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Journal of Sexual Aggression
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The utility of sex offender registration: a research
note
David M. Bierie
To cite this article: David M. Bierie (2015): The utility of sex offender registration: a research
note, Journal of Sexual Aggression, DOI: 10.1080/13552600.2015.1100760
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13552600.2015.1100760
Published online: 12 Nov 2015.
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The utility of sex offender registration: a research note
†
David M. Bierie
Department of Criminology & Criminal Justice, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
ABSTRACT
Sex offender registries are one of the more hotly debated and polarising
topics in criminology. Registries are generally perceived as valuable by
the public, legislators, and law enforcement. However, academics and
treatment providers have largely remained critical, arguing registries are
costly and ineffective. Continued support despite these claims has led
some scholars to suggest that proponents are unaware of evidence,
indifferent to science, and perhaps driven by emotions. Yet this
conclusion denies important facts. First, statistical evidence shows that
registrants are at far higher risk of committing a sex crime than the
general public. Second, high-quality empirical research suggests that
enacting registries is associated with significant decreases in sex
offences. Third, there is prima facie evidence that registration has
assisted in police investigations and prevented sexual crimes.
Recognising these arguments is likely an important step towards
improving the quality of debate, science, and policy on registration.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 7 March 2015
Revised 13 August 2015
Accepted 23 September 2015
KEYWORDS
Sex offender registration;
policing; public policy
Sex offender registries first appeared in the USA in California during the mid-1940s. They expanded
significantly since that time and transitioned into national policy in 1994 via the Jacob Wetterling Act
and in 1996 with the passage of Megan’s Law. The most recent iteration of national policy was created
in the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (AWA). This law articulated definitions and
rules regarding which offenders should be required to register and what information should be dis-
played to the public. It also enhanced penalties for failing to register and charged the United States
Marshals Service with enforcing the Act. Sex offender registries generally comprise two components:
(1) the existence of a transactional database for law enforcement which contains personal identifiers,
addresses, and criminal history for convicted sexual offenders (i.e. registration) and (2) the public
display of portions of that information for some offenders (i.e. community notification) through a
public website.
The federalisation of the registry was a significant development in the history of registration. There
are myriad databases maintained by local and state jurisdictions which, collectively, represent the
national sex offender registry systems. These jurisdictions vary in what information is collected,
how it is displayed to the public, how long registrants must remain on the registry, how often and
in what ways their address is verified, and the local policies or practices with which the registries
operate. The passage of the AWA was in part an attempt to streamline these many different registries
in the pursuit of uniform policies, procedures, and data. A key goal of this uniformity was an increase
in the quality of data which would be fed into the federal registry maintained by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) within the National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) databases, as well as the
National Sex Offender Public Website (NSOPW).
This work was authored as part of the Contributor’sofficial duties as an Employee of the United States Government and is therefore a work of the
United States Government. In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 105, no copyright protection is available for such works under U.S. Law
CONTACT David M. Bierie bierie@umd.edu
†
The ideas and opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Marshals Service, The U.S.
Department of Justice, or any component therein.
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The federalisation has led to more uniformity, but is far from perfect. Many states have chosen not
to comply, at least in part, with the requirements of the AWA. Many grounded the decision on the
assumption that the benefits of implementing AWA were lower than the costs of compliance
(Justice Policy Institute, 2009). Regardless, registration is relatively more uniform after federalisation
and now exhibits important similarities across jurisdictions. All include some form of database acces-
sible to law enforcement listing address(es), criminal history, and personal identifiers of registrants, all
feed data into the NCIC, and all display some form of that information, for most convicted sex offen-
ders, to the public via a public and searchable sex offender website. Also, regardless of jurisdiction,
the most important goals of registries remain the same: to prevent sexual crimes and to help law
enforcement respond to such crimes. This research note refers to the national infrastructure of sex
offender registries in general—whether maintained by a local jurisdiction, a state agency, or the
National Sex Offender Registry maintained by NCIC.
