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Assuring Assured Retaliation: China's Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability
Abstract
Whether China will abandon its long-standing nuclear strategy of assured retaliation for a first-use posture will be a critical factor in future U.S.-China strategic stability. In the past decade, advances in U.S. strategic capabilities, especially missile defenses and enhanced long-range conventional strike capacity, could undermine China�s nuclear retaliatory capability, which is based on a relatively small force and second-strike posture. An exhaustive review of Chinese writings on military affairs indicates, however, that China is unlikely to abandon its current nuclear strategy of assured retaliation. Instead, China will modestly expand its arsenal, increase the sophistication of its forces, and allow limited ambiguity regarding its pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. This limited ambiguity allows China to use the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter a conventional attack on its nuclear arsenal, without significantly increasing the size of its nuclear forces and triggering a costly arms race. Nevertheless, China�s effort to maintain its strategy of assured retaliation while avoiding an arms race could backfire. Those efforts increase the risk that nuclear weapons could be used in a crisis between the United States and China, even though China views this possibility as much less likely than the United States does.
... China describes its desired nuclear force structure as a "lean and effective" nuclear deterrent, one that is capable of ensuring retaliation following an enemy attack against China. [3] China's focus on the effectiveness of its nuclear missile force can be traced to concerns expressed in PLA publications dating to the late 1980s, which outlined plans to improve China's nuclear counterattack capability by moving toward mobile launchers, improving survivability, increasing the ability to penetrate missile defenses, increasing the numbers of missiles and launch units, and improving command and control and support systems. As China continues to implement its plans to deploy a more modern, mobile, and increasingly credible nuclear deterrent, it continues to focus on making progress in all of these areas. ...
... In addition, lower costs and wages render Chinese security capabilities much higher per dollar spent. On a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) basis, China's domestic security spending in 2017 was equivalent to about US$349 billion, more than double the United States' estimated US$165 billion.[3] In 2010, China's national domestic security spending for the first time exceeded its spending on external defense by a small margin. ...
... [1] See Contemporary International Relations (现代国际 关系), August 2017.[2] See Geological Work Strategic Research Reference ( 地质工作战略研究参考) 99, Oct 2012.[3] For example, information on Greenland was included in materials offered by the CGS at a MLR-organized forum on overseas mineral exploration in Beijing, attended by government departments, mining companies, banks and academics (CGS, Overseas Mining Exploration and Development Newsletter (境外矿产资源勘查开发简讯), 50,Oct 2013)China Brief is a bi-weekly journal of information and analysis covering Greater China in Eurasia.China Brief is a publication of The Jamestown Foundation, a private nonprofit organization based in Washington D.C. and is edited by Matt Schrader.The opinions expressed in China Brief are solely those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Jamestown Foundation.For comments and questions about China Brief, please contact us at cbeditor@jamestown.orgThe ...
This paper examines the structure and growth of China's domestic security spending, drawing on previously unpublished data.
During Hu Jintao’s second term as general party secretary (2007 to 2012), total national expenditures increased 51 percent faster than domestic security spending. During Xi Jinping’s current term (2013 to 2017), China’s domestic security spending grew 34 percent faster than total spending.
In particular, security-related expenditures in sensitive regions such as Xinjiang and Tibet have risen so rapidly that they now exceed the United States average on a per capita PPP basis. As China continues to invest heavily in developing ever more advanced security technologies, every dollar spent on domestic security will experience further leverage.
These figures begin to reveal the cost of maintaining stability especially in restive minority regions.
... As the force has grown in size and capability, Western analysts have suggested that its capabilities endow China with an "assured retaliation" capability. 9 Recent events have raised the possibility that growth is accelerating. In 2021, open-source intelligence revealed that China was building hundreds of new silos deep in the country's interior. ...
... Some China teams successfully employed limited nuclear attacks to coerce U.S. teams into reversing the outcome of the conventional war. First use by China teams in three games (9,11,13) led to a favorable settlement (a PRC enclave on Taiwan) against U.S. teams unwilling to climb the escalation ladder. In Game 9, the U.S. team attempted to continue the war conventionally but later relented in the face of escalating Chinese threats. ...
This study examines nuclear dynamics in a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, a war that the authors hope will never occur. What creates the greatest pressure for nuclear weapons use in such a conflict? What happens if nuclear weapons are used?
... And most important role in such war fighting is to be done by the conventional forces. Despite its growing global outreach, so far, it appears that the PLA is more focused on fighting smaller, localized battles and conflicts particularly in the maritime domain in the east and south China seas (Fravel, 2015). Historically although nuclear weapons have remained an important part of Chinese national security, these were never considered the most integral part of it. ...
... To achieve this, China needs an effective and leaner nuclear deterrent aimed at countering any nuclear coercion (Fravel, 2019). Hence, it is argued that the Chinese nuclear doctrine can best to understand as a doctrine of assured retaliation implying that it aims at denying any aggressor (read USA) to either conduct a nuclear attack against China or if a nuclear strike occurs, survive it and retaliate with an unacceptable damage to the adversary (Cunningham, 2015). This is the logic behind the Chinese decision not to seek parity with any adversarial nuclear state. ...
Employing the qualitative and historical analysis method, this paper overviews the Chinese nuclear doctrine and how it has evolved over the years with particular focus on the Chinese policy of ‘no-first use of nuclear weapons’ and its future. This paper argues that to understand the role assigned to the nuclear weapons in the Chinese defense policy, one must comprehend Chinese strategic thinking and where does nuclear weapons lie in this thinking. The paper further argues that for a better understanding of Chinese strategic thinking, it is imperative to be cognizant of the strategic language and vocabulary used by the Chinese strategic thinkers. The paper also analyses the command and control set up for the Chinese nuclear weapons and the American assessment of the Chinese nuclear capability. The argument put forth is that the American assessment of the Chinese nuclear capabilities is mostly exaggerated as it has security implications for American interests regionally and globally. The paper also argues that despite new emerging threats in the technological domain, China would continue pursuing the policy of no first use in the foreseeable future.
... And most important role in such war fighting is to be done by the conventional forces. Despite its growing global outreach, so far, it appears that the PLA is more focused on fighting smaller, localized battles and conflicts particularly in the maritime domain in the east and south China seas (Fravel, 2015). Historically although nuclear weapons have remained an important part of Chinese national security, these were never considered the most integral part of it. ...
... To achieve this, China needs an effective and leaner nuclear deterrent aimed at countering any nuclear coercion (Fravel, 2019). Hence, it is argued that the Chinese nuclear doctrine can best to understand as a doctrine of assured retaliation implying that it aims at denying any aggressor (read USA) to either conduct a nuclear attack against China or if a nuclear strike occurs, survive it and retaliate with an unacceptable damage to the adversary (Cunningham, 2015). This is the logic behind the Chinese decision not to seek parity with any adversarial nuclear state. ...
Employing the qualitative and historical analysis method, this paper overviews the Chinese nuclear doctrine and how it has evolved over the years with particular focus on the Chinese policy of 'no-first use of nuclear weapons' and its future. This paper argues that to understand the role assigned to the nuclear weapons in the Chinese defense policy, one must comprehend Chinese strategic thinking and where does nuclear weapons lie in this thinking. The paper further argues that for a better understanding of Chinese strategic thinking, it is imperative to be cognizant of the strategic language and vocabulary used by the Chinese strategic thinkers. The paper also analyses the command and control set up for the Chinese nuclear weapons and the American assessment of the Chinese nuclear capability. The argument put forth is that the American assessment of the Chinese nuclear capabilities is mostly exaggerated as it has security implications for American interests regionally and globally. The paper also argues that despite new emerging threats in the technological domain, China would continue pursuing the policy of no first use in the foreseeable future.
