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Abstract

Wang Bi’s syncretistic hermeneutics, influenced by his affiliations with the Jingzhou school of learning, draws on a combination of Confucian political and social thought, Daoist naturalism, and Huang-Lao concepts of the sage ruler, while his interest in the function of language also owes much to the School of Names. This study of Wang Bi’s life and works focuses on the distinction between “nothingness” and “somethingness” and the “substance” and “function” of “nothingness”: wu (nothingness), though possessing no physical existence, is both the primogenitor of and the cosmic program that directs all phenomenal existence, the ultimate principle of principles, the “one” that governs the “many.” As such, Wang’s xuanxue (arcane learning) fuses Daoist naturalism with Confucian ethics for the human world. For language, Wang’s analysis of the relationships among “images” (xiang), “ideas” (yi), “concepts” (yi), “principles” (li), and “words” (yan), develops a view of language that had immense impact on later Chinese hermeneutics and poetics. Finally, an account is provided of Wang’s influence on the later Daoist philosophical and religious traditions, and his veneration of wu “nothingness” is contrasted with Guo Xiang’s emphasis on the spontaneous self-generation of everything, entirely without a transcendent creator, his rejection of “nothingness” and veneration of you “somethingness” (phenomenal reality).
Chapter 16
WANG Bi and Xuanxue
Richard John Lynn
1 Historical and Family Background
WANG Bi (226–249) lived in the state of Wei, which had to share what
had been the Han empire with the later Han state in Sichuan, which occupied the
southwest, and the state of Wu, which controlled the southeast. The Wei ruling
house, marked by a quick rise to power and an equally swift fall from it, made
the state internally far from secure. Though WANG Bi lived in the midst of much
political and military strife, he also found himself at the center of major intellectual
trends that had been developing for more than a 100 years, much of which involved
his own earlier family.
The WANGS comprised a prominent gentry clan in Gao Ping ,Shanyang
commandery , Shandong, just south of present-day Ji’ning city ,and
a detailed account of the clan has been written by WANG Xiaoyi (WANG
1996: 166–192). Although accounts of the clan go back further, we shall begin with
WANG Qian , known in the sources only as chief secretary to HEJin (died
189), Defender-in-chiefand staunch opponentof the palace eunuchs and grandfather
of HEYan (190–249), with whom WANG Bi became closely associated later.
WANG Qian had one son, WANG Can (177–217), perhaps the best poet among
the “Seven Masters of the Jian’an Era” , the prominent group of officials
and literary figures who enjoyed the patronage of CAO Cao (155–220), usurper
of Han rule and father of CAO Pi (187–226), first emperor of the Wei
dynasty (Miao 1982;Diény1982). WANG Can was born and grew up in Luoyang,
the Later Han capital, and his childhood was spent largely in the company of an
R.J. Lynn ()
Professor Emeritus of Chinese Thought and Literature, East Asian Studies,
University of Toronto, Canada
e-mail: richard.lynn@utoronto.ca
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
X. Liu (ed.), Dao Companion to Daoist Philosophy, Dao Companions
to Chinese Philosophy 6, DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-2927-0__16
369
370 R.J. Lynn
older cousin, WANG Kai , the grandfather of WANG Bi. When Luoyang was
sacked and burned in 190, young Emperor Xian and the court were removed
to Chang’an, and the WANGS moved with them. However, 2 years later, when civil
order broke down in Chang’an, WANG Can and WANG Kai fled to Xiangyang
(present-day Xiangfan , Hubei) and the protection of LIU Biao (142–208),
de facto ruler of Jingzhou .L
IU at first intended to give his daughter in marriage
to WANG Can but, thinking Can too short, physically weak, and ugly, and put off
by his casual and familiar manner, he gave her to WANG Kai instead, supposedly
because of his handsome appearance. This woman was the mother of WANG Ye
,W
ANG Bi’s father, and thus his paternal grandmother.
1.1 Jingzhou Learning
The main features of Jingzhou learning are summarized here, together with WANG
Bi’s affiliations with it:
(1) The later Han shift in classics scholarship (jingxue ) away from emphasis
on new text versions of the five classics (jinwen jing ) to old script versions
(guwen jing ) reached a high point in Jingzhou academic circles, where
old script texts were declared orthodox and became for the first time the official
versions used in government schools and academies. Accompanying this shift was
the rejection of prognostic commentary approaches, associated with earlier Han
apocrypha, which often referred to correlative cosmology based on numerology or
“image and number” (xiangshu ), yin-yang 陰陽 thought and the five phases
(wuxing ). Even the immensely influential commentaries by ZHENG Xuan
(127–200), which often stressed a “meaning and principle” exegesis, were found
deficient because they were also loaded with abstruse correlative cosmological
interpretations. This prevailing trend toward creation of straightforward and succinct
philosophical commentaries on old script classics was led by SONG Zhong ,
whose own commentaries, including those to the Classic of Changes and to
YANG Xiong’s (53 B.C.E.–C.E. 18) Canon of the Supreme Arcane ,
a divination manual that draws and expands on the Classic of Changes,servedas
models that eschewed the “image and number” approach. SONG’s commentaries
on even these divination works—so rife with correlative categorical thinking
and numerology—now concentrated on the “meaning and principle” inherent in
passages.
The text of the Classic of Changes used by the later WANG Bi, whose Commen-
tary On the Changes of the Zhou (Zhouyi zhu ) is the earliest extant complete
commentary edition, belongs to this old script tradition (Shaughnessy 1993: 222–
24), and his exegesis based on “meaning and principle” is clearly affiliated with
Jingzhou learning. Although Wang often borrows from ZHENG Xuan’s commentary
where it focuses on “meaning and principle,” he utterly rejects ZHENGScorrelative
categorical approach, especially his analysis of hexagrams in terms of “heavenly
16 WANG Bi and Xuanxue 371
stems inhere in the trigrams” (najia ) and “time of day inheres in hexagram
lines” (yaochen )(S
HU 2001), and this too clearly places him in the Jingzhou
tradition.
(2) A significant component of Jingzhou learning was the strong resurgence of
Huang-Lao thought 思想, supposedly a combination of the teachings of the
Yellow Emperor and Master Lao (Laozi), but actually an amalgam of Confucianism
(Rujia ), classical Daoism represented by the Laozi or Daode jing
and parts of the Zhuangzi , School of Names or Terminologists (Mingjia
), Mohism (Mojia ), and Legalism (Fajia ). Huang-Lao thought
originated in the middle Warring States era (fourth century B.C.E.),
dominated much of Western Han thought, and waned in influence during the Eastern
or Later Han (Yates 2008: 508–10). Yin-yang cosmology and techniques to achieve
longevity and physical immortality were also important components of earlier
Huang-Lao thought, but these were downplayed in Jingzhou learning. Huang-
Lao thought, especially aspects of it associated with Legalism, largely focuses on
statecraft, an approach to government in which ramifications of sagely rule are
delegated to officialdom. The sage ruler stays free of conscious action (wuwei
) and is concerned only with overall policy and the fundamentals of governance,
never involving himself in their conscious application (youwei ), which is the
responsibility of subordinate officials whose decisions are informed and inspired
by a sage ruler’s example of resonance with the Dao. Without trying to do so, the
paradigm of the sage ruler thus shapes and guides officialdom so that its decisions
are always “right” in the sense that they produce perfect accord between the Dao
of humanity (rendao ), the political and social order, and the Dao of Heaven
(tiandao ), the cosmic order. WANG Bi’s syncretistic hermeneutics draws on
a combination of Confucian political and social thought, Daoist naturalism, and
Huang-Lao concepts of the sage ruler, and his great interest in the function of
language obviously owes much to the School of Names (Harbsmeier 1998: 355–58;
Ashmore 2004). All these dimensions of WANGSthought clearly echo essentials
of Jingzhou learning.
(3) An intermittent tendency from the late Warring States era to integrate Huang-
Lao thought and the School of Names was revived and strongly reinforced in
Jingzhou learning; an important implication of this was the wide-spread practice
of appraising personal character (renwu pinping ). Jinzhou interest in
Huang-Lao thought concentrated on the creation of an ideal officialdom, and its
involvement with the School of Names focused on the relationship between “form
and name” or “performance and title” (xingming ), which constituted a two-
pronged effort to define and apply criteria for the selection of officials. The late
Han and Wei-Jin eras seem to have been obsessed with the appraisal of personal
character, for many prominent figures are known for their involvement in it—
both for isolated pithy sayings and for whole works or substantial portions thereof
devoted to the subject, such as LIU Shao’s (174–242)1On Human Character
1Liu Shao’s dates have been worked out by LUN Chibiao [Luen Chih-Biao] in LUN 1990.
372 R.J. Lynn
and Ability (Renwu zhi )andLIU Yi’s (180–221) On Governance
(Zhenglun ). As for pithy remarks, WANG Can, harboring resentment from
LIU Biao’s low opinion of him based largely on his looks,2said in a toast to CAO
Cao after LIU died and CAO had taken Jingzhou:
When LIU Biao was livingin ease and majesty in Jing Chu [Jingzhou], observing from
the sideline how greatly unsettled then the world was, he thought he could model himself
on Xibo 西[King Wen’s title before he rose against the Shang to found the Zhou
dynasty]. Literati who had fled from disorder to Jingzhou were all outstanding talents from
all over the empire, but Biao did not know how to employ them, with the result that when
his state was falling into danger no one was there to help alleviate the situation. (CHEN
1975: 21.599)
Judging the inner reality that underlies appearance was thus a major problem,
with serious implications not only for the selection of officials but also, in those
precarious times, even in the choice of personal friends and colleagues, since the
wrong kind of associates could easily lead to one’s own downfall and destruction.
I suggest that such preoccupations were responsible for much of the contemporary
resurgence of interest in the School of Names and that this interest carried over for
some, including WANG Bi, to reassessment of the relationship between “form and
name” as a philosophical problem. WANG Bi’s focus on the nature and function of
language seems intimately connected with such concerns.