Registries present “one of the most widely discussed and debated criminal justice policy issues in
recent years”(Tewksbury & Mustaine, 2013, p. 95). The literature shows that registries are supported
by the public (Kernsmith, Craun, & Foster, 2009; Levenson, Brannon, Fortney, & Baker, 2007), legis-
lators (Matson & Lieb, 1996; Phillips, 1998; Sample & Kadleck, 2008), police officers (Finn, 1997;
Gaines, 2006; Tewksbury & Mustaine, 2013), and even sex offenders themselves (Tewksbury, 2006;
Tewksbury & Lees, 2007). However, academics and treatment providers have generally remained criti-
cal of the registry. First, scholars are troubled by studies showing registries have little or no impact on
sex crimes. In one of the most prominent examples, Levenson et al. (2007) point out that several
studies on sex offender recidivism show that roughly 5% of sex offenders commit a new sex crime
once released from prison, and even studies with exceptionally long follow-up periods or those focus-
ing on higher risk offenders at most show 15% sexual recidivism. The low rate of continued sexual
offending, they argue, is prima facie evidence that sexual offenders are rarely dangerous and thus
a universal solution like a registry is unwarranted. Second, they note, more than 90% of sex crime
victims know their attacker (Snyder, 2000). Presumably, a registry would not have provided new
knowledge to these victims, or family of these victims, allowing them to better protect themselves
from that offender. Knowing someone (e.g. a parent, uncle, and sibling) implies victims would prob-
ably be aware of a sexual assault history regardless of a registry. Third, they note that most studies
which compare sexual assault rates before and after a registry went into effect generally show no
statistically significant reductions in sexual assault (see Prescott & Rockoff, 2011, for a list of these
studies). Fourth, critics have pointed to numerous studies showing collateral harms to registrants
and their families (e.g. difficulty making friends, finding employment, or securing housing), especially
juvenile registrants (Tewksbury & Lees, 2006). Given the potential of harm and the lack of clear evi-
dence that sex crimes are reduced by registries, academics have generally argued for abolition or
extensive reform of sex offender registration.
Failing to see progress in calls for reform or repeal, opponents of the registry have concluded that
policy-makers, the public, and law enforcement may be irrational, such that “community notification
laws are driven by emotional responses to sexual violence rather than by empirical data, [and]
provide misguided reassurance to citizens”(Levenson et al., 2007, p. 4). Others conclude that propo-
nents are merely indifferent to science, suggesting “it appears that many criminal justice officials are
in support of sex offender policies, even if there is no scientific evidence to suggest they work, and
even when the rationale for such support is unclear”(Tewksbury & Mustaine, 2013, p. 111). Or, they
speculate that proponents are unaware or tend not to decipher differences in the quality of evidence
on registries. Thus, “such laws are not guided by empirical evidence, but are driven instead by myths
perpetuated and reinforced by the media”(Levenson et al., 2007). Each of these arguments begins
with a policy paradox: How can the public, and especially legislators or law enforcement, ignore
such persuasive statistical evidence showing registries have no utility? Failing to see a rational expla-
nation, some are left wondering whether those who support the registry—the vast majority of the
population and many in government—have some inability or disinterest in pursuing evidence-
based policy.
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An alternate view would be that proponents are rational, but diverge from critics in how they
consume or make sense of the current empirical literature. First, it may be that proponents are
simply giving more weight to higher quality research. The strongest designs have tended to show
registration has important benefits (as discussed below). Second, it may be that proponents see a
different standard or goal for judging registration policy as evidence based than found among
typical social science paradigms. Opponents of the registry use methodology and arguments
which assume a policy must work all the time, or most of the time, in order to have value. Proponents
are likely more interested in whether it is occasionally or ever useful in reducing sex crimes or assist-
ing law enforcement investigations. With this context in mind, it is important to consider available
research on the criticisms suggested above.
Are sex offenders risky?
