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Convolution and modal representations in Thagard and Stewart’s neural theory of creativity: a critical analysis

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Abstract

According to Thagard and Stewart (Cogn Sci 35(1):1–33, 2011), creativity results from the combination of neural representations (an idea which Thagard calls ‘the combinatorial conjecture’), and combination results from convolution, an operation on vectors defined in the holographic reduced representation (HRR) framework (Plate, Holographic reduced representation: distributed representation for cognitive structures, 2003). They use these ideas to understand creativity as it occurs in many domains, and in particular in science. We argue that, because of its algebraic properties, convolution alone is ill-suited to the role proposed by Thagard and Stewart. The semantic pointer concept (Eliasmith, How to build a brain, 2013) allows us to see how we can apply the full range of HRR operations while keeping the modal representations so central to Thagard and Stewart’s theory. By adding another combination operation and using semantic pointers as the combinatorial basis, this modified version overcomes the limitations of the original theory and perhaps helps us explain aspects of creativity not covered by the original theory. While a priori reasons cast doubts on the use of HRR operations with modal representations (Fisher et al., Appl Opt 26(23):5039–5054, 1987) such as semantic pointers, recent models point in the other direction, allowing us to be optimistic about the success of the revised version.
Synthese (2016) 193:1535–1560
DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-0934-7
S.I.: NEUROSCIENCE AND ITS PHILOSOPHY
Convolution and modal representations in Thagard and
Stewart’s neural theory of creativity: a critical analysis
Jean-Frédéric de Pasquale1·Pierre Poirier2
Received: 18 March 2015 / Accepted: 24 September 2015 / Published online: 30 October 2015
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
Abstract According to Thagard and Stewart (Cogn Sci 35(1):1–33, 2011), creativity
results from the combination of neural representations (an idea which Thagard calls
‘the combinatorial conjecture’), and combination results from convolution, an opera-
tion on vectors defined in the holographic reduced representation (HRR) framework
(Plate, Holographic reduced representation: distributed representation for cognitive
structures, 2003). They use these ideas to understand creativity as it occurs in many
domains, and in particular in science. We argue that, because of its algebraic prop-
erties, convolution alone is ill-suited to the role proposed by Thagard and Stewart.
The semantic pointer concept (Eliasmith, How to build a brain, 2013) allows us to
see how we can apply the full range of HRR operations while keeping the modal
representations so central to Thagard and Stewart’s theory. By adding another combi-
nation operation and using semantic pointers as the combinatorial basis, this modified
version overcomes the limitations of the original theory and perhaps helps us explain
aspects of creativity not covered by the original theory. While a priori reasons cast
doubts on the use of HRR operations with modal representations (Fisher et al., Appl
Opt 26(23):5039–5054, 1987) such as semantic pointers, recent models point in the
other direction, allowing us to be optimistic about the success of the revised version.
BPierre Poirier
poirier.pierre@uqam.ca
Jean-Frédéric de Pasquale
jfdepasquale@yahoo.com
1Laboratoire d’Analyse Cognitive de l’Information (LANCI), UQAM, Montreal, QC, Canada
2Department of philosophy, Université du Québec à Montréal, C.P. 8888, Succ. Centre-Ville,
Montreal, QC H3C 3P8, Canada
123
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