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... This project has created opposition between the principal actors (fishermen, agriculturists, livestock-herders and others), the stakeholders from public administration, (from national and provincial ministries), local politicians and land lords (Nauman 2003;Magsi 2012). The public administrative authorities with highly bureaucratic approaches and mismanagement of construction to compensation funds, the local politicians with misuse of their position and power against forcible displacement, where the local landlords with power competition to local population, all this made the task of bringing-off this project more complicated and controversial. ...
... Since major part of the Chotiari wetlands area (before the reservoir) was owned by local population (Magsi 2012), where they had to enjoy the complete rights of their land ownership, but most of the owners were poor, illiterate and socially inefficient, with little awareness of land-use rights. In this situation, some outside stakeholders took the advantage of these loopholes and created fake ownership documentations for compensations and other benefits during the reservoir construction period (Nauman 2003). Additionally, the corruption of public servants is an undeniable fact in the country (Khan 2006); while in the case of Chotiari reservoir government has itself admitted the cases of corruptions and misuses of the funds (Iqbal 2004). ...
... According to the experts the compensation has been paid to 260 out of 993 families, who either belonged or supported by local landlords and politicians. Thus, the powerful lobby has managed to drain over Rs 76 million (approximately one million US dollars) to fake owners, which is about 80 percent of total disbursement (Nauman 2003). Many families went through the courts for justice, because either they refused the lower compensations amount or they were not declared as affectees. ...
... This project has created opposition between the principal actors (fishermen, agriculturists, livestock-herders and others), the stakeholders from public administration, (from national and provincial ministries), local politicians and land lords (Nauman 2003;Magsi 2012). The public administrative authorities with highly bureaucratic approaches and mismanagement of construction to compensation funds, the local politicians with misuse of their position and power against forcible displacement, where the local landlords with power competition to local population, all this made the task of bringing-off this project more complicated and controversial. ...
... Since major part of the Chotiari wetlands area (before the reservoir) was owned by local population (Magsi 2012), where they had to enjoy the complete rights of their land ownership, but most of the owners were poor, illiterate and socially inefficient, with little awareness of land-use rights. In this situation, some outside stakeholders took the advantage of these loopholes and created fake ownership documentations for compensations and other benefits during the reservoir construction period (Nauman 2003). Additionally, the corruption of public servants is an undeniable fact in the country (Khan 2006); while in the case of Chotiari reservoir government has itself admitted the cases of corruptions and misuses of the funds (Iqbal 2004). ...
... According to the experts the compensation has been paid to 260 out of 993 families, who either belonged or supported by local landlords and politicians. Thus, the powerful lobby has managed to drain over Rs 76 million (approximately one million US dollars) to fake owners, which is about 80 percent of total disbursement (Nauman 2003). Many families went through the courts for justice, because either they refused the lower compensations amount or they were not declared as affectees. ...
... This project has created opposition between the principal actors (fishermen, agriculturists, livestock-herders and others), the stakeholders from public administration, (from national and provincial ministries), local politicians and land lords (Nauman 2003; Magsi 2012). The public administrative authorities with highly bureaucratic approaches and mismanagement of construction to compensation funds, the local politicians with misuse of their position and power against forcible displacement, where the local landlords with power competition to local population, all this made the task of bringing-off this project more complicated and controversial. ...
... Since major part of the Chotiari wetlands area (before the reservoir) was owned by local population (Magsi 2012), where they had to enjoy the complete rights of their land ownership, but most of the owners were poor, illiterate and socially inefficient, with little awareness of land-use rights. In this situation, some outside stakeholders took the advantage of these loopholes and created fake ownership documentations for compensations and other benefits during the reservoir construction period (Nauman 2003). Additionally, the corruption of public servants is an undeniable fact in the country (Khan 2006); while in the case of Chotiari reservoir government has itself admitted the cases of corruptions and misuses of the funds (Iqbal 2004). ...
