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Critical notes on Hegel’s treatment of Africa

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This paper interrogates the adequacy of Hegel’s cultural framework upon which he constructed a philosophy of history which excludes Africa from the scheme of things. In what follows, I argue that the Hegelian dialectic is a project aimed at the exclusion of Africa from the universal history, leading to certain problematic theses like the Hegelian thesis on slavery, which is connected to theproblem of class formation and his concept of thestate. This paper is therefore a refutation of the Hegelian position, drawing insights from Senghor’s discussion of Negritude as a geo-climatic contextualized ideology.

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... Those four worlds are Oriental, Greek, Roman and German. For him, all other cultures or civilisations (including Africa) look on (Kuykendall 1993;Adegbindin 2015). In his treatment of Africa, he divides Africa into three parts: the first, Africa proper, that territory which lies south of the Sahara; the second, European Africa, that territory which lies north of the Sahara; and Egypt, that territory which is connected to Asia (Kuykendall 1993;Adegbindin 2015). ...
... For him, all other cultures or civilisations (including Africa) look on (Kuykendall 1993;Adegbindin 2015). In his treatment of Africa, he divides Africa into three parts: the first, Africa proper, that territory which lies south of the Sahara; the second, European Africa, that territory which lies north of the Sahara; and Egypt, that territory which is connected to Asia (Kuykendall 1993;Adegbindin 2015). ...
... According to Hegel (1956), Africa proper is the land of childhood, which, oblivious or ignorant of self-concious history, is enveloped in the dark mantle of night. For Hegel, in Negro life, the characteristic point was the fact that consciousness has not yet attained the realisation of any substantial objective existence (Hegel 1956;Kuykendall 1993;Adegbindin 2015). Therefore, the African has not reached the level of realising their being; they have not yet realised their person. ...
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This article reconsiders Molefi Asante’s idea of Afrocentrism. It discusses Eurocentrism and the search for identity that provoked Afrocentrism as an intellectual paradigm. It details some basic tenets of the Afrocentric paradigm and makes some critical remarks on certain issues in the conceptualisation of the Afrocentric paradigm. Essentially, those remarks revolve around the notions of multiculturalism, identity and language. First, the article argues that the Afrocentric paradigm, through its openness to anyone interested in it an extension of its claim to multiculturalism drags itself back into the problem of identity that it initially set out to resolve. This is because it provokes the dilemma of extreme inclusivity and extreme exclusivity. Second, it uses the language of Eurocentrism to fight against Eurocentrism, which seems absurd. Third, it glosses over the fact that, apart from Africa, other cultural civilisations might have significantly influenced the intellectual development of the ancient Geeks. The article argues, therefore, using the methods of analysis and critical argumentation typical of philosophical writing, first, that Afrocentrists may need to rearticulate the Afrocentric paradigm in such a way that would address the problem of identity which it set out to resolve by properly delineating its boundaries. Second, they need to address the language question, which is an important aspect of the problem of identity. Third, they need to recognise and respect the contributions of other cultural civilisations to the Greek intellectual development. This does not upset their multiculturalist programme.
... There have been critiques of Western thought before decoloniality came into existence in its current form, as Schubring (2021) and Walsh and Mignolo, 2018) point out. One such a critique is Hegelian tetradic dialectics comprising thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, which is often referred to as dialectical idealism (Adegbindin, 2015;Samson, 2019). However, Hegelian dialectics, and the whole Hegelian scholarly enterprise, does not serve as a point of reference nor as an anchor point for decoloniality as used in this paper. ...
... This, in turn, implies that for Hegel, Africa was undeveloped, uncivilized, ahistorical, and therefore, unworthy of being regarded as having any culture. Further, Hegel's view was that there was a justification for a European colonization and enslavement of Africa for purposes of civilization (Adegbindin, 2015;Kuykendall, 1993). Moreover, there are instances in which the Hegelian philosophy of history is seen as one of the anchor points of Eurocentrism and systemic racism (Tibebu, 2011). ...