... China's nuclear modernization efforts are intended to enhance the survivability and effectiveness of its strategic nuclear forces, thereby increasing the credibility of its nuclear deterrent and ensuring assured retaliation (Cunningham and Fravel 2015). Over the past decade, its nuclear arsenal has expanded from 240 warheads in 2010 to about 320 warheads today. ...
... Indeed, US pursuit of strategic primacy (nuclear and conventional modernization, missile defenses, and long-range precision-strike capabilities) would challenge China's long-standing nuclear strategy of assured retaliation with a relatively small nuclear arsenal. A shift in Chinese nuclear strategy oriented toward a more offensive posture not only would require building a larger inventory but also lead to uncertainties in US-China strategic stability and East Asian security (Cunningham and Taylor Fravel 2015;Logan 2020a, b). ...
With intensifying US–China strategic rivalry in Asia, an increasingly salient issue of bilateral strategic stability is drawing growing attention from scholars and policy analysts alike. This paper examines how the nuclear arm competition between the two great powers, each driven by its (mis)perceptions of the other’s strategic intentions, and in the absence of adequate bilateral dialogues at the official level, runs serious risks of mutual misapprehension and miscalculation. Nuclear learning, in a way, offers some unique pathways for both countries to reassess their perceptions and find ways to engage each other and modify worse-case scenario preparation for war. With growing US–China strategic rivalry and a Trump administration determined to check if not derail China’s modernization process, one would expect Beijing to assess the situation, set its priorities, and develop strategies to manage the challenges. One of its priorities would be ensuring that bilateral disputes over security issues do not escalate to open military conflicts and risk escalation to nuclear exchanges largely as a result of misunderstanding, miscommunication, and miscalculation. At the same time, Beijing should be open to bilateral nuclear dialogue with Washington, not with an aim of revealing or accepting an upper limit on its nuclear arsenal, but to get a better understanding of the strategic, technical, and security implications of various potential agreements. Nuclear arms control measures remain viable options for the two powers to avoid nuclear Armageddon.
... After Beijing launched and tested its first nuclear device in 1964, the firstgeneration leaders in China emphasized the important role of Chinese nuclear weapons واالقتصاد السياسة كلية مجلة -العدد وال الخامس عشرون -يناير 5 202 396 in deterring potential nuclear attacks 35 . But the Chinese nuclear policy for this period and after stated that China pursued a "self-defensive nuclear" strategy, the two key pillars of that strategy were: counter attack in self-defense and nuclear weapons limited development 36 . ...
... Çin'in yapım aşamasındaki bilinen silo sayısı Rusya'nın sahip olduğu silo sayısını aşmakta, ABD'nin sahip olduğu sayıya yaklaşmaktadır. Uzmanlar, 1960'lardaki ilk başarılı denemesinin ardından Çin'in yaklaşık 300 adet nükleer başlığı olduğunu varsaymaktadırlar (Maick & Salidjanova, 2017;Cunningham & Fravel 2015;Pande, 2000). Eğer bu bilgi doğruysa, bu sayı ABD ve Rusya'nınkiyle karşılaştırıldığında yaklaşık %10'a denk gelmektedir. ...
Günümüz uluslararası ilişkilerinde konvansiyonel ve nükleer güçler arasındaki etkileşim, devletlerin tehdit algılarını ve davranışlarını önemli ölçüde etkileyen karmaşık bir dinamik yaratmaktadır. Çin’in 2021 yılının ortalarında üç yeni füze silosu inşa ettiğinin ortaya çıkması, Çin’in geleneksel “asgari nükleer caydırıcılık” stratejisinde bir değişiklik olup olmadığına dair soruları gündeme getirmiştir. Bu çalışma, Çin’in uzun süredir devam eden nükleer stratejisinden saptığını ileri sürmektedir. ABD ve Çin arasındaki konvansiyonel dengede meydana gelen olumsuz değişiklikler Çin’i nükleer kabiliyetlerini arttırmaya ve konvansiyonel kabiliyetlerini geliştirerek nükleer gücünün caydırıcılık kabiliyetini arttırmaya teşvik etmiştir. Bir devlet nükleer caydırıcılığının hasmının konvansiyonel yetenekleri tarafından zayıflatılabileceğini algıladığında, nükleer caydırıcılığını güçlendirerek karşılık verme eğilimindedir. Benzer şekilde, nükleer kuvvetlerinin beka kabiliyetini arttırmak için konvansiyonel kabiliyetlerini de geliştirebilir. Çinli uzmanlar ABD’nin konvansiyonel hassas vuruş kabiliyetlerini Çin’in garantili misilleme kabiliyeti için önemli bir tehdit olarak görmektedir. Ayrıca, Çin’in nükleer cephaneliğinin geçmişe kıyasla daha çeşitli konvansiyonel tehditlerle karşı karşıya olduğuna inanmaktadırlar. Bu çalışma, Çin’in nükleer füze silolarını genişletmesinin ardındaki nedenleri analiz etmeyi amaçlamakta ve nükleer silahların Çin’in askeri doktrinindeki rolünü ve Çin ordusundaki son modernizasyon çabalarını incelemektedir. Çin’in tehdit algılarına bağlı olarak gelişen nükleer kabiliyetlerini ve bunların küresel güvenlik dinamikleri üzerindeki etkisini anlamak bu araştırmanın odak noktasıdır.
... We may now be witnessing yet another case of power transition in the world order that is potentially perilous yet so far has occurred in the absence of armed conflict: the decline of American power and the simultaneous rise of China (Allison 2017). Whereas China is conventionally inferior to the United States, and its nuclear arsenal lags significantly behind the latter's in absolute numbers Korda 2019a, 2019b), Beijing has been rapidly modernizing its nuclear forces, expanding its stockpile, and significantly improving its capability for assured retaliation (Cunningham and Fravel 2015;Schreer 2015;Bojian 2018). The capability to deter both nuclear and conventional challenges from the United States could underpin the process of peaceful power transition as envisioned in the minimalist view of peaceful change, in which the rising power repositions itself in the international hierarchy without the need to resort to the use of military force and the declining power refrains from the use of military force to reverse this dynamic. ...
With the rapid rise of China and the relative decline of the United States, the topic of power transition conflicts is back in popular and scholarly attention. The discipline of International Relations offers much on why violent power transition conflicts occur, yet very few substantive treatments exist on why and how peaceful changes happen in world politics. This Handbook is the first comprehensive treatment of the subject of peaceful change in International Relations. It contains some 41 chapters, all written by scholars from different theoretical and conceptual backgrounds examining the multi-faceted dimensions of this subject. In the first part, key conceptual and definitional clarifications are offered and in the second part, papers address the historical origins of peaceful change as an International Relations subject matter during the Inter-War, Cold War, and Post-Cold War eras. In the third part, each of the IR theoretical traditions and paradigms in particular Realism, liberalism, constructivism and critical perspectives and their distinct views on peaceful change are analyzed. In the fourth part papers tackle the key material, ideational and social sources of change. In the fifth part, the papers explore selected great and middle powers and their foreign policy contributions to peaceful change, realizing that many of these states have violent past or tend not to pursue peaceful policies consistently. In part six, the contributors evaluate the peaceful change that occurred in the world’s key regions. In the final part, the editors address prospective research agenda and trajectories on this important subject matter.
... Jervis 1976;Van Evera 1998. 22. Cunningham andFravel 2015;Nitze 1976 electronic warfare, wrote pointedly about their concern that threats to NC3 from emerging technologies could create incentives for preemptive strike. As Ashton Carter warned, "faced with alarming analyses, the superpower command systems can come to fear their vulnerability so much that they take seriously the need to strike first." ...
