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Cosmopsychism: A Holistic Approach to the Metaphysics of Experience
Abstract
This paper introduces cosmopsychism as a holistic alternative to atomistic panpsychism, and as a general perspective on the metaphysics of consciousness. I begin with some necessary background details concerning contemporary panpsychism and the problems it faces, and then proceed to the theory itself. The starting point of the theory is the assumption that an all pervading cosmic consciousness is the single ontological ultimate. From this assumption, a panpsychist ontology of mind with distinct holistic overtones is developed. In particular, I argue that such universal consciousness serves as the ground for the emergence of individual conscious creatures. The result is a theory with significant conceptual resources which presents novel means for confronting some of the most recalcitrant problems facing contemporary panpsychism: in particular, the subject combination problem, and the problem of entailment associated with it. In so doing, cosmopsychism places itself as an viable alternative to atomistic varieties of panpsychism as well as to orthodox physicalist accounts of consciousness.
... In part 2, I provide some definitions and conceptual frameworks, which I then utilize in part 3, where I introduce the core concepts of hyperdimensional neutral monism. In part 4, I compare HNM to cosmopsychism (Shani, 2015) to demonstrate the logical viability of HNM as well as to explore some of its core concepts. In part 5, I review the problems facing HNM in particular and neutral monism in general. ...
... Subjects of experience appear within this ontological ocean as protrusions of the surface into the dimension of consciounth. These protrusions can be likened to whirlpools or vortices appearing within an ocean of water (Shani, 2015). 7 Just as physical vortices have surfaces which are part of the surface of the ocean, subjects of experience have bodies (including brains), which are part of the physical world of spacetime. ...
... While hyperdimensional neutral monism is a form of neutral monism, it shares a reliance on the aquatic metaphor with various forms of idealism (Kastrup, 2014) and cosmopsychism (Nagasawa & Wager, 2017;Shani, 2015;Shani & Keppler, 2018, Mathews, 2011. I therefore utilize this metaphor to compare HNM to cosmopsychism as well as to explain various subtle aspects of HNM. ...
This article introduces the concept of ‘hyperdimensional neutral monism’ as an elaboration and exploration of neutral monism. Neutral monism states that there is a single type of neutral, ontologically primary ultimate, which both the physical and the mental supervene on (Banks Philosophical Psychology, 23(2), 173-187, 2010). Hyperdimensional neutral monism (HNM) states that these ultimates exist in a more-than-4-dimensional realm and that the physical world of spacetime is a 4-dimensional aspect of this realm. Consciousness is the localized protrusion of spacetime into more than four dimensions. In order to explain these concepts, I utilize an aquatic metaphor of vortices appearing within a physical ocean. I compare HNM to panqualityism, which is another version of neutral monism (Coleman, Erkenntnis, 79(1), 19–44 2014 & Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Godehard Bruntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 249–282 2016), and cosmopsychism (Shani Philosophical Papers, 44(3), 389-437, 2015, Shani & Keppler, 2018) which relies on a similar aquatic metaphor. I argue that HNM is a viable means of addressing the mind–body problem and the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996, 2015, Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives,179(214), 2017, Chalmers, 2019).
... By contrast, within philosophy of mind, cosmopsychists deal with the combination problem by inverting it. Shani's (2015) development of this position is particularly clear and has many resonances with reflexive monism as well as some instructive differences. So, we will examine it in detail. ...
... Rather, the micro-experiences of its micro-components remain secluded from each other and do not bind together, resulting in a system that lacks unified subjectivity, and whose behaviour gives no indication that it contains pockets of consciousness. As Shani (2015) goes on to explain: "… the esonectic-exonectic divide fits well with empirical knowledge regarding characteristic differences in material organization between prototypical conscious entities such as brain-endowed organisms and prototypical non-conscious entities such as minerals. Mentioning a few contrastive features should suffice to illustrate the point. ...
... See, for example, Albahari (2019),Jaskolla and Buck (2012),Kastrup (2018, present volume, chapter 7, Mathews (2011,Nagasawa and Wager (2017),Shani (2015),Shani & Keppler (2018). ...
This chapter examines the integrative nature of reflexive monism (RM), a psychological/philosophical model of a reflexive, self-observing universe that can accommodate both ordinary and extraordinary experiences in a natural, non-reductive way that avoids both the problems of reductive materialism and the (inverse) pitfalls of reductive idealism. To contextualize the ancient roots of the model, the chapter touches briefly on classical models of consciousness, mind and soul and how these differ in a fundamental way from how mind and consciousness are viewed in contemporary Western philosophy and psychological science. The chapter then travels step by step from such contemporary views towards reflexive monism, and towards the end of the chapter, to more detailed comparisons with Hindu Vedanta and Samkhya philosophy and with Cosmopsychism (a recently emergent, directly relevant area of philosophy of mind).
According to RM there never was a separation between what we normally think of as the “physical world” and what we think of as our “conscious experience”. In terms of its phenomenology, the phenomenal physical world is part-of conscious experience not apart-from it. This phenomenal world can be thought of as a biologically useful representation of what the world is like, although it is not the world as-described-by modern physics, and it is not the thing itself—supporting a form of indirect (critical) realism. The analysis then outlines how 3D phenomenal worlds are constructed by the mind/brain, focusing specifically on perceptual projection, and then demonstrates how normal, first-person conscious experiences (e.g. of phenomenal worlds) and their associated, third-person viewable neural correlates can be understood as dual manifestations of an underlying psychophysical mind, which can, in turn, be understood as a psychophysical form of information processing. This dual-aspect monism combines ontological monism with a form of epistemological dualism in which first- and third-person perspectives on the nature of mind are complementary and mutually irreducible—a principle that turns out to have wide-ranging applications for the study and understanding of consciousness.
The chapter then considers the evolution and wider distribution of consciousness (beyond humans) through a brief analysis of the many forms of discontinuity theory versus continuity theory and argues that to avoid the “hard problem” of consciousness one may need to treat its existence as fundamental, and, as co-evolving with the evolution of its associated material forms. This, in turn, takes one to a central issue: What does consciousness actually do? The analysis argues that its central function is to real-ize existence (to know it in a way that makes it subjectively real). With these foundations in place we then come to the heart of the essay—the ways in which reflexive monism provides a very different view of the nature of the universe to those offered either by dualism or materialist reductionism. As summarised in the last paragraph of this section, “In this vision, there is one universe (the thing-itself), with relatively differentiated parts in the form of conscious beings like ourselves, each with a unique, conscious view of the larger universe of which it is a part. In so far as we are parts of the universe that, in turn, experience the larger universe, we participate in a reflexive process whereby the universe experiences itself.”
The essay then considers the precise ways in which this reflexive monist understanding of “consciousness” and “mind” relates to later developments in Vedic philosophy and suggests a way of bridging contemporary Western and classical Vedic ways of understanding consciousness and mind. Finally, the chapter considers what can be said of mystical experience and the ground of being, following the principle that this ground must have the power to both manifest the universe in the form that science shows it to be and our ability to experience the universe in the way that we do. In this, RM is shown to be a dual-aspect monist form of cosmopsychism—a recent area of development within philosophy of mind. The essay compares and contrasts this with idealist versions of cosmopsychism and argues that RM allows for an integrated understanding of realism versus idealism, dualism versus monism, how ordinary experience relates to mystical experience, and how consciousness relates to mind. RM also provides an ‘open’ conceptual system that can, in principle, incorporate a range of parapsychological effects.
... Another serious problem having to do with quality combination as well as subject summing is the perspective objection, formulated originally by Sam Coleman (2014) and repeated with further explication by Shani (2015) and Albahari (2020). The perspective objection basically pivots around the idea that, since the subjective experiences, the points of view, of subjects always occur as total experiences to the exclusion of everything else, they can never appear subsumed as parts of a larger subjective experience. ...
... In any case, infusionism does have the benefit (as compared to the constitutive forms of panpsychism) of avoiding the perspective objection of Coleman (2014), Shani (2015) and Albahari (2020). The perspective objection, as brought up already in chapter 4.2, pivots around the idea that phenomenal qualities can be essentially such that they exist to the exclusion of all other qualities-that there can be, for example, a phenomenal quality the essence of which is "the experience of only redness", or "the experience of total redness", or indeed "the experience of redness to the exclusion of all other colors". ...
... I shall consider one smallist framework in depth here, Phenomenal Bonding, as defended by earlier Philip Goff (2009Goff ( , 2016. Smallist frameworks are not the only option, however: there is also the priority monist Priority Cosmopsychism, exemplified by Itay Shani (2015) and Yujin Nagasawa and Khai Wager (2016), lately also endorsed by Goff (2017a). Gregg Rosenberg's (2004Rosenberg's ( , 2016 Theory of Natural Individuals is, due to its much more significantly revisionist nature, difficult to categorize in any pre-existing taxonomy, and serves as an example of a more unique approach to the problem. ...
In this book I elucidate and evaluate panpsychism, the view that consciousness is ubiquitous in nature. Panpsychism is contrasted with emergent physicalism. The book covers some of the most critical problems facing emergent physicalism, and moves on to describe panpsychism and its most common variants.
After an in-depth discussion of the combination problem for panpsychism, the different variants of panpsychism are assessed in terms of their competence in answering this problem. The book ends with a discussion of the most helpful solutions to the problem, and of the possible ways forward for the panpsychist.
... By contrast, within philosophy of mind, cosmopsychists deal with the combination problem by inverting it. Shani's (2015) development of this position is particularly clear and has many resonances with reflexive monism as well as some instructive differences. So, we will examine it in detail. ...
... Rather, the micro-experiences of its micro-components remain secluded from each other and do not bind together, resulting in a system that lacks unified subjectivity, and whose behaviour gives no indication that it contains pockets of consciousness. As Shani (2015) goes on to explain: "… the esonectic-exonectic divide fits well with empirical knowledge regarding characteristic differences in material organization between prototypical conscious entities such as brain-endowed organisms and prototypical non-conscious entities such as minerals. Mentioning a few contrastive features should suffice to illustrate the point. ...
... See, for example, Albahari (2019),Jaskolla and Buck (2012),Kastrup (2018, present volume, chapter 7, Mathews (2011,Nagasawa and Wager (2017),Shani (2015),Shani & Keppler (2018). ...
This is an Introduction to "Is the Universe Conscious? Reflexive Monism and the Ground of Being" an invited chapter for E. Kelly and P. Marshall (eds.) Consciousness Unbound. Rowman and Littlefield (2021--in press). The presentation introduces ancient dualist and monist attempts to understand how consciousness, mind, self and soul relate to brain, body and the material world. It then contrasts modern dualist and materialist- reductionist visions of the universe with reflexive monism, the view that the universe is reflexive and self-observing. It explains ways in which the latter requires a paradigm shift in which consciousness and its material accompaniments are entirely natural consequences of what the universe is like, exemplified by the dual-aspect monist nature of the human mind and that of other sentient beings. The presentation then introduces different ways to explore the ground of being, and makes connections with Eastern as well as Western philosophy. The presentation is publicly available at https://youtu.be/6AqijBqX7z0
... This is not to imply a solipsism, where everything exists in a personal mind. Rather, Kastrup (2017aKastrup ( , 2018Kastrup ( , 2019 refers to a 'mind at large' (synonymous with 'Cosmic Consciousness', see Shani, 2015), in which all things (mind and matter) exist within. Physicalism according to Kastrup (2017a) is an 'explanatory model' and not a given, used to try to account for correlations between brain activity and inner life, the fact we all inhabit the same world and how the world unfolds independently of personal volition (see Kastrup, 2017a for an extended discussion). ...
