Nové mocnosti globálního Jihu: Čína, Indie, Brazílie, Jihoafrická republika a Indonésie v mezinárodním systému.
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V souvislosti s vypuknutím hladomoru v polovině devadesátých let se KLDR stala příjemcem humanitární a rozvojové pomoci. Prakticky ihned byla zjevná rozsáhlá diverzifikace poskytovatelů pomoci, z nichž byli dlouho těmi nejvýznamnějšími Korejská republika a USA. Svojí úlohu z hlediska dárcovství však mělo i Japonsko a Rusko a specifickou roli zaujímá dodnes Evropská unie a Švýcarsko. Zcela výlučné postavení v tomto ohledu dlouhodobě patří Číně, která po krátkém přerušení obnovila přísun prostředků a aktuálně zaujímá post patrona KLDR. Cílem předkládaného textu je komparovat strategie vybraných poskytovatelů pomoci a zmapovat trendy v jejím poskytování s ohledem na specifické prostředí KLDR v letech 1995–2012. Strategie dárcovství mají rozbíhavé tendence a dárci ve většině případů výrazně preferovali poskytování humanitární pomoci doprovázené snahou dosahovat svých zahraničněpolitických cílů v KLDR.
In a contemporary multipolar (or uni-multipolar) world, powerful states in particular regions attempt to take a leading role in the region and sometimes to become a great world power. Th is is also the case of Brazil, India and Iran-three powerful states attempting to achieve the status of regional hegemony in particular subsystems (South America, South Asia and the Middle East). Although these powers have some common features, according to which they can be distinguished from other (weaker) states in the region, they diff er in their power capabilities, their strategies of gaining more power and of becoming a regional hegemon. Th ese strategies do not only depend on the particular state and its capabilities, but also on the region which a state is part of, and on relations with other countries.
There are reasons for thinking that this is at last Indonesia's moment on the world stage. Having successfully negotiated its difficult transition to democracy after 1998, Indonesia has held three popular elections with a low level of violence by the standards of southern Asia. Recently its economic growth rate has been high (above 6 per cent a year) and rising, where China's has been dropping and the developed world has been in crisis. Indonesia's admission in 2009 to the G20 club of the world's most influential states seemed to confirm a status implied by its size, as the world's fourth-largest country by population, and the largest with a Muslim majority. Some international pundits have been declaring that Indonesia is the new star to watch, and that its long-awaited moment in the sun may at last have arrived. Those who know Indonesia well, like the experts writing in this book, are less easy to convince. In this volume they weigh the economic evidence (Ross Garnaut and M. Chatib Basri); the political equation between democracy and the massive obstacles to progress in corruption, inefficiency and legal inadequacies (Rizal Sukma and Donald K. Emmerson); and Indonesia's unrealized potential as a leader in matters environmental (Frank Jotzo) and Islamic (Martin van Bruinessen). The volume is rounded out by Scott Guggenheim's analysis of the potential for better performance in education, and by the longer-term considerations of Anthony Reid and R.E. Elson. Overall, the conclusion is one of cautious optimism, well aware of past disappointments. "Perhaps, as the contributors to this eminently readable and thought-provoking volume suggest, Indonesia is finally emerging as the globally significant nation-state that it surely is. A timely and important publication that deserves to be widely read." - Hal Hill, H.W. Arndt Professor of Southeast Asian Economies, The Australian National University. © 2012 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. All rights reserved.
The rise of the BRIC grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China) is one of the most commented on phenomena in international politics of the past years. Yet little is known about how and why institutionalized cooperation between the BRIC countries began. This article makes two arguments. First, an unprecedented combination in 2008-a profound financial crisis among developed countries, paired with relative economic stability among emerging powers-caused a legitimacy crisis of the international financial order, which led to equally unprecedented cooperation between emerging powers in the context of the BRIC grouping. The BRIC countries were able to use their temporarily increased bargaining power to become agenda setters at the time-culminating in the International Monetary Fund quota reforms agreed on in 2010. This shows that even short periods of reduced legitimacy in global governance can quickly lead to the rise of alternative institutions-such as, in the case of the crisis that began in 2008, the BRIC platform-which now forms part of the landscape of global governance. Second, intra-BRIC cooperation in the area of international finance enhanced trust among the BRIC countries and led to a broader type of cooperation in many other areas, suggesting the occurrence of spillover effects. Intra-BRICS cooperation (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) is therefore likely to continue, even after the conditions that facilitated its genesis-the crisis in the West-have disappeared.