... According to the experts the compensation has been paid to 260 out of 993 families, who either belonged or supported by local landlords and politicians. Thus, the powerful lobby has managed to drain over Rs 76 million (approximately one million US dollars) to fake owners, which is about 80 percent of total disbursement (Nauman 2003). Many families went through the courts for justice, because either they refused the lower compensations amount or they were not declared as affectees. ...
... The Chotiari reservoir area was characterized as wetlands and included lakes, forest, swamps, irrigation channels, agricultural land, barren land and a rich ecosystem, which supported the livelihoods of the local population through fishing, agriculture, grazing and a range of other economic activities (WWF, 2008). The Chotiari reservoir project has created opposition between the principal actors (fishermen, farmers, livestock herders and others) on the one hand, and stakeholders from the public administration (national and provincial ministries), local politicians and landlords on the other (Magsi and Torre, 2012;Nauman, 2003). More specifically, a number of factors have made the task of implementing this project more complicated and controversial: the public administration's highly bureaucratic approaches and mismanagement of construction and compensation funds; local politicians' misuse of position and power with regard to forced displacements; and local landlords' exercise of power over the local population. ...
... The result is that the reservoir (after its inauguration) has been occupied (illegally) by some of those influential actors, as displaced populations have not been allowed to access the reservoir to earn their livelihood by fishing, etc. As highlighted by Nauman (2003), this cooperative lobbying network has managed to direct over 80% of compensation disbursements to fictitious owners (individuals whom they support). Moreover, the government itself has accepted that there was massive corruption in the Chotiari reservoir project (Iqbal, 2004), but no accountability has been established to date. ...
... According to the experts, no significant changes would be required to extend the agricultural land around the reservoir. This is because the authorities cannot store more water because of the poor quality of the earthworks in constructing its embankments (Nauman, 2003). However, arable land inside the reservoir perimeter has been flooded, and arable land outside this perimeter has been damaged by waterlogging and seepage. ...
... Journal of Infrastructure Development, 4, 2 (2012): 59-76 Figure 5 indicates the panel of the actors in a bureaucratic and politicised environment, comprised of federal to provincial ministries and local landlords, with a single objective to construct the reservoir on the Chotiari wetlands. In fact, the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) had planned and initiated to construct the reservoir with the help of provincial departments (irrigation and drainage, forest and environment) as well as the local feudal lords (Nauman 2003), to provide irrigation water to down command area in the province, with financial assistance provided mainly by the World Bank and partially by other agencies. In this regard, WAPDA has also claimed that the construction of the reservoir and remodelling of the irrigation system would increase the cost-benefit ratio from 0.9:1 to 1:3.1 (Tarar 2003). ...
... In most of the developing countries like Pakistan, the landownership rights are unclear or complex, and with a long hierarchy (Ali and Nasir 2010). Moreover, the local governance structure is unhelpful (Nemeroff 2008), with bureaucratic behaviour and controlled by the supremacy of institutions (Nauman 2003). Pakistan exercises the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, 6 where the law has been amended several times (Janjua 2007), but the transfer of land property and compensation systems are incompatible and have loopholes (Khan 2006). ...
... A major part of the Chotiari wetlands was owned by the local population (Nauman et al. 2001), where they enjoyed complete rights of their landownership, but most of the owners were poor, illiterate and socially inefficient, and with little awareness of land use rights. In this situation, some outside stakeholders 7 took the advantage of property rights loopholes and created fake ownership papers for compensations and other benefits during the reservoir construction period (Nauman 2003). Additionally, the corruption of public servants is an undeniable fact in the country. ...
Little attention has been devoted to the role of social networks and property rights in infrastructural projects. We use the Chotiari water reservoir project data from Pakistan, to explore the social network of actors on land use and property right violation, which create a dissimilar power distribution and significant land use conflicts. Results indicate that public officials with their alien stakeholders have pressurised the local population to displace, where institutional inconsistency towards justice has led them to mistrust and project opposition. In Pakistan, the non-existence of a national resettlement policy is germinating land use conflicts and human and property rights violations since five decades. Therefore, attention to such conflicts, their resolution and prevention are important for research and policy development.