... 33)as Kastrup (2018) argues, to suggest that some ultimates are conscious, raises the problem of how 'micro-level phenomenal parts' (Kastrup, 2018: 135) can constitute macro human subjectivity. This is known as the subject-combination problem, which prompted Cosmopsychisms (see Mathews, 2011;Shani, 2015), to posit a cosmos-as-a-whole ontology; which sees phenomenality (in the forms of mind and matter) as expressions of Consciousness. Subjectivity in Cosmopsychism is an extension to 'force fields, space itself, rather than its restriction to merely matter' (Mathews, 2011-cited in Kastrup, 2018. ...
... Can a Consciousness-only ontology offer a wider understanding about the nature of child? In order to address the value of relative subjectivity as an experience, Kastrup (2018), draws upon the work of Shani (2015) who posits 'two intrinsic features of Cosmic Consciousness as constituents of the generic character of each relative subject' (p. 136). ...
The ‘new’ sociology of childhood sees an emergence of interdisciplinary approaches to understanding self, experience and subjectivity of children. As debates frame research with children, concerned with ‘ethics’ and ‘agency’, what is meant by the ‘subject’ of experience is given little attention. In this article, I ask whether narratives are a true representation of ‘self’; who is the ‘experiencer’ that stories refer to and what are the implications for claiming subjectivity through narrative structures? I suggest that ‘experience’ is an irreducible quality of reality that transcends personal self, and that a core subjectivity serves as the dative of experience, ‘ as natures sole ontological primitive. Understanding self, experience and subjectivity in line with an “Analytical Idealism”’, offers fresh insight into current sociological debates in Childhood Studies.
... This is not to imply a solipsism, where everything exists in a personal mind. Rather, Kastrup (2017aKastrup ( , 2019 refers to a 'mind at large' (synonymous with 'Cosmic Consciousness' -see Shani, 2015), in which all things (mind and matter) exist within. Physicalism according to Kastrup (2017a) is an 'explanatory model' and not a given, used to try to account for correlations between brain activity and inner life, the fact we all inhabit the same world and how the world unfolds independently of personal volition (see Kastrup, 2017a for an extended discussion). ...
... As Kastrup argues (2018), to suggest that some ultimates are conscious, raises the problem of how 'micro-level phenomenal parts' (Kastrup, 2018, p135) can constitute macro human subjectivity. This is known as the subject-combination problem, which prompted Cosmopsychisms (see Matthews, 2011;Shani, 2015), to posit a cosmosas-a-whole ontology; which sees phenomenality (in the forms of mind and matter) as expressions of Consciousness. Subjectivity in Cosmopsychism is an extension to 'force fields, space itself, rather than its restriction to merely matter' (Matthews, 2011-cited in Kastrup, 2018. ...
... In order to address the value of relative subjectivity as an experience, , draws upon the work of Shani (2015) who posits 'two intrinsic features of Cosmic Consciousness as constituents of the generic character of each relative subject' (p136). One as a relative 'I' and a core 'I': ...
... Does the hypothesis of an object-oriented metamind clash with the interconnectedness of all objects? Shani (2015) argued that the division of the physical world into objects is merely nominal, because objects are not natural kinds. ...
... This is picturesque but has no obvious explanatory power. Likewise is Shani's (2015) metaphor of the personal mind as "a 'vortex' surging from the oceanic background" of cosmic consciousness-a metaphor that brings a lot of baggage from fluid dynamics without offering any account of the structure and dynamics of the connection between personal consciousness and the metamind. ...
... To avoid this problem with panpsychism, some writers have advocated 'cosmopsychism', associating a universal mind with the state of the whole physical universe. For example, Mathews (2011), Jaskolla and Buck (2012), Shani (2015), Nagasawa and Wager (2016). At first, this seems like an extrapolation of panpsychism, but jettisoning any structural mirroring between the physical construct and the mental world loses the core intuition of panpsychism. ...
In the contemporary debate on the Cartesian mind-body problem, the theories of panpsychism and mental monism are receiving growing attention as candidate accounts of the conscious mind. Panpsychism asserts that consciousness pervades a spatially extended physical universe, while mental monism asserts that consciousness exists in a purely mental domain, and denies the reality of physical substance and space. In this paper, I compare the two theories and evaluate whether each is true. They seem fundamentally contradictory, but I propose that they are closer than they seem. I argue that their apparent difference rests on a category-mistake (in Ryle’s term), a misplaced reification of the physical. My claim is that physics is topic neutral (in Foster’s use of the term) and that consequently situating consciousness in a purely notional physical universe adds nothing to our concept of reality beyond what mental monism gives us. I argue that: First, when we see physics correctly through the lens of topic neutrality, the physical part of panpsychism disappears and the theory reduces to mental monism. Second, that mental monism is true as a general thesis. That is, reality ultimately consists of nothing but conscious minds. Third, that panpsychism is false and that a Berkeleyan flavor of mental monism resolves the Cartesian mind-body problem, which in recent years has received attention in the form of Chalmers’ Hard Problem. Besides providing a resolution of this philosophical problem, mental monism also potentially offers a platform on which to build a naturalistic account of psi phenomena.
... In chapter I we shortly review some metaphysical ontologies that have been recently proposed or rediscovered in order to tackle with the hard problem of consciousness. More specifically we found of particular interest I. Shani's 'cosmopsychism' [3], B. Kastrup's 'cosmoidealism' [4] and S. Taylor's 'panspiritism' [5]. We will examine it first with a critical review which highlights their strengths but also their shortcomings which will motivate us then to look beyond their monistic or dualistic approach expanding it to the integral cosmology of the Indian mystic, yogi and poet Sri Aurobindo. ...
... Some philosophers of mind, moved by this unconvincing aspect of panpsychism, but still intentioned to not fall back to the physicalist standpoint, considered the opposite viewpoint of micropsychism, that of 'cosmopsychism', which replaces a bottom-up with a top-down approach and which conceives of the whole cosmos as the ultimate conscious being (see, for example, Itay Shani [3]). From this perspective, the universe is a sort of 'cosmic Mind', a unitary conscious entity (something not really new, as it is a concept appearing also in several Eastern traditions). ...
The recent revival of metaphysical frameworks such as panpsychism, cosmopsychism, panspiritism and its idealistic and monistic versions are shortly reviewed and used as a basis for an extended and more consistent emergentist integral cosmology in the light of Sri Aurobindo. Consciousness studies, the modern evolutionary concepts, the life and physical sciences are interpreted in a larger vision that unites science and spirituality, Western and Eastern traditions in a synthesis of knowledge as envisioned from higher states of consciousness.
... According to Lloyd [5], if (and only if) we accept that physics is topic neutral, then the physical component of panpsychism drops away and the theory reduces to a variety of idealism. Hence, panpsychists who do not accept that physics is topic neutral, and who instead insist that consciousness is "all-pervading" (Shani [6]) or "ubiquitous" (Goff [7]) are not idealists because they ascribe spatial location to minds. ...
... about the behaviour of the mental primitives. I will argue that the first five hypotheses form a core that are necessary, as they are either pre-requirements of a workable model (Hypotheses 1,2) or entailed by mental monism (Hypotheses 3,4,5), while the remaining three are speculative (Hypotheses 6,7,8). This set of Hypotheses points toward mental systems that can embody cellular automata, which are known to be capable of implementing Universal Turing Machines, which can compute any computable function. ...
Models of consciousness are usually developed within physical monist or dualistic frameworks, in which the structure and dynamics of the mind are derived from the workings of the physical brain. Little attention has been given to modelling consciousness within a mental monist framework, deriving the structure and dynamics of the mental world from primitive mental constituents only—with no neural substrate. Mental monism is gaining attention as a candidate solution to Chalmers’ Hard Problem on philosophical grounds, and it is therefore timely to examine possible formal models of consciousness within it. Here, I argue that the austere ontology of mental monism places certain constraints on possible models of consciousness, and propose a minimal set of hypotheses that a model of consciousness (within mental monism) should respect. From those hypotheses, it would be possible to construct many formal models that permit universal computation in the mental world, through cellular automata. We need further hypotheses to define transition rules for particular models, and I propose a transition rule with the unusual property of deep copying in the time dimension.
... • Smallist panpsychism: Fundamental categorical properties are instantiated by micro-level entities and are consciousness-involving. • Priority monist panpsychism (AKA constitutive cosmopsychism): Fundamental categorical properties are instantiated by the universe as a whole and are consciousness-involving (Shani 2015;Nagasawa and Wager 2016;Goff 2017; Albahari forthcoming). • Smallist neutral monism: Fundamental categorical properties are instantiated by micro-level entities and are not consciousness-involving. ...
... I have argued (2017: Ch. 9) that there are plausible solutions to this worry. Even if the combination/de-combination problems turn out to be insoluble, there is always the option of adopting emergentist forms of these views (Mørch 2014;Shani 2015), according to which human and animal consciousness causally arise from the consciousness of the cosmos and hence facts about human consciousness are not reducible to facts about the consciousness of the universe. The emergentist position may also be attractive if one wishes to accommodate libertarian free will. ...
Many philosophers and scientists believe that we need an explanation as to why the laws of physics and the initial conditions of the universe are fine-tuned for life. The standard two options are: theism and the multiverse hypothesis. Both of these theories are extravagant and arguably have false predictions. Drawing on contemporary philosophy of mind, I outline a form of panpsychism that I believe offers a more parsimonious and less problematic explanation of cosmological fine-tuning.
... Moreover, dissolving the Combination Problem with scientific observations inherently also dissolves the De-combination Problem relative to the rather larger scale Cosmopsychism, an originally Idealist view that consciousness is really top-down in the scale of the universe and all things exist within Mind at large (Shani 2015). To begin with, the cosmos is most certainly biocentric, despite all within it essentially being borne from qubits and bits. ...
This paper is not dissimilar in topic from others I have written, nor does it include many different or new references cited, but it is custom tailored to address a philosophical audience and not also myth-and-religion focused or entheogen-curious audiences. It first concisely introduces the philosophical rebuttal of the Combination “Problem” as ignorant of nature, in a short assertion that physicality itself is premised upon the combination of multiple molecular systems, organisms, organs, and species, and yet we have no experience of or control over their operation, revealing that we therefore cannot dissect this truth from the phenomena of conscious experiences. Discussion of this mirrored nature of physical and mental processes will then give way to more direct and lengthy coverage on how awareness in varying degrees exists even for these entities, a fact displayed by observations in biology, mycology, and physics. Finally, the paper will reject the De-combination problem, the inverse but analogous rebuttal to Cosmopsychism, a sort of Idealist perspective that the cosmos is a sentient Monad, host to myriad others, perhaps even being a sentient quantum computer. In these rejections, we can readily accept these connected philosophies as valid theory and thereby pursue further exploration of their implications and gain a greater understanding of reality and increased gnostic compassion for the environment – something lacking from mainstream domineering philosophies and religions today – which the world direly needs at this critical point in ecological and human survival.
... What we deem to be the philosophy of panpsychism today is usually considered to have two variations: one of these considers consciousness as co-fundamental with matter, while the other is really cosmopsychism whereby the universe is conscious itself, or rather reality takes place in consciousness (Itay 2015). It has enveloped disparate Western philosophies over the millennia, so cannot be called an ideological antiquity as it stands now, but it might as well be considering the evidence. ...
(Please download the chapter-bookmarked PDF). The Renaissance and Scientific Revolution both stemmed from processual self-exile from the dominion of fundamentalist religious dogma and superstition, but not without extraction of certain scientific truths embedded in it all. The stepwise progression of philosophy towards the scientific method is rooted in the also stepwise progression from animism to shamanism and ancestor worship, then to polytheistic and monotheistic views (Peoples, Duda, and Marlowe 2016; Winkelman and Baker 2010:135-148), the latter of which will be brought under question as being ‘mono-’ at all. The capstones of these views are always culturally relevant stories that are in actuality complex symbolic combinations of cosmology, psychology, ethics, and traditional ecological knowledge or ‘natural history’ (Barber and Barber 2006) while also being entertaining enough to pass the test of time via the persistent verbal transmission of culture. So, we ought to be careful when we consider such things to be pure mythos or fable, incompatible with scientific progress and interpretation – they are in fact coded tomes of ethnoscience.
