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Arctic meltdown
... Several dozen papers have been published on the future of Arctic shipping since the turn of the century, mostly focusing on the idea of climate change and shorter distances as the driver for the expansion of shipping: as sea ice retreated and shorter maritime routes became available, Arctic shipping was described as being bound to expand quickly (Borgerson 2008;Howard 2009;Lasserre 2010a;Maurette 2010;Emmerson 2011;Young 2011;Rahman et al 2014). Sixteen years later, climate change is causing the ice to melt at an unabated rate, and commercial shipping and vessel traffic in the Arctic has observably increased. ...
... Among this literature on Arctic transit shipping, a first group of papers tackles policyrelated issues, trying to portray the expansion of Arctic shipping, (accepted as a qualified given), in the political frame of a changing Arctic (Huebert 2001(Huebert , 2002Griffiths, 2003;Macneil 2007;Borgerson, 2008;Brigham 2008;Arctic Council 2009;Chircop, 2007Chircop, , 2009Jakobson 2010;Ho 2010;Lasserre 2010b;Valsson & Ulfarsson 2011;Blunden 2012;Dalaklis and Baxevani 2016). ...
... A third category of papers groups those studies that analyze Arctic shipping in terms of cost structure and analysis, with a view to assessing the logistical operational profit margin and thus the likely future of the different routes. Based on a variety of assumptions, as they all rely on models of potential Arctic shipping, 16 papers out of the 36 we identified in this category hint at the potential profitability of Arctic routes while underlining the inherent difficulties of Arctic shipping (Arpiainen and Kiili 2006;Borgerson 2008Borgerson , 2013Liu and Kronbak 2010;Schøyen and Bråthen 2011;Hong 2012;Cho 2012;Falck 2012;Furuichi and Otsuka 2013;Wergeland 1991Wergeland , 2013Lasserre 2014;Raza and Schøyen 2014;Chang et al 2015;Furuichi and Otsuka 2015;Zhao et al 2016). Twenty also come to a more nuanced conclusion and point to poor profitability levels, if not to deficits, and to at least Lasserre (Guy 2006;Somanathan et al 2007Somanathan et al , 2009Pharand 2007;Kitagawa 2008;Laulajainen 2008;Verny and Grigentin 2009;Arctic Council 2009;Liu and Kronbak 2010;DNV 2010;Hua et al 2011;Carmel 2012;Erikstad & Ehlers 2012;Østreng et al 2013;Buixadé Farré et al 2014;Lasserre 2014;Lee and Song 2014;Cariou and Faury 2015;Zhang and Meng 2015;Keupp and Schöb 2015;Mietzner 2015). ...
Climate change in the Arctic is leading to the fast recession of the sea ice extent in the summer. This evolution leads several observers, scientists, media and government officials, to consider the possibility of developing new shipping routes along Arctic routes, as these routes are much shorter between Europe and Asia. The literature displays a strong interest for these potential shipping routes while the media often assume shipping companies nurture a sustained attraction for Arctic routes. This paper tackles with this idea and examines to what extent shipping companies, the ultimate economic agents, are really interested in Arctic shipping routes. The image the research portrayed is that only a minority of shipping companies are indeed interested, and those that are interested stress the destinational dimension of Arctic shipping, not transit shipping.
... However, some analyses also include the territories of the Sub-Arctic region [6,32]. Long seen as a strategic location for commercial shipping [2,7,8,23], submarine routes [33,68,71], and natural resources [30,32], the region is straddled by countries with Arctic Ocean coastlines. Russia, Canada, the United States, Denmark via Greenland, and Norway constitute the core five circumpolar states while smaller parts of Finland, Iceland and Sweden also extend into the area. ...
... In relation to both the security and commercial aspects of the region, several authors [6][7][8]21,25,67] have increasingly turned their focus toward broad issues of regional governance drawing very different conclusions about operating norms in the Arctic ranging from "becoming highly developed" [25,p. 307] or "characterized by a spirit of cooperation" [21,p. ...
... 1228] to those that question the viability of existing international institutions to regulate future developments in the region. Borgerson [7] controversially delivered the latter position arguing that there is a "coming anarchy" driven by a "new scramble for territory and resources", sparking an intense debate in the academic and policy literature [10], with the several scholars arguing that there is little empirical evidence to substantiate this view [40,88,90]. Such debates aside, the pursuit of narrowly defined national interests in the Arctic is neither new nor surprising even if it may seem to be overly simplistic. ...
The Arctic, a vast and uninviting region that encompasses about six percent of the Earth's surface and an estimated 22% of the world's undiscovered fossil fuel resources, is rapidly becoming one of the critical geopolitical issues of our time. Much of its resource trove is located under the region's disputed international waters. Working from a region-centered perspective, combining old and new geopolitical theories, we examine whether the Arctic's special characteristics make circumpolar state cooperation more or less likely in an economic and politically sustainable fashion. We systematically assess the correlation between economic and military activities by putting together descriptive spatial and temporal data on new oil and gas projects, shipping routes and activity, icebreaker orders, submissions to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), and different types of military activities of the five Arctic littoral states. We find substantial evidence of increased Arctic investment and trade transit followed by militarization. This allows us to claim that economic interests drive military activity in the Arctic rather than purely classical expansionist explanations.
... While no studies to our knowledge have looked at the shipping sector's plans to expand and / or develop business opportunities on Arctic sea routes, several studies have been conducted to determine the potential cost advantages of Arctic transit routes (see Table 1) over other routes. The simulations used in these cost advantage studies incorporate a number of variables such as, average transit speed taking account of ice cover, building and operation costs for a vessel, how many rotations a vessel can carry out given its average speed; the bunker fuel cost; freight rates, etc. Borgerson (2008) states that Arctic transit could enable shipping firms to save $3.5 million per transit. Banking on the shorter distances (a fact), he postulates that average speed will not be an issue and gives no information regarding his sources or the basis for his calculation. ...