2WANG Can
When Cao Cao returned north to Chang’an, after conquering Jingzhou, WANG Can
and WANG Kai, accompanied by their families, followed him. Although WANG Kai
does not appear to have held office after the return to Chang’an,WANG Can became
a close personal advisor to CAO Cao, especially on literary and ritual matters. An
odd twist to WANG family history took place in 219, about 2 years after WANG
Can’s death, when his two sons were implicated in WEI Feng’s abortive revolt
and executed. CAO Cao was then absent on campaign and so charged CAO Pi, his
son and heir, with investigating the revolt with full authority to judgethe ringleaders
and accomplices. However, when CAO Cao heard that WANG Can’s sons had been
executed, he said: “If I had been there, I would not have cut off Zhongxuan’s
[WANG Can’s] line” (CHEN 1975: 21.599 note 2). Later, after CAO Pi had become
Emperor Wen , he decreed that WANG Ye, son of WANG Kai, was to become
WANG Can’s legitimate heir, which allowed WANG Can, whose service to the Caos
had far surpassed those of his cousin, to “recover” his posterity.
The fact that WANG Ye became WANG Can’s heir had important implications
for his son, WANG Bi. During 190–192, when the WANGS were living in Chang’an
2WANG Xiulin has made a thorough study of the relationship between physical appearance
and the appraisal of personal character during the Wei-Jin era (WANG 1996).
16 WANG Bi and Xuanxue 373
and before the flight to Xiangyang, the young WANG Can had become a disciple
of the leading classical scholar of the day, CAI Yong (132–192), who was so
impressed by WANG that during his last years he gave him his library of a “myriad
books.” Later, after WANG Can’s sons were executed, the books that CAI Yong had
given to WANG Can all went to WANG Ye ( CHEN 1975: 28.796n1). This enormous
library must have been available to Wang Bi a generation later.
Neither WANG Ye nor his older son WANG Hong are known as thinkers
or writers, but both pursued official careers. WANG Ye rose through the ranks to
become a secretarial court gentleman, a subordinate position within the imperial
secretariat concerned with drafting edicts and other court documents. However,
his son achieved higher office, for WANG Hong was appointed Metropolitan
Commandant, whose duty was to supervise the entire officialdom of the capital, with
a rank equivalent to that of the Director of the Imperial Secretariat (CHEN 1975:
28:796n1). Enough is thus known of the high official status of the WANG family
during WANG Bi’s own time and earlier to provide context for the development of
his exegetical and philosophical writings, both of which exhibit a strong political
slant that surely derived from personal experience of his family’s involvement in
the government and politics of the late Han and early Wei eras.
Wang Bi was also similarly influenced by some of his great uncle WANG Can’s
essays, for example, Can’s “Treatise On Keeping One’s Person Safe” (An shen lun
):
To honor virtue, nothing makes more of a contribution than keeping one’s person safe.
To keep one’s person safe, nothing is greater than making government secure; to make
government secure, nothing is more important than freedom from self-interest; to achieve
freedom from self-interest, nothing is more significant than minimizing desire. Thus it is
that the noble man only makes a move after making his person safe, speaks only after
calming his heart and mind, and takes action only after making his friendships firm.
Therefore, one’s actions determine whether good fortune or bad begins; one’s speech
controls whether honor or disgrace results; one’s search for friends defines the starting
point of either benefit or disaster; one’s deeds decide the difference between security and
danger. The noble man thus never acts recklessly by ensuring that he acts only in accordance
with the Dao; he never speaks in vain by ensuring that he speaks only in terms of the true
principles of things; he never seeks wrong friendships by ensuring that they develop out
of righteousness; he never behaves inconsequentially by ensuring that his behavior springs
from rectitude.
In this way, one can avoid misfortune and instead be blessed with the aid of Heaven.
Thus it is that when one’s person is not safe, it is in peril; when one’s speech is not
compliant, it will result in conflict; when one’s friendships are not examined carefully, one
will be misled; when one’s actions are not sincere, they will result in danger. If one harbors
these four failings within, calamity and misery will meet him without. Such meeting with
misery and calamity surely arises from selfishness and flourishes because of the desires
that beset one. One caught up in selfishness can never fulfill his self-interest, and one who
has desires can never be delivered from them. Such are the ultimate principles of existence
(YAN 1995:Hou Hanwen, 91.4b–5a).
Both because of his own experience and the earlier history of his family, WANG Bi
was acutely aware that he lived in dangerous times, and it is quite possible to read
his commentaries, on one level at least, in terms of strategies for survival.
374 R.J. Lynn
2.1 Biography of WANG Bi
The primary source for WANG Bi’s life is a biographical notice written by HE
Shao (late third-early fourth centuries), a prolific essayist on the people and
events of his own times, preserved in the commentary of PEI Songzhi
(372–451) to the History of the Wei (Wei shu ) section of the Chronicles of the
Three Kingdoms (CHEN 1975: 28.795–96). Most of the information provided in this
biography is also found in LIU Yiqing’s (403–444) A New Account Of Tales
Of the World (Shishuo xinyu ), divided among a number of entries, often
in passages worded differently, and with a few other details concerning WANGS
life (Mather 1976: 95–97, 593, 722).
HEShao’s biography of WANG:
WANG Bi revealed his intelligence and wisdom even while still a child. By the time he was
only about ten years he had already developed a liking for the Laozi, which he understood
thoroughly and could discuss with ease. His father was WANG Ye, a Secretarial Court
Gentleman.
At the time when PEI Hui was serving as Director of the Ministry of Personnel,
WANG Bi, who then had not yet been “capped” [i.e. before the age of nineteen], went to
pay him a visit. As soon as PEI saw him, he knew that he was an extraordinary person,
so he asked him, “Nothingness (wu ) in truth is the source on which the myriad things
depend for existence, yet the Sage [Confucius] was unwilling to talk about it, while Master
Lao expounded upon it endlessly. Why is that?” WANG Bi replied, “The Sage embodied
nothingness so knew that it could not be explained in words, thus did not talk about it.
Master Lao, by contrast, operated on the level of somethingness (you ) [i.e., physical or
phenomenal existence], which was why he constantly discussed nothingness; he had to, for
what he said about it always fell short.” Shortly afterwards WANG also came to the attention
of Fu Gu [209–255].
Fu Gu was a member of HEYan’s circle of friends dedicated to “pure conversation”
(qingtan ), but he had broken with HEand joined the SIMA party in 249, thus
avoiding execution when SIMA Yi usurped power from the Wei and founded
the Jin dynasty. He authored one of the essays in ZHONG Hui’s (225–264)
Treatise on the Four Basic Relations [Between Talent and Human Nature](Siben
lun ). He Shao’s biography of WANG continues:
At this time, HEYan [190–249] was President of the Ministry of Personnel, and
he too thought WANG Bi most remarkable. Sighing in admiration, he said, “As Zhongni
[Confucius] said, “Those born after us shall be held in awe” (Analects 9.22). It
is with such a person as this that one can discuss the relationship between Heaven and
Mankind!”
Compare a passage from Liu Yiqing’s A New Account of Tales of the World:
When HEYan was serving as president of the President of the Ministry of Personnel
he enjoyed both status and acclaim. Debaters of the time thronged the seats of his
home. WANG Bi then not yet twenty also went to visit him. Since Yan had heard of
Bi’s reputation, he culled some of his best arguments from past debates and said to Bi,
“These arguments I consider unsurpassable. Do you wish to raise any objections?” Bi then
proceeded to raise objections, and after he had finished the whole company thought that Yan
16 WANG Bi and Xuanxue 375
was defeated. Bi then went on, himself acting as both host and guest for several bouts. In
every case he was unequaled by anyone else in the whole company. (Adapted from Mather
1976: 95; for original text, see LIU 1972: 151).
He Shao’s biography of WANG continues:
During the Zhengshi era [240–249], the position of Director of the Chancellery became
vacant a succession of times, but HEYan had managed to fill it with JIA Chong [217–
282], PEI Xiu [224–271], and ZHU Zheng ; now he also proposed WANG Bi for
that office. However, it was then that DING Mi and HEYan were vying for power
[within the CAO Shuang clique], and, when Ding recommended WANG Li of
Gao District to CAO Shuang, CAO appointed him to that position, in consequence
ofwhichhemadeW
ANG Bi a Secretarial Court Gentleman. When WANG Bi first took
up his post and paid his ceremonial visit to CAO Shuang, he asked for a private interview.
Cao dismissed his entourage, and when WANG Bi discussed the Dao with him for a time,
never touching on anything else, this made CAO laugh at him [since he would not discuss
government in any other terms except the Dao of the Laozi].
It was at this time that CAO Shuang monopolized political power at court and formed a
clique whose members recommended each other for office, but WANG Bi, unconventional
and brilliant, did not concern himself with high office and reputation. Shortly afterward,
when WANG Li suddenly died of illness, CAO Shuang appointed WANG Chen to take
WANG Li’s place, so WANG Bi never managed to gain a place among CAOSinner circle.
This made HEYan sigh with regret. WANG Bi was now limitedto superficial duties at court
and never had a chance to accomplish anything of merit, so as time went on he paid ever
less attention to duties.
LIU Tao , a native of Huai’nan, was good at discussing political strategies and
alliances, for which he had quite a reputation at the time, but on every occasion when he
debated these matters with WANG Bi, he was always defeated by him. The talent with which
he was endowed by Heaven made WANG Bi an outstanding figure, and no one was ever able
to beat him at what he did best.
By nature gentle and reasonable, WANG enjoyed parties and feasts, was well versed in
the technical aspects of music, and excelled at pitching arrows into the pot.3In discussing
the Dao, he may not have been as good as HEYan at forcing language to say what he meant,
but in spontaneously coming up with unique insights he often beat HEYa n.