... Thus the flawed infrastructural projects have not only forced rural people to migrate, but also failed considerably to protect biodiversity (WWF, 2008b; Iqbal, 2004). The article is mainly descriptive in parts, which discusses the case of reservoir construction in an economically and ecologically prosperous area of the Sindh Province in Pakistan (Husnain et al., 2010; WWF, 2008a), which has not only devastated the natural resource dependant livelihoods of local population (Magsi, 2012), but also diminished ecological habitats (WWF, 2008; Nauman, 2003). The research explores root causes of poor performance of EIA, while discussing the case of Chotiari reservoir construction. ...
... They further argued that local population raised their voice against mismanagement in land acquisition and misuse of funds allocated for land compensation to the farmers by public officials. In fact, due to ineffectual planning and corruption the project was delayed by five years up-to December 2002 and inaugurated on February 2003 (Iqbal, 2004; Nauman, 2003). Chotiari is an ecologically rich area and unique wetland complex. ...
... However it identified some risks to Hog Deer and other key species of the site due to destruction of their habitats but failed to figure out any suitable mitigation. It did not provide the survey of adjacent habitats nor determine their carrying capacity for relocation of displaced fauna, yet the availability of adjacent habitats were given as justification for habitat loss (Nauman, 2003). Majority of the experts have opined that the EIA completely neglected to evaluate any alternative site or option for endangered species. ...
Being an agro-based economy, Pakistan depends mainly on fertile lands and Indus River irrigation systems. The extensive expansion and unsustainable growth in this sector is rapidly degrading ecosystem and environmental services, which leads to undermine the rural livelihoods. This research explores root causes of poor performance of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in this sector, taking the case of Chotiari water reservoir construction as an example. It further explores the outcomes of the unilateral decisions taken towards development projects which had led to the destruction of environmental services, biodiversity, fertile agricultural lands and sustenance of local population in the region. The aim of the article is to highlight inadequacies of EIA framework in the country and to recommend good governance practices to promote regional sustainability through such infrastructural projects.
... Therefore, a key contribution of this paper is to provide qualitative estimation that can help to quantify regional development losses incurred due to the conflicts of land use. The article is descriptive in parts but mainly tries to point out the important factors in each section in accordance to provide foundations of a deeper investigation of a flawed development project example from a developing country, which has not only forced rural people to migrate (Magsi, 2012), but also failed considerably to protect biodiversity and the environment (Magsi and Torre, 2012; WWF, 2008; Iqbal, 2004; Nauman, 2003). Therefore, the paper is structured as follows. ...
... Since major part of the Chotiari wetlands area (before the reservoir) was owned by local population (Nauman et al., 2001), where they had to enjoy the complete rights of their land ownership, but most of the owners were poor, illiterate and socially inefficient, with little awareness of land-use rights (Khan, 2006). In this situation, some outside stakeholders took the advantage of these loopholes and created fake ownership documentations for compensations and other benefits during the reservoir construction period (Nauman, 2003). Additionally, the corruption of public servants is an undeniable fact in the country (Khan, 2006), while in the case of Chotiari reservoir government has itself admitted the cases of corruptions and misuses of the funds (Iqbal, 2004). ...
... Normally, the institutions are responsible to develop a social interface among society and to promote the reforms and historical changes overtime, which are invisible, but can be measured through the policies (Ostrom, 1990). In Pakistan, most of the land owners have confrontations with existing institutions due to their mismanagement and ignorant behavior and unhelpful governance structure (Khan, 2006), and bureaucratic behavior (Nauman, 2003), where land registration system is very old and complex with a long hierarchy (Ali and Nasir, 2001). Although, in Pakistan the property rights are constitutionally documented that authorize the owners to take decision with regard to its use. ...