How do emerging technologies affect nuclear stability? In this paper, we use a quasi-experimental cyber-nuclear wargame with 580 players to explore three hypotheses about emerging technologies and nuclear stability: (1) technological uncertainty leads to preemption and escalation; (2) technological uncertainty leads to restraint; and (3) technological certainty leads to escalation through aggressive counterforce campaigns. The wargames suggest that uncertainty and fear about cyber vulnerabilities create no immediate incentives for preemptive nuclear use. The greater danger to strategic stability lies in how overconfidence in cyber exploits incentivizes more aggressive counterforce campaigns and, secondarily, how vulnerabilities encourage predelegation or automation. Both of these effects suggest worrisome relationships between cyber exploits and inadvertent nuclear use on one hand and cyber vulnerabilities and accidental nuclear use on the other hand. Together, these findings reveal the complicated relationship between pathways to escalation and strategic stability, highlighting the role that confidence and perhaps-misplaced certainty—versus uncertainty and fear—play in strategic stability.
... Это предположение подразумевает, что Китай будет доволен сохранением небольшого количества оружия, которое может наносить ответные удары по городам противника. С другой стороны, текущая и планируемая ядерная модернизация Китая оставляет открытыми двери для более мощных средств ядерного сдерживания: в зависимости от возможностей будущих наступательных ядерных сил России и США и противоракетной обороны США, среди других переменных [14]. ...
В статье анализируется ядерная политика Китая в контексте российско-китайского стратегического партнерства и изменяющегося баланса сил в мировой политики. Сегодня Китай занимается широкой модернизацией своих стратегических и других ядерных сил, включая усовершенствованные баллистические ракеты наземного базирования и подводных лодок, а также летательные аппараты с ядерным оружием. Роль ядерного оружия в международной политике остается жизненно важной, поскольку оно стало элементом стратегической стабильности, инструментом достижения национальных интересов государства, а ядерная модернизация Китая направлена на повышения статуса глобальной державы и защиты своего суверенитета. Автором отмечается, что КНР использует ядерное оружие как средства сдерживания неазиатских держав от вмешательства в определяемые самим собой ключевые зоны своей безопасности.
... 5-6). Third, Arms control analysts say that now Russia can blame US for the death of -INF Treaty‖ because US withdrew from the agreement at first (Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, 2015) (Borger, 2018) while NATO has unanimously expressed its support for the United States policies regarding -New START Treaty‖. ...
Nuclear politics is always a tricky business at the international level. Understanding nuclear politics is not easy for teachers, students, researchers, and scholars of nuclear politics and global affairs. Arms Control doesn’t mean controlling or reducing the arsenals, it is sometimes building arsenals to influence the opponent as two superpowers expanded their nuclear arsenals and raised the slogan of arms control. In this sense, the world witnessed hovering clouds of arsenals across the globe during the cold war era when the USSR and the USA plunged into conflict in the Korean Peninsula, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and in the European vicinity. Although a number of agreements have been signed by powerful states to avoid nuclear tussles and they remained successful but the race between USSR and USA stimulated other countries to build nuclear arsenals. The bitter reality is that some countries achieved nuclear technology some trying to get like Iran. However, except for nuclear issues, there are several issues in global politics because now the world has become multipolar, and more interestingly China is an emerging global power and influencing the states across the globe. On the other hand, a number of treaties have lost their worth or been withdrawn such as INF Treaty and NEW START Treaty is going to expire in February 2026. The question is that what world-leading powers learned from history in sense ofnuclear tussles? Because INF has been terminated and New START is also going to be expired. What would be next? What will be the consequences of the termination of INF firsthand and the New START Treaty if it would be terminated? This research attempts to find out these main questions through descriptive-analytical research Methodology.
... Even with recent strategic modernization involving solid fueled mobile missiles, their force is modest by Russian and US standards. They have historically embraced a second strike retaliatory policy (Cunningham and Fravel 2015). Therefore, China can be coded as lacking advanced offensive and defensive capabilities with respect to both the US and Russia. ...
This concluding chapter attempts to adjudicate debates and resolve apparent contradictions among the preceding arguments to arrive at a complete, synthetic explanation of China-Russia cooperation. In making the case that this collection is a substantial advance in scholarship on China-Russia relations, it also identifies important limitations, and maps out a path forward for subsequent scholarship to build on the progress made in this volume to further refine our causal understanding of the vital China-Russia relationship.
... The nuclear strategy of 2003 further explains that China would launch a warning contributor for ensuring the nuclear survivability that has further elongated the military debates of the resultant future on behalf of the country's nuclear intentions. Second Artillery Force executed the responsibility of the conventional operation of nuclear weapons in the 1990s for future blasts against the direct command of military service so that country may resist the parallel nuclear destruction in case of sudden invasions from neighboring nuclear forces (Colby, 2018). ...
This research paper focuses on the development, management, and execution of nuclear policies and strategies in China. Chinese nuclear policy has always been a center of discussion for military officials and researchers worldwide. Considering its internal and external security situation and strategic perceptions, China has made some crucial adjustments in its nuclear deterrent to cope with future threats and maintain the diminutive stature among nuclear powers. The issue of Taiwan and ballistic missile defense systems(BMDs) of India and USA may raise China’s critical thinking in the coming future for which it must change its policy of No First Use (NFU) and must shift its nuclear intentions from narrow to limited nuclear deterrent posture. Due to changed cultural perspectives, China has its specific nuclear strategy that involves the minimum utility of nuclear weapons. Factors involved in the evolution of Chinese nuclear strategy are in line with technological modernization. However, China is not willing to leave adherence from its NFU policy. China possesses a limited capacity of nuclear experts, a comparatively lesser quantity of nuclear installations, and a relatively lower number of nuclear weapons because it mainly focuses on the “lean and effective” quality of its strategic nuclear approach. Keywords: Nuclear policy, strategic perceptions, China, security environment.
... To them, it weakens the latter's nuclear deterrence. 67 Another view is that the description of targets given in Congressional Research Report-for instance, 'deeply buried' and 'hardened' or 'fleeting' and 'time-critical' targets-clearly fit in Chinese missile sites and command and control facilities. 68 Further, China's evolving anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) and A2/AD capabilities are considered a major concern in the official US discourse. ...
China's nuclear threat perception, of which its nuclear weapons program is the by-product, is driven by the external strategic environment where the United States (US) is a key player. Chairman Mao Zedong, after the US nuclear intimidation during the Korean War and the Cross-Strait Crises, considered that nuclear weapons were central not only to deter their potential use against China but also to counter the nuclear threat. The geostrategic location of the country makes it vulnerable to a few nuclear powers. However, not all of these states constitute a key concern in Beijing's nuclear threat perception. In this regard, an analysis of the US nuclear weapons program and capabilities would help understand China's nuclear threat perception. The paper aims to explore the threat that China perceives from the US given the latter's growing focus against it, including through its nuclear arsenal. The study, after a brief historical background, begins with a cursory discussion on theoretical underpinnings for threat perception. The next section outlines the US nuclear weapon policy and capability that has a bearing on China's nuclear threat perception. The paper argues that with its intentions and excessive capability, the US is a primary actor in shaping China's nuclear threat perception and altering its long-standing nuclear weapons policy and modernization of its nuclear forces.
... The post-9/11 Iraq and Afghan campaigns have meanwhile fueled a literature on the relative advantages of insurgents and counterinsurgents, terrorists and counterterrorists, which may be thought of in offense-defense terms (e.g., Betts 2002). Worries over the escalatory possibilities of cyber conflict, and the potential crisis instability generated by first-move advantages in the emerging US-China and NATO-Russia strategic relationships, are also essentially worries over the relative efficacy of attack versus defense (e.g., Goldstein 2013; Gompert and Libicki 2014;Cunningham and Fravel 2015;Gartzke and Lindsay 2015;Futter 2016;Shlapak and Johnson 2016;Rovner 2017;Slayton 2016Slayton /2017Talmadge 2017;Trenin 2018;Blagden 2020). ...