Importantly, there is in these regards an ancient notion that unifies Western and non-Western cosmological views. This notion is panpsychism, the theory that consciousness is co-fundamental with matter and may even precede it (Goff and Moran 2022; Seager 2021; Skrbina 2017; Vetlesen 2020). However, further astonishing findings across multiple disciplines such as astrophysics, astrobiology, and artificial intelligence, lend cogent credence to not just this, but its more expanded philosophy of cosmopsychism ¬¬(Itay 2005), i.e., that consciousness is not just co-fundamental with matter but rather that the universe is in consciousness, a notion that Idealists regard as indicating a living monad (Kastrup 2018). It has recently been expounded in detail the ways in which these modern sciences, as well as quantum physics and neuroscience, can help us understand that the ancient Vedas of India had presciently put a pin on the map for realizing these tenets, and incorporated them into the ideology and lifeway of Vedanta (Bombaci 2022), progenitor of both Hinduism and Buddhism, with their respective transcendental practices.
In Part I of this paper, the rather polysemic or elaborative extension of Vedanta, i.e., Hinduism, will be explored in these regards, followed by a handful of other religions and myths of the ancient and modern world. Part II of this paper will explore how myriads of cultures throughout the millennia have been tempering materialist thought via entheogenic ritual in order to noetically realize the nature of panpsychism and/or cosmopsychism, instilling a powerful sense of connectedness to the environment and our place in it. For these peoples, there is a strong propensity for gnostic thought that comes from self-identification with aspects of or all creation. For some Westerners today, familiarity with this notion brings about a lifestyle of spirited naturalism. Part III is a thorough exposition of the noted scientific backings of panpsychism and cosmopsychism having leverage over other modern philosophies, and it is not dissimilar from the noted article by this author but still makes access to this information easier for the reader of the prior Parts whose interest is piqued. Panpsychism and implicated cosmopsychism can be either simply or complexly convincing, depending on the reader’s outlook. For the reader of any faiths detailed in this paper, Part III may be entirely superfluous. For the reader attracted to this paper due to its anthropological exposition, to which discipline it has been categorized, it may be best to read front to back. For the explorative reader whose main interests are typically philosophical and scientific literature, starting with Part III and returning to the start may be best.
... 2 As representatives of atheistic uses of panpsychism, Chalmers, Strawson and (this earlier work from) Goff should not be taken as representative for how cosmopsychism might be paired with philosophy of religion more broadly. As explored in later sections of this paper, other philosophers have been far more unapologetic in their pairing of holistic and idealistic version of panpsychism with a particular model of God; see, Mathews (2011), Shani (2015, Albahari (2019Albahari ( , 2020Albahari ( , 2022; Medhananda (2022); Ganeri (2022). ...
Panpsychism is the view, found in ancient and modern, Eastern and Western philosophies, that mind is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the universe. This article explores the use of panpsychism to support different views of God. It is seen that as a family of views, panpsychism is a theologically flexible position that has been used to support atheism, pantheism, panentheism, and traditional monotheism. However, the relationship between panpsychism and philosophy of religion is not infinitely flexible. Different versions of panpsychism constrain these models of God, and vice versa. The different motivations for linking panpsychism to (dis)belief in God reveals the range of ways of interpreting the spiritual import of positing mentality in nature.
... How is this combination to be explained, not least when it comes to combining discrete perspectives into a single perspective (Coleman, 2014)? In response to this difficult problem, the position of cosmopsychism has been introduced and advanced in the debate (e.g., Jaskolla & Buck, 2012;Shani, 2015;Shani & Keppler, 2020;Petersen, 2021). Rather than positing microsubjects, the cosmopsychist instead proposes that the whole of the cosmos possesses one (single) consciousness. ...
The Danish thinker and mystic Martinus presented a comprehensive metaphysical system that explores and explains a wide range of topics, from the nature of consciousness and reality to an objective ethics and the structure of a just and fair society. Although a mystic, his argumentative justification for this system is not based on transcendent experiences but instead on rational arguments and methods and is thus broadly philosophical. This paper argues that since his views stand almost entirely untreated in contemporary philosophical research, it is of interest to examine them further, partly in the context of the history of ideas, but not least, given their unconventional nature, to provide fresh perspectives on the complex problems faced by contemporary philosophy. For example, the problem of decombination: To circumvent the difficult problem of consciousness, which challenges materialism, the position of cosmopsychism claims that the consciousness of the subject is constituted in a cosmic consciousness. How, then, to explain the differentiation or “decombination” of this cosmic consciousness into individual minds? Martinus has a triunic conception of the subject, and a theoretical metaphysical model based on this concept seems to be able to handle the decombination problem. It could be of explanatory benefit to examine other philosophical topics, both theoretical and practical, in light of Martinus’ views. Thus, this paper aims to introduce the views of Martinus into contemporary philosophical debates and
argue the value of its further examination.
... Dukor's and Gyekye's pan-psychism fits into the broad conception of pan-psychism as the view that consciousness is fundamental in the world and irreducible to matter (cf. Chalmers 2015;Shani 2015;and Strawson 2006). Dukor's understanding of pan-psychism is a version of what Shani calls cosmopsychism, the view that "an omnipresent cosmic consciousness is the single ontological ultimate there is and the definitive ground of all spatiotemporally localized centres of consciousness" (2015, 390). ...
Kwame Gyekye has been called a dualist to the extent that he accepts the ontological distinction between mind and matter, with both phenomena interacting with each other. I argue in this article that Gyekye’s presentation of the sunsum as a universal animating principle that is itself nonmaterial and irreducible to a material base warrants a second look at his philosophy of mind to determine whether he can be considered a pan-psychist and whether a pan-psychist reading can resolve the Gyekyean problem of interaction. I assert that, while Gyekye’s interpretation of the Akan notion of sunsum invites a pan-psychist scrutiny, the interpretive difficulties surrounding the concept, as highlighted by Kwasi Wiredu and Safro Kwame, render a pan-psychist conclusion problematic even if persuasive. I recommend that the notion of sunsum as a nonmaterial principle that underlies material entities is significant enough to warrant further interrogation by African philosophers of mind.
... Receptive connections and effective properties bound together form causal nexuses, and these nexuses are conscious subjects. What makes the model an example of weak experiential monism is that the receptivities are ontological entities distinct from the effective properties themselves; the 'point-of-viewness' of the conscious subject stems 28 This is essentially the perspective objection brought up originally by Sam Coleman (2014) and further explicated by Shani (2015) and Albahari (2020). Shani and Keppler (2018) argue that a high enough functional isolation of a subset of the cosmic consciousness could explain why that subset (a particular mind, such as that of a human) would appear so differently to itself and to the cosmic consciousness while still being a proper part of the cosmic consciousness. ...
In this article, I explicate a new problem for a variant of panpsychism, strong experiential monism, that is the view that all being is experiential. I contrast the view with weak experiential monism, a softer variant that allows for non-experiential bare particulars to act as the carriers of properties. I argue that strong experiential monism can't explain what works as the ontological commonality between the referents of one experience of something and another experience of that same thing; in other words, in virtue of what are those experiences about the same thing at all. If they aren't about the same ontological existent at all, the apparent mutual coherence between these experiences (as manifest in our ability to discuss about them in a seemingly coherent way, for example) requires explanation. I argue that strong experiential monism necessitates a more or less brute kind of parallelism between the experiences to explain their mutual coherence. Alternatively, the strong experiential monist must either retreat to weak experiential monism and non-experiential bare particulars or to a more robust kind of property dualism or dual-aspect monism.
... This led to the recent revival of metaphysical ontologies, such as panpsychism or idealistic and panentheistic conceptions of a universal mind. Most notably, panpsychism has been reconsidered in its different forms by modern leading philosophers in the field, like Thomas Nagel [47], Galen Strawson [48], David Chalmers [49], and Philip Goff [50], and on the other side of the spectrum, theories of cosmic consciousness, such as Ithai Shani's cosmopsychism [51] or Bernardo Kastrup's analytic idealism [52], to mention only the most noted. These posit not matter, but, rather, consciousness or mind, as fundamental. ...
According to the current scientific paradigm, what we call ‘life’, ‘mind’, and ‘consciousness’ are considered epiphenomenal occurrences, or emergent properties or functions of matter and energy. Science does not associate these with an inherent and distinct existence beyond a materialistic/energetic conception. ‘Life’ is a word pointing at cellular and multicellular processes forming organisms capable of specific functions and skills. ‘Mind’ is a cognitive ability emerging from a matrix of complex interactions of neuronal processes, while ‘consciousness’ is an even more elusive concept, deemed a subjective epiphenomenon of brain activity. Historically, however, this has not always been the case, even in the scientific and academic context. Several prominent figures took vitalism seriously, while some schools of Western philosophical idealism and Eastern traditions promoted conceptions in which reality is reducible to mind or consciousness rather than matter. We will argue that current biological sciences did not falsify these alternative paradigms and that some forms of vitalism could be linked to some forms of idealism if we posit life and cognition as two distinct aspects of consciousness preeminent over matter. However, we will not argue in favor of vitalistic and idealistic conceptions. Rather, contrary to a physicalist doctrine, these were and remain coherent worldviews and cannot be ruled out by modern science.
... There are also models which combine elements of cosmopsychism and micropsychism. For instance, Shani (2015) argues that there is a universal consciousness in which other forms of consciousness, including a basic experientiality of matter's fundamental constituents, are grounded. Further, there are also forms of cosmopsychism which posit that consciousness is the sole fundamentally existent ontological reality, and which are therefore more accurately described as idealist rather than panpsychist (Kastrup 2018). ...
The ways in which social theorists conceptualise the material world influences their approach to conceiving and addressing the environmental challenges of the Anthropocene. Vital materialism and historical materialism offer promise in confronting these challenges, but are both limited by how they account for the relation between matter and human consciousness. Because of this, they have difficulties in effectively analysing the relationship between humans and the nonhuman world in the context of the Anthropocene. Hence, vital materialism tends to diminish human value and responsibility, whilst historical materialism tends to devalue and instrumentalise nature. This thesis employs panpsychist theory, which holds that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the natural world, as a point of contrast to vital materialism and historical materialism, and as a basis for reconfiguring and extending these theories. It investigates how panpsychist premises can improve the way these fields relate to the Anthropocene and to each other. A key feature of this investigation concerns intrinsic value in nature, and the argument that intrinsic value is dependent on consciousness. The thesis aims to make a theoretical contribution to enhancing how the relations between humans, consciousness, nature and the environment are characterised.
... Rather, as Sherrington (1942) suggested, consciousness is a "development of mind from unrecognisable into recognisable." According to such panpsychist, panexperientialist, and cosmopsychist views (Skrbina, 2009;Seager, 2020;Shani, 2015;Velmans, 2021) consciousness co-emerged with matter and coevolves with it. As matter became more differentiated and developed in complexity, consciousness became correspondingly differentiated and complex. ...
This is a commentary on Merker, Williford & Rudrauf (2022), “The integrated information theory of consciousness: Unmasked and identified”, a target article in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 45, e65. Merker, Williford, and Rudrauf argue persuasively that integrated information is not identical to or sufficient for consciousness, and that projective geometries more closely formalize the spatial features of conscious phenomenology. However, these too are not identical to or sufficient for consciousness. Although such third-person specifiable functional theories can describe the many forms of consciousness, they cannot account for its existence.
