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Pilkada, money politics and the dangers of "informal governance" practices
... However, the abuse of power between ruling elites and interest groups, such as corruption, lobbying, and even political violence, colours Indonesia's political decentralization. In addition, political Decentralization has led to high political costs, transactional political models, political pragmatism, and the establishment of political elites that dominate local political and economic resources (Hidayat, 2003(Hidayat, , 2007(Hidayat, , 2009; Seymour & Turner, 2000). Not surprisingly, political decentralization in Indonesia has led to the emergence of local leaders, who tend to abuse their power for their interests and the interests of groups. ...
... Therefore, perpetrators in the local carried out more than 65 per cent of corruption cases. The phenomenon is in line with Hidayat (2003Hidayat ( , 2009)'s findings that the direct election of regional heads created a local state capture phenomenon in the regions. This conclusion supported Nordholt (2003)'s belief that state capture practices in local government management will accompany Decentralization and regional autonomy policies. ...
... Many people mistakenly believe that the decentralization of corruption also accompanies political decentralization. Rapid decentralization reforms, on the other hand, frequently result in a slew of issues, including abuse of power, the role of informal networks in local government administration, the growth of patronage links, and the formation of a local power oligarchy (Hidayat, 2009;Robinson & Hadiz, 2004) In Indonesia, decentralization has allowed for grassroots and broader public participation in local politics. Many decentralization projects begin with the goal of reorganizing government from a hierarchical, bureaucratic top-down management mechanism to a system of nested self-governments defined by participation and cooperation (Wardhana, 2019). ...
The local state capture phenomenon becomes very interesting if it is associated with the macro state capture framework that has begun to develop in the last two decades. A more multifaceted political approach is needed because state erosion is a political problem, not just an economic one. By referring to the political ethnographic tradition, this study describes how the complexity of relations between local economic, political, and ruling elites leads to the emergence of local state capture and the scope of its power. This study concludes that the weathering or weakening of formal government functions is not the source of the emergence of the local capture phenomenon. The growth of local state capture is more owing to the one-of-a-kind interaction between local political and economic actors and the ruling elite since the direct election of regional leaders takes place. This elite collaboration results from the emergence of a local oligarchic pole controlling local resources. The initiation of relations between the economic and political elite and the ruling elite is not only because of economic spheres but because they want to be part of the rulers' closest political circle of power.
... Source: The other substantial change with this transition is in the system of political governance. In the decentralization era, the head of regional government, such as governor of the province, walikota (mayor of municipalities), bupati (head of district), and kepala desa (head of village), who were previously appointed by central government, are now directly elected by the local people (Hidayat 2009;Valsecchi 2012). It was hoped that this would promote better governance, as local officials would be more aware of and responsive to their local constituents' needs. ...
... Forcing companies to support their political promises can maintain the little kings' position in the eyes of their constituents. Furthermore, the need to raise money during a Pilkada (local direct election for head of district) and Pilkades (village direct election for head of village) drives the little kings to build alliances with businesses in order to get alternative resources for use in these election campaigns (Hidayat 2009). In this respect, the distribution of CSR resources through a little kings' network may benefit village communities as the infrastructure is to be used by them and returns to voters in the future. ...
Indonesia was one of the first countries in the world to implement legislation mandating businesses to undertake Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). This research examines how CSR legislation has been implemented in three Oil and Gas companies in the Musi Banyuasin district in the South Sumatera Province. Oil and Gas is one industry that has applied CSR legislation and the district being researched is one of the richest districts in terms of mining resources, including Oil and Gas, in Indonesia. Meanwhile, the legislation cannot be separated from the decentralization process that began in 1999 where government power has been transferred to local district governments including Musi Banyuasin districts and their local community rights have been acknowledged. Adopting institutional and stakeholder perspectives, the research examines how the CSR legislation and local stakeholder pressures influence the CSR practices of three Oil and Gas companies in Musi Banyuasin District, South Sumatera province, Indonesia. The research focuses on three main questions:
(i) What are the main mandates of CSR legislation for Oil and Gas companies operating in Indonesia?
(ii) How do Oil and Gas companies operating in Indonesia practice CSR and treat local stakeholders?
(iii) What are local stakeholder expectations of mandated CSR and their perceptions of the practices of Oil and Gas companies operating in Indonesia?
An interpretive approach was adopted, using a multiple case study methodology where interviews and focus group discussions were used to collect primary qualitative data. Document analysis of the relevant CSR laws, related government regulations and ministerial decrees was also undertaken. Three Oil and Gas Companies operating who had a Production Sharing Contract (PSC) with the Indonesian government were selected: an Indonesian Owned Company (IOC), a Foreign Owned Company (FOC) and a State Owned Company (SOC). Research participants included members from each of the three companies, their local stakeholders, and other participants related to the CSR issue in the area. Interviews with managers and staff from each of these three companies provided an understanding of implementation strategies related to mandatory CSR requirements. Local stakeholders included local district government officials as well as local community members from the villages located nearby to each company’s operations. Other participants included key informants from a national business association, non-government organisations (NGOs), and the national regulatory body for Oil and Gas. Analysis reveals that mandated CSR legislation requires Oil and Gas Companies to distribute a share of their wealth to local communities. The legislation has directed that companies should allocate a portion of their profit and/or their operational cost to local communities. Whilst the legislation appears to be ‘hard’ in mandating companies to distribute wealth to local communities in actuality it is ‘soft’ as the institutional environment lack enforcement and the political environment allows companies to negotiate their compliance with the legislation.
