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Visions of freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the struggle for southern Africa, 1976-1991
Abstract
During the final fifteen years of the Cold War, southern Africa underwent a period of upheaval, with dramatic twists and turns in relations between the superpowers. Americans, Cubans, Soviets, and Africans fought over the future of Angola, where tens of thousands of Cuban soldiers were stationed, and over the decolonization of Namibia, Africa's last colony. Beyond lay the great prize: South Africa. Piero Gleijeses uses archival sources, particularly from the United States, South Africa, and the closed Cuban archives, to provide an unprecedented international history of this important theater of the late Cold War. These sources all point to one conclusion: by humiliating the United States and defying the Soviet Union, Fidel Castro changed the course of history in southern Africa. It was Cuba's victory in Angola in 1988 that forced Pretoria to set Namibia free and helped break the back of apartheid South Africa. In the words of Nelson Mandela, the Cubans "destroyed the myth of the invincibility of the white oppressor. . . [and] inspired the fighting masses of South Africa.". © 2013 The University of North Carolina Press. All rights reserved.
... P.W. Botha further spearheaded this initiative at a meeting that took place in Carlton Centre, Johannesburg on the 22 nd of November 1979. Gleijeses (2013) asserts that the South African apartheid government envisioned that members of the CONSAS would be anti-communist, lenient of the apartheid regime and keen to oppress the ANC and the South-West Africa People Organization (SWAPO). His (P.W. ...
The study aimed at understanding expert opinion on the linkage between hegemonic states and regional integration, the benefits of post-apartheid regional integration, South Africa’s socio-economic and political efforts in the region and whether the country’s post-1994 foreign policy had been beneficial to regional integration. A panel of experts with immense expertise in regional foreign policy and integration were consulted. Structured interviews were used to collect data from this sample. The collected data were analysed through thematic content analysis. From the analysis, five major themes emerged. These were: Theme 1, the Perceived link between regional powers and regional integration; Theme 2, Regional integration under post-1994 leaders; Theme 3, South Africa’s foreign policy processes and tools within the region; Theme 4, Regional integration and foreign policy: successes, benefits and failures and Theme 5, Recommendations on the regional integration role. Under these themes, it was noted that regional leaders generally led regional integration although lesser powers also had an impact on its formation and perpetuation. It was also found that South Africa’s foreign policy has been highly dynamic with different presidents putting different emphases on regional integration and most energy towards the process having been put under President Mbeki’s tenure. South Africa’s main tool in regional integration was described as diplomacy-based soft power. South Africa had been of considerable economic and political stability benefit to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region although the country did not get much out of the region and was under constant criticism for its perceived hegemonic stance. The study recommended a focus on regionalism rather than hegemony, putting more emphasis on economic integration and taking into consideration the wills of other countries within their regions of interest.
... Cuando en virtud de este ideario Estados Unidos entró en la guerra de Vietnam, hasta los realistas políticos más conocidos, como Morgenthau, criticaron no la forma de hacer la guerra, sino la guerra misma (Podhoretz, 1982, p. 105). Al final de la guerra Estados Unifos falló en su tarea de contener el comunismo y la URSS intentó extenderse por África y Asia, pero también fracasó su deseo de dominio permanente (Gleijeses, 2013). ...
Este artículo tiene como objetivo principal comprender el concepto y la experiencia de la guerra fría en Sudamérica en los años sesenta y setenta del siglo XX –dado que fue en el Cono Sur en donde se desarrollaron con más eficacia los regímenes llamados de Seguridad Nacional– y, al mismo tiempo, penetrar en el modo en que esos regímenes crearon un tipo de Estado de carácter netamente militar. Para este trabajo se ha inspeccionado documentación y fuentes orales en distintos lugares –Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Israel–, durante varios años, con fines diversos, ligados todos ellos al estudio del fenómeno militar y, tras el análisis de parte de esa información para este artículo, se concluye que, en la guerra total y permanente contra el comunismo, la autoridad del Estado militar, fundado en origen para proteger del autoritarismo a la sociedad civil, se volvió despótica y el Estado deificado, tiránico.
... 130 FAPLA's elite forces, comprising four reinforced brigades of 11 400 men, plus 62 Soviet military advisers, as well as SA-8 and SA-13 surface-to-air missiles, 80 tanks and artillery would make up the attacking forces. 131 The 16 th and 21 st brigades would move east from Cuito Cuanavale and then head south and towards Mavinga. 132 The 47 th and 59 th brigades would move south and south-east respectively towards Mavinga. ...
assessment of the final military phase of South Africa’s border war in southern Angola from 1987 to 1988 in terms of victory or defeat is not without controversy. The mobile engagements on the Lomba between the South Africans (in support of UNITA) and the Angolan armed forces (FAPLA), saw a clear victory for the SADF when assessed in terms of achievement of objectives, equipment captured and destroyed as well as enemy casualties. South Africa’s offensive manoeuvres on the Chambinga River - particularly regarding the Angolan 16th Brigade as more recent information indicates - were also successful in inflicting significant losses of men and equipment and damaging morale. However, once the SADF switched from mobile warfare – which allowed it to effectively engage the Angolans who had superior numbers – to positional warfare against larger numbers of Angolan and Cuban forces in well-prepared and defended positions at Tumpo opposite Cuito Cuanavale, the picture changed. Tumpo can thus be regarded as a stalemate. South Africa had achieved its objective of preventing UNITA’s annihilation and inflicted sufficient losses on FAPLA. But it had not managed to completely dislodge the Angolan and Cuban forces from the east bank of the Cuito River.