... Rather, as Sherrington (1942) suggested, consciousness is a "development of mind from unrecognisable into recognisable." According to such panpsychist, panexperientialist, and cosmopsychist views (Seager, 2020;Shani, 2015;Skrbina, 2009;Velmans, 2021), consciousness co-emerged with matter and co-evolves with it. As matter became more differentiated and developed in complexity, consciousness became correspondingly differentiated and complex. ...
Consciousness directs the actions of the agent for its own purposive gains. It re-organises a stimulus-response linear causality to deliver generative, creative agent action that evaluates the subsequent experience prospectively. This inversion of causality affords special properties of control that are not accounted for in integrated information theory (IIT), which is predicated on a linear, deterministic cause-effect model. IIT remains an incomplete, abstract, and disembodied theory without explanation of the psychobiology of consciousness that serves the vital agency the organism.
... Rather, as Sherrington (1942) suggested, consciousness is a "development of mind from unrecognisable into recognisable." According to such panpsychist, panexperientialist, and cosmopsychist views (Seager, 2020;Shani, 2015;Skrbina, 2009;Velmans, 2021), consciousness co-emerged with matter and co-evolves with it. As matter became more differentiated and developed in complexity, consciousness became correspondingly differentiated and complex. ...
In our response to a truly diverse set of commentaries, we first summarize the principal topical themes around which they cluster, then address two “outlier” positions (the problem of consciousness has been solved vs. is intractable). Next, we address ways in which commentaries by non-integrated information theory (IIT) authors engage with the specifics of our IIT critique, turning finally to the four commentaries by IIT authors.
... According to Goff (2017), all conscious experiences are grounded via subsumption in the consciousness of the whole universe. 10 Other recent explorations of cosmopsychism include Nagasawa and Wager (2017), Shani (2015), and Shani and Keppler (2018). 11 Most of these are heavily indebted to Schaffer's (2010) work proposing that the cosmos is the one truly fundamental and whole object, and thus ontologically prior to all of the more derivative objects within the universe. ...
The inherently subjective nature of consciousness severely limits our ability to make progress on the problem of consciousness. The inability to acquire objective, publicly available data on the phenomenal aspect of consciousness makes evaluating alternative theories very difficult, if not impossible. However, the anomalous nature of subjective states with respect to our conventional theories of the physical world suggests the possibility of considering other anomalous data around consciousness that happen to be objective. For such purposes, I propose that we examine the psi data gathered under laboratory conditions, which generally receive little attention. I wish to consider whether we have theories or frameworks of consciousness that attempt to account for subjective qualia but also fit the psi data. I argue that Russellian monism can be combined with an argument regarding quantum holism to arrive at a version of cosmo-psychism that fits very well with the psi data. While I do not argue that such a framework exhausts the theoretical possibilities, I do suggest we can move forward with a framework that has attractive theoretical features and is also consistent with objective data currently on the table.
... For recent discussions of cosmopsychism, see Albahari (2019), Goff (2017a), Jaskolla and Buck (2012),Matthews (2011), Miller (2018,Nagasawa and Wager (2017),Nagasawa (2019) andShani (2015). ...
Panpsychism has received much attention in the philosophy of mind in recent years. So-called constitutive Russellian panpsychism, in particular, is considered by many the most promising panpsychist approach to the hard problem of consciousness. In this paper, however, I develop a new challenge to this approach. I argue that the three elements of constitutive Russellian panpsychism—that is, the constitutive element, the Russellian element and the panpsychist element—jointly entail a ‘cognitive dead end’. That is, even if constitutive Russellian panpsychism is true, we cannot ascertain how it might solve the hard problem of consciousness.
... Videre kan den her skitserede metafysik forestilles at åbne op for nye vinkler på andre eksistentielle 34 Her orienteret i retning af kosmopsykisme, hvor det ganske kosmos ses som vaerende en bevidst eller oplevende helhed, frem for mod konstitutiv mikropsykisme, hvor det er bevidsthed hos de fysiske mindsteenheder, der opfattes som konstituerende for makrobevidstheder som menneskets. Således er der i den i denne artikel forfaegtede metafysik et antal faellestraek at finde med eksempelvis Itay Shanis kosmopsykisme (Shani 2015). 35 En mere religiøs orienteret tolkning, med det Absolutte identificeret med gud, er også en mulighed -i en sådan tolkning er en egentlig naturalistisk forståelse selvsagt vanskeligere at opretholde. ...
Physicalism is the most widely accepted metaphysical view today. The thesis of physicalism, however, seems unable to adequately explain the existence and nature of consciousness. Moreover, the thesis is not itself a scientific finding but must be characterized as a metaphysical assumption. Hence, there are strong reasons to explore alternatives to the physicalist view. While metaphysical theses based on classic idealistic views like subjective or absolute idealism have been largely absent from the philosophical debate during most of the 20 th century, in the last few decades theses of this kind have been advocated, most notably by John Foster and Timothy Sprigge. Russell's and Moore's influential refutations of idealism have been severely questioned by recent scholarship, which means that conventional arguments against absolute idealism appear to be significantly less well-founded than what is usually assumed. With Sprigge's panpsychistic absolute idealistic metaphysical system as the basis and by incorporating key elements in Foster's thinking, the present paper outlines an idealistic thesis which, it is argued, first of all escapes the problem of consciousness inherent in physicalism and secondly counters important arguments raised against Sprigge's views, including the question of personal identity and the problem of the one and the many. In addition, this thesis can be seen as naturalistic in a broad sense, thereby potentially being of existential relevance also within the framework of modernity. Thus, it is the aim of the present paper to argue-although sketchily-that despite its controversial character in the light of contemporary mainstream views, panpsychistic absolute idealism demonstrates a significant explanatory power and is therefore of philosophical interest as a subject for further study.
... Let us call this variant of panpsychism micropsychism. If, rather, we assume that phenomenal experience starts with the whole, for example the entire universe (i.e., cosmopsychism-e.g., D'Espagnat 2006, Goff 2017, Keppler and Shani 2020and Shani 2015, then phenomenal experience appears the way it does in humans and other animals because we are small parts of the greater whole universe-i.e., the wholes are prior to the parts rather than the other way around. In this case we have a kind of reverse explanatory gap problem: the so-called de-combination problem: when the universe (or any other larger whole) is broken down, why do such systems lose their larger phenomenal qualities? ...
In this paper the explanatory gap of the philosophy of mind is explored, and found to have a similar structure even in different framings of the mind–body problem (MBP). This leads to the consideration that the MBP may be a special case of the more general whole-part problem: how do properties of wholes arise from the particular assembly of isolated parts? The conclusion is argued that only an approach of mereological holism offers (some) solace from the explanatory gap problem, exchanging it for a reverse explanatory gap problem that has more promising prospects for future solution, possibly in the form of integrated information theory. These considerations, along with the problem of explaining qualia lead to a proposed solution to the MBP in holistic cosmopsychism.
... If, as I argued in 2011, the starting point of analysis was assumed to be not the microlevel but rather the cosmological level, then the Combination Problem would not arise: individual minds could be construed as local psycho-configurations within a larger field of consciousness, as per ES (Mathews 2011b). This way of addressing the Combination Problem has indeed seen the advent in recent years of several cosmological versions of panpsychism, dubbed 'cosmopsychist' as opposed to the 'micropsychism' of the earlier versions that unquestioningly adopted the particulate template of physics (Goff 2019;Nagasawa and Wager 2015;Shani 2015). Interesting lines of both micropsychist and cosmopsychist inquiry are currently being vigorously pursued, and this is opening up as a fruitful and exciting research programme not merely xvi in the philosophy of consciousness but in metaphysics generally (Goff 2019;Seager 2019). ...
... In particular, we believe that some philosophical ideas recently rediscovered and redeveloped within the fields of metaphysics and the philosophy of mind give fresh impetus to consciousness research in that they provide a conceptual matrix opening up new interpretations of the neuroscientific body of evidence and, potentially, leading to unprecedented research strategies. In this spirit, we present the central ideas behind a novel variant of cosmopsychism, a holistic form of panpsychism from the genus of priority cosmopsychism that relies on the assumption of a cosmic level of consciousness serving as the ultimate bedrock of experiential reality (Keppler, 2012;Shani, 2015;Shani and Keppler, 2018; for different variants of priority cosmopsychism, see Mathews, 2011;Goff, 2017;Nagasawa and Wager, 2017). ...
Despite the progress made in studying the observable exteriors of conscious processes, which are reflected in the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), there are still no satisfactory answers to two closely related core questions. These are the question of the origin of the subjective, phenomenal aspects of consciousness, and the question of the causal mechanisms underlying the generation of specific phenomenal states. In this article, we address these questions using a novel variant of cosmopsychism, a holistic form of panpsychism relying on the central idea that the universe is imbued with a ubiquitous field of consciousness (UFC). This field is understood as a foundational dual-aspect component of the cosmos, the extrinsic appearance of which is physical in nature and the intrinsic manifestation of which is phenomenological in nature. We argue that this approach brings a new perspective into play, according to which the organizational characteristics of the NCC are indicative of the brain's interaction with and modulation of the UFC. Key insights from modern physics suggest that the modulation mechanism is identical with the fundamental mechanism underlying quantum systems, resulting in the conclusion that a coherently oscillating neural cell assembly acquires phenomenal properties by tapping into the universal pool of phenomenal nuances predetermined by the UFC, or more specifically, by entering into a temporary liaison with the UFC and extracting a subset of phenomenal tones from the phenomenal color palette inherent in the basic structure of the UFC. This hypothesis is supported by a substantial body of empirical evidence.
... 9 Tononi defends Exclusion from phenomenology and parsimony. On the other hand, Shani interprets these authors (Koch, Tononi) as saying that information integration generates consciousness, which would be a "non-panpsychist idea" (Shani, 2015). Panpsychism assumes that sentience is combined and amassed into larger unities (macro-level consciousness) form smaller ones (micro-level consciousness), not from something non-sentient. ...
I investigate the status of subjectivity in Integrated Information Theory. This
leads me to examine if Integrated Information Theory can answer the hard problem of consciousness.
On itself, Integrated Information Theory does not seem to constitute an answer to
the hard problem, but could be combined with panpsychism to yield a more satisfying theory
of consciousness. I will show, that even if Integrated Information Theory employs the metaphysical
machinery of panpsychism, Integrated Information would still suffer from a different
problem, not being able to account for the subjective character of consciousness.
What justifies holding the person that we are today morally responsible for something we did a year ago? And why are we justified in showing prudential concern for the future welfare of the person we will be a year from now? These questions cannot be systematically pursued without addressing the problem of personal identity. In pursuing this problem, this essay considers whether Buddhist Reductionism, a philosophical project grounded on the idea that persons reduce to a set of bodily, sensory, perceptual, dispositional, and conscious elements, provides support for Parfit’s psychological criteria of personal identity. It examines the role that self-consciousness plays in mediating both self-concern and concern for others, and offers an argument for how reductionism about substantive or enduring selves may be reconciled with the irreducibility of self-consciousness as an experiential dimension of subjectivity.
In assessing the relevance of Velmans' work for transpersonal psychology, two major features of his reflexive monism are explored. The first is the notion that consciousness is embedded in the external world and in the body, the second is the principle of reflexivity itself. The embeddedness of consciousness in the world underpins transpersonal notions of consciousness as a primary reality of the universe. Consciousness as embodied is a critical component for therapies and psychospiritual practices that focus on somatic awareness, both central to transpersonal psychology's objectives. The reflexivity at the core of Velmans' theory is identified as a principle that recurs at different scales (the brain, cognition, and the universe), thus relating to esoteric ideas of correspondence across microcosmic and macrocosmic levels of being. For transpersonal psychology, this recognition that 'ancient' esoteric ideas can be substantiated and updated through contemporary research into consciousness opens further avenues of enquiry.