The following article examines Brazil's motivations for contributing to peacekeeping missions. The work focuses on its participation in East-Timor and its leadership of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti. Brazil seeks prestige and hopes to gain influence through the pragmatic mechanisms of its foreign policy. The author believes the contributions are advantageous for the country, given the low cost of the missions, along with the receipt of military training, global visibility and an extension of Brazil's political and economic influence.
Given their growth records, large markets, and reformed economic systems, both China and India appear to be equally likely candidates for foreign direct investment (FDI). Yet, China has received substantially more FDI. The literature comparing FDI in these two countries is small, and does not provide conclusive evidence to explain this puzzle. Applying the Porterian framework of the competitiveness of nations to compare China and India, we garner evidence that differences in demand, factor conditions and firm strategy, structure and rivalry are not sufficient to explain the differential in the two countries' FDI flows. Differences in related and supporting industries, as well as Porter's other two factors – government and chance – are more compelling. We identify China's early entry into East Asian production networks in the 1980s as a key factor pushing China ahead of India in terms of FDI. We argue that this coincidental mix of timing and geography (Porter's ‘chance’ factor), pushed forward in China by the establishment of special economic zones, gave China a sustainable competitive advantage for the following two decades. What is implied from these findings is that China's FDI sources have been much larger and heavily slanted towards East Asia and manufacturing, while India, having missed this particular historical phase, needed to find an alternate route to development and global competitiveness.
By "mirroring" trade and investment statistics of those engaged in such activities with North Korea, I calculate the prevailing net deficiency in food, fertilizer, and oil, and identify China as the source of replenishment for such deficiency. From such findings, we may infer the political ramifications behind China's persistent economic support for the North. © 2008 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
China has made extraordinarily rapid gains in Southeast Asia since it turned its old confrontational policy on its head in 1997.The Dragon Looks Southfocuses closely on the past five years and is a comprehensive work that reviews all aspects of China's relations with all Southeast Asian states. Percival also distinguishes between China's goals in mainland and maritime Southeast Asia, deals with all of the major external players in Southeast Asia, not just China and the United States, and contends that various international relations schools of thought may or may not be relevant to Chinese-Southeast Asian relationships.
From Recipients to Donors examines the emergence, or re-emergence, of a large number of nations as partners and donors in international development, from global powers such as Brazil, China and India, to Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, to former socialist states such as Poland and Russia. The impact of these countries in international development has grown sharply, and as a result they have become a subject of intense interest and analysis.
This unique book explores the range of opportunities and challenges this phenomenon presents for poorer countries and for development policy, ideology and governance. Drawing on the author’s rich original research, whilst expertly condensing published and unpublished material, From Recipients to Donors is an essential critical analysis and review for anyone interested in development, aid and international relations.
As India’s attempts to carve out a foreign policy that is in sync with theirrising international stature, they arehaving todeal with a range of issues that are controversial but central to the future of an Indian global strategy. This book examines these issuesanddeduces major trends in Indian foreign policy.
Two highly regarded scholars come together to examine India's relationship with the world's major powers and its own search for a significant role in the international system. Central to the argument is India's belief that the acquisition of an independent nuclear capability is key to obtaining such status. The book details the major constraints at the international, domestic and perceptual levels that India has faced in this endeavor. It concludes, through a detailed comparison of India's power capabilities, that India is indeed a rising power, but that significant systemic and domestic changes will be necessary before it can achieve its goal. The book examines the prospects and implications of India's integration into the major-power system in the twenty-first century. This book's incisive analysis will be illuminating for students, policy makers, and for anyone wishing to understand the region in greater depth.