Is there a meaningful offense–defense balance of technological, geographical, and human factors that substantially affects war likelihood and severity? Key contemporary policy debates are certainly infused with the notion, from the dangers of crisis instability in East Asia to the possible first-move advantages of cyber weaponry. Defensive realist theory, meanwhile, raises the possibility of inferring intent from external posture choices. Yet for offensive realists, such signaling is a doomed hope, because of aggressors’ incentives to conceal their hostile intentions before turning extant military technology to offensive ends. This article suggests that both perspectives misstate the causal role of the offense–defense balance. Competition may be a general condition of international politics—but it only manifests itself as a military conflict, defined as “cold” or ultimately “hot” war, under certain conditions. Specifically, the feasibility of advancing political goals via aggression rests on prevailing military technology, taken in its geographical context—that is, offense–defense calculations. Via three sub-theoretical cases—the “stopping power of water,” conventional blitzkrieg, and nuclear counterforce innovation—the article shows that the offense–defense balance affects conflict likelihood and severity even within offensive realism, specifically by affecting deterrence prospects. But this does not mean, as defensive realism posits, that the distinguishability of defense dominance promises a route out of the security dilemma.
... China's long-held low-profile nuclear policy was questioned by its left-wing nationalist media, which advocates for a large "enough" nuclear arsenal to win US respect (Global Times, 2016). This article is thus highly policy-relevant, hoping to shed light on the ongoing US-China strategic stability discussion (Cunningham and Fravel, 2015;Fingar and Fan, 2013;Li, 2012) in the context of their increasing rivalry. By studying China's interactions with nonproliferation norms, this project also speaks to China's willingness, or lack thereof, to assimilate with international norms and accept its responsibility in tackling global challenges. ...
Why did a would-be recognized nuclear state oppose nonproliferation for two decades, but then change its position in 1984? Based on extensive fieldwork in Beijing where the author conducted 20 interviews with high-profile Chinese government and military officials, ambassadors of disarmament, and nuclear and astronautic scientists, this article argues that China openly opposed nonproliferation to give its nascent nuclear program time to achieve a retaliatory capability. Once this goal was fulfilled in the mid-1980s, China began accepting nonproliferation norms. While China’s fervent opposition seemed ideological in a revolutionary era, it was indeed a rational behavior in pursuit of security interests.
Thomas Schelling argued that “The most spectacular event of the past half century is one that did not occur. We have enjoyed sixty years without nuclear weapons exploded in anger.” To this, he added a question: “Can we make it through another half dozen decades?” Contemporary technological innovation, weapons proliferation, increased modernization efforts, and nuclear saber-rattling have made Schelling's question an urgent one. Recently, there has been an explosion in scholarship attempting to test the resilience of nonuse. These scholars have focused primarily on methodological innovations, generating an impressive body of evidence about the future of nonuse. Yet we argue that this literature is theoretically problematic: it reduces mechanisms of nuclear nonuse to a “rationalist” versus “normative” dichotomy which obscures the distinct pathways to nuclear (non)use within each theoretical framework. With rationalist theories, the current literature commits the sin of conflation, treating what should be distinct mechanisms—cost and credibility—as a single causal story. With normative theories, scholars have committed a sin of omission, treating norms as structural and overlooking mechanisms of norm contestation. We show that teasing out these different causal pathways reveals radically different expectations about the future of nonuse, especially in a world of precision nuclear weapons.
The Obama administration announced in 2011 its intention to pivot strategically towards Asia. Ten years later, it was clear that this strategy had evolved, moving from strategic rebalancing to the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy under Trump. However, had American diplomacy and defence's centre of gravity truly shifted to the Indo-Pacific? Regarding foreign policy, the woefully inadequate President Trump compromised this strategy by withdrawing the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and accelerating the American withdrawal from world affairs when China was consolidating its position in the Indo-Pacific.
Europeans should recognize the responsibility for their own security including arms control, given not only renewed Russian
belligerence but also other global trends undermining strategic
stability. As the United States is likely to be even more focused on the Indo-Pacific region in the future, Europeans cannot afford to take a passive role or pursue multilateralism for the sake of multilateralism. Actively taking responsibility for their own security including arms control would mean Europeans learn to combine deterrence, competition, and engagement with nuclear-armed great powers. Such a combination would be particularly important for incentivizing Russia to engage with Europeans on arms control, and to find consensus within Europe to engage with Russia.
Drawing on a wide body of literature on international rivalries, this comprehensive and theoretically grounded work explains the origins and evolution of the Sino-Indian rivalry. Contrary to popular belief, the authors argue that the Sino-Indian rivalry started almost immediately after the emergence of the two countries in the global arena. They demonstrate how the rivalry has systemic implications for both Asia and the global order, intertwining the positional and spatial dimensions that lie at the heart of the Sino-Indian relationship. Showing how this rivalry has evolved from the late 1940s to the present day, the essays in this collection underscore its significance for global politics and highlight how the asymmetries between India and China have the potential to escalate conflict in the future.
Strategic stability at the China-India-Pakistan trijunction remains tenuous. The two dyads have endured conflicts over ideology, territorial disputes and power rivalry. Though drivers of conflict vary in each dyad, common aspirations and history of cooperative security agreements are worthy foundations for managing future strategic risks in Southern Asia. While each state in the strategic triangle faces nested security dilemmas, new sources of instabilities are compounding the strategic trilemma. Recent India-Pakistan (2019) and China-India (2020) military crises exposed the potential for multi-domain crisis escalation in future conflicts. Strategic risks increase either due to escalation dynamics in conflicts and/or inadvertence due to technical failures and incidents. This essay identifies three key strategic risks. First, faulty assessment of intentions and capabilities could lead to dangerous actions and counteractions. Second, nuclear-conventional entanglement of delivery systems may increase chances of blundering into accidental wars, as respective doctrines become murkier, communications become lesser, and military crises become more frequent. Third, fusion of accurate missiles systems with the emergent technologies is enabling cross-domain deterrence capabilities and providing decision-makers with multiple options to take greater risks during an evolving crisis. This article proposes that the three states consider new strategic risk-reduction measures through a series of multilateral and bilateral strategic dialogues at the Track-I and Track-II levels, and establish “strategic risk-reduction centers” customized to the Southern Asian strategic environment. These centers would function as central clearing house for all past and future agreements and act as nodal points for preventing misinterpretation or tragic incidents.
This paper discusses both the external and domestic drivers of the nuclear trilemma in Southern Asia that involves China, India and Pakistan. It seeks to untangle the complexity of the dyad and the triangular nature of the relationships between the three countries and highlights major differences as well as similarities in the nuclear dynamics. It identifies and examines the internal dynamics of the China–India and India–Pakistan conflicts and explores how domestic drivers such as nationalism, public opinions, and civil–military relations either mitigate or exacerbate nuclear risks in a region marked by perennial disputes, emerging rivalry, and long-standing extra-regional interferences. Against these backgrounds, the paper addresses the central theme of the nuclear trilemma between China, India, and Pakistan by looking at causes of instability, risks of conflicts and escalation to nuclear use, and prospects of restraint and risk reduction, including the development and implementation of confidence-building measures and nuclear risk reduction mechanisms.