... An exception is Piero Gleijeses' magisterial volumes on relations between Havana, Pretoria, and Washington. 52 But given that the bulk of the literature focuses attention on the role of the South African army and treats other actors as incidental to the story, there is a need to be wary of promoting South African exceptionalism. ...
South Africa’s Apartheid Wars had a profound effect on shaping the postcolonial landscape of the region, as well as the country itself. This much is evident from the difficulties encountered by the liberation movements in making the transition to government. The armed struggle and the experience of exile left a deep imprint on these movements and shaped them as political organizations. They have not been able to divest themselves of internal hierarchical structures, as well as intolerant and authoritarian tendencies. On the other hand, the counterrevolutionary war waged by the apartheid state’s security nexus delayed decolonization and shaped the political culture considerably. The militarization of South African society undermined civil-military relations, contributed to a legacy of corruption in the defense sector, and proved detrimental to the practices of governance.
The integration of the armed formations of the state and the liberation movements into new national armies were fraught processes. Reconciliation became the byword in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa, but only the latter established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as an exercise in nation-building. However, cohesion and consensus remain elusive as the fault lines of colonial and apartheid society are still very much in evidence. Moreover, the governments of the region harbor resentment about South Africa’s dominance of the region and remain suspicious of its intentions. Therefore, relations between these states, and groups within them, are still prickly. The conflicts might be over but the countries of the region are still having to deal with contestations over their remembrance and commemoration.
... Die ooreenkomste het die weg gebaan vir ʼn vreedsame afsluiting van die sogenaamde Suidwes-kwessie. 56 ...
In addition to securing the União Nacional para a Independêcia Total de Angola (UNITA) strongholds at Mavinga and Jamba, Operations Modular, Hooper and Packer (1987-1988) also intended to destroy all Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola (FAPLA) brigades east of the Cuito River, or to drive them to the west across the river. During operations Modular and Hooper the South African Defence Force (SADF)-UNITA allies succeeded in effectively stopping the advance of the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) allies. The primary objective to destroy all FAPLA brigades east of the Cuito River or to drive them across the river at least, could not fully be realised, however. During Operation Hooper, two failed attacks were launched on Tumpo within the scope of about two weeks - each time from the same direction or line of advance. This article focuses on the third and final South African Defence Force (SADF)-UNITA attack on Tumpo and the claim by Colonel Jan Breytenbach, former commander of 32 Battalion, that "By early the next morning they had driven the 25th Brigade from their positions and taken Tumpu . This clearly demonstrated that well planned, well led and well coordinated night attacks by well trained infantary seldom fail." The task of launching a third attempt to conquer Tumpo would be undertaken by elements of citizen force units, 32 Battalion and four UNITA infantry battalions under the command of 82 South African Mechanised Brigade (SA Mech Bde). The citizen force units in question were Regiment Mooi River, Regiment President Steyn, Regiment De la Rey, Regiment Great Karoo, Regiment Potchefstroom University, 44 Parachute Brigade, 13 Field Engineering Regiment, 19 Rocket Regiment and 7 Anti-Aircraft Regiment. The maximum number of UNITA infantry had to join the attack, mainly to draw fire, to identify targets and to restrict SADF losses to the minimum. To justify the continued battle, the SADF provided five reasons to leadership and troops: The MPLA was illegally in power in Angola; Angola was used as a firm base by the Union of Socialist Sowjet Republics (USSR) to fight against the Republic of South Africa (RSA) and South West Africa (SWA); the USSR supported the MPLA and the ANC; and UNITA served as a buffer zone for attacks against SWA and therefore the SADF was indirectly fighting for UNITA and directly for the RSA. It would also give the SADF an opportunity to test new weaponry. Several dominant factors, however, led to the failure of the third attack on Tumpo: A lack of creative thinking, by repeating almost exactly the same plan of attack and line of advance of the failed second attack on Tumpo; the lack of an informed logistics system (e.g. shortage of diesel and mechanical readiness of vehicles and equipment); well-entrenched and well-equipped MPLA forces; inadequate intelligence (especially regarding the second minefield); almost impassable sandy and forested terrain; unmanned observer posts; largely insufficient preparation and training of citizen force units; the tension and lack of trust between citizen force units and SADF permanent force officers; and international pressure to withdraw from Angola. The morale of the SADF-UNITA troops reached a low after the third failed attempt. The MPLA morale, in contrast, was particularly high, after successfully defending Tumpo and seizing three SADF tanks. The tanks which were abandoned by the SADF, had strong propaganda value for the MPLA forces. One of the tanks was towed to 25 Battalion's positions while the others were protected by positions to prevent the SADF forces from reaching them. Foreign journalists were even flown in to view the SADF tanks. In addition, amplified broadcasting was used to announce far and wide that the three tanks were in FAPLA hands and that an Afrikaans-speaking SADF soldier was captured. As in previous operations, the SADF did not realise the importance of psychological debriefing. Many traumatised SADF soldiers suffered from post-traumatic stress, which put a damper on their vitality. UNITA suffered serious personnel losses, especially the troops who had moved with the tanks. In addition, many soldiers of the two UNITA battalions who attacked on the western bank, died in action. In contrast, the SADF forces suffered no losses. The objective to minimise SADF losses through the maximum utilisation of UNITA troops, was therefore fully realised.