The fundamental premise of sex offender registries is that people who have been convicted of a sex
crime in the past are at a higher-than-average risk of committing a new sexual crime. As noted above,
the fact that between 5 and 15% of registrants are rearrested for a new sex crime appears, at first
glance, counter to this assumption. However, while a small portion of sexual offenders are rearrested
for a new sexual crime in any given year, their rate of arrest is far higher than that found in the general
public. For example, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reports approximately 84,376 forcible rape arrests
occurred in 2012. Research tells us that 5% of these (i.e. approximately 4200) will have been at the
hands of someone on the sex offender registry (Craun, Simmons, & Reeves, 2011). These 4200
arrests among the 700,000 registrants in 2012 imply an arrest rate of 60 for every 10,000 registered
sex offenders. There were 314 million people in the US that year available to generate the remaining
80,000 sexual assault arrests. This means that approximately 2 out of 10,000 citizens outside the reg-
istry were arrested for a forcible rape in 2012 (i.e. 30 times less risk than registered sex offenders).
Even if one limits consideration to the 117 million adult males in the US at that time, the arrest
rate jumps only as high as 7 in 10,000 (i.e. nine times less risk). That comparison severely underesti-
mates the differences between registrants and the general public, of course, because it assumes that
no women or juveniles in the general public commit sex crimes. Regardless of various ways one can
try to bias the comparison to show no difference between registrants and others, the story is the
same: registered sexual offenders exhibit far more risk of being arrested for a sexual assault than
the general public.
1
The fact that those with prior sex offences are at a higher risk to commit sexual crimes than the
general public seems, to some degree, obvious. And for that reason, defending that assertion with
data may seem an unnecessary exercise. However, it is important to articulate this in the terms
laid out above because the low base rate of sexual recidivism has been used as evidence that regis-
trants are not particularly risky with respect to future sexual crimes.
Prevention of sexual recidivism
The first goal of registries is to prevent sexual crimes—primarily through enhancing guardianship of
potential victims. In signing the Adam Walsh Act, the president explained that a key intent of the legis-
lation was to ensure that “parents have the information they need to protect their children from sex
offenders that might be in their neighborhoods”(Bush, 2006). As noted above, research suggests that
victims knew their offender in an overwhelming majority of sexual assaults. This fact has been used to
suggest a logical flaw to the registry: it would rarely add new information for most potential victims.
However, a closer look at the data challenge this conclusion. Bierie and Davis-Siegel (in press)
examined sexual assaults reported to more than 6000 police departments over a 20-year period,
finding that in most cases the victim was an acquaintance (24.6%), friend (8.2%), neighbour (3.8%),
babysitter (3.5%), employer/employee (1%), or otherwise outside the family but known to the offen-
der (20.6%). Thus, over 60% of assaults reported were by non-relative acquaintances.
2
Even if one
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agrees with the premise that criminal history within a family is well known (i.e. the registry adds little
value for family victimisation), the majority of victims would likely still see value added. That is,
acquaintance offenders, such as dates, neighbours, family friends, co-workers, or other people in a
position of trust, offend through manipulation, hiding information, and grooming (Bourke et al.,
2015; Mcalinden, 2006; Williams, 2014). Without a registry, it may be particularly easy for acquain-
tance offenders to hide their history from those they interact with socially. The registry is intended
to inform people about their current or potential acquaintances so that people can make informed
decisions about contact and risk mitigation.
3
The registry was also intended to prevent stranger-attacks. As noted above, these are fewer than
10% of sexual assaults (Levenson et al., 2007; Williams & Bierie, 2014). But that does not mean they are
irrelevant; that assisting with those cases is trivial. And there is some reason to believe that registries
can assist. Most sexual offenders who target strangers reside relatively close to the crime location
(Lundrigan, Czarnomski, & Wilson, 2010; Rossmo, 2000). The premise of the registry is that potential
victims may be able to recognise a sexual offender in their community and take actions to ensure that
they and their children limit contact with that offender. Likewise, the registry allows residents to be
aware of an offender and alert police if they see suspicious behaviour (e.g. a person listed as a child
sexual offender inviting neighbourhood children into his/her house). In short, the registry does
appear to have a rational basis and it is at least plausible that it may assist in the prevention of
some sex crimes, whether by acquaintances or strangers, some of the time. This begs a logical
and pervasive question in the field: Do registries work?
Impact on sex assault rates
Research in the past two decades has generally evaluated the impact of registries by comparing
sexual offence rates in communities before and after the enactment of a registry. That research
has generally found no effect on sexual assault rates (see Prescott & Rockoff, 2011, for a comprehen-
sive listing). This has been, perhaps, the single most important and troubling argument against regis-
tries. However, Prescott and Rockoff (2011) recently re-evaluated this literature and found nearly all
“prior studies had used incorrect legal dates or had mischaracterised many of these laws”(p. 163).
