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International sanctions before and beyond UN sanctions
Abstract
United Nations sanctions are authorized by the international body that is legally charged with the maintenance of international peace and security, the UN Security Council. They are grounded in provisions of the UN Charter. However, only a fraction of all international sanctions are mandated by the UN. One of the findings of this article, which is based on data collected by the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC), is that the large majority of UN sanctions are preceded by non-UN sanctions, particularly sanctions by the United States and the European Union. Furthermore, it is common practice, particularly by the US and the EU, to add sanction provisions of their own to UN sanctions. As a result, for most UN sanctions, there are also non-UN sanctions against the same targets. Such combined sanction regimes add restrictions imposed by only some governments to those that all countries have to implement. Combined sanction regimes are therefore potentially more effective in achieving the targeted outcome than UN sanctions, which represent the lowest common denominator achievable among the members of the UN Security Council. On the other hand, combined sanction regimes might suffer from a type of ‘sanctions fatigue’. A growing number of states outside of the West are openly opposed to unilateral sanctions. Adding non-UN sanctions to UN sanctions might reduce their willingness to support UN sanctions. The TSC data, however, does not support such a contention. Rather, the data indicates that combined sanction regimes are more effective than stand-alone UN sanctions. Still, the US and EU governments—as the main drivers of sanctions policy in general and UN sanctions in particular—need to be aware of this criticism in order not to unwittingly undermine the UN sanctions instrument.
... The United Nations Security Council has increasingly resorted to sanctions as part of its efforts to build peace and prevent conflict under the authority of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (Mack & Khan, 2000;Brzoska, 2003Brzoska, , 2015 (Farrall, 2007). Security Council sanctions have taken a number of different forms in pursuit of a variety of goals. ...
... The widespread use of economic and other sanctions constitutes one of the great paradoxes of contemporary foreign policy even though they are becoming the policy tool of choice for many international bodies and countries in the post-Cold War world (Weiss, 1999;Hufbauer et al., 2008;Brzoska, 2015). The defense of sanctions adoption in general, as a foreign policy instrument, was premised on the expectation that sanctions would offer an alternative to the use of force (Carneiro & Apolinário, 2016). ...
... Nevertheless, despite the widespread use of sanctions and the extensive range and number of sanctions regimes by different international actors applied at different scales, e.g. countries, sectors, products, firms, and individuals, there is a growing debate as to their effectiveness in enacting policy change in the target country (Pape, 1997;Galtung, 1967;Hufbauer et al., 2008;Brzoska, 2015). Smeets (2019) observes that: 'The number of sanction episodes seems to be on the rise and sanctions have increasingly gained in popularity in recent years and such ...
... The United Nations Security Council has increasingly resorted to sanctions as part of its efforts to build peace and prevent conflict under the authority of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (Mack & Khan, 2000;Brzoska, 2003Brzoska, , 2015 (Farrall, 2007). Security Council sanctions have taken a number of different forms in pursuit of a variety of goals. ...
... The widespread use of economic and other sanctions constitutes one of the great paradoxes of contemporary foreign policy even though they are becoming the policy tool of choice for many international bodies and countries in the post-Cold War world (Weiss, 1999;Hufbauer et al., 2008;Brzoska, 2015). The defense of sanctions adoption in general, as a foreign policy instrument, was premised on the expectation that sanctions would offer an alternative to the use of force (Carneiro & Apolinário, 2016). ...
... Nevertheless, despite the widespread use of sanctions and the extensive range and number of sanctions regimes by different international actors applied at different scales, e.g. countries, sectors, products, firms, and individuals, there is a growing debate as to their effectiveness in enacting policy change in the target country (Pape, 1997;Galtung, 1967;Hufbauer et al., 2008;Brzoska, 2015). Smeets (2019) observes that: 'The number of sanction episodes seems to be on the rise and sanctions have increasingly gained in popularity in recent years and such ...
... Since the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the post-Cold War period has witnessed a dramatic increase in the imposition of sanctions and the US, the UN and the EU in particular have employed sanctions on other nations more than 500 times (Cashen, 2017). Sanctions therefore form a prominent feature of the international relations landscape and have become one of the cornerstones of foreign policy in the absence of armed intervention (Brzoska, 2015;Kaempfer & Lowenberg, 2007). According to Farrall (2007), there are two factors which contributed to the rise of sanctions in the aftermath of the Cold War. ...
... Despite their widespread use of economic sanctions and the extensive range and number of sanctions regimes by different international actors applied at different scales, e.g. countries, sectors, products, firms, and individuals, there is considerable debate as to their effectiveness in achieving the desired outcomes of sanctioning bodies (Brzoska, 2015;Hufbauer et al., 2008;Lindsay, 1986;O'Sullivan, 2010;Pape, 1997). Furthermore, the utility of sanctions as a means of regime change is questionable as various countries subjected to sanctions (e.g. ...
... Furthermore, in a sanctions environment, public spending priorities often change and public resources shift to defence equipment and personnel to enhance the coercive capacity of the targeted leadership. As a result, other areas such as environment or production remain secondary while the focus is maintaining the ruling structure and sovereignty and ensuring regime survival (Brzoska, 2015;. ...
... Moreover, we still do not know whether different sanctioning entities have contrasting approaches to the ending of external pressure. The main global sanctions senders, namely the European Union, United Nations and United States, apply sanctions in their own distinct ways (Brzoska, 2015). Similarly, regional organizations (ROs) also differ in their imposition of restrictive measures on their member states. ...
... There are also instances of African RO sanctions being imposed over unconstitutional changes of government where the UN was not active at all (Charron, 2013). At the same time, the sanctions implemented by African ROs rarely go beyond the measures adopted by the UN (Brzoska, 2015). However, not only regional actors and the UN differ in how quickly they resort to sanctions and how long they keep them in place. ...
The termination of sanctions is an important but largely understudied phenomenon within international politics. Of the nearly 400 sanctions cases that were in place in 1990 or imposed thereafter, nearly three-quarters had been lifted by 2018. As almost all existing research has focused on threatened and imposed sanctions, we lack insight into when and how these measures are lifted. This is particularly the case for sanctions that have been terminated despite targets resisting senders’ demands. To remedy this, we conceptualize the protracted process of sanctions termination and conduct an in-depth analysis of termination patterns of European Union, United Nations, United States and regional-organization sanctions in the post-Cold War era using the novel International Sanctions Termination (IST) dataset. We compare commonalities and differences between sanctions senders and assess how often and under what conditions targeted governments either give in to or resist their demands. Finally, we discuss how the material and signalling properties of sanctions may affect political contestation in the targeted country after these measures have ended.
... Empirically, conflict severity is a more powerful predictor of UNSC intervention than P5 interests (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012, 35). Intriguingly, recent studies note that 78% of UN sanctions after the Cold War were preceded by similar measures by other senders (Brzoska 2015(Brzoska , 1341. However, this research does not differentiate between sanctions by individual states and regional organizations. ...
... For example, ECOWAS formally requested the UNSC to universalize the sanctions it wielded on Liberia in 1992 (Carish, Rickard-Martin, and Meister 2017) and called for UN sanctions on Côte d'Ivoire after imposing its own measures in 2010 (Bellamy and Williams 2011). The Organization of African Unity promoted UN sanctions on Sudan in 1996 (Brzoska 2015). Its successor, the African Union (AU) asked the UN to multilateralize AU sanctions against Guinea in 2009 "to give them a universal character" (African Union 2009), as it did again in 2013 with Central African Republic (Sossai 2017). ...