Since 1994, as the ruling party in South Africa, the ANC have become synonymous with and indivisible from the fight against apartheid rule. This has left little space for competing accounts, visions, and political projects to find their appropriate place in the historical narrative. In this innovative book, Toivo Asheeke moves beyond these well-trodden histories, to tell the previously neglected story of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), a militant revolutionary nationalist wing of the anti-colonial struggle. Using archival sources from four countries and interviews with former veterans of the movement, Asheeke explores the BCM's engagement with guerrilla warfare, community feminism and Black Internationalism. Uncovering the personal and political histories of those who have previously received scant scholarly attention, Asheeke both illuminates the history of Africa's decolonization struggle and that of the wider Cold War.
This article highlights Tanzania’s role in global decolonisation by combining personal stories rooted in everyday life with political and pedagogical accounts of experiments in African socialism. The Dar es Salaam school of scholars and activists developed into an epicentre of productive and fraught debates that continue to offer us lessons today. By paying close attention to the stories these thinkers tell, and by situating them in the context of both political events and quotidian experiences, we can further uncover what Fanon called the “grandeur and weakness” of anti-colonial praxis. Gendering these syntheses of red and black internationalisms also contributes a perspective rooted in a more radical democratic politics, productively extending this decolonial genealogy into our present conjuncture.
Explaining Caribbean foreign policy with reference to the literature
Yugoslavia’s military internationalism was one of the most practical expressions of the country’s policy of nonalignment. Beginning with Algeria in the 1950s until its demise in the 1990s, Yugoslavia was an ardent supporter of liberation movements and revolutionary governments in Africa and Asia. This article argues that Yugoslav military internationalism was at the heart of Yugoslavia’s efforts to reshape the post-1945 global order and represented an extension of Yugoslav revolution abroad. Military aid was an expression of personal identification of Yugoslavia’s “greatest generation” with decolonization struggle. However, Yugoslav military aid to other countries went beyond a single foreign policy issue. Yugoslav military internationalism touched upon many other issues that included problems related to finances, economic development, the acquisition and transfer of military technology, relations with the superpowers, national security, ideology and politics, and prestige and status in global affairs. By the end of the 1970s, with the departure of the World War II generation and the looming economic crisis, Yugoslav military involvement in the Global South became increasingly driven by economic reasons. Former Yugoslav republics, after a short hiatus in the 1990s during the wars for Yugoslavia’s succession, are still present in the arms trade in the Global South.
This dissertation analyzes the creation and cultivation of the movement to oppose South African apartheid in the United States. The anti-apartheid movement is frequently cited as one of the most successful protest movements of the twentieth century, both because of its scale as well as its success in enacting sanctions against South Africa despite a number of considerable obstacles. Less attention has been paid to how the anti-apartheid movement in the United States cultivated such a broad following. It would be a mistake to assume that because most people found apartheid to be morally repugnant, a movement capable of effectively lobbying the U.S. government was a historical inevitability. The dissertation analyzes the transnational dimensions of the anti-apartheid movement to study how a national constituency was built. This analysis opens up facets of the anti-apartheid movement in the United States, namely its local and grassroots dimensions, as well as the ways in which transnational actors shaped national committees. This analytical approach reveals that opposition to apartheid was cast in a variety of ways: opposition to racism, critiques of global capitalism, organized labor struggles, anti-nuclear proliferation, and peace activism were all different facets of the U.S. anti-apartheid movement during its existence. The significance of this analysis shows how the movement was sustained for a long period of time, how it succeeded, and the legacy of the anti-apartheid movement today.
