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Transforming Hungary - together?: An analysis of the Fidesz-Jobbik relationship
... In Romania, the Church itself assumed a leading role in furthering key elements of the radical right agenda (see Andreescu 2015). Second, the other version of continuity in the face of disappearing or absent radical right parties has been the adoption of their agenda by other political parties, most notably but not exclusively the mainstream right, with Hungary being the most extreme case of such agenda co-optation (see Krekó and Mayer 2015;Pytlas 2016; see also Chapter 5). The analysis will now be completed by a closer look at the movement sector in the region. ...
... The Czech Republic and Romania bear witness to a wealth of movements and movement activities furthering neo-Nazi, racist, and revisionist goals. These goals are most fiercely propagated by the Hungarian Guard and its successor organizations which at times act as right-wing terrorist groups by inflicting violence against and terror on minorities, in particular the sizable group of Roma in the country (see Mayer and Krekó 2015). They are also the major "target group" of the most radical and violent spectrum of the radical right in other countries, such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia (see Gyárfášová and Mesežnikov 2015;Mareš 2015). ...
... It is important to remember that the fluidity of the radical right party sector in the region does not allow more than snapshots but, even so, a difference between West and East emerges in that Western radical right parties stay clear of such movements, not the least because the movements' extremism and uncontrollability is more often than not a liability instead of a resource. In the East, however, margin and mainstream are not as clearly divided, and movements are often accepted as resources rather than Karácsony and Róna 2011;Krekó and Mayer 2015). The newly formed successor organizations, such as the New Hungarian Guard (Új Magyar Gárda) and the For a Better Future Hungarian Self-Defense (Szebb Jövőért Magyar Önvédelem), were kept at a distance by the party-but only officially. ...
This book is a comparative analysis of the post-communist East European radical right, both in party and non-party formation, using the West European radical right as a baseline. Minkenberg offers insights into the political field of the radical right since the onset of democracy in the region and elicits region-wide and country-specific characteristics. The book argues that due to the nature of the transition process from Soviet hegemony to national independence and from communist to democratic societies, and the unfinished process of nation-building in the region, the radical right in Eastern Europe is a phenomenon sui generis, both organizationally more fluid and ideologically more extreme than the Western counterpart. The issues covered include trends in party system and electoral developments, patterns of movement mobilization and racist activism, and the impact of the radical right on their countries’ politics and policies.
... Disappointed by the electoral defeat of the right wing parties and by their lack of a more radical approach, the Community established its own party in 2003 and called it Jobbik-the Movement for a Better Hungary. Jobbik is considered an extreme right party (Bíró -Nagy et al., 2013;Pirro and Ró na, 2019): its ideology is strongly nationalistic, combining opposition to capitalism and liberalism with anti-Semitic and anti-Roma rhetoric (Krekó and Mayer, 2015). ...
... However, Jobbik recalibrated its electoral strategy in its second term in parliament (2014-2018) and tried to moderate its image in an attempt to present itself as a 'people's party' (Pirro and Ró na, 2019) and attract the protest votes against the government. This shift was also in response to the radicalisation of Fidesz, which sought to neutralise its extreme right rival by implementing some of its own campaign promises (Krekó and Mayer, 2015;Böcskei and Molnár, 2019) but the symbolic separation of the two parties was carefully maintained and Fidesz never supports Jobbik's initiatives in parliament (Enyedi and Ró na, 2018). In the 2014 and 2018 elections, Jobbik obtained significant support ($20% of votes) and is currently the second strongest party in Hungary, albeit still in opposition. ...
The context of European parties has been through a process of significant transformation in recent years, with the fall of traditional mainstream parties and the rise of challenger parties. Despite their significant differences, mainly at the ideological level, we argue that challenger parties share some common characteristics when they first enter parliament. Namely, we expect them to employ a similar strategy as regards their relationship with the other party actors and to attempt to send the same message to their electorate: that they represent the alternative to existing parties, be it in government or in opposition, and will behave accordingly in parliament. We test our expectations by analysing and comparing the cooperation attitudes of challenger parties vis-à-vis the other opposition parties, using legislative co-sponsorship during their first term in parliament as an indicator and Social Network Analysis as a method.