However, mandated CSR legislation is an important institutional symbol that legitimates local stakeholders’ CSR requests from companies. The findings highlight that requests for company CSR have predominantly been made by heads of villages, some legislative members and local government officials, which are characterised by research participants as “raja-raja kecil” (little kings). These particular stakeholders have the power to control territories within the district and influence company legitimacy in the eyes of other local stakeholders. This limits the involvement of more marginalized stakeholders whom the legislation is primarily intended to benefit. The three companies have implemented the legislation differently, depending on these institutional environment and local stakeholder pressures. The IOC was owned by a national political figure, providing political connections to counter the power of local ‘little kings’. The IOC was thus able to establish and foster a direct link with the ‘marginalized’ groups of local stakeholders, which included farmers and women, without fearing the ‘little kings’ to be a threat to their legitimacy. The FOC viewed the ‘little kings’ as having power, and interacting with them as being essential, as being foreign owned they felt vulnerable to resource nationalism claims, regarding their exploitation of natural resources in the area. With limited political connections, the FOC needed to rely on economic influences, and so provided significant CSR funds for and adopted the development agendas of ‘little kings’ as the basis to gain their legitimacy. The SOC, due to their state ownership structure, primarily concerned themselves with central government interests. They experienced less pressure from local stakeholders, leading them to lack initiative and direct involvement with local stakeholders and their CSR efforts. As a result the SOC company mainly focused on projects directed by the central government such as the soft-loans program ordered by the Minister of State Owned Companies.
This thesis concludes that the implementation of CSR legislation in Indonesia has had mixed results to date in achieving its stated goal to improve the welfare of local communities. Specifying the stakeholder groups companies should focus on and providing transparent information about company CSR are necessary to improve the outcomes from legislation. This research makes a contribution to the CSR literature by illustrating how institutional and stakeholder pressures affect CSR implementation in the context of mandated CSR legislation. This research also makes a contribution to the CSR as public policy literature by showing how implementation and enforcement are often weak in developing countries like Indonesia, where weak institutional conditions, lacking transparency and susceptible to corruption frustrate the intentions of CSR legislation.
... Sebaliknya, ketidaksuksesan desentralisasi telah mengancam stabilitas ekonomi dan politik serta mengganggu penyediaan pelayanan publik (Jaya, 2010: 3). Sejumlah studi di negara maju dan berkembang termasuk Indonesia, menunjukkan bahwa berlakunya undang-undang desentralisasi telah mendorong dilaksanakannya akuntabilitas, namun juga menjadi peluang terjadinya saluran baru bagi praktik penyalahgunaan kekuasaan seperti korupsi, politik uang, lobi-lobi (lobbying), bahkan premanisme (Seymour & Turner, 2002;Hidayat, 2009;Jaya, 2010). Selain itu, salah satu resiko dari sistem desentralisasi adalah kemungkinan terjadinya kontrol penuh oleh elit daerah (Robison & Hadiz, 2004), dikarenakan salah satunya oleh desain kelembagaan yang dibuat tidak efisien (Jaya, 2010). ...
... Bagaimana dengan Indonesia? Dalam prakteknya, desentralisasi dan Pilkada telah disertai dengan munculnya preman (gangster), penyebaran politik uang dan korupsi di daerah (Hadiz, 2005;Hidayat, 2009). Persaingan, pertengkaran, dan perkelahian untuk mengendalikan kekuasaan desentralisasi dan sumber daya telah terjadi. ...
Political reality in Indonesia tells the relationship between decentralization and democracy, in some respects, problematic. This paper intends to explain the politics of decentralization in In-donesia through a substantive democratic approach. Various studies and scientific research that has been generated, and information of media become the main reference to explain how the future of decentralized Indonesia. This paper concludes how to create procedures to strengthen the achievement of substantive democracy in relation to decentralization. Any offer and strategy , and what is needed to bring the future of a more democratic decentralization.
... This, however, has proven to be a somewhat naïve supposition, since gifts of money and other commodities rapidly became a regular part of what the voters have come to expect from candidates (with the cynical idea often expressed, that "we may never get another chance to get something from these politicians"). With this, direct elections have become increasingly expensive and they have come to support the development in Indonesia of what Hidayat (2007Hidayat ( , 2009) and Schulte Nordholt (2003) call 'shadow state' practices, where businesses work behind the scenes to support the election of particular candidates, who then owe them favours, giving them access to lucrative project contracts or concessions if they win, whether or not these are supported by the voting public (hence, leading to the cynicism of the public mentioned above and their often correct anticipation that their 'aspirations' are frequently ignored). ...
... This, however, has proven to be a somewhat naïve supposition, since gifts of money and other commodities rapidly became a regular part of what the voters have come to expect from candidates (with the cynical idea often expressed, that "we may never get another chance to get something from these politicians"). With this, direct elections have become increasingly expensive and they have come to support the development in Indonesia of what Hidayat (2007Hidayat ( , 2009) and Schulte Nordholt (2003) call 'shadow state' practices, where businesses work behind the scenes to support the election of particular candidates, who then owe them favours, giving them access to lucrative project contracts or concessions if they win, whether or not these are supported by the voting public (hence, leading to the cynicism of the public mentioned above and their often correct anticipation that their 'aspirations' are frequently ignored). ...
Creating and guarding boundaries is one of the pervasive features of modern states. Many boundaries have been contested in the Southeast Asian region between states, and boundaries are always locations of great insecurity for states, and for the people who live on them. The case to be explored in this paper is about boundaries that are not international, but local boundaries between districts within the nation state of Indonesia, in the eastern region of western Flores. The years of political change in Indonesia have created considerable attention to the creation of new boundaries, with the "pemekaran", or "flowering" of new districts. This has caused the revival of concern over the actual boundaries of western Flores districts, resulting in various extreme instances of boundary contestation and protection. One contestation revived a much older dispute of the eastern boundary of the western Flores district of Manggarai, which dates from the time of the beginning of the Indonesian modern state. In this paper it will be queried what makes internal, domestic boundaries important, including how they are complicated by issues of ethnicity foreign investment in natural resources, and religion, all of which can create considerable insecurity for the local communities who live near and on these contested borders.
... This, however, has proven to be a somewhat naïve supposition, since gifts of money and other commodities rapidly became a regular part of what the voters have come to expect from candidates (with the cynical idea often expressed, that "we may never get another chance to get something from these politicians"). With this, direct elections have become increasingly expensive and they have come to support the development in Indonesia of what Hidayat (2007Hidayat ( , 2009) and Schulte Nordholt (2003) call 'shadow state' practices, where businesses work behind the scenes to support the election of particular candidates, who then owe them favours, giving them access to lucrative project contracts or concessions if they win, whether or not these are supported by the voting public (hence, leading to the cynicism of the public mentioned above and their often correct anticipation that their 'aspirations' are frequently ignored). ...