This chapter examines the scholarship of the Cold War in sub‐Saharan Africa. It begins by giving a brief overview of the African policies of each U.S. presidential administration during the Cold War. It then examines the literature on a number of specific events, including the independence of the Congo, U.S. support for South Africa, and the 1970s Cold War crises in southern Africa and the Horn of Africa. It takes into consideration not only U.S. foreign relations, but also the policies of the United States' enemies and allies, before concluding with some thoughts about potential lines of future inquiry.
A number of South African Defence Force (SADF) veterans have undertaken trips to the erstwhile Angolan battlefields of the so-called ‘Border War’ (1966–1989) in recent years. This paper proposes to examine two projects by SADF veterans who returned to Angola. The first involved the making of a film called My Heart of Darkness that records the journey of former paratrooper Marius van Niekerk who returned to Angola in 2007 in search of redemption from his shameful memories relating to his role in the war. The second is a more recent trip to Angola by a number of SADF veterans who initiated joint ventures and sourced investment to provide employment for Angolan veterans. Such initiatives are framed as exercises in reconciliation between former enemies who celebrate a new-found camaraderie occasioned by their common histories as soldiers. The paper conceives of SADF veterans as ‘transnational agents’ who have crossed borders so as to promote co-operation rather than dwell on past ideological and political differences. It argues that the informal initiatives by SADF veterans might be regarded as attempts to make amends for the absence of formal institutional ones by South Africa and that these ventures have been undertaken in lieu of admissions of culpability for the damage inflicted upon Angola by the defunct apartheid army.
There are issues of critical importance to the Black world that will be illustrated by reviewing some of the work of Gerald Horne and Charles Mills. This is an opening shot in what may be a long campaign. It is an initial note as many of the issues will deserve fuller explanation and that will require more time. However as the issues are pertinent to almost all scholarly activity in the Black world it is important that a bugle call be sounded immediately and that other scholars and activists be alerted to the issues.
This article explores the humanitarian and geopolitical rationale behind the decision of President Gerald R. Ford in placing the power and prestige of the United States, for the first time, in actively seeking an end to minority control in Rhodesia. This article specifically highlights the importance of Ford’s morality and belief in racial equality combined with the changing Cold War realities, specifically the growth of Cuban and Soviet power in southern Africa, as the major influences shaping presidential decision making. Rhodesia, given its unique legal status as an unrecognized nation and as part of the global “periphery” offered a great deal of flexibility to the White House in shaping policy. This article, therefore, not only illuminates an area of policy that has previously been somewhat overlooked by academic scholarship but further offers a deeper understanding of the Ford administration’s broader approach to foreign policy.
The discussion begins with a brief historical overview of racial oppression and exploitation in South Africa, including the period of apartheid. The critical role played by the bureaucracy in realizing the National Party’s vision for a racially separated and white dominated South Africa is explained. The discussion then shifts to the apartheid bureaucracy’s formal structure, demographic character, values and norms, and capacity and performance. This descriptive analysis sheds light on why successive ANC governments have sought to reform the public service, and in particular, to transform it into a representative bureaucracy. The apartheid bureaucracy presents a paradox: while it possessed impressive capabilities and achieved notable successes, it was also plagued by chronic deficiencies that limited its efficiency and effectiveness and necessitated major administrative reforms.
p style="margin: 0cm 0cm 10pt;"> Republika Namibii ogłosiła niepodległość w 1990 r., po ponad 25 latach wojny o wyzwolenie spod południowoafrykańskiej dominacji. Tożsamość młodego narodu wykuwała się jednak znacznie wcześniej, a jeden z najważniejszych elementów budowania wspólnoty, która zawierała się w haśle SWAPO „jedna Namibia, jeden człowiek, jeden naród”, stanowiły obozy dla cywilnych uchodźców i oddziałów partyzanckich Ludowej Wyzwoleńczej Armii Namibii (PLAN), znajdujące się w Angoli, Zambii i Tanzanii. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest wskazanie kluczowych momentów w historii namibijskich obozów w Angoli, wybranych elementów ich funkcjonowania oraz roli, jaką odegrały w dziejach młodego państwa i jego mieszkańców. </p
This article traces the experiences of Angolan students who attended East German institutions of higher education between Angolan independence and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Based on oral histories collected in Luanda from twenty-one returned Angolan students in 2015, triangulated with archival material from Angola and the GDR, it argues that students negotiated between accommodation and resistance in their everyday life at the university and beyond. Conscious of the importance of academic success and adaptation to the East German learning culture, Angolan students drew a line when regulations infringed on their personal freedom and responded by engaging East German officials in discussion or simply by circumnavigating the rules. The life history of a female student illustrates how she negotiated between responsibility to formal learning and personal needs within a controlling society. When one considers the conditions of Angolan student life in East Germany as a whole, it becomes apparent that the East German notion of the model foreign student did not map onto the complexities of Angolan student lives. This article sheds light on the student migration of a generation of Angolan post-independence technocrats, many of whom studied in the former East during the Cold War. Through the eyes of Angolan educational migrants, we see the limits and possibilities of the lives of foreign students in the GDR.