A similar statement occurs in SUN Sheng’s (ca. 302–373) Spring and Autumn
Annals of the Wei (Weishi chunqiu ): “In discussing the Dao, WANG Bi’s
ability to use concise yet beautiful language was inferior to that of HEYa n, bu t
WANGSability to come up with spontaneously with unique insights was superior
to HES.” SUNScomment is quoted in LIU Jun’s (462–521) commentary
to A New Account of Tales of the World (Liu 1972: 152; Mather: 96). HEShao’s
biography of WANG continues:
To some extent, he used the advantages with which he was blessed to make fun of other
people, so he incurred the enmity of scholars and officials of his day. WANG Bi was good
friends with ZHONG Hui, who was an established expert in disputation, thanks to his well
trained mental discipline, but he was always vanquished by Wang’s high-flying élan.
3“Pitch [arrows] into the pot” (touhu ) was a game played at formal or ritual feasts.
376 R.J. Lynn
3 The Sage and Emotions
HEShao’s biography of Wang continues:
It was HEYan’s opinion that the sage is free of pleasure, anger, sadness, or happiness,
and his discussion of this issue was meticulously argued. ZHONG Hui and others passed
around what he had to say, but WANG Bi took a different position and thought that it was
numinous intelligence (shenming ) that the sage was more richly endowed with that
made him different from people in general, and what made him the same as people in
general was that he too had the five emotions. Since the sage was so richly endowed with
numinous intelligence, he could embody pneuma perfectly fused [with the unitary pneuma
of everything else] and thereby integrate flawlessly with nothingness (ti chonghe yi tongwu
).
WANG Bi says something similar in his commentary to a passage in the Laozi,
Section 42: “The myriad things, bearing yin and embracing yang, form a unified
harmony through the fusion of these pneuma” (chongqi yi wei he 沖氣):
Therefore the myriad things are begotten, and I know the Master that controls this. Although
they have a myriad forms, the fusion of pneuma makes One out of all of them (sui you
wanxing chongqi yi yan )(L
OU 1980: 117; Lynn 1999: 135).4
To “integrate flawlessly with nothingness” is thus to become One with the Dao. HE
Shao continues:
Since the sage was same as other people in having the five emotions, he could not fail to
respond to things without feeling sadness or pleasure. Nevertheless, the emotions of the
sage are such that he may respond to things without becoming attached to them. Nowadays,
because the sage is considered free of such attachment, one immediately thinks it can be
said that he no longer responds to things. How very wide of the mark this is!
When WANG Bi wrote his commentary to the Classic of Changes,XUN Rong ,
a native of Yingchuan , found fault with WANGSMeaning of the Great Expansion
(Dayan yi ).
Though a work long lost, a fragment of WANGSMeaning of the Great Expansion is
included in HAN Kangbo’s (died ca. 385) commentary to the “Commentary
on the Appended Phrases” (Xici zhuan ), Part One, of the Changes of Zhou
(Classic of Changes)5(KONG 1997: 7.80a–80b):
After expanding the numbers of Heaven and Earth, we find that the ones that are of benefit to
us number fifty, and of these we actually use forty-nine, thus leaving one unused. Although
this one is not used, yet through it the use of the other numbers becomes readily possible,
and, although this one is not one of the numbers, yet through it the other numbers are
formed. As this one represents the supreme ultimate of change (yi zhi taiji ), the
4Translations from WANG Bi cited from previously published works by Richard John Lynn (Lynn
1994,1999,2001) are often presented here in revised form.
5Han Kangbo commented on those parts of the Changes not included in WANG Bi’s commentary:
the “Commentary To the Appended Phrases,” the “Providing the Sequence of the Hexagrams”
(Xugua ), the “Hexagrams In Irregular Order” (Zagua ), and the “Explaining the
Trigrams” (Shuo gua ).
16 WANG Bi and Xuanxue 377
other forty-nine constitute the ultimateof numbers (shu zhi ji ). Nothingness cannot
be brought to light by means of nothingness but must take place through somethingness.
Therefore, by applying ourselves constantly to this ultimate [number] for things that have
somethingness, we shall surely bring to light the Primogenitor (zong ) from which all
things derive. (Lynn 1994: 60–61).
The “Primogenitor” is “Nothingness,” the “One,” or the Dao. Manipulation of the
49 numbers yields the 64 hexagrams, which in total represents all phenomenal
existence—the sum total of “somethingness.” And it is through the constant
exploration and pondering of the hexagrams that one can arrive at an understanding
of the underlying unity of all things. This passage from WANGSwritings perhaps
best illustrates his new “meaning and principle” (yili ) style of commentary,
which rejects “image and number” thought and correlative cosmology—a complete
contrast, for example, to ZHENG Xuan’s commentary on this same passage—
as pointed out by TANG Yongtong (1893–1964), who refers to Wang’s
approach as a search for the “arcane principles” (xuanli ) inherent in the
hexagrams and their associated texts. (TANG 2000a: 4. 53–61). HEShao continues:
So WANG replied to what he was getting at and drafted a letter which teased him: “Even
though one may have intelligence sufficient to delve into the greatest profundity and subtlety
(youwei ), such a one still cannot escape the bounds of his natural endowment (ziran
zhi xing ). Whatever capacity Master YAN had,6it was something already realized
beforehand in Confucius, yet when Confucius met him, he could not but feel pleasure, and,
when Confucius buried him, he could not but feel sadness. Moreover you are in the habit of
belittling this Confucius, whom you regard as someone who found it impossible to pursue
principle (li ) via the path of the emotions (qing ). But now you know that what one is
by nature can never be changed. As for your capacity, sir, though it is already fixed within
your breast, nevertheless here we are parted for only about half a month, and you feel the
pain of separation as much as all this! Thus we know, comparing Confucius to Master YAN,
he could not have surpassed him by very much!”
4 “Nothingness” and “Somethingness”
It appears that WANG is pointedly responding to what seems to have been XUNS
belief, like HEYan’s, that “the sage has no emotions,” and that this might
well have been the basis of XUNScriticism of WANGSwork on the Changes.
WANG, in referring to XUNSdisparagement of Confucius because he could not
“pursue principle via the path of the emotions,” pokes fun at XUN for being
unable himself to avoid emotion, and in doing so he probably was punning on
the double range of meaning of qing, the first meaning of which may have been
“emotions” or “feelings,” but an equal early range of meaning was “proper nature,”
6Master YAN , also called YAN Hui or YAN Yu an , was supposedly the most
virtuous, learned, and diligent of Confucius’s disciples.
378 R.J. Lynn
“circumstances,” “quality,” “attribute,” or “feature,” among others (Schuessler
2007: 433). We can never know exactly what in WANGSwork prompted XUNS
remarks or even what those remarks were, but I suggest that XUN disagreed with
WANGSstatement (or something similar to it) that “nothingness cannot be brought
to light by means of nothingness but must take place through somethingness.” This
becomes apparent when we consider the relationships between “emotions” and
“principle” and between “somethingness” and “nothingness.” In other words, qing
can refer to the innate character and predilection or innate properties or tendencies
of physical things and their behavior—the sum total of phenomenal reality, the
very “somethingness” of everything existent. To return to what seems to have been
WANGSpun on qing in his response to Xun: just as one must pursue principle
via the emotions, one must also seek “nothingness”—the One, the Dao—via qing
as phenomenal reality, the “somethingness” of everything that exists. HEShao
continues:
WANG Bi wrote a commentary to the Laozi, for which he provided an Outline Introduction
(zhilue )7marked by clear reasoning and systematic organization. He also wrote a
General Discussion of the Dao (Dao luelun ), as well as a commentary to the
Changes. All these works frequently exhibit lofty and beautiful language.8WANG JI
[ca. 240–ca. 285] of Taiyuan liked to talk about and find fault with the Laozi and
the Zhuangzi, but it was his habit to say “when I saw WANG Bi’s commentary to the Laozi,
there was much about which I was enlightened (wu ).”
Although HEShao’s biography of WANG Bi reads “there was much about which I
was enlightened” (suo wuzhe duo ), it is much more likely that the source
HEquotes should have been “there was much about which he [WANG Bi] was
wrong” (suo wuzhe duo ), for this is the way WANG Yinglin
(1223–1296) in his postface (ba ) to his edition of ZHENG Xuan’s commentary
to the Changes copies a portion of a letter from LUCheng (425–94) to WANG
Jian in which WANG Ji’s remark is cited (WANG 1983: 32b–33a). LUS
letter clearly identifies WANG Ji as a partisan of ZHENG Xuan’s commentary to the
Changes and an opponent of WANG Bis,soitislikelythatWANG Ji did not think
WANG Bi’s work “enlightening”but “wrong”; his main objection was probably that
WANG Bi did not follow ZHENGS“image and number” approach but instead used
the thought of the Laozi and the Zhuangzi to explain the Changes. Although another
source also has LUSletter read “enlightened” (wu ) instead of “wrong” (wu )
(XIAO 1972: 39.683–684), TANG Yongtong is convinced from his reading of the
entire quoted portion of the letter that this too is in error and that the text should still
read “wrong.” TANG ends his analysis with the observation that referencehere to the
ZHENG Xuan versus the WANG Bi commentary to the Changes is another example
of the long-standing conflict between the “old” image and number approach and
the “new” philosophical reading (TANG 2000a: 53–54). HEYan, of course, had the
7This is translated and annotated in its entirety in Lynn 1999: 30–47.
8Zhilue can also be translated as “Essential Purpose” or “Essential Meaning.” See Lynn 1994.
16 WANG Bi and Xuanxue 379
highest opinion of WANG Bi, as these passages in the A New Account of Tales of the
Word s record:
When HEPingshu [HEYan] had just completed his commentary to the Laozi,he
went to visit WANG Fusi [WANG Bi], but after seeing how brilliant and marvelous
WANGScommentary was, he bowed in homage to him as if he were a god, saying, “With
such a person one may discuss the frontier where Heaven and Man meet!” Therefore, he
converted what he had commented on into two treatises, one on the Dao and one on the
Vir tu e (De ).