... Authors from the studied countries have also dealt with the issue of the populist radical right in CEE, analyzing the PRR in a specific state (Mareš 2003;Sum 2010;Mikuš and Gurňák 2012;Gregor 2015;Kasprowicz 2015;Krekó and Mayer 2015;Kluknavská and Smolík 2016) or across several countries (Kupka, Laryš, and Smolík 2009;Gurňák 2016, 2019). Their research shows that the populist radical parties initially strongly emphasized the Roma issue and the poor economic situation in selected regions. ...
When the popularity of the populist radical right increases, questions arise. Where are these parties successful? Does the geographic distribution of the supporting change with changes their primary issues? This article analyzes spatial aspects in the support of populist radical right parties in Slovakia and Czechia and their change over time. The spatial distribution was examined using spatial autocorrelation . The results showed that this parties have strong support in “left-behind” regions and peripheral rural regions and weak support in the surroundings of largest cities. The distribution of support for parties also changed more significantly when the parties changed the presented main issues. In Slovakia there was visible spatial competition between the traditional populist radical right party, the Slovak National Party (SNS), and newer and adaptable party, the People’s Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS). ĽSNS succeeded in areas with traditionally strong support for SNS thanks to changes in its main electoral themes. In Czechia, the distribution of support between Dawn and Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) has changed. Dawn had a support distribution similar to the populist party Public Affairs, which shared ideas of direct democracy. SPD’s support distribution was closer to areas traditionally supporting the populist radical right.
... The Fidesz took note of the resonance of Jobbik's exclusionary ethnonationalism and quickly appropriated it to preempt ethnic outbidding on the right (Krekó and Mayer 2015;Mudde 2015). War rhetoric against enemy "others" was a constant feature of government communications from the beginning. ...
This chapter investigates the ways in which the post-2010 Fidesz government under Viktor Orbán used antisemitic tropes to configure George Soros—once hailed as a champion of market reform, freedom, and democracy—as an ontological threat to the Hungarian nation that should therefore be expunged from the country, together with “his networks,” including the Open Society Institute and Central European University. To show the government’s communication strategy in action, we combined an analysis of antisemitic discourse on the far right with a media content analysis of Sorosozás in government-backed online news portals from 2015 to 2020. We show that, from 2010, Orbán and his media allies discursively interpellated specific individuals and states as “financiers” and “global powers” as cogs in a global “Soros network.” In doing so, they drew upon well-established fifth-column narratives originally constructed and refined by ideologists from the Kádár era who employed a latent antisemitic code in their writing. At one time vehemently rejecting such discourse, Orbán and his government allies have become its chief articulators with devastating effects for one of his targets—the Central European University in Budapest.
... Obwohl es in der Praxis eine sichtbare Affinität zwischen beiden Konzepten gibt, kann die Präferenz für starke, charismatische Führung auch ohne Populismus artikuliert werden. Populismus wird vielmehr zur Beförderung von Konstruktionen charismatischer Führung benutzt (Mudde 2004 (Krekó und Mayer 2015). ...
Dieses Kapitel erörtert Mechanismen der Erodierung demokratischer Institutionen, aber auch von Normen und Werten durch illiberal agierende Regierungen in Mittel- und Osteuropa und diskutiert die Rolle populistischer Politik bei diesen Entwicklungen. Im Schwerpunkt der Analyse liegen aktuelle Fallbeispiele aus MOE-Ländern, die durch übergreifende, wenn auch unterschiedliche Trajektorien illiberaler Erosion demokratischer Normen gekennzeichnet sind (Polen, Ungarn, Bulgarien und Rumänien). Die Rolle populistischer Politik wird aus handlungszentrierter Perspektive beobachtet. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Elemente populistischer Ideologie von Akteur*innen an der Macht benutzt wurden, um eine autokratisch affine Instrumentalisierung und Kaperung demokratischer Regelwerke im Namen der „Demokratie“ zu normalisieren und in die ausgehöhlten Institutionen einzubetten. Gleichzeitig wurde Populismus nicht nur direkt, sondern überwiegend als Hilfsnarrativ für die rechtsradikale Ideologie des Nativismus eingesetzt. Die Schlussfolgerungen des Kapitels sind auch jenseits der untersuchten Region relevant. Die Erkenntnisse suggerieren, dass formelle Stärke demokratischer Institutionen nicht per se gegen illiberale Aushebelung der Demokratie schützt. Wichtig ist auch, inwiefern die pluralistische Legitimität von demokratischen Institutionen, Normen und Werten gegen ihre illiberale Umdeutung kontinuierlich gefeit ist.