As we approach the closing days of the twenty-first century, the balance of power in the world economy looks quite different from what existed barely 20 years ago. The shift from bipolarity to multipolarity has ushered in a new set of international alignments, potentially making a definitive break with some of the post-World War II institutions and practices. The emergence of China and India as powerful economic giants, the proliferation of new trilateral formations such as the Brazil, Russia, India, China (BRICs) alliance, the India-Brazil-South Africa dialogue (IBSA) forum, a profoundly transformed G-20 forum in the wake of the global financial crisis, presents both challenges and opportunities to the developing countries (Wilson and Purushothaman, 2003; National Intelligence Council, 2008). Indeed, over the last decade, Africa’s relationship with Asia has expanded as evident from the frequent summits between Asian and African countries. The precursor for renewing the spirit of the 1995 Bandung conference was the April 2005 Asian-African summit held in Jakarta, Indonesia.1 This was followed by the forum for China-Africa Cooperation (November 2006), the first India-Africa summit (April 2008), the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (June 2008) and the Korea-Africa Summit (November 2009). By 2010, China will overtake the US as Africa’s largest trading partner (UNCTAD, 2007a).
Indonesia is the world's largest archipelagic state, with more than 18,000 islands and over 7.9 million square kilometres of sea. The marine frontier presents the nation with both economic opportunities and political and strategic challenges. Indonesia has been affected more than most countries in the world by a slow revolution in the management of its waters. Whereas Indonesia's seas were once conceived administratively as little more than the empty space between islands, successive governments have become aware that this view is outmoded. The effective transfer to the seas of regulatory regimes that took shape on land, such as territoriality, has been an enduring challenge to Indonesian governments. This book addresses issues related to maritime boundaries and security, marine safety, inter-island shipping, the development of the archipelagic concept in international law, marine conservation, illegal fishing, and the place of the sea in national and regional identity. © 2009 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. All rights reserved.
This 2003 book develops the idea that since decolonisation, regional patterns of security have become more prominent in international politics. The authors combine an operational theory of regional security with an empirical application across the whole of the international system. Individual chapters cover Africa, the Balkans, CIS Europe, East Asia, EU Europe, the Middle East, North America, South America, and South Asia. The main focus is on the post-Cold War period, but the history of each regional security complex is traced back to its beginnings. By relating the regional dynamics of security to current debates about the global power structure, the authors unfold a distinctive interpretation of post-Cold War international security, avoiding both the extreme oversimplifications of the unipolar view, and the extreme deterritorialisations of many globalist visions of a new world disorder. Their framework brings out the radical diversity of security dynamics in different parts of the world.
The article discusses the pressures that influence China's interactions with the world in terms of three spatial dimensions. The three dimensions that can help achieve a comprehensive and coherent picture of China's position are those of a single-region state, a multi-regional power and a global presence.
This companion volume to the highly successful Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy explores the extent to which foreign policy in the world's largest Muslim nation has been influenced by Islamic considerations.
We assume that the ideas, interests and strategies of regional powers are highly significant variables, with the power to influence foreign policy. Yet while comparative research projects involving OECD-countries are fairly common, comparative research integrating developing regions is still rare, despite the fact that these countries are among the key actors of the twenty-first century. This collection emphasizes the role of regional powers in intra-regional, interregional and global contexts, analyzing the rise of regional powers from a comparative perspective. In so doing, the book explains how these powers have power to shape regional and global politics.
This pioneering study of the Indonesian presidency significantly redefines our understanding of Indonesian politics from independence to the present. Angus McIntyre blends political biography with constitutional history to locate Indonesian leaders within both Indonesian cultural frameworks and the global biographical literature on political leaders. The Indonesian Presidency shows how Indonesia's 1945 constitution provided first for the personal rule of presidents Sukarno and Soeharto and then facilitated the shift towards constitutional rule that marked the presidencies of B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Megawati Sukarnoputri. This important study elevates the personalities of Sukarno and Soeharto into key explanatory factors for the character of their "Guided Democracy" and "New Order" regimes, respectively. It argues that in 1959 Sukarno began fashioning his system of personal rule, to the detriment of Indonesia's parliamentary democracy. Another constitutional turning point occurred in 1998, when a rudimentary constitutional rule reappeared. The broad shift since 1998 from personal to constitutional rule has its personal counterpoint in the relationship between Megawati and her father, which makes this unique blend of history and biography a powerful tool for understanding the Indonesian presidency. An afterword by the author on the book's website, www.rowmanlittlefield.com/isbn/0742538273, brings readers up to date on Indonesian political developments that have affected the presidency since the book's publication.For an up-to-date afterword by the author, click here; for glossary, click here.