HEYan had been writing a commentary on the Laozi but had not yet finished when he went
to visit WANG Bi, to whom he explained how he intended to comment on the Laozi,but
WANG for the most part found HESapproach so deficient that he could bring himself to
say nothing other than “I see.” As a consequence, HEdid not continue with his commentary
but instead used the opportunity to write separate treatises on the Dao and the Vir tue.(L
IU
1972: 152–53; Mather 1976: 95, 97)
4.1 Last Years
HEYan’s biographical notice concludes:
However, Wang Bi was shallow in his personal relationships and obtuse concerning how
others felt. At first, he was good friends with WANG Li and XUN Rong, yet when WANG
Li stole his chance to be Director of the Chancellery, he came to hate him, and he did not
manage to finish up with XUN Rong on good terms either.
In the tenth year of the Zhengshi era [249] CAO Shuang was deposed, in consequence
of which WANG Bi was dismissed from service at court. In the autumn of that year he fell
prey to a pestilence and died at twenty-three years of age. He had no son, so his linestopped
with him. Concerning his death, when Prince Jing of the Jin dynasty [the posthumous title
of SIMA Shi (208–255)] heard the news, he sighed and moaned over it for days on
end—regret at his passing was felt as keenly by the intelligentsia as this!
4.2 Advocates and Opponents
WANG Bi’s reputation as a brilliant thinker, exegete, and writer continued through-
out the time “arcane learning” (xuanxue ) flourished, with, of course, a few
notable exceptions, the most serious of which was probably the diatribe against
him, HEYan, and others associated with arcane learning by FAN Ning (339–
401), who, though a Buddhist in private life, was a strict Confucian advocate of
ethical formalism (mingjiao ) in public life. FAN did all he could to restore
Confucian ritual and ethical standards to political and social behavior,blaming their
degeneration into rampant nihilism and pernicious libertinism on arcane learning
advocates such as WANG Bi. FAN apparently only knew arcane learning in the
notorious form advocated by some of its avowed but superficial followers who used
it just as rationalization for licentious and libertine behavior. (FANG et al. 1974:
1984–85; Mather 1969).
380 R.J. Lynn
A far more sympathetic view of WANG Bi can be found in LIU Xie’s 劉勰 (ca.
465–522) great work of literary theory and criticism, the Literary Mind: Dragon
Carvings [Elaborations](Wenxin diaolong ), which makes two references
to WANG Bi that place him in the context of other writers and thinkers of the time:
When the Wei first became hegemon, as the art of government conjoined the teachings
of the School of Names with that of the Legalists, FUGu and WANG Can examined and
assessed names (ming ) and principles (li ), but, by the Zhengshi era [240–48], an
earnest wish had arisen to conserve the literary heritage, and, thanks to such figures as HE
Yan, discourses on the arcane (xuanlun ) began to flourish. It was then that Dan
[Laozi] and Zhou [Zhuangzi] so came to prevail that they even contended with Master
Ni [Confucius] for supremacy! When we carefully read the “On Talent and Individual
nature” (Caixing )byLanshi[FUGu], the “On ridding oneself of boastfulness”
(Qu fa ) by Zhongxuan [W ANGCan], the “Analysis of Music” (Biansheng )[On
the Non-emotional Character of Music” (Sheng wu aile lun )] by Shuye
[JIKang (223–62)], the “On Origin in the Arcane” (Benxuan )[OnOriginin
Nothingness” (Benwu lun ) by Taichu [XIAHOU Xuan (209–54)], the
two “General Remarks” ()byFusi[W
ANG Bi] [“General Remarks on the Changes
of the Zhou”(Zhouyi lueli ) and “General Remarks on the Laozi”(Laozi zhilue
)] and the two “Discourses” (Lun ) [“On Non-purposeful Action” (Wuwei l un
) and “On the Nameless” (Wu min g lun )] by Pingshu [HEYan], we discover
that all express independent views based on original insight and argue with precision and
tight organization. There is no doubt that these are outstanding examples of discourses. (LIU
1958: 327)
As for the commentary (zhushi ), its composition is a discourse broken into fragments,
and, although the odds and ends of text that result differ [from that of the integral discourse],
when the commentary is considered as a whole, it turns out to be much the same:::.Asfor
suchworksasMasterM
AOS[MAO Heng ] exegesis on the Classic of Poetry (Shijing
), Anguo’s [KONG Anguo 孔安second century B.C.E.] commentary to the Classic
of Documents,MasterZ
HENGS[ZHENG Xuan] exegeses on the [Three]Rites,andWANG
Bi’s commentary to the Changes, all these are concise but thoroughly lucid—worthy models
indeed for exegetical writing! (LIU 1958: 328)
Wang was thus both praised and condemned during the Wei, Jin, and Six Dynasties
era (third–sixth centuries). The following passage taken from the biographyof Wang
Yan (256–311) in the History of the Jin Era (Jinshu 晉書) exemplifies the
controversy surrounding him.
During the Zhengshi era of the Wei, people such as HEYa n and W ANG Bi followed the
teachings of Master Lao and Master Zhuang, honoring them as patriarchs. They founded a
doctrine that taught that “Heaven, Earth, and the Myriad Things all had as their fundamental
principle (ben ) non-deliberate or non-purposeful action (wuwei ). As for this
nothingness, from the start of things to the completion of affairs, no undertaking takes place
in which it is not integrally present. The yin and yang rely on it to create things (hua sheng
); the myriad things rely on it to attain mature physical existence (cheng xing );
worthies rely on it to complete their virtue (de ); and the antisocial rely on it to avoid
harm (mian shen ). Thus it is that nothingness functions in such a way that though
invaluable is never honored.” WANG Yan thought very highly of this teaching, but PEI Wei
[267–300] thought it all wrong and even wrote a treatise ridiculing it, but WANG Yan
just went on believing in it as he had before. (FANG et al. 1974: 43.1236)
PEI Wei’s treatise was called “Acknowledge the Primacy of Somethingness
[Phenomenal Existence]” (Chong you lun ) (Fang et al. 1974: 35.1044–47),
16 WANG Bi and Xuanxue 381
and in it he argues that a genuine sense of social and moral responsibility can
only grow if one takes the actual, physical world seriously; on the other hand, the
exaltation of “nothingness” leads only to irresponsible behavior and licentiousness.
WANG Yan, of course, rejected such assertions and remained firmly convinced that
both the good society as well as individual self fulfillment can only emerge from
naturalness in harmony with the Dao, which he, like WANG Bi before him, equated
with “nothingness.” For details of the feud between WANG Yan and P EI Wei see the
critical study by Professor Mather (Mather 1969).
4.3 The “Substance” and “Function” of “Nothingness”
“Nothingness,” sometimes a compound word, wuwu or wuyou —that
which has no physical or specific existence, no “somethingness”—is a key term
in the thought of WANG Bi, where it becomes the chief attribute of the Dao.
Nothingness as such designates two related aspects of the Dao, which can be
discussed in terms of (1) what the Dao as “nothingness” is and (2) what it does.I
believe that this polarity might best be discussed in terms of “substance” (ti )and
“function” (yong ), as WANG Bi suggests in his commentary to Laozi Section 38,
which begins with:
A person of superior virtue (shangde ) is not virtuous, and this is why he has
virtue. A person of inferior virtue (xiade ) never loses virtue, and this is why he lacks
virtue. A person of superior virtue takes no conscious action and so acts out of nothing
(wu yi wei ). A person of inferior virtue takes conscious action (wei zhi )and
so acts out of something (you yi wei ).
“Superior virtue” is thus one with the virtue of the Dao, and as such emerges from
the nothingness of the Dao. “Inferior virtue” is a product of conscious effort, and as
such signifies estrangement from the Dao. WANG Bi continues:
The greatest thing possible, how can this be other than the Dao? How could any lesser
expression adequately serve to honor It? Thus, although Its virtue is replete, Its enterprise
great, and Its rich abundance embraces the myriad things, each thing still has access to
Its virtue, but none in itself can encompass It all. Thus, Heaven cannot serve to uphold
It, Earth serve to cover It; or Mankind show It all the reverence It deserves. Although the
myriad things are noble, their functioning (yong ) is based on nothingness, so one cannot
reject nothingness as one’s embodiment (ti ), for if nothingness were rejected as one’s
embodiment, such a one would lose the power to be great. This is what is meant by “one
resorts to virtue only after losing the Dao.” (LOU 1980: 93–94; Lynn 1999: 121–22)
In addressing the interrelatedness among the Dao, nothingness, virtue, substance
or embodiment, and function, WANG Bi concludes that those of “lesser virtue,”
whose powers are derived from and limited to conscious effort, cannot possibly
be “great” since they have to “act out of something” and thus fail to tap into the
greatness of the Dao. By contrast, the sage like the Dao “acts out of nothing” and
thus has direct access to the limitless power inherent in the virtue of the Dao. The
sage concretely manifests nothingness in the phenomenal world—this is what the
382 R.J. Lynn
sage is—and always acts out of nothingness—this is what the sage does. One with
the Dao, the sage shares in the same embodiment and the same function.
It might be easier to grasp what is meant by the “substance” of “nothingness” if
we first explore what WANG Bi understood as the “function” of “nothingness”: It is
the perfect absence of conscious design, deliberate effort, prejudice, or predilection,
opposed, on the other hand, to conscious design, deliberate effort, prejudice, or
predilection, all of which belong to “somethingness” or “being”—the phenomenal
existence of creatures, including humankind, everything in the plant world, as well
as physical phenomena in general. The functioning (yong )oftheDaoorthe
Natural (ziran ) always “acts out of nothing,” never with conscious design; it
never “acts out of something.” Since the true sage embodies “nothingness” and is
thus one with the Dao, such a one never makes a false or wrong move.