The imposition of sanctions by the UN Security Council (UNSC) is notoriously selective. Many crises have qualified for UNSC sanctions by endangering peace and security, yet the UN has imposed sanctions in only a few. Selectivity in UNSC sanctions is conventionally explained by conflict intensity or the interests of the Council’s permanent members. Complementing these accounts, we document a third explanation: pre-existing sanctions by regional organizations. We argue that the UNSC has incentives to sanction countries which are already under sanctions by regional organizations because regional sanctions embody neighborhood consensus on the legitimacy of these sanctions and reassure the Council about implementation. Statistical analyses of original data, text analyses, a case study, and interviews strongly support our argument: regional sanctions increase the likelihood of UNSC sanctions adoption, particularly when these are enacted by regional organizations composed of neighboring states. This study advances research on sanctions, conflict resolution, and regime complexity.
... Sanctions are generally viewed as a lower-cost, lower-risk, middle ground between diplomacy and war (Masters, 2017) and often represent "the least unpalatable of the coercive alternatives available to the UN Security Council when faced with the task of taking action to maintain or restore international peace and security" (Farrall, 2007, p. 3). The UN Security Council has increasingly resorted to sanctions as part of its efforts to build peace and prevent conflict (Brzoska, 2015;Mack & Khan, 2000). Based on Chapter VII of the UN charter, if the UN Security Council determines under Article 39 the "existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression," then under Article 41 it can authorize "complete or partial interruption of economic relations" and under Article 42 it can enforce these through "such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary" to maintain or restore international peace and security. ...
... Sanctions are promoted as a means to achieve peace (Brzoska, 2015;Lorenz, 2019;Mack & Khan, 2000). However, the history of sanctions clearly shows that economic sanctions have not been able to maintain peace in the long-term. ...
... UN, EU) in order to achieve a diplomatic, foreign policy or security goal without overt direct confrontation. Sanctions have increasingly become a ubiquitous blunt tool of coercive diplomacy (Brzoska, 2015) and are generally configured to encourage behavioral change in the regimes, individuals, or groups of the target country (Cortright & Lopez, 2018). Most sanctions regimes have targeted state actors and have been enforced at multilateral (e.g. ...
... As discussed earlier, sanctions are increasingly utilized to address a range of threats to international and domestic peace and security interests and for many others political, military, and social ends (Brzoska, 2015;Drezner, 2011). Nevertheless, sanctions typically fail to achieve their goals, particularly when the aim is regime change or significant changes in state behavior (Hanania, 2020;Hufbauer et al., 2008;Pape, 1997). ...
In an effort to contain the advancement of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, many states have introduced unprecedented peacetime measures ranging from border closures and travel bans to the suspension of visa exemptions, as well as internal mobility restrictions, including full lockdowns and quarantine for incoming passengers. Nevertheless, coercive measures such as sanctions continue to be applied during the COVID-19 outbreak and have largely undermined sanctioned countries' capacity to respond to the pandemic. The latter has prompted renewed discussion of the humanitarian costs of this frequently deployed foreign policy tool against the civilian populations in the target countries. The inconsistent application of border controls and travel restrictions by states also raise questions as to the politics of pandemics and how they fulfill the International Health Regulations. Framed from a geopolitical perspective, this study aims to discuss the power of sanctions regime in relation to state responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. This paper also discusses the degree of selectivity of border restrictions by major global tourism destinations. While the COVID-19 pandemic is first and foremost a health crisis, its implications are economically and geo-politically far-reaching with corresponding implications for the framing of travel and tourism within humanitarian and political contexts.
... Sanctions are generally viewed as a lower-cost, lower-risk, middle ground between diplomacy and war (Masters, 2017) and often represent "the least unpalatable of the coercive alternatives available to the UN Security Council when faced with the task of taking action to maintain or restore international peace and security" (Farrall, 2007, p. 3). The UN Security Council has increasingly resorted to sanctions as part of its efforts to build peace and prevent conflict (Brzoska, 2015;Mack & Khan, 2000). Based on Chapter VII of the UN charter, if the UN Security Council determines under Article 39 the "existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression," then under Article 41 it can authorize "complete or partial interruption of economic relations" and under Article 42 it can enforce these through "such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary" to maintain or restore international peace and security. ...
... Sanctions are promoted as a means to achieve peace (Brzoska, 2015;Lorenz, 2019;Mack & Khan, 2000). However, the history of sanctions clearly shows that economic sanctions have not been able to maintain peace in the long-term. ...
Despite the widespread use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool in the absence of armed intervention and as a means to promote peace, there is notable absence of research on the effects of sanctions on the peacebuild-ing capacity of tourism and their relationship to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This situation is surprising given that both sanctions and tourism are promoted as a force for peace and reconciliation processes. Drawing upon international relations and political science and via semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders in the Iranian tourism and hospitality industry, this study investigates whether sanctions contribute to peace and create an environment suitable for tourism development. The findings indicate how the imposition, relaxation and then reimposition of sanctions by international state actors as a means of peace have paralyzed the Iranian tourism industry through its psychological , sectoral, and societal effects and mobility restrictions. The consequences of sanctions and their sharp contrast with the SDGs are also explored. This study fills a significant gap in tourism research by examining the implications of the application of a widely used coercive geopolitical tool of statecraft in relation to the peace and tourism nexus.
... Two main reasons contribute to this: first, as Fu et al. (2020) note, other governments are often less willing to enforce UN sanctions without additional conditions to achieve their geopolitical goals. Second, if the EU and US view UN sanctions as insufficiently severe, they may impose additional sanctions to meet their objectives (Brzoska, 2015;Fu et al., 2020). This could explain why US and EU sanctions have a more significant adverse impact on child vaccination progress in target countries. ...
International sanctions are often imposed with the aim of influencing the political behavior of target states, but they may have unintended consequences on public health. This study empirically examines the impact of international sanctions on child immunization rates in developing countries. Utilizing panel data from 76 developing countries between 2000 and 2019, the analysis explores how different types of sanctions, including those from the US, EU, and UN, as well as economic and unilateral sanctions, affect the immunization rates for DPT, Hepatitis B, and Measles vaccines. The findings indicate that sanctions, particularly those imposed by the US and EU, significantly reduce vaccination rates, with economic and unilateral sanctions showing the most substantial negative impact. Additionally, the study highlights the moderating role of health spending, revealing that increased healthcare investment can mitigate some of the adverse effects of sanctions. Poorer developing countries are disproportionately affected compared to their more affluent counterparts. The results underscore the need for policymakers to consider the broader public health implications of sanctions and for international efforts to ensure that essential medical resources remain accessible in sanctioned countries. This study contributes to the literature by providing comprehensive empirical evidence on the detrimental effects of international sanctions on child immunization, advocating for a balanced approach that protects public health while achieving geopolitical objectives.
... The debate on sanctions efficacy as a foreign policy tool has become a prominent theme in public policy, and its use has been as frequent as it has been diverse (Brzoska, 2015;Cotright & Lopez, 2018;OSallivan, 2010) . Relevant literature showed that sanctions could be considered an effective policy tool 5 (Doxey, 1987;Galtung, 1967;Ninsic & Wallenstein, 1983;Nossal, 1989) in accomplishing different policy objectives (Daoudi & Dajani, 1983;Hoffmann, 1967;Wallenstein, 1968). ...