... This, however, has proven to be a somewhat naïve supposition, since gifts of money and other commodities rapidly became a regular part of what the voters have come to expect from candidates (with the cynical idea often expressed, that "we may never get another chance to get something from these politicians"). With this, direct elections have become increasingly expensive and they have come to support the development in Indonesia of what Hidayat (2007Hidayat ( , 2009) and Schulte Nordholt (2003) call 'shadow state' practices, where businesses work behind the scenes to support the election of particular candidates, who then owe them favours, giving them access to lucrative project contracts or concessions if they win, whether or not these are supported by the voting public (hence, leading to the cynicism of the public mentioned above and their often correct anticipation that their 'aspirations' are frequently ignored). ...
Eastern Indonesia, most notably Nusa Tenggara Timor province, has been frequently referred to as the poorest region in Indonesia and claims have recently been made that it is the most corrupt as well. The spread of corruption in the post-Suharto period, with the introduction of regional autonomy and decentralisation, has often been commented on; but what is corruption? How do people define it? This paper uses an anthropological lens on corruption to suggest that with the spread of ideas of `good governance' and `democracy', one significant way that local communities in NTT province engage with the state and define corruption is as an abuse of power and non-consultation with the populace. This has become particularly acute with the government belief that new investment opportunities in the reform era will become a road to development and prosperity for local communities, who are, however, seen to be unable to provide for themselves or seek their own ways out of poverty. Several regional governments in NTT province have taken advantage of new laws put into effect in the reform era to award mining concessions to domestic and foreign mining companies. A swell of protest has arisen across the province, however, and an increasing critique of poor government and corrupt practices focuses on these mining contracts.
... The 1 st Proceeding of The International Conference on Economics and Business Vol.2, No.2 July-December 2023e-ISSN: 2963p-ISSN: 2963-3656, Hal 38-44 Literature review reveals that financial resources have a significant impact on Pemilukada (Cahyaningsih et al., 2019;Putri and Dwipriandi, 2021;Setiawan and Setyorini, 2018;Thamrin et al., 2020), particularly in amplifying campaign messages, enhancing candidate visibility, and influencing voter preferences (Hidayat, 2009;Khairi, 2020;Koeswara et al., 2014;Noor, 2016). ...
This study analyzes the patterns of transactional politics between candidates and donors in the 2020 Simultaneous Regional Head Elections in Toraja Utara Regency. By adopting the perspective of social exchange theory, this research reveals the dynamics of the relationship between candidates and donors in soliciting financial support for their campaigns. A qualitative descriptive method was employed to gather data through in-depth interviews, observations, and documentation. The research findings indicate that the required funding for candidates ranged from 50 to 80 billion IDR during the 2020 regional elections. This study illustrates that fundraising through family/relatives is carried out based on the strength of emotional ties and shared values within Toraja culture, while businesspersons offer support in order to gain future political advantages and power. The theoretical implications of this research link the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic exchanges, highlighting their impact on political dynamics and social change in the region.
... Kondisi lembaga eksekutif di era orde lama tak ubahnya seperti sebuah sistem monarki. Soekarno memposisikan dirinya sebagai raja yang terpatri dalam patron pemimpin besar revolusi dengan lembaga legislative yang lumpuh tak berkutik (Hidayat, 2009). Kondisi yang sama terjadi pula di era orde baru, baik lembaga legeslatif, eksekutif, maupun yudikatif secara faktual bertumpu kepada restu Soeharto. ...
Penelitian ini dimaksudkan untuk mengetahui respon dua ormas Islam terbesar di Indonesia pada saat penerapan asas tunggal Pancasila. Fokus penelitiannya mencakup tanggapan, alasan dan konsekuensi dari Muhammadiyah dan NU terhadap pemberlakuan kebijakan asas tunggal itu. Teori fungsional struktural, teori perubahan organisasi dan adaptasi digunakan sebagai alat analisis, dengan menggunakan pendekatan historis. Ditemukan bahwa baik Muhammadiyah maupun NU sama-sama menerima berlakunya sila tunggal Pancasila dengan alasan dan akibat yang hampir sama meski dalam waktu yang berbeda. NU menerima di awal, sedangkan Muhammadiyah di akhir.
... 24 Bahkan, relawan politik sebagai saluran partisipatoris baru ini telah mampu menghambat peredaran politik uang. Apalagi, selama ini banyak penilaian bahwa suara pemilih khususnya kelas miskin dapat digadaikan dengan imbalan uang, sembako ataupun material lainnya (Choi, 2009;Hidayat, 2009;Taylor, 1996) yang mana pola-pola relasi seperti ini sangat kuat berakar di dalam identitas lokal Indonesia. Inilah kenyataan dinamika politik Indonesia, sebuah demokrasi, yang telah gagal melenyapkan kesenjangan sosial yang relasinya ditandai oleh kegiatan rent-seeking dan berpotensi menimbulkan kekerasan. ...
This article describes how the presidential contestation in 2014 was characterized by the presence of political volunteers. Here political volunteers is defi ned as a manifestation of strengthening active participation of citizens in promoting substantive democracy. This article argues that the rise of a new social movement has brought a tradition of voluntarism in politics. In addition he voluntarism has transformed the values of patrimonial political and oligarchy onto active popular voluntarism and participatory. The political volunteers who employed offl ine and online medium have clearly increased public participation in Indonesia.This article has also argued the presence of political volunteers has positively contributed to developtment of extra parlementary democracy model.
... Tax revenue derived from society is reduced to increase people's disposable income. Tax reductions may also be made in business activities, as the consequence of political transactions by business actors in the role of political sponsors (Hidayat 2009). In countries with a federal system, which involves systems for the transfer of central government funding to lower levels of government, patterns of manipulation can be in the form of changes to this process (Rogoff 1990). ...