... Aker Arctic Technology (2006) Arctic transit in general Very profitable because of shorter distances. Borgerson (2008) of the market share as of September 2010, according to the Alphaliner Top 100 rankings (www.alphaliner.com/top100/ index.php), ...
Sea ice is melting fast but this evolution did not trigger a fast expansion of transit shipping. What is observed is a steady expansion of destinational or local traffic, ships that go to the Canadian Arctic to perform economic activities there, and then return to another destination, as opposed to transit shipping where ships merely go by without stopping over. This reality of shipping in the Canadian Arctic is no different from what can be seen elsewhere in the Arctic, even along the Northern Sea Route where destinational shipping is expanding fast along with natural resources extraction, but where transit shipping has plummeted since 2013. Shipowners see local market possibilities and thus favor destinational shipping, while transit conditions are still perceived as too hazardous from a commercial point of view.
... Since the end of the twentieth century, the pronounced summer melting of sea ice in the Arctic Ocean has triggered much speculation about the opening of much shorter sea routes linking Europe via the eastern coast of North America to Asia (Borgerson, 2008;Pelletier and Lasserre, 2012;Käpylä and Mikkola, 2013). Traditionally, there has been little interest from Asian, European, and North American shipping companies in developing regular shipping lines through the Arctic (Borgerson, 2008;Lasserre and Pelletier, 2011;Lasserre, 2014;Beveridge et al., 2016;Lasserre et al., 2016). ...
... Since the end of the twentieth century, the pronounced summer melting of sea ice in the Arctic Ocean has triggered much speculation about the opening of much shorter sea routes linking Europe via the eastern coast of North America to Asia (Borgerson, 2008;Pelletier and Lasserre, 2012;Käpylä and Mikkola, 2013). Traditionally, there has been little interest from Asian, European, and North American shipping companies in developing regular shipping lines through the Arctic (Borgerson, 2008;Lasserre and Pelletier, 2011;Lasserre, 2014;Beveridge et al., 2016;Lasserre et al., 2016). With the recent surge of interest in the vast mineral potential of the Arctic, however, this view has changed (Arnarsson et al., 2014;Farré et al., 2014;Têtu et al., 2015a;Beveridge et al., 2016;Lasserre et al., 2016). ...
... Upon ratification of the UNCLOS, Arctic coastal countries have 10 years to make scientifically proven claims to an extended continental shelf which, if validated, provide exclusive rights to resources on or below the seabed of that extended shelf area[13]. The U.S. signed, but has not ratified the UNCLOS, so cannot formally assert any rights to resources beyond their EEZ, nor join the UN commission that adjudicates these claims[13,15]. Norway, Russia, Canada, and Denmark launched projects to provide a basis for seabed claims on extended continental shelves beyond their EEZ[13]. ...
... During the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Mexican Gulf in 2010 (where 48,000 people, 6500 vessels, and 125 aircraft were involved during peak cleanup), one study over-estimated the quantity of oil recovered and degraded[60]. However, subsequent studies reported that only < 3% of spilled oil was recovered using mechanical equipment[15,19]. Extrapolating these to the Arctic, challenges of ice cover, a harsher climate, and remoteness could prove much more demanding for response teams compared to lower latitudes. ...
There has been global interest in the exploitation of rich hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic for decades. However, recent low oil prices, a low carbon economy climate agenda, and technical challenges of Arctic oil extraction have curbed interest in these Arctic resources. Despite a recent reluctance to explore and develop an offshore Arctic drilling industry, a resurgence in oil and gas prices could spark renewed interests that could pose unacceptable risks of pollution from oil spills. These risks are further compounded by complex governance and sovereignty issues between circumpolar nations. This paper (i) compares cycles of Arctic hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation activity with global energy prices; (ii) outlines current pollution abatement techniques under pan-Arctic national regulations to identify potential gaps; (iii) describes current international frameworks for Arctic governance to highlight how problems could arise if offshore oil drilling returns to the Arctic and associated spills migrate to international waters; and (iv) provides policy recommendations to aid both national and international policy-makers regarding pollution abatement methods for future Arctic drilling.
... In contrast, Russia possesses 18 icebreakers and even China, despite lacking own Arctic waters, owns one icebreaker. Scott Borgerson thus concludes that "[t]hrough its own neglect, the world's sole superpower -a country that borders the Bering Strait and possesses over 1,000 miles of Arctic coastline -has been left out in the cold" (Borgerson, 2008 (BarentsObserver, 2010a). In addition, environmental nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), the US Navy and US Coast Guard service chiefs as well as leading voices in the private sector support the convention (Borgerson, 2008). ...
... Scott Borgerson thus concludes that "[t]hrough its own neglect, the world's sole superpower -a country that borders the Bering Strait and possesses over 1,000 miles of Arctic coastline -has been left out in the cold" (Borgerson, 2008 (BarentsObserver, 2010a). In addition, environmental nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), the US Navy and US Coast Guard service chiefs as well as leading voices in the private sector support the convention (Borgerson, 2008). Also, American strategic interest in Greenland has been revived recently when the Bush Administration in 2004 obtained an agreement with Denmark to incorporate the Thule radar station in its Missile Defence programme. ...
... With the gradual escalation of the global population, the increasing trend in urbanization and industrialization leads to a continuous deterioration of the total environmental quality. [1][2][3][4][5][6] Presently, air pollution becomes one of the foremost environmental hazard which is strongly interconnected with the increase in healthcare budget, the number of premature deaths as well as the reduction of global economic throughput. [7,8] Besides this, the use of pesticides and the threat of using biochemical weapons are increasing day by day. ...