This article critically examines the cultural backlash theory proposed by Norris and Inglehart [Cultural Backlash] to explain the rise of authoritarian populism in the US and Europe. While the theory emphasizes the conservative mobilization against progressive values, we argue that the success of authoritarian populism in Europe cannot be attributed solely to a cultural backlash. We contend that different European countries have unique historical contexts and older, unresolved conflicts are pivotal to understand the rise of authoritarian populist parties in the European context. By employing EVS-data from 2017-18, we analyse case studies from Hungary, Italy, Norway, and Poland. Challenging the "one-size-fits-all" approach, our study demonstrates that older cleavages are essential to understand the success of these parties and highlights the need to consider different variables and unresolved conflicts within specific national contexts when explaining the success of authoritarian populism in Europe.
Hungary has become the leader of democratic backsliding within Europe, with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán turning into the staunchest critic of the EU, despite a consistent support for the European project among the wider public and Hungary being a net benefiter of EU membership. Using a systematic analysis of all speeches, statements and interviews of the PM for his three consecutive governments 2010–2022, I claim the radicalization of this Eurosceptic discourse is a direct consequence of a continuous populist performance of crisis that demands the creation of images of friends and foes to unite and mobilize people. Orbán relies on discursive processes of othering to construct to his liking both “the good people” and its enemies, who are to be blamed for the crises. Anybody can become an enemy in the various crises that follow each other. At the same time, discursive conceptions of Europe vs. the EU remain in the center of the discourse to establish Hungary's European belonging as well as opposition to EU for policies that allegedly people reject. While the economic crisis pits an economic “us” against the former socialist political elite, foreign capital, and the EU and IMF that are all blamed for Hungary's near-bankruptcy situation. The refugee crisis redefines both “us” and “others”, the “self” is distinguished using ethno-linguistic criteria and identitarian Christianity to signal the cultural distance from the Muslim migrant “other” as well as multicultural EU. The pandemic crisis is performed only to further exacerbate the conflict between the illiberal “self” and the liberal “others”, where supranational EU, promoting multiculturalism, gender ideology or neoliberal policies not only threatens the very existence of traditional-national lifestyles but endangers the people themselves. With each crisis performed, newer and newer conflict lines between various “European self's” and “threatening EU” are identified, each adding to the radicalization of Orbán's discourse. The demonization of the EU and the pretext of saving Europe using these false discursive constructs enables Orbán strengthen his grip of power and drift to authoritarianism.
Although Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán had declared that he does not deal with ‘women issues’, he just put women in the center of his government program after his 2018 electoral victory. In exchange for extra government funds, a preferential credit and a life-long tax exemption, Orbán wants women to bear enough children to ensure the hegemony of the Carpathian basin, to avoid economic decline, and to prevent the Islamization of Europe. This chapter examines how the discursive construction of the supremacy of the nation and national interest not only favors the adoption of majoritarian rules at the expense of minorities but also influences gendered norms and practices in politics and society. Nativist conceptions, conservative preferences for traditional values, religious moralism and ethnicized nationalism all point towards silencing women, denying them equal rights or opportunities. The populist rejection of liberal democracy thus creates a political discourse of social and religious conservatism of the 19th century that on turn leads to state-sponsored anti-feminism.
Since taking office in April 2010, the government under Viktor Orbán has been restructuring Hungary's political system. It is moving away from the principles of a liberal constitutional state. In the name of "majority democracy", the government has weakened the separation of powers, centralized the state, and expanded the prime minister's powers. The root causes of this change lie in the Hungary's political and social structural deficiencies. An illiberal democracy has now come into being. There is a risk that this will turn into a hybrid regime in which elements of democracy merge with elements of authoritarian rule. This would set a precedent in the European Union.
The extreme right has consolidated its presence across Western Europe. This book presents a compilation of studies on the ideological meanings and political/partisan expressions of the extreme right, their post-war evolution, and the reasons behind the success and failure of various parties. It highlights the rise of a new type of parties that are anti-system rather than neo-fascist.