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Transnational constitutionalism and a limited doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment
Abstract
A deep tension exists in many parts of the world between commitments to democracy and procedures for constitutional amendment.
Amendments are frequently passed that follow formal democratic procedures but are aimed at achieving anti-democratic or “abusive”
constitutional aims—i.e., to help powerful presidents extend their term in office, to remove parliamentary or federalism-based
checks on executive power, and to narrow or suspend basic human rights protections. Limiting a power of constitutional amendment,
therefore, can have clear democratic benefits. One way to do this is via a judicially enforceable doctrine of “unconstitutional
constitutional amendment.” While such a doctrine may not be a complete solution to anti-democratic uses of constitutional
amendment powers, it can create an additional hurdle to change. But such a doctrine should be approached with caution from
a democratic perspective, because it can also create a significant road-block to the legitimate use of amendment procedures
as a means of overriding courts decisions deemed unreasonable or unacceptable by a majority of citizens. In order to promote
democracy rather than undermine it, any doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment must be limited in scope. This
article argues that because threats to a democratic order are so varied, and can be altered or staged by would-be authoritarian
actors, limiting the doctrine to a narrow set of institutional provisions or principles defined ex ante is unlikely to be a stable solution. Instead, courts must rely on a broader doctrine that is nonetheless limited to constitutional amendments that clearly pose
a substantial threat to core democratic values. This article also argues that an effective way to limit the use of such a
doctrine is by tying its use to transnational constitutional norms. Engagement with transnational constitutional law will
help to limit both the kinds of principles courts define as fundamental and the sorts of institutional changes that are alleged
to pose a substantial threat to those principles. The article shows how engagement with transnational materials can serve
as a workable check on a doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment, helping to separate cases where the doctrine
must be deployed to defend democracy from cases where its use is unnecessary.
... Jefferson would have been delighted to know, for instance, that the American Constitution was eventually amended in the mid-20th century to institutionalize term limits. However, as our empirical analysis shows, the same mechanisms for constitutional change can also undermine democratic norms when they are used for undemocratic purposes (Dixon and Landau 2015). This dilemma has spurred a debate about the legality of constitutional changes and amendments and the possible threats to democracy that might result from 'unconstitutional' constitutional changes (see, for example, Albert 2009;Dixon 2011;Dixon and Landau 2015). ...
... However, as our empirical analysis shows, the same mechanisms for constitutional change can also undermine democratic norms when they are used for undemocratic purposes (Dixon and Landau 2015). This dilemma has spurred a debate about the legality of constitutional changes and amendments and the possible threats to democracy that might result from 'unconstitutional' constitutional changes (see, for example, Albert 2009;Dixon 2011;Dixon and Landau 2015). The same fears shroud wholesale constitutional changes at moments of refounding the social contract, when 'authoritarian-aspiring' leaders in both democratic and non-democratic settings 'reform' their constitutions solely to extend their rule. ...
Since the third wave of democracy, term limits have become a popular fixture of most constitutions intended to constrain the executive. Yet, recent constitutional reforms around the world show that presidents seeking re-election sometimes overturn the entire constitutional order to extend their power. What is the impact of these constitutional manipulations on the longevity of the executive in office? Using survival analysis of all political leaders and national constitutions from 1875 to 2015, this article demonstrates, for the first time, that when ‘authoritarian-aspiring’ presidents remove constitutional term limits, they increase their stay in office by more than 40%. Our findings contrast with a widely held position in the comparative authoritarian literature suggesting that dictators survive longer under institutional constraints. On the contrary, we argue that by removing constitutional barriers, rulers consolidate more power at the expense of their most ambitious allies and can stay in power longer.
... Often, this will take the form of courts applying an 'unconstitutional constitutional amendment' doctrine (UCA), which imposes substantive and procedural limits on the scope for formal amendment powers. 70 However, it can also involve courts imposing purely procedural limits, for example, by insisting that certain amendments are invalid because of how they are proposed, debated, or approved. 71 Hence, one of the decisions explored in detail in the symposium is the decision of the Supreme Court of Kenya in the BBI Case. ...
In the same vein as John Hart Ely, but with a modern, global focus, a new wave of comparative constitutional scholarship focuses on the role of courts in protecting and promoting democracy. This article introduces this new wave of ‘comparative political process’ theory (CPPT), and explains its origins and utility, but also suggests it is best conceptualized as a form of ‘comparative representation-reinforcing’ theory (CRRT). Labels are not everything, but they do matter. And CRRT better captures the varieties of different forms of judicial democracy protection and promotion, and avoids any false claim of neutrality for such an approach.
... Uribe and his proposed reelection reform enjoyed high popularity rates when the Court's decision came down. 13 By contrast, during the recent 2023 decision, the Court recognized its power to preliminarily enjoin laws at a time of low popularity for Petro's regime. The Constitutional Court has repeatedly recognized countermajoritarian rights, including a decision on same-sex marriage at a time when 62 percent of the population rejected it. ...
Ten years of debates over democratic backsliding have failed to produce many examples of independent institutions thwarting authoritarian attempts on democracy. Yet Latin American courts seem to be countering this larger trend. The three largest countries in the region—Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia—have produced robust institutions able to check leaders with authoritarian tendencies, with high courts playing a fundamental role. In a dramatic succession of recent cases, courts in these three countries have been innovative, acted with a high degree of independence, and appear legitimately interested in defending democratic norms. All of this is profoundly surprising. There is little to no track record of independent Latin American judiciaries that stand in the way of authoritarian governments. Closer study of these three countries is therefore critical for scholars and practitioners, who are otherwise locked in debates over the importance of judicial review in preserving democracy. After dozens of judicial reform failures since the 1990s, we may be observing some overdue success. It appears that 1990s judicial reforms are making a comeback in Latin America.
... Comparaciones de esta clase pueden tomar dos subformas generales, que emplean dos lógicas diferentes. Por un lado, algunos académicos sugieren que la mejor manera de hacer estas comparaciones es mediante un enfoque agregado 21 . La lógica detrás de esta aproximación es la "ley de los grandes números", o lo que los científicos sociales llaman el "teorema del jurado de Condorcet". ...
Courts and constitutional scholars throughout Latin America routinely engage in processes of constitutional comparison. The article, however, provides a typology of the many different ways in which they can, and do, compare constitutionally –e. g., through ‘borrowing’ or transfer-oriented, genetic or genealogical forms of comparison; deliberative, empirical, reflective and /or moral-cosmopolitan forms of comparison. Each mode of comparison implies a somewhat different focus, has greater relevance under some constitutional theories than others, and can take ‘thinner’ or ‘thicker’ forms. And each is likely to be practised by different constitutional actors –i. e., in the case of deliberative, moral-cosmopolitan or transfer-oriented modes of comparison, by constitutional drafters, lawyers or judges, or in the case of (at least thick) empirical comparison, by constitutional scholars. But each has value and relevance in Latin America. The article further draws attention to the particular value for scholars working in the field of a form of empirical or ‘socio-legal’ comparison that embraces broad attention to constitutional context (including a constitution’s institutional, social, economic and political context) and attention to the insights of other disciplines, including history, sociology, comparative politics and economics /econometrics. In doing so, it outlines some basic principles of case-selection that can usefully guide processes of comparison of this kind. But it also calls for a realistic approach to these principles, which recognizes the strengths of different scholars in studying various constitutional systems, and the need for provisional, overlapping studies, which together contribute to robust findings about the origins and/or consequences of constitutional developments.