This Electronic Monograph (E-Monograph) is interested to present the effects of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and its impact on the world economy. This E-Monograph is divided into five chapters. The first chapter is explaining each chapter of this E-Monograph. The second chapter in this research aims to explore various scenarios of World War III under different levels of destruction, involving multiple opponents and global geographical locations simultaneously. We utilize the World War III Impact Simulator (WW3-Simulator) to assess the potential outcomes of WWIII, considering various degrees of war escalation and intensity, ranging from partial conflicts to full-scale warfare. In our study, we examine twelve potential areas of armed conflict in the context of WWIII, each involving different opponents across the world. These areas and their respective opponents are as follows: 1. Europe vs. Russia (C1); 2. China vs. Taiwan (C2); 3. South Korea vs. North Korea (C3); 4. Pakistan vs. India (C4); 5. Japan vs. China (C5); 6. Japan vs. North Korea (C6); 7. Greece vs. Turkey (C7); 8. Israel vs. the Middle East (C8); 9. U.S. vs. China (C9); 10. U.S. vs. Russia (C10); 11. U.S. vs. Russia Allies in Latin America (Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela) (C11); 12. U.S. vs. Iran (C12). We consider varying degrees of military devastation to assess the economic damages resulting from these conflicts. This research employs maps and multidimensional graphs to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the economic consequences of WWIII. Ultimately, our study presents intriguing findings generated by the WW3-Simulator within a unified multidimensional graphical framework and across different timeframes. Finally, it's worth noting that we are utilizing Wolfram Mathematica for our calculations and forecasts. The third chapter shows the economic dimensions of a territorial military conflict. The Intraregional Trade Disruption from War Simulator (ITDW-Simulator) attempts to estimate the heterogeneous macroeconomic effects of the military conflict. The model suggests two primary indicators and four secondary indicators. The final trade suffocation index (TS-Index) and the final investment desgrowth from war function (〖-δ〗_w ) measure trade disruption’s potential impact on international trade patterns and economic development. The agriculture exports, industrial and manufacturing exports, service exports, and FDI flows capture the trade and investment interdependency. The model investigates the impact of the Russo-Ukraine military conflict on the bilateral trade and investment between the Russian Federation and the European Union. The fourth chapter evaluates the impact of any armed conflict on economic performance is substantial, but measuring this impact to gauge the intensity of its effects on inflation and unemployment is fraught with uncertainty. This paper aims to address this gap by introducing the War Economic Destruction Level Simulator (WEDL-Simulator), a new economic method designed to evaluate the impact of armed conflict on both inflation and unemployment simultaneously. Using five key indicators, the WEDL-Simulator draws from various analytical perspectives to assess the economic damage caused by the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. In this article, the global economy is used to demonstrate the applicability of the WEDL-Simulator, providing a coherent evaluation of the negative economic effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on world inflation and unemployment.
Finally, the fifth chapter introduces a new economic simulator in the case of a war, this new economic simulator is entitled “The Post-War Economic Impact Simulator (PEI-Simulator).” The PEI-Simulator assesses the economic impacts of countries thorough the possible scenario of a partial or full war in three different stages: (i) pre-war stage; (ii) war stage; (iii) post-war stage. The analysis makes use of different indicators such as economic desgrowth from war (-δwar), war intensity (I), war losses (-Lwar), economic wear from war (Πwar), level of war tension (Twar), level of diplomatic negotiations (D), and the total economic leaking from war (Ωwar). Lastly, this research applies the PEI-Simulator to evaluate a possible full war between Russia and Ukraine.
... International actors The article analysis the application of international sanctions as a tool for foreign policy, both before and beyond the UNSC sanctions system. [98] Judicial review The article analyses the legal implications and effects of two significant decisions made by the European Union's Court of First Instance, known as the Yusuf and Kadi decisions. ...
UNSC sanctions have been referred to as a powerful tool increasingly used by the UNSC to maintain international peace and security based on Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. This study conducts a bibliometric analysis to provide a comprehensive overview of the current research status, developments trends, and research hotspots in UNSC sanctions research from 1990 to 2023. This study uses CiteSpace to visualize and analyze datasets of 345 articles about UNSC sanctions obtained from the Web of Science (WOS) database. The research on UNSC sanctions has three stages: the initial development stage (1990–2006), the transitional development stage (2007–2017), and the rapid development stage (2018–2023). This study describes UNSC sanctions research status, trends, hotspots, and distributions of publications by journal sources, disciplines, countries, institutions, and authors. It also describes the knowledge-based mapping and research hotspots on UNSC sanctions, including keywords, citation burst, keyword clusters, keyword clusters timeline view, cited references, intellectual base, and descriptive analysis. In addition, this study analyzed UNSC sanctions research divided into four domain categories: implementation, human rights, impacts, and specific regimes. The results showed that the topic of UNSC sanctions was multidisciplinary research and that scholars from different research disciplines had different focuses on UNSC sanctions. This study offers valuable insights into the current hot topics within the field of UNSC sanctions and offers recommendations for future research directions.
... Наиболее ярким примером можно считать КНДР и Иран, в отношении которых блокирующие финансовые санкции применялись весьма активно [Nephew 2018;Zarate 2013]. Блокирующие санкции вошли в инструментарий ограничительных мер СБ ООН [Beirsteker, Tourihno 2016], хотя США систематически "достраивали" режимы ограничений ООН своими односторонними санкциями [Brzoska 2015]. Их стал активно применять Европейский союз и отдельные страны, включая Великобританию, Швейцарию, Японию, Австралию, Канаду, а с недавнего времени -Китай и Россия. ...
The article examines an aspect of the meta-theoretical context of the renewed confrontation between the political West and Russia. A distinction is drawn between democratism, the purposive instrumentalization of democracy agendas in great power conflict, and democracy as a responsive, reflexive and participatory mechanism of popular control over government. In the post-Cold War era this gave rise to inter-democracy, the combination of NATO and the European Union as the basis for the continued predominance of Atlanticism in the political West. This served to exclude alternative security arrangements in post-Cold War Europe, notably pan-continental variants. At the same time, the political West, a constellation of power that was created during and shaped by the Cold War, advanced transdemocracy, the view that democracy was the foundation for the creation of a genuine security community. Drawing on democratic peace theory, this approach substituted democratic internationalism for the sovereign internationalism at the heart of the UN-based Charter international system established in 1945. This gave rise to a distinctive style of international politics, described as democratism in this paper. Rather than overcoming conflict, democratism serves to sharpen antagonisms and thus helped to regenerate Cold War practices and undermined the credibility of liberal internationalism itself. The blowback effects, however, should be distinguished from the continuing struggle for democracy and a style of international politics that remains true to Charter principles.
... Pek çok ülkeye BM tarafından yürütülen yaptırımlarla birlikte, BM-dışı yaptırımlar aynı anda uygulanmış, bu da bir overlap (üst üste binme) durumu oluşturmuştur. Yaptırımlar konusunda çalışan uluslararası bir hükümet-dışı kuruluş olan Akıllı Yaptırım Konsorsiyumu (Targeted Sanctions Consortium, TSC) verilerine göre, ABD, BM tarafından uygulanan 23 yaptırımdan yedisine; Avrupa Birliği (AB) ise altısına ek olarak kendileri de overlap yaratan yaptırımlar uygulamışlardır (Brzoska, 2015(Brzoska, : 1340(Brzoska, -1343. 5 Devletlerin neden BMGK ile aynı hedeflere münhasıran yaptırım uyguladıklarını açıklamak ve birbirleri ile örtüşen bu yaptırımların amaçlarına 5 Burada sözü edilen TSC, Graduate Institute Geneva'nın akıllı yaptırımlar olarak bilinen uygulamalarla ilgili bir veritabanı projesidir. ...