In antiquity living beings are inextricably linked to the cosmos as a whole. Ancient biology and cosmology depend upon one another and therefore a complete understanding of one requires a full account of the other. This volume addresses many philosophical issues that arise from this double relation. Does the cosmos have a soul of its own? Why? Is either of these two disciplines more basic than the other, or are they at the same explanatory level? What is the relationship between living things and the cosmos as a whole? If the cosmos is an animate intelligent being, what is the nature of its thoughts and actions? How do these relate to our own thoughts and actions? Do they pose a threat to our autonomy as subjects and agents? And what is the place of zoogony in cosmogony? A distinguished international team of contributors provides original essays discussing these questions.
Critics have charged constitutive panpsychism with inconsistency. Panpsychists reject physicalism for its seeming inability to explain consciousness. In making this argument, they commit themselves to the idea of "revelation": that we know, in some especially direct way, the nature of consciousness. Yet they then attribute properties to our
consciousness---like being constituted out of trillions of simpler experiential parts---that conflict with how it seems introspectively. This seems to pose a dilemma: either revelation is false, and physicalism remains intact, or revelation is true, and constitutive panpsychists are hoist by their own petard. But this is too simplistic. Constitutive panpsychists can say that our minds contain innumerable phenomenal states that are "confused" with one another: immediately present to introspection only en masse, not individually. Accepting revelation does not require ignoring the attentional, conceptual, and interpretive limitations of introspection, and these familiar limitations remove the tension between panpsychism and relevation.
Panpsychism is now a bona fide potential solution to the metaphysical quandary of consciousness. Much of the debate concerning the viability of panpsychism is centered on the combination problem (CP). Intriguingly, the literature analyzing this problem displays two competing interpretations which differ in their modal force. According to the first, which we call the ‘no-necessitation view', CP consists in the absence of a priori necessitation of macro-level phenomenal facts from micro-level phenomenal facts. In contrast, the second interpretation, which we label the ‘incoherence charge’ (IC), goes further by insisting that it can be positively demonstrated that micro-experiences cannot combine to yield integral macro-experiences. While conceivability arguments are vulnerable to debates over conflicting intuitions, as well as to the claim that a more complete picture will grant the desired necessitation, IC has the advantage that, if true, it removes these concerns and approaches a more final verdict. Nevertheless, while conceivability arguments are widely discussed IC has not been equally well understood or recognized. In this paper we conduct a systematic investigation and reevaluation of IC, as it applies to constitutive micropsychism (or, micro-reductive panpsychism). We argue that the problem is real and therefore that constitutive micropsychism is a blind alley.
Analytic Panpsychism has been brought into contact with Indian philosophy primarily through an examination of the Advaita Vedānta tradition and the Yogācāra tradition. In this work I explore the relation between Rāmānuja, the 12th century father of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta tradition, and analytic panpsychism. I argue that Rāmānuja’s philosophy inspires a more world affirming form of cosmopsychism where there are different kinds of reality, rather than one fundamental reality of pure consciousness and an ordinary wrold that is illusory from the perspective of fundamental reality.
Panpsychism is viewed by its advocates as resolving the main sticking points for materialism and dualism. While sympathetic to this approach, I locate two prevalent assumptions within modern panpsychism which I think are problematic: first, that fundamental consciousness belongs to a perspectival subject (whether microlevel or cosmic) and second, that the physical world, despite being backed by conscious subject(s), is observer-independent. I re-introduce an argument I’d made elsewhere against the first assumption: that it lies behind the well-known combination and decombination problems. I then propose a new argument against the second assumption: that it leads to an equally pernicious difficulty I call the “Inner-Outer Gap Problem.” The variant of panpsychism I continue to develop and defend, Perennial Idealism, avoids these assumptions and their problems, allowing real progress on the mind-body problem. Perennial Idealism is a type of panpsychist idealism rather than panpsychist materialism.
This article argues that the Indian philosopher-mystic Sri Aurobindo (1872–1950) espoused a sophisticated form of cosmopsychism that has great contemporary relevance. After first discussing Aurobindo’s prescient reflections on the “central problem of consciousness” and his arguments against materialist reductionism, I explain how he developed a panentheistic philosophy of “realistic Adwaita” on the basis of his own spiritual experiences and his intensive study of the Vedāntic scriptures. He derived from this realistic Advaita philosophy a highly original doctrine of evolutionary cosmopsychism, according to which the Divine Saccidānanda is “involved” in everything in the universe and gradually manifests itself at each stage of the evolutionary process from matter to life to mind, and ultimately, to Supermind—the final stage that is yet to come, upon the attainment of which we will attain knowledge of our true divine nature as Saccidānanda. I then reconstruct Aurobindo’s novel solution to the individuation problem, according to which the Divine Saccidānanda individuates into various distinct consciousnesses by playfully limiting itself through a process of “exclusive concentration.” Finally, I highlight the continued relevance of Aurobindo’s evolutionary cosmopsychism by bringing him into conversation with Itay Shani, a contemporary proponent of cosmopsychism.
The central thesis of the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta is the doctrine of the identity of brahman (the absolute) and ātman (the self). Brahman is essentially sat, being as such in the sense of the dimension of existence in which all worldly goings-on take place. The ātman is conceived as the “seer,” i.e., as the pure subject qua the to-whom of any experiential givenness; and this subject, in turn, is understood not as some entity that performs the seeing but as nothing but the very seeing itself, i.e., as consciousness in the sense of the abiding presence-realm in which permanently changing experiential contents come to givenness. The Advaitic thesis is that this presence-realm—the seeing that takes place “in us”—is ultimately nothing other than the universal being-dimension—brahman—itself, (seemingly) modified by the mental contents of an innerworldly individual. This paper attempts to vindicate this doctrine by a series of reflections on the nature of the I and of reality as such. It argues that Advaita Vedānta can be viewed as a version of cosmopsychism in its idealist version which does not view consciousness as one of the features of the cosmos as a whole, but as its exclusive intrinsic nature, i.e., as the very essence of being as such.
This paper explores cosmopsychism’s explanatory aspirations from a programmatic perspective. The bulk of the text consists of an argument in favor of the conclusion that cosmopsychism suffers from no insurmountable individuation problem (IND). I argue that the widespread tendency to view IND as a mirror-image of micropsychism’s combination problem (CP) is mistaken. In particular, what renders CP insolvable, namely, the commitment to the coupling of phenomenal constitution with phenomenal inclusion, is, from the standpoint of cosmopsychism, an entirely nonmandatory assumption. I proceed to show that severing this unhappy coupling is the key for defending cosmopsychism against the charge of theoretical incoherence. Moreover, I argue that successful defense against such accusation could be mounted regardless of whether or not we assume cosmic consciousness to be perspectival in nature. In addition, the paper touches upon another foundational issue: cautioning against the popular tendency to identify cosmopsychism’s monism with a mereological unity-in-diversity, and motivating an alternative conception which I call generative monism. Finally, as befitting this volume, I pause to reflect upon the question of which schools of Hindu philosophy might tally best, and connect most fruitfully, with cosmopsychism as I understand it.
A growing movement in contemporary philosophy of mind is looking back on Indian thought to gain new insights into the problem of consciousness. This paper weighs the prospects of thinking about mentality through the lenses of Śaṅkaran Advaita Vedānta. To start, I outline micropsychist and cosmopsychist accounts of consciousness, introduce Śaṅkaran monism, and describe a potential reason of attraction of the framework over micropsychist and cosmopsychist alternatives. I then show that the eliminativist commitments of the view threaten to yield a self-defeating account of ordinary experience, and that Advaitins took the accommodation of the issue to be beyond the reach of rational inquiry. Finally, I discuss how the analytical debate over Śaṅkaran monism might proceed based on these premises.
The most widespread metaphysical position in academic philosophy today is apparently physicalism, the view that all phenomena, including consciousness, are reducible to physical things, states, or events. Metaphysical materialism – the more general view that the physical is ontologically primary and indeed the only thing that exists metaphysically independently – is even more widespread. Linked to physicalism is reductive naturalism, the view that any phenomenon is in principle explanatorily reducible to conditions that lie within the subject matter of the natural sciences.
However, several objections can be raised against these positions. One is that they are not themselves scientific results and cannot be verified using the methods of empirical science, and must therefore be seen as metaphysical assumptions. A second is that due to their apparent incompatibility with a view of downward causation – causal influence by the mental on the physical, that is, on neural processes – these positions do not seem compatible with genuine free will. Third, given these positions, objective ethics seems difficult to substantiate; fourth, they might be too restrictive a way of explaining the structures of reality. Finally, they show a lack of explanatory power, both when it comes to explaining the intrinsic properties of matter, and (most importantly) the nature and even the existence of consciousness.
Because the objections to physicalism and its fellows are numerous and persistent, in recent years otherwise controversial views have seen an increase in interest. Among these is panpsychism (e.g., Brüntrup & Jaskolla, Goff, Seager), the view that consciousness is ubiquitous and fundamental (or at least not reducible to the physical). Panpsychism is often explicated through the attribution of consciousness to the elementary physical entities, with macro-consciousnesses (e.g., human consciousness) constituted in these, that is, seen as combinations of these micro-consciousnesses. This is known as constitutive micropsychism. However, this view faces the difficult combination problem: how can we explain how these micro-consciousnesses are combined into one macro-consciousness, given that the discrete perspectives intrinsically linked to individual consciousnesses must be taken into account? In response to this problem, the view of cosmopsychism – the notion that the whole cosmos possesses consciousness – has been introduced and defended, often in the form of constitutive cosmopsychism (e.g., Nagasawa & Wager), according to which the individual subjects’ consciousnesses are constituted in the cosmic consciousness. However, this position is confronted with the question of how this differentiation of the one, cosmic consciousness into the individual consciousnesses is to be explained. This is the so-called decombination problem – a modern variant of absolute idealism’s traditional problem of the one and the many. Some suggestions attempting to address this problem have been put forward (Shani & Keppler, Albahari, Maharaj), but these models either have not yet been developed in full or face significant counterarguments, and the debate on the decombination problem is thus far from settled. Therefore, there is good reason to explore new alternatives in the attempt to gain new perspectives on, and develop solutions to, this difficult problem.
This is the subject of the present dissertation – here, a metaphysical model is developed which, it is argued, handles or avoids all of the problems just identified: physicalism’s problem of consciousness, constitutive micropsychism’s combination problem and – the main focus of the dissertation – constitutive cosmopsychism’s decombination problem. This is possible because this model is one of non-constitutive cosmopsychism and absolute idealism (and furthermore, it is located within a naturalistic framework, broadly understood).
The model is developed through a synthesizing approach, where key elements from existing models are combined. Methodologically, the approach is one of weighted methodological pluralism (Klausen), where all traditional philosophical methods are initially accepted, but where the actual weighted distribution is a matter of assessment based on the research goal in question and the subject of the study. Due to the transempirical nature of the subject of the present work, the scientific theories (but not their empirical bases) are thus considered less weighty than rational insight and factors such as consistency, coherence, systematization, philosophical assessment, and (not least) explanatory power.
The question of how to obtain (metaphysical) knowledge is a major theme in the debate on ‘metametaphysics.’ Another is the subject matter of metaphysics. The present work is one of metaphysics as traditionally conceived, and there are strong arguments substantiating the relevance and value of practicing metaphysics in this way (e.g., Lowe). Thus, this work subscribes to a (neo-) Aristotelian rather than a Quinean conception of metaphysics, holding, that is, that metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental nature of reality and not just existence questions – a view that has seen an increase in support in contemporary philosophy (e.g., Tahko).