... The second theme is about 'unconstitutional constitutional amendments' (Roznai 2014(Roznai , 2017Dixon and Landau 2015;Albert 2009). This is a broad theme and includes a wide range of cases. ...
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on a possible postponement of the 2021 South African local government elections is analysed. The question was whether a court of law could constitutionally postpone the election and if so, would such a postponement constitute a legal amendment of the Constitution? In a brief literature review, four themes were identified, namely the ‘unamendability’ of a constitution, unconstitutional constitutional amendments, the ‘basic structure’ of constitutions’ doctrine and the ‘implicit limitations’ on amendments doctrine. The Electoral Commission of SA appointed the Moseneke inquiry for advice on whether the election will be free and fair while subject to the pandemic regulations. It recommended an election postponement beyond the constitutional time-limits which was tested by the Constitutional Court. The Court did not allow for a postponement but insisted on additional voter registrations. The conclusions are that the judiciary regarded ‘regular elections’ as a more binding constitutional principle than ‘free and fair elections’. Judicial amendments of the Constitution would be possible only in exceptional cases, which excluded the pandemic. The positive public perceptions about the election are qualified by a lower voter turnout, which results in compromising the quality of South Africa’s democracy, but only temporarily.
... Constitutions are written or unwritten (Amar 2012;Fassbender 2016), liberal and illiberal (Ginsburg and Simpser 2014;Tushnet 2017), congeries of basic laws or single texts (Albert and Colón-Ríos 2019;Navot and Roznai 2019). They are also national, subnational, or even transnational (Dixon and Landau 2015). The capaciousness (or indeterminacy) of this category is, in part, what has made socio-legal studies of comparative constitutional law so exciting. ...
This article argues that there is body of governing laws appearing widely throughout the global history of religions that warrants classification as constitutions. Like national constitutions, these religious constitutions present themselves as a form of “higher law” that declare the identity of a given a community, organize its structures of governing power, define its foundational norms, and authorize further acts of rulemaking. In this article, I offer an overview of these texts across several traditions and a defense of their importance in the study of comparative constitutional law. I then draw on fieldwork from Sri Lanka to provide a firsthand account of what a modern religious constitution looks like and how it works to govern one of the country’s largest communities of Buddhist monks. I conclude by urging scholars to view religion and constitutional law not as opposing legal domains but, rather, as homologous forms of social ordering that draw upon similar concepts and logics to address common human dilemmas.
... Dentro de la literatura contemporánea se ha señalado que mayores niveles de rigidez constitucional tendrían un impacto positivo sobre las democracias debido a que, tal y como sostuvo Madison, se prevendría la «tiranía de la mayoría», otorgándose poder de veto a las minorías con el objeto de frenar reformas radicales por parte de mayorías circunstanciales cuyo propósito sería mantenerse y concentrar el poder de forma indefinida, lesionando las bases sostenedoras del sistema democrático (Buchanan y Tullock, 1962;Dixon y Landau, 2015;Landau, 2013). ...
El artículo discute sobre la relación entre rigidez constitucional y democracia. De acuerdo al liberalismo, constituciones más flexibles (o menos rígidas) producen democracias más débiles. Con el propósito de probar que esta relación no se cumple en todos los casos, la investigación examina el caso de Uruguay como un caso atípico de baja rigidez constitucional, democracia estable y reformas que no han debilitado la democracia electoral. Por otro lado, se argumenta sobre las desventajas en la implementación de elevadas barreras de enmienda explorando dos casos: Venezuela bajo la Constitución de 1961 y Chile bajo la Constitución de 1980. El análisis de los casos ilustra que constituciones más flexibles no necesariamente producen democracias más débiles o reformas que debiliten la democracia. Asimismo, elevados niveles de rigidez pueden generar problemas de adaptación de los sistemas constitucionales a las demandas de su entorno.
... Revus, 41 | 2020 4.2 Unconstitutional constitutional amendments 22 Ackerman's theoretical view has both improved our understanding of constitutionalism and stimulated our discussions about the scope and limits of constitutional reforms. In line with these developments, the issue of constitutional amendment has begun to receive extraordinary attention within the last few years (see for example Albert 2009;Dixon & Landau 2015;Isacharoff 2011;Roznai 2017). In a recent interview, Yaniv Roznai, one of the leading figures in this discussion, summarized the matter in the following way: ...
... Los nuevos actores autoritarios cubren sus verdaderas intenciones con la proclamación de una Constitución con todos los componentes liberales (constitucionalismo autoritario; Tushnet, 2015) y organizan elecciones regularmente (autoritarismo electoral; Schedler, 2016). Incluso reforman la Ley Fundamental siguiendo formalmente los procedimientos constitucionales, con fines antidemocráticos, y mani-pulan a los jueces constitucionales para permitir decisiones que disminuyen la calidad de la democracia y del Estado constitucional (constitucionalismo abusivo; Dixon y Landau, 2015). ...
... For Dixon and Landau (2015) abusive constitutional developments undermine constitutional democracy or the entire constitutional system "based on free and fair elections and respect for the rule of law and basic human rights and hence is contrary to international law.'' Despite the fact that international law provides frame work of liberal democracy, the scholars have pointed out that historically the matters such as forms of government were considered as matters related to internal governance and hence were beyond the scope of international law (See, e.g., Franck, 1992, 46-91). ...
This research concerns the constitutional development in Pakistan with a specific reference to 21st Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan. It is widely perceived among scholarly and semi-scholarly circles that the tendency of militarys direct intervention in politics; toppling democratically elected government has been declined for the last many decades across the world. According to the new trends, military interferes in the state affairs through indirect means. One of the indirect means includes abusive constitutionalism that involves constitutional amendment and constitutional replacement as mechanisms for constitutional change. The paper explores whether 21st Amendment to Constitution of Pakistan was an abusive constitutionalism that really empowered military to get a strong hold on key policy making areas of national interest during the democratic rule. The research concludes that the 21st Amendment was an abusive constitutionalism as it curtailed civil liberties and fundamental rights of the citizens and hence undermined democracy in Pakistan.
... The first attempt succeeded, but the second was blocked by a decision of the Colombian Constitutional Court. Uribe left power in 2010 and, like Correa, was succeeded by a successor from his own party, Juan Manuel Santos (Dixon & Landau 2015). Santos, however, took a far more centrist, conciliatory line than Uribe. ...
This article reassesses the relationship between populism, democracy, and constitutionalism in light of the strong tendency toward personalism that populism often carries. Populists who have taken power in recent years have often sought to carry out formal or informal constitutional changes. Whereas some of these changes have been celebrated as constitutional innovations, many have been viewed as threats to democracy. Focusing on examples from Latin America, this article shows that despite the stress populists put on constitutional change, the phenomenon remains tied to the charisma of individual leaders. Populist leaders go to great lengths to remain in office, and succession poses an acute regime crisis. A core task for constitutional design is incentivizing populist leaders to leave power, which is more likely to be achieved by channeling politics than by judicial fiat. If this can be accomplished, the ultimate legacy of populist constitutions may be more beneficial, and less harmful, than commonly thought.
Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Law and Social Science, Volume 16 is October 13, 2020. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.