How should alliance patterns respond to changing relative power? The bargaining theory approach to international relations suggests that as a country grows in power, it will acquire a credible threat to fight against other countries who then may become more likely to put aside their differences and ally against the threat. Nuclear weapons reduce the threat and balancing incentive by making war more costly. Advanced nuclear capabilities, however, hold out the hope of destroying adversary nuclear forces and thereby lowering the cost of nuclear war, making threats to fight more credible. I analyze this process and discuss US-Chinese-Russian relations as an illustration of the theory.KeywordsRussiaChinaUSAlliancesNuclear Weapons
The discovery of new Chinese nuclear missile silos, a seemingly escalating nuclear-conventional arms competition between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the announcement that Australia, in concert with the United States and the United Kingdom, is pursuing nuclear-powered attack submarines are events that collectively indicate a worsening security environment in East Asia. Using geostrategic, operational, and technological factors as the basis for analysis, this paper contextualizes these and other developments and assesses the potential for nuclear war in East Asia in general and on the Korean Peninsula in particular. The most dangerous threat to strategic stability is a counterforce dilemma where the conventional weapons of the United States, China, and regional East Asian actors may create strategic instability by their intentional or inadvertent entanglement or use to target the nuclear forces of another state, resulting in pursuit of more secure second-strike capability by the countries of the region, and forming the heart of conventional warfighting and deterrence strategies. The many different conflictual or competitive relationships across the region make arms control initiatives unlikely to succeed, but the maritime nature of the geostrategic environment and the lack of existential threat that the United States and China pose to each other may offer fewer natural pathways to the use of nuclear weapons for either China or the United States than there were for the adversaries in the Cold War.
China’s improving nuclear arsenal, the United States’ deteriorating “strategic ambiguity” policy, and Taiwan’s increasing identification as independent polity raises the prospect of conflict over Taiwan. But the use of nuclear weapons in the Taiwan Straits would happen only under extreme circumstances. This paper argues Beijing is increasing its use of gray-zone tactics with conventional and non-military means below the level of nuclear provocation to tip the cross-straits military balance in its favor. This report first examines China’s aim to achieve unification with Taiwan via its use of threat and use of force in both the nuclear and conventional domains through a close examination of the three historical cross-strait crises. Second, it outlines the geostrategic and geopolitical rationale for continued American support for Taiwan in an era of United States-China competition. Lastly, it explores the role of Taiwan’s consolidating democracy and how Taipei responds to Beijing’s coercion. The report concludes with consideration of how the Taiwan Straits case may affect the possibility of nuclear weapons use in Northeast Asia, including in Japan and on the Korean peninsula.
Increased geopolitical competition, nuclear multipolarity, and emerging technologies are steadily undermining strategic stability as well as the existing arms control and non-proliferation regime architecture. The 1980s and 1990s were a high-water point in terms of the normative and legal institutionalization of arms control and non-proliferation regimes, including, but not limited to, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START) and the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Open Skies Treaty (OST), the Vienna Document (VD), and the Wassenaar Arrangement. We are seeing a disintegration of these regimes.
This report first offers an in-depth analysis of how both geopolitical and technological developments affect strategic stability. It then looks at the arms control, non-proliferation and deterrence policy measures that states have at their disposal to contain and prevent the production, proliferation, deployment and employment (PPDE) of weapon technologies that threaten strategic stability, to provide new solutions for a new generation of durable arrangements. While arms control and non-proliferation efforts are aimed at countering the production, the proliferation and the deployment of such capabilities, deterrence seeks to prevent their actual employment. Rather than singling out one weapon technology or one specific arms control regime, it introduces a new analytical framework that assesses the feasibility of policy measures to control weapon technologies along the PPDE-chain. Applying this framework to ten emerging weapon technologies, the report identifies specific policy measures to curtail the risks associated with each of them. The overview of measures offers European and Dutch policymakers a blueprint for a broader integrated arms control agenda, and facilitates careful consideration of the appropriate balance of policy mixes along the PPDE-chain included therein. On that basis the report offers a set of policy recommendations to policymakers to bolster strategic stability.
Australian strategic studies scholars have traditionally made an outsized impact on the world stage. This reflection upon the past, present and future of their field begins by seeking to explain why. It then takes stock of Australian strategic studies today, finding a flourishing field that stacks up remarkably well, even when measured against the exploits of its illustrious past. The essay concludes by identifying the main challenges and opportunities facing Australian strategic studies going forward, suggesting possible approaches for addressing these.
Will AI-enabled capabilities increase inadvertent escalation risk? This article revisits Cold War-era thinking about inadvertent escalation to consider how Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology (especially AI augmentation of advanced conventional weapons) through various mechanisms and pathways could affect inadvertent escalation risk between nuclear-armed adversaries during a conventional crisis or conflict. How might AI be incorporated into nuclear and conventional operations in ways that affect escalation risk? It unpacks the psychological and cognitive features of escalation theorising (the security dilemma, the 'fog of war', and military doctrine and strategy) to examine whether and how the characteristics of AI technology, against the backdrop of a broader political-societal dynamic of the digital information ecosystem, might increase inadvertent escalation risk. Are existing notions of inadvertent escalation still relevant in the digital age? The article speaks to the broader scholarship in International Relations-notably 'bargaining theories of war'-that argues that the impact of technology on the cause of war occurs through its political effects, rather than tactical or operational battlefield alterations. In this way, it addresses a gap in the literature about the strategic and theoretical implications of the AI-nuclear dilemma.
Nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are traditionally believed to provide assured second-strike capability and stabilize deterrence. This paper contests this classical assumption in South Asia’s context and argues that SSBN capability to become secure and credible deterrent depends upon doctrinal issues, command and communication systems, and operational readiness of SSBN force. In a dyad, if both countries have invulnerable second strike capability, there is less incentive to strike first. Whereas invulnerability of one country incentivizes first strike. In South Asian strategic situation, an assured sea-based second-strike capability may contribute to India’s aggressive nuclear posture. This paper evaluates New Delhi’s induction of SSBNs in light of its stated notion of minimalism, as declared in its nuclear doctrine, and discusses in the context of traditional stability theory associated with the development of SSBN force. This paper primarily considers deterrence stability and crisis stability as two dependent variables to study how India’s sea-based nuclear capability affects strategic stability in South Asia.
What are Chinese public attitudes regarding nuclear weapons? Although scholars have studied Chinese elites’ views on nuclear weapons, surprisingly little is known about the views of China’s public. To understand Chinese public views on nuclear weapons, we conduct an online survey ( N = 1066) of Chinese respondents. This is, to our knowledge, the first survey of Chinese public attitudes towards nuclear weapons. We find that although Chinese citizens view the possession of nuclear weapons as important for their country’s security, they strongly oppose the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. We also provide respondents an opportunity to describe their views on nuclear weapons in their own words. Using computer-assisted text analysis, we assess patterns in these open-ended responses and compare across age groups. We find that younger respondents emphasize non-material factors such as having a greater voice internationally, whereas older respondents emphasize self-defense. Overall, this analysis sheds light on the public attitudes that may shape China’s evolving approach to nuclear weapons.
One of the most important questions about China's rising military and economic power is whether this trend will eventually lead to confrontation with the United States in the future or if China will become even more deeply integrated into the contemporary world order. John Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism claims that great powers relentlessly maximize their power in a highly competitive anarchical world in order to assure their survival by trying to achieve regional hegemony at the expense of other powerful actors. Unlike many other contemporary liberal and realist thinkers, Mearsheimer predicts that China will try to become regional hegemon in Asia, which will inevitably lead to counterbalancing moves by today's sole regional hegemon – the United States. For Mearsheimer, significant change in China's material capabilities will unescapably lead it to a conflict with an American‐led counter‐balancing coalition, similar to the situation during the Cold War superpower competition. In this paper, I argue that the theory of offensive realism is lacking both in theoretical accuracy and in interpretation of empirical cases chosen by its author. That is especially true of contemporary offensive realism's analysis of China's rise to become a true global power. Understanding the deficiencies of offensive realism is crucial for avoiding foreign policy prescriptions that might lead to further deterioration of future Sino–American relations.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) has the potential to affect ever more aspects of military and civilian life as part of the fourth industrial revolution. Countries are racing for global AI dominance, and whoever ‘wins’ shall reap the economic and geopolitical power expected to result. However, AI-enhanced technologies could pose new security risks that have not been encountered before.