It is to contribute in the research on land use conflicts created by infrastructural projects, which have entailed expropriation of homes, farm businesses and other productive resources in the developing countries. In Pakistan, land use conflicts have been germinated by non-existence of national resettlement policy, and human and property right violators, since five decades. For this research the data from Chotiari water reservoir project (Pakistan) has been collected, which explores that how a decision towards a development project have disturbed sustainability of indigenous population, devastated natural resources, environmental services and fertile lands. First, the article defines the conflicts over land use with their dynamic features; as well as the description on the case study and the principle actors. The next section highlights the nature and positions of stakeholders involved. There is then a discussion on the impacts of the reservoir, governance roles and responsibilities, and to determine the root causes and consequences, as well as how the institutional inconsistency towards justice has lead local population in mistrust. Finally, on the basis of results we offer policy implications particularly for land use conflict prevention and management.
... The government of Pakistan promulgated Pakistan Environmental Protection Ordinance EIA outline was developed purely on scientific basis with deficiencies such as without conceiving major changes in existing environmental and ecological conditions by diverting natural water into artificial lake and increase in water volume and without realizing its impacts on biodiversity and livelihood of fishermen, simultaneously, the EIA, could not deliver to accomplish the goals of environmental sustainability and unable to safeguard natural environment. This article debates a case study of reservoir construction in environmentally sensitive area of the Nara Desert, District Sanghar, Sindh Province, Pakistan resulted not only shrunken ecological habitat but also put limitation for poor local folks to utilize natural resources (Nauman, 2003). The purpose of this article is to analysis of overlooking of EIA process and its consequences on the biodiversity of Chotiari reservoir ecosystem. ...
... The negative aspects include risks to Hog Deer (Axis porcinus) and important species of the area due to loss of their habitat but unable to draft any tangible mitigation plan. It did not conduct research on peripheral habitats nor determines their carrying capacity for relocation of displaced fauna, yet the availability of adjacent habitats were given as justification for habitat loss (Nauman, 2003). The EIA report states that Marsh The Chotiari wetland area was also historical importance. ...
The goals of sustainable development can be achieved through serious implementation of environmental impact assessment process and better decision making but this potential is hardly used in most of the under developed country i.e. Pakistan. Pakistan is an agro-based country supported by the availability of fertile land and Indus Basin Irrigation System. The rapid unsustainable growth and extensive expansion in the agri-sector has resulted in debacle of natural ecosystem, its environmental services and the livelihood of poor folks are at great risk. This article discourses the root causes of weak performance of EIA in this sector by discussing the case of Chotiari Reservoir, where unwise decision-making led to the destruction of habitats, biological diversity, ecological services, agricultural lands, and livelihood resources. The results show that the degradation of livelihoods of local community i.e fishermen, mat makers and farmers has increased the biodiversity devastation process in the region. The purpose of this article to discuss the deficiencies and limitations in the country's EIA framework and to suggest way out to achieve environmental sustainability in the region.
... For example, in the case of Chotiari water reservoir construction in Pakistan, the evicted families were referred to the courts for justice. At first, courts have preceded their land use and compensation related cases, but after inauguration of the reservoir in 2003, almost all cases have been discarded without any decision, because of the involvement of high profile officials and bureaucrats [Nauman (2003)]. On the other hand, in the case of Lombok International Airport in Indonesia, despite regular agitations, government never invited land owners for a dialogue [LRAN (2007)]. ...
... Some projects seemed having roots in corruption and greed, which are doomed to benefit to a few stakeholders rather than to whole society or economy[Lama (2008);Nauman (2003);Sharma (2002)]. ...
... For example, in the case of Chotiari water reservoir construction in Pakistan, the evicted families were referred to the courts for justice. At first, courts have preceded their land use and compensation related cases, but after inauguration of the reservoir in 2003, almost all cases have been discarded without any decision, because of the involvement of high profile officials and bureaucrats [Nauman (2003)]. On the other hand, in the case of Lombok International Airport in Indonesia, despite regular agitations, government never invited land owners for a dialogue [LRAN (2007)]. ...