In the present era of the Internet of Things, wearable sensors have been receiving considerable attention owing to their great potential in a plethora of applications. Highly sensitive chemical type wearable sensors that can conformably adhere to the epidermis or textiles for monitoring personal microenvironment have gained incredible interest. Attributable to the large surface area and excellent mechanical, chemical, physical, thermal as well as biocompatible properties, nanomaterials have become a prominent building block to develop wearable sensors. In this review, recent progress in the development of nanomaterial enabled wearable chemical environmental sensors (WCESs) is presented by focusing on the chemistry‐based transduction principles. The developments in sensor structures, selection of materials, and fabrication methods are highlighted. The recent WCESs are summarized by grouping in three major types according to their transduction principles: electrical, photochemical, and electrochemical. In addition, sensors with multimodal sensing capability as well as sensors immobilized in wireless tags are summarized. Finally, issues, challenges, and future perspectives are discussed to develop next‐generation WCESs with long life, biocompatibility, self‐healing, and real‐time communication capabilities. Owing to the outstanding chemical, mechanical as well as thermal characteristics and large surface areas, wearable sensors comprised of nanomaterial‐based substrates, electrodes, and active layers have emerged as a leading solution for the monitoring of one's ambient microenvironment. Several chemistry‐based transduction methods along with advanced fabrication techniques have the capability to produce environmental sensors with excellent sensitivity, selectivity, and responsivity.
... Several dozen papers have been published on the future of Arctic shipping since the turn of the 21st century, mostly focusing on the idea of climate change and shorter distances as the driver for the expansion of shipping. As sea ice retreated and shorter maritime routes became available, Arctic shipping was described as being bound to expand quickly because of the shrinking ice (Borgerson 2008;Emmerson 2011;Howard 2009) that would reduce the severe constraint on ship mobility (Aksenov et al. 2017;Stephenson et al. 2013). Others tried to assess the economic profitability of Arctic sea routes through econometric models, with a relative majority of papers asserting that Arctic transit was reportedly profitable (Lasserre 2014;Theocharis et al. 2018). ...
... Indirect impacts are harder to be assessed, for the reason that they impact on a larger scale than just a port, e.g. international transportation patterns (Pinnegar et al., 2006;Borgerson, 2008;Hansen, 2008 ...
Catastrophes, with the features of high negative impact and low frequency, are causing
increasing losses to the human society due to the increasing exposure and vulnerability.
Seaports are critical lifeline infrastructures in coastal cities and are at the same time
vulnerable to both natural and man-made catastrophes, such as typhoon, earthquake,
fire, and explosion. Any disruptions to a seaport will have a direct impact on the supply
chain where the port lies and have a second order or even a third order propagation to
the industrial clusters in the hinterland.
A literature review reveals a research gap on port multi-dimensional vulnerability
assessment against catastrophes, which includes assessments of physical, functional,
institutional, economic and interdependency aspects of port vulnerability. Therefore, to
fill the gap, this study firstly identifies the major port catastrophic hazards by literature
review. Based on the framework, port vulnerability is assessed against non-repetitive
catastrophes by utilizing the method of vulnerability index which integrates the fuzzy
evidential reasoning (ER) and the fuzzy technique for order preference by similarity
ideal solution (TOPSIS). By using Tianjin Port Explosion in 2015 as the case study,
vulnerability estimates of the four port sub-systems as well as the whole port system in
two assessment periods are obtained. It is found that the storage system is the most
vulnerable subsystem after the explosion, while the vulnerability condition of the
loading and unloading system improves the most after the first round of port recovery.
Further, port vulnerability assessment against repetitive catastrophes is conducted by
using the developed port operation simulation-based model. The relationship between
catastrophe magnitude and port loss is revealed by quantifying decreased port
throughput and physical damages. The typhoon hazard and the Port of Shenzhen, China
is selected as the case study. It is estimated that a worst-case scenario typhoon attack
could cause a total loss of 0.91 USD billion in the studied terminal, which is
approximately three times the terminal net profit in 2015. Finally, the research takes a
further step in considering the hinterland industrial clusters into the research scope.
VIII
Propagation of port vulnerability to hinterland industrial clusters is evaluated by an
original three-layer port-cargo-industrial cluster model. The key seaports and industrial
clusters in Guangdong province, China as well as the typhoon hazard are used as
examples. It is identified that the most vulnerable industrial cluster of Guangdong is the
petrochemical industrial cluster when facing typhoon-induced port disruptions in the
import mode, while the textile and apparel industrial cluster is the most vulnerable one
in the export mode. Consequently, the port and industrial clusters vulnerability
estimates obtained from this study could be used by decision makers in identifying and
prioritizing critical port protection targets, ship route planning, and risk mitigation
strategy formulating.
... Since the end of the twentieth century, the pronounced summer melting of sea ice in the Arctic Ocean has triggered much speculation about the opening of much shorter sea routes linking Europe via the eastern coast of North America to Asia (Borgerson, 2008;Pelletier and Lasserre, 2012;Käpylä and Mikkola, 2013). Traditionally, there has been little interest from Asian, European, and North American shipping companies in developing regular shipping lines through the Arctic (Boergerson, 2008;Lasserre and Pelletier, 2011;Lasserre, 2014;Beveridge et al. 2016;Lasserre et al. 2016). ...
Driven by rapid economic growth over the past thirty years, China is world’s foremost consumer of nickel ore. China’s economic growth and political affirmation on the international scene, which coincides with a period of debate and concern in Canada about the country’s sovereignty in the North, contribute to the portrayal of various representations in the Canadian media of an aggressive China eager for the region’s mineral resources. In this context, the question that arises is what part Northern Quebec plays in China’s global strategies for its nickel ore supply. The Authors’ results show that Northern Quebec is not a major supply partner in the nickel sector for Chinese companies, which invest primarily in the Eurasian regional environment of China. The maritime distance and longer transit time from or to Northern Quebec from Chinese ports, coupled with lack of marine infrastructure facilities in the North explain the low level of interest and investment of Chinese companies for this area.
... The race by the Arctic states to determine their respective Arctic continental shelves is leading to some observers to be concerned that this is the start of an Arctic resources rush. 56 The United States' Arctic neighbours are all beginning to rebuild their military and coast guard abilities in order to operate in the north, and to take more assertive -even aggressive -tones in the Arctic. 57 As a result, the United States will need to pay much closer attention to the region. ...
