The social intuitionist model: Some counterintuitions

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Challenging the Social Intuitionist Model Page 1
The Social Intuitionist Model: Some Counter-Intuitions
Darcia Narvaez
University of Notre Dame
(Text word count: 2909)
Contact information:
Darcia Narvaez, Department of Psychology, 118 Haggar Hall, University of
Notre Dame, Notre Dame IN 46556, dnarvaez@nd.edu, 574-631-7835
Author note:
Thanks to Dennis Krebs, Dan Lapsley, Steve Thoma, Larry Walker, for
comments on earlier drafts.
**************
Haidt and Bjorklund offer two important correctives to the
longstanding cognitive perspective of moral reasoning. As Haidt and
Bjorklund point out, psychological science is in the process of abandoning
the view that humans make decisions in the classical sense, as rational
decision makers who reason deliberately under full conscious control.
Instead, human cognition and decision making is influenced to a large
degree by non-conscious systems. The second corrective endorsed by
Haidt and Bjorklund is the fact that human cognition is a social
phenomenon, highly influenced by one’s social situation and community,
and not the individualistic activity that western tradition has emphasized.
Although these are important and worthwhile correctives, the social-
intuitionist model has several worrisome elements that bear some
reflection.
1. Only a Small Sample of Moral Judgment and Reasoning Processes Are
Addressed
Haidt and Bjorklund limit their discussion of moral judgment to the
cognitive appraisal of the action or character of a person. [See Haidt, 2001:
“Moral judgments are therefore defined as evaluations (good versus bad) of
the actions or character of a person that are made with respect to a set of
virtues held by a culture or subculture to be obligatory”, p x]. The equally
narrow definition of moral reasoning (“transforming given information
about people in order to reach a moral judgment”, ibid) is again limited to
processing information about others. It is not clear how social intuitionist
theory addresses aspects of moral judgment and reasoning beyond such
cognitive appraisals. For example, most philosophical discussion since
Kant has addressed moral decision making. Moral decision making
includes such things as ascertaining which personal goals and plans to set
(Williams, 1973), determining what one’s responsibilities are (Frankfurt,
1993), weighing which action choice among alternatives is best (Rawls,
1971), reconciling multiple considerations (Wallace, 1988), evaluating the
quality of moral decisions made and actions taken (Blum, 1994), as well as
juggling metacognitive skills such as monitoring progress on a particular
moral goal or controlling attention to fulfill moral goals (Kekes, 1988). It is
not clear where these types of activities fit in the social intuitionist model.
Although intuitions may play a role in these activities, I argue below that at
least some of the time moral deliberation and conscious reasoning may be
required.
2. Flashes of Affect and Intuition Are Overcredited While Deliberative
Reasoning is Undervalued
Haidt and Bjorklund propose that moral judgment is the result of
quick intuitions that evaluate events according to good-bad categories, and
that these intuitions drive moral judgment. While it may be true that
individuals react to stimuli emotionally, with approach-avoidant reactions,
a quick flash of affect is but one piece of information that humans use to
make decisions about their goals and behaviors (Hogarth, 2000). A person
may attend to physical reactions and interpret them (correctly or not) when
making a decision (e.g., “my stomach is tight, I must not like x, so I won’t
do x”), but this is only one contributing factor among many factors.
Numerous elements play a role in moral decisions along with gut feelings,
such as current goals and preferences (Darley & Batson, 1969), mood and
energy (Hornstein, LaKind, Frankel & Manne, 1975; Isen, 1970; Isen &
Levin, 1972), environmental affordances (Gibson, 1979), situational press
(Fiske, 2004), contextual cue quality (Staub, 1978), social influence
(Hornstein, 1976), logical coherence with self image (Colby & Damon,
1991) and with prior history (Grusec, 2002).
People wrestle with moral decisions, commitments, transgressions,
and judgments in a more complex fashion (e.g., Gilligan, 1982; Klinger,
1978) than Haidt and Bjorklund allow (“People sometimes do look on both
sides of an issue, thereby triggering intuitions on both sides….but it must
be stressed that such deadlocks are fairly rare in our moral lives…”).
