Article

Will China be a New Type of Great Power?

November 2015
The Chinese Journal of International Politics 8(4):pov010

Authors:

University of California, Los Angeles

How will China’s rise to great power status affect its foreign policy and world order? This article argues that China’s future policies will depend on how it defines its identity relative to the United States and other powers, and how others respond to China’s self-definition. For insights, I draw on social identity theory (SIT), from social psychology, which holds that states seek to maintain a positive but distinctive identity. China wants to restore its previous status as a great power, but at the same time to preserve its culture and norms, without assimilating Western liberal values. According to SIT, states that want to improve their status may pursue social mobility, social competition, or social creativity. Social creativity seeks to attain pre-eminence in a different domain from that of the leading powers. Social creativity—the strategy that China has generally followed since the end of the Cold War—appears to be the most desirable and feasible path for China’s rise and peaceful integration into the international system.

Kazakhstan’s Quest for Status: A Secondary State’s Strategy to Shape Its International Image

Article

Full-text available

May 2023

Since becoming an independent country in 1991, Kazakhstan has demonstrated a strong desire for international status and recognition by, for example, hosting numerous international events, such as chairing the OSCE and hosting EXPO 2017; creating the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia; and, most notably, presenting the abandonment of its nuclear weapons as a model for other states to emulate. Surprisingly, Kazakhstan has received scant attention by scholars regarding its desire for status, especially considering how the government has framed its decision to relinquish its nuclear weapons in terms of advancing international peace at the expense of its own security self-interest. Kazakhstan’s status-seeking raises two questions. First, how can a mid-level power strategically frame its foreign and domestic policies in order to improve its global status? And second, how can it improve its international status when domestic priorities (such as economic development and political stability) lead to policies that meet disapproval abroad? In this article, we answer these questions by examining issue areas (security, democratization, and the environment) that contain variation in our dependent variable, Kazakhstan’s quest for status. In doing so, we reveal patterns of how a secondary or mid-level state lacking substantial material capabilities can, through its words and actions, construct an image that may enhance its international status. We also show variation by issue area in the reception of these efforts by developed and developing countries. Lastly, we reveal in what issue areas Kazakhstan’s desire for status internationally is constrained by the government’s desire to maintain power domestically.

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and Status-Seeking: China’s Foray into Global Economic Governance

Article

Oct 2016

Hai Yang

Despite the long-standing debate on the rise of China, there has been relatively little attention to the country’s status concerns. This article therefore examines how China sought an enhanced international status by looking into the illustrative case of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). To this end, it employs the social identity theory (SIT) framework applied to international relations (IR), in conjunction with additional insights into institutional innovation. In the IR context, SIT posits that an aspiring state resorts predominantly to one of the three status-seeking strategies—social mobility, social competition and social creativity, i.e., emulating or competing with established powers, or attempting to achieve prestige on a new dimension. As to institutional innovation, it is introduced as a construct to understand the crystallisation of social creativity in the AIIB. By virtue of analysing primary sources and secondary literature, the research at hand finds that in the case of the AIIB China adopted largely, albeit not exclusively, the social creativity strategy to mitigate the doubt of the West and boost the legitimacy of the bank. Specifically, Beijing followed the relevant rules of the game in the institution-building process and presented as a legitimate addition the quintessential status-seeking initiative—partly born out of exasperations with the existing architecture. The case study on such a noteworthy institution-building effort can shed light on the underlying rationales and wider implications of similar China-backed structures and, relatedly, the strategic thinking of the Chinese leadership to seek a greater international status.

İsmet İnönü Era: Assessing the Challenges of Democracy in Turkey

Chapter

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Jun 2023

Ibrahim Yorgun

This study aims to critically analyze the İsmet İnönü era in Turkey during his tenure while concentrating on the challenges and shortcomings of democracy. It will focus on various dimensions, including political restrictions, limitations on freedom of expression, one-party rule, electoral systems, socio-cultural factors as well as economic policies so as to offer a detailed examination of the complex dynamics which shaped the democratic landscape of the mentioned era. Studying the mentioned dimensions is expected to uncover the factors which led to the inadequacy of democracy during the İnönü era and eventually to evaluate their implications for Turkey's democratic development, which on the one hand encompasses the succession from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Republican People's Party's (CHP) dominant role and on the other hand emphasizes the consolidation of power and the challenges to political representation. Particularly, the analysis of electoral practices can provide insights into the limitations of democratic processes, such as restrictive laws, voter intimidation, and limited political pluralism. Moreover, the study will examine the impact of these challenges on democratic decision-making which would include but not limited to the centralization of power, the marginalization of opposition voices, and the implications for citizen participation. The study will also try to evaluate the restrictions on freedom of speech and the media landscape, discussing the limitations imposed on critical voices, media control, and its consequences on public discourse and democratic participation. In addition to these, the study is expected to assess the socio-cultural dynamics which would focus on İnönü's modernization policies and their impact on social transformation. The study will explore the tensions between traditional values and cultural constraints, too. This will be carried out by highlighting the challenges faced by less represented groups and the inclusiveness of the political system. The economic policies of the İnönü era, including the economic vision and development strategies will be scrutinized, with particular attention given to the socio-economic disparities and their effects on democratic participation as well as political power dynamics. Furthermore, the study will attempt to examine the international relations and foreign policy approach of İsmet İnönü. This examination will be through the consideration of the implications for democracy and Turkey's international standing. The influence of external factors on democracy in Turkey during the mentioned timeline will also be assessed. Finally, the study will be concluded with the evaluation of the legacy of the İnönü’s era, weighing the democratic gains and losses while drawing lessons for Turkey's democratic development and considering the implications for the post-İnönü era. This comprehensive analysis is expected to contribute to a nuanced understanding of the İsmet İnönü era's impact on democracy in Turkey which could highlight the complexities and challenges faced during his tenure. The critical examination of the various dimensions, the study will provide valuable insights for scholars, policymakers as well as for any expert who is interested in Turkey's democratic history and in the ongoing democratic journey.