Despite widespread fears about China's growing economic clout and political stature, Beijing remains committed to a "peaceful rise": bringing its people out of poverty by embracing economic globalization and improving relations with the rest of the world. As it emerges as a great power, China knows that its continued development depends on world peace--a peace that its development will in turn reinforce.
The United States is spreading its aid and efforts too thin in the developing world. It should focus on a small number of "pivotal states": countries whose fate determines the survival and success of the surrounding region and ultimately the stability of the international system. The list should include Mexico, Brazil, Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, Turkey, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia. A discriminating strategy for shoring up the developing world is a wise way to address traditional security threats and new transnational issues; it might be thought of as the new, improved domino theory. If effective, it could forestall the move in Congress to wipe out nearly all foreign aid.
In the wake of September 11, China has launched its own "war on terror" against Uighur separatists in Xinjiang. But Beijing is employing the wrong strategy; the way to improve the situation is by addressing the Uighurs' legitimate grievances.
The simultaneous rise of China and now India is a fundamental factor for understanding the twenty-first century. In rising as Great Powers, a relative term, they are coming up against each other across Asia and its surrounding waters. Traditional geopolitical models, Mackinder, Spykman and Mahan point to their spatial politics around Central Asia, South Asia, Pacific Asia and the Indian Ocean. Actual spatial settings are combined with perceived spatial outlooks. These powerful neighbouring states seek to continue rising, and constrain the other where necessary through mutual encirclement and alliances/proxies. This type of 'Great Game' is evident in the military-security, diplomatic and economic areas. Globalisation has not replaced regionalism, nor has geoeconomics replaced geopolitics. The stakes are high as is their need for securing access to energy resources for their economics-led rise to Great Power status. Some cooperation is evident, in line with IR liberalism-functionalism. However, geopolitical IR realism and security dilemma perceptions still shape much of their actions.
This article aims to analyze the impact of domestic politics and international changes that influence Brazilian positions regarding regional integration processes in South America, particularly the Southern Common Market, Mercosur. The dynamics of the international system and their impact on the evolution of the elite's perception of the role the country should play in the world are important variables for understanding these positions. The state's postures in relation to integration were and are based on a real interest, but this interest is also linked with the objective of ensuring better conditions for participation in other international arenas. Starting with the hypothesis that transformations in the international setting have strongly influenced Brazil's positioning, the elements of continuity and change in the country's behavior toward Mercosur are identified, with domestic politics as the main explanation.
Brazilian foreign policy demonstrates an interesting double aspect in the changing global system. Its rhetoric and overt positioning is framed around the idea of Brazil as a value-creating actor, while in reality there are significant value-claiming characteristics at the core of its approach to regional and global affairs. The key for Brazil is its position as a ‘bridge’ between the South and the North, which allows its diplomats to establish the country as a critical coalition organizer and ideational leader for southern actors looking for major changes in global governance systems, and a central interlocutor for northern actors trying to cope with pressure from the South. Brazil's ambitions are simple: focusing more on an improved relative position, rather than a complete reformulation of the international system, which serves it well in economic, political and security terms. To explain this argument the article focuses on Brazilian engagement with Africa and South America, as well as the country's approach to major negotiations such as the WTO's Doha round, the Free Trade Area of the Americas and the evolution of regional governance mechanisms such as the Organization of American States and the recently created Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. The pattern that emerges is one of Brazil working to create a consensus around its position, using its consequent leadership to improve Brazilian leverage in the regional and global arena.
This article examines the sources of economic growth for a group of Latin American countries in relation to their export performance in China. The analytical framework is based on an extended normalized quadratic profit function. The econometric results confirm that a favorable export record with China represents a positive source of growth for Latin America. However, it also creates long-run dependability conditions in terms of reduced prices and thinner profits that weaken its growth capacity. Latin American countries must seek product diversification away from their current commodity base and aggressively climb up the value chain to remain competitive worldwide. Este artículo examina las fuentes de crecimiento económico para un grupo de países latinoamericanos en relación a su desempeño exportador con respecto a China. El marco analítico está basado en una función cuadrática normalizada de beneficios. Los resultados econométricos confirman que un favorable record exportador hacia China representa una fuente positiva de crecimiento para América Latina. No obstante, también crea condiciones de dependencia de largo plazo en términos de precios reducidos y utilidades menores que debilitan su capacidad de crecimiento. Los países latinoamericanos deben apuntarse hacia una diversificación productiva distinta a su actual base exportadora y escalar agresivamente la cadena de valor a fin de permanecer mundialmente competitivos.