This study aims to investigate political budget cycles motivated by elections in Indonesia and the role of incumbent coalition parties in the degree of budget manipulation in election years. Employing a panel data regression model, we analyzed total revenue and total expenditures, together with their components, to identify budget patterns. The study employed data obtained from 499 districts/cities in Indonesia, covering the 2011–2017 period. With regard to revenue, budget cycles existed in all components of local own revenue. In contrast, they occurred in spending components favorable for community welfare in terms of the spending function. In relation to the type of spending, budget cycles were evident in spending components, goods and services spending, and capital spending. Stronger incumbent party alliances were observed to lead to a higher degree of budget manipulation in election years.
... Decentralization is categorized into two perspectives, namely the political decentralization perspective and the administrative decentralization perspective (Hidayat, 2009). According to a political perspective, the main objective of decentralization and regional autonomy is democratization through regional government leadership succession. ...
The reform aims to achieve democracy, prosperity, and justice at the local level. Even though the reform process has been rolling for more than two decades, the goal of reform in realizing local democracy through an ideal regional head election is still far from expectations. This study aims to analyze the causes of the absence of synergy between regional autonomy and regional elections and identify the causes. A qualitative approach is used in the literature review method. The result showed that the root of the problem is not creating a synergy between regional autonomy and regional head elections because the application of the decentralization concept in Indonesia is dominated by the administrative decentralization perspective and the lack of actualizing the political perspective decentralization. The definitions of decentralization and regional autonomy in Acts tend to preserve centralization. Besides, regional autonomy's main objective places more emphasis on the administrative objectives of government and regional development rather than the development of local democracy. The lack of synergy between regional autonomy and regional elections is the gap between expectations and reality and conflicts at the ideological and technical levels. The gap between expectations and reality can be seen from the hope of realizing the acceleration of the democratization process at the local level, but technically, regional autonomy is characterized by an oligarchy of political parties and transactional politics. There are some suggestions for the Ministry of Home Affairs to revise the policy packages for decentralization and regional autonomy, especially in articles regulating the definition and objectives of regional autonomy, as well as revising Acts of Regional Head Election and Acts of Political Parties, particularly regarding the mechanism for nominating regional heads.
... Although the topic of political branding is strategic and actual, there are not enough studies on political branding in Indonesia, especially related to female politicians. There have been copious studies on direct local elections since 2005 such as the practice of money politics (Masaaki & Hamid, 2008), (Hamid, 2014); illegal campaign financing (Mietzner, 2011); strengthening of local identity (Nordholt & van Klinken, 2007); collusion (Hidayat, 2009); and economic growth, public services, and natural resources (Hill, 2014). Nevertheless, only a few have been dedicated to understanding the rising of female leaders in elections such as those conducted by LSI (2007), Ratnawati (2009), Satriyo (2010), University of Airlangga (2011), Perludem (2015), and Satunama (2015). ...
Personal political branding becomes an important element in political contestation under the new direct democracy in Indonesia. In the male-dominated political atmosphere, it is interesting to analyze creation and development of personal political branding by female politicians. This paper explores stories of the two female politicians, each a candidate for the district head of Gowa (Tenri) and North Luwu (Indah) in the 2015 direct local election in South Sulawesi Province, where a strong political dynasty is the primary feature. This is qualitative research employing feminist research methodology by interviewing the two female politicians. This paper reveals that the use of femininity element in the tagline SAYANG IBU (love your mother) as Tenri’s personal political branding contains of what I call ‘gender risk’ which disadvantaged her. Within a strong political dynasty feature of South Sulawesi which is patriarchal, her opponent created a counter narrative to weaken her and pointed out centrality of a male politician. On the other hand, a successful female politician candidate for the district head of North Luwu, Indah, used PINTAR (smart) as her personal political branding which did not resemble her femininity and did not exclusively target women. By doing so, this paper offers different findings from those of the previous research which suggest that femininity can help all candidates to stand out. In a strong political dynasty feature, it is important to pay attention to the subconscious element such as patriarchal ideology which often plays or is used to weaken or against female politicians.
... Freedom of the press as a fundamental element of democratic governance was almost non-existent [14]. ...
... This is undeniably relevant to the case of burgeoning SP in Indonesia after 2005 when the direct election was officially launched. Yet, many political analysts believe there are also low-level operative factors playing in the Indonesian political system (Hidayat, 2009). What has become the dominant view among theorists or analysts is similar to the practitioner's rule of thumb: a party will not waste its resources on loyal supporters (or possibly on die-hard haters), but instead spend on swing voters (Cox, 2009). ...
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to find the relationship between local direct elections and the change in social spending, controlling for GDP per capita, revenues and wide-range socio-welfare indicators at the regional level.
Design/methodology/approach
This research uses a model of time-series cross-sectional panel data set for 33 provinces in Indonesia from 2001 to 2012.
Findings
The main finding of this research is that the political budget cycle does exist in Indonesia. Incumbents responded to the direct elections more sensitively rather than to other variables in the model. The most important variables that are significant in the model are not only direct election but also inter-governmental grants. Interestingly, the local economy (as measured by GDP per capita) does not clearly exhibit a meaningful impact.
Research limitations/implications
Although the importance of decentralisation in Indonesia is actually at the regency level, obtaining the data is really challenging. Therefore the exercise on this paper is currently limited only for the provincial level.
Practical implications
This finding conveys the message that there is large room for improvement in inter-governmental transfer formulation, more importantly to the regions where they still entail significant budget support from central government. In addition, transfers during specific periods such as elections need to be modified to avoid the misappropriation of local budget and to mitigate the adverse impact of PBC. The formulation of inter-governmental transfers is pivotal in reducing over-dependence to the central government funding and to ensure the effectiveness of budget devolved at the local level.
Originality/value
To the author’s understanding, the paper is the first to discuss the presence of the political budget cycle on social protection programs in Indonesia. The expected contribution of the current work is twofold: Firstly, the author used a recent data set hosted by the World Bank (INDO-DAPOER). Secondly, the findings are relevant to the discussion within the sphere of development studies and political science.
... Berdasarkan penelitian yang telah dilakukan (Alfiantoro 2018), (Muhtadi 2013 (Kumorotomo 2011(Kumorotomo ), (S 2016, (Ananingsih 2016), (Reuter 2015), (Rhoads 2012), (Hellmann 2014), (Winters 2016), (Hidayat 2009), (Holish, Rohmat, and Syarifudin 2018), (Haliim 2018), (syawie 2011). ...
