indicating a decline effect.
Par as psy ch olo gi cal P hen om ena a s N on loc al Co rrel at ion s 625
the time and hence methodological aspects are unlikely explanations for
the decline. Decline effects would also be expected as a consequence of
experimental testing and thus misrepresentation of correlational effects.
Hence, in the very long run, the strategy of amassing experimental evidence
and distilling out a true effect size using meta-analysis might be treacherous.
It can only be used if there is such a thing as a true effect size in the sense of
a causal signal. Our expectation would be that this will not work long-term,
because there is no causal effect in the first place.
This is also the reason, by the way, why pragmatically speaking the
most robust advice one can give to victims of spuk phenomena is to observe
and document the effects as closely as possible, with cameras covering all
angles. This restriction of the degrees of freedom of the effect seems to
have the consequence of destroying the correlations. It turned out, that in
practice, this method is very successful.
Sometimes one can hear the argument: Why? In physics, entanglement
correlations have been experimentally proven. Why not for the generalized
case? It is important to analyze how the experimental test in physics was
done. In what we term “experiment” in this paper, an experimental condition
is tested against an artificially created control condition. This gives rise to the
potential signal coding in a replication experiment. In physics, entanglement
correlations were proven against a theoretical prediction that was derived
from a precise theory. That is, in the physical entanglement experiments,
two streams of data were generated, polarization measurements of stream
A and analogous measurements of stream B. Their correlation function was
then compared not against another, artificially produced control condition,
but against the theoretical expectation derived from Bell’s inequalities. This
is a completely different experimental and theoretical situation. For in no
way could the correlation function measured in this data stream in any way
be used to generate a signal.
Thus, in order to construct an experimental proof in the generalized
situation, we must stop classical experimentation. Some experimenters
instinctively do the right thing: They never repeat experiments exactly the
same way, but always change some parameters. The problem only arises with
exact replications. As soon as changes are introduced—new parameters,
new variables—the system is, technically and conceptually speaking, a new
system. But for scientific acceptance, identical replicability of experimental
paradigms is key to accepting a phenomenon as a fact.
A way out is to design an experiment which is indirect. We did that
by using a matrix approach to analyzing a micro-PK experiment. In this
experiment a classical micro-PK situation was generated, instructing
volunteers to influence a display that was driven by a random number
626 Har al d Wa la ch, Wa l ter v on Lu cad ou , a nd Ha rt man n Röm er
generator. A classical experiment such as those conducted by the PEAR
(Princeton Engineering Anomalies Research) lab, would look at the mean
shift against expectation values. We constructed a large array of potential
correlations using 5 physical variables derived from the experiment and
5 psychological variables, such as number of key presses and time used
for the runs. Since each experiment consisted of 9 runs, we had a matrix
of 45*45 cells which gives a huge array of 2,025 potential correlations
between physical and psychological variables. Now, in any correlational
analysis one would expect a certain number of significant correlations by
chance. However, if entanglement correlations are also operative, we would
expect more significant correlations than by chance. Furthermore, we
constructed a negative control by letting the system run empty and pasting
the psychological variables into the physical matrix, correlating these empty
runs with the psychological variables. This experiment had already proven
replicable in four previous attempts and was now successfully replicated by
an independent replication (data in preparation for publication).
Thus it seems, if we obey the framework conditions of the NT theorem
and build an experimental setup, that, in principle, cannot be used to distill a
signal out of the experiment when identically replicated, GET effects seem
to be amenable to experimental analysis. The correlational matrix approach
obeys this boundary condition. For it is completely irrelevant which cell
of the matrix will exhibit the significant correlations as long as they are
more numerable than expected by chance and more than seen in the control
condition. Only if we were to fix the effect and predict which cell it will
show up in would we be on the trajectory of defining signals and would fail.
This would, incidentally, also constitute an empirical test between the two
models, the nonlocal and the local one. A local model would predict that the
cells stay the same. The nonlocal model would predict that the cells have to
change, but the effect overall stays the same. This is already true for the five
experiments conducted so far: The effect stays the same, but the cells in the
matrix with significant correlations jump between cells across experiments.
Another way to test these models against each other would be to run a
series of replications of the matrix experiment. While the local model looks
at the mean shift and expects a replicable mean shift over experiments, this is
exactly what the nonlocal model prohibits. It would predict that correlations
stay the same, but the effect in mean shift will decline toward zero.
With some ingenuity, other experimental models can be adapted such
that it becomes operationally impossible to code signals from experiments
and their replications. Then this would be our prediction, that GET effects
can be replicably shown.
Par as psy ch olo gi cal P hen om ena a s N on loc al Co rrel at ion s 627
In sum: We have shown that a theoretical model that is predicated on
generalized entanglement correlations derived from a generalized quantum
theory can be used to model PSI effects of all kinds. This makes it preferable
over other models that can only cover certain types of phenomenologies.
We have also shown that such a model explains why local assumptions
fail in PSI research. It makes understandable why we have exactly the data
structure in the field that we have. This makes the model preferable over
any tacit or explicit local signal-theoretical models. We have also shown
why experimentation has to proceed in indirect ways, and we point toward
future development of the field.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Holger Hartmann (formerly Bösch) and Emil Boller for
allowing us to use their data.
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