Everyday moral decisions are not necessarily, as they say, “like aesthetic

Challenging the Social Intuitionist Model Page 2
judgments …made quickly, effortlessly, and intuitively” (p. 7). In response
to the authors’ suggestion of a diary study to determine the nature of moral
judgment, the Table 1 lists a sampling of thoughts/issues from two days in
my life recently, which I think suggest that moral deliberation is not the
rare event Haidt and Bjorklund assume.
Table 1.
Moral Issues that Involved Intuition and Deliberation
“He looks upset; what could it be; what should I say?”
“Did I handle the kids well enough? What would be better next time?”
“I don’t want to hurt her feelings; what do I do?”
“I’m feeling anxious. How do I keep that from affecting my caregiving?”
“This meeting is a waste of time. What can I do to make it worthwhile for
everyone?”
“Woops, I screwed that up. How do I make it up to them?”
“What’s the fairest way to distribute my limited time today?”
“I suppose I should stop over there and say hi, but I don’t feel like it.”
“Oh dear, another person needs my help but I have a deadline to meet.”
“I’m really mad at her but I promised I would call her.”
“How do I tell my boss that the workload is unfair?”
“I can’t believe I am expected to use my time this way. How can the system
be changed?”
Wrestling with these issues included a simultaneous assessment of
multiple factors: certainly my gut feelings, but also my principles (e.g.,
being a kind sister, being a fair child caregiver, doing excellent work, being
a team player, etc.); weighing my goals/needs and the goals/needs of others
in the circumstances; encouraging myself to be patient, loving and non-
judgmental; keeping track of reactions and outcomes (mine and others’);
and consciously letting go of conflicting (sometimes moral) goals. Instead
of intuition dominating the process, intuition danced with conscious
reasoning, taking turns doing the leading. At different times one or the
other provided energy and drive, or a moral compass. I played “moral
musical chairs” in terms of “feeling out” consequences of different
decisions. As Krebs and Denton (2005) point out, my deliberations did not
necessarily require postconventional reasoning in making choices.
Nevertheless, intuition and reasoning worked hand in hand as an iterative
process (much like social information processing is an iterative process
among conscious, pre-conscious, and post-conscious processes—see
Hassin, Uleman, & Bargh, 2005).
In fact, one might suggest that my reasoning process resembles
something of an internalized “common morality” approach to decision
making (Beauchamp & Childress, 1995; Gert, 2005) in which principles
and intuitions are integrated with the history, needs, and goals of local
circumstance. Particularities are taken into account in light of principled
goals, providing a unique response to each situation. Whereas Haidt and
Bjorklund say the real action lies in “gut feelings and moral emotions”
(p.6), I contend that the real action occurs in the iterative pattern among the
feelings, thoughts, drives and reactions in the particular circumstances.
Perhaps it is more appropriate to name this process practical wisdom, for it
requires applying the appropriate virtues in the right way for the particular
situation. Practical wisdom coordinates intuitions, reasoning and action
systems for the circumstances. These are applied automatically by those
with more experience (experts) but more deliberately, if at all, by non-
experts. The real work of moral decision making is found in practical
wisdom in action.
3. Human Moral Development Requires More Psychology
Haidt and Bjorklund’s explanation of moral development in
children can be criticized both from the perspective of developmental
psychology and from the perspective of neuroscience. In the view of Haidt
and Bjorklund, the child seems to be a relatively passive creature, subject to
the timed maturation of moral modules and the shaping of the cultural
environment (“morality is better described as emerging from the
children…on a particular developmental schedule [p.21];” “morality
requires guidance and examples from the local culture to externalize and
configure itself properly [ibid];” “each of the five moral modules matures at
a different point in development”). Genetic constraints and subsequent
maturation interact with cultural shaping to “externalize” moral modules
with a set of socially-constructed virtues, all of which apparently requires
little self-construction on the part of the individual. Contemporary
developmental psychologists emphasize ecological contextualism where
active individuals play leading roles in shaping their own development
within many arenas of interaction (e.g., Bransford, Brown, & Cocking,
1999; Lerner, 1998). Individuals interact with multiple social environments,
constructing understanding, building schemas and operations at a far
greater and faster pace than initially understood by the acknowledged
progenitor of developmental psychology, Jean Piaget. Moreover, a
developmental systems model accepts a biopsychosocial approach. The

Challenging the Social Intuitionist Model Page 3
social intuitionist model seems to include the biological and the social, but
not the psychological.