Devletler, tarih boyunca siyasi, hukuki, ahlaki amaçlarla birbirlerine yaptırım uygulamışlardır. Soğuk Savaş sonrasında yaptırımlar uluslararası topluluğun ajandasında önemli yer tutmaya başlamış, bu dönemde Amerika Birleşik Devletleri de, belirli devletlere karşı tek taraflı yaptırımları hayata geçirmiştir. 11 Eylül sonrasında güvenlik veya insan hakları gerekçeleriyle uygulanan Küresel Magnitsky Yasası (GMA) ve Amerika’nın Yaptırımlar Yoluyla Hasımlarıyla Mücadele Yasası (CAATSA) kapsamında yeni yaptırımlar gündeme gelmiştir. Ancak bu yasalara istinaden uygulanan yaptırımların insan haklarına etkisi literatürde yeterli derinlikte araştırılmamıştır. Bu çalışma, insan hakları ihlalleri nedeniyle sözkonusu iki yasaya istinaden yaptırım uygulanan Rusya, Çin ve İran’daki temel hak ve özgürlüklerin bu yaptırımlardan ne şekilde etkilendiğini bulmak amacıyla yapılmıştır. Araştırmanın temel bulgusu, yaptırımların Rusya’da minör düzeyde etkin olmakla birlikte Çin ve İran’da majör bozulmaların kaydedildiği, yaptırımların hak ihlallerinin önüne geçmekte hedeflenen başarıya ulaşamadığıdır.
... Economic sanctions are means of exerting pressure on a country or government to force them change their political behavior (Cortright and Lopez, 2018;Brzoska, 2015); they are implemented multilaterally (at the United Nations), regionally (EU) and unilaterally by one country (Happold and Eden, 2019). Sanctions are considered as one of the foreign policies of the US government to exert pressure on governments. ...
Purpose
The blockchain technology is based on distributed ledger. Many stakeholders, such as developers, entrepreneurs and technology lovers, consider the blockchain as an economic and business re-creation that is faced with numerous challenges in its application. Blockchain technology is the backbone of many digital currencies, i.e. Bitcoin and Ethereum. Although presently digital currencies are recognized as payment and exchange instruments in many countries, the economic sanctions imposed on some countries have restricted the possibility of the trading. So, this study seeks to evaluate the adoption of blockchain for digital currency use in Iran in the shadow of economic sanctions.
Design/methodology/approach
The developed value-based technology adoption model and smart PLS software have been used in this research. The statistical population of the study was people active in the Iranian stock market; the purpose for this selection was their familiarity with financial and digital currency issues.
Findings
The results show that the terms of sanctions, usage and facilitating conditions are directly related to users' perceived value of digital currency and its use; As a result, in a sanctioned country like Iran, the use of digital currencies is being accepted as a way of rolling out economic sanctions and thus making commercial payments.
Originality/value
As well as the fact that evaluating the adoption of the blockchain technology in a sanctioned country like Iran is considered as the originality aspect of the research, applying an extended model in the technology adoption is also the research innovation.
... Economic sanctions or restrictive measures 1 as terms used by the acts of the European Union and of United Nations are topics of discussion in the political, legal and economic spheres since they constitute one of the tools where the nation-states implement the economic and financial statecraft (Simon, 2014;Brzoska, 2015;Marossi, Basset, 2015;Biersteker, Eckert, Tourinho, 2016;Happold, Eden, 2016;Nephew, 2018;Gordon, Smyth, Cornell, 2019;Russell, 2022) According to the CJEU, trying to give a concrete notion on sanctions: "(...) economic and financial sanctions (such as freezing of assets or investment restrictions), measures concerning travel (inter alia, travel or entry bans in the territory of the Member States), (...) trade measures (such as embargoes or restrictions on the import/export of certain goods or services) but also the suspension or termination of trade agreements or aid programs, as well as diplomatic measures such as suspension of diplomatic relations (...)". above all as a diplomatic policy that States followed to avoid new conflicts and economic crises in global markets. ...
The restrictive measures imposed on the Russian federation concern not only the State but also the entities and some people of power. These measures include the freezing of funds, illegal economic resources of a technical or material nature but also those that are oriented towards the production and use of chemical weapons and/or acts that help and encourage such activity. This research focuses mainly on the type of the aforementioned sanctions by the European Union. This work also seeks to analyze the legal effectiveness of these sanctions within the circle of the United Nations and World Trade Organization (WTO). Finally, the proposal of new types of sanctions, but also the setting of new rules against the Russian federation are the final objective of our work.
... Despite being widely debatable [25][26][27], economic sanctions are often politically seen as an effective policy tool [28][29][30][31] to accomplish various policy objectives [32][33][34] such as compliance, subversion, and/or international deterrence [35]. The embargo on Russian exports is intended to accomplish these objectives, which will be essential for speeding up an end to this devastating conflict. ...
The recent economic sanctions against Russia can jeopardise the sustainability of the European Union’s (EU) energy supply. Despite the EU’s strong commitment to stringent abatement targets, fossil fuels still play a significant role in the EU energy policy. Furthermore, high dependency on Russian energy supplies underlines the vulnerability of the EU energy security. Using a global computable general equilibrium model, we prove that the current EU embargo on coal and oil imported from Russia will have adverse supply effects, substantially increasing energy prices and welfare costs for the EU resident. Although it reduces emissions, extending the embargo to include natural gas doubles this welfare cost. The use of coal is likely to increase, especially with respect to EU electricity generation, given the current constraints of additional import capacities from non-Russian producers. The impact on Russia once the EU extends the sanctions to natural gas is less substantial than on the EU. Russian welfare cost will increase less than 50%, indicating that extending the current restriction to boycott Russian gas is a costly policy option.
... Scholars first assumed that cooperation is a necessary condition for economic sanctions to succeed (Galtung 1967;Doxey 1980;Gilpin 1984;Baldwin 1985). 2 Later, systematic empirical research proved this assumption to be wrong. Multilateral sanctions were shown to not increase the effectiveness of the tool; potentially they could be even counter-effective (Hufbauer et al. 2007;Drezner 1999Drezner , 2000Morgan and Schwebach 1997;Miers and Morgan 2002;Bonetti 1997;van Bergeijk 1994;Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1999;Brzoska 2015). Three main theoretical frameworks were developed in order to explain this anomaly: selection effects, public goods problem, and spatial theory. ...
This article studies cooperation on multilateral economic sanctions. Despite low effectiveness and sanction-busting, multilateral economic sanctions are a popular tool of foreign policy. We explore an instrumental approach to sanctions and develop a game theory framework where sender states face a collective action problem when coordinating multilateral coercion. We indicate that cooperation can be achieved through repeated interactions and reputation. We test empirically the two mechanisms with the TIES data on economic sanctions and adherence to past sanction regimes and the Correlates of War data on membership in International Organizations. Our results indicate that reputation is a strong predictor of cooperation on multilateral economic coercion. The effect of repeated interaction appears conditional on reputation; states with poor reputation positively mediate its effect through repeated interaction.
Este artículo analiza la cooperación en materia de sanciones económicas multilaterales. A pesar de la escasa eficacia y de la violación de las sanciones, las sanciones económicas multilaterales son una herramienta popular de la política exterior. Exploramos un enfoque decisivo de las sanciones y desarrollamos un marco de teoría del juego en el que los Estados de origen se enfrentan a un problema de acción colectiva cuando coordinan la coerción multilateral. Indicamos que la cooperación puede lograrse mediante repetidas interacciones y mediante la reputación. Comprobamos empíricamente los dos mecanismos con los datos sobre la amenaza y la imposición de sanciones económicas (TIES, por su sigla en inglés), así como la adhesión a regímenes sancionadores anteriores y los datos del proyecto Correlates of War sobre la pertenencia a organizaciones internacionales. Nuestros resultados indican que la reputación es un fuerte predictor de la cooperación en materia de coerción económica multilateral. El efecto de la interacción repetida se ve condicionado por la reputación; los Estados con mala reputación median positivamente su efecto a través de la interacción repetida.