This error is not a mere limitation, but a fatal flaw. Studies were intending to compare sexual
assault rates in a given county, for example, in the year prior to the enactment of a registry to
rates in the year after the law went into effect. By using the date the law was passed rather than
the date it went into effect or the date the registry actually appeared, these studies were generally
comparing sexual assault rates prior to a registry with sexual assault rates …prior to a registry.
After correcting for this mistake, Prescott and Rockoff (2011) conducted the largest and most com-
prehensive study to date of the impact of registries on sexual assault. That is, they examined thou-
sands of jurisdictions rather than one or a handful, examined several types of sexual assault rather
than grouping them all together, and compared sexual assault rates prior and after the real date a
registry began in each jurisdiction. Their analysis showed sexual crimes declined by an average of
13% in communities after the enactment of a registry. This is a similar magnitude as reported in
other recent, large-scale, and start-date-accurate studies that estimated the impact of enacting a
sex offender registry (e.g. Letourneau, Levenson, Bandyopadhyay, Sinha, & Armstrong, 2010).
These studies are not illustrated because they are exceptions to the field in that they find a
benefit to the registry. They are not listed here because, conveniently, they are the few which find
a benefit. Rather, they are by far the largest and most accurate research on the topic; Prescott and
Rockoff (2011) show that the majority of prior work concluding no-effect was unreliable.
Clearing sex crimes
The second and related goal of registries is to assist law enforcement in solving sex crimes committed
by strangers. That is, to offer a tool which will help ensure sexual predators “will be caught,
4D. M. BIERIE
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prosecuted and punished to the fullest extent of the law”(Bush, 2006). An accurate, timely, and well-
organised registry is intended to help clear crimes either through identifying a registrant that is the
actual offender, or by allowing police to rule out known sex offenders quickly and thus move on to
other investigative strategies. Thus, we might expect registration to correspond to higher, faster, and
more efficient clearance rates for sex crimes.
At least three types of scenarios come to mind in this regard. First, one might find a registry useful
in child abductions by strangers. In these scenarios, police could check whether the suspect’s descrip-
tion, should it exist, matches any registered sexual offenders who live or work in the area. Or, if a
partial license plate is obtained by a witness, police can obtain a list of all cars with that match
that partial plate, quickly match the list against the registry, and prioritise checking on registrants
as they work through that list of potential abductors. Second, one can imagine scenarios involving
citizen action facilitated by a registry. For example, if a person sees children being invited into the
home of a registered child sex offender, that person might contact police and potentially facilitate
a quick arrest if not prevention of a new crime altogether. Finally, police may even detect new
crimes (including sex crimes) during registry verification checks. Given that registrants are far more
likely to commit a new sex crime than the general public (as described above), registration and
the public website seem a reasonable tool to facilitate these types of investigative actions. The
absence of a registry would make these types of actions slower or impossible to carry out.
Many law enforcement officers and law enforcement agencies assert that registries assist in sex
crimes investigations, at least some of the time (Finn, 1997; Gaines, 2006; Matson & Lieb, 1996;
Tewksbury & Mustaine, 2013; Tewksbury, Mustaine, & Payne, 2011). One of the only empirical
studies examining this question to date shows a non-significant increase in clearance rates as a func-
tion of registries (Prescott & Rockoff, 2011). This study examined sex crime clearance rates before and
after registries became available (within thousands of jurisdictions). This study was somewhat limited
in addressing this specific question, however, because all sex crimes were examined collectively. One
might expect registries to be helpful in locating victims of abduction or rape by strangers (i.e. when
the offender is not already known to the victim at the time the crime is reported to police). But police
usually do not need a registry in order to find the identity of a reported offender in most other
scenarios (e.g. date rape, family abuse, assault by acquaintances). Prescott and Rockoff (2011) aver-
aged the effect of registries on clearance rates between the crimes where a registry was likely to
be useful for clearance (strangers) and the 90% of assaults where it was not expected to help. This
would bias their analyses towards finding no effect. In short, there is no reliable statistical research
which tests whether, and under what conditions, registration assists in sexual assault investigations.