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This paper discusses aspects of the scholarship of teaching and learning (SoTL) in South African higher education (HE) and locates it within what it calls Southern theories. Three examples of such theories that the paper advances are Southern decolonial theory, decoloniality, and transversality, which it frames from the Global South standpoint. Concerning the first theory, the paper argues that SoTL, both as a notion and as a practice, needs to be problematized, critiqued, and contextualized according to the Global South HE settings in which it is applied. One of its key points in this regard is that SoTL has to question and critique the dominant epistemic practices and scholarly practices underpinning the curricula of Global South higher education institutions (HEIs), and through which students are framed in these HEIs. With reference to both decoloniality and transversality, the paper foregrounds components of SoTL that are aligned to these two approaches in a way that dismantles their hierarchical relations. Most importantly, it contends that transversality is capable of decentering Western truth claims in favor of polycentric epistemologies, frameworks, and methodologies that resonate with and that have applicability to the Global South.
... This is also encapsulated by Trevor-Roper (1963, p. 871) who wrote "Africa had no history before European exploration and colonization, that there is only the history of Europeans in Africa". This Western criterion of understanding history naively assumed that the indigenous people of Africa were incapable of making any meaningful contribution to the world of history since their systems of archiving history were portrayed to be 'barbarous' and 'primitive' (Adegbindin, 2015;Chimee, 2018). As a result, the reliance on oral traditions by indigenous people in Africa as their archives, instead of written ones was deliberately misinterpreted to mean that indigenous people had no historical legacy (Chimee, 2018). ...
Chapter
The current South African school history curriculum is embedded in and shaped by colonial ideas of history linked to Enlightenment thinking. Tied to this are Western archives of history that are problematic as they have been epitomised in an objective and universal way that only imputes truth to colonial ideas of history. Considering that most people within the South African education system come from indigenous communities, the curriculum becomes completely incompatible with their realities, bearing no relevance to their own lives since the Western archives of history fail to capture and narrate indigenous histories using archives that are more relatable. In this chapter, I argue that these conventional archives imbued in the curriculum have left out indigenous voices, experiences, epistemologies, and ontologies. The post-apartheid curriculum has failed to provide alternative archives of history while grappling with issues of coloniality that continue to define the curriculum. Subsequently, I argue that there is a need to re-think the curriculum in a way that recognises indigenous archives of history. To do that, I propose theorising alternative archives of history which should be derived from a wide range of indigenous sources such as Umlando (oral traditional archives), Izithakazelo (clan praises), and intwaso (ancestral archives).
... Later, Hegel, 'whose place in Eurocentrism's pantheon is supreme … [and whose] philosophy remains prominent and insidious' (Asante, 1990: 35), held the position that Africa had no history and that it was devoid of morality, religions and political constitution (Adegbindin, 2015;de Tocqueville, 1831). The dehumanizing colonial project instilled servility and submission in African people, especially through European colonists and proselytizing missionaries, who exercised their 'civilizing mission' , equating African culture with sin and evil (Césaire, 1955;Fanon, 1967). ...
Chapter
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... No matter the questions are viewed, the fact remains that these questions never arose until Placide Tempels published his Bantu Philosophy [10]. The debate on African Philosophy continues, and is crystallizing into definitive patterns. ...
Article
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The contemporary debate on African philosophy took off from a derogatory standpoint. It was a response to the racially discriminatory claims made by European philosophers and anthropologists against Africans on the supposed inability of Africans to engage in sublime thinking. Numerous European scholars wrote extensively about the supposed intellectual inferiority of the African race. The peak came with the publication of Bantu Philosophy by Placid Tempels in 1946. Tempels admitted that indeed, there was immanent philosophy in African worldview. However, it was unknown to be the African mind. It required the Western mind to make it known to the world and to Africans. Numerous African scholars reacted to him, many toeing the line of ethno-philosophy he claimed Africans had, albeit unknowingly. Most of the African scholars missed the fundamental question of the position of African in the development of the formal philosophic enterprise. This work runs a detailed critique of these reactions from the backdrop of the copiously attested foundational role of Africans in the establishment of philosophy as a formal enterprise.