Comparative Political Process Theory or Comparative Representative Reinforcement Theory (CPPT/CRRT) is an emerging scholarly field that theorizes about the courts’ role in the broader comparative universe. Considered an intellectual descendent of John Hart Ely’s work in the American context, CPPT/CRRT emphasizes the courts’ role in preventing democratic backsliding, promoting equality, enhancing the efficacy of democratic institutions, fostering deliberative processes, and addressing the failures of majoritarian politics. CPPT/CRRT scholars generally advocate broadening judicial powers and capabilities to fulfill these roles. This article examines the practicality of such judicial responsibilities through the lens of the review of constitutional amendments in India. It concludes that, despite the theoretical aspirations of CPPT/CRRT, courts are unlikely to meet these expectations in practice due to their institutional limitations. The positive outcomes of judicial interventions tend to be more modest than the protective and proactive actions envisioned by CPPT/CRRT proponents. Moreover, the modest benefits also come at the cost of the potential adverse impacts that an empowered judiciary may impose on the constitutional fabric. Consequently, this article suggests a need for recalibration of CPPT/CRRT scholarship wherein its goals are moderated and its aspirational objectives balanced against the potential adverse effects of an empowered judiciary on constitutional systems.
This volume of essays brings together a group of leading political scientists, legal scholars, and political theorists to describe and analyze the body of constitutional law and practice within and upon democratic institutions, in particular examining how constitutional law shapes electoral democracy. Constitutional law and practice on this question are complex and varied. This volume therefore takes a thematic and regional approach: it selects a range of key theoretical questions related to democratic constitutional design and offers a series of chapters featuring a diverse range of voices, as well as a blend of theory, qualitative studies, and quantitative methods. Readers will gain a multifaceted understanding of a phenomenon of growing importance. The volume will also be useful to students of comparative constitutionalism, who will gain a rich array of empirical evidence to stimulate further work. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Este trabajo tiene el propósito de esclarecer y valorar críticamente la argumentación jurisprudencial del Tribunal Constitucional respecto de la doctrina de las «reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales». Desde una perspectiva principalmente constitucional, aunque complementariamente filosófico-jurídica, se defenderá la tesis de que el alto Tribunal mantiene básicamente una concepción sustancialista o valorativa de la Constitución —donde las reformas constitucionales están sujetas no solo a límites institucionales, sino también a límites materiales—, evidenciándose además que dicha concepción implícita, no obstante su plausibilidad, adolece de desequilibrios importantes que resulta necesario corregir.
The rise of populism and its consequences – such as democratic backsliding, the erosion of constitutional principles, and the weakening of the rule of law – are among the most pressing issues facing comparative constitutional scholars today. To address these emerging challenges, the Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment Doctrine (UCAD) has emerged as the most promising remedy for the “third counterwave of de-mocracy”. However, a fundamental problem with UCAD is how to apply it effectively without undermining constitutional democracy, as it is often criticised and deemed illegitimate from the perspective of democratic principles.
Son yıllarda anayasanın üstünlüğünü benimseyen bazı ülkelerin yargı organları tarafından ortaya konan “temel yapı doktrini”, anayasa hukuku gündeminde önemli bir yer bulmuştur. Bu doktrini kullanan mahkemeler, anayasa değişikliklerinin içeriğine bakarak denetim yapma konusunda kendilerine olağanüstü bir yetki tanımaktadırlar. Bangladeş Yüksek Mahkemesi “temel yapı doktrini”ni ilk kez, 1989 yılında karara bağlanan Anwar Hossain Chowdhurdy davasında benimsemiştir. Bu tarihten sonra uzun bir zaman boyunca temel yapı doktrini, Bangladeş’te anayasa değişikliklerinin yargısal denetiminde tek ölçü olarak kullanılmıştır. Bangladeş Anayasasında 2011 yılındayapılan On Beşinci Anayasa Değişikliği ile getirilen geniş kapsamlı 7B maddesi, Anayasanın önemli sayıda hükmünün değiştirilemeyeceğini açıkça ortaya koymuştur. Bu çalışmada, 7B hükmünün getirilmesiyle birlikte temel yapı doktrininin, Bangladeş Anayasasında gelecekte yapılacak olan anayasa değişikliklerinin yargısal denetiminde en önemli ölçü olma özelliğini yitireceği ifade edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Yük- sek Mahkeme yargıçlarının görevden alınmasına ilişkin parlamento mekanizmasının Anayasanın 7B maddesine dayanılarak anayasaya aykırı bulunduğu Asaduzzaman Siddiqui davası ise bu iddiayı kanıtlar niteliktedir.
There has long been debate about the capacity of the US Supreme Court to achieve “progressive” social change. Recent decisions of the court also point to a new worry for American progressives: the court may not only have a limited capacity to drive such change. In some cases, it may actively stand in the way of such change or help reverse it. This invites us to rethink when, or under what conditions, courts are likely to be effective in driving change—whether in a positive, dynamic, or else more obstructionist or regressive direction.
Responsive constitutionalism is a theory of constitutionalism that starts from the idea that democracy involves two overlapping commitments — to a relatively thin ‘minimum core’ set of norms and institutions and thicker, more contestable set of rights and deliberative commitments. It then proceeds to affirm a commitment both to legal and political constitutionalism. This article explores the relevance of this theory for Australian constitutionalism and suggests that it in fact has strong resonance with the Australian constitutional tradition. First, the capital ‘C’ Constitution gives strong legal protection to the ‘minimum core’ of democracy in ss 7, 24 and the High Court’s decisions on the implied freedom of political communication and access to the franchise. Second, the small ‘c’ constitution adopts norms that help protect the democratic minimum core and advance a responsive approach to thicker democratic commitments to rights. Third, there are important connections between the idea of responsive constitutionalism and limits on the scope legal constitutionalism and judicial review in Australia. Yet, there are also ways in which a responsive approach points to potential reforms of the Australian constitutional model — to include more robust rights-based constitutional protections, albeit in ways that are premised on a notion of shared legal and political authority and enforcement, and therefore involve a ‘weak-form’ national rights charter or extended principle of legality.
Constitutions serve to legitimate the exercise of public power. Yet their scope is often subject to reasonable disagreement among citizens in a democracy. As Frank Michelman notes, this points to an understanding of democratic constitutions as a framework for contestation, rather than entrenched set of binding legal constraints. This understanding, however, arguably overlooks the difference between ordinary constitutional norms and those that protect the ‘democratic minimum core’. For the latter, there is far less scope for reasonable disagreement, and greater prudential importance to conceptualizing constitutions as entrenched norms authorized strong-form judicial review. The essay thus explores the idea of a ‘tiered’ approach to constitutional design, which combines elements of strong and weak constitutional entrenchment, and judicial review. In doing so, it further considers the role that transnational norms or practices could play in helping delineate these different constitutional tiers.