The model developed in the present dissertation is one of metaphysical idealism. This is a rarely defended position in contemporary philosophy, but the position possesses significant potential in terms of explanatory power, especially in the case of absolute idealism. The starting point in this work is Timothy Sprigge's absolute idealistic metaphysical system, with further development through the inclusion of elements from the metaphysics of Danish thinker and mystic Martinus. This may seem to be a controversial choice, but it is not unfounded: Martinus justifies his views through rational and not transcendent arguments, and the views of mystics have been included in the cosmopsychism debate (Albahari, Maharaj) in the last few years. Furthermore, Martinus' metaphysics has a significant number of features in common with Sprigge's system, which, seen in the synthesizing context of the present work, makes this particular metaphysics a natural choice: to wit, this metaphysics contains elements that strengthen that system precisely with regard to the decombination problem. In addition, a review of the relevant research history shows that Martinus' work – which, taken as a whole, constitutes a very comprehensive and consistent metaphysics – has so far received almost no treatment in academic philosophy (standing completely unexamined in international debates), and this despite its fresh perspective on a wide range of philosophical questions.
The present dissertation is anthological and includes four articles. The first of these, Toward a Broader Conception of “Liberal Naturalism”: Widening the Perspective (forthcoming, 2021), argues for a conception of naturalism that is not only broader than reductive naturalism, but also broader than regular, liberal naturalism (e.g., De Caro, Macarthur). A key point in this article is the detachment of the concept of naturalism from any particular metaphysics. Usually, naturalism is understood as linked to physicalism, or at least to metaphysical materialism, but detachment from these positions is not unheard of in contemporary philosophy (e.g., Chalmers, Rosenberg, Hutto), yielding a naturalism that emphasizes the existence of laws of nature. The article follows this line of thought, arguing, based on the notion of nature as a concept of ontological totality, that the basic criterion of being “naturalistic” is not a matter of attachment to any particular metaphysics, but is instead a matter of the presence of fundamental principles and laws or regularities that govern or describe the concrete behavior of the world. This concept of naturalism allows for variants of (for example) idealism, including absolute idealism, to be categorized as naturalistic in so far as this criterion is met (though it does not allow for metaphysical views that include entities that are autonomous with respect to these principles or laws, such as a theistic god). Given the positive connotations of ‘naturalistic’, this concept of naturalism is of value with regard to legitimizing philosophical inquiry into unconventional alternatives to physicalism and materialism – exactly the sort of project in which this dissertation is engaged.
The second article, Absolut idealisme – et glemt potentiale? (‘Absolute idealism – a forgotten potential?’) (2018), advocates the view that absolute idealism (referring not just to Hegel, but more precisely to variants along the lines of Bradley and Sprigge) remains relevant and is of value, not only in the context of the history of ideas, but also when it comes to developing theses and contributions to contemporary academic debates in philosophy. Moore’s and Russell's influential rejections of idealism in the early 20th century seem to be significantly less well-founded than is usually assumed (Mander), especially regarding absolute idealism. John Foster and Timothy Sprigge have presented the most significant contemporary contributions when it comes to comprehensive idealistic metaphysical theses, with Sprigge's panpsychistic absolute idealistic metaphysical system arguably occupying a stronger position than Foster's “canonical phenomenalism.” In this article, Sprigge’s system is developed further by incorporating elements from Foster’s thesis (and from Martinus' metaphysics), and the key features of the resulting metaphysical model are outlined – this model shows, at least prima facie, improved explanatory power regarding key criticisms of Sprigge's original metaphysics, including the question of personal identity and the problem of the one and the many. In addition, the model can be characterized as naturalistic (in the above sense).
The third article, The Metaphysics of Martinus: Exploring New Territory (unpublished at the time of this writing), presents the main features of Martinus' metaphysical system. This system is extraordinarily comprehensive, covering a range of topics − from the nature of consciousness to the principles of an objective ethics to the nature of a good and just society. A key feature is a triadic conception of the subject and, due to the panpsychistic nature of Martinus’ metaphysics, of the whole of reality. This is the triune principle. Analytically conceived, the subject, or living being, as well as the whole of reality itself, consist of three parts: that which experiences (called the 'I' or 'X1'), the faculty of creating and experiencing ('X2'), and that which is experienced ('matter' or 'X3'). Martinus' system can be interpreted as a form of absolute idealism, with everything in existence being part of the one underlying, transempirical something that is, and with our entire world of experience being the appearance for us of this something in the form of the manifestation of living beings. Reality in its entirety consists of the Godhead, and every living being thus forms part of it. The individual being has eternal existence, and through innumerable incarnations it gradually develops intellectually and ethically. Ethics thus plays an existentially crucial role as it is the only way through which to end suffering and achieve an existence of bliss and unconditional happiness – this is achieved by every being eventually, and thus, ultimately, “all is very good.” Even though Martinus explicitly refers to transcendent experiences as the epistemic foundation of his views, he justifies the views solely by rational arguments, that is, philosophically (in a broad sense). His views stand unexamined in academic philosophy, but, the article argues, they are worth further investigation, not merely in the context of the history of ideas, but also for their potential contribution to the debates of contemporary philosophy. For example, the cosmopsychism debate, where Martinus' particular triadic conception of the subject provides the contours of a solution to the decombination problem.
The fourth and final article, Non-Constitutive Cosmopsychism: Countering the Decombination Problem (2021), unfolds the theoretical metaphysical model toward which the previous articles have paved the way. Due to its idealistic and non-constitutive cosmopsychistic form, this model, it is argued, is able to avoid or deal with key problems that plague materialism, panpsychism, and constitutive cosmopsychism (that is, the problem of consciousness, the combination problem, and the decombination problem, respectively). Martinus’ triune principle is presented both metaphorically and conceptually, and this triadic conception of the subject forms a cornerstone of the model. Analytically, the subject is perceived as consisting of three components: an experiencing, substantive component; an experience- and interaction-constituting and -organizing metaphysical structure (the EICO structure); and a sphere of experience, holding the concrete content of experience. The model is one of quantitative substance monism, that is, it posits a single, undivided (and noumenal or transempirical) substance (which does experience, but, unlike many other cosmopsychistic models, does not consist of consciousness per se). But due to the presence of the metaphysical EICO structure, the model includes the existence of individual perspectives or spheres of experience − and thus individual subjects − as well as an absolute subject. This is illustrated by the following image, which is intended as a metaphor: a bright light shines in the center of a sphere that is opaque but evenly perforated all over with small holes; the central light thus streams through the holes. In this metaphor, the light represents the one, noumenal substance; the perforated sphere the EICO structure; and the light rays the individual subjects. As unity is found at the substantive level and the actual differentiation is at the level of perspective or experience, the model avoids the decombination problem. In other words: the model is non-constitutive in the specific sense that individual consciousnesses are not constituted in a cosmic consciousness, as is the case in the constitutive cosmopsychistic models. Even though the metaphysical EICO structure is merely postulated, the model is arguably better off than emergent panpsychism (where consciousness is postulated to emerge from the physical), as the present model is not faced with the problem of downward causation. Thus, the model arguably shows greater explanatory power than the metaphysics with which it is compared.
The aims of the present dissertation are thus threefold: to defend a broad liberal naturalism which is compatible with (e.g.) metaphysical idealism; to introduce Martinus’ metaphysics into (international) academic philosophy; and, in order to deal with the problem of decombination, to develop the main features of an absolute idealistic and cosmopsychistic theoretical model – a model that also constitutes a theoretical metaphysical model for the fundamental nature of reality as such.
As for the implications of the dissertation’s results, they can be assessed on three levels: the strength of the arguments themselves, the de facto position of the results given the philosophical climate of today, and the philosophical implications under the hypothetical premise that the results are accepted. The mainstream currents in contemporary academic philosophy being what they are, a model of an absolute idealistic and cosmopsychistic nature must be seen as quite controversial and unlikely to gain any significant support. The main argument for the model is a strengthened explanatory power, and the assessment of the strength of this argument depends on how explanatory power is weighted against postulating empirically unsupported premises such as the EICO structure. If the model is accepted, however, the implications are significant − for theoretical questions, such as the nature of consciousness; ethical questions; and existential questions, for instance, those relating to continued existence after death and the meaning of life itself.
The metaphysical vision of Advaita Vedānta has been making its way into some corners of Western analytic philosophy, and has especially garnered attention among those philosophers who are seeking to develop metaphysical systems in opposition to both reductionist materialism and dualism. Given Vedānta’s monistic view of consciousness, it might seem natural to put Vedānta in dialogue with the growing position of panpsychism which, although not fully monistic, similarly takes mind to be a fundamental feature of reality. This paper will evaluate to what extent Śaṅkara’s monism can bypass the most pressing issues facing panpsychism, namely combination and individuation problems. As will be seen in this paper, while Advaita Vedānta is able to avoid some of the panpsychist problems, it struggles ultimately to ontologically ground illusion (māyā/avidyā) in a coherent manner. As a result, a conclusion of this paper is that although Śaṅkara’s vision offers a promising route for those philosophers who take consciousness to be fundamental – including panpsychists – it cannot be uncritically adopted due to the problem of grounding Illusion.
This is a technical treatise for the scientific-minded readers trying to expand their intellectual horizon beyond the straitjacket of materialism. It is dedicated to those scientists and philosophers who feel there is something more, but struggle with connecting the dots into a more coherent picture supported by a way of seeing that allows us to overcome the present paradigm and yet maintains a scientific and conceptual rigor, without falling into oversimplifications. Most of the topics discussed are unknown even to neuroscientists, biologists, philosophers, and yet are based on the findings published in their own mainstream peer reviewed literature or on deep insights of the scientific, philosophical and spiritual giants of the past.
A scientific, philosophical, and spiritual overview of the relationship between science and spirituality, neuroscience and the mystery of consciousness, mind and the nature of reality, evolution and life. A plaidoyer for a science that goes beyond the curve of reason and embraces a new synthesis of knowledge. The overcoming of the limitations of the intellect into an extended vision of ourselves and Nature. A critique of physicalism, the still-dominant doctrine that believes that all reality can be reduced to matter and the laws of physics alone. A review and reassessment of the old and new philosophical and metaphysical ideas which attempts to bring closer Western and Eastern traditions where science, philosophy, consciousness, Spirit and Nature are united in a grand vision that transcends the limited conventional scientific and philosophical paradigm. A possible answer to the questions of purpose and meaning and the future evolution of humankind beyond a conception that posits a priori a purposeless and meaningless universe. A report of the new scientific discoveries of a basal intelligence in cells and plants, on the question if mind is computational, the issue of free will, the mind-body problem, and the so called ‘hard problem of consciousness’. An essay on ancient as modern philosophical conceptions, from the One of Plotinus, the God of Spinoza until the recent revival of panpsychism or the universal consciousness. A journey into quantum physics from the perspective of philosophical idealism and an invitation to adopt new ways of seeing that might help us to transform our present understanding, expanding it into an integral cosmology, with a special emphasis on the spiritual and evolutionary cosmology of the Indian seer Sri Aurobindo.
Not just a philosophical and metaphysical meditation but, rather, an appeal to work towards a change of consciousness, a widening of our perspective towards a new way of seeing beyond a purely mechanistic worldview to avoid a social, environmental and economic collapse. Humans are transitional beings that will have to make a choice: relapse into a pre-rational state or evolve towards a new trans-rational species supported by an ideal of human unity in diversity as the expression of a spiritual evolutionary process, the call of the Spirit on Nature.