This thesis proposes to remedy some of the theoretical lacunae surrounding the topic of strategic culture by reconceptualising it in a way that is compatible with existing expected utility models of executive choice. Current theorising regarding strategic culture has been paralysed by an ongoing debate between the first and third generations of strategic culture theorists and by the persistent inability of scholars to provide a predictive framework based on the concept - meaning that it is unable to operate as anything other than a residual variable. The hypothesis of this thesis is that conceptualising strategic culture using Thomas Schelling’s concept of a focal point permits us to sidestep some of the theoretical debates that have divided rationalists and theorists of strategic culture by allowing culture to be grafted on to a rational actor model of executive choice in a way that is progressive rather than degenerative. In order to test this theory, the thesis develops and subsequently tests the idea of a liberal strategic culture, utilising both the congruence method and within case process tracing to demonstrate the external validity of the theory being developed. The cases chosen span American administrations from the Cold War to the contemporary era and demonstrate the utility of a re conceptualised model of strategic culture across a range of geopolitical and domestic contexts.
Based on ethnographic research conducted in Beirut’s southern suburbs (Dahiye) and northern Lebanon (Akkar) between 2011 and 2013, this chapter advances a critical reflection on humanitarian lifeworlds in Lebanon and their encounters with war-stricken local citizens and refugees. Defining Southism as a structural relationship that cements the ‘global South’ as the key symbolic capital of Northern empowerment, accountability and capability, the chapter discusses the attitudes and thinking that have characterised the Lebanese humanitarian economy during the Israel–Lebanon July 2006 war and the Syrian refugee influx into Lebanon from 2011. While it defines ‘epistemic failure’ and ‘material discrimination’ as the actual encounters between humanitarian providers and their beneficiaries, this chapter proposes that ‘humanitarian tourism’, ‘politics of blame’, and the ‘betrayal of the international community’ represent the local and refugee imaginary encounters with global humanitarian lifeworlds. With the purpose of problematising ethnic and political geographies in provider–recipient power relations, it finally theorises a de-geographicised notion of Southism that can better capture the complex role of international and local humanitarian workers in crisis settings, as well as the ad hoc relevance of nationality within humanitarian economies.
Spośród wielu sporów istniejących między Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Związkiem Sowieckim w czasie zimnej wojny jednymi z trwających najdłużej była wojna o niepodległość Namibii i wojna domowa w Angoli, w literaturze traktowane niekiedy jako jeden konflikt, nazywany południowoafrykańską wojną o granice. Walka Namibijczyków o wolność trwała od 1966 r., jednak 20 lat później wciąż nie było widać perspektyw szybkiego zakończenia konfliktu. Przełom nastąpił w latach 1987–1988 dzięki seriom spotkań i negocjacji, jakie odbyły się między administracją prezydenta USA Ronalda Reagana i sekretarza generalnego KPZS Michaiła Gorbaczowa. Dla rozwiązania kwestii Namibii kluczowym rokiem był 1988 dzięki podpisaniu w Nowym Jorku grudniowych porozumień między władzami Angoli, Kuby i RPA. Rok później rozpoczęto realizację Rezolucji Rady Bezpieczeństwa ONZ nr 435, a wojska południowoafrykańskie zaczęły stopniowo opuszczać terytorium Namibii. Artykuł ma na celu wskazać najważniejsze aspekty negocjacji między USA i ZSRS w sprawie Namibii w latach 1987–1988, głównie przed szczytem i w czasie jego trwania (Moskwa, przełom maja i czerwca 1988 r.).
This chapter examines the contours of how African nations and liberation movements encountered and manipulated Cold War interests on the African continent from the early 1960s to the late 1970s. It focuses on three main case studies: the first Congo Crisis during and after the decolonization of the Congo from 1960 to 1965; the competition between the Soviet Union, the United States, and China for influence in the late decolonization of southern Africa in the 1970s and 1980s; and the shifting alliances between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa during the 1970s. These case studies are used to contextualize a broader assessment of the high costs of Cold War interventions and proxy wars in terms of human lives lost and the promotion of authoritarian leadership in much of the continent.
As historical interest and scrutiny has grown over the diplomatic history of the Rhodesian crisis from the mid-1970s to independence in 1980, the bulk of historical attention has been focused on the two big conferences in this period, the Geneva talks in October–December 1976, and the Lancaster House talks in September–December 1979. This article examines the shifting contours of Anglo-American negotiations with the leaders of the Zimbabwean Patriotic Front (Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe), the Front Line State presidents, the South African government and the UDI government of Ian Smith in this important period between Geneva and Lancaster House. This article begins by examining the rivalry between Nkomo and Mugabe. In doing so, it sees their suspicions of, and participation in, the Anglo-American talks in these three years as being part of their own competition and rivalry to become the leader of a future independent Zimbabwe. The article then examines attempts by the Nigerians and the British to circumvent the Anglo-American talks to press for a direct settlement between Smith and the Patriotic Front in August 1978. The sources for this article are primarily from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Rhodesia Office files.