Unamendability is often viewed as a ‘lock on the door’ that can keep enemies of constitutional democracy out, at least for a time. Unsurprisingly, it has also been invoked as a potential bulwark democratic backsliding. While it may not entirely thwart authoritarian populist takeovers, unamendability – including in the form of basic structure doctrines or constitutional identity review – is said to at least delay them, buy some time for defenders of constitutional democracy to resist, and clearly signal to the outside world (including supranational institutions such as the European Union) that foul play is afoot. This article questions such easy assumptions about the nature and operation of unamendability, both in general and in an authoritarian populist context in particular. It argues, based on the examples of India and Hungary, that unamendability is a tool either too ineffective to be deployed against authoritarian populists in power, even while courts may not have been fully captured, or one they are just as comfortable wielding as their opponents. For example, the Indian Supreme Court’s hitherto celebrated basic structure doctrine has been useless in the face of the court’s refusal to hear or decide key challenges against the government. Additionally, drawing on the Hungarian case, the article shows the dark side of constitutional identity review includes captured courts defending majoritarianism and exclusion in the name of a national identity perceived as under attack. In other words, doctrines of unamendability may quickly and subversively turn into instruments of entrenching the very authoritarian populist projects proponents of such doctrines abhor.
The delegation theory of unconstitutional constitutional amendments, a limited theory of unamendability – Applying a doctrinal approach to justify unconstitutional constitutional amendments – Introducing a typology of unconstitutionality – The practical deficiencies and internal inconsistencies of the delegation theory – The limited role of the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments in the Swedish context – The redundancy of constituent power as a legal concept
The writing analyzes the judgment 11.230-2021 of the Constitutional Court. Specifically, it reviews the arguments that the Court used to accept the inapplicability, considering that it is a constitutional precept. The Court did something unprecedented: declare the unconstitutionality of a constitutional precept through inapplicability. The author argues that this sentence is problematic, because it violates the norms of competence that defines the actions of the Constitutional Court in matters of inapplicability.
Anayasa değişikliklerinin esas bakımından yargısal denetimi, anayasa hukukunun en tartışmalı konularından biridir. Esas denetiminin iki koşulu vardır: İlk olarak, anayasa değişiklikleri için öngörülmüş açık veya örtülü sınırlar bulunmalıdır. İkinci olarak, yargı organı, anayasa değişikliklerini esas bakımından denetlemek için yetkilendirilmiş olmalıdır. Anayasa değişikliklerinin esas bakımından yargısal denetime tabi tutulduğu ülkelerde, yargısal denetim açık veya örtülü sınırlara dayandırılmaktadır. Anayasa değişikliklerinin esas bakımından yargısal denetiminin söz konusu olmadığı ülkelerde mahkemeler, anayasa değişikliklerini esas bakımından denetlemeye yetkili olmadıklarını kabul etmektedir. Bu makalede, mahkemelerin anayasa değişikliklerini esas bakımından denetleyebilmek için anayasa tarafından açıkça yetkilendirilmiş olmaları gerektiğine vurgu yapılmıştır. Bu bağlamda, anayasa ile açıkça yetkilendirilmediği halde anayasa değişikliklerini esas bakımından denetleyen mahkemeler eleştirilmiştir.
El presente trabajo analiza la trayectoria constituyente de Venezuela a finales del siglo XX y su posterior deriva autoritaria de 2017. En particular, son analizados los elementos del constitucionalismo abusivo presentes en la iniciativa, convocatoria e integración de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente de 2017, una formula invocada por Nicolas Maduro como respuestaante la crisis institucional agravada por el enfrentamiento entre el Gobierno y el Congreso de mayoría opositora. Este órgano seconvertiría en una manifestación más de un diseño normativo autoritario orientado a desarticular el Estado de Derecho, la disidencia al régimen y las libertades políticas de la ciudadanía.
How should the constitutional reform in Israel be assessed in comparative terms? Comparative constitutional understandings point to the centrality of three key sets of norms as part of the ‘democratic minimum core’: (i) commitments to free and fair, regular multi-party elections; (ii) political rights and freedoms; and (iii) a system of institutional checks and balances necessary to maintain (i) and (ii). Any change in judicial power and independence must be assessed against the benchmark of the democratic minimum core, and by reference to its cumulative practical effect on a system of institutional checks and balances.
We claim that recent changes in Israel may already threaten these institutional checks, and have the potential to do more damage in the future, if given broad effect and if combined with further changes in the power and independence of the Supreme Court. On this basis, we suggest, the relevant changes should be viewed as either ‘abusive’ or ‘proto-abusive’ in nature. By threatening to undermine both the power and independence of the Supreme Court of Israel, they directly threaten the health of the constitutional checks and balances system and, hence, the ‘democratic minimum core’ in Israel.
Contextualização: Apesar da aparente relação conflituosa, o constitucionalismo é essencial para a democracia, uma vez que a limitação do poder é um dos sustentáculos dos regimes democráticos. Ocorre que, na atualidade, observa-se, em muitos Estados que se autoproclamam democráticos e constitucionais, a prática de atos voltados ao enfraquecimento dos pilares da democracia, culminando em retrocessos autoritários, tudo isso sem a necessidade de lançar mão do meio clássico de tomada do poder, qual seja, o golpe de estado, mas fazendo uso de instrumentos das próprias constituições. O constitucionalismo abusivo estuda o uso dos mecanismos constitucionais para minar a democracia e, muito embora, os estudos acerca desse fenômeno, geralmente, concentrem-se sobre o Poder Executivo, nada impede que ele seja praticado por qualquer um dos poderes, ramos ou órgãos do Estado. Objetivo: Este artigo tem como objetivo demonstrar como o Supremo Tribunal Federal tem utilizado instrumentos, procedimentos, institutos e medidas próprias do Direito Constitucional de forma abusiva, com graves consequências para o constitucionalismo e democracia brasileiros. Metodologia: Quanto à metodologia empregada, a pesquisa teve natureza qualitativa, realizada por meio de ampla revisão bibliográfica em livros e revistas especializadas sobre o tema, com a finalidade de explicar os fatores que contribuem para a ocorrência do objeto em estudo. Resultados: Verificou-se que o Supremo Tribunal Federal tem sido decisivo em vários momentos de instabilidade política, crise institucional e ataques à democracia brasileira, mas que a mesma Corte protagoniza episódios de constitucionalismo abusivo, por meio de estratégias como a sincronicidade e o uso seletivo da subsunção, a concessão indiscriminada e discricionária de medidas cautelares individuais e o poder de agenda. Palavras-chave: Constitucionalismo abusivo; Democracia; STF; Poder Judiciário .
The Chilean Constitution puts under the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction the review of constitutional amendments. The notion of an unconstitutional constitutional amendment appeals to the existence of legal limits to the constitutional amending power. This article discards several alternatives of interpretation of the constitutional amendment’s limits and favors, instead, a formal, restrictive reading of such limits as the only ones compatible with the principles of democracy and popular sovereignty. This restrictive interpretation has enormous significance for understanding the amending power in times of constitutional change.
We studied the changes in the Constitution of Russia, as threats to the social security in the Russian Federation. We carried out the analysis of normative acts, law enforcement practice and relevant scientific literature. The main problems with amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation were the frequency with which they were adopted, the lack of substantiation, the similarity of their wording, the excessive simplification of the adoption procedures, the focus on authoritarianism and the creation of obstacles to the succession of powers and the principle of separation of powers. The link between the processes of constitutional change and social security issues based on appealing to foreign experience is demonstrated. Negative social cataclysms are proposed to be solved by world jurisprudence using the theory of constitutionalism and constitutional engineering. There is a variety of approaches in the definition of constitutionalism, but in the work constitutionalism is understood as a process of significant influence of the constitution on social relations through the principles: recognition and guarantee of human rights, separation of powers, people’s sovereignty, election and responsibility of officials, the highest legal force and stability of the constitution. Reference to the theory of constitutional engineering is made to motivate the protection of the constitution from unjustified changes in its text. The article also referred to the concept of “unconstitutional” constitutional amendment, which is actively applied in foreign countries. Special attention we paid to the analysis of different views on the prospects of changing the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Three main approaches were considered: calls to constitutionalize Russia’s national specifics, a proposal to strengthen European values in the Russian Constitution and justification of the need for its stability. The authors suggested to conserve the stability for the text of Russian basic law.KeywordsConstitution of RussiaConstitutional engineeringConstitutional justiceConstitutional amendments
Принципы конституционного права в XXI столетии: оценка и прогнозы развития в научных школах генерологии права, правовой и конституционной футурологии.