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Příspěvek kriticky reaguje na pojednání o russelliánském monismu v monografii Jaké to je, nebo o čem to je? Tomáše Hříbka. Podle Hříbka russelliánský monismus, přístup k fenomenálnímu vědomí inspirovaný vhledy Bertranda Russella, nepředstavuje skutečnou alternativu vůči materialismu, dualismu a idealismu. Autor příspěvku argumentuje, že russelliánský monismus naopak lze pokládat za svébytné metafyzické stanovisko, jež se navíc vyhýbá hlavním úskalím těchto tradičních přístupů. Nejprve odpovídá na námitku, že fundamentální jsoucna neutrálního monismu jsou ve skutečnosti mentalistická, a tedy nikoli neutrální.V souvislosti s neutrálním monismem rovněž poukazuje na problémy Hříbkovy definice fyzikalismu v duchu via negativa. Autor dále vysvětluje, proč na rozdíl od dualismu nepředstavuje pro russelliánský monismus vážnou obtíž kauzální uzávěra fyzična, a upozorňuje, že russelliánský monismus dokáže lépe než materialismus odpovědět na výzvy, jako jsou argument z myslitelnosti a argument z poznání. Ačkoli tedy russelliánský monismus má s materialismem, dualismem a idealismem jistě styčné plochy, daří se mu vyhnout nejvážnějším obtížím těchto směrů, a máme proto dobrý důvod chápat jej jako svébytný a slibný přístup k fenomenálnímu vědomí.
Provides a cosmological version of panpsychism and its environmental implications.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, our purpose is to propose and motivate a novel and scientifically informed variant of cosmopsychism, namely, the view that the experiences of ordinary subjects are ultimately grounded in an all-pervading cosmic consciousness. Second, we will demonstrate that this approach generates promising avenues for addressing familiar problems of phenomenal constitution. We use stochastic electrodynamics (SED) as the physical bedrock of our approach, supplementing it with key insights about the nature of consciousness long emphasized in eastern philosophy and other wisdom traditions. We proceed to show that our approach substantiates an intriguing way of thinking about the dynamical emergence of ordinary consciousness from cosmic consciousness, identifying the latter with the vacuum state of quantum field theory. Finally, we argue that the present approach is well suited to address problems of phenomenal constitution, in particular as they pertain to the qualities and structure of experience and to the generation of subjects.
A number of contemporary philosophers have suggested that the recent revival of interest in panpsychism within philosophy of mind could reinvigorate a pantheistic philosophy of religion. This project explores whether the combination and individuation problems, which have dominated recent scholarship within panpsychism, can aid the pantheist’s articulation of a God/universe unity. Constitutive holistic panpsychism is seen to be the only type of panpsychism suited to aid pantheism in articulating this type of unity. There are currently no well-developed solutions to the individuation problem for this type of panpsychism. Moreover, the gestures towards a solution appear costly to the religious significance of pantheism. This article concludes that any hope that contemporary panpsychism might aid pantheists in articulating unity is premature and possibly misplaced.
This book explores a neglected philosophical question: How do groups of interacting
minds relate to singular minds? Could several of us, by organizing ourselves the right
way, constitute a single conscious mind that contains our minds as parts? And could each
of us have been, all along, a group of mental parts in close cooperation? Scientific
progress seems to be slowly revealing that all the different physical objects around us are,
at root, just a matter of the right parts put together in the right ways: How far could the
same be true of minds? This book argues that we are too used to seeing the mind as an
indivisible unity and that understanding our place in nature requires being willing to see
minds as composite systems, simultaneously one conscious whole and many conscious
parts.
In thinking through the implications of such a shift of perspective, the book relates the
question of mental combination to a range of different theories of the mind (in particular
panpsychism, functionalism, and Neo-Lockeanism about personal identity) and identifies,
clarifies, and addresses a wide array of philosophical objections (concerning personal
identity, the unity of consciousness, the privacy of experience, and other issues) that have
been raised against the idea of composite minds. The result is an account of the
metaphysics of composition and consciousness that can illuminate many different debates
in philosophy of mind, concerning split brains, collective intentionality, and the
combination problem, among others.
Some philosophical theories of consciousness imply consciousness in things we would never intuitively think are conscious—most notably, panpsychism implies that consciousness is pervasive, even outside complex brains. Is this a reductio ab absurdum for such theories, or does it show that we should reject our original intuitions? To understand the stakes of this question as clearly as possible, we analyse the structured pattern of intuitions that panpsychism conflicts with (what we call the ‘Great Chain of Being’ intuition). We consider a variety of ways that the tension between this intuition and panpsychism (or other counter-intuitive theories) could be resolved, ranging from complete rejection of the theory to complete dismissal of the intuition, but argue in favour of more nuanced approaches which try to reconcile the two.
Consciousness ties together knowledge and feeling, or sapience and sentience. The connection between these two constitutive aspects - the informational and the phenomenal - is deep, but how are we to make sense of it? One influential approach maintains that sentience ultimately reduces to sapience, namely, that phenomenal consciousness is a function of representational relations between mental states which, barring these relations, would not, and could not, be conscious. In this paper I take issue with this line of thought, arguing that neither of these salient aspects of consciousness reduces to the other. Instead, I offer an explanatory framework which takes both sentience and sapience as ontological fundamentals and explore how they co-evolve. In particular, I argue that while epistemic access cannot generate experience from scratch it does play a crucial role in constituting an important form of higher-order experience, namely, the capacity to experience a sense of ownership over one's experiential domain.
Russellian monism offers a distinctive perspective on the relationship between the physical and the phenomenal. For example, on one version of the view, phenomenal properties are the categorical bases of fundamental physical properties, such as mass and charge, which are dispositional. Russellian monism has prominent supporters, such as Bertrand Russell, Grover Maxwell, Michael Lockwood, and David Chalmers. But its strengths and shortcomings are often misunderstood. In this paper we try to eliminate confusions about the view and defend it from criticisms. We present its core and distinguish different versions of it. We then compare these versions with traditional theories, such as physicalism, dualism, and idealism. We also argue that the knowledge argument and the conceivability argument are consistent with Russellian monism and that existing arguments against the view, such as the argument from weirdness, are not decisive. We conclude that Russellian monism is an attractive view that deserves serious consideration.
Constitution is the relation between something and what it is made of. Composition is the relation between something and its parts. I examine three different approaches to the relation between constitution and composition. One approach, associated with neo-Aristotelians like Mark Johnston and Kathrin Koslicki, identifies constitution with composition. A second, popular with those sympathetic to classical mereology such as Judith Thomson, defines consti-tution in terms of parthood. A third, advocated strongly by Lynne Baker, takes constitution to be somehow inconsistent with relations of parthood. All of these approaches, I argue, face serious problems. I conclude, tentatively, that constitution and composition have nothing to do with each other. Call the relation between something and what it is made of 'constitution.' Call the relation between something and its parts 'composition.' What is the relation between constitution and composition? Broadly speaking, three approaches have been apparent in the literature to the relation between constitution and composition, assuming that there is some significant relation between them. First, one might simply identify (or come close to identifying) the relations. This approach has been characteristic of neo-Aristotelian metaphysicians in the vein of Kit Fine (1982, 1999), Mark Johnston (2005, 2006) and Kathrin Koslicki (2008). Secondly, one might think that even though the relations are distinct, one can be defined in terms of the other. In particular, several philosophers have argued that constitution should be defined in terms of composition. (I am not aware of any attempts to define composition in terms of constitution.) This is an approach favored by friends of classical mereology (or variants thereof) and has been pursued by Judith Thomson (1997) and Dean Zimmerman (1995). 1 Thirdly, one might think that the relations are somehow exclusive of each other. This approach has been forcefully taken by Lynne Baker (2000, 2007). These options may not exhaust the logical territory. Perhaps, for example, the relations are distinct but connected by some synthetic principle. But they cover 1 Zimmerman's version of such a theory is not offered in propria persona; nevertheless, I shall continue to refer to it as his theory.
Taking their motivation from the perceived failure of the reductive physicalist project concerning consciousness, panpsychists ascribe subjectivity to fundamental material entities in order to account for macro-consciousness. But there exists an unresolved tension within the mainstream panpsychist position, the seriousness of which has yet to be appreciated. I capture this tension as a dilemma, and offer advice to panpsychists on how to resolve it. The dilemma is as follows: Panpsychists take the micro-material realm to feature phenomenal properties, plus micro-subjects to whom these properties belong. However, it is impossible to explain the generation of a macro-subject (like one of us) in terms of the assembly of micro-subjects, for, as I show, subjects cannot combine. Therefore the panpsychist explanatory project is derailed by the insistence that the world’s ultimate material constituents are subjects of experience. The panpsychist faces a choice of giving up her explanatory ambitions, or of giving up the claim that the ultimates are subjects. I argue that the latter option is preferable, leading to neutral monism, on which phenomenal qualities are irreducible but subjects are reducible. So panpsychists should be neutral monists.
The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology presents twenty-eight chapters on the field of contemporary phenomenology, and gives an overview of the type of work and range of topics found and discussed in contemporary phenomenology. The chapters aim to articulate and develop original theoretical perspectives. Some of them are concerned with issues and questions typical and distinctive of phenomenological philosophy, while others address questions familiar to analytic philosophers, but do so with arguments and ideas taken from phenomenology. Some offer detailed analyses of concrete phenomena; others take a more comprehensive perspective and seek to outline and motivate the future direction of phenomenology. The book aims to provide a definitive guide to what is currently going on in phenomenology. It includes discussions of such diverse topics as intentionality, embodiment, perception, naturalism, temporality, self-consciousness, language, knowledge, ethics, politics, art and religion, and will make it clear that phenomenology, far from being a tradition of the past, is alive and in a position to make valuable contributions to contemporary thought.
To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. In this paper, I first isolate the truly hard part of the problem, separating it from more tractable parts and giving an account of why it is so difficult to explain. I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that these methods inevitably fail to come to grips with the hardest part of the problem. Once this failure is recognized, the door to further progress is opened. In the second half of the paper, I argue that if we move to a new kind of nonreductive explanation, a naturalistic account of consciousness can be given. I put forward my own candidate for such an account: a nonreductive theory based on principles of structural coherence and organizational invariance and a double-aspect view of information.
Visual awareness is a favorable form of consciousness to study neurobiologically. We propose that it takes two forms: a very fast form, linked to iconic memory, that may be difficult to study; and a somewhat slower one involving visual attention and short-term memory. In the slower form an attentional
mechanism transiently binds together all those neurons whose activity relates to the relevant features of a single visual object. We suggest this is done by generating coherent semi-synchronous oscillations, probably in the 40-70 Hz range. These oscillations then activate a transient short-term
(working) memory. We outfit several lines of experimental work that might advance the understanding of the neural mechanisms involved. The neural basis of very short-term memory especially needs more experimental study.
Many thinkers have said that a God whose existence is argued for metaphysically would have no religious significance even if he existed. This book examines the God or Absolute which emerges in various metaphysical systems and asks whether he, she, or it could figure in any genuinely religious outlook. The systems studied are those of Spinoza, Hegel, T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley (very briefly), Bernard Bosanquet, Josiah Royce, A. N. Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne. There is also a chapter on Kierkegaard as the most important critic of metaphysical religion (especially Hegelian Christianity). The book ends with a statement of a form of absolute or pantheistic idealism espoused by the author and an indication of what religious significance it may have.
This book presents the major philosophical doctrines of phenomenology in a clear, lively style with an abundance of examples. The book examines such phenomena as perception, pictures, imagination, memory, language, and reference, and shows how human thinking arises from experience. It also studies personal identity as established through time and discusses the nature of philosophy. In addition to providing a new interpretation of the correspondence theory of truth, the author also explains how phenomenology differs from both modern and postmodern forms of thinking.
Recently, Terry Horgan and Matjaž Potrč have defended the thesis of ‘existence monism’, according to which the whole cosmos is the only concrete object. Their arguments appeal largely to considerations concerning vagueness. Crucially, they claim that ontological vagueness is impossible, and one key assumption in their defence of this claim is that vagueness always involves ‘sorites-susceptibility’. I aim to challenge both the claim and this assumption. As a consequence, I seek to undermine their defence of existence monism and support a common-sense pluralist ontology of ‘ordinary objects’ as being fully consistent with a thoroughgoing metaphysical realism.