This book examines the concept of regional power in international relations. Using the emerging powers of India and South Africa as the case studies, it explores how regional powers simultaneously differ and share common features. The book develops a method to classify and evaluate different types of regional powers and applies this typology to contemporary case studies of India and South Africa. Regional power is often expected to have a positive influence on region-specific problems of conflict, economic deprivation and political instability. In reality, an 'achievement-expectations gap' can be seen in many regional powers, which can be analysed and understood through observable variation in regional power. The author discovers that in addition to the management of the internal regional order, regional powers have to establish individuality whilst fitting into the global international environment, altering both regional dynamics and creating variance in the level of control within the region. Elucidating concepts and definitions, this book is an accessible and in-depth study that both introduces key concepts and provides a framework for the future study of regional power in international relations. Redefining Regional Power in International Relations will be of interest to students and scholars of regionalism and international relations
China's rapid growth and increased integration with the global economy over the past three decades have significant economic impacts and political implications for Latin America. This paper reviews the debate over whether these impacts have on balance been positive or negative for the region. It argues that those who emphasise the positive economic impacts of China have been over-optimistic and underplay some of the negative impacts associated with Chinese competition in manufacturing and increasing Latin American specialisation in primary products. On the other hand, when focusing on the political dimensions, there has been a tendency to exaggerate both the extent of China's influence in the region and the fears to which this gives rise, particularly among US commentators.
The post-Cold War period witnessed a spurt in regional integration and regional trading arrangements. India’s attempt at regional integration with Afro-Asian countries during the early years of independence had been without much success. The economic reforms in 1991 and the resultant liberalization and opening of the economy, and the reshaping of its foreign policy have thrown open the floodgate of its Asianism. This article discusses the trend towards regional integration with the end of Cold War and argues that the Look East policy is the byproduct of India’s attempt at regional economic integration with East and Southeast Asian countries. The policy is also used by India as one of the means for solving multiple predicaments in its Northeastern region.
Since 2004 China has set up over 700 Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms around the world to promote its language and culture and thereby to shape its image. Despite this impressive number Confucius Institutes are surprisingly understudied, especially in terms of their actual structure, operation mode and activities. This paper uses German Confucius Institutes as a case study to bridge this gap. It first discusses the concepts of public and cultural diplomacy and culture institutes as a conceptual tool to analyze Confucius Institutes. It then turns to the case study to provide empirical data to better understand this instrument of China’s image shaping efforts. It argues that Confucius Institutes are connected to the rise of China and a unique member of the family of national culture institutes.
It is puzzling that India, which has a large domestic constituency of people suffering from underdevelopment, chronic poverty and mal-governance, is emerging as an important aid donor. With the intension of understanding why poor countries provide foreign aid, this article is the first to econometrically analyze India’s aid allocation decisions. First, we utilize cross-sectional data on aid commitments by the Ministry of External Affairs to 125 developing countries, obtained in US dollars from AidData for the 2008-2010 period. Second, we compare India’s aid allocation with that of other donors. Our findings show that India’s aid allocation is partially in line with our expectations of the behavior of a “needy” donor. Commercial and political self-interests dominate India’s aid allocation. We find the importance of political interests to be significantly larger for India than for all donors of the Development Assistance Committee. Moreover, we find that countries which are closer geographically are favored, and that countries at a similar developmental stage are more likely to enter India’s aid program.
The Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration attempted to replace a reactive foreign policy agenda dominated by a logic of autonomy through distance with a proactive international agenda guided by a logic of autonomy through integration . In adopting this agenda, the administration maintained that Brazil would be able to confront its problems and secure more control over its future if it actively contributed to elaborating the norms and guidelines of the administration of the global order. Because of structural weaknesses, however, this policy of integration, adherence, and participation was not adequately accompanied by positions entailing practical responsibilities—responsibilities that would have prepared both government and civil society for a higher profile in the post—cold-war era. In the end, the gains achieved during Cardoso's tenure failed to alter Brazil's international standing in any significant way.