Although the United States is an Arctic nation, the Arctic has seldom figured prominently in US policy. In January 2009 the US released its new Arctic policy. Arctic Region Policy signals that the US is beginning to understand that the Arctic is changing in a manner that concerns its vital national interests. The core Arctic issues facing the US are resource development and international circumpolar relations. The development of oil and gas reserves in Alaska is discussed in the context of sustainable development and US domestic energy security, which are often at odds with each other. In regards to circumpolar relation, the US has traditionally been a reluctant Arctic power. It has been unwilling to take the initiative in the area of international Arctic policy. Now, the United States also must act to improve its participation in the main Arctic institutions in order to strengthen cooperation among the Arctic nations. But at the same time, the US must now face a geo-political environment that is becoming more complicated and possibly dangerous than was the case in the last decade. Thus their new policy also emphasizes the priority the US places on security by maintaining a strong military presence in the Arctic. All of these actions are already having an impact on their Arctic neighbors including Canada. This will continue to be the case as American activity increase in the region. Now that the Arctic is transforming due to climate change, resource development, globalization, and geopolitical factors,the United States can no longer ignore the Arctic.
... has just one seaworthy oceangoing icebreaker. . . Russia, by comparison has a fleet of 18 icebreakers' (Borgenson 2008). Even the left-leaning Center for American Progress warns about this 'icebreaker deficit,' albeit with slightly different numbers, claiming that, 'with only two functional icebreakers designed to operate in the Arctic, compared to the 25 operated by or under construction in Russia, the United States is vastly underprepared to manage. . . ...
Global warming is transforming the Arctic. This study presents an analysis of prominent think tank and U.S. national security strategy documents in order to explore how both the corporate community and the U.S. government are responding to changes in the region. While sociologists have paid a great deal of attention to think tanks and climate denialism, this study introduces the term climate opportunism to describe how important segments within the corporate community and the U.S. government are planning to take advantage of Arctic warming in order to promote economic growth and to extend territorial control. By so doing, this study suggests that, while capitalism and militarism are often treated as analytically distinct in the sociological literature, the corporate community and the military often depend upon one another and plan accordingly. Finally, the research findings reported here indicate that, as is consistent with much theory in environmental sociology, the expansionary logics of capitalism and militarism will have severe consequences for the Arctic environment.
... For Arctic shipping models, Lasserre listed all the related research from 1991 to 2013 (Lasserre 2014). Arctic Routes have been studied for two decades ((Wergeland 1992, Mulherin 1996, Kamesaki et al. 1999, Kitagawa et al. 2001, Griffiths 2005, Arpiainen and Kiili 2006, Guy 2006, Somanathan et al. 2007), and many studies have investigated the economics and accessibility of this route (Borgerson 2008, Stephenson et al. 2014, Dvorak 2009, Verny and Grigentin 2009, Chernova and Volkov 2010, Srinath 2010, Liu and Kronbak 2010, Schøyen and Bråthen 2011, Carmel 2012, Falck 2012). Because of the increasing advancement and convenience of network information, new navigation routes presented using a 3D geographic information system (GIS) are more clearly understood (Steiniger and Hunter 2013). ...
To plan undeveloped optimal routes between Asia and Europe via the Arctic Northeast Passages using a 3D geographic information system (GIS), voyage paths are simulated in a 3D visual form. This ensures that the distances are calculated accurately, and that other voyage data such as water depths, sea ice distribution, and seashore topology are also easily deciphered, giving a more direct and clear demonstration compared to simplified presentations on an Electronic Chart Display & Information System (ECDIS). This article also implements a higher-geometry maze router in ice zone areas to obtain the optimal path in relation to safety and costs. This article compares the optimal Arctic Northeast Passages with traditional routes through the Suez Canal for dynamic analyses of the cost efficiency (including time costs, fuel costs, and other factors) of travel between major ports in Asia and Europe. The average benefit assessment is around 30-45% in a bulk carrier comparison. Thus, a 3D GIS can easily obtain and demonstrate safe navigation routes, providing a very convenient tool for initial planning.
... Existing disputes about overlapping claims concerning exclusive economic zones and continental shelf boundaries, such as between the USA and Canada about their boundary in the Beaufort Sea and between Russia, Canada and Denmark about the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges, would aptly demonstrate the looming tensions over Arctic riches (e.g. Borgerson, 2008Borgerson, , 2009Fairhall, 2010;Frey, 2011;Gerhardt et al., 2010;Haftendorn, 2009;Howard, 2009;Huebert, 2010;Marx, 2010;Seidler, 2009;Singh, 2007). ...
Neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist explanations for the state and future of the Arctic region dominate the Arctic debate in international relations. While both schools focus on different aspects concerning the current and future state of Arctic affairs - neorealism evokes a confrontational rush for the Arctic's resources, whereas neoliberal institutionalism propagates the necessary reform of the institutional system governing Arctic issues - both share the underlying assumption of significant and rising stakes towards Arctic commodities. However, this article argues that this debate has hitherto failed to substantiate the actual stakes of the main actors involved. Consequently, many studies make grandiloquent statements about prospects of cooperation and conflict and the appropriate institutional framework for the Arctic region, based on only limited empirical support. This article aims to fill this gap by analysing the Arctic oil and gas interests of the five Arctic littoral states (Russia, USA, Canada, Norway and Denmark/Greenland). The analysis shows greatly different levels of interests towards the High North among the Arctic states. The findings make it possible to make more credible statements about the likelihood of confrontation over Arctic resources and necessary institutional adjustments. The evidence shows that the often-evoked issue of geopolitical rush for Arctic resources is unlikely to eventuate. Nonetheless, there remain institutional challenges for the protection of the fragile Arctic ecosystem.
... 25 Here are the conclusions of cost studies that attempt to evaluate the cost advantage of container transit shipping across Arctic routes: Scott Borgerson asserts, without quoting his sources or his calculation method, that Arctic transit could enable shipping firms to save up to $3.5 million per voyage. 26 However, he explicitly estimates that transit speed will not be hindered. His study is therefore unverifiable and not really credible. ...