The practice of buying and selling votes, has become an uncontrolled part in the implementation of the Direct General Election, in Indonesia. Transactional political behavior, finding reasons to be maintained by candidates for governor, regent and mayor, because constituents have an acute understanding, about the political behavior of reciprocity which is often deliberately violated by elected candidates, after taking office. Fear of being forgotten, hopes in the division of government projects, caused people to make transactional politics, by selling their support, or their right to vote in a voting booth, as a norm in the General Election.
... Yet, many political analysts believe there are also low-level operative factors playing in the Indonesian political system (S. Hidayat, 2009). What has become the dominant view among theorists or analysts is similar to the practitioner's rule of thumb: a party will not waste its resources on loyal supporters (or on die-hard haters), but instead spend on swing voters (Cox, 2009). ...
... [5] Such networks usually include extended family structures [6] but also any other group that may have a strong presence in a given constituency. Informal networks that have been incorporated into past election campaigns have ranged from diaspora associations [7] to organized crime syndicates [8] and religious networks. [9] Many of the religious networks that have been approached by Indonesian politicians in recent years have their origins in the formative years of the Republic of Indonesia. ...
This essay is part of a series that examines the genesis, evolution, mobilization tools and processes,
impacts and limitations of informal civil society in political transitions, that is, loose groupings of like-minded
individuals—those that are unofficial, unregistered, or unregulated—in the MENA and
Southeast Asia.
... For a discussion of the problems experienced by several districts in using the DAK allocations, see in particular Newsletter No. 25, SMERU Research Institute, January-April 2008 (www.smeru.or.id). 34 Hidayat (2009) gives several case studies of the way in which powerful business interests have captured provincial and district governments, especially since the introduction of direct election of local officials. Particularly interesting is his study of Banten. ...
The paper reviews the changes in the structure and role of provincial and sub-provincial governments in Indonesia since independence. Particular attention is paid to the process of splitting both provinces and districts (kabupaten and kota) into smaller units. The paper points out that this process has been going on since the 1950s, but has accelerated in the post-Soeharto era. The paper examines why the splitting of government units has occurred in some parts of the Outer Islands to a much greater extent than in Java, and also examines the implications of developments since 1999 for the capacity of local government units to deliver basic services such as health and education.
... 24 Bahkan, relawan politik sebagai saluran partisipatoris baru ini telah mampu menghambat peredaran politik uang. Apalagi, selama ini banyak penilaian bahwa suara pemilih khususnya kelas miskin dapat digadaikan dengan imbalan uang, sembako ataupun material lainnya (Choi, 2009;Hidayat, 2009;Taylor, 1996) yang mana pola-pola relasi seperti ini sangat kuat berakar di dalam identitas lokal Indonesia. Inilah kenyataan dinamika politik Indonesia, sebuah demokrasi, yang telah gagal melenyapkan kesenjangan sosial yang relasinya ditandai oleh kegiatan rent-seeking dan berpotensi menimbulkan kekerasan. ...
This article describes how the presidential contestation in 2014 was characterized by the presence of political
volunteers. Here political volunteers is defi ned as a manifestation of strengthening active participation of
citizens in promoting substantive democracy. This article argues that the rise of a new social movement
has brought a tradition of voluntarism in politics. In addition he voluntarism has transformed the values
of patrimonial political and oligarchy onto active popular voluntarism and participatory. The political
volunteers who employed offl ine and online medium have clearly increased public participation in Indonesia.This article has also argued the presence of political volunteers has positively contributed to developtment
of extra parlementary democracy model.
... Having established the elite backgrounds of local powerholders and aspirants , scholars have also turned their attention to the power resources that candidates mobilize, and their connections to circuits of financial and bureaucratic power. Although much of this literature uses the indigenous Indonesian term 'money politics' , scholars often mention patronage distribution strategies such as vote-buying and distribution of club goods, though usually in passing or anecdotally in local case studies focusing on other issues (for instance, Hidayat 2009:129–32; Hadiz 2010:120–33). Even so, some scholars have drawn on such studies to argue that patronage is a defining feature of local politics (for instance, Van Klinken 2009; Aspinall 2013). ...
This article analyses the roles played by patronage and brokerage in an Indonesian district election by focusing on variation in village-level results. Through interviews with village elites, we found that highly uneven village voting patterns were strongly influenced by varying patterns of patronage distribution. The winning candidate (the son of the incumbent) used a state-centred form of patronage involving pork barrel and club goods that proved more effective than gifts distributed through social, specifically religious, networks. Also critical were effective and trustworthy community-level brokers to deliver patronage, with retail vote-buying especially vulnerable to broker predation. Among the four categories of brokers we identified, state brokers—notably village heads—were especially effective at marshalling votes. Our findings underline the importance of patronage in Indonesian elections and the centrality of brokers in clientelistic systems generally. They also help explain the domination of former bureaucrats in electoral contests in regional Indonesia.
... 10 The second contends that Indonesia has done comparatively well in consolidating democracy (for example, Holtzappel and Ramstedt 2009;MacIntyre and Ramage 2008), 11 particularly considering the general trend that has democracy in retreat in much of the world, and in Southeast Asia in particular. Work in the third stream suggests that Indonesia has made significant changes in the direction of democracy but that it remains beset by deep-seated structural problems like corruption and weak law enforcement (for example , Buehler 2009;Sulistiyono 2009;Hidayat 2009). Santoso (2013, pp. ...
Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim nation, has developed into the world’s third-largest democracy. Despite the encouraging picture of political transformation accompanied by remarkable economic growth that it presents, serious challenges and the potential for backsliding remain. Studies on Indonesia undertaken at centres outside the country have grown in number, but their authors’ engagement and dialogue with Indonesian scholars about the state of studies on Indonesia and the direction in which those studies are heading remain insufficient. To address this gap, and in collaboration with other Indonesian scholars, we outline contemporary developments in research on Indonesia. We address the ongoing and emerging studies, research gaps and future directions identified during a round table organized by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies on 10 May 2013 in Singapore. Areas of focus are sociological and demographic trends, domestic politics, decentralization and political economy.