Умнова-Конюхова И. А.
Институт научной информации по общественным наукам РАН 117418, г. Москва, Нахимовский пр-т, д. 51/21, Российская Федерация
Аннотация
Цель. Выявить актуальные проблемы теории и методологии общих принципов права и принципов конституционного права, рассмотреть теоретико-прикладные аспекты нового понимания, особенностей природы и систематизации принципов конституционного права.
Процедура и методы. При написании статьи применены общенаучные методы (системного анализа, диалектический, формально-логический) и специальные методы исследования (сравнительно-правовой, историко-правовой, формально-юридический).
Результаты. Раскрыты теоретико-методологические и научно-практические вопросы формирования и развития методологии общих принципов права и принципов конституционного права как фундаментальных правовых регуляторов конституционного строя государств и общего международного публичного правопорядка в XXI столетии. Даны оценка и прогнозы эволюции и систематизации данных принципов в контексте решения актуальных задач новых научных школ генерологии права, правовой и конституционной футурологии.
Теоретическая и/или практическая значимость. Результаты исследования вносят вклад в теорию конституционного права, создавая предпосылки для развития теории и классификаций принципов конституционного права, методологии конституционно-правовой таксономии и дальнейшего углубленного концептуального изучения конституционно-правовых категорий.
Ключевые слова: общие принципы права, принципы конституционного права, общепризнанные принципы международного права, природа принципов права, классификация принципов конституционного права, конституционно-правовая таксономия, генерология права, конституционная футурология.
Principles of constitutional law in the XXI century. Assessment and forecasts of development in scientific schools of the generology of law, legal and constitutional futurology
Abstract
Goal. To identify the actual problems of the theory and methodology of the general principles of law and principles of constitutional law, to consider the theoretical and applied aspects of a new understanding, the peculiarities of the nature and systematization of the principles of constitutional law.
Procedure and methods. When writing the article, general scientific methods (system analysis, dialectical, formal-logical) and special research methods (comparative-legal, historical-legal, formal-legal) were used.
Results. The theoretical, methodological, scientific and practical issues of the formation and development of the methodology of general principles of law and principles of constitutional law as fundamental legal regulators of the constitutional system of states and the general international public order in the XXI century are disclosed. The assessment and forecasts of the evolution and systematization of these principles are given in the context of solving urgent problems of new scientific schools of the generology of law, legal and constitutional futurology.
Theoretical and/or practical significance. The results of the research contribute to the theory of constitutional law, creating prerequisites for the development of the theory and classifications of the principles of constitutional law, the methodology of constitutional and legal taxonomy and further in-depth conceptual study of constitutional and legal categories.
Keywords: general principles of law, principles of constitutional law, generally recognized principles of international law, nature of principles of law, classification of principles of constitutional law, constitutional and legal taxonomy, generology of law, constitutional futurology.
In 1989, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, in the Anwar Hossain Chowdhury case, first embraced implicit unamendability or interpretative unamendability of the Constitution – that is, the basic structure doctrine. Since then, the basic structure or the basic feature doctrine has been recognised as the theoretical premise underpinning judicial review of constitutional amendments in Bangladesh. In 2011, the Parliament adopted Article 7B of the Constitution, which introduced explicit or codified unamendability of a substantial number of provisions of the Constitution. This article argues that with the adoption of Article 7B, the basic structure doctrine has lost its relevance as the most important normative tool for determining the validity of future constitutional amendments, and this was confirmed in the Asaduzzaman case, in which the parliamentary mechanism for the removal of Supreme Court judges was held unconstitutional on the basis of Article 7B of the Constitution. It is also argued that the reasoning provided in the majority opinion of the Asaduzzaman case is not entirely flawless.
The current crisis in the relationship between the Polish Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) is of crucial significance for the process of regional integration based on the values of liberal democracy taking place in the EU. The constitutional crisis in Poland that began in the end of 2015 has challenged the systemic position of the Polish Constitutional Court. It resulted in a new model of constitutional adjudication, and in this new model the Constitutional Court, stripped of its counter-majoritarian power, cannot be perceived as the guardian of liberal democracy. This article postulates that the assessment of the present case law of the Polish Constitutional Court in European matters is made through the prism of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence pre-2016 (i.e. before the constitutional crisis). Based on that assumption, the current reversal in the case law of the Polish Constitutional Court concerning the ECJ is analysed and assessed. It is argued that the root cause of the constitutional crisis in Poland is the departure from the principles of liberal democracy in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, which are foundational—in light of the assumptions of the integration process—for the axiological identity of the EU and its Member States. This article also shows how the principles and concepts developed in the Polish constitutional jurisprudence pre-2016 could have served to avoid the current conflict with the ECJ, and how those notions are misused in the current jurisprudence of the Polish Constitutional Court.
This chapter summarizes current constitutional design regarding the Amendment Power. It is based on the review of national constitutions and seeks to establish a common ground for writing and amending constitutions. It reviews procedural considerations for amendment clauses of rigid and flexible constitutions and the structural approach for drafting them. It specifies organs and thresholds to initiate amendments and passing them and reviews the time frames for this procedure and associated legislative advice. Further it elaborates on approval by referendum as foreseen by some constitutions. Limits of constitutional amendments such as immutable sections of a constitution or moratoriums of constitutional amendments and the possible involvement of the constitutional court in the amendment process finalise the review. This chapter forms part of Vol. I of Writing Constitutions
En los diseños constitucionales contemporáneos suelen imponerse límites al poder de reforma constitucional. Aunque no todas las constituciones vigentes establecen nor- mas o disposiciones inmodificables, algunos tribunales constitucionales han derivado del texto restricciones implícitas para el poder de reforma. La Constitución Política de 1991 no posee cláusulas pétreas o normas intangibles y autoriza a la Corte Constitucio- nal para controlar la constitucionalidad de las reformas a la constitución solo por vicios de procedimiento, no por vicios de contenido. Sin embargo, la Corte Constitucional definió que el poder constituyente derivado está sujeto a límites competenciales, los cuales se proyectan sobre el contenido de la constitución. A fin de establecer en qué casos el poder de reforma excede el ámbito de su competencia, la Corte creó una me- todología denominada test de sustitución. El propósito de este capítulo es reconstruir la estructura del test de sustitución y evaluar la capacidad de respuesta que posee frente a la identificación de los elementos definitorios de la constitución. En términos generales, se sostiene que el test de sustitución evade el problema de la identidad de la constitución y profundiza las objeciones que se han formulado contra la autoridad del juez para definir sus elementos esenciales.