It is important to note, however, that statistical evidence of average effects represent an important
but incomplete picture of utility. Policy-makers are interested in whether registries work on average
(a statistical question), and also whether the registry helps occasionally or ever. Many policy-makers,
law enforcement professionals, and the public would likely feel that registries have utility even if they
only help in a fraction of crimes—if there are even a handful of examples in which the registry helped
prevent or clear a sex crime. These examples are not hard to find. Consider the following examples,
found in only a few minutes of searching on Google:
.a woman in New Jersey opened the door to a census worker and recognised him from the registry
as an offender who had multiple convictions for sexually assaulting children (he had provided a
false name when he obtained employment with the census). Concerned the registrant was
using a fake name and federal credentials to gain access to area homes, she contacted police.
Police investigated, found probable cause, and he was arrested;
4
.an Iowa deputy recognised a carnival worker as a child sex offender from his image on the registry.
Police investigated, finding probable cause that the registrant was in violation of child-contact
requirements and he was arrested;
5
.a parent in Alabama recognised the umpire in her daughter’s softball game from the registry as a
child sex offender. Police were notified; they conducted an investigation and found the registrant
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hid his status from the sports organisation and that his work as a volunteer with children was a
violation of law. He was arrested;
6
.a former sheriff’s deputy in Colorado saw a man who appeared to be watching children from his
car, which was parked outside an elementary school. The former deputy recognised the man from
his image on the sex offender registry. The registrant, who had a previous conviction for sexually
assaulting children, was interviewed by police. They determined that he was there looking for
the “perfect”girl to lure into his car. He was arrested;
7
.an elementary school secretary in Maryland regularly studied the images of sex offenders registered
in the area of the school. As a result, she recognised a man who had three prior sexual convictions
against children when he came into the school and asked to take a specific seven-year-old girl out
of class “at the request of her mother”. The secretary alerted police, who investigated and deter-
mined that he had no connection with the family. He merely lived nearby, was able to discover the
child’s name, and then devised a ruse to abduct the child from the school. He was arrested.
8
There is no systematic research to date counting or describing these kinds of tangible examples of
registries leading to the detection or prevention of crime. These are only a handful of what are likely
myriad other similar examples. It is not guaranteed that these offenders would have committed a
sexual assault if they had not been recognised, but it appears that in each case the offender was
far out of legal bounds, that he knew this, and that he was pursuing opportunities and access to
potential victims. Investigations in each case led to the determination that there was probable
cause for arrest. It is unlikely that these crimes would have been detected without the registry.
We will rarely know the names of the near-victims saved by registries, and this is precisely the
point. The registry helps the public identify and respond to risk; it offers a way to intervene before
registrants’plans towards sexual assault are carried through. In those cases we do not have to
learn a new name like Megan Kanka, Jacob Wetterling, or Adam Walsh. As the above list of arrests
show, the registry has helped in the detection of crime. From a law enforcement perspective, and
for much of the public, that makes registries extremely valuable.
This is not to say that anecdotal evidence is on par with rigorous statistical analyses of policy
impact. This is not an example of pitting statistical methodology versus anecdotes as a way of
testing the same question, but choosing anecdotes. Rather, this argument hinges on the observation
that proponents of registries are likely interested in whether they can ever help—whether there is
any tangible examples in which a case was assisted or a victimisation prevented. For that question,
real-life examples of success are in fact more useful evidence than the statistical studies which
assesses a wholly separate question: Do registries lead to prevention or case closure so often as to
create statistically significant shifts in the population of cases?
Collateral harm
Academic researchers have articulated a broad number of potential costs or limitations associated
with registration (Agan, 2011; Letourneau et al., 2010; Levenson, Ackerman, & Harris, 2013; Tewks-
bury, Jennings, & Zgoba, 2012). For example, they argue that registration may lead to the placement
of unfair stigma on family members of registrants, and they worry that registries facilitate or even
encourage vigilante justice. They worry that having a registry may give a false sense of security to
families, as there are plenty of sexually dangerous people who are not on a registry. They also
worry that money spent on registries is wasteful; that they are expensive to maintain and this rep-
resents a drain on funds which might be more efficiently spent on other programmes or practices.