... The models are of diverse quality and purpose. Borgerson (2008) uses his very synthetic simulation to illustrate his idea that the NWP will witness a traffic explosion, but he does not disclose his sources and his reasoning rests on a debatable hypothesis that ships will navigate the NWP with the same speed as along southern sea lanes. Paterson (2011) andFalck (2012) Given all the parameters involved, 13 models conclude that Arctic routes can be profitable for commercial shipping in the short term; five are more ambivalent or do not take a position, and five conclude that conditions are difficult for a profitable exploitation of these routes (Tables 3, 4). ...
Arctic sea routes have for long been of interest for shipping because of much shorter distances between the Atlantic and the Pacific. Sea ice prevented real development of significant traffic, but did not prevent research from trying to assess their economic viability. With the melting of sea ice in the Arctic, this effort at modeling the profitability of Arctic shipping routes has received a new impetus. However, the conclusions of these studies vary widely, depending on the parameters chosen and their value. What can be said of these models, from 1991 until 2013, and to what extent can a model be drawn, capitalising on twenty years of simulations?
This paper considers how sociotechnical imaginaries structure the development and use of sensing technology in the Canadian Arctic. The central claim is that these technological developments are grounded in a particular sociotechnical imaginary centred on risk, vulnerability, and probability, which frames the Arctic as a space threatened by myriad future dangers. Within this sociotechnical imaginary, the Canadian state’s security and sovereignty are threatened by the potential for competing expressions of power enabled by climate change, technological diffusion, and other trends stemming from the international scale. Consequently, sensing is envisioned as a mode of sovereign power to protect Canada’s Arctic territory and manage threats in their indeterminate and potential form.
Revue Nordiques
Dans le contexte des changements climatiques et de la fonte accélérée de la banquise arctique, les médias et bon nombre d'articles scientifiques se font l'écho des possibles autoroutes maritimes qui structureraient les passages arctiques au 21 e siècle. Ces scénarios reposent souvent sur la projection de la fonte de la glace, des analyses de coûts et l'idée que des trajets plus courts seront nécessairement attractifs, mais négligent les aspects logistiques et économiques de la navigation commerciale en mer englacée. Leur enthousiasme s'enracine plutôt dans une lecture fantasmée des passages arctiques héritée des grands voyages d'exploration du 16e au 19e siècle.
In the context of climate change and the accelerated melting of the Arctic sea ice, the media and many scientific articles echo the potential maritime highways that would structure Arctic passages in the 21 st century. These scenarios are often based on the projection of ice melt, cost analyses, and the idea that shorter journeys will necessarily be attractive; they however neglect the logistical and economic aspects of commercial shipping in icy waters. Their enthusiasm is rooted in a romanticized approach to Arctic passages inherited from the great voyages of exploration of the 16 th to 19 th centuries.
The Arctic Ocean has drawn major attention in recent years due to its rich natural resources and shorter navigational routes. Arctic development and transportation involve significant risk caused by the unique features of this region, such as ice, severe operating conditions, unpredictable climatic changes, and remoteness. Considering the high degree of uncertainty in the performance of vessel operating systems and humans, robust risk analysis and management tools are required to provide decision-support to prevent accidents and ensure safety at sea. This paper proposes an Object-Oriented Bayesian Network model to dynamically predict ship-ice collision probability based on navigational and operational system states, weather and ice conditions, and human error. The model, when integrated with potential consequences, may help estimate risk. A case study related to oil tanker navigation on the Northern Sea Route (NSR) is used to show the application of the proposed model to predict oil tanker collision with sea ice.
Polar amplification is an established scientific fact which has been associated with the surface albedo feedback and with heat and moisture transport from the Equator to the Poles. In this paper we unify a two-box climate model, which allows for heat and moisture transport from the southern region to the northern region, with an economic model of welfare optimization. Our main contribution is to show that by ignoring spatial heat and moisture transport and the resulting polar amplification, the regulator may overestimate or underestimate the tax on greenhouse gas emissions. The direction of bias depends on the relations between marginal damages from temperature increase in each region. We also determine the welfare cost when a regulator mistakenly ignores polar amplification. Numerical simulations confirm our theoretical results, while ballpark estimates indicate that the tax bias could be as high as 20%, while welfare cost could reach 2% of global effective steady-state consumption.
The United States military is treating climate change as a crucial factor in its preparation for future conflicts. This concern manifests not only in strategic planning and forward-looking documents, but also in building infrastructural capacity and material provision. Yet, the impetus to 'green' the military goes beyond the deployment of existing technologies. We examine several facets of the military's role as an environmental actor, particularly through its promotion of the US Navy's 'Great Green Fleet' (GGF), which actively supports the development of advanced biofuels by subsidizing their development and facilitating wider marketization. The GGF promises to reduce military reliance on conventional fossil fuels and reconfigure its energy sourcing, thus reducing dependence on imported hydrocarbons; this is with an eye towards ultimately severing the logistical relationship between existing energy infrastructures and the spaces of military intervention. Taking an integrated lens of political ecology and geopolitics-'geopolitical ecology'-we seek to provide an understanding of the production of weaponized nature. We demonstrate that the US military's discursive use of climate change to justify the provision of new military hardware and advanced biofuels promotes a vision of resource conflicts to support the development of technologies to overcome the constraints to delivery of fuel to emergent front lines. We argue that while this may appear to be militarized greenwashing, it signals a shift in the logics and practices of fuel sourcing driven by a dystopian vision of climate change, which the US military played a significant role in creating.
Polar amplification is an established scientific fact which has been associated with the surface albedo feedback and with heat and moisture transport from the Equator to the Poles. In this paper we unify a two-box climate model, which allows for heat and moisture transport from the southern region to the northern region, with an economic model of welfare optimization. Our main contribution is to show that by ignoring spatial heat and moisture transport and the resulting polar amplification, the regulator may overestimate or underestimate the tax on greenhouse gas emissions. The direction of bias depends on the relations between marginal damages from temperature increase in each region. We also determine the welfare cost when a regulator mistakenly ignores polar amplification. Numerical simulations confirm our theoretical results, while ballpark estimates indicate that the tax bias could be as high as 20%, while welfare cost could reach 2% of global effective steady-state consumption.