As southern Africa became deeply embroiled in the Cold War after the decolonisation of Angola and Mozambique in 1975, President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania emerged as a key actor in the international diplomatic efforts aimed at bringing Rhodesia to independence. This article, based on Tanzanian, British and American archival sources, analyses the role played by President Nyerere within the context of the Anglo-American initiative for Rhodesia of 1976. In doing so, it sheds new light on the ambiguities surrounding Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy in southern Africa and the factors that brought about the failure of the Geneva Conference (October and December 1976). Furthermore, the article also argues that Nyerere introduced important changes to the diplomatic initiative for Rhodesia set in motion by the British and American governments with the cooperation of South Africa. Afraid of a repetition of the Victoria Falls fiasco and fearing a civil war among the liberation movements, Nyerere insisted on the need for the British government to call a constitutional conference and to play an active role during Rhodesia’s transition to independence. However, together with Great Britain’s hesitancy, a leadership crisis within the Zimbabwe African National Union took Nyerere by surprise and delayed the negotiations in Geneva. When, finally, the British government advanced new proposals for Rhodesia’s transitional government, the parties refused to support them, sealing the fate of the Geneva Conference.
The long legacy of distrust between Cuba and the United States may be the most significant problem the two countries confront in trying to build on the foundation they constructed in reestablishing normal diplomatic relations. Indeed, distrust continued to envelop their engagement in 2015 and 2016 despite both countries’ intention to develop a normal relationship. This article examines the historic sources of distrust on which each country focuses, the ways in which they attempted to build trust after December 2014, and the continuing sources of distrust that must be overcome in order to make the movement toward normalization irreversible.
Reagan's engagement with Africa presents a curious blend: a historical topic that receives more and more attention (Reagan) blends with a topic that has struggled to enter the historical conversation (Africa). During the Reagan presidency Africa, and particularly apartheid South Africa, was very much a part of the contemporary conversation. Reagan consistently spoke against apartheid, remarking that it was not something with which Americans could be comfortable. Nevertheless, in these years he also made plain his opposition to economic sanctions against South Africa, arguing that American companies provided jobs and elevated employment practices and pay in South Africa. The Reagan administration in southern Africa experienced major issues, including the ongoing post-independence struggles in Angola and Mozambique and the continuing struggle for independence in Namibia. In Africa the Cold War raged internationally while domestically President Reagan faced some of his sharpest criticism and worst defeats.
This project outlines and assesses Canadian relations with Cuba, with particular respect to the issue of Cuban engagement in the Angolan civil war and the impact of the U.S. on the bilateral Canadian-Cuban relationship. It takes a comparative approach, examining the key periods of 1975-1976 (the dispatch of Cuban troops to Angola) and 1989-1991 (the withdrawal of Cuban troops), to analyze the trajectory of Canadian foreign policy on the issue of Cuban engagement with Angola and to connect this to larger questions relating to Canada’s role as a middle power, peacekeeping nation and its relationship with the United States.
It argues that Canadian-Cuban relations have been, and still are, symbolic of the desire of Canada not to be viewed as dependent on the United States; but, when Cuban involvement in the Angolan civil war conflicted with Canadian efforts to be seen as a constructive middle power in the international community, relations with Cuba had to be drawn back in order to preserve Canada’s peacekeeping role and bilateral relations with the U.S.
Throughout the different Canadian Prime Ministers, Canadian-Cuban relations were pursued despite American objections to the matter. The extent to which this was done had to do with the respective Prime Minister.
Britain, America, and the Special Relationship since 1941 examines the Anglo-American strategic and military relationship that developed during the Second World War and continued until recent years. Forged on a common ground of social, cultural, and ideological values as well as political expediency, this partnership formed the basis of the western alliance throughout the Cold War, playing an essential part in bringing stability to the post-1945 international order. Clearly written and chronologically organised, the book begins by discussing the origins of the ‘Special Relationship’ and its progression from uneasy coexistence in the eighteenth century to collaboration at the start of the Second World War. McKercher explores the continued evolution of this partnership during the conflicts that followed, such as the Suez Crisis, the Vietnam War, and the Falklands War. The book concludes by looking at the developments in British and American politics during the past two decades and analysing the changing dynamics of this alliance over the course of its existence. Illustrated with maps and photographs and supplemented by a chronology of events and list of key figures, this is an essential introductory resource for students of the political history and foreign policies of Britain and the United States in the twentieth century.