They assert that being on the registry likely makes it difficult to get a job, obtain housing, or make
friends. At the extreme, critics warn that registries may actually increase danger to the public by
making registrants more crime prone. For example, registries may increase strain or frustration
among registrants (motivation towards crime) and diminish social control or conformist values
that might otherwise have emerged through engaging prosocial relationships or institutions.
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This line of research is important and the evidence for harm is persuasive. The premise of stigma is
logical, and there are a number of studies documenting negative impacts of the registry on employ-
ment, housing, and social relationships (as cited above). The literature is persuasive as well because it
corresponds to a wealth of evidence showing similar effects for re-entry of offenders in general.
However, this consistency with the re-entry literature also presents an important, if nuanced, chal-
lenge to the abolitionist movement. That is, the collateral harms faced by registrants are similar to
those which exist for all returning prisoners (who are not on the registry). It is hard to tell, then,
how much collateral harm would be reduced without a registry.
Developing this point, Craun and Bierie (2014) note several limitations in extent collateral harm
research. This includes using survey instruments which prime sex offenders to report problems,
and the failure to isolate the effects of registration from other forces which may be driving collateral
harms. For example, we do not know what portion of the poor employment outcomes for registrants
is due to the registry versus a criminal history in general or the impact of local economies. That is,
registrants tend to live in areas of concentrated disadvantage (Hipp, Turner, & Jannetta, 2010) and
it is unclear whether poor employment outcomes are in part due to this. The same can be said of
other harms, such as levels of victimisation, stress, fear, or frustration which are pronounced for regis-
trants but also problematic in general for ex-offenders and for those living in areas of concentrated
disadvantage.
Is registration cost effective?
Collectively, the above arguments led opponents of registration to argue that it is costly and returns
little if any benefit. Framing the registration debate in terms of a cost–benefit analysis is appropriate,
although a challenging analysis. Few of the costs and benefits of registries have been valuated. We do
not know how often it leads to a faster arrest, or what the tangible or intangible value of that is
(benefits). We also are not sure how often it leads to serious distress for family members of registrants,
or loss of employment, or what the value of that is (cost). An accurate and actionable cost–benefit
ratio is certainly premature because only a portion of the costs and benefits have been estimated
or valuated. Yet, it is important to consider the cost–benefit information that is available because
fiscal arguments are already a major part of the national discourse on this policy. Opponents of
the registry argue that it is expensive for taxpayers with little or no return. This argument is worth
pausing to consider.
It is instructive to assess this argument while giving the benefit of the doubt to those critical of
registration and using a relatively high estimate of the cost of implementing this policy. To that
end, the Justice Policy Institute (2009) estimated that federally compliant registry systems cost
states an average of $18 million up front and a (slightly) lower amount for maintenance in the follow-
ing years. For example, they estimate that building such a registry would cost Virginia $12.5 million up
front, and around $8 million per year to maintain and enforce thereafter. Taken to a national scale,
they estimated that it would cost approximately $400 million per year to create compliant registries
across the USA. This is a daunting figure, especially if the registry has no benefit.
However, as noted above, there is reason to believe that registration does have some impact on
sexual offending—a crime which has been valuated (see Bierie, 2009, for a complete listing of valua-
tion estimates for sexual assault). The most often used, and most conservative, estimates of the life-
time impact of a sexual assault derive from the National Institute of Justice (Miller, Cohen, & Weirsema,
1996), which estimated that the sexual assault of an adult invokes just over $117,000 in lifetime losses
per incident (converted to 2009 dollars to match the national implementation cost figure of $400
million cited above).
9
National statistics estimated just under 300,000 sexual assaults incidents in
2010 (Truman & Langton, 2014). If sex offender registry systems reduced this by 13%, then the
nation would see a savings of around $4.5 billion per year.
10
And that is using a smaller estimate
of the valuation of sexual assault (i.e. it does not weight in the cost of child sexual assaults—a valua-
tion which is 50% higher).