The unilateral use of technologies for counteracting global warming is regarded as a threat by decision-makers, academics and the wider public, yet existing studies do not address the scenario in a systematic manner. I develop a conceptual framework for the study of unilateral geoengineering which distinguishes different types of actors, their capacities and decision-making contexts. Focusing on Ocean Iron Fertilization and Stratospheric Aerosol Injections, I develop several short- and long-term scenarios in which actors are conceivably both willing and able to deploy those technologies on a scale sufficient for impacting the climate system. Beyond being the first paper to develop a systematic approach to unilateral geoengineering, I show that some scenarios which stir public concern are implausible.
In 1959 the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers built Camp Century beneath the surface of the northwestern Greenland Ice Sheet. There they studied the feasibility of deploying ballistic missiles within the ice sheet. The base and its wastes were abandoned with minimal decommissioning in 1967, under the assumption they would be preserved for eternity by perpetually accumulating snowfall. Here we show that a transition in ice sheet surface mass balance at Camp Century from net accumulation to net ablation is plausible within the next 75 years, under a business-as-usual anthropogenic emissions scenario (Representative Concentration Pathway 8.5). Net ablation would guarantee the eventual remobilization of physical, chemical, biological, and radiological wastes abandoned at the site. While Camp Century and four other contemporaneous ice sheet bases were legally established under a Danish-U.S. treaty, the potential remobilization of their abandoned wastes, previously regarded as sequestered, represents an entirely new pathway of political dispute resulting from climate change.
The biophysical state change currently underway in the Arctic Ocean is opening up the region to new and intensified human activities. While the pace of development is not as rapid as many expected a few years ago, increased human activities are generating new needs for governance pertaining to the Arctic Ocean. The critical shortcomings of the existing arrangements applicable to this area arise from jurisdictional and sectoral fragmentation. A more effective governance system for the entire Arctic Ocean must rest on the constitutive foundation provided by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The toolkit provided by the law of the sea includes at least four distinct though not mutually exclusive approaches: (i) the application of specific provisions of UNCLOS (e.g. Arts. 122 and 123) to address emerging needs for governance in the Arctic Ocean, (ii) the development of UNCLOS implementing agreements that are applicable to the Arctic Ocean, (iii) the use of measures adopted by UN specialized agencies (e.g. IMO, FAO), and (iv) the creation of subsidiary bodies, such as regional fisheries management organizations or regional seas arrangements, tailored to the circumstances of the Arctic Ocean. A critical review of these approaches reveals their strengths and weaknesses as mechanisms for meeting emerging needs for governance in the Arctic Ocean. The way forward is likely to feature the development of a multi-functional arrangement that applies to human activities in the entire Arctic Ocean and that allows for distinct categories of members possessing different rights and responsibilities.
With a long view of the Arctic in international politics and economics, the paper discusses the effects of political and economic power transitions for the Arctic, focusing on Sino-Russian relations. The Arctic has in the last decade received new attention from new quarters of the world, especially Asian emerging powers, which reflects climate change and power transition/globalization. The focus here is on cases of cross-border exchanges in agriculture, raw materials, processed goods, energy and Arctic shipping. The chapter discusses how Sino-Russian relations in this region reflect general trends of Russia and China in a post-Cold War globalized international political and economic system. Russia for both domestic and international reasons struggles to find its post-Cold War position in the international political and economic system, which affects its place between the West and China. Russia’s entire northern boundary is the Arctic, with the longest Arctic coastline of all five Arctic coastal states. To in any way relegate any parts of its Arctic marine area currently defined by the Law of Sea as its EEZ to any international or Chinese authority would diminish Russia's power. China has since the late 1970s experienced phenomenal economic growth, which is the strongest single driver of political and economic power transition in the international system. This power transition also defines China's relation to the Arctic and to Russia. China now terms itself a “near Arctic” nation, has previously described the Arctic as a common heritage of mankind, and seeks to further its influence in the Arctic.
Climate change in the Arctic is leading to the fast recession of sea ice in the summer. This evolution leads several observers, scientists, media and government officials, to consider the possibility of developing new shipping routes along Arctic routes, as these routes are much shorter between Europe and Asia. The literature displays a strong discourse about interest from Asian countries for these potential shipping routes. This paper tackles with this idea and examines to what extent Asian shipping companies, the ultimate economic agents, are really interested in Arctic shipping routes. The image the research portrayed is that only a minority of Asian shipping companies are indeed interested, and those that are interested stress the destinational dimension of Arctic shipping, not transit shipping.
The role of seasonality on predator-prey interactions in the presence of a resource subsidy is examined using a system of non-autonomous ordinary differential equations (ODEs). The problem is motivated by the Arctic, inhabited by the ecological system of arctic foxes (predator), lemmings (prey), and seal carrion (subsidy). We construct two nonlinear, nonautonomous systems of ODEs named the Primary Model, and the n-Patch Model. The Primary Model considers spatial factors implicitly, and the n-Patch Model considers space explicitly as a "Stepping Stone" system. We establish the boundedness of the dynamics, as well as the necessity of sufficiently nutritional food for the survival of the predator. We investigate the importance of including the resource subsidy explicitly in the model, and the importance of accounting for predator mortality during migration. We find a variety of non-equilibrium dynamics for both systems, obtaining both limit cycles and chaotic oscillations. We were then able to discuss relevant implications for biologically interesting predator-prey systems including subsidy under seasonal effects. Notably, we can observe the extinction or persistence of a species when the corresponding autonomous system might predict the opposite.