... Some projects seemed having roots in corruption and greed, which are doomed to benefit to a few stakeholders rather than to whole society or economy[Lama (2008);Nauman (2003);Sharma (2002)]. ...
... For example, in the case of Chotiari water reservoir construction in Pakistan, the evicted families were referred to the courts for justice. At first, courts have preceded their land use and compensation related cases, but after inauguration of the reservoir in 2003, almost all cases have been discarded without any decision, because of the involvement of high profile officials and bureaucrats [Nauman (2003)]. On the other hand, in the case of Lombok International Airport in Indonesia, despite regular agitations, government never invited land owners for a dialogue [LRAN (2007)]. ...
... Some projects seemed having roots in corruption and greed, which are doomed to benefit to a few stakeholders rather than to whole society or economy[Lama (2008);Nauman (2003);Sharma (2002)]. ...
This research is aimed to analyse land use conflicts mainly caused by infrastructural development projects in the developing countries. For this purpose, qualitative data is gathered, which is repeatedly published on land use conflicts against the development related infrastructure projects in Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and Pakistan. It identifies and defines land use conflicts, their dynamic features and contestations. The results reveal as to how the conflicts have been germinated by the property and human right violators? Further, it also focuses on the governance roles and responsibilities, the institutional inconsistency towards justice, and the local population's mistrust in the respective case study areas. This analysis concludes with an overview of root causes and consequences of the land use conflicts, by indicating as to how land use decisions for infrastructural settings have changed rural economy, and induced local population to displace and oppose the projects. Finally, on the basis of the results, this article proposes some preventive measures to manage such conflicts. JEL Classification: D74, O16, H54
... For example, in the case of Chotiari water reservoir construction in Pakistan, the evicted families were referred to the courts for justice. At first, courts have preceded their land use and compensation related cases, but after inauguration of the reservoir in 2003, almost all cases have been discarded without any decision, because of the involvement of high profile officials and bureaucrats [Nauman (2003)]. On the other hand, in the case of Lombok International Airport in Indonesia, despite regular agitations, government never invited land owners for a dialogue [LRAN (2007)]. ...
... Some projects seemed having roots in corruption and greed, which are doomed to benefit to a few stakeholders rather than to whole society or economy[Lama (2008);Nauman (2003);Sharma (2002)]. ...
This research is aimed to analyse land use conflicts mainly caused by infrastructural development projects in the developing countries. For this purpose, qualitative data is gathered, which is repeatedly published on land use conflicts against the development related infrastructure projects in Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and Pakistan. It identifies and defines land use conflicts, their dynamic features and contestations. The results reveal as to how the conflicts have been germinated by the property and human right violators? Further, it also focuses on the governance roles and responsibilities, the institutional inconsistency towards justice, and the local population's mistrust in the respective case study areas. This analysis concludes with an overview of root causes and consequences of the land use conflicts, by indicating as to how land use decisions for infrastructural settings have changed rural economy, and induced local population to displace and oppose the projects. Finally, on the basis of the results, this article proposes some preventive measures to manage such conflicts. JEL Classification: D74, O16, H54
... Waseem et al. (2019) found that a total of 114, 630 hectares of agricultural land in Lahore was urbanized, causing significant decrease in crop production during 1986-2008. The construction of reservoir on economically and ecological convenient area resulted in to decrease in crop production and posed adverse impacts on livelihoods of the people (Husnain et al., 2010;Nauman, 2003). Physical and socio-economic factors were the prominent driver of agricultural land transformation to urbanization (Farah et al., 2019). ...