Coastal communities in the Global South face significant challenges due to urbanization, population growth, and climate change-induced sea level rise. This paper contributes to the study of community adaptation in these contexts by emphasizing the critical role of community leaders in developing, maintaining, and activating community adaptive capacity. Drawing on quantitative data from a household survey and qualitative interviews with community leaders in Semarang, Indonesia, this study identifies and empirically analyzes previously overlooked linkages between community leadership and adaptive capacity. Our key findings demonstrate that effective leadership significantly impacts community adaptive capacity by building social capital, organizing collective action, accessing knowledge, managing communal funds, and representing community interests. Community leaders' influence stems from their network position as brokers and their ability to mobilize external resources and knowledge. Furthermore, we develop an empirically based framework of factors determining community leadership effectiveness, emphasizing the importance of social networks. Factors such as social capital, formal authority, influence, and legitimacy determine the scope of leaders’ actions and resources and are closely connected to the structure and dynamics of social networks. Our research contributes to the literature on community adaptive capacity by underlining the critical role of community leaders and social networks in enhancing community adaptation to natural hazards, with broader implications for coastal communities across the Global South.
In almost every election event in Indonesia, it can be seen that there are many violations that often characterize it, the criminal behavior of money politics, for example, is always repeated even though the threat of criminal punishment lurks the perpetrators and recipients. This situation makes it difficult to enforce the law by the Panwaslu, the Police, and the Prosecutor's Office, which are members of the Gakkumdu center, this is because there are obstacles at the time of legal proof from the interpretation and perspective of the meaning of money politics itself which is considered to still have different views/perspectives. . The application of the law and the handling of violations by the Panwaskab against money politics based on formal offenses is a criminal act that has been committed and the act matches the formulation in Article 187 A paragraph (1) of Law Number 10 of 2016 concerning the Election of Governors, Regents and Mayors which requires an act that is prohibited or required to be completed without mentioning the consequences or prohibited by law is the act. Keywords: Crime, Money Politics, Pilkada.
The characteristics of a democratic state can be applied that in the hands of the people the ownership of the highest sovereignty is located, this is also in line with the contents of the constitution as stated in the provisions of Article 1 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution. The concrete form of the implementation of democracy can be seen from the implementation of elections both to elect members of the legislature and or executive as well as regional head elections which are held directly by prioritizing the priority of the indicators, namely implementation in the implementation process, applicable legal rules, and how to enforce election law. As a system and mechanism, elections are expected to be carried out freely and equally/freely and fairly. Theories and ideas regarding the definition of the rule of law are numerous to be our reference in understanding it. According to Immanuel Kant in his book Methaphisiche Ansfangsgruunde der Rechtslehre, he expressed his opinion on the concept of a liberal rule of law state. The role and authority of the Kuningan Panwaskab in handling election crime violations is quite good although it still has limitations in carrying out its authority, in addition to problems in handling criminal offenses in Law no. 10 of 2016, the Panwaskab often found indecision as well as law enforcers, the prosecutor's office and the police who were members of the Gakkumdu center. Keywords: Crime, Money Politics, Pilkada, Supervisor.
Circulating debates concerning the intense influence of direct local election towards money politics remains ongoing among Indonesian scholars. This article demonstrates several aspects indicating the relationship between direct local election (Pilkada) and money politics. In more specific rhetoric, current practices in money politics tend to occur before and during the election day, engaging political actors, voters, and soaring capital. As the novelty of this article, the findings reveal that the likelihood of money politics would most occur within the environment where the existing regulation encourages corruption. Hence, people have less concern to support a fair election, inevitably due to the weak law enforcement, exacerbated by disengagement of political parties.
This analysis aims to be able to develop an understanding of the management and transformational leadership of Mochamad Ridwan Kamil S.T., M.U.D. with a millennial-style leader who can make the jurisdiction or community in his leadership period better. Each leader has his method determining the direction of his leadership period. This analysis will focus on the leadership style of Ridwan Kamil S.T., M.U.D. Leadership style is very important in exercising control in society. Transformational leadership is a very ideal method to apply in creating a region to is Democratic, Open, and Progressive. Transformational leadership methods have now been widely used by leaders in The world. One of them is the Governor of West Java Ridwan Kamil who has an open, dynamic, and communicative leadership style that is his trademark in building bonds with colleagues and their communities. The conclusion from this analysis, Ridwan Kamil is ideal for carrying out social control and progress in developing jurisdictions.
This chapter provides an analysis of how political decentralisation has facilitated the consolidation of neo-patrimonial regimes centred on the local government leader and bureaucratic élites. Schools as part of the local bureaucracy are co-opted for political ends. Education personnel are dragged into local political contestation and school policies are subverted by external interests: parents, bureaucrats and politicians. Drawing on cases like new student admissions and school principal recruitment, this chapter demonstrates the way this neo-patrimonial structure responds to the pressure from national standards. However, the chapter also records the emergence of some internal resistance to this neo-patrimonial governance as part of the dynamics of structuration.
Election becomes the main feature of liberal democracy and a prerequisite of the working of democracy. After Indonesia's reformation, an election has played an important role in engaging citizens to participate in the government. It includes the subsequent introduction of elections at the local level that portrays an increasing role of citizens in democracy at the grassroots. Consequently, every position of the regional head, both at the provincial and district/city levels, should involve citizens' direct intervention to implement "the regional head to be democratically elected", the norm outlined in Article 18 (4) of the 1945 Constitution. This paper aims to trace the historical trajectory and development of the direct regional head election and analyze the extent to which its continuities and changes in the last two decades have linkages to the performance of Indonesian democracy. By examining the relevance of regional head elections to Indonesia's contemporary democracy after two decades of reform, this paper specifically reflects on the interpretation of the above constitutional norm through regional head elections, which in practice become problematic because money politics is often unavoidable. This money politics in this local election encourages the regression of the Indonesian democracy because direct regional head elections do not necessarily reduce vote manipulation as had been practiced in regional head votings by members of the Regional People's Representative Council.