Numerosas cortes en todo el mundo han evaluado o ejercido la facultad para invalidar una reforma constitucional. Sin embargo, no debemos tomar la creciente prevalencia de la teoría de la reforma constitucional inconstitucional como evidencia de su conveniencia para todos los Estados constitucionales. Es imperativo que los actores constitucionales comprendan que hay otra respuesta a la pregunta sobre si una reforma puede ser inconstitucional. Este artículo tiene tres objetivos y tratamos de cumplir cada uno de ellos con referencia a tres jurisdicciones específicas, Francia, Georgia y Turquía, cuyas constituciones y prácticas constitucionales concomitantes han rechazado expresamente esta teoría de una manera que refleja lo que describimos como una resistencia formalista común a las reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales. En primer lugar, pretendemos demostrar que la teoría de la reforma constitucional inconstitucional aún no ha madurado lo suficiente como para convertirse en una norma de constitucionalismo global. También procuramos explicar cómo opera una jurisdicción que rechaza expresamente la idea de una reforma constitucional inconstitucional frente a una reforma que, en otras circunstancias, sería invalidada por ser inconstitucional en una jurisdicción donde sí fuese aceptada la teoría. Por último, buscamos evaluar lo que se gana y lo que se pierde en un Estado constitucional cuando se rechaza esta teoría. Uno de los hallazgos es que la decisión de rechazar esta teoría tiene consecuencias tanto de fortalecimiento como de debilitamiento para la democracia. Nuestro propósito más amplio es inherente a nuestra investigación en sí misma: diversificar nuestro pensamiento sobre el riesgo que se corre al considerar la aceptación de la teoría de la reforma constitucional inconstitucional como una característica necesaria del constitucionalismo, cuando el diseño y la práctica constitucional muestran claramente lo contrario.
Desde los albores del constitucionalismo democrático, se afirma que los tribunales son instituciones inherentemente débiles y, por ello, las posibilidades de limitar a sus contrapartes elegidas democráticamente, por medio del control de constitucionalidad, serían pocas. Sin embargo, el caso de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia desafía esta afirmación dado que en varias sentencias ha limitado el poder de presidentes al cuestionar la constitucionalidad de reformas constitucionales importantes para la agenda gubernamental (como reelección presidencial y paz). Este artículo pretende explicar las razones jurídico-políticas que han hecho que el control judicial de las reformas en Colombia haya sido un instrumento realmente efectivo para la limitación del poder presidencial. Concretamente, el artículo sostiene que la existencia de una arquitectura constitucional adecuada, condiciones político-culturales favorables y una estrategia judicial prudente, le permitió a la Corte Constitucional limitar a un actor mucho más poderoso como el presidente.
This chapter describes and assesses the procedures, norms and practices pertaining to constitutional advice in Cyprus. The chapter also examines the development of constitutional advising in the Cypriot setting, taking into account the comparative dimension and the influences from the civil law and common law traditions. Finally, the chapter focuses on the rationale behind the isolationist Cypriot approach and the institutional and substantive gaps that are formed. It is argued that there is an overlap of functions concentrated in the institution of an all-powerful Attorney-General that blurs the line between advising and reform. The Attorney-General is the exclusive legal advisor for the executive in a rigid presidential system. The law of necessity has removed the internal counter-balancing element and the progress of time has magnified the reliance on one official. There is need for reform that must touch upon the role of the Attorney-General. The reform can include the institutional setting-up of an advising body for the legislature, the institutional separation of the advising and wide prosecutorial roles of the AG, as well as the introduction of pluralism in constitutional advising through the distinction between concrete specific advice and abstract advice aiming at reforms.
En Colombia, el acuerdo de paz se suscribió en el contexto de una constitución en vigor. Los instrumentos de justicia transicional se implementaron en múltiples reformas constitucionales que produjeron tensiones frente al régimen político vigente. Una de estas reformas constitucionales incorporó un procedimiento especial de enmienda constitucional para hacer posible el proceso de justicia transicional. En la Sentencia C-332 de 2017 se declaró parcialmente inconstitucional tal procedimiento de enmienda constitucional. El propósito de este artículo es analizar cómo se superan las tensiones entre la rigidez interpretativa de la constitución y el cambio transicional. Por lo tanto, argumento que un proceso de transición implica una identidad constitucional flexible para adaptar el régimen vigente a lasexigencias de la justicia transicional. El control de constitucionalidad realizado al procedimiento especial de reforma constitucional puede leerse como un control político al proceso de paz y no como un control jurídico al procedimiento de enmienda.
El contenido de la Constitución Política de Colombia de 1991 ha sido extensamente estudiado en la dogmática constitucional colombiana. En este libro, analizamos varios problemas que versan sobre el significado de la constitución y el alcance que tienen algunos de sus principios y derechos funda-mentales. El texto está estructurado en tres apartados. En la primera parte, analizamos cuestiones relacionadas con el significado de la Constitución. Consideramos el problema de los desacuerdos que origina la interpretación de disposiciones constitucionales sobre derechos de parejas del mismo sexo en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional español y de la Corte Constitucional colom-biana. Además, abordamos las dificultades que genera la identificación de elementos esenciales de la constitución vigente a través del test de sustitución creado por la Corte Constitucional. En la segunda parte, nos ocupamos de los principios de colaboración armónica y el debido proceso. La colaboración armónica es estudiada desde las concepciones clásicas del pensamiento jurídico y el debido proceso a partir de la incidencia que tuvo el neoconstitucionalismo sobre conceptos básicos de la dogmática procesal. En la tercera parte, proponemos un análisis sobre los derechos de las víctimas y el consentimiento informado en el ámbito médico. Proponemos una reflexión acerca de los derechos a la reparación, a la participación política y a la memoria de las víctimas del conflicto armado en una democracia. Finalmente, examinamos la naturaleza del consentimiento informado y su relación con los derechos fundamentales. En cada capítulo planteamos propuestas de análisis sobre el alcance que tienen los desacuerdos interpretativos, los elementos definitorios, los principios y los derechos en la constitución vigente.
The European constitutional tradition rests on the foundation of human rights,
the rule of law and democracy. In its interpretation of the meaning of the provisions
of Article 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania,1 the Constitutional
Court of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter also referred to as the Constitutional
Court) stressed in 2014 that the innate nature of human rights, democracy and the
independence of the state are those constitutional values that form the foundation of
the Constitution and the whole State of Lithuania.2 No one may deny the provisions of
the Constitution that consolidate these fundamental constitutional values; otherwise,
the essence of the Constitution itself would be denied.
Democracy, as one of the three constitutional values mentioned above, is
inconceivable without democratic elections and, in most countries, without
referendums. The article confirms that democratic elections and referendums are
both based on the same constitutional foundations: the sovereignty of the people,
democracy and the constitutionally guaranteed electoral rights. The constitutionally
consolidated democratic principles governing elections to political representative
institutions are, therefore, mutatis mutandis applicable to referendums. Some of these
universal principles underlying the European electoral tradition, as well as examples
of national experience in applying these principles, are discussed in the article.