Le présent article s’intéresse à la coopération dans le cadre de sanctions économiques multilatérales. Malgré qu’elles soient peu efficaces et souvent violées, les sanctions économiques multilatérales restent un outil largement utilisé en politique étrangère. Nous nous intéressons à l’approche instrumentale des sanctions et développons un cadre de théorie des jeux dans lequel les États exportateurs sont confrontés au problème de l’action collective lors de la coordination de coercition multilatérale. Selon nous, la coopération est possible au moyen d’interactions répétées et grâce à la réputation. Nous testons empiriquement ces deux mécanismes à l’aide des données TIES sur les sanctions économiques et le respect des régimes de sanctions imposés par le passé, mais aussi des données du projet Correlates of War sur l’adhésion aux organisations internationales. Nos résultats indiquent que la réputation constitue un indicateur important de coopération en matière de coercition économique multilatérale. L’effet des interactions répétées semble dépendre de la réputation. En effet, les États jouissant d’une moins bonne réputation en atténuent les effets grâce aux interactions répétées.
... The debate on sanctions' efficacy as a foreign policy tool has become a prominent theme in public policy, and its use has been as frequent as it has been diverse (Brzoska, 2015;Cotright & Lopez, 2018;O'Sallivan, 2010). Relevant literature showed that sanctions could be considered an effective policy tool 6 (Doxey, 1987;Galtung, 1967;Ninsic & Wallenstein, 1983;Nossal, 1989) in accomplishing different policy objectives (Daoudi & Dajani, 1983;Hoffmann, 1967;Wallenstein, 1968). ...
This paper intends to establish conceptual foundations for analyzing the economic dimensions of a territorial military conflict. The Intraregional Trade Disruption from War Simulator (ITDW-Simulator) attempts to estimate the heterogeneous macroeconomic effects of the military conflict. The model suggests two primary indicators and four secondary indicators. The final trade suffocation index (TS-Index) and the final investment desgrowth from war function (w) measure trade disruption's potential impact on international trade patterns and economic development. The agriculture exports, industrial and manufacturing exports, service exports, and FDI flows capture the trade and investment interdependency. The model investigates the impact of the Russo-Ukraine military conflict on the bilateral trade and investment between the Russian Federation and the European Union.
... The debate on sanctions' efficacy as a foreign policy tool has become a prominent theme in public policy, and its use has been as frequent as it has been diverse (Brzoska, 2015;Cotright & Lopez, 2018;O'Sallivan, 2010). Relevant literature showed that sanctions could be considered an effective policy tool 6 (Doxey, 1987;Galtung, 1967;Ninsic & Wallenstein, 1983;Nossal, 1989) in accomplishing different policy objectives (Daoudi & Dajani, 1983;Hoffmann, 1967;Wallenstein, 1968). ...
This paper intends to establish conceptual foundations for analyzing the economic dimensions of a territorial military conflict. The Intraregional Trade Disruption from War Simulator (ITDW-Simulator) attempts to estimate the heterogeneous macroeconomic effects of the military conflict. The model suggests two primary indicators and four secondary indicators. The final trade suffocation index (TS-Index) and the final investment desgrowth from war function (w) measure trade disruption's potential impact on international trade patterns and economic development. The agriculture exports, industrial and manufacturing exports, service exports, and FDI flows capture the trade and investment interdependency. The model investigates the impact of the Russo-Ukraine military conflict on the bilateral trade and investment between the Russian Federation and the European Union.
... The debate on sanctions' efficacy as a foreign policy tool has become a prominent theme in public policy, and its use has been as frequent as it has been diverse (Brzoska, 2015;Cotright & Lopez, 2018;O'Sallivan, 2010). Relevant literature showed that sanctions could be considered an effective policy tool 6 (Doxey, 1987;Galtung, 1967;Ninsic & Wallenstein, 1983;Nossal, 1989) in accomplishing different policy objectives (Daoudi & Dajani, 1983;Hoffmann, 1967;Wallenstein, 1968). ...
This paper intends to establish conceptual foundations for analyzing the economic dimensions of a territorial military conflict. The Intraregiona l Trade Disruption from War Simulator (ITDW-Simulator) attempts to estimate the heterogeneous macroeconomic effects of the military conflict. The model suggests two primary indicators and four secondary indicators. The final trade suffocation index (TS-Index) and the final investment desgrowth from war function (−) measure trade disruption's potential impact on international trade patterns and economic development. The agriculture exports, industrial and manufacturing exports, service exports, and FDI flows capture the trade and investment interdependency. The model investigates the impact of the Russo-Ukraine military conflict on the bilateral trade and investment between the Russian Federation and the European Union.
... In addition, all cases aimed to stigmatize the regimes that violated international norms. The case of Ethiopia/Eritrea in 2000 is particularly noteworthy as Russia led debates concerning the imposition of sanctions while the US, UK or France led all other post-Cold War cases (Brzoska 2015(Brzoska : 1342. In addition to stigmatizing the aggressive use of force, these sanctions also strengthened positive norms and practices such as the use of diplomacy and regional organizations to Others have maintained that international sanctions were more effective than unilateral measures in altering Qaddafi's behavior through economic and reputational cost (Collins 2004;Lopez and Cortright 2004, 102-103;Zoubir 2006 (Berger 2016, 9). ...
... In addition, many fields have also been implicated in the impact of international sanctions. First, human rights and democracy have increasingly become important policy objectives in international economic sanctions (Tostensen and Bull, 2002;Brzoska, 2015). Additionally, in the economic field, sanctions present a significantly negative impact on the trade of the target countries (Ang, 2011). ...
Russia's four largest petroleum companies, Rosneft, Surgutneftegaz, Gazprom Neft, and Lukoil, account for more than 50% of petroleum production and 70% of the demand in Russia's drilling market. All these four petroleum companies are profoundly relaying on Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and import of equipment and technologies. FDI have been mostly received from European Union (EU) countries and United States (U.S.) and also these countries have been major providers of equipment and technologies including technologies for offshore development, horizontal, controlled-angle, and directional drilling, hydraulic fracturing, catalysts for oil processing and petrochemicals, and geological and seismic exploration. However, since applying economic sanctions against Russia by EU and U.S. in 2014 due to Crimea annexation and Ukrainian crisis, the situation with FDI and access to technologies has been dramatically changed. Keeping with the analytical separation between economic and non-economic sanctions and using concept of political economy of energy, this paper focuses on economic energy sanctions, and for brevity refer to them as energy sanctions with emphasizes on technology export ban, foreign capital ban, state support of petroleum industry and in addition, because of the crucial role that petroleum industry plays in the Russian economy, the paper discusses the impact of both energy sanctions and COVID-19 pandemic on national economy.
Keywords: Petroleum industry, Covid-19, Russia, Energy Sanctions
JEL Classifications: P4, P48; Q4, Q43; K3, K32
DOI: https://doi.org/10.32479/ijeep.11385
... Indeed, in many ways the remarkable growth in the application of economic sanctions (Cortright and Lopez 2018), matches that of international tourism. This apparent relationship should not be surprising as it reflects the growing intensity and scale of economic globalization and associated transport connectivity and therefore the increased capacity of economic sanctions to have effect as an instrument in international geopolitics and relations (Eriksson 2011;Brzoska 2015;Biersteker, Eckert and Tourinho 2016;Lopez and Cortright 2018). In a tourism context, Hall (2005) viewed sanctions as part of a type of 'carrotand-stick' trade diplomacy in which sanctions on access to a country by tourists from a sanctioning country was a stick for which measures might range from increased visa costs or limitation through to prohibition on access. ...
Tourism is an important economic sector in many countries of the world and a major source of employment, government revenue and foreign exchange earnings. Tourism is usually defined as a form of short-term voluntary mobility which means that it includes not just leisure/holiday travel, but also business travel, visiting friends and relations. Therefore, the reach of tourism includes the movement of a country's diaspora as well as business connectivity. It is this cross-border mobility that makes tourism vulnerable to the introduction of economic sanctions. Sanctions can affect tourism directly, i.e. through the imposition of limitations on individual mobility as well as carriers, as well as substantially affecting investment in the sector. Indirectly, sanctions can affect industry access to equipment and technology, leading in the long-term to a run down in infrastructure and plant as well as a negative destination image. The chapter addresses these issues in relation to a number of cases including Cuba, Iran, Turkey and Russia and notes that while tourism flows are often severely affected by the imposition of sanctions, tourism is also sometimes seen as a response.