Since WANG Bi essentially reads the Laozi as advice to rulers, “virtue” here
refers to the sage-ruler’s power to accomplish things in such a way that while
all benefit, none suffer harm. The sage rules just as the Dao operates in Nature,
where the differentiation of the myriad things and all related phenomena occur
spontaneously andwithout consciousdesign. “Being” is an appropriate word foryou
() in this context, but “being” or “somethingness” is also the principal attribute of
all that is artificial—once spontaneity is lost or shunted aside. When one “acts out
of something,” thus violating the Dao, failure, danger, dissatisfaction, and misery
inevitably result. WANG also observes that animals, too, are sometimes subject to
the dangers of “acting out of something,” that is, acting with conscious purpose,
driven by desire to enhance life beyond the bounds of natural existence (Laozi
Section 50):
Bottom creatures deem the lowest depths as still too shallow so burrow into them. Eagles
and ospreys deem mountains as still too low and so build their nests on top of them. Since
harpoon arrows cannot reach them or nets get at them, it can be said that where they locate
themselves are places free of death. But, after all, there are those that for the sake of some
sweet bait enter places where there is no life for them. Is this not due to placing too much
emphasis on life? (LOU 1980: 135; Lynn 1999: 148)
The “substance” (ti ) of “nothingness,” on the other hand is utterly without
physical existence. Though entirely free of “somethingness,” “nothingness” embod-
ies the very power of the universe that creates and brings to fruition everything that
does exist—Heaven and Earth, mankind, all creatures and plants, as well as all other
things animate and inanimate—everything that has “somethingness.” Since it has no
physical existence, the Dao is in but not of things.
4.4 “Nothingness” and “Principle”
Besides “nothingness,” WANG Bi also identifies the Dao with both the Natural
(ziran ) and “Perfect Principle” (zhili )—the great overarching sum of
all principles (li ) inherent in all things. Commenting on the Laozi, Section 42,
WANG states:
16 WANG Bi and Xuanxue 383
My [Master Lao’s] teaching of others does not consist of forcing them to follow what I teach
but to make use of the Natural and foster Perfect Principle, compliance with which means
good fortune and opposition means misfortune. (LOU 1980: 118; Lynn 1999: 135–36)
Alan K. L. Chan succinctly analyses WANG Bi’s identification of the Dao with
principle and, following QIAN Mu and Wing-tsit Chan [CHEN Rongjie
], observes that WANGSconcept of principle, a key characteristic of his thought,
anticipated the Song era Neo-Confucians use of it by many centuries, but adds
that it “lacks the sense of ontological independence that is apparent in the later
development of the concept.” (Chan 1991: 51–54) I am not so sure, for it seems to
me that the only real difference between WANGSli and the later Neo-Confucians’
use of this term is WANGSlack of detail in describing what he meant by it and
his failure to define its place in a philosophical system, both aspects that the later
Neo-Confucians wrote about extensively.
5 The “Many” and the “One”
Nevertheless, WANGSconsistent use of various terms often hints at such a system,
as, for example, in his “General Remarkson the Changes of the Zhou” (Zhouyi lueli
):
The many (zhong ) cannot govern the many; that which governs the many is the Most
Solitary (zhigua ) [the One]. Activity (dong ) cannot govern activity; that which
controls all activity that occurs in the world, thanks to constancy (zhen ), is the One
(yi ). Therefore for all the many to manage to exist, their master (zhu ) must reach back
to the One, and for all activities to manage to function (yun ), their source cannot but be
the Unique (wuer ) [the One]. No thing behaves haphazardly but necessarily follows its
own principle (li ). To unite (tong ) things, there is a Fundamental Regulator (zong );
to integrate (hui ) them, there is a Primordial Generator (yuan ). Therefore things are
complex but not chaotic, multitudinous but not confused. (LOU 1980: 591; Lynn 1994: 25)
The “Most Solitary,” the “One,” the “Unique,” the “Fundamental Regulator,” and
the “Primordial Generator all are epithets of the Dao”. “Master” and “principle”
refer to the differentiated configurations, the patterns or paradigms that govern both
the embodiment and the function of each of the myriad things. The sum of all these
principles, as we saw in the previous passage, is Perfect Principle, another epithet of
the Dao. The polarity of “the One” and “the many” is echoed elsewhere in WANGS
writings by two pairs of parallel terms: “root” (ben ) and “branch tips” (mo )
and “Mother” and “child” (zi ). Depending on context, “root” has the sense of
“fundamental principle,” “fundamentality,” or “original substance,” all of which
appear as epithets of the Dao as foundation of good government, and “branch tips”
refer to the details of government and social life: The “Mother” and “child” polarity
represents the same idea, as WANG asserts in his commentary to Laozi, Section 52:
The Mother is the root, and the child is the branch tips. It is by having access to the root that
one knows the branch tips, so one must not discard the root in order to pursue the branch
tips. (LOU 1980: 139; Lynn 1999: 151).
384 R.J. Lynn
When the sage ruler tends to the “root” and the “Mother,” the “branch tips” and
“child” take care of themselves, and, thus guided by the Dao, the state will flourish.
However, if rulers reverse their priorities and instead neglect their tending to tinker
with the “branch tips” and the “child” by burdening government with aggressive
bureaucracy and inflicting excessive laws and punishments on the populace, thestate
withers. This view is frequently raised in both the Laozi and Wang Bi’s commentary
to it; see Laozi, Sections 20, 38, 52, 54, 57, 58, and 59 (LOU 1980: 48–49, 95, 141,
143, 149–150, 153, and 156; Lynn 1999: 85, 123–24, 151, 154, 158–59, 160–162,
and 163).
The “Mother” is also an epithet of the Dao as the creative power that produces
and sustains everything that exists—an essential idea that appears at the beginning
of the Laozi, Section 1: “Nameless, It [the Dao] is the Origin (shi )ofthemyriad
things; Named, It is the Mother of the myriad things.”
WANG Bi comments:
Anything that exists [or “has somethingness”] originates from nothingness, thus, before
It has forms and is still nameless, It serves as the origin of the myriad things, and, once
It has forms and is named, It grows them, rears them, ensures them their proper shapes,
and matures them as their Mother. In other words, the Dao, by being Itself formless and
nameless, originates and brings the myriad things to maturity. They are originated and
matured in this way yet do not know how it happens, for this is the Arcane (xuan )
beyond Arcane. (Lou 1980:1;Lynn1999: 51).
And again in Laozi, Section 51: “The Dao gives them [the myriad things] life;
Virtue (de ) nurtures them, matter (wu ) gives them physical form (xing ),
and characteristic potential (shi ) brings them to maturity (cheng ).”
WANG Bi comments:
Once things achieve life, they are nurtured. Once nurtured, they acquire physical form. Once
they have physical form, they achieve maturity. What is the origin from which their lives
comes? It is the Dao. What is the source from which they are nurtured? It is Virtue. What
is the cause (yin ) for their physical form? It is matter. What is the agency (shi 使)that
brings about their maturity? It is characteristic potential.9It is this cause alone that makes
it possible for each and every thing to have physical form. It is this characteristic potential
alone that makes it possible for each and every thing to achieve maturity. From the way
all things achieve life to the way the potentiality (gong ) of things reaches maturity, all
these processes have an origin. Since there has to be an origin for them, this origin without
exception is the Dao. Thus, if we trace these processes back to their ultimate origin, we
arrive inevitably at the Dao, and when we follow each process back to what caused it,
there is a different designation (cheng ) for each process. (Lou 1980: 136–137; Lynn
1999: 149).
The Dao in all its aspects generates, sustains, and matures everything that
exists; though it is utterly without physical existence itself, and devoid of all
“somethingness,” it is responsible for all phenomenal reality—everything that has
9Shi has a wide range of meaning, including “propensity,” which also would work here,
but “characteristic potential” seems better since it more explicitly suggests that maturity is the
realization of the potential for growth inherent in the character of things. For shi as “propensity”
and related meanings, see the work of François Jullien (Jullien 1999).
16 WANG Bi and Xuanxue 385
“somethingness.” This “nothingness”—“somethingness” divide signifies a dualism
that defines ultimate cause and effect: the Dao both causes things to exist and
determines their properties. In his commentary to Laozi, Section 25, “there is
something, amorphous and complete, which was born before Heaven and Earth,”
WANG Bi makes it quite clear that the Dao exists apart from things and is antecedent
to them:
Amorphous, there is no way to know It, yet the myriad things by It achieve maturity. Thus
the text says It is “amorphous and complete.” We do not know whose child It could be,
which is why “It was born before Heaven and Earth.” (Lou 1980: 63; Lynn 1999:?)
Wang’s comment on the next line, “obscure (ji ), oh, and immaterial (liao ), oh,
It stands alone, unchanged,” continues in the same vein:
Ji and liao [ordinarily “silent” and “empty”] means “without physical form or substance”
(wu xingti ). Nothing exists that corresponds to It. Therefore, the text says: “It
stands alone.” In the end It always transforms Itself back to what it was at the start, thus
never losing its constancy (chang ). Thus the text says that It is “unchanged.”
The Dao is thus eternal, stands apart from all things, and is antecedent to Heaven
and Earth and all they contain. However, although the Dao as primogenitor is thus
ontologically transcendent in substance (), in function (), it is imminent in all
things. As Alan K. L. Chan proposes, the link between the transcendent Dao and its
immanence in things is principle (li ):
If the Dao is by definition what being is not, how is it related to the world? The concept
of li (“principle”) plays an important role in bridging the gap between transcendence and
immanence. In his commentary on the Yijing, Wang Bi stresses that phenomena conform to
fundamental principles, such as the laws of nature, which can in turn be traced to a logically
necessary unity. (Chan 2003: 216)
The following examples (not inclusive) from WANGSChanges commentary, which
address the concept of “principle” both in general and in specifics, confirm Professor
Chan’s observation:(1) “Once one recognizes how things act, then all the principles
of their existence (suoyi ran zhi li ) can be understood.” (Hexagram 1
Qian , “Commentary to the Words of the Text” (Wenyan ); LUO 1980: 216;
Lynn 1994: 140). (2) “[A ruler] devoid of hard and strong substance (ti ) can let
things fully realize their innate tendencies (qing ) only by thoroughly grasping
their principles (li ), and he can only occupy a noble position with the virtues of
compliance and obedience only if he has given himself over entirely to the principles
of civility (wenli ) [i. e., as embodied in “etiquette and ritual” (yili ].”
(Hexagram 2 Kun ,“Fifth Yin”(liuwu ); LUO 1980: 228; Lynn 1994: 149).