There is equal doubt from the perspective of affective
neuroscience. To propose the existence of modules in the human brain is a
common practice these days among evolutionary psychologists (e.g.,
Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). Unfortunately, such suggestions are more
rooted in creative thinking than in empirical evidence (Panksepp &
Panksepp, 2000). Although there is vast evidence for many specialized
neurodynamic units in subcortical structures of the brain that humans share
with other mammals, “there is no comparable evidence in support of highly
resolved genetically dictated adaptations that produce socio-emotional
cognitive strategies within the circuitry of the human neocortex” (Panksepp
& Panksepp, 2000, p. 111). Indeed, Haidt and Bjorklund do not cite
physiological evidence for their modularity theory. Nor does their theory
appear to have roots in what is known about mammalian brain circuitry,
which is hardwired with specialized functions.1 In contrast to subcortical
regions, the very plastic neocortex, rather than being set up with
genetically-wired adaptive functions, is specialized via experience
(Panksepp, 2005). The propensities that Haidt and Bjorklund describe
would better be described within the ecological contextualism of
developmental systems theory (Lerner, 1998) as experience-based units
formed as a result of the plasticity of the neocortex grounded within the
limits and propensities of subcortical adaptations (Panksepp, 1998).
It may be better to frame the development of automaticity in moral
judgment with the novice-to-expert paradigm, a paradigm nearly
universally accepted among cognitive researchers. Individuals start as
novices and develop towards expertise in most domains of life, including
morality (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1990; Bransford et al., 1999; Varela, 1995).
When there are no intuitions, as with a novice in a new domain,
performance can be ineffective. Novices are typically overwhelmed with
stimulation that they cannot sort out. In such situations, novices and
children (as universal novices) can appear dumbfounded. Their intuitions
are often wrong, demonstrating a lack of experience and inadequate
conceptualization. Ask novices for their intuitions about a set of wines,
poems or paintings and their answers will differ markedly from the experts
because they do not have the conceptual structures to perceive and interpret
the affordances and variability that experts perceive. Novices do not have
the sensibilities to notice excellence in the domain, for example, to
appreciate exquisite brushstrokes or feel the beauty in a sublime turn of
phrase. Novices will focus on the most concrete and superficial elements,
and often not realize what they missed.
Dreyfus (2005) suggests at least six levels of expertise
development. Novices initially memorize and follow rules. Only with
extensive practice and development of competencies do rules become
internalized and eventually surpassed in the expert. For example, the
“interview” transcript Haidt and Bjorklund present could be interpreted as
an attempt by the advanced beginner to figure out when and where the rules
apply because the rules have not yet been fully internalized as intuitions.
This intertwining of deliberative reasoning and intuition cultivation, with
increasing reliance on intuition, is the hallmark of expertise development.
Expert-education in a particular domain cultivates reasoning and
intuitions simultaneously. Immersion in the domain and theory are
presented together, to cultivate both intuitions and deliberative
understanding (Abernathy & Hamm, 1995). Through the course of
expertise training, perceptions are fine tuned and developed into chronically
accessed constructs; interpretive frameworks are learned and, with practice,
applied automatically; action schemas are honed to high levels of
automaticity (Hogarth, 2000). What is painfully rule-based as a novice
becomes, with vast experience, automatic and quick for an expert (Dreyfus
& Dreyfus, 1990).
Moral development occurs in a similar fashion (see Narvaez, 2005;
Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005). Moral expertise requires a whole host of
processes and action-schemes most easily described using Rest’s Four
Component Model (Narvaez & Rest, 1995; Rest, 1983). Those with more
expertise have more and better organized knowledge (declarative,
procedural, conditional) and are able to employ this knowledge more
effortlessly and skillfully. The four components of the model are described
in a logical order although they may influence one another in an iterative
fashion in any order. First, a person must notice a need or an opportunity
for moral action and employ the skills of ethical sensitivity primarily
through moral imagination (identifying key players, possible actions and
outcomes, possible reactions and results). This requires the iterative back
and forth interplay of intuition and other cognitions (e.g., perception,
attention, motivation, reason). Second, once the array of possibilities are
laid out, the actor must choose the most moral action by employing a set of
principles or rules or, with extensive practice to tune up automaticity, by
deciding intuitively which is the most moral choice. But this is not enough
either. Third, the actor must focus attentional resources and energy to seek
the goal, setting aside other concerns or interests. Chronic moral goal
setting becomes automatic. Yet this is still not enough for moral behavior to
take place. Fourth, the actor must implement the goal by taking the
necessary steps to complete the task and persevere to the end. The

Challenging the Social Intuitionist Model Page 4
successful completion of these four processes (ethical sensitivity, ethical
judgment, ethical focus, ethical action) result in an ethical behavior. Failure
is possible at any point due to weaknesses in particular skills and other
factors such as competing moral goals. The mismatch between intuition and
reason may thwart an ethical action, but so too may other misfirings or
inadequate skill deployment.