In this review article certain aspects of the history of the War for Southern Africa of 1966 to 1989, as well as its consequences, are evaluated critically by looking at three recent publications on interrelated topics. The most controversial of the three publications deals with the highly-classified operations conducted from 1978 to 1988 by the South African Special Forces in Angola and Mozambique - with invaluable assistance provided by the South African Navy. The second book focuses on the war in Angola in the years 1975 to 1989, looking at the conflict from the South African, Russian, Cuban and East German point of view, and also includes an invaluable list of sources that deal with the war. The third book explores, inter alia, the impact that the years of conflict had (and still have) on South African society and culture. These three publications form part of the continued outpouring of books on the years of struggle in southern Africa, but are of a much higher standard than some of the many popular works of recent years.
(TAKEN FROM THE INTRODUCTION): The Cold War made way for new standards of foreign intervention in the name of national security to be set. As a Cold War superpower, the United States took the task of containing Communism upon itself, and used the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as a method of controlling how events abroad unfolded ... American involvement [in Angola] went ahead regardless of its unpopularity as was insisted on by the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Even though those within the CIA were trying to deter Kissinger, Kissinger’s insistence on countering any Soviet move around the globe to show American dominance in the post-Vietnam and Cold War contexts led to unnecessary and damaging CIA involvement in the Angolan civil war. All of this was happening while Kissinger was travelling around the world; meeting Mao in China, stopping in Indonesia, and making his way through Europe. This illustrates a relative disconnect between Kissinger and his interest in Angola via the CIA, as he was busy making other diplomatic moves. Yet, this did not stop him from trying his hand at a putting forth a covert paramilitary operation in Angola in 1975.
In light of the broader American historical contexts of Watergate, the Vietnam Syndrome, and the Year of Intelligence, Kissinger’s failure in Angola offers a dynamic case study of how different levels of American government interact with one another. Ultimately, Kissinger’s
interest in dominating American foreign policy was self-defeating, and his efforts to pursue covert action in the Angolan Civil War brought forward tensions between branches and within executive bureaucracies, and eventual American failure in Angola.
The use of surrogate or ‘proxy’ actors within the context of ‘irregular’ or guerrilla conflict within or between states constitutes a phenomenon spanning nearly the whole of recorded human military history. Yet it is a phenomenon that has also acquired urgent contemporary relevance in the light of the general evolution of conflict in Ukraine and the current Middle East. This introduction to a special issue on the theme investigates some potentially important new avenues to studying the phenomenon in the light of these trends.
Cuba’s long military commitment to Angola resulted in two great victories that saved the country from catastrophic defeat and in the end initiated profound regional change. But long warfare also helped to entrench a heavy, elitist authoritarianism which served as a platform for deep presidentialist corruption. An ‘oiligarchy’ enjoys great wealth while simultaneously ignoring the basic needs of the people.
Conference Paper presented at the African Studies Association meeting, San Diego, 19-21 November 2015 on the state of research on and study of the history of the South African liberation struggle. The paper examines research outputs by South African academics and the relevance given to the history of the liberation struggle at South African universities.
April 25th, 1980. President Jimmy Carter was under siege at home and abroad. Inflation had risen to almost 20 percent, and unemployment was more than 7 percent. Americans sat in lines at gas pumps. Pummeled from the Left by Senator Edward Kennedy and from the Right by Ronald Reagan, Carter saw his quest for a second term foundering. The shah of Iran had been overthrown, the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan, the Sandinistas had seized power in Nicaragua, and fifty-two Americans sat captive in Tehran. It was, as Walter Cronkite told his viewers, “Day 175 of America held hostage.”, At seven o’clock that morning, the president addressed the nation. “Late yesterday,” he explained, looking exhausted and grim, “I cancelled a carefully planned operation which was underway in Iran to …rescue … American hostages, who have been held captive there since November 4.” The photographs of the crumpled hulks of US helicopters in the Iranian desert seared deep into the American psyche. They seemed to illustrate the absolute collapse of US power and prowess. The photographs resonated – a helicopter framed the disgraced Richard M. Nixon as he waved farewell on the White House lawn in August 1974; helicopters lifted the last, defeated Americans from the roof of the US Embassy in Saigon in April 1975; and the insistent rhythm of chopper blades suffused the memory of the war in Vietnam, constructed by movies like Apocalypse Now.
Lars Schoultz offers a comprehensive chronicle of U.S. policy toward the Cuban Revolution. Using a rich array of documents and firsthand interviews with U.S. and Cuban officials, he tells the story of the attempts and failures of ten U.S. administrations to end the Cuban Revolution. He concludes that despite the overwhelming advantage in size and power that the United States enjoys over its neighbor, the Cubans' historical insistence on their right to self-determination has been a constant thorn in the side of American administrations, influenced both U.S. domestic politics and foreign policy on a much larger stage, and resulted in a freeze in diplomatic relations of unprecedented longevity. © 2009 The University of North Carolina Press. All rights reserved.