(3) “As such a one understands wherefrom misfortune and fortune arise, he does
not take delight thoughtlessly, and as he distinguishes what constitutes ineluctable
principles (biran zhi li ), he does not allow his behavior to vary from them
(bugai qi cao ).” (Hexagram 16 Yu ,“Second Yin”(liuer ); LOU
1980: 299; Lynn 1994: 236–7).
The following passage addresses the particular dao (lower case to distinguish
particular daos from the great Dao) that underlies Hexagram 21 Shihe :(4)
“Whereas one can in this way derive benefit from the good fortune that obtains
386 R.J. Lynn
from ‘exercising constancy in the face of difficulties,’ this falls short of fulfilling
the dao that comprehensively covers the principles here (tongli zhi dao
).” (Hexagram 21 Shihe (), “Second Yin”(jiusi ); LUO 1980: 323; Lynn
1994: 270).
A passage that exemplifies the convergence of Confucian and Daoist thought in
WANG Bi occurs in the following: (5) “If [a ruler] were able to embrace the dao of
moral principles and the mean (lizhong ) and that of generosity and obedience
(houshun ) and use them to try to hold them [the people] fast, none would
manage to break away.” (Hexagram 33 Dun ,“Second Yin;” LOU 1980: 383; Lynn
1994: 342). This use of particular dao seems identical to particular li, for it signifies
the principles that underlie two distinct but interrelated sets of sociopolitical values
and behavior. As this and other daos are particular differentiations of the Great
Dao (dadao ) of Nature, so are particular principles differentiations of Perfect
Principle—the overarching sum of all principles—another way of referring to the
Dao—so on this level dao and li are unquestionably interchangeable terms.
6 Daoist Nature and the Confucian Human World
Hexagram 38 “Contrariety” (Kui ), “Commentary On the Great Images”
(Daxiang ): “Above Fire and below Lake: this constitutes the image of
Contrariety. In the same way, the noble man differentiates among things while
remaining sensitive to their similarities” (junzi yi tong er yi ).
WANGScommentary contrasts “principle” (li ) and “affairs” (shi ): (6) “His
appreciation of similarities stems from his thorough grasp of principle (tong yu
tongli ), and his appreciation of differences emerges from his practical
handling of affairs (yi yu zhishi ).” (LOU 1980: 405; Lynn 1994: 368). That
“grasp of principle” leads to an appreciation of similarities suggests understanding
of the underlying unity of all things, whereas awareness of differences stemming
from the handling of “affairs” surely means involvement in human, sociopolitical
affairs, each of which has its own underlying dao or li. Such passages in WANGS
commentary to the Changes do indeed articulate that principle is the link between
the transcendent Dao and its immanence in things, including human affairs, thus
bringing to bear Daoist insight into what had hitherto been largely a Confucian area
of concern.
However, besides WANG Bi’s reading of the Changes,hisResolving Problems
In Interpreting the Analects (Lunyu shiyi 論語) is an obvious text to explore
to see how he went about applying arcane learning (xuanxue ) to interpret the
Confucian classics. Although the Lunyu shiyi has apparently been lost since the end
of the Tang dynasty,a significant numberof fragments survive as quotations in three
other works: Huang Kan (488–545), Exegesis of the Analects (Lunyu yishu
); Lu Deming (556–627), Explications Of the Texts of the Classics
(Jingdian shiwen );andXingBing(932–1010), Correct Meaning
16 WANG Bi and Xuanxue 387
of the Analects (Lunyu zhengyi 論語)(WANG 1996: 328). All such fragments
have been collected by LOU Yulie (LOU 1980: 621–637). For example:
When LIN Fang asked about the roots (ben ) of ritual (li ), the Master said, “What a
great question!” (Analects 3.4)
WANG Bi’s commentary:
Since people of that time had discarded the root and instead venerated the branch tips
(mo ), he [Confucius] thought it great that he [LIN Fang] was able to seek the root for the
meaning of ritual. (LOU 1980: 622)
The “root” vs. “branch tips” polarity occurs frequently in the Laozi itself, in WANG’s
commentary to it, and in his Outline Introduction to the Laozi (Laozi zhilue
)—in all instances the “root” is extolled as the fundamental manifestation
of the Dao and “branch tips” denigrated as mere superficialities—ramifications far
removed from the essential Dao. (See Lynn 1999: 33, 37, 38, 40, 76, 85, 89, 121,
123, 124, 128, 130, 143, 148, 151, 154, 158–59, 163–164, 170). It is apparent from
a survey of the fragments of WANGScommentary to the Analects that the above
passage is typical of his tendency to use the Laozi to explicate the Analects—and
the Changes as well—and to merge the Dao of the Confucians with the Dao of the
Laozi. This tendency seems to permeate arcane learning hermeneutics in general.
Rather than cite more such examples, I shall focus only on one more passage in
Wang’s Analects commentary:
The Master Said, “I set my heart on the Dao” (zhi yu dao ). (Analects 7.6)
WANG Bi’s commentary:
Dao is a designation (cheng ) for Nothingness. It is because It goes through absolutely
everything and absolutely everything comes via It, we make a simile (kuang )forItand
thus call it the Dao (Way). As It operates silently and is without physicality (ti ), it is
impossible to provide images for It. Since such a Dao is impossible to conceive of as a
physical entity (buke ti ), he [Confucius] could do nothing more than set his heart
on emulating It” (zhimu eryi ). (LOU 1980: 624).
Much of this passage—“Dao is a designation for Nothingness:::. it is impossible
to provide images for it”—is quoted in HAN Kangbo’s commentary to the sentence
“The reciprocal process of yin and yang is called the Dao” in the “Commentary
on the Appended Phrases,” Part One, of the Changes of Zhou, answering the
question, “What is this Dao?” (LOU 1980: 541; Lynn 1994: 53). Its presence there
makes one suspect that HANScommentary might well contain other excerpts from
WANGScommentary to the Analects and others of his lost writings. In any case,
HAN consistently read the “Commentary on the Appended Phrases” in terms of
arcane learning and drew heavily on the thought of the Laozi and other early
Daoist philosophical writings (Lynn 1994: 47–101). Modern scholarship rejects
the traditional view that the “Commentary on the Appended Phrases” was either
authored by Confucius or at least represents his teachings, but concludes instead
that Confucius had nothing to do with it, that it probably dates from the early
388 R.J. Lynn
Han period, and is actually a hybrid text that contains more Daoist than Confucian
thought. (Peterson 1982). Althoughthe last sentence in the abovepassage is worded
ambiguously, since we know from HEShao’s biography of WANG Bi that WANG
asserted that Confucius “embodied nothingness,” buke ti , we know here
that it cannot be rendered “he could not embody the Dao.” Moreover, it is obvious
that mu should be rendered “emulate” and not “admire,” its more usual meaning.
Consider another part of WANGScommentary, to Analects 11.19, “As for Hui [YAN
Hui], how close he came to it (shuhu ), yet he was constantly in poverty”:
He almost succeeded (shuji 庶幾) in emulating the sages (mu sheng ), but since he
was utterly indifferent to wealth he was constantly poor. (LOU 1980: 629).
Returning to Analects 11.19, WANG seems to be saying that Confucius recognized
he could not learn how to practice the Dao, since nothing objectively existed of it
that could be studied, so all he could do was intuitively emulate it.
7 Wang Bi on Language
One cannot “study” the Dao, of course, because it is impossible to name or describe
(Laozi, Section 1): “The Dao that can be described in language is not the constant
Dao; the name that can be given it is not its constant name.”WANG comments:
The Dao that can be rendered in language and the name (ming ) that can be given It point
to a thing (zhishi ) or creates a semblance (zaoxing ), neither of which is It in Its
constancy (chang ). This is why It can neither be rendered in language (buke dao
) nor given a name (buke ming ).
“Point to a thing” (zhishi ) is the first of XUShen’s (fl. ca. 100 C. E.)
“Six Graphic Principles of Chinese Characters” (liushu ), the simple ideogram.
“Creates a semblance of something” (zaoxing ) seems equivalent to “image
the form” (xiangxing ), XUSsecond Graphic Principle, the simple pictogram.
See Explanations of Simple and Compound Characters (Shuowen jiezi )
(XU1982: 15A.3a–3b). WANG here addresses the limited way language functions,
too limited to capture the transcendent Dao because it always has to refer to aspects
of phenomenal reality. “Creates a semblance of something” likely also alludes to a
passage in the Zhuangzi,Xu Wugui (Chapter 24): “Although you, my lord,
may practice humanity (ren ) and righteousness (yi ), this is tantamount to
falsehood (wei )!” GUO Xiang (252–312) comments: “The people will just
continue such falsehood, unwilling to act authentically (zhen ).” The Zhuangzi
continues: “And your semblance (xing ) of them will certainly result in further
semblances of them being created (zaoxing ).” GUO: “As soon as semblances
for humanity and righteousness exist, counterfeits (weixing ) will surely be
made of them” (GUO 1997: 4.633). It is likely that WANG Bi read this passage in
the Zhuangzi in much the same way:Not only is languagelimited to namingspecific
things, it consists of names that, at best, only approximate the real nature of things,
and, as such, are inevitably false or “counterfeit.”
16 WANG Bi and Xuanxue 389
However, WANGSview of language is far more complicated than this, for it
defines and analyses the relationships among “images” (xiang ), “ideas” (yi ),
“concepts” (yi ), “principles” (li ), and “words” (yan )—a view that had
immense impact on later Chinese hermeneutics and poetics (Lynn 2001). In his
commentary to the “Commentary on the Images” (Xiangzhuan )to“First Yin
in Hexagram 40 “Release” (Xie ), “To be on the borderline between hard and soft
as a concept (yi ) means ‘there is no blame’,” WANG equates concept (yi ) with
principle (li ): “When something incurs blame, it means that it does not measure
up to its principle (fei qili ). Concept is the same as principle.” FENG Youlan
said of this passage:
Both terms [“concept” and “principle”], therefore, would seem to be his [WANGS]
designations for the primary principles which underlay the phenomenal world, whereas
by “ideas” he would seem to mean these same objective principles as they are mentally
imprinted in men’s minds. (FUNG 1973: 2.186).