Jika Pemilu dikonsepsikan sebagai sarana kedaulatan rakyat untuk memiih anggota DPR, anggota DPD, Presiden dan Wakil Presiden, dan anggota DPRD, maka sarana kedaulatan rakyat itu diwujudkan dalam bilik suara ketika hari pemungutan suara (voting day) berlangsung. Bilik suara adalah tempat/ruang istimewa bagi rakyat pemilih untuk merealisasi hak-hak politiknya. Di bilik suara, rakyat pemilih melakukan kontrak sosial dengan calon pejabat negara dan/atau calon wakil rakyat untuk jangka waktu 5 (lima) lima tahun. Di bilik suara pula, rakyat pemilih mewujudkan kedaulatannya lewat pernyataan kehendak ketika menjatuhan pilihannya pada surat suara.
Mengingat karena kontrak sosial dilakukan di bilik suara, dan prinsip kedaulatan rakyat direalisasikan dalam bentuk pernyataan kehendak (pemilih) di bilik suara, maka suara rakyat pemilih dari bilik suara harus dijaga kemurniannya. Penyelenggara Pemilu harus bisa memastikan bahwa konversi suara rakyat pemilih menjadi kursi dilakukan secara jujur dan adil. Oleh karena itu, segala bentuk tindakan yang memanipulasi suara rakyat pemilih dari bilik suara, berarti menciderai kontrak sosial dan prinsip kedaulatan rakyat, serta menegasikan pernyataan kehendak rakyat pemilih dari bilik suara.
Kata Kunci: Pemilu, kontrak sosial, kedaulatan rakyat, bilik suara, dan pemilih.
Money politics is a serious problem for the improvement in the quality of democracy in Indonesia. In every election, there has been a shift or variation in the pattern of money politics. This article answers the important question of what pattern of money politics applied in the 2014 elections was. This study found that the pattern was more complex and that it involved more actors between not only candidates and voters, but also the election organizers. A case study had been used to view the pattern of money politics in the legislative elections in Surabaya and Sidoarjo during the 2014 election. This study explains the connectivity between the emergence of pragmatic-rational voters, the engagement of the party oligarchy in moving the political party machinery and the covert dealings with the election organizer.
The regional head election, a local political event and a symbol of democratic government, is a contest for a legitimized power of regional leaders, who are given authority and responsibility to administer and lead the regional apparatus and development. Since the Indonesian reformation era, the policy regarding the regional head election has shifted from being elected by the local legislative assembly (representative system) to being elected by the people directly (direct election). Anchored in the quantitative descriptive research design, in which the data was garnered from documentation, this study aims to examine the extent to which the people partook in the first round of the direct and simultaneous regional head election in 2015. The collected data was analyzed by means of the participatory and democracy approach within the local political landscape. The empirical findings showed that the public participation in the local election remained low given the statistical evidence (64.02% of the total voters). The study demonstrates that despite the provision of the political stage within the local scope, it does not fully encourage the people to exercise their political rights.
Salah satu problem utama pendidikan di Indonesia adalah rendahnya produktivitas karya akademik yang berkualitas. Hal ini bukan saja terkait dengan rendahnya mutu sumber daya manusia yang menjadi tenaga pendidik di perguruan tinggi, serta rendahnya anggaran untuk meningkatkan kualitas mereka. Tetapi juga sangat terkait dengan tradisi akademik yang memang belum terbangun cukup baik di Indonesia. Termasuk di lingkungan Perguruan Tinggi Keagamaan Islam (PTKI). Karena itulah segala bentuk ihktiar untuk meningkatkan kualitas tenaga pendidik dan kependidikan menjadi sangat penting. Dengan upaya-upaya inilah kualitas output lembaga pendidikan yang berupa hasil riset dan juga lulusan dapat ditingkatkan. Karena hanya riset yang berkualitas dan banyak dimanfaatkan oleh masyarakat, menandakan orang-orang yang berada di balik karya tersebut memiliki komptensi yang memadai dalam dunia akademik. Buku berjudul Islam Indonesia Pasca-Reformasi ini adalah kumpulan hasil karya penelitian alumni program PIES angkatan ke-3 tahun 2014. Buku ini sebagai salah satu output dari keterlibatan mereka dalam pergulatan intelektual selama dua semester dalam kurun 2014 di universitas ternama negeri kanguru, Australian National University (ANU). Enam artikel dalam buku ini jelas merupakan karya berbobot dari dosen PTKIN yang berbakat dalam bidangnya masing-masing, baik dari bidang hukum, politik, sosial, budaya maupun pendidikan.
This study seeks to examine the distant relationship that exists between CSOs and parties within the new Indonesian democracy because of their nature of organizations and the influence of political and social structures to their relations. The main research question in this study is: How does the distant relationship between women’s CSOs and political parties affect selected gender equality issues in post-Suharto Indonesia? This is supported by two sub-questions: (1) to what extent have Indonesian women’s CSOs been linked with political parties since the fall of Suharto in 1998? (2) How distant relationships between women’s CSOs and parties contribute to the development of women’s political representation in Indonesia?
The aim of this study is to contribute to the existing theories about political parties and society that elaborate on political representation from a women’s civil society organizational perspective. The results will provide capacity-building development insights for women’s civil society actors and members of political parties who want to learn more about the dynamics of both these institutions and the strategies that political parties and CSOs use to establish and develop relationships in Indonesia.
This study can be categorized as a single case study with a synchronic and diachronic variations This study uses a combined co-variational analysis and causal-process tracing to explore suitable inquiries from observations of two events: the policy-making process for gender issues and women’s political representation roles.
This dissertation broadly asserts two hypotheses. First, it hypothesizes that enabling environmental factors (internal and external) in the relationship between women’s CSOs and political parties explain their contribution to political representation in democracies in general. The second hypothesis is that the informal and distant relations between women’s CSOs and political parties have contributed to the development of women’s political representation in the consolidated democracy of post-Suharto Indonesia.
This study confirms that a distant relationship has been maintained between CSOs and political parties following the decline of the Suharto regime, due to their limited relationship in the political sphere, weak connections, and limited direct influence. Although the distant relationship between women’s CSOs and parties in Indonesia appears to support a picture of weak institutionalized party and fragmented CSO, however the autonomy of each organization in terms of their political interactions needs to be balanced to succeed.