... The "tit-for-tat" principle (Bongardt & Torres 2018) in introducing tariffs, sanctions and other restrictions affected direct relations between the largest countries of the contemporary world. In this wave of trade wars, a leading role is played by governments that introduce sanctions against particular economic sectors, companies or politicians, including "smart" or "targeted" sanctions (Drezner 2003;Gordon 2011;Brzoska 2015). ...
Increased geopolitical competition and growing economic nationalism
after 2014 have gradually started to slow the trend of liberalization of
international trade. Relations among certain national states have turned into trade wars – a hybrid phenomenon shaped at the intersection of geopolitics and geoeconomics. The paper explores global and regional trends in trade regulations introduced by the world’s largest economies and, at the same time, its major military powers. The G20 countries’ role in these processes was illustrated through references to empirical data on the dynamics of the introduced trade regulations in 2009–2018. The effectiveness of the regulations index is proposed. Apart from the harm that deepening such negative trends in the global geostrategic balance does to broader bilateral relations, the role of trade wars in re-shaping globalization’s established conditions is also discussed.
... «Most of the UN Security Council sanctions (78%) were initiated after unilateral sanctions were imposed on the« target country ». Often, «initiating countries» seek to complete their own sanctions regime in the UN, actively promoting relevant resolutions (Brzoska 2015(Brzoska : 1342. This pattern clearly describes the US foreign policy towards Iran. ...
Осы зерттеу Иранға қарсы АҚШ-тың экономикалық санкцияларын жүргізу саясатын зерттеуге бағытталған. Тақырып Иранның ядролық бағдарламасы бойынша қабылданған Бірлескен кешенді іс-қимыл жоспарынан Вашингтонның шығуы салдарынан тағы да өзекті болды. АҚШ-тың мұндай шешімі Иранға қатысты экономикалық санкциялардың жаңа толқынын білдіреді. БКІЖ-дан шығу айтарлықтай қысымға негізделетін жаңа санкциялардың тиімділігі туралы маңызды мәселе қояды. Бұл жағдай іргелі ғылыми мәселелерді тудырды, атап айтқанда – бір жағдайларда санкциялардың тиімділігіне және басқаларында құлдырауға не себеп болды? Осыған байланысты белгілі бір «ел- мақсат» жол беруге, ал басқалары санкциялардан үлкен шығынға қарамастан, өзінің стратегиялық бағытын іске асыруға баса назар аударады ма? Зерттеу барысында біз ішкі саяси консенсус, балама сауда серіктестері және т.б. сияқты басқа да факторлардың бар болуын ескереміз. Біз өз жұмысымызда case-study әдісін пайдаланамыз, негізгі дереккөздік база санкцияларды енгізу және жүргізу саясатын регламенттейтін құқықтық және нормативтік құжаттар болды.
... Значительные акценты в литературе делаются на политике санкций США. Тем не менее существует большой объѐм работ, связанный с санкциями ООН как единственного легитимного источника ограничительных мер [например, Jazairi, 2015;Brzoska, 2015]. С учѐтом возрастающей роли ЕС, растѐт и число исследований политики санкций Европейского союза [например, Portela, 2010;Giumelli, 2013], в том числе и в контексте санкций против России [например, Connolly, 2018]. ...
The U.S. Administration has been increasingly using secondary sanctions to make legal persons in foreign jurisdictions comply with the U.S. regimes of economic restrictive measures. The practice of secondary sanctions has been towering since the outbreak of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine. Hundreds of companies in third jurisdictions found themselves in Specially Designated Nationals List of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. At the same time the concept of secondary sanctions as well as empirical reflections of their use hardly enjoy satisfactory reflection in the academic literature. The purpose of the article is to fill in this gap. Key research questions concern the intensity of the use of the U.S. secondary sanction in relation to Russia, the main reasons of their use against particular persons, the distribution of sanctioned persons in terms of country of origin and other variables. Main hypothesis implies the quantitative rise of sanctions related to the violation of export control and connections to already sanctions persons in such countries as China, UAE, Turkey and others. The processing of 511 cases of secondary sanctions database is the main tool to test this assumption.
With the increase in the number of international legal obligations and the absence of centralized institutional enforcement, economic coercion has become increasingly widespread as a tool for ensuring compliance with international law. The purpose of this work is to study the concept of “sanctions / unilateral restrictive measures” in the framework of the political, legal and economic analysis. Due to the lack of a common understanding of the nature of unilateral restrictive measures, the author analyzes and highlights the main features of sanctions. Based on the features identified, the author formulated a definition that is universal for most modern jurisdictions. Sanctions are understood as extraterritorial measures and/or restrictions in the economic sector used by the initiating state (or a group of such states) unilaterally for the purpose of political coercion of the target state. The paper argues for the need for a clear separation of multilateral and unilateral sanctions, the latter of which do not have a sufficient degree of legality in terms of international law. A solution to the problem of the lack of an established standard for assessing the effectiveness of economic sanctions is also proposed by clearly specifying the criteria and fixing them in international practice and regulatory documents. It is concluded that the use of the term “restrictive economic measures” instead of the term “sanctions” is legally more correct. The necessity of unification of international legal norms regulating the procedure, possibility and consequences of the application of unilateral sanctions is pointed out.
In this chapter, Borozna and Kochtcheeva present a comprehensive analysis of research on sanctions, covering their various types, objectives, and their effectiveness in influencing the foreign policy direction of the states they are imposed upon. The synthesis of empirical evidence strongly suggests that, in the realm of coercive diplomacy, economic sanctions are typically ineffective. Targeted nations frequently do not modify their foreign policy stances and tend to maintain their domestic political trajectories. Paradoxically, sanctions can sometimes produce negative consequences for the states imposing them. The research shows that due to the damage that sanctions inflict on the economies of the targeted states, countries subject to sanctions perceive them as a threat to their national security. The destructive effect on the economy of the targeted state is comparable to the destruction of the state economy during a military intervention. Additionally, the research in security studies reveals how states can frame discussions surrounding sanctions as matters of national security. This framing is a strategic tool that governments use to rally their populations to endure the hardships brought about by sanctions. This not only eases the burden on the targeted state but also contributes to the limited success of sanctions in terms of achieving their goals.
Sanctions senders respond to the abrupt escalation of crises, such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. To react quickly, they often decide on coercive measures without a long-term exit strategy in mind. Similarly, research has long prioritized questions of sanctions onset and effectiveness, while studies on their termination remain scarce. In response, we reconstruct previously neglected debates about ending sanctions for the “watershed case” of the UN embargo against Iraq. Based on a conceptual framework that emphasizes a more process-oriented and signaling perspective on sanctions termination, we analyze archival data as well as governmental and UN documents. We find that the United States depicted the lifting of sanctions as an all-or-nothing question, which impeded a more gradual approach toward ending the measures. We show that senders significantly disagreed over the requirements for ending sanctions and over whether possibly signaling the end of Iraq’s isolation was politically desirable. In the second step, we then draw implications from the case of Iraq to study contemporary sanctions termination. We use novel data on the termination of all EU, UN, and US sanctions from 1990 to 2018 to explore whether the Iraq case inspired changes in senders’ approaches. We find that the use of review provisions and sunset clauses significantly increased post-Iraq. Finally, we discuss whether disagreements over termination requirements in the case of Russia risk the repetition of past pitfalls when it comes to the process of ending sanctions.
