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Diversifying the Meanings of Norms 1327
Diversifying the Meanings of Norms
Another group of commentaries elaborate the intricate meanings of norms, including the com-
ments on classic distinctions between norms and values (Frese, this issue), between descriptive
and injunctive norms (Eriksson & Strimling, this issue), between personal and social norms
(Peterson & Barreto, this issue), and the roles of “others” and social interactive processes in norm
emergence (Postmes, Akkus, & Stroebe, this issue).
Cultural Practices, Norms, and Values
Michael Frese1,2
DOI: 10.1177/0022022115600267
Keywords
cultural psychology, values, norms, cultural practices
My starting point of interest and reading the papers in this special issue is the fact that the GLOBE
study finds a negative relationships between the “As Is” (cultural practices) and “Should Be” (cul-
tural values) scores in seven out of nine of their culture scales (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman,
& Gupta, 2004). Cultural practices are shared perceptions of how people routinely behave in a
culture (similar terms used are intersubjective perceptions or descriptive norms) and values are
shared ideals of a culture (similar terms are injunctive norms). “As Is” are cultural practices, and
“Should Be” refer to values. Moreover, there are clear relationships between the Should Be ques-
tions with Schwartz’ value scales (Schwartz, 1999). Hofstede (2001) was not able to differentiate
between values and practices when he took IBM’s value survey as a starting point for his cross-
cultural work; some of his scales seem to operationalize practices and some other operationalize
values (there are high correlations between GLOBE’s and Hofstede’s scales of individualism and
power distance, but there is a negative correlation of GLOBE’s uncertainty avoidance and Hofstede’s
version of uncertainty avoidance; Hanges, 2004; Hanges & Dickson, 2004; Hofstede, 2001). None
of the articles in this special issue discuss the differences between norms, cultural practices, and
values in detail. However, the GLOBE study results suggest that we may have to pay attention to
differences between cultural practices and cultural values and discuss their (differentiated) func-
tionality. As this commentary needs to be very short, I may not do justice to the intricacies of the
meaning of these terms; however, I hope to make a start here in this special issue on norms.
1National University of Singapore, Singapore
2Leuphana, University of Lueneburg
Corresponding Author:
Michael Frese, National University of Singapore, 15 Kent Ridge Drive, Singapore 119245, Singapore.
Email: michfrese@gmail.com
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1328 Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 46(10)
The concept of descriptive norm as common behaviors in a society helps to get a grasp of the
concept of cultural practices (Shteynberg, Gelfand, & Kim, 2009; Stephan & Uhlaner, 2010). The
area of descriptive norms is well developed in social psychology (we use “norms” for short); norms
define how people are thinking (shared reality) and behaving, and they control the behavior of
people (Shteynberg et al., 2009); they are, therefore, conceptually related to cultural practices (As
Is; Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010). Norms are both input as well as output
variables in the development of practices: Norms prescribe certain behaviors, and once these behav-
iors are socially routinized, they become practices. Thus, cultural norms lead to cultural practices
and vice versa. Both are inferred by perceptions of common behavior of Others—“how do people
think and behave around here?” Some articles in this special issue distinguish between norms and
values (e.g., Gelfand & Harrington, Gao et al.). However, other papers may profit from a stronger
differentiation between norms and values. For example, at what point is intersubjective agreement
about a specific routine a result of values (as suggested by Wan) or a result of norms?
There is an inside–outside differentiation between values and norms; values (I live my values)
are inside the person, whereas norms and cultural practices are perceived to be outside the person
(I conform to the norms). Consistent outside control of behavior can lead to routines. Once a
behavior is routinized, routines can be reinforcing as the Premack principle had shown a long
time ago (Premack, 1959). An example is the norm of toothbrushing. At first, toothbrushing is
enforced from the outside. After a while, children routinize toothbrushing and may even feel
uncomfortable when they are not able to brush their teeth.
A second differentiation is that values are related to what is perceived as morally good or bad,
but because they are abstract, they are not directly related to behavior; in contrast, routines are
relatively specific. Values may be categorized into systems of thinking about values, as in reli-
gions (however, there are also combinations of routines—otherwise one would not find clear
factor structures in cultural practices). The transmission process and upkeep of cultural practices
and values may be different; for example, Tam in this issue provides ideas of cultural transmis-
sions that are differentiated according to norms as perceived by the parents and their personal
values (cf. also Gelfand & Harrington). Norms may be derived from observation of peer groups
or aspirational groups (Morris & Liu).