This paper discusses some military and defence implications of AI development and assesses potential threats to Euro-Atlantic security. China has been identified as potentially threatening because of its high AI capability rankings, use of AI for military applications and poise to become the global 5G leader.
Ultimately, this paper argues that the UK and the EU should approach outsourcing critical communications infrastructure with caution and take recent security concerns involving China more seriously.
https://static.rusi.org/202011_poni_papers_2020_web.pdf
This article examines the relationship between US missile defense and the US-China security dilemma dynamics by developing the concept of diffuse signaling involving the Korean peninsula. We argue that the US’ efforts to bolster deterrence against North Korea’s growing threats through missile defense have resulted in China’s countermeasures of enhancing survivability and penetrability of its second-strike capability, leading to downward spirals of tensions between Beijing and Washington. We explain how three structural factors – geography, the US alliance system, and nuclear asymmetry – have made diffuse signaling salient, thus making it very challenging for the United States to reassure China even when its actions targeted North Korea. The article empirically shows the action-reaction process through which China and the US have come to experience the aggravation of the security dilemma over the Korean peninsula.
Th? paper focuses on the research of general possibilities and limitations of the multilateralization of the strategic arms control negotiations and particularly the inclusion of China in these negotiations because, during 2019 and 2020, the US conditioned the extension of the New START Treaty with China?s involvement in the trilateral strategic arms control negotiations. By doing so, the US recognised China as an important factor influencing the maintenance of strategic stability and possibilities for further reduction of strategic arms. The main hypothesis is the claim that the limitations still overcome the possibilities regarding the multilateralization of the strategic arms control negotiation, and that the prospects of involving China in this kind of negotiation remain minimal. This hypothesis was tested through theoretical deliberation based on the notion of strategic stability, and its transformation during the Cold War until today, as well as on four indicators or preconditions of China?s involvement in the strategic arms control, which are: 1) quantitative reduction of the number of nuclear arms of the US and Russia to China?s level; 2) decrease of the role of nuclear weapons in the national security and defense strategies of the great powers; 3) decrease of the role of nuclear weapons as the status symbol of the great power or superpower and 4) conclusion of the multilateral international agreement (not trilateral) on limitations on the use of nuclear weapons. The author uses the methods of content and discourse analysis, as well as the comparative method. The author concludes that the absence of the intention of the US and Russia to further reduce their strategic arms and decrease the role of nuclear weapons in their security and defense strategies, as well as the absence of consent on which parties or actors should be included in the arms control talks and China?s general suspicion about the effectiveness of the arms control agreements, influence China not to take part on any strategic arms control talks at this moment.
Experts increasingly highlight the dangers of nuclear-conventional entanglement, particularly in the U.S.-China context. This article develops a framework for assessing entanglement and its risks. Applying that framework to China, it finds that Beijing’s missiles are not as entangled as is sometimes feared, but ongoing trends may increase future entanglement. It also presents evidence that, counter to the prevailing wisdom, Chinese entanglement has not emerged as a strategic policy choice but, rather, as the byproduct of more parochial organizational dynamics. Strategic signaling and perception management will be key to controlling escalation risks stemming from nuclear-conventional entanglement in China.
The U.S. provides extended nuclear deterrence to allies in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. The 2018 NPR signals several potentially destabilizing policies, including lowering the threshold for use and adding low-yield capabilities, and it emphasizes the need for nuclear superiority. This chapter argues that the U.S. is changing its nuclear posture to address the growing challenge to U.S. conventional superiority. Extended nuclear deterrence is inherently dubious and the asymmetry between the U.S. on the one hand, and its allies and adversaries on the other, makes it doubly so. In the coming decades, this will continue to generate problems for the U.S. as long as it maintains its alliance commitments.
The contention over the quantity and quality of regional missile defenses forward-deployed by the United States in the Asia-Pacific region animates much of the US–China disagreement about strategic stability. The Chinese argue that the deployed assets exceed reasonable defensive requirements and suggest that if these missile-defense deployments continue, they will be forced to increase the size of their nuclear arsenal. In disagreement, the United States claims that regional missile defenses are defensive by design, limited in scope, and necessary to defeat a North Korean missile campaign. In this article, a series of simulation experiments were developed to empirically test these opposing arguments over missile defenses and strategic stability. The simulations indicate that current deployments are necessary for defense and proportional to the threat. The analysis also argues that current deployments do not possess the ability to alter the US–China strategic nuclear balance significantly. The article concludes with a discussion of other subjective aspects of national security that may explain Chinese concerns and explore possible ways to reassure China.
Many strategists argue that to deter a nuclear attack, states must be certain of their ability to retaliate after a nuclear first strike. China's nuclear posture of uncertain retaliation suggests an alternative logic. Given the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear attack, uncertain retaliation can have a strong deterrent effect, and assured retaliation is not necessary. A simplified nuclear exchange model developed to evaluate China's nuclear retaliatory capabilities against the Soviet Union in 1984 and the United States in 2000 and 2010 shows that China's nuclear retaliatory capability has been and remains far from assured. In its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, the United States promised to maintain strategic stability with China; therefore, the 2010 scenario can be considered as a baseline for China-U.S. strategic stability. Both China and the United States are developing or modernizing their strategic offensive and defensive weapons. The technical competition between China and the United States favors each in different ways. A hypothetical scenario of China versus the United States in 2025 reveals that China-U.S. strategic stability will likely be maintained at no lower than its 2010 level.
Cambridge Core - American Studies - The Revolution that Failed - by Brendan Rittenhouse Green
Przełom 2018 i 2019 roku obfitował w ważne wydarzenia związane z rozwojem
amerykańskich systemów przeciwrakietowych. Szczególne znaczenie ma ogłoszony
17 stycznia 2019 roku przez prezydenta Donalda Trumpa Przegląd Obrony
Przeciwrakietowej (Missile Defense Review, MDR). Wcześniej, 13 sierpnia
2018 roku, prezydent ten podpisał ustawę o obronie narodowej (National Defense
Authorization Act, NDAA) na rok budżetowy 2019, w której znalazło się wiele odniesień
do obrony przeciwrakietowej. Dużo informacji ujawniono także podczas
sympozjum Space and Missile Defense, które odbyło się w dniach 7–9 sierpnia
2018 roku. Analiza zawartych w tych dokumentach ustaleń pozwoli na wskazanie
kluczowych trendów rozwojowych w zakresie amerykańskiej obrony przeciwrakietowej
oraz na ocenę możliwych wpływów podejmowanych przez Pentagon
działań na strategiczny balans sił w skali globalnej, co jest zasadniczym celem niniejszego artykułu.
Significant developments regarding American missile defense have been occurred at the
break of 2018/2019. Missile Defense Review, announced by the President Donald Trump on 17 January 2019 is particularly important. The analysis of its conclusions can afford to indicate crucial trends in American missile defense and to estimate possible outcomes, including the influence on global strategic balance of force. These tasks constitute the main purpose of the paper.