In summary, moral development is an active process. The
individual acts on the environment and responds to environmental
influences based on cultural and psychological factors and biological
propensities. Individuals build moral expertise through social experience,
particularly peer relations and with guidance from the more experienced
(Piaget, 1932/1965). Individuals construct cognitive-affective-action
schemas that become more complex and sophisticated with more relevant
experience (Rest et al., 1999) and are shaped by the particularities of their
experience. Human moral development is proactive and autopoetic
(Juarrero, 1999; Varela, 1999).
4. Enculturation and Moral Development Are Not Equivalent
The social-intuitionist theory seems to operate outside of one of the
most critical discussions in the history of moral development research. In
the early years of the cognitive developmental tradition there was a
distinction made between social conformity and moral development
(Kohlberg, 1969). This distinction was necessary in order to explain how
in some situations (e.g., Germany in the 1930s) social conformity worked
against moral development, and in others, resisting social pressures (U.S.
Civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s) was the virtuous path. Thus
it is shocking to read Haidt & Bjorklund assert that “a fully enculturated
person is a virtuous person” (p. 29). Apparently Hitler youth and Pol Pot’s
Khmer Rouge were virtuous and most moral exemplars are not. Much like
the behaviorists and psychoanalysts did before the cognitive revolution and
Kohlberg’s achievements, Haidt and Bjorklund praise moral
conventionality. Kohlberg’s enterprise was to fight the acceptance of
relativism that pervaded psychology from its inception. Although it may be
an open question whether psychological theory should be judged on
whether it gives aid or comfort to ethical relativism, it is startling to see
mere conventionality held up as the goal of moral formation.
Haidt and Bjorklund give no indication that they believe that
intuitions can be flawed or wrong. Samenow (1984) points out the
distinctive intuitions of the criminal mind, which focus on finding personal
advantage at the expense of others in every situation. The intuitions of the
criminal mind are not “good” intuitions. But how does social intuitionist
theory judge the goodness or badness of particular intuitions? Intuitions
appear to be (equally) meritorious, as are all cultural practices, if they
conform with the norms of one’s social group (“full enculturation”). This is
precisely the attitude that drove Kohlberg to mount his research program—
how to support the law-breaking behavior of Martin Luther King, Jr., and
condemn the law-abiding behavior of the Nazi soldier. If one understands
cultural influences as those influences to which youth are most exposed,
enculturation today means becoming a good consumer, a celebrity groupie,
and a materialist. Self interest is cultivated more than moral citizenship.
This is a situation that many are beginning to lament because it does not
lead to psychological or community flourishing (e.g., Kasser, 2002; Linn,
2004).
Conclusion
Haidt and Bjorklund have initiated a substantial and important
conversation about the nature of moral development and decision making.
They are to be commended for pushing us to incorporate recent data and
insights into moral psychological theory in an effort to make theory more
true to life. I agree with many of their points. For example, I concur that
intuition and automaticity are more intelligent than they are credited for and
that a naturalized ethics is fundamental to moral philosophizing. We should
appreciate their efforts at highlighting the role of intuition and affect, but
note that there may be better ways of incorporating such insights into a
more theoretically robust moral psychology.
Footnote
1 Panksepp and Panksepp (2000, p. 119) suggest that if evolutionary
psychology wants to propose modules, it should start with the dedicated
circuitry found in mammalian brains for care, fear, lust, panic, play, and
rage.

Challenging the Social Intuitionist Model Page 5
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