The United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 2664 is a trailblazing development in the protection of humanitarian interests in the context of sanctions regimes. Adopted after strenuous and tough negotiations, the Resolution introduces a humanitarian carve-out to almost all asset-freezing sanctions, exempting humanitarian operations from the scope of application of UN sanction regimes. This represents a momentous achievement towards prioritizing and safeguarding the needs and interests of humanitarian organizations and actors. Indeed, economic sanctions as instruments to achieve policy objectives raise challenges as they restrict entire economies, thus bringing severe consequences for the populations of the targeted states. Targeted sanctions, however, can be difficult to implement, as the activities of targeted individuals or groups and legitimate humanitarian actors can often overlap from a financial standpoint. The humanitarian carve-out introduced by Resolution No. 2664 aims at addressing these issues; and while the effectiveness of the carve-out will depend largely on its implementation and enforcement, the rationale behind the Resolution should be adopted as the standard for current and future sanctions regimes. This article argues that Resolution No. 2664 has the potential to transform the way sanctions are implemented and enforced, and is therefore a crucial development in the UN’s effort to protect and promote human rights.
The chapter analyzes US efforts to secure what it sees as its national interests in the Middle East through the lens of its arms exports policy. Affirming the importance of the Middle East in maintaining the US’ hegemonic ambitions, we argue that the sensitivity and importance of the region have pushed the USA to adopt a policy with a disproportionate emphasis on military aid and arms sales. While US security policy has been changing in recent years by reducing its direct military operations, it has been continuing large-scale arms transfers while seeking to limit the procurement of potentially dangerous weapons and weapons systems by adversaries. In this vein, it imposed strict sanctions over the development of military programs in some of the countries in the region while being the biggest weapons supplier for other countries. This chapter argues that US arms policy toward the Middle East, rather than contributing to stability in the region, has actually contributed to a dangerous arms race and increasing instability.
The author discusses the modern international legal framework governing the application of sanctions. The author focuses on the following issues: international and regional sanctions in the context of the UN Charter, restrictions on sanctions regimes, sanctions in humanitarian law, the legitimacy of unilateral economic sanctions. The methodological base of this work is a systematic approach, which allows to consider sanctions as part of the modern international legal system. As a result of the study, it was revealed that within the framework of the existing international legal system, only the UN Security Council is authorized to impose sanctions in order to ensure global peace and security. The resolutions of the UN Security Council on the issue of the application of restrictive measures are dominant in comparison with the decisions of other international bodies and the obligations of member countries under international treaties. The legitimacy of applying regional sanctions is limited by the statutes of regional organizations. The novelty of the study lies in a comprehensive consideration of the reasons why unilateral sanctions are a violation of international law. Unilateral economic restrictions violate the free trade regime of the WTO and the principle of non-discrimination that underpins the GATT. They represent a violation of the fundamental principles of sovereign equality, as well as the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. As a result of the application of economic sanctions by certain states, extraterritorial jurisdiction is manifested, which creates a dangerous precedent for international law.
Scholars worldwide have amassed a wealth of knowledge on the use of economic sanctions, relying on either the analysis of large datasets or the examination of particular cases. The extensive sanctions levied against Russia have spurred research into their implementation and impact among Russian scholars, necessitating impartial empirical research. This demand raises a number of epistemological questions, such as what the strategy for understanding sanctions empirically should be, how to handle data and its processing, and what implications the existing literature, both domestically and abroad, has for approaching empirical research on sanctions. The crux of the matter is the generation of quantitative datasets of multiple sanctions events and cases, which serves as an essential starting point for empirical research. This approach helps to differentiate between “normal” and “deviant” cases, thereby justifying further sampling of cases for in-depth qualitative analysis. The article vividly illustrates this point by relying on the author’s databases on sanctions events, U. S. government enforcement actions, and U.S. Congress legislation processes on sanctions.
За последние десятилетия наука о международных отношениях (МО) накопила большой массив эмпирических исследований об использовании ограничительных мер (санкций) в качестве инструмента внешней политики. Эмпирические обобщения позволили добиться впечатляющего прогресса на уровне теории среднего уровня, однако их связь с фундаментальной теорией МО оставалась незначительной. Эмпирических исследований собрано столь много, что возникает потребность в фундаментальных категориях, способных обобщить их. Кроме того, наметились признаки изменений мирового порядка, а вместе с ними и характера применения санкций. Они в растущей степени используются в отношениях между крупными державами, тогда как долгое время после окончания холодной войны санкции применялись главным образом против так называемых стран-изгоев. Обращение к фундаментальной теории в подобных условиях имеет прикладной смысл, так как даже самые точные эмпирические расчеты, выполненные в устаревших или неадекватных категориях, способны дать неверные результаты. Для России это особенно актуально в условиях резкого усиления санкционного давления на страну после февраля 2022 г. Целью предлагаемой статьи является оценка применимости ключевых теорий международных отношений к исследованию политики санкций в меняющихся международных условиях. Основной тезис состоит в том, что в условиях трансформации мирового порядка подрываются сложившиеся механизмы взаимозависимости между государствами. Такие изменения расширяют “слепые зоны” неолиберальной теории МО, для которой понятие взаимозависимости является центральным. Понимание изменений современной политики санкций может потребовать понятийного аппарата реализма и других теорий международных отношений.
Sanctions are a tool used by political actors to induce foreign countries, firms or individuals to alter their behavior. As nonmilitary coercive measure, they have the potential to disrupt the international business environment, often on short notice, and change the rules of the game. Synthesizing the available evidence on the economic and political impacts of sanctions, we explore how sanctions disrupt the institutional framework for international business and how firms respond to sanctions. Based on a review of available scholarly evidence, we discuss how theories of international business, such as institution-based view, resource- and knowledge-based view, resource dependency theory, and behavioral theories of the firm, can contribute to explaining the impact of sanctions. At the same time, we discuss how sanctions, as politically motivated disruptions, challenge some assumptions underlying these theories. Going forward, our research agenda on sanctions is likely to help firms and governments to strategize in a geopolitically sensitive world.
The COVID-19 pandemic has given hope for international consolidation in the face of a common threat. Alleviating numerous sanctions and economic restrictions could be one step toward unification.
Databases constitute key research tools in sanctions scholarship. Over the past few years, we have witnessed a proliferation of sanctions databases: while only a single dataset was available until 2009, this number had increased to five by 2020; thus, the choice has more than doubled in less than a decade. This essay assesses the evolution observed. It reviews the five major datasets, comparing some of their basic choices, and evaluates them along two dimensions: the extent to which they capture targeted sanctions and the degree to which they brought innovations to the subfield. We find that targeted sanctions are not adequately reflected in databases, which remain state-centric in their approach. We conclude that the crafting of new databases does not entail an incremental refinement in which each iteration renders its predecessors obsolete. Rather, the evolution observed has resulted in a diverse set of options with different emphases. We nevertheless observe that a trend toward innovation has yielded to one toward consolidation, more focused on enlarging the empirical testing ground than in innovating. We conclude by discussing implications for the development of sanctions scholarship.
Subject. This article deals with the issues related to the settlement risk in the implementation of international payment transactions for domestic participants in foreign economic activity. Objectives. The article aims to investigate the settlement risk problems in the implementation of international payment transactions, as well as find ways to avoid and minimize such risk. Methods. For the study, I used the methods of abstraction, induction and deduction, synthesis, and comparative analysis. Results. The article describes the modern specifics of the implementation of settlement risk in the international payment system, associated mainly with political sanctions reasons. The article also proposes relevant ways for domestic subjects of foreign economic activity to avoid and reduce such a risk, involving the participation of government agencies in the formation of new payment mechanisms. Conclusions. In modern conditions, the international payment system inevitably increases the percentage of settlements in national currencies that are not toxic for participants in foreign economic activity, the use of international clearing mechanisms in operations with counterparties from friendly countries, the use of barter and compensation transactions, as well as the testing of innovative methods of payment in cryptocurrency and stablecoin.