Two major findings are: the first is enabling combination of environmental factors (external and internal) to shape the distance of the relationship. The second finding is that women’s CSOs and party links in the law-making process and certain representation roles are informed by informal and personal relationships.
These two major findings indicate a distant relationship between women’s CSOs and political party interactions over certain gender equality issues. From tracing several Indonesian historical events and focusing on the late post-Suharto period, the study confirms that this distant relationship has been caused by certain post-cartelization phenomena and weak institutionalization phenomena.
What are the implications of this study in terms of the development of democratization theory? First, this study has contributed to the CSO political party linkage theories. Secondly, this study also supports the claim that the role of civil society is to strengthen democratic representation. Third, this study has presented discussions of gender and political theory, particularly in relation to Pitkin (1967)’s three models of political representation: formal, descriptive, and substantive.
This study therefore proposes two areas for future research. Firstly, it is suggested that democratization studies require further exploration into the role that authoritarian legacies play in political institutions. It was not possible in this study to fully explore and explain how the roots of authoritarian legacies from the history of Indonesian democracy are still embedded in society today. Such research could focus on the development of religious organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah which have close attachment with parties and individual politicians until these days. A second rich area for future research is the development and support of empirical political involvement mechanisms for civil society.
This article explains the making of intra party coalition prior to and during simultaneous local direct election phase I in Central Java Province, held in 9 December 2015. Referring to and modifying from the current scholarly works on the coalition making and politico-ideological orientation of political party in Indonesia, it offers four typologies of intra party coalition which are small ideological coalition, small pragmatic coalition, grand ideological coalition, and grand pragmatic coalition. The case of coalition making in the local direct election in 21 districts/municipalities in Central Java Province reveals that political party is a powerful and irreplaceable political player in democratic setting. As a formal political institution, it is and will remain considerably influential in nominating and endorsing candidates to run in the local direct election.
Challenging the existing literature, which tends to downplay the impact of good governance reform in post-Suharto Indonesia, the article suggests that greater intervention by international donors, combined with the process of decentralisation, has influenced the dynamics of political competition at the local level. It suggests that the increasing availability of international aid has provided local elites with an option to engage in a new form of patronage politics that relies less on old instruments, such as money politics and violence. By selectively committing themselves to good governance reform, Indonesian local elites can now seek a new source of power in the form of support from international donors, with which they can raise their profiles as ‘reformists’ and consolidate power, only to engage in familiar, if less blatant, forms of patronage politics. The article highlights such a dimension of local politics with reference to the case of Kebumen's former regent, Rustriningsih.
Research in many countries shows that where voters and campaign workers are motivated by material rewards, the brokerage networks delivering those rewards can be highly unstable. Brokers often exercise considerable autonomy, shifting between candidates, disobeying their directives, or stealing the cash or goods they are supposed to pass on to voters. What determines whether brokers betray their ca ndidates in such ways? This article answers this question by focusing on elections in Indonesia, where candidates construct ad-hoc “success teams” to organize brokers and mobilize voters. In proposing a model to explain broker behavior, the author proposes the division of team members into three categories: activist brokers, who support a candidate based on a political, ethnic, religious, or other commitment; clientelist brokers, who desire long-term relations with the candidate or with more senior brokers, with the goal of receiving future rewards; and opportunist brokers, who seek short-term material gains during the course of a campaign. Two problems of broker loyalty are then discussed, specifically: predation, where brokers misappropriate resources intended for voters or lower-level team members, and defection, where they desert one candidate in favor of another. Explaining the incidence of these phenomena, the author examines two key factors: the material endowments of candidates and broker evaluations of their prospects of electoral victory. Well-resourced candidates with poor prospects are most likely to experience predation, whereas less materially endowed candidates will experience defection. The article concludes by addressing the implications for studies of clientelism and brokerage.
Local political elites in post-Soeharto Indonesia have become increasingly diverse, challenging the dominant characterizations of them as leftovers of the old regime or political opportunists. Existing literature on Indonesia’s local politics tends to focus on top-tier elected officials, such as provincial governors, district regents and municipal mayors. Political elites and elite aspirants at intermediate and lower levels of governance have received less attention. Field-study data collected in Pontianak, the regional capital of West Kalimantan, serves as the basis for analysis of the changing profiles of local elites and elite aspirants and for scrutiny of their efforts and tactics to acquire and retain power. The analysis demonstrates that local political elites in Indonesia consist not only of "holdovers" from the New Order era, but also new and diverse "risers". "Old" elites remain, as some survived the political transition and as young generations have inherited the resources and constituencies of their forbears. But at the same time "new" elites have entered the local political scene from various socio-economic and cultural backgrounds by taking advantage of new opportunities, resources and strategies. This local political diversification does not, however, necessarily indicate the level of the country’s democratic maturity.
The position taken in this article regarding the notion of decentralization is that its definition ought to be reduced to its two main aspects, namely, political (devolution) and administrative (deconcentration) aspects. The analysis of the assumed advantages and disadvantages of decentralization leads us to the conclusion that more often than not, the so-called advantages are mere claims and not hard facts since the experience of many countries in Africa demonstrates that there are more cases of failure than success associated with decentralization efforts, whether political or administrative. These failures are attributable to a number of factors which include poor design of decentralization programmes, imitative nature of decentralization programmes which fail to take into serious consideration their feasibility, the prevailing political environment, notably interference in the governance process caused by untested ideologies and militarization of political life and, even more importantly, the lingering culture of central hegemony over the localities, whether political or administrative. Arising from the above, the lessons of experience in many African countries suggest that contrary to the expectations, decentralization has not been an instrument of democratization of politico-administrative life. It has also failed to act as a spur to democratic development management and efficient and effective delivery of services. This is a rather harsh indictment of decentralization. In taking this position, one is not unmindful of the fact that there have been situations over the years in different African countries where certain successes, especially on the development front, are attributable to programmes of decentralization. These cases are few and rather scattered and do not seem to have been institutionalized where they have been experienced. The lingering issue, then, is how to cope with the demands of decentralization in a situation of a seemingly unending tendency towards centralization in every sphere of government activity.