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Even if we assume that the estimate of 300,000 sexual assaults is too high and therefore use the
national estimate of 88,000 arrests from 2010 instead (i.e. assume there is no unreported sexual
assault), a 13% reduction in the annual count of these 88,000 sexual assaults would generate a
value of approximately $1.34 billion in savings per year. Even if we assume that the benefits of regis-
tries are half of what research shows (e.g. only a 6.5% reduction in sexual assaults rather than 13%)
and used an unbelievably small estimate of the number of sex crimes in the nation (the 88,000 arrests
only), and the rather high estimates of the costs to implement the system ($400 million)—the
national sex offender registry systems would still generate hundreds of millions of dollars more
benefit than cost each year.
11
Again, these figures are incomplete. There is no valuation of the harm caused to registrants or their
families as a result of feeling stigmatised or other potential costs to the registry. Likewise, there is no
estimate of the impact of registration on case closure or other benefits. Developing the valuation lit-
erature remains an important avenue for future research. But given the information available to date,
it certainly looks more rational than opponents have suggested.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that registries are controversial—informed people disagree on what benefits and
costs they generate and whether the benefits outweigh the potential costs. Opponents have gener-
ated a number of criticisms and some evidence that there are unintended consequences of the reg-
istry (as noted above). On the other hand, there is some evidence that registries are associated with
decreases in sexual offending and assist law enforcement in response to some of these crimes.
This commentary is not a defence of registration as a policy, or a dismissal of evidence which chal-
lenges registration. Nor is it a rebuttal of the assertion that some sex offender policy-making is likely
influenced by myths about sex offender risk, emotional reactions or disgust many feel about sex
offenders, or lack of complete awareness of statistical evidence. There is no doubt that registration
can be costly, that there are cases in which registrants are socially harmed, and that most registrants
would not be arrested for a new sex crime even without the registry. Rather, this commentary is a call
for understanding; it is an attempt to show that policy-makers, law enforcement, and the public are
more rational than assumed and that they likely have reasonable and important ideas to consider.
Science evolves through the consideration and testing of alternative ideas; it is grounded in critical
debate and challenge. An assumption that advocates are incapable of understanding evidence, logic,
or reason will likely lead to the quick and uncritical dismissal of challenging ideas. In that case, the
field will miss the opportunity to test those ideas and develop a more nuanced and, perhaps, accurate
view of this policy. In short, this note suggests that a more “collaborative”exchange is needed—one
in which both opponents and supporters of registration give fair and thoughtful scholarly attention to
one another’s arguments. That is not to say that the field needs teams of researchers made up of
oppositional stances. Rather, it is to say that the field needs room for all ideas to be considered on
their merits; for the field to be a place to exchange ideas and evidence. A field in which opposition
is branded “emotional/ignorable”is not likely to produce great science. In contrast, a more collabora-
tive exchange could lead to real advances in several important research topics.
First, there is a need to continue to assess the impact of registries on sexual crimes in communities,
and whether the impact varies across types of offenders, situations, or places (e.g. population density
and poverty). Somewhat related, the field needs a better understanding of the ways in which regis-
tration is actually administered. Do police in a given community really verify addresses? Do local
courts really enforce registration violations? Are there other policies implemented alongside regis-
tration which are also impacting sexual assault rates? Tackling these questions will lead to a more
accurate assessment of costs and benefits of registration. It would likely also help policy-makers
better understand what rules and policies should be in place to maximise the effectiveness and effi-
ciency of the registry.
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Second, collaborative exchanges could lead to better valuation. There is likely a great deal of
research which can already be leveraged to advance this literature, such as valuation of unemploy-
ment (Haveman & Weimer, 2015) weighted by the loss or reduction of employment caused by regis-
tration. But that requires an honest and rigorous analysis of the impact of the registry on employment
separate from the personal characteristics of registrants, the impact of criminal history in general, and
local economies in the areas registrants live. Likewise, there is a need to understand the impact of the
registry on the rate and speed of case closure, and also the value of doing so. Does faster case closure
lead to significant savings for investigations or communities? What is the value to victims for each
additional case solved with the help of the registry? These are difficult questions to answer. But
they are probably possible to estimate and similar to questions routinely valuated in many other
fields such as public health, military science, transportation policy, etc. (Cohen & Bowles, 2010)). It
is likely that the most effective and accurate research will emerge from collaborative efforts
between those critical and supportive of the registry.