This study was conducted in three tehsils, Gujranwala, Nowshera Virkan and Wazirabad of district Gujranwala. The major objective of the study was to explore the causes and consequences of the different conflicts faced by the rural people. A total 384 respondents were chosen at random. Data were collected through face-to-face interview technique on a structured, validated and reliable interview schedule from randomly selected 384 respondents. Collected data were analyzed with the help of Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). Findings indicated that, conflicts between two groups; conflicts over access to power, feeling of self-superiority, dispute over access to agricultural resources, mutual farming, disturbance in family relationship and theft of farm produce were the major causes of the conflicts as perceived by respondents. The conflicts had adverse impacts on the availability of labor, inputs, and farm assets and more importantly on adoption of innovations among farmers in particular. In result, decrease in farm production and income of farmers was more likely. Multiple linear regression analysis confirmed that, age, education, income level, land size and farming experience of respondents had statistically significant relationship (P
... In big infrastructural projects like dams, the proper information dissemination of all reports at the public level is an important and significant step right from the start of the project to avoid the conflicts (Nolte, 2020). In Pakistan, the capability of institutions for planning, implementation, and monitoring to safeguard the public interests is highly questionable (Nauman, 2003). In the Chotiari reservoir case, access to information was not given to local people and their participation was discouraged at most of the stages of the project. ...
In this research two cases of infrastructure development (Chotiari and Diamer Bhasha Dams) from Pakistan were studied in terms of a superposition of land uses and their consequences. For this purpose, we obtained qualitative information from both primary as well as secondary sources. Primary data were collected through a partially developed questionnaire from pre-selected experts of various professional backgrounds. National and regional dailies along with other published literature were used as a secondary source of information. The findings have identified the key groups of stakeholders and their relative social power at different levels of governance. The results further highlight that unfair land acquisition, improper displacement, mismanagement in compensation, etc., have caused negative impacts on local people and the surrounded environment. The article further emphasizes governance issues and conflicts among different actors due to the project. Finally, we recommend several actions to prevent strong opposition and conflicts in the infrastructural project in developing countries, like the enhancement of the capacities and the capabilities of the local population, the diffusion of information and the involvement of stakeholders, and the application of technical tools and devices.
... In big infrastructural projects like dams, the proper information dissemination of all reports at the public level is an important and significant step right from the start of the project to avoid the conflicts (Nolte, 2020). In Pakistan, the capability of institutions for planning, implementation, and monitoring to safeguard the public interests is highly questionable (Nauman, 2003). In the Chotiari reservoir case, access to information was not given to local people and their participation was discouraged at most of the stages of the project. ...
In this research two cases of infrastructure development (Chotiari and Diamer Bhasha Dams) from Pakistan were studied in terms of a superposition of land uses and their consequences. For this purpose, we obtained qualitative information from both primary as well as secondary sources. Primary data were collected through a partially developed questionnaire from pre-selected experts of various professional backgrounds. National and regional dailies along with other published literature were used as a secondary source of information. The findings have identified the key groups of stakeholders and their relative social power at different levels of governance. The results further highlight that unfair land acquisition, improper displacement, mismanagement in compensation, etc., have caused negative impacts on local people and the surrounded environment. The article further emphasizes governance issues and conflicts among different actors due to the project. Finally, we recommend several actions to prevent strong opposition and conflicts in the infrastructural project in developing countries, like the enhancement of the capacities and the capabilities of the local population, the diffusion of information and the involvement of stakeholders, and the application of technical tools and devices.
Dams are built to provide water for irrigated agriculture, domestic or industrial use, to generate hydropower or help control floods. Decisions to build dams are made, as human knowledge and experiences expand and new technologies develop, parallel with the fact that the decision-making process is also increasingly becoming more open, inclusive and transparent. Despite the benefits provided by the dams to humankind, much environmental damage has occurred as a consequence of these projects. In particular, dam projects often lead to considerable changes in the natural ecosystem. As the changes are related to the fundamental ecological issues, ecological input should be mandatory and play a major role in all dam project decisions. This paper looks into various studies on the application of ecological evaluation methods in regards to the EIA for the land-use development projects, particularly the dam projects. It details the limitation and challenges faced by the ecological evaluation. Alternative approaches are considered and elucidated as the way forward to enhance the ecological evaluation framework. Towards this end, an ecological evaluation method for the EIA of dams based on ecosystem rarity is proposed. This method allows the loss and fragmentation of the ecosystem of the alternative dam site to be determined in an objective and replicable way.
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