El presente artículo propone una vista distinta de los hechos ocurridos el 9 de noviembre de 2020 y posteriores en el Perú, a raíz de la vacancia presidencial de Martín Vizcarra por la causal de incapacidad moral. La mirada para analizar estos sucesos se centran en la hipótesis de que el Perú presenció un Constitucionalismo abusivo por parte del Congreso de la República, hipótesis que se busca probar a lo largo del trabajo. En primer lugar, la investigación detalla y explica las concepciones iniciales que tiene el Constitucionalismo abusivo y cómo la doctrina ha ido delimitando el concepto. En segundo lugar, se proponen nuevas formas de manifestación que puede tener el Constitucionalismo abusivo más allá de su definición inicial, de tal manera que pueda incluir otros supuestos en los que se esté socavando la democracia mediante mecanismos aparentemente constitucionales. En tercer lugar, se realiza un estudio crítico al sistema de gobierno peruano y las instituciones constitucionales que ha adoptado en su organización, lo que permite identificar los puntos débiles de su estructura política y cómo el Constitucionalismo abusivo puede manifestarse. En cuarto lugar, se analiza la figura de la vacancia por incapacidad moral y cuáles podrían ser sus posibles delimitaciones. Por último, se realiza el análisis final a los hechos ocurridos el 9 de noviembre de 2020 y se determina la presencia de un Constitucionalismo abusivo en la actuación del Congreso.
Dalam studi perbandingan hukum tata negara, doktrin amendemen konstitusi yang inkonstitusional telah banyak menarik perhatian para sarjana dalam beberapa tahun terakhir. Konsekuensi dari doktrin amendemen konstitusi yang inkonstitusional adalah adanya pembatasan kekuasaan amendemen konstitusi. Artikel ini bermaksud untuk menjelaskan doktrin amandemen konstitusi yang inkonstitusional yang berimplikasi pada pembatasan kekuasaan amendemen konstitusi. Selain itu, artikel ini juga membahas praktik pembatasan kekuasaan amendemen konstitusi di beberapa negara seperti Jerman, India dan Kolombia. Berdasarkan teori dan praktik atas pembatasan kekuasaan amendemen konstitusi, artikel ini berupaya untuk menjawab apakah doktrin amendemen konstitusi yang inkonstitusional dapat diterapkan di Indonesia. Dalam artikel ini dikemukakan bahwa dalam UUD 1945 terdapat ketentuan yang tidak dapat diubah. Oleh karenanya, Mahkamah Konstitusi dapat mengadopsi doktrin amendemen konstitusi yang inkonstitusional jika amendemen konstitusi dilakukan terhadap ketentuan yang tidak dapat diganggu gugat dalam konstitusi. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian hukum doktrinal dengan menggunakan pendekatan yuridis normatif dan komparatif.
The Colombian Constitutional Replacement Doctrine has been created by the Constitutional Court in order to review whether amendments to the Constitution are substantially constitutional or not, despite the fact that the Constitution prescribes that such a review is circumscribed to procedural defects in its creation only. In this article we present the Replacement Doctrine, its background and the premises on which it is built. We then provide a critique. On the one hand, the critique aims at the theoretical inconsistency of the doctrine, both from a logical and legal perspective. On the other, it points out the implications the doctrine has within the separation of powers structure. The critique emphasizes how problematic the position taken by the Constitutional Court as an arbiter of Colombian politics is. Also, it underscores how the doctrine distorts the principle of constitutional supremacy and the legitimate field of autonomy of the political.
Ongoing discussions on the need to amend the effective Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 or to enact a new Fundamental Law have made the question on the limits of permitted modifications of system-related decisions to become increasingly pertinent also in the context of Polish constitutional law. The question posed above naturally raises further questions: the importance of the constitution itself, its role in the legal system, the relationship between constituent power and constituted power, as well as the interdependence between constitutionalism and democracy. These questions are well embedded in theoretical and legal considerations, and the answers to them depend to a large extent on the adoption of specific initial assumptions.
El presente artículo aborda el principio de proporcionalidad a la luz de una teoría sustantiva de la justicia y los derechos subjetivos que lo fundamenta. A pesar de la existencia del principio de proporcionalidad, resulta necesaria una teoría “externa” a la mecánica del funcionamiento del principio de proporcionalidad. Una que sirva de soporte a los jueces al momento de responder las preguntas normativas que exige la aplicación del principio. Los pasos y las probabilidades de la proporcionalidad no son suficientes a la hora de identificar distinciones cualitativas entre derechos o atribuir pesos abtractos a la restricción de un derecho vis-à-vis el cumplimiento de un fin legítimo o la garantía de otro derecho de igual importancia. Por tal razón, el presente artículo subraya la necesidad de elaborar serie de teorías sustantivas que sustenten el test de proporcionalidad al determinar, entre otros elementos, el alcance y la aplicación de los derechos en las diferentes esferas sociales, el efecto horizontal de los derechos constitucionales en el ámbito privado, o las implicaciones institucionales de la aplicación del principio de constitucionalidad al determinar el rol de los tribunales en ejercicio del control constitucional.
This essay argues that invoking the concept of the “constituent power” clarifies some persistent puzzles about the constitutional
and legal status of purportedly unconstitutional constitutional amendments. It argues that in some circumstances such amendments
should be understood as exercises of the constituent power, effecting revolutionary transformations in a nation’s constitutional
identity but—sometimes—through the forms of legality. The essay distinguishes between a purely conceptual version of the constituent
power and a more sociological or real-world version, and argues that the former is superior to the latter.
More than two decades after the post-communist constitutional transition, Hungary
is in the spotlight again. As a result of the 2010 elections, the governing
majority has two-thirds of the seats in parliament, which makes constitutional
revision exceptionally easy. Th is is not only conjecture, since the Constitution has
been changed ten times within half a year, including a reduction of the Constitutional
Court’s competencies. In April 2011, on the fi rst anniversary of the 2010
election, a brand new constitution was promulgated, named the Basic Law.
Th e objective of this paper is to describe how these changes are altering the
basic structure of the Hungarian State. We fi rst briefl y outline the state structure
based upon the 1989 Constitution. Second, we show how the fl exible Constitution
and the hostile political climate have challenged the constitutional stability. Th ird,
we describe the fl urry of controversial constitutional changes including limitation
of the competencies of the Constitutional Court immediately after the elections.
Fourth, we review the process of the adoption of the new constitution, the Basic
Law. And finally, painting with a broad brush, we introduce the main features of
that new constitution.
The use of comparative constitutional materials in constitutional interpretation – comparative constitutional interpretation – has emerged as a central component of contemporary constitutional practice. This article identifies three distinct modes of comparative constitutional interpretation (universalist, genealogical, and dialogical) which offer courts the interpretive resources to explain why comparative law should count. Because of their centralizing role in legitimizing and validating the exercise of public power, courts are under an obligation to engage in a process of justification for their decisions. Through an examination of the case law of the Constitutional Court of South Africa and the Supreme Court of Canada, the author discusses the three ways that justification occurs within comparative constitutional jurisprudence and the distinct normative justification for the use of comparative law that each offers. The author finally assesses the scope, effects, and the legitimacy of the normative claims of each mode.
This article is built around three general observations. The first is that, in the current stage of the development of constitutional theory and practice, there is a need to create procedures allowing the review of constitutional amendments. The second is that traditional mechanisms, in particular the “internal” review of constitutionality of constitutional amendments, may not always be able to provide sufficient protection against amendments that run counter to the existing constitutional structure. The final observation is that, in the current state of globalization, international law—in particular international human rights law—may play a significant role in an “external” assessment of the legitimacy of constitutional amendments. This role of international law is particularly well developed in Europe, and most of our conclusions therefore focus on the European perspective. Given the universal nature of human rights, however, at least some of these conclusions may also be validfor other regions of the world.