Third, there is a need to develop ways to improve the registry. One of the more obvious examples
is by integrating validated risk assessment within registries. It is clear that registrants vary in risk of
sexual recidivism, and there is ample empirical evidence articulating factors which explain a relatively
large portion of that variance (Hanson, Harris, Helmus, & Thornton, 2014; Hanson & Thornton, 2000).
There is little or no valid risk assessment structure built into the registries at the local or national level.
Both advocates and opponents of the registry would likely agree that it would be efficient and
reasonable to concentrate the efforts of monitoring, checking, and enforcing the registry on those
offenders who have the most risk of recidivism. It is likely that collaborative efforts will produce
the most careful and efficient advances in this area as well.
Registration has represented one of the more complicated and controversial policy debates in
criminology. The policy has serious implications for important and foundational issues, including
civil liberty, the reach of criminal justice systems, and prevention of sexual assault. The context of
such an important and distinct policy problem has, perhaps naturally, led to polarised views and
made science especially difficult to pursue. It is not easy to remain objective or balanced when
such high stakes exist and so many value-laden concepts are present. However, it is precisely
these stakes which make science the critical arbiter of debate; they require scholars from all sides
of that debate to redouble their efforts to pursue a collaborative science in which all ideas, especially
critical ones, are given serious scholarly attention. This research note is an attempt to illustrate the
value that can come from taking critical ideas seriously, even in such a charged and politicised
arena—perhaps especially when a topic is so highly charged.
Notes
1. It is important to note that these statistics refer to arrests, not offenses. There is considerable evidence that the
majority of sexual offenses go unreported to police (Bachman, 1998), and also that the majority of reported
sexual offenses never result in arrest (Williams & Bierie, 2014). It is unclear whether sexual assaults by registrants
would be reported to police more often than those committed by non-registrants. However, it may be that
sexual crimes which are reported to police result in an arrest more often when the offender is already on the registry
because registrants may be more intensely investigated and/or registrants are more likely to have DNA contained in
law enforcement data systems which facilitate case closure.
2. These statistics refer to all victim age groupings. The distribution among child victims would be different (i.e. more
family assailants).
3. Many victims are assaulted by family members. It is likely that families are more aware of prior sexual offending
arrests than acquaintances would be. However, it is also plausible that family members can keep the details of
their criminal history secret as well. Thus, the benefits of knowing a person’s sexual assault history is not limited
to non-familial acquaintance assault scenarios alone.
4. http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/NJ-Mom-Recognizes-Census-Worker-as-Sex-Offender-94185994.html
5. http://www.kcrg.com/news/local/Carnival-Worker-Recognized-As-Sex-Offender-Is-Arrested-99460894.html.
6. http://www.abc3340.com/story/25135523/hueytown-parent-recognizes-umpire-at-childs-softball-game-as-a-
convicted-sex-offender.
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7. http://www.kktv.com/home/headlines/Deputies-Say-Sex-Offender-Was-Watching-Kids-Outside-School-244724421.
html.
8. http://www.capitalgazette.com/news/sex-offender-causes-stir-at-school/article_53574f74-80f4-55df-a6fc-
5283e8724b18.html.
9. These estimates are derived from direct tangible costs (e.g. average hospital stay and cost per victim, reduction in
lifetime earnings, investigation costs, court and correctional costs), and intangible costs such as pain and suffering
(estimated from jury award and similar data). More recent estimates put the total realised cost as approximately
$250,000 in 2009 dollars (Cohen, Rust, Steen, & Tidd, 2004). The lower figure is used in this paper to create bias
in favour of registry critics in a cost–benefit analysis.
10. That is, (300,000) (0.13) ($117,000) = $4.56 billion.
11. That is, (88,000) (0.065) ($117,000) = $669.2 million. This is more than $250 million in benefit above and beyond the
$400 million estimated cost of implementing federally compliant registries across the nation.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Eliza Edgar, Paul Detar, Sarah Craun, Michael Bourke, and Drew Wade for comments on earlier drafts.
ORCID
David M. Bierie http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9367-9507
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