Although earlier in his analysis Feng suspects that what WANG calls “ideas” and
what he calls “concepts” are “essentially the same,” here “ideas” seem defined
as individual mental experiences of general “concepts” or “primary principles.”
TANG Junyi says something similar in his own analysis of WANG Bi’s
terminology: “When ideas are made known, they become concepts” (yi zhi suo
zhijiyi)(T
ANG 1973: 2.885). That is, once ideas are articulated
(rendered in knowable form), they are concepts: “ideas” are private and personal;
“concepts” are public and general. An individual experiences a concept or principle
first as an idea, which to be shared with and communicated to others, must be put
in knowable form: as a concept or principle. Therefore, ideas become concepts,
when starting from the individual (subjective), and concepts/principles become
ideas when starting from the general (objective).
WANGSmost detailed and explicitdiscussion of language occurs in the “Clarify-
ing the Images” (ming xiang ) section of his “General Remarks on the Changes
of the Zhou”:
Images (xiang ) are the means to express ideas (yi ). Words (yan ) are the means to
clarify (ming ) the images. To yield up ideas completely, nothing is better than images,
and to yield up images completely nothing is better than words. Words are generated by
the images, thus it is possible to ponder words in order to observe the images. Images are
generated by ideas (yi ), thus one can ponder images in order to observe ideas. Ideas are
yielded up completely (jin ) by images, and images are made explicit (zhu ) by words.
Thus, since words are the means to explain images, once one gets the images, he forgets the
words, and, since images are the means to allow us to concentrate on ideas, once one gets
the ideas, he forgets the images. Similarly, “the snare exists for the hare, but once the hare
is caught, one forgets the snare, and the fish trap exists for the sake of fish; once one gets
the fish he forgets the trap.”10 If so, then words are snares for images, and images are traps
for ideas :::. someone who stays fixed on words will not get the images, and someone who
stays fixed on images will not get the ideas. Images are generated by ideas, but if one stays
fixed on the images themselves, then what he stays fixed on will not be images as we mean
10Zhuangzi, “External Things” (Waiw u ) (Chapter 26) (GUO 1997: 4.944).
390 R.J. Lynn
them here :::. This is why anything that corresponds analogously (chulei ) [to an idea]
can serve as its image, and any concept that fits (heyi ) [with an idea] can serve as its
symbol (zheng ). (LOU 1980: 609; Lynn 1994: 31–32).
WANG also says something similar but in more succinct fashion in his commentary
to the “Commentary To the Words of the Text” to “Top Yang” in Hexagram 1 “Pure
Yang” (Qian ):
The Changes consist of images, and what images are produced from are concepts (yi ).
One first has to have a particular concept, which one then illustrates by using some concrete
thing (qiwu ) [to symbolize it]. Thus one uses the dragon to express “Pure Yang” (Qian)
and the mare to illustrate “Pure Yin” (Kun ) (Hexagram 2). One follows the concept
inherent in a matter (shi ) and chooses an image for it accordingly. (LOU 1980: 215;
Lynn 1994: 138–39).
Although Section 1 of the Laozi and WANGScommentary both state that language
is incapable of naming or describing the Dao, we now know that language can
begin an approach to the Dao that may reach it through intermediary stages, a
paradigm of which can be induced that looks like this: Although words can but
point to things or reproduce semblances for them, they also articulate subjective
ideas and convey them into the public realm where they become concepts. Concepts
so generated by the human mind and universally shared are inherently identical
to the natural principles that create and control the properties of all phenomenal
reality. Finally, the perfect sum of these principles constitutes the Dao. Principle in
WANGSthought not only mediates between the natural and the human worlds but
also provides linkage between the ontology of the Dao and the phenomenology of
Heaven, Earth, Mankind, and the myriad things.
8 Conclusion
The bifurcation of Daoism into a philosophical Daoist Lineage of the Way (Daojia
) and a religious Daoist Teachings of the Way (Daojiao ), commonplace in
an earlier era of modern scholarship, has become increasingly suspect in more recent
times, and instead of two separate and inimical traditions, the growing consensus
now, especially in religious studies circles, is that the philosophical and religious
dimensions of Daoism are best seen not as a pair of incompatible opposites but in
terms of a complementary polarity within a single tradition. However, historians
of Chinese philosophy continue to emphasize philosophical approaches to the
foundational texts of Daoism—the Laozi and the Zhuangzi—and the commentary
traditions associated with them. They consider the “arcane learning” (xuanxue )
of the Wei-Jin and Six Dynasties eras, including the thought of WANG Bi, firmly
within their purview; see for example WANG 1996;LUO 2003;TANG 2000a;HU
2007;XU2003; Wagner 2000,2003a,b. Alan K. L. Chan contrasts and compares
the Laozi commentaries of WANG Bi and the “Old Man By the River” (Heshang
16 WANG Bi and Xuanxue 391
Gong ), a work traditionally ascribed to the early Han era. He concludes
that although WANGSinsights led to essential features of later Neo-Confucian
thought and those of Heshang Gong were later appropriated by Daoist religion, they
originally shared many fundamental interests and presuppositions, and it would be
both anachronistic and simplistic to think of them in terms of inimical opposition
(Chan 1991: 188–191). Contemporary scholars of Chinese religion, on the other
hand, can roughly be divided into those who readily admit that a separate Daoist
philosophical tradition, including arcane learning, contributed significantly to the
initial development of Daoist religion, and on the other, those who adamantly
deny any such independent contribution and instead insist on subsuming all early
“Daoist” thought into Daoist religion.
WANG Bi fares rather well with the former, who note, for example, (1) that his use
of “nothingness” or “Non-being” and “somethingness” or “Being” had significant
influence on Ge Hong (283–343), the author of the Sayings of the Master
Who Embraces Simplicity (Baopu zi ), an important transmitter of early
Daoist scriptures, and a prominent alchemist/herbalist (Robinet 2008a: 21)11;(2)
that WANGSwuyou polarity became an important element in the developmentof
the Highest Clarity (Shangqing ) School of Daoist teaching during the fourth
and fifth centuries C. E. (Robinet 2008a: 21); and (3) his “substance” and “function”
paradigm “provided a basic conceptual framework for Buddhist thought, which
in turn was adopted by Taoism [Daoism]” (Robinet 2008b: 973–74). (4) WANG
influenced the way the “inner elixir” or “inner alchemy” (neidan ) Daoist tradition
understood the role of images in the development of its alchemical metaphors
(Robinet 2008c: 1086–87). However, WANG Bi comes off rather badly with scholar
who claim for religion all manner of “Daoist” thought. For example, Kristofer
Schipper, among WANGSmost negative and vociferous critics, denies that he had
anything at all to do with Daoism but was actually a “Confucian” reason-monger
who distorted the meaning of the Laozi so badly that “instead of clarifying the text,
his commentary makes it more difficult to understand” (Schipper 1993: 193).
Lastly, we should note that for WANG Bi the concept of “Nothingness,” his
principle epithet for the Dao, was the transcendent primogenitor of all things—of
all “somethingness.” Although PEI Wei wrote a treatise refuting WANGSconcept
of wu, it met with limited success. However shortly thereafter Wang was challenged
far more successfully by Guo Xiang, who took arcane learning in an entirely
new direction that emphasized the spontaneous self-generation of everything—
a transcendent creator entirely absent. Guo expresses it this way:
Nothingness is just that—nothing—so it cannot create “somethingness” [i.e., phenomenal
reality], and as long as “somethingness” is not yet created, it cannot bring about creation
either. Since this is so, what is it that does all this creation? Actually, clod-like (kuairan
) [i.e. intrinsically] things create themselves. Since they just create themselves, it is not
11Entries by Robinet and others in Pregadio 2008 end with recommendations for further readings
on the subjects involved.
392 R.J. Lynn
any I who creates them. As I cannot create something else, something else cannot create me
either, thus I am spontaneously (ziran )what I am. When something is so by itself (ziji
er ran ), we call it “natural” (tianran ). What is natural is not made (wei ),
and that is why it is referred to by the term “Heaven” (tian ), a term used to make it clear
that something is what it is utterly by itself (ziran ). (GUO 1997: 2.50)
The essential differences between WANG Bi’s and GUO Xiang’s positions on wu
and you are discussed in detail in the chapter on Guo Xiang.
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16 WANG Bi and Xuanxue 395
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... Para estudios sobre el movimiento Xuanxue, historia, objetivos y relación con Wang Bi, véanseWagner, 2000Wagner, , 2003aLynn, 2015; Chan, 1991. 9 A partir de la segunda parte de la dinastía Han, el método zhangju se fue abandonando progresivamente por considerarse prolijo y corrupto por las doctrinas heterodoxas. ...
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The essay analyzes and compares the concept of Dao in the three most influential commentaries of the Laozi. In particular, it explores how different readings of Dao within the texts relate to different historical periods, traditions, goals, and authors of the commentaries. For example, the tradition of the Huang-Lao school, with its interest in cosmological theories and self-cultivation, permeates the Heshang gong commentary and its vision of Dao as an accessible and knowable cosmic principle. On the other hand, in the Xiang Er, the religious institution of the Celestial Masters, approaches the Laozi as a sacred text, and Dao as a divinity with its clear and intelligible precepts. Finally, the relative interpretative freedom of Wang Bi, devoid of orthodox exegetical influences, together with the search for internal coherence of the text, generates a totally different commentary from the earlier exegetical tradition. The Laozi becomes a manual of wisdom that reveals the Dao as the logical foundation of the world.
... Para estudios sobre el movimiento Xuanxue, historia, objetivos y relación con Wang Bi, véanseWagner, 2000Wagner, , 2003aLynn, 2015; Chan, 1991. 9 A partir de la segunda parte de la dinastía Han, el método zhangju se fue abandonando progresivamente por considerarse prolijo y corrupto por las doctrinas heterodoxas. ...