... Africa has for long been viewed from Hegelian dystopian lens, as a place without civilization [3]. Scores of scholars, Omotade Adegbindin included on their part, have repudiated strongly the Hegel's cultural framework of Africa [4]. They contend that even though many previous studies on Africa's mobility have sometimes brought out the element of time delays and frustrations, this does not mean, Africa is not developing. ...
Article
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Today, the research interest on the state of mobility and accessibility of a place is growing everywhere. Previous studies on space-time convergence have shown that, the world has become 'flat' due to fastness in accessibility of places by goods, information and the people. Whereas this is true, the prevailing state of space-time convergence in Africa is still an outstanding issue of concern. This paper aims to fill this gap through story telling of the information borrowed randomly from existing literature on the subject matter. The results obtained show that, Africa is yet to fully get integrated proper into the global networked society because of her huge transport and communication infrastructure gap. The paper concludes with a recommendation that, African leaders should endeavour to fix the infrastructure gap and must at the same time, purpose to allow a faster cross border movement of goods and people to help speed up space-time convergence to match the global mobility pace.
... Later, Hegel, 'whose place in Eurocentrism's pantheon is supreme ... [and whose] philosophy remains prominent and insidious' (Asante, 1990: 35) held the position that Africa had no history and that it was devoid of morality, religions, and political constitution (Adegbindin, 2015;de Tocqueville, 1831). The dehumanizing colonial project instilled servility and submission in African people, especially through European colonists and proselytizing missionaries, who exercised their 'civilizing mission', equating African culture with sin and evil (Césaire, 1955;Fanon, 1967 While Alexis de Tocqueville, known for his liberal position and condemnation of slavery, critiqued the oppressive actions of European American settlers towards 'Indians' and the oppression of 'negros' (mainly because of its negative political impact on White America) in 1831, he also pronounced that, in the Americas, the white races were the superior in intelligence. ...
Chapter
This open access edited collection provides a long-overdue examination of a practice that is continuously involved in managing, regulating, and subordinating individuals and communities. While it is well established that neoliberal systems of population management are designed to target the “constructed other,” there is considerably less research examining how social work in particular interacts with the vestiges of colonialism to further this practice. Gathering social work scholars and practitioners from around the world, this collection offers a geographically diverse array of ambitious and insightful theoretical, conceptual, and practical discussions of how social work can perpetuate the afterlives of colonialism and of how this can be reversed. In so doing, this book not only provides in-depth, empirically grounded critiques of – and antidotes to – various policies for managing people at the margins of society, it also makes a compelling case for always keeping the complexity of colonial continuity in conversation with neoliberal systems of governance. As these chapters show, it is only by keeping the full complexity of such confluences in mind that social inequality and institutional racism can be understood and that possibilities for change can emerge. For its fundamental contributions to the literature on postcolonial social work, this is essential reading for social work researchers and postgraduates; and for its plainspoken tone and practical recommendations, it is a go-to source for social work practitioners eager to align their own everyday work with the demands of global justice. Theebook editions of this book are available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence on bloomsburycollections.com. Open access was funded by the Bloomsbury Open Collections Library Collective.
... Of course, some colonial scholarship depicted Africans in ways that suited colonial racist ideologies and that portrayed Africans as beasts, as four legged, as one eyed monsters, and so on (Magubane 2007;Nhemachena 2017;Fanon 1963). Even Hegel, arrogantly, and in a racist way, described Africans as children of the forest, as wild and at the level of nature, as lacking morals, as people without history and as inconsequential in world history and therefore as fit for enslavement in the matrix of racial relations of the world (Adegbindin 2015;Terada 2019;Andindilile 2016). Because Africans were dehumanised and deanthroposised, as it were, during colonialism within which they were depicted and treated as indistinct from machines and animals, emancipation for them does not lie in postanthropocentrism or posthumanism but in humanisation wherein hunhu/unhu, rather than mere vitality or entanglements, would be central in matters of data collection. ...