In the summer of 2007, when the Russian flag was placed on the ocean floor at the North Pole and the Arctic ice cover receded to the lowest extent ever recorded, the media sought Arctic story lines that would grab the public's attention. Titles and headlines such as “Arctic Meltdown,” “A New Cold War,” and “Arctic Land Grab” focused on burgeoning Russian activities in the Arctic all fed a sense of circumpolar competition, conflict, and crisis. These story lines were effective because they built on geopolitical beliefs that have been with us for more than a century, from the final years of the Russian Empire through the Soviet era and into the first years of the Russian Federation. For all of that time, the core of Western geopolitical thought has held that there is a natural conflict between the landlocked Eurasian heartland and the Western maritime nations. In this analysis, the Arctic has played an essential, yet unrecognized, role as the northern wall in the Western strategy to enclose and contain the world's largest land power. Throughout the twentieth century, scant attention was given by the West to changes in Arctic technology, economics, climate, and law that had been under way since the 1930s. Stories of Russian claims to the seabed of the Arctic Ocean and Moscow's control of new sea lanes, interpreted through the old (and by now, creaky) geopolitics of the early twentieth century, heightened fears of conflict.
Interest in Arctic politics is on the rise. While recent accounts of the topic place much emphasis on climate change or a new geopolitics of the region, the history of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) and Arctic politics reaches back much further in time.
Global climate change provides both risks and opportunities in the surrounding areas of the North Pole. Melting icebergs and glaciers increase the environmental risks to the ecosystem. Simultaneously the extraction of natural resources in the region and the use of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) seem easier than before. Those countries and companies that would utilize these opportunities have begun competing to take initiative for the development of the region. For instance, a Korean shipping company operated a test navigation between Russia and Korea through the NSR in 2013, while others did not. What are the drivers and barriers of sailing the NSR? This study aims to address this question by identifying the economic, external, and internal drivers and barriers to voyage through the NSR, from the perspective of shipping companies. Comparative case studies, using interviews and document analysis, suggest that the differences between shipping companies that consider voyaging the NSR mainly lie in companies' perceptions of economic opportunities and their internal factors. Despite economic and external policy barriers, a company's financial capacity and leadership played a key role to explore the new route, seeking potential of shipping resources from the Arctic region.
Interest from the Chinese government has been on the rise since about 2005, and the media have widely reported on these Chinese projects. China is often described as being very interested in both Arctic mineral resources and the opening of Arctic shipping routes, but in this characterization there is a hint of a perceived threat, as commentators are often stressing out that China's appetite may lead Beijing into considering the Northwest Passage an international strait and resources as open up for grabs. However, the motives for this Chinese interest boils down to three points: diplomacy, access to natural resources, and access to Arctic sea routes. To what extent are Chinese shipping firms really interested in developing active service along these polar waterways?
The Arctic is perceived as an area that requires increased North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) attention. On the one hand, the region has always been of particular concern to NORAD, especially during the Cold War. From this perspective, attention to the Arctic is business as usual. On the other hand, increased potential traffic in the region due to warmer temperatures, natural resource exploitation, and tourism could increase threats to North America and create the need for a new NORAD posture. This paper reviews the challenges facing the Arctic, the perceived new urgency for attention, the command and control structures of NORAD, and NORAD's specific preoccupations in order to answer the question: does the Arctic represent status quo for NORAD or does NORAD need to change, fundamentally, its approach to the North? This paper ultimately argues for the former.
The book is divided into three sections. In the first, the key theoretical and practical arguments for and against bringing together environmental and security issues are set out. The book then goes on to present how and why environmental issues have come to be framed in some quarters as 'national security' concerns in the context of the effects of overpopulation, resource depletion, climate change and the role of the military as both a cause and a solution to problems of pollution and natural disasters. Finally, the third section explores the case for treating the key issues of environmental change as matters of human security. Overall, the book will provide a clear, systematic and thorough overview of all dimensions of an area of great academic and 'real-world' political interest but one that has rarely been set out in an accessible textbook format hitherto.
US-China relations represent the most central bilateral relationship in the world, but few studies investigate the two countries’ approaches to the Arctic. This article explores the geopolitical shifts in the Arctic, and compares and contrasts American and Chinese policy in the region. The article examines to what extent the two have common or conflicting interests, and discusses the potential for US-China friction and rivalry. Some alarmist writers suggest that the future Arctic is set for confrontation. This article, however, argues that the current stakes in the circumpolar Arctic region are not sufficiently high to warrant confrontation between the two states. Cooperation predominantly guides their policies and activities. While they play different roles and increasingly seek to demonstrate their influence, there are common interests, such as in the freedom of the seas, in resource extraction and in developing infrastructure in the region.
This article presents a model for the analysis of the domestic-international nexus of Arctic politics. It offers a preliminary attempt at mapping the domestic politics of Arctic boundary disputes in Canada. It explores the potential impact of domestic politics on such disputes by identifying the interests of domestic stakeholders in the Canadian Arctic. The paper views maritime boundary negotiations as a ‘two-level game’ in which negotiations occur internationally and domestically. The paper argues that the domestic level negotiation is contingent on how the issues are ‘framed’ between policymakers and their constituents. The paper identifies ways that domestic actors can reduce the number of acceptable outcomes in a two-level game, thereby impeding cooperation.
Greenland was used by the US as a platform and as an extended arm within its security and foreign policy during the World War II and the cold war. After this things changed, although Greenland remained important in Danish-US relations under the umbrella of NATO. Nowadays, the geostrategic position of Greenland between North America and Europe is gaining fresh prominence in the race for natural resources in the Arctic. Many issues arise from the prospective opening of the Arctic, all of which may have fateful impacts on future development in the region. Climate change, claims related to the extension of the continental shelf, exploitation and exploration of natural resources, together with the protection of indigenous peoples are all current issues that must be taken into consideration in the context of security and foreign policy formation in Greenland. The future of the Thule Air Base is also relevant. This article reviews developments from the World War II to the present regarding international relations from a Greenlandic perspective. As a self-governing sub-national territory within the realm of Denmark, Greenland does not have the ultimate decision-making power within foreign and security policy. The new Self-Government Act of 2009, however, gives Greenland some room for manoeuvre in this respect.