At least in some subject-matter domains—most notably, social and economic rights— weak-form constitutional review may have become the predominant form of constitutional review in practice. This essay describes the obvious connections between weak-form review and political constitutionalism: Weak-form review allows the courts to bring to legislatures' attention constitutional difficulties that may have been overlooked in the process of enactment. This may occur because of the burdens of inertia and coalition-building, as identified by Rosalind Dixon, or because of unanticipatable difficulties of application in individual cases, the sort of difficulties that are central to Alon Harel's account of constitutional review as justified by a right to a hearing. Once legislatures have been so notified, they can address—or deliberatively refuse to address—the difficulties the courts have identified. Political constitutionalism provides an account of how they do so. This essay then discusses some of the political conditions that must be in place for political constitutionalism to be normatively attractive, relative to judicial constitutionalism. It concludes with some speculations about the utility of weak-form review in dealing with matters at the core of first-generation rights, such as seditious speech, after describing its utility in dealing with more “modern” problems associated with first-generation rights, such as hate speech and sexually explicit expression.
In May 2011, Britain's Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government published proposals for reform of the House of Lords. In a White Paper and draft bill they set out detailed plans for a largely or wholly elected second chamber. These marked the latest stage in a long‐running debate on Lords reform. The government's proposals aim to change the composition of the second chamber, suggesting that there will be no change to its powers or the conventions governing relations with the House of Commons. But this expectation has been disputed. The House of Lords presently does not make full use of its powers, and many anticipate that it would if its members became elected. This paper reviews the composition of all second chambers internationally, showing that wholly directly elected chambers make up the minority, and that both mixed chambers and indirect election are common. It then reviews the formal powers of all largely and wholly elected chambers. This shows that amongst parliamentary systems the formal powers of the House of Lords are relatively great. But second chamber powers, as well as their composition, vary widely.
Increased interactions among peoples and states combined with the growth of written constitutions are creating new opportunities for “extra-territorial” forms of constitutional interpretation, that is, the interpretation of domestic constitutions by “outsiders.” This article considers the potential benefits, and dangers, of outsider interpretation. It also identifies factors relevant to the appropriateness or legitimacy of such practices, drawing from analogous rules and doctrines developed in the context of U.S. federalism and international law.
International law prescribes rules for states on a wide variety of matters, such as the use of force, the protection of human rights, and the conduct of trade. Some of these rules may limit states' discretion on constitutional matters; for example, constitutions must be consistent with international human rights law protections. But international law has been widely understood to leave to each state's discretion key questions as to how its government is structured and how its constitution is revised. Recent developments in international law challenge this division. Increasingly there are signs of emerging international legal norms addressing structural constitutional matters such as the separation of powers and constitutional amendment. This article describes these developments and their background, evaluates their application to constitutional crises in Nicaragua and Togo, and discusses their relevance for U.S. constitutional law, including limits on executive power. Situating these developments in the context of other international constraints on states, the article concludes that the apparent trend toward making matters of constitutional structure and revision into proper subjects of international law has undeniable merits but also carries significant risks.
The question of legal legitimacy, liberally understood, is that of whether anyone has a morally justified complaint about impressment into compliance with a particular law or set of laws. A good constitution may possibly contribute towards a liberally legitimate practice of national politics. This essay is concerned with one way in which a constitution, no matter how excellent, cannot thus contribute. We cannot use judgments regarding constitutionality to bridge the gap that must always exist between judgments regarding the validity of controversial laws and judgments regarding their legitimacy. We cannot hope to solve in that ‘contractual’ or ‘procedural’ way the riddle of government by consent in modern social conditions of deep ethical plurality and conflict, because we cannot successfully combine a proceduralist idea of constitutional legitimacy with a content-based conception of the binding virtue for constitutions.[O]ur exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational. This is the liberal principle of legitimacy.1
Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51 DUke L
Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51 DUke L.J. 223, 226 (2001).
Is the Constitution a Contract for Legitimacy?
- E G See
- I Frank
- Michelman
See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Is the Constitution a Contract for Legitimacy?, 8 Rev. CoNsT. sTUDs 101 (2004);
Ida's Way: Constructing the Respect-Worthy Governmental System, 72 FoRDHam L); Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Legitimation for Political Acts, 66 moDeRN L
- I Frank
- Michelman
Frank I. Michelman, Ida's Way: Constructing the Respect-Worthy Governmental System, 72 FoRDHam L. Rev.
345 (2003); Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Legitimation for Political Acts, 66 moDeRN L. Rev. 1 (2003).
Democratic Consolidation in the Post-KMT Era: The Challenge of Governance, in TaiwaN's pResiDeNTiaL poLiTiCs: DemoCRaTiZaTioN aND CRoss-sTRaiT ReLaTioNs
- Yun-Han Chu
Yun-Han Chu, Democratic Consolidation in the Post-KMT Era: The Challenge of Governance, in TaiwaN's
pResiDeNTiaL poLiTiCs: DemoCRaTiZaTioN aND CRoss-sTRaiT ReLaTioNs 88, 90-93 (Muthiah Alagappa ed., 2001).
- E G See
- F John
- Copper
See, e.g., JoHN F. CoppeR, CoNsoLiDaTiNg TaiwaN's DemoCRaCY 15 (2005).
136 For the degree to which the opinion did explicitly engage with at least some transnational sources, in ways that are relatively unusual in Taiwan, see Wen-Chen Chang & Jiunn Rong-Yeh, Judges as Discursive Agent: The Use of Foreign Precedents by the Constitutional Court of Taiwan
- See Id
135 See id.
136 For the degree to which the opinion did explicitly engage with at least some transnational sources, in
ways that are relatively unusual in Taiwan, see Wen-Chen Chang & Jiunn Rong-Yeh, Judges as Discursive
Agent: The Use of Foreign Precedents by the Constitutional Court of Taiwan, in THe Use oF FoReigN pReCeDeNTs BY
CoNsTiTUTioNaL JUDges 373 (Tana Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau eds., 2013).
§ 101 (giving the president power to censure and remove the chief of the Cabinet, although not other cabinet posts
- E G See
- Const
See, e.g., CoNsT. aRg., § 101 (giving the president power to censure and remove the chief of the Cabinet,
although not other cabinet posts, by a vote of an absolute majority);
The Supreme Court Term-Comment: Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HaRv Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 iNDiaNa L
- See Vicki
- C Jackson
See Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Comment: Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence,
Resistance, Engagement, 119 HaRv. L. Rev. 109 (2005); Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of
Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 iNDiaNa L. J. 819 (1999).
See Kriszta Kovács & Gabor Attila Tóth, Hungary's Constitutional Transformation, 7 eUR
See Kriszta Kovács & Gabor Attila Tóth, Hungary's Constitutional Transformation, 7 eUR. CoNsT. L. Rev. 183,
193 (2011).
135, § 7 (allowing the Congress to vote no-confidence in ministers through an absolute majority of both chambers
- Const
- Col
CoNsT. CoL., art. 135, § 7 (allowing
the Congress to vote no-confidence in ministers through an absolute majority of both chambers, which
results in removal).
Term-Comment: Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HaRv
- See Vicki
- C Jackson
See Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Comment: Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence,
Resistance, Engagement, 119 HaRv. L. Rev. 109 (2005);