A description and analysis of the transition from white Rhodesia to black Zimbabwe in the brief but crucial period between 1974 and 1979, placing the process within the context of the decoloniaztion of Southern Africa, taking up the story after the Portuguese colonial abdication in the wake of the Lisbon coup. The withdrawal of the Portuguese radically altered the stalemate in Rhodesia, and the process of decolonization became both more intensive - military and diplomatic strategies were much more energetically pursued - and more comprehensive, as existing external participants became more involved, and new ones entered the scene. The crisis ceased to be predominantly a black-white domestic confrontation. The author employs the analytical concept of a conflict system with equally active domestic, regional and international actors. Close attention is given to the complex and intensive set of interactions within the conflict system which gave it its volatile and dynamic qualities. In accounting for the failure to secure a peaceful resolution to the Rhodesian conflict in the Victoria Falls Bridge conference in 1975 and the Geneva conference in 1976-77, and for the success of the Lancaster House conference in 1979, the concept of "ripeness of conflict' is employed. The author argues that only the combination of successful conference management and highly favourable circumstances secured a peaceful and successful resolution to the Rhodesian crisis. -M.Amos
This article examines the considerable efforts made by some Namibians (notably the 'Breaking the Wall of Silence' committee) throughout the 1990s to keep alive the issue of the Swapo leadership's alleged abuses of power when in exile. These activists' key focus has been the torture and killing of many innocent cadres (labelled 'spies') of Swapo in the movement's detention centre at Lubango, Angola, in the 1980s. The article reviews the difficulties such critics have had - within both the formal political arena and within civil society (including the churches, so important a sphere of Namibian life) - in setting the record straight about such events and/or in obtaining any kind of redress of grievances. The chief obstacles have been the unwillingness of the SWAPO leadership to allow its own record in exile to be opened up to public scrutiny and, indeed, its active role in discouraging any such outcome. The leadership's advocacy of the wisdom of silence on these matters has tended to be cast in terms of the presumed imperatives of 'reconciliation', but it is argued here that this policy may have at least as much to do with the leadership's seeking to hide the blood of the past that it has on its own hands. The article alludes to the possible applicability of such models as South Africa's process of 'Truth and Reconciliation' to resolving such issues, and to the considerable challenge of realising any such outcome in the immediate future in Namibia.
This article addresses the political and military relationship between the Soviet Union and Angola between 1961 and 1991. It examines some of the problems between the two countries and is based on newly available archival material and interviews. Soviet policy towards Southern Africa and Angola has been the subject of a lot of academic research in the West, especially during the ‘Cold War’, yet many aspects remain controversial and contested.
The purpose of this introductory paper is to advance some reasons for the collapse of the UN plan for Namibia. It is argued that the plan lacked two essential elements for success — deadline and a credible calculus of pressure — on the part of the Western intermediaries. Moreover, because of international developments the collective bargaining position of the Western Five over South Africa deteriorated markedly since 1978. Finally, the plan conflicted with South Africa's perception of its national interest.
Namibia is distinctive in Africa for at least three significant reasons. First of all, it remains the continent's last colony in defiance of world opinion and the United Nations. Secondly, it has experienced Africa's longest armed liberation struggle apart from South Africa, with no end yet in sight. Thirdly, and most importantly, that conflict is not being waged against some distant metropolitan power, but Namibia's dominant and pariah neighbour. Just as this geographical contiguity has facilitated South African attempts to retain control over Namibia, it seems certain to impose severe constraints on the scope for pursuing independent policies once Namibian sovereignty is finally achieved.
Until 1975, Washington paid little attention to southern Africa, a backwater in the Cold War where weak insurgencies posed
little threat to white rule in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, and Namibia. The collapse of the Portuguese dictatorship in April
1974 meant the end of white rule in Angola and Mozambique. The Cuban victory in Angola the following year propelled southern
Africa into the vortex of the Cold War. Between 1977 and 1981, the Carter administration engaged in a complicated minuet with
South Africa and the Namibian rebels to craft a negotiated settlement that would grant Namibia its independence. Secretary
of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski clashed over the course the United States should follow,
while Cuba and the Soviet Union strongly supported the Namibian insurgents and 20,000 Cuban soldiers were poised in neighboring
Angola. I analyze the failure of Carter's Namibia policy based on US, Cuban and South African documents, as well as interviews
with Namibian, US, Cuban and South African protagonists.
In April 1977 the United States and four other major Western governments embarked on a unique diplomatic exercise in the hope of negotiating an agreement for the independence of the territory of Namibia, or South West Africa. The “Contact Group” as it became known (or Western Five), consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and the Federal Republic of Germany, functioned actively from April 1977 until mid-1982 as an ad hoc multilateral mediating and facilitating team in close proximity to but not directly linked with the United Nations. The five countries secured basic agreement in 1978 on a plan calling for UN supervised elections for a constituent assembly in the territory leading to early independence and the appointment of a UN special representative to ensure the necessary conditions for such elections.