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Se analiza y compara el concepto de dao en los tres comentarios más influyentes del Laozi, y, en particular, cómo las distintas lecturas del dao en los tres textos se relacionan con diferentes épocas históricas, tradiciones, objetivos y autores de los comentarios. Por ejemplo, la tradición de la escuela Huang-Lao, con su interés en teorías cosmológicas y prácticas de autocultivo, impregna el comentario Heshang gong y su visión del dao como principio cósmico accesible y cognoscible. Por otra parte, en el Xiang Er, la institución religiosa de los Maestros Celestiales plasma el Laozi como texto sagrado y el dao como una divinidad con preceptos claros e inteligibles. A su vez, la relativa libertad interpretativa de Wang Bi, desprovista de influencias exegéticas ortodoxas, junto con la búsqueda de una coherencia interna en el texto, genera un comentario totalmente distinto de la tradición interpretativa anterior. El Laozi se convierte en manual de sabiduría que revela el dao como fundamento lógico del mundo.
... 9 Guo Xiang's idiosyncratic philosophy does not represent all of Wei-Jin Daoism, as scholars like Xi Kang or Wang Bi offer quite different visions generally and of ziran. For more on this, see Lynn (2015) and Henricks (1983). 10 Though this dating issue has been heavily debated, the majority of scholars now generally accord with Rao Zongyi's Eastern Han conclusion (Rao 1956;Ōfuchi 1967;Yoshioka 1977;Yu 1983;Seidel 1992;Robinet 1977;Chan 1991;Wang [1993Wang [ ] 1997Tadd 2013). ...
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This essay explores the core Daoist concept of ziran (commonly translated as spontaneity, naturalness, or self-so) and its relationship to authenticity and authority. Modern scholarship has often followed the interpretation of Guo Xiang (d. 312) in taking ziran as spontaneous individual authenticity completely unreliant on any external authority. This form of Daoism emphasizes natural transformations and egalitarian society. Here, the author draws on Heshanggong’s Commentary on the Daodejing to reveal a drastically dissimilar ziran conception based on the authority of the transcendent Way. The logic of this contrasting view of classical Daoism results not only in a vision of hierarchical society, but one where the ultimate state of human ziran becomes immortality. Expanding our sense of the Daodejing, this cosmology of authority helps unearths greater continuity of the text with Daoism’s later religious forms.
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Wang Chong’s influence on the Xuanxue movement is well known. His Lunheng was prized and used by Cai Yong, Wang Lang, and a number of others as aid in their argumentative pursuits, which largely followed the methods devised by Wang. Wang has sometimes even been referred to as the first of the Xuanxue scholars. In this chapter, I argue that Wang Chong’s view of the connection between nature and allotment and its implications for spontaneity influenced Xuanxue views of ziran, particularly those offered by Wang Bi and Guo Xiang, and offer a particular reading of Wang’s understanding of the link between ziran as principle of development and the concepts of nature and allotment. This led him to a view of ziran as itself a principle of development and activity tied to the nature of a thing. This view is further developed by Wang Bi and Guo Xiang, both of whom adopt a view of ziran as principle of development tied to the nature of a thing. Here, I outline the ways in which Wang Chong’s view can be found as informing those of both Wang Bi and Guo Xiang.
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The original Daodejing presents us with a collection of aphoristic fragments that on their own remain ambiguous and opaque. That is to say, Daoist philosophy only really begins when the earliest aphoristic records like the Daodejing achieve order in subsequent more architectonic works. When looking at the later stages of Daoist thought (i.e., Xuanxue), we must recognize the key role commentaries play in reconceptualizing and developing the nascent ideas of the “classic.” This chapter focuses on one such commentary, Heshanggong’s Commentary on the Daodejing, to reveal an important development in Daoist articulations of the concepts Dao and ziran.
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In this paper we focus on the famous dialogue between Zhuangzi and Huizi concerning the question whether or not ren 人 (in particular the shengren 聖人) have qing 情. Most scholars have understood qing in this exchange as referring to “feelings” or “emotions.” We take issue with such readings. First, we demonstrate that, while Huizi probably understands qing as something like feelings or emotions, Zhuangzi’s view is that having qing 情 is connected with making shifei 是非 judgments whereas having no qing means that shifei has no grip on those ren, especially the shengren. What follows is that, the expression wuqing 無情 should not be identified as a “doctrine of non-emotion.” Instead, wuqing implies that Zhuangzi advises us to lead a life of tranquility, calmness, and stillness. We show that these peaceful attitudes are associated with the idea of wuwei 無為 in the Zhuangzi.
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Birds and beasts often appear in the Zhuangzi, in fables and parables meant to be read analogically as instructions for human thought and behavior. Whereas the analogical significance of some fables is obvious, in others it is obscure and in need of explication, and even the readily accessible can be made to yield more clarity thanks to commentaries. This paper explores contributions made by the commentaries of Guo Xiang (252–312) and Cheng Xuanying (ca. 620–670) to the understanding of such fables. Guo Xiang and Wang Bi 王弼 (226–249) are the two most important figures in the xuanxue 玄學 “arcane learning” or “Neo-Daoism” movement of early medieval China (third to sixth century C.E.), which combined elements of Confucianism with the thought of Daoist foundational texts, especially the Daode jing (Classic of the Dao and Virtue) and the Zhuangzi (Sayings of Master Zhuang). Focus of the movement was the promotion of the concept and practice of the sage-ruler as a catalyst for the regeneration of self and society, leading to the foundation of a worldly utopia. Guo’s is the earliest intact philosophical commentary to the Zhuangzi and one of the most widely read during premodern times. Cheng Xuanying composed the only subcommentary to Guo’s commentary. Its more explicit style is most helpful in deciphering Guo’s too often cryptic and elliptical statements. However, it also tends to shunt Guo’s statecraft reading of the Zhuangzi more in the direction of explicating philosophical and religious dimensions of the text. Whereas Guo’s observations about sagehood, self-fulfillment, and the good life largely focus on the sage-ruler and his relation to his people, Cheng’s approach tends more to explore issues of personal self-realization and individual enlightenment, and, as such, is far more “religious” than Guo’s. However, when it comes to accounts of birds and beasts, parodies and satires, which address the limitations, failures, delusions and faulty assumptions, narrow-mindedness, and other human foibles, both Guo and Cheng see them all rooted in self-conscious thought and knowledge, and thus deadly impediments to enlightenment. Other passages about beasts and birds use animal fables as exemplars of truth concerning endowed personal nature and the natural propensity to stay within the bounds of individual natural capacity. Since the commentaries of Guo and Cheng add important dimensions to these accounts, this study explores these as well.
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(pre-publication draft version): The philosophy of Wang Bi 王弼 (226-249) was articulated in his commentaries on the Analects (Lunyu 論語), the Daodejing 道德經, and the Yijing 易經 (Classic of Changes). His Daodejing and Yijing commentaries shaped the reception and hermeneutics of these texts while his commentary on the Analects survived only in a fragmentary condition. Despite his prioritization of Confucius (Kongzi 孔子) as the ultimate paradigmatic figure of the sage, Wang's works offer a syncretist Daoist, or "neo-Daost" mysterious learning (xuanxue 玄學), reasons for this priority. This reconstructed Daoist notion of nothingness (wu無) functions as a key concept that informs his readings of the classics and his depiction of the relationship between language, imagination, and reflection. Wang interpreted the Yijing as a dynamic medium for reflecting on and interpreting nature, society, and one's own situation. This chapter elucidates Wang Bi's commentaries, focusing particularly on the relation between words (yan言), images (xiang 象), meanings (yi 意), and the forgetting (wang 忘) of words, images, and ideas in the context of Wang’s interpretation of responsiveness from nothingness. Nothingness cannot be thematically grasped as a thing or something, and it resists being treated as a determinate idea or propositional said. It is irreducible to words, images, and ideas. Its primordiality is disclosed and enacted in practices of emptying, forgetting, and letting go.
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This volume launches the translation of a work that describes the development of Chinese political thought from the time of Confucius in the late Chou era into the twentieth century. The author systematically treats leading thinkers, schools, and movements, displaying a consummate mastery of traditional Chinese learning, and of Western analytical and comparative methods. This first complete translation includes prefatory remarks by Kung-chuan Hsiao and notes prepared by the translator to assist the Western reader.
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This is an attempt to assemble the fragmentary remains of xuan-school Analects commentary so as to articulate the broad coherence of a xuan-school style of interpretation of that text. A model of "gestural language" is proposed as a way of seeing the overall thrust of interpretive approaches to this text by commentators from Wang Bi in the mid-third century to Huang Kan in the first half of the sixth. This xuan-school approach to reading the Analects is of considerable interest in its own right, reminding us of the centrality of the notions of sagehood and "timeliness" to hermeneutical thought in this period, as well as anticipating some of the insights obtained by modern-day applications of speech-act theory to the interpretation of thetext. What close attention to these relatively neglected sources conveys, moreover, is a sense of the real importance of the Analects, and of the sage Confucius, to much xuan-school thought. Viewing this historical style of interpretation in its conceptual sophistication and broad coherence may thus also serve as a corrective to persistent assumptions about xuan-school thought as essentially "metaphysical" or "Neo-Daoist" in its basic orientation.
Two visions of the way; A study of the Wang Pi and the Hoshang Kung commentaries on the Lao-Tzu
  • Alan K L Chan
Chan, Alan K.L. 1991. Two visions of the way; A study of the Wang Pi and the Hoshang Kung commentaries on the Lao-Tzu. Albany: State University of New York Press. [Essential reading for Wang Bi and Heshang Gong scholarship.]
Chronicles of the three kingdoms 三國志. With the commentary of Pei Songzhi 裴松之 (372-451). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju. [The essential historical source for the three kingdoms era
  • Chen Shou
CHEN Shou 陳 壽 (233-297). 1975. Chronicles of the three kingdoms 三 國 志. With the commentary of PEI Songzhi 裴 松 之 (372-451). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju. [The essential historical source for the three kingdoms era (220-280).]