China is the only one of the five original nuclear weapon states that is quantitatively increasing the size of its nuclear arsenal and it now is estimated to have approximately 260 warheads. The arsenal's capabilities are also increasing as older missiles are replaced with newer ones. As China assigns a growing portion of its warheads to long-range missiles, the US intelligence community predicts that by the mid-2020s the number of warheads on missiles capable of threatening the United States could increase to well over 100. The nuclear warheads in the Chinese stockpile are intended for delivery mainly by land-based ballistic missile but also by aircraft and submarines. The current force has nearly 150 nuclear-capable land-based missiles, half of which are short-range and medium-range. China has also built two types of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, one developed for a submarine no longer considered operational and the other in the final stages of development.
Secure second strike nuclear forces are frequently held to be easy to procure. Analysts have long argued that targeting intelligence against relocatable targets like submarine launched and land mobile ballistic missiles is difficult to obtain. However, the scholarly consensus on intelligence for counterforce operations is seriously overdrawn. Both during and after the Cold War, the United States developed substantial intelligence capabilities to track and target submarines and mobile missiles. These efforts achieved important and under-appreciated success. Second strike forces have been far more vulnerable than most analysts are willing to credit.
Chinese writings on the workings of nuclear stability, deterrence, and coercion are thin and politicized. Nevertheless, it is possible to glean, from direct and inferential evidence, rather pessimistic conclusions regarding Chinese views of nuclear stability at low numbers. While China has been living with low numbers in its own arsenal for decades, today it views missile defense and advanced conventional weapons as the primary threat to nuclear stability. More generally, China views nuclear stability as wedded to political amity. Because none of these would be directly addressed through further US and Russian arsenal reductions, China is unlikely to view such reductions as particularly stabilizing. While there is little in Chinese writing to suggest lower US and Russian numbers would encourage a ‘‘race to parity,’’ there are grounds to worry about China becoming more assertive as it gains confidence in Beijing’s own increasingly secure second-strike forces.
Alastair Iain Johnston is Assistant Professor of Government at Harvard University, where he is also a Faculty Associate with the Olin Institute of Strategic Studies and the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research.
The author wishes to thank Patrick Garrity and the participants in the Center for National Security Studies Workshop on Regional Nuclear Forces and the Future of Nuclear Weapons, and Karl Eikenberry, Paul Godwin, Lisbeth Gronlund, Harlan Jencks, Stan Norris, Michael Pillsbury, David Shambaugh, David Wright, and especially Tom Christensen for comments, criticism, and input. A number of U.S. and Chinese officials who must remain nameless also deserve much thanks. None of these people is responsible for the analysis.
1. John Lewis's group at Stanford has produced excellent histories of the Chinese nuclear weapons program. See John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988); John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 5-36; and John Lewis and Xue Litai, China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994). Chong-pin Lin has written an important study of nuclear thinking up to the mid-1980s; Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition within Evolution (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988). But there are only a handful of articles on doctrinal issues in the late 1980s. See Harlan Jencks, "PRC Nuclear and Space Programs," in Richard Yang, ed., Yearbook on PLA Affairs 1987 (Kaohsiung: Sun Yat-sen Center for Policy Studies, 1988); Arthur S. Ding, "PLA in the Year 2000: Nuclear Force and Space Program," in Richard Yang, ed., Yearbook on PLA Affairs 1988-89 (Kaohsiung: Sun Yat-sen Center for Policy Studies, 1989); J. Mohan Malik, "Chinese Debate on Military Strategy: Trends and Portents," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 1990), pp. 3-32; and Xue Litai, "Evolution of China's Nuclear Strategy," in John C. Hopkins and Weixing Hu, eds., Strategic Views from the Second Tier: The Nuclear Weapons Policies of France, Britain, and China (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1995).
2. See, for instance, Hua Di's comments in the New York Times, October 26, 1994, p. A10; and Xue, "Evolution of China's Nuclear Strategy."
3. All translations of titles and quotations in these materials are the author's, unless indicated otherwise.
4. See, for instance, Li Shisheng, "Guanyu guoji xin zhixu ji ge wenti de tan tao" (A preliminary discussion of several problems relating to the new international order), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World economics and politics) [hereafter, Shijie jingji], No. 10 (1992); Gu Yan, "Duli zizhu shi Mao Zedong waijiao sixiang de linghun" (Independence and autonomy is the spirit of Mao Zedong's foreign policy thinking), Shijie jingji, No. 2 (1994); Zhao Huaipu and Lu Yang, "Quanli zhengzhi yu xianghu yicun" (Power politics and interdependence), Shijie jingji, No. 7 (1993). For a discussion of the social-Darwinian flavor of Chinese analyses of international economics, see Huang Yasheng, "China in the New International Political Economy: Perspectives and Problems" (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Center for International Affairs [CFIA], unpublished ms., 1995).
5. Chen Chongbei, Shou Xiaosong, and Liang Xiaoqiu, Weishe zhanlue (Deterrence strategy) (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences, 1989) pp. 200-205.
6. Song Shilun, Mao Zedong junshi sixiang de xingcheng ji qi fazhan (The formation and development of Mao Zedong's military thought) (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences Press, 1984), pp. 214-215; and Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, forthcoming), chap. 6.
7. Liang Minglun and Zhao Youzi, "Shilun wo jun weilai hetong zhanyi zuozhan de zongti gouxiang" (Preliminary discussion of the comprehensive notion of our military's future coordinated war-fighting campaigns), in National Defense University Research Department, ed., Gao jishu ju bu zhanzheng yu zhanyi zhanfa (High tech limited war and campaign methods) (Beijing: National Defense University [NDU] Press, 1994) p. 88; Liu Zhenwu and Meng Shaoying, Xiandai jundui zhihui (The command of modern military forces) (Beijing: NDU Press, 1993), pp. 408-409.
8. As...
Devin T. Hagerty is a Postdoctoral Research Associate with the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security and a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Pennsylvania in August 1995. This article was written while the author was a National Security Fellow at Harvard University's John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies. Additional research support was provided in 1993-94 by the United States Institute of Peace and the American Institute of Pakistan Studies.
The author would like to thank the following people for their helpful comments on earlier manifestations of this article: Stephen P. Cohen, Daniel Deudney, Avery Goldstein, Herbert G. Hagerty, and Wendy Patriquin. Thanks also to participants in the Olin Institute's 1994-95 National Security Seminar; a colloquium series on "South Asian Security Issues After the Cold War" at the Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, Spring 1995; and a conference on "New Frontiers in Arms Control," at the Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland, March 30-31, 1995.
1. Seymour M. Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge," New Yorker, March 29, 1993, pp. 56-73. The quotations are on pp. 56-57.
2. William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 506.
3. Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 83, 99.
4. Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge," pp. 64-66.
5. Major works addressing this debate have included: Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Praeger, 1962); Richard N. Rosecrance, ed., The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons: Strategy and Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964); Alastair Buchan, ed., A World of Nuclear Powers? (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966); William B. Bader, The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Pegasus, 1968); George Quester, The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); Joseph I. Coffey, ed., "Nuclear Proliferation: Prospects, Problems, and Proposals," special issue, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, No. 430 (March 1977); Albert Wohlstetter et al., Swords from Plowshares: The Military Potential of Civilian Nuclear Energy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); George H. Quester, ed., "Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking the Chain," special issue, International Organization, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Winter 1981); Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper No. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1981); Lewis A. Dunn, Controlling the Bomb (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982); Benjamin Frankel, ed., "Opaque Nuclear Proliferation: Methodological and Policy Implications," special issue, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3 (September 1990); Lewis A. Dunn, Containing Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Paper No. 263 (London: IISS, 1991); Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds., "The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread (and What Results)," special issue, Security Studies, Vol. 2, Nos. 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993).