A set of parameters for classifying composition operations is introduced. These parameters determine whether a composition operation is (1) universal, (2) determinate, (3) whether there is a difference between possible and actual compositions, (4) whether there can be singleton compositions, (5) whether they give rise to a hierarchy, and (6) whether components of compositions can be repeated. Philosophical implications of these parameters, in particular in relation to set theory and mereology, are discussed.
The philosophy of modality investigates necessity and possibility, and related notions — are they objective features of mind-independent reality? If so, are they irreducible, or can modal facts be explained in other terms? This book presents new work on modality by established leaders in the field and by up-and-coming philosophers. Between them, the chapters address fundamental questions concerning realism and anti-realism about modality, the nature and basis of facts about what is possible and what is necessary, the nature of modal knowledge, modal logic and its relations to necessary existence and to counterfactual reasoning. The general introduction locates the individual contributions in the wider context of the contemporary discussion of the metaphysics and epistemology of modality.
The combination problem is still one of the hardest problems for a panexperientialist ontology. Prominently, among others, Philip Goff wrote two papers in 2009 arguing that panexperientialists cannot get around the combination problem. (1) We will argue that Goff 's attack is only relevant if parsimony is the only methodological principle for evaluating and comparing ontologies. (2) Our second approach will sketch a version of panexperientialism for which the combination problem does not arise at all. Panexperiential holism is the theory that the universe as a whole is one big experiential matter of fact. What we normally believe to be independent centres of conscious subjectivity are merely long-lived structural features of this big experience. The notion of 'personal identity' entailed by panexperiential holism is essentially vague and may lead us into something like Derek Parfit's relation R (1984). Therefore, persons are not merely series of experiences, but (in an anti-realistic fashion) exemplify the common denominator of these experiences. In this sense, a person is what has experiences, or the subject of experiences. We will argue that this concept fits nicely into some frameworks of personal identity put forth by Peter Simons and Godehard Brüntrup.
Which is prior, the whole or its parts? The monist holds that the whole is prior to its parts, and thus views the cosmos as fundamental, with metaphysical explanation dangling downward from the One. The pluralist holds that the parts are prior to their whole, and thus tends to consider particles fundamental, with metaphysical explanation snaking upward from the many. There seem to be physical and modal considerations that favor the monistic view. Physically, there is good evidence that the cosmos forms an entangled system and good reason to treat entangled systems as irreducible wholes. Modally, mereology allows for the possibility of atomless gunk, with no ultimate parts for the pluralist to invoke as the ground of being.
A framework for representing a specific kind of emergent property instance is given. A solution to a generalized version of the exclusion argument is then provided and it is shown that upwards and downwards causation is unproblematical for that kind of emergence. One real example of this kind of emergence is briefly described and the suggestion made that emergence may be more common than current opinions allow.
Let ‘monism’ be the view that there is only one basic object—the world. Monists face the question of whether there are also non-basic objects. This is in effect the question of whether the world decomposes into parts. Jonathan Schaffer maintains that it does, Terry Horgan and Matjaž Potrč that it does not. In this paper, I propose a compromise view, which I call ‘Kantian monism.’ According to Kantian monism, the world decomposes into parts insofar as an ideal subject under ideal conditions would divide it into parts, but it does not decompose into parts in and of itself, that is, in an entirely mind-independent manner. After articulating Kantian monism more precisely (Section 1), I present a prima facie case for preferring it over more standard varieties of monism (Section 2).
Mereological nihilism is the view that all concrete objects are simple. Existence monism is the view that the only concrete object is one big simple: the world. I will argue that nihilism culminates in monism. The nihilist demands the simplest sufficient ontology, and the monist delivers it. Nothing is cheaper and commoner in philosophy than monism; what, unhappily, is still rare, is an attempt to defend it, and critically to establish its assumptions. [Schiller 189741.
Schiller , F. C. S. 1897. Reply: Lotze's Monism. Philosophical Review, 6: 62–64. View all references: 62]
The integrated information theory (IIT) starts from phenomenology and makes a critical use of thought experiments, to claim that consciousness is integrated information. Specifically: (1) the quantity of consciousness is given by the amount of integrated information generated by a complex of elements, and (2) the quality of experience is given by the set of informational relationships within that complex. Integrated information is defined as the amount of information generated by causal interactions within a complex of elements, above and beyond the information generated independently by its parts. Qualia space is a space where each axis represents a possible state of the complex, each point is a probability distribution of its states, and arrows between points represent the informational relationships generated by causal interactions among its elements. Together, the set of informational relationships within a complex specifies a shape in that in turn specifies a particular experience. Several observations concerning the neural substrate of consciousness fall naturally into place within the IIT framework. Among them are the association of consciousness with certain neural systems rather than with others; the fact that neural processes underlying consciousness can influence or be influenced by neural processes that remain unconscious; the reduction of consciousness during dreamless sleep and generalized seizures and the distinct role of different cortical architectures in affecting the quality of experience.
The generation problem is to explain how material configurations or processes can produce conscious experience. David Chalmers urges that this is what makes the problem of consciousness really difficult. He proposes to side-step the generation problem by proposing that consciousness is an absolutely fundamental feature of the world. I am inclined to agree that the generation problem is real and believe that taking consciousness to be fundamental is promising. But I take issue with Chalmers about what it is to be a fundamental feature of the world. In fact, I argue that taking the idea seriously ought to lead to some form of panpsychism. Powerful objections have been advanced against panpsychism, but I attempt to outline a form of the doctrine which can evade them. In the end, I suspect that we will face a choice between panpsychism and rethinking the legitimacy of the generation problem itself.
Strawson's (2006) case in favour of panpsychism is at heart an updated version of a venerable form of argument I'll call the 'intrinsic nature' argument. It is an extremely interesting argument which deploys all sorts of high calibre metaphysical weaponry (despite the 'down home' appeals to common sense which Strawson frequently makes). The argument is also subtle and intricate. So let's spend some time trying to articulate its general form.
Though most contemporary philosophers and scientists accept a physicalist view of mind, the recent surge of interest in the problem of consciousness has put the mind/body problem back into play. The physicalists' lack of success in dispelling the air of residual mystery that surrounds the question of how consciousness might be physically explained has led to a proliferation of options. Some offer alternative formulations of physicalism, but others forgo physicalism in favour of views that are more dualistic or that bring in mentalistic features at the ground- floor level of reality as in pan-proto-psychism.My aim here is to give an overview of the recent philosophic discussion to serve as a map in locating issues and options. I will not offer a comprehensive survey of the debate or mark every important variant to be found in the recent literature. I will mark the principal features of the philosophic landscape that one might use as general orientation points in navigating the terrain. I will focus in particular on three central and interrelated ideas: those of emergence, reduction, and nonreductive physicalism. The third of these, which has emerged as more or less the majority view among current philosophers of mind, combines a pluralist view about the diversity of what needs to be explained by science with an underlying metaphysical commitment to the physical as the ultimate basis of all that is real. The view has been challenged from both left and right, on one side from dualists (Chalmers, 1996) and on the other from hard core reductive materialists (Kim, 1989). Despite their differences, those critics agree in finding nonreductive physicalism an unacceptable and perhaps even incoherent position. They agree as well in treating reducibility as the essential criterion for physicality; they differ only about whether the criterion can be met. Reductive physicalists argue that it can, and dualists deny it.
I defend (metaphysical) ground against recent, unanswered objections aiming to dismiss it from serious philosophical inquiry. Interest in ground stems from its role in the venerable metaphysical project of identifying which facts hold in virtue of others. Recent work on ground focuses on regimenting it. But many reject ground itself, seeing regimentation as yet another misguided attempt to regiment a bad idea (like phlogiston or astrology). I defend ground directly against objections that it is confused, incoherent, or fruitless. This vindicates the very attempt to regiment ground. It also refocuses our attention on the genuine open questions about ground and away from the distracting, unpersuasive reasons for dismissing them.
"Mind, Brain and the Quantum" presents a radically new approach to the mind-body problem, drawing together considerations from such diverse fields as the philosophy of mind, cognitive science, neurophysiology, relativity and quantum mechanics. The very existence of consciousness, Michael Lockwood argues, poses a challenge to the traditional view of matter, as do the paradoxes of quantum theory. If mind as revealed in introspection, and matter as manifested in observation and experiment, are to be seen as dual aspects of a unitary underlying reality, then a fundamental adjustment is called for in our understanding of mental and physical phenomena alike.
Michael Lockwood develops a theory that is rooted both in the latest thinking about the foundations of quantum mechanics and in some previously neglected ideas of Bertrand Russell. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
This paper starts from the assumption that panpsychism is counterintuitive and metaphysically demanding. A number of philosophers, whilst not denying these negative aspects of the view, think that panpsychism has in its favour that it offers a good explanation of consciousness. In opposition to this, the paper argues that panpsychism cannot help us to explain consciousness, at least not the kind of consciousness we have pre-theoretical reason to believe in.
Introduction1The ProblemArguments Against MaterialismType-A MaterialismType-B Materialism15The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Type-B MaterialismType-C MaterialismInterludeType-D DualismType-E DualismType-F MonismConclusions
This introductory chapter attempts to clarify the philosophical, empirical, and theoretical bases on which a cognitive neuroscience approach to consciousness can be founded. We isolate three major empirical observations that any theory of consciousness should incorporate, namely (1) a considerable amount of processing is possible without consciousness, (2) attention is a prerequisite of consciousness, and (3) consciousness is required for some specific cognitive tasks, including those that require durable information maintenance, novel combinations of operations, or the spontaneous generation of intentional behavior. We then propose a theoretical framework that synthesizes those facts: the hypothesis of a global neuronal workspace. This framework postulates that, at any given time, many modular cerebral networks are active in parallel and process information in an unconscious manner. An information becomes conscious, however, if the neural population that represents it is mobilized by top-down attentional amplification into a brain-scale state of coherent activity that involves many neurons distributed throughout the brain. The long-distance connectivity of these 'workspace neurons' can, when they are active for a minimal duration, make the information available to a variety of processes including perceptual categorization, long-term memorization, evaluation, and intentional action. We postulate that this global availability of information through the workspace is what we subjectively experience as a conscious state. A complete theory of consciousness should explain why some cognitive and cerebral representations can be permanently or temporarily inaccessible to consciousness, what is the range of possible conscious contents, how they map onto specific cerebral circuits, and whether a generic neuronal mechanism underlies all of them. We confront the workspace model with those issues and identify novel experimental predictions. Neurophysiological, anatomical, and brain-imaging data strongly argue for a major role of prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, and the areas that connect to them, in creating the postulated brain-scale workspace.
Global workspace (GW) theory emerged from the cognitive architecture tradition in cognitive science. Newell and co-workers were the first to show the utility of a GW or "blackboard" architecture in a distributed set of knowledge sources, which could cooperatively solve problems that no single constituent could solve alone. The empirical connection with conscious cognition was made by Baars (1988, 2002). GW theory generates explicit predictions for conscious aspects of perception, emotion, motivation, learning, working memory, voluntary control, and self systems in the brain. It has similarities to biological theories such as Neural Darwinism and dynamical theories of brain functioning. Functional brain imaging now shows that conscious cognition is distinctively associated with wide spread of cortical activity, notably toward frontoparietal and medial temporal regions. Unconscious comparison conditions tend to activate only local regions, such as visual projection areas. Frontoparietal hypometabolism is also implicated in unconscious states, including deep sleep, coma, vegetative states, epileptic loss of consciousness, and general anesthesia. These findings are consistent with the GW hypothesis, which is now favored by a number of scientists and philosophers.
Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism
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