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The debate whether there is African philosophy has ended but there was a time when it was a serious business. While the debate raged on, many African scholars made attempts to defend a system of philosophizing called ‘African philosophy’. One of the scholars who offered a defence for the existence of African philosophy is Chukwudum Barnabas Okolo. According to Okolo, African philosophy exists but began from a particular period. This argument was based on his distinction between debased or informal sense of philosophy and genuine or formal sense of philosophy. Okolo’s argument stemmed from the Western denial of humanity and consequently of philosophy to the African. Okolo’s defence, therefore, was a response to the European hegemony that the African was not capable of intelligence or reasoning which was essential in order for one to be classified as a human being. Thus, this paper sets out with the aim to challenge Okolo’s defence and periodization of African philosophy and to make evident its inherent problems. The paper adopted the method of historical hermeneutics and contextual and conceptual analysis. It concluded that Okolo’s defence of African philosophy despite its merit in responding to the Eurocentrism, ironically later conforms to the European standard of philosophy and denies the fact that African philosophy and known African philosophers before 1945 are properly philosophers.
Article
Full-text available
The debate whether there is African philosophy has ended but there was a time when it was a serious business. While the debate raged on, many African scholars made attempts to defend a system of philosophizing called ‘African philosophy’. One of the scholars who offered a defence for the existence of African philosophy is Chukwudum Barnabas Okolo. According to Okolo, African philosophy exists but began from a particular period. This argument was based on his distinction between debased or informal sense of philosophy and genuine or formal sense of philosophy. Okolo’s argument stemmed from the Western denial of humanity and consequently of philosophy to the African. Okolo’s defence, therefore, was a response to the European hegemony that the African was not capable of intelligence or reasoning which was essential in order for one to be classified as a human being. Thus, this paper sets out with the aim to challenge Okolo’s defence and periodization of African philosophy and to make evident its inherent problems. The paper adopted the method of historical hermeneutics and contextual and conceptual analysis. It concluded that Okolo’s defence of African philosophy despite its merit in responding to the Eurocentrism, ironically later conforms to the European standard of philosophy and denies the fact that African philosophy and known African philosophers before 1945 are properly philosophers.
Article
Full-text available
The debate whether there is African philosophy has ended but there was a time when it was a serious business. While the debate raged on, many African scholars made attempts to defend a system of philosophizing called ‘African philosophy’. One of the scholars who offered a defence for the existence of African philosophy is Chukwudum Barnabas Okolo. According to Okolo, African philosophy exists but began from a particular period. This argument was based on his distinction between debased or informal sense of philosophy and genuine or formal sense of philosophy. Okolo’s argument stemmed from the Western denial of humanity and consequently of philosophy to the African. Okolo’s defence, therefore, was a response to the European hegemony that the African was not capable of intelligence or reasoning which was essential in order for one to be classified as a human being. Thus, this paper sets out with the aim to challenge Okolo’s defence and periodization of African philosophy and to make evident its inherent problems. The paper adopted the method of historical hermeneutics and contextual and conceptual analysis. It concluded that Okolo’s defence of African philosophy despite its merit in responding to the Eurocentrism, ironically later conforms to the European standard of philosophy and denies the fact that African philosophy and known African philosophers before 1945 are properly philosophers.
Chapter
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This paper will contend that we, in the first quarter of the 21st century, need an enhanced Age of Reason based on global epistemology. One reason to legitimize such a call for more intellectual enlightenment is the lack of required information on non-European philosophy in today’s reading lists at European and North American universities. Hence, the present-day Academy contributes to the scarcity of knowledge about the world’s global history of ideas outside one’s ethnocentric sphere. The question is whether we genuinely want to rethink parts of the “Colonial Canon” and its main narratives of the past. This article argues that we, if we truly desire, might create “a better Enlightenment.” Firstly, by raising the general knowledge level concerning the philosophies of the Global South. Thus, this text includes examples from the global enlightenments in China, Mughal India, Arabic-writing countries, and Indigenous North America—all preceding and influencing the European Enlightenment. Secondly, we can rebuild by rediscovering the Enlightenment ideals within the historiography of the “hidden enlightenment” of Europe’s and North America’s past. In Part I, of two parts of this paper, a comparative methodology will be outlined. In addition, examples will be given from the history of ideas in India and China to argue that we need to study how these regions influenced the European history of ideas in the 16th and 17th centuries. Finally, towards the end of this text, a re-reading of the contributions from Egypt and Greece aspires to give a more global and complex context for Western Europe’s so-called Age of Reason.