In principle, all types of relationships between values and practices are possible: Values may
be aligned to practices or not. It is also possible that people perceive the normative pressures of
cultural practices, but are still be critical of them; for example, if they perceive these norms to be
too extreme (either too high or too low; Chiu et al., 2010), then a negative correlation between
values and practices may appear; this may be the reason why the above-mentioned negative cor-
relation between cultural practices and values appeared in the GLOBE study.
An action regulation perspective (Zacher & Frese, in press) would suggest that the process of the
development of cultural practices (cultural routines) may start earlier and is more implicit than the
development of cultural values. Norms structure specific developmental tasks that are specific to
culture, for example, the developmental task of being a teenager and behave like one in a certain
culture (Frese & Stewart, 1984; Havighurst, 1948)—cultural practices as routines can then develop
as a result of implicit learning when dealing with these tasks. Cultures will have an impact on devel-
opmental tasks as well as on general tasks, for example, tasks that produce norms to deal with a
harsh climate (Van der Vliert, 2011). To understand the stickiness and affective quality of cultural
practices better, I find the concept of group attention (Shteynberg) fascinating as group attention
can help this process of implicit learning. Moreover, I assume that developmental cultural tasks as
well as general tasks provide guidance; the higher the homogeneity of a society, the higher is the
identification with one’s peer group and the stronger are the cultural practices (Morris & Zhu).
Practices can be rationalized a posteriori moralization, as well as norm activation by identifi-
cation (Morris & Zhu) and by affective importance that is governed by group attention
(Shteynberg). Moreover, stronger socialization tactics by certain cultures (e.g., tight cultures,
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Diversifying the Meanings of Norms 1329
Gelfand) and parents (Tan, for example, need for closure, Gelfand & Harrington) may reinforce
cultural practices. However, norms and cultural practices may also be understood explicitly, and
people may choose to conform or not to conform to specific cultural norms (Gelfand & Harrington,
Tan, Morris & Zhu).
There is an additional difference—Values can be distinct from behavior unlike norms that are
more prescriptive of concrete behaviors. People usually concentrate on mid-range and somewhat
concrete goals (e.g., a manager may think of the increase of the productivity of the group is
responsible for); in contrast, values may be on a much higher level and not regulate behavior in the
same way as norms (e.g., environmental sustainability values; Zacher & Frese, in press). Practices
are typically inferred from behavior, learning of practices is often tacit, and normative pressure on
behavior leads to routines; we are, therefore, not always aware of norms (Johnson, Chang, & Lord,
2006; Myers & Davids, 1993). Thus, the effect of practices may be more implicitly regulated (or
System 1 regulated; Kahneman, 2003) than the conformity to a system of values.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
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Injunctive Versus Functional Inferences From
Descriptive Norms: Comment on Gelfand and
Harrington
Kimmo Eriksson1,2 and Pontus Strimling1,3
DOI: 10.1177/0022022115605387
Keywords
decision-making, group processes, social cognition
Social norms theorists make an important distinction between descriptive norms (beliefs about
what is the common behavior in a particular reference group) and injunctive norms (beliefs about
how one should behave to gain social approval and avoid disapproval in the reference group). It
has long been argued that descriptive and injunctive norms exert independent motivational
forces. Whereas injunctive norms motivate by the promise of social sanctions, descriptive norms
have been taken to motivate by inference from what is typical to what is a sensible thing to do
(Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). This independence is less clear than it may seem at first. In
a recent article (Eriksson, Strimling, & Coultas, 2015), we documented a phenomenon that we
called the common-moral association, which indicates that descriptive and injunctive norms are
not processed independently. In a number of studies, we found that information about a behavior
being common versus uncommon automatically activates injunctive beliefs and judgments about
the behavior being more or less socially approved. The effect also works in the other direction
where an indication that a behavior is seen as moral in a community automatically activates the
notion that it is common.
An implication of the common-moral association finding is that descriptive norms may
motivate behavior by influencing people’s beliefs about how one should behave to gain social
1Stockholm University, Sweden
2Mälardalen University, Västerås, Sweden
3Linköping University, Sweden
Corresponding Author:
Kimmo Eriksson, Mälardalen University, School of Education, Culture and Communication, Box 883, Västerås, SE-
10691, Sweden.
Email: kimmoe@gmail.com
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