We argue that the current understanding of the Arctic as a region fraught by increasing tension and competition under conditions of climate change is an incomplete story. It ignores many salient developments in furthering co-operation and human security agendas, and marginalises some of the more complex and interesting developments within the region. Such changes in ‘natural states’ do not, in and of themselves, create geopolitical and political instability. Rather, it is the way in which change is understood as a problem for institutional and international organs that creates conditions for co-operation or competition. In the Arctic today, the balance is tipped in favour of co-operation, but the situation is complex and many actors have vested interests.
As the effects of climate change are becoming more and more pronounced, the Arctic region is attracting renewed attention from politicians, transnational corporations, and environmentalists alike, many of whom are based geographically far from the region itself. Interests span from the prospects of vast oil and mineral riches and shorter international shipping routes, to preserving what is often framed as a fragile, pristine environment. As a resource frontier and a wilderness, but also a homeland and a space of culture to its inhabitants, the Arctic is characterised by potentially conflicting geographical imaginaries and visions of both the present as well as the future of the region. Hence, the political geographies of the Arctic are both messy and complex. This paper examines some of the principal themes and issues of Arctic geopolitics and offers a discussion of how scholars of Political Geography have engaged the topic at a time when an increasing number of academics are directing their analytical gaze towards the North. Focusing on publications from the past decade, it aims to contextualise scholarly debates on Arctic geopolitics and illustrate the complexity and richness of the topic.
For wild belugas (Delphinapterus leucas), gestation length estimates based on fetal size have produced extreme ranges. Ex situ populations thereby provide unique opportunities to define this important life history event. Accordingly, research with ultrasound was conducted on six beluga whales over 11 gestations with known conception dates to serially measure fetal changes in biparietal diameter (BP), thoracic diameter (TD), thoracic circumference (TC), and total length (TL). Incremental polynomial regression analyses were performed on each fetal measurement to develop predictive models for determining age based on fetal size and days from parturition. Gestation length (n = 11) was a mean 467 ± 5.4 d with male calves (478 ± 8.6 d) experiencing a longer gestation (P = 0.04) than females (457 ± 3.9 d). Age at TL was best described using a 2nd order polynomial model, while linear relationships existed for BPD, TD, and TC. Accuracy was improved for predicting age (P = 0.001) or days prior to parturition (P = 0.038) using data from the first vs. the second half of gestation. The results provide accurate models for aging beluga fetuses based on size in both in situ and ex situ populations.
Due to both the environmental impacts and the economic opportunities brought about by climate change, interest in the Arctic is rising in Asia. While there is a growing scholarship analyzing Asian interest in the Arctic, Iceland's reception to this interest has been under-studied. This paper explores Iceland's rising interest in the Arctic and its linked response to growing Chinese overtures toward Iceland and the region. Data were gathered from peer-reviewed literature, policy documents, popular media articles, participant observation at the Arctic Circle conference, and semi-structured interviews from October to December 2013 with a cross-section of Iceland's political, economic, and scientific elite. Results indicate that Iceland is trying to capitalize on the increasing global visibility and economic opportunities in the Arctic while working to ensure regional geopolitical and environmental stability. While Iceland generally welcomes Chinese overtures into Arctic political and scientific spheres, the response to economic overtures is more nuanced. Specifically, Iceland is trying to balance a desire for economic gains, Chinese investment in Icelandic industries, and an associated ability to ‘scale up’ economically with a perceived vulnerability to being dominated by a country which dwarfs Iceland in both size, power, and influence.
Climate change is literally and metaphorically bringing the Arctic in from the cold in international affairs with new economic opportunities emerging with the retreat of the ice sheets. Prominent amongst these is the prospect of previously inaccessible oil and gas sources in the High North becoming available for extraction.Aspate of extended maritime claims by the states of the region and some high profile diplomatic posturing has prompted much anticipation of anew scramble of resources and even anew, more literal Cold War. The re-ality, however, appears to be more mundane with the Arctic oil rush proving to be more of aslow and cooperative saunter thus far, as the Arctic powers, and others, seek the new riches with adegree of caution, employing – and even sharing – lawyers and geologists rather than de-ploying troops.
Arctic waters have historically been relatively inaccessible for marine transport. Lately, climate change has made more of this region ice-free in the summer season. This has reduced the difficulty of marine transport in Arctic waters. Further, exploration and development of natural resources is increasing in Arctic regions, as is destinational shipping. The unique risk factors of this region, such as extremely low temperature, ice conditions and drifting icebergs, continue to pose threats to transportation. Potential impacts associated with marine transportation accidents warrant contingency plans that recognize that preventative measures may fail. To plan effectively, a transportation accident risk assessment model for Arctic waters is helpful. There is limited work on the development of such models. A new cause-consequences based risk assessment model is proposed here. The model estimates the probability of a transportation accident and also the related consequences during navigation in Arctic waters. To illustrate the application of the methodology, it is applied to a case of an oil-tanker collision on the Northern Sea Route.
The five states that surround the Arctic Ocean— Russia, Canada, the United States, Denmark, and Norway—have in recent years taken various measures to protect their economic and security interests in the north. The measures include not only the adoption of Arctic strategies, but also the development of new military capabilities. As in other parts of the world, one state's military efforts to enhance its security may have the unfortunate effect of making others feel less secure, and therefore more likely to undertake similar efforts. Thus, despite being a low-tension region, the Arctic is by no means immune to the logic of the security dilemma.
Political attention in Europe and the US to the problem of energy security has significantly diminished, and there is more to this shift that just the impact of financial crisis in the EU and the effect of the ‘shale gas revolution’. In the middle of the past decade, some fundamental decisions were made in the European Commission regarding the liberalization and diversification of the energy supplies, but the economic underpinning of these decisions has vastly changed. The whole set of energy directive is now pointing in the wrong direction, but rethinking of past mistakes is lagging, so the energy policy is left in its bureaucratic ‘box’. Russia is set to remain locked in the European gas market but is very slow in adapting to the changes in it. Both Russia and the EU remain in denial that the time for their energy-geopolitical games is over as the nexus of energy flows is fast shifting to Asia-Pacific.
Semantic arguments about the definition of 'tipping points' are
distracting attention away from the causes and impacts of climate change
in the Arctic.
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