Article
Many Black scholars reject G.W.F. Hegel, for his Philosophy of History ignominiously and grotesquely denigrates Africans. This article first discusses Negritude’s detournement of Hegel’s theses and, from an African point of view, refutes two Hegelian theses: slavery and the state in Africa. Hegel contradicts itself, and the very dialectic analytical method that excluded Africa from universal history also fully reinstates it.
Book
With prefaces by Charles Hegel and the translator, J. Sibree, M.A.
The Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition
  • W T Stace
W.T. Stace, The Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition (New York: Dover, 1955), p. 438. 1955.
The Foundations of "Africanite" or "Negritude" and "Arabite
  • L S Senghor
L. S. Senghor,The Foundations of "Africanite" or "Negritude" and "Arabite," trans. M. Cook, (Paris: PrésenceAfricaine, 1971), p. 12.
The Drought Challenge and the Struggle in Sudano-Sahelian Africa
  • Pierre Fougeyrollas
Pierre Fougeyrollas, "The Drought Challenge and the Struggle in Sudano-Sahelian Africa", Seminar on Environment and Economy in Arid and Semi Arid Zones, Niamey (February 15-March 6, 1974), p. 5.
Engels et les problems de l'Afrique noire
  • Dieng
  • Marx Hegel
Dieng,Hegel, Marx, Engels et les problems de l'Afrique noire,p. 30.
The Notion of 'Asain Mode of Production' and the Marxist Mode of Societal Evolution
  • Maurice Godelier
Maurice Godelier, "The Notion of 'Asain Mode of Production' and the Marxist Mode of Societal Evolution", Notebook for the Center for Marxist Studies and Research, (Paris: CERM: 1975), p.30.
  • Claude Lévi-Strauss
  • Race
  • History
  • Paris
Claude Lévi-Strauss, Race and History, (Paris: UNESCO, 1968), p. 20.
  • J K Ngubane
J. K. Ngubane, Conflict of Minds (New York: Books in Focus, 1979), p. 78.
De la Démocratietraditionnelle
  • Diagne
Diagne,"De la Démocratietraditionnelle", p. 93.
25 Stance, The Philosophy of Hegel, p. 395. 26 Ibid
  • Ibid
24 Ibid., p. 223. 25 Stance, The Philosophy of Hegel, p. 395. 26 Ibid. p. 396.
The Philosophy of Hegel
  • G W F Hegel
42 G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 37. 43 Stace,The Philosophy of Hegel,p. 382.
The German Ideology " , in The Marx-Engel's Reader
  • Karl Marx
Karl Marx, " The German Ideology ", in The Marx-Engel's Reader, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1978, p. 178.
African Religions and Philosophy, p. 13. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Hegel, The Philosophy of History
  • Mbiti
Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, p. 13. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Hegel, The Philosophy of History, p. 95.
  • Claude Lévi-Strauss
  • Race
  • History
Claude Lévi-Strauss, Race and History, (Paris: UNESCO, 1968), p. 20.
The Philosophy of History, trans
  • G W F Hegel
G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. H. Clarke (New York: Dover, 1956).
Europe have tried in vain to refuse it this honour. In any event, it is the first of African civilizations
  • L S Senghor
Senghor was well aware of the anteriority of Black African civilizations. He says, "Egypt founded the first of the historical civilization. Europe have tried in vain to refuse it this honour. In any event, it is the first of African civilizations" (L. S. Senghor, 1971, p. 88).
Engels et les problems de l'Afrique noire (Hegel, Marx, Engels and the Problematic of Black Africa
  • A A Dieng
  • Marx Hegel
A. A. Dieng, Hegel, Marx, Engels et les problems de l'Afrique noire (Hegel, Marx, Engels and the Problematic of Black Africa) (Dakar, Senegal: Sankoré, 1975), pp. 43-44.
The Philosophy of Hegel
  • Stance
Stance, The Philosophy of Hegel, p. 395.
  • Claude Lévi-Strauss
Claude Lévi-Strauss, Race and History, (Paris: UNESCO, 1968), p. 20.