6. For a comprehensive descriptive statement of this "logic," see Dunn, Controlling the Bomb, pp. 69-94. Sagan's "Perils of Proliferation" is a recent, more theoretical treatment. See also Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What is the Threat? What Should be Done?" International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 5-42; and Steven E. Miller, "The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 67-80.
7. The classic statement of this position is Waltz, More May Be Better. For other works in this vein, see John J. Weltman, "Nuclear Devolution and World Order," World Politics, Vol. 32, No. 2 (January 1980), pp. 169-193; John J. Weltman, "Managing Nuclear Multipolarity," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Winter 1981/82), pp. 182-194; and John J. Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 50-66.
8. This term was first introduced by Benjamin Frankel in...
Since the mid-1990s, much has been written about the potentially disruptive impact of China if it emerges as a peer competitor challenging the United States. Not enough attention has been paid, however, to a more immediate danger—that the United States and a weaker China will find themselves locked in a crisis that could escalate to open military conflict. The long-term prospect for a new great power rivalry ultimately rests on uncertain forecasts about big shifts in national capabilities and debatable claims about the motivations of the two countries. By contrast, the danger of crisis instability involving these two nuclear-armed states is a tangible near-term concern. An analysis that examines the current state of U.S.-China relations and compares it with key aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War indicates that a serious Sino-American crisis may be more likely and more dangerous than expected. The capabilities each side possesses, and specific features of the most likely scenarios for U.S.-China crises, suggest reasons to worry that escalation pressures will exist and that they will be highest early in a crisis, compressing the time frame for diplomacy to avert military conflict.
This article examines the modernization of China's nuclear missile force and assesses the implications for the U.S.
China's nuclear deterrent relies on so-called ‘first strike uncertainty’, which means not letting the other side be confident of a completely successful disarming strike. But in order to deter, the uncertainty must be high enough. After reviewing the developmental history of China's nuclear capability and the evolution of Chinese and foreign leaders’ perceptions of China's nuclear retaliatory capability, this article identifies the criteria of nuclear deterrence for China and other countries. This research can contribute to Sino-US strategic dialogue and deepening understanding of the security consequences of nuclear proliferation.
For the last decade of Mao Zedong’s rule in China, his revolutionary thinking dominated all strategic planning and operations and directly shaped the policies of the strategic rocket forces, the Second Artillery. Only in the mid-1980s did Mao’s legacy give way to concepts governing nuclear forces throughout the world and permit the development of China’s first nuclear strategy and acceptance of the principles of nuclear deterrence. Step by step, the ever-more complex command-and-control mechanisms of the People’s Liberation Army adopted and refined new roles for its nuclear and conventional missiles to support peacetime diplomacy, to manage military crises, and to pursue combat readiness. The authors examine the evolution of China’s overall defense strategy, with a focus on central elements of today’s nuclear war plan and how they are operationalized. They seek to answer this question: How did conventional missiles change nuclear strategy, the organization of the combined conventional-nuclear missile forces for both deterrence and combat, and the relationship of the Second Artillery to the other military commands?
After exploding its first nuclear device in 1964, China did not develop sufficient forces or doctrine to overcome its vulnerability to a first strike by the United States or the Soviet Union for more than three decades. Two factors explain this puzzling willingness to live with nuclear vulnerability: (1) the views and beliefs of senior leaders about the utility of nuclear weapons and the requirements of deterrence, and (2) internal organizational and political constraints on doctrinal innovation. Even as China's technical expertise grew and financial resources for modernization became available after the early 1980s, leadership beliefs have continued to shape China's approach to nuclear strategy, reflecting the idea of assured retaliation (i.e., using the fewest number of weapons to threaten an opponent with a credible second strike). The enduring effect of these leadership ideas has important implications for the trajectory of China's current efforts to modernize its nuclear force.
Will China's development of a new generation of nuclear weapons impact US-China security relations in important ways? One's answer depends on how one views the following: whether or not Chinese leaders believe that they are only now acquiring a secure second strike capability; the scope of coercive power that secure second strike capability provides to conventionally inferior actors; the meaning of China's ‘No First Use’ Doctrine; and the prospects for escalation control in future crises. Applying Cold War theories and tapping Chinese doctrinal writings this article concludes that China's nuclear modernization program might prove more consequential than is commonly believed.
This article examines the assumptions that lead China alarmists to dismiss America's ability to impose a distant blockade as an inadequate counter to Chinese A2/AD systems. It argues that distant blockade is indeed a viable, lower cost strategy that capitalizes on America's strengths and China's weaknesses.
For nearly half a century, the world's most powerful nuclear-armed states have been locked in a condition of mutual assured destruction. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the nuclear balance has shifted dramatically. The U.S. nuclear arsenal has steadily improved; the Russian force has sharply eroded; and Chinese nuclear modernization has progressed at a glacial pace. As a result, the United States now stands on the verge of attaining nuclear primacy, meaning that it could conceivably disarm the long-range nuclear arsenals of Russia and China with a nuclear first strike. A simple nuclear exchange model demonstrates that the United States has a potent first-strike capability. The trajectory of nuclear developments suggests that the nuclear balance will continue to shift in favor of the United States in coming years. The rise of U.S. nuclear primacy has significant implications for relations among the world's great powers, for U.S. foreign policy, and for international relations scholarship.
The People's Republic of China (PRC), no longer content with its longstanding ‘minimalist’ nuclear posture and strategy, is enhancing the striking power and survivability of its theater and strategic missile forces and rethinking its nuclear doctrine in ways that may pose serious challenges for the United States. Although the modernization of Chinese nuclear and missile forces may ultimately result in greater strategic deterrence stability, this change will not come about immediately or automatically. Indeed, it is entirely possible that China's growing missile capabilities could decrease crisis stability under certain circumstances, especially in the event of a US–China conflict over Taiwan.
Chinese commentators assessing the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) acknowledged a number of ways in which they felt it was “better” than the 2001 NPR but still found much to criticize and many reasons for concern regarding the review's implications for China and for strategic stability. They welcomed the reduction of US nuclear inventories and reliance on nuclear weapons, the commitments to seek ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to not conduct nuclear tests, the declaration that the United States would continue to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, and a number of other points. Commentators generally devoted more attention to issues that were seen to have negative implications for China's deterrent (e.g., continued development of missile defense capabilities and advanced conventional weapons). Their assessments of the NPR were initially colored by the downturn in Sino-US relations in the months prior to the review's release but became more positive as the overall bilateral relationship improved.
The survivability of China's ballistic missile submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles is examined. First, the Type 094 ballistic missile submarine is noisy and vulnerable even in shallow waters. This suggests the urgency for China to improve the quietness of the Type 094. Second, after the deployment of the U.S. interceptor missile, SM-3 Block IIA, in 2018, China's intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles launched from Chinese coastal waters would face a three-layer engagement, constructed by SM-3 IIAs deployed near China's coastal waters, ground-based interceptors deployed in California and Alaska, and SM-3 IIAs deployed near U.S. coastal waters respectively. These deployments could undermine the credibility of China's nuclear deterrence. It would be well for China and the United States to work together to improve strategic stability between these two states.
This article examines the rising prominence of strategic nuclear deterrence in Sino-US relations. China is the only major nuclear power that has been actively expanding its offensive capabilities. Its nuclear modernization has inevitably caused concerns in the United States. The article suggests that China's nuclear programme is driven significantly by US missile defence, which has fundamentally altered the incentive structures for Chinese nuclear deterrence. The article also assesses the latest Chinese perception of US strategic adjustment under the Obama administration and its potential impact on arms control. It reveals that recent measures by the United States to restrain its missile defense could be conducive for achieving a strategic nuclear understanding between the two countries. The article then suggests a number of concrete actions for China and the United States to realize such an understanding.