Open-source software (OSS) has been widely used in the process of software development for the purpose of shortening the process development and reducing its costs. The growing process of OSS has put out new ways for development, distribution and correspondence of software in organizations. Countries under international sanctions are facing extreme limitations over financial transactions and technology transmissions with different countries; therefore, individuals and companies working in such territories are involved with legal limitations and limits of copyright as to using and having access to software. This research seeks to evaluate the acceptance of OSS in a country under sanction, that’s to say Iran. In this research the developed value-based acceptance model has been used. The statistical population of the study was individuals active in software and information technology industry in Iran. The sampling method was convenience sampling. The results indicated that the sanction has a significant effect on the perceived value of OSS (β = 0.72, p = 0.000) and eventually its usage. Besides, usefulness (β = 0.69, p = 0.001), perceived enjoyment (β = 0.54, p = 0.000) and facilitating conditions (β = 0.58, p = 0.002) are considered as factors effective in applying OSS. As a result, one of the solutions of technology development in sanctioned organizations is to use OSS.
Sanctions constitute one of the most demanded instruments of the U.S. foreign policy agencies in affecting foreign adversaries. The use of sanctions is also a challenge for commercial companies, given the growing use of financial sanctions and enforcement measures by the U.S. government. Banks have been increasingly vulnerable to these risks; they are among the most frequent targets of restrictive and enforcement measures by the U.S. and tend to pay much more in comparison with other sectors in terms of financial penalties. This study is based on the analysis of 54 cases of US financial penalties against banks as well as individual cases of US sectoral and blocking sanctions. The article aims at understanding the reasons why this type of financial organizations is vulnerable to US sanctions, the key features of US sanctions against them, and possible application of US sanctions in this direction in the future. The results of the study demonstrate that the heightened sanctions risks that banks face are attributed to their functional connections with the governments under sanctions, the nature of banking business and some intraorganizational factors. Moreover, the inclination of financial companies pressured by
sanctions to accept requirements of the U.S. indicates the effectiveness of application of sanctions against commercial ventures.
В России и за рубежом накоплен большой массив литературы, посвященной политике санкций США. Многие работы выполнены в логике “государство – государство”, т.е. рассматривают ограничительные меры как инструмент влияния страны-инициатора на политический курс страны-цели. Однако власти США ведут активную политику и в отношении бизнеса, целью которой является принуждение американских и зарубежных компаний к исполнению режимов санкций США, т.е. в политике санкций присутствует и связка “государство – бизнес”. Она исследована в гораздо меньшей степени, между тем бизнес может сыграть важную роль в эффективности санкций, способствуя или препятствуя изоляции стран-целей. Для самого бизнеса режимы санкций представляют серьезный политический риск: их нарушение может привести к материальным и репутационным потерям. Особенно уязвим финансовый сектор. В работе изучается практика использования штрафных мер Министерством финансов США против финансовых компаний. Выявлены следующие закономерности: (1) финансовый сектор наиболее уязвим в силу значительного числа и широкого охвата совершаемых трансакций; часто к нарушениям ведут недостатки систем внутреннего контроля соблюдения режимов санкций; (2) большинство компаний допускают нарушения непреднамеренно; (3) банки не спешат добровольно раскрывать нарушения, но сотрудничают с властями США, совершенствуя систему отслеживания возможных нарушений. Это говорит об эффективности американских властей в принуждении международного финансового сектора к соблюдению режимов ограничений, а значит и поддержке финансовой блокады стран, находящихся под санкциями США. Выводы проверяются на основе анализа 54 случаев штрафных мер против финансовых компаний в 2009-2020 гг. Они сравниваются с закономерностями аналогичных штрафов по выборке из 215 случаев по всем секторам экономики за тот же период.
Resumen: Este artículo analiza las sanciones internacionales impuestas a Rusia por parte de la UE como consecuencia de la anexión de Crimea y el conflicto en el Donbás, así como su impacto en términos políticos y económicos en los estados miembros, en determinados sectores económicos y sobre Rusia. Asimismo, aborda cómo la diversidad de posiciones en el seno del Consejo Europeo afecta al pro-ceso de toma de decisiones en esta materia, donde cada vez más se hacen oír voces crí-ticas contra estas medidas. El estudio se de-sarrolla sobre postulados normativos que se trasladarán al caso específico para observar el comportamiento de los actores involucrados y las distintas reacciones que se van dando a lo largo del tiempo, entre ellas la de España. Así, quiere ser una contribución a la literatura académica en materia de sanciones interna-cionales aplicando a este caso de estudio es-pecífico las tipologías de sanciones existentes. Abstract: This article analyses the international sanctions imposed on Russia by the EU as a result of the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Donbass, and their impact in political and economic terms on member states, on certain economic sectors and on Russia. It also addresses how the diversity of positions within the European Council affects decision-making in this area, in which criticisms of these measures are growing louder. The study is developed on norma-tive postulates that will be transferred to the specific case to observe the behaviour of the actors involved and the different reactions that occur over time, including that of Spain. It thereby seeks to contribute to the academic literature on international sanctions by applying existing sanctions typolo-gies to this specific case study.
This paper studies the impact of international sanctions on environmental performance by using the panel fixed effect model for 22 sanctioned states over the period 2002–2016 while considering several cases of international sanctions (unilateral, plurilateral, U.S., EU, UN, economic, and intensity) and measures environmental performance by the Environmental Performance Index (EPI). Overall, we find that the imposition of unilateral, plurilateral, U.S., EU, and economic sanctions has a significantly negative impact on EPI, dropping their EPI scores respectively by 0.114, 0.060, 0.045, 0.084, and 0.063, while a level increase of intensity results in EPI dropping by 0.028. Moreover, the simultaneous-equation models and Sobel tests show that the intermediate effect about GDP between international sanctions on environmental performance is significantly negative. We believe that our empirical findings can contribute to policy formulation by those sanctioned countries.
With the rise of “smart” sanctions in international politics, the oil sector of some of the world’s leading oil exporters has emerged as a key target. Russia’s oil sector presents a recent case. Much of the scholarly discourse on sanctions has focused on whether and under what conditions sanctions work as intended. Much less has been the attention on the process through which sanctions are having an impact. This article aims to further deepen our understanding of this less explored area by focusing on a target country’s response. It argues that the statecraft of developing a response to sanctions could have substantial role in determining their impact. The paper provides an in-depth case study of how Russia responded to sanctions on its petroleum industry during the five-year period after 2014. It analyses in detail Russia’s response with respect to three key structural constraints for the oil industry: the tax regime, the industry’s organisational setup, and its chronic technological lag. The response in each area has presented opportunities to neutralise or mitigate the impact of sanctions. The paper highlights the limited extent of the Russian government’s response to this end, and provides possible explanations about its choices.
Sanctions are frequently applied by the UN Security Council (UNSC) as well as regional organizations. While the objectives sought often vary, a frequent commonality is that they target African states. Indeed, Africa is the most frequently targeted continent by the UNSC and regional organisations including the African Union, Economic Community of West African States and the European Union. However, little attention has been paid to the confluence of this sanctions activity by these different organizations. This article seeks to address this gap in the research. While the UNSC continues to focus on sanctioning to end hostilities, the regional organizations have assigned themselves unconstitutional changes to government as the principal reason to sanction African states. Drawing on data from the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC), this article suggests that: 1) regional organisations are leading UNSC activity more often than is appreciated in the literature; 2) the UNSC has of late been expanding its sanctioning activity to consider issues of democracy and good governance; 3) the UNSC uses sanctions to endorse the activity of African regional organizations to deal with crises on the continent; and 4) UNSC and regional sanctions are intimately tied to crisis management in Africa.