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... Hexner had an insider's knowledge of cartels (Barjot, 1994, p. 65). Marlio (1947), a French economist, who wrote a detailed account of the international aluminum cartel, was also a cartel manager (ibid., p. 66). Both of these authors found much to admire in international cartels, whereas postwar works by American authors tended to be distinctly more skeptical, if not hostile regarding the economic and political effects of the interwar cartels (e.g., Berge, 1944;Edwards, 1946). ...
... These ratios could be relevant for assessing whether cartels intend to maximize profits through price increases (as most economists assume) or whether the goal is to control variation in their output or prices. Apologists for cartels, particularly those writing about international cartels during the Great Depression, tended to assert that cartels did not aim to raise prices so much as stabilize prices (Marlio, 1947;Pyndyck, 1979). There is little evidence in Table 13 that the interwar, international cartels achieved greater price stability than those ending before or after the interwar period. ...
... Hexner had an insider's knowledge of cartels (Barjot, 1994, p. 65). Marlio (1947), a French economist, who wrote a detailed account of the international aluminum cartel, was also a cartel manager (ibid., p. 66). Both of these authors found much to admire in international cartels, whereas postwar works by American authors tended to be distinctly more skeptical, if not hostile regarding the economic and political effects of the interwar cartels (e.g., Berge, 1944;Edwards, 1946). ...
... These ratios could be relevant for assessing whether cartels intend to maximize profits through price increases (as most economists assume) or whether the goal is to control variation in their output or prices. Apologists for cartels, particularly those writing about international cartels during the Great Depression, tended to assert that cartels did not aim to raise prices so much as stabilize prices (Marlio, 1947;Pyndyck, 1979). There is little evidence in Table 13 that the interwar, international cartels achieved greater price stability than those ending before or after the interwar period. ...
Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891-1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international- membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60-80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.
... One of its mem bers was the indus tri al ist Louis Marlio (1878Marlio ( -1952, who, after a few years in gov ern ment, became a busi ness leader in the alu mi num indus try (he ended up being chair man of the alu mi num com pany Péchiney) and one of the lead ers of Redressement français, a busi ness lobby pro mot ing indus trial mod ern i za tion and con cen tra tion; he also taught eco nom ics at the École Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées and the École Libre des Sciences Politiques (Morsel 1983). Unsurprisingly, his report on the global alu mi num car tel (in which Péchiney par tic i pated; see Bertilorenzi 2015) for the CEII was reassuring, as was his arti cle on the same topic in La Revue de Paris (Marlio 1930). ...
As in other industrialized countries, cartelization was widespread in France after the 1870s. Cartels, and the public policy toward them, were frequently addressed in the public debate. This article deals with the stance taken by French economists on this subject until the Great Depression. Although they were divided into several groups that were in sharp disagreement on most scientific and policy issues, French economists were almost united in their lack of support for anticartel policy. The liberal economists' opposition stemmed from their general hostility to government intervention. Unlike in the English-speaking world, where many economists otherwise critical of government gradually became supportive of antitrust after mounting evidence had revealed the scope of certain kinds of exclusionary behavior, the French liberal economists remained constant in their opposition. The more reform-minded university professors, as well as the sociologists- economists of the Durkheimian school, were unenthusiastic about policies meant to safeguard competition because they viewed “excessive” market competition as destabilizing and wasteful. Finally, the most prominent experts in industrial economics, who were employed by large companies or professional organizations, also advocated a hands-off approach, in accordance with their employers' preferences.
... It was argued that the experts' reputation , along with their inner knowledge of cartels, represented the best guarantee for the quality of the information provided. 31 For the writing of the Etude and the Rapport Général, the CEII made use of Marlio's 1930 article (Marlio 1930), in which the author argued in favor of cartels for the rationalization of the European economy. According to the CEII, the above mentioned studies provided evidence that cartels could serve to reduce costs and to stabilize prices. ...
Contractual Knowledge: One Hundred Years of Legal Experimentation in Global Markets, edited by Grégoire Mallard and Jérôme Sgard, extends the scholarship of law and globalization in two important directions. First, it provides a unique genealogy of global economic governance by explaining the transition from English law to one where global exchanges are primarily governed by international, multilateral, and finally, transnational legal orders. Second, rather than focusing on macro-political organizations, like the League of Nations or the International Monetary Fund, the book examines elements of contracts, including how and by whom they were designed and exactly who (experts, courts, arbitrators, and international organizations) interpreted, upheld, and established the legal validity of these contracts. By exploring such micro-level aspects of market exchanges, this collection unveils the contractual knowledge that led to the globalization of markets over the last century.
While the re-foundation of liberalism is generally attributed to the Colloque Walter Lipp-mann, it should be recalled that the supporters of this renewed liberalism intended to stand together in the face of the advance of planism, the problem of industrial concentration, and the rise of the limited liability company. This paper focuses on the groups known today under the captions of French neoliberalism and German ordoliberalism who, at the Colloque and in the following decades, sought to bring together ideas and people with the objective of defining the foundations of a liberal society and state interventions compatible with the market.
This chapter provides a brief overview of the Colloquium’s participants, within the broader framework of their life, their philosophical and economic convictions, and their professional accomplishments and contributions. The organizations to which participants belonged and the links and connections between some of them are also addressed. Particular attention is paid to the context of the 1930s.
This note analyzes the collusive strategies developed by coal companies in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais (NPC) coal basin of France during the inter-war period. Based on an examination of archival data, mechanisms for maintaining collusive agreements are detailed.
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