The Political Psychology of 'China Threat': Perceptions and Emotions

Chapter

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Jun 2023

Ulas Basar Gezgin

In this study we first briefly introduced political psychology of international relations, and moved to the notion of threat perceptions in political psychology which extends from national threats to group threats. Thirdly, we focused on the so-called 'China threat' which is mostly considered as a theory, a perception, a discourse or a thesis, but also as an issue, a theme, a hypothesis, a notion, a charge, a narrative, a debate, an image, a coverage, a topic, a school of thought, a public discourse, a story, a perspective, a proposition, a specter, a view, a syndrome, a school, a fear, a sentiment, an idea, a terminology, a rhetoric, a possibility, a mentality, and an atmosphere, in the order of frequency. We also see other scholars preferring to use 'the so-called China threat' as they don't believe it. The notion of 'China threat' is mostly associated with China's military build-up which is visible in South China / East Vietnam Sea territorial disputes. China is at odd with most of its neighbors due to its revisionist moves. Emotions play a role in all parties to the conflict including the Asian neighbors and U.S.. Chinese government, reminiscent of the past humiliations, wants to be respected; but China's military moves are viewed with fear, mistrust and suspicion among other parties. National threat perceptions are updated accordingly. As a response to China's rise, conservatives and Republicans support containment policies, while the liberal and Democrat response is engagement. This division is also related to the attitudes towards Chinese people and Chinese government. China has its own logic in its moves, but to what extent it is rational is to be disputed. The study concludes with further discussions about China's rise, considering the possibility of peaceful rise or confrontation.

Emerging power, tight wallet: How China chooses where to earmark funds in the UN

Article

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Mar 2025

Why do rising powers maintain a more limited earmarked funding portfolio compared to established (Western) powers? How do emerging powers, within their limited financial contributions, determine the allocation of resources across various UN entities? This paper proposes a theoretical framework to explain how these funding decisions reflect both its motivations and constraints faced by rising powers. We argue that rising powers confront a fundamental dilemma when engaging with established international institutions. While earmarked funding allows them to pursue foreign policy goals—such as enhancing influence and advancing geopolitical interests—it also entails opportunity costs. Funds allocated to one institution cannot be redirected to others, and the risks are significant: substantial financial contributions may ultimately prove ineffective or be discounted due to entrenched power structures within these organizations. Using an original dataset covering 69 UN entities from 2013 to 2022, we find that China employs a limited and selective approach to earmarked funding. China is more likely to direct funds toward entities with a higher number of Chinese nationals or where the executive heads have a high level of policy alignment, and less likely to fund entities that primarily benefit high-income countries. Our findings provide new insights into how rising powers, such as China, navigate multilateral institutions and seek influence, contributing to ongoing debates on great power competition, China’s rise and Chinese foreign policy. This study expands the emerging literature on how rising powers try to reshape established (Western-dominated) organizations, complementing research on earmarked funding, which has predominantly focused on Western donor behaviors.

Pushing Boundaries: Current Trends in Understanding China’s International Institutions and China’s Continuing Rise

Article

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Mar 2024

Enrico Gloria

China’s partners or US allies: the dual status of major European states and their voting behaviour in the UNGA

Article

Full-text available

Feb 2023
Asia Eur J

Qi Haixia

China’s rise, along with deepening Sino-European economic relations, seems to have a strong impact on the diplomatic outlook of actors in Europe. An interesting phenomenon is that, while several major European states have become strategic partners of China, they remain US allies at the same time. In the context of trade tensions and a possible decoupling between China and the USA, what are the diplomatic effects of the close economic relations between Europe and China? To find the answer, this study builds models on the functions of trade and partnerships with China with respect to voting choice of China’s partners, including those in Europe, in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). After making a statistical analysis and presenting detailed analysis on France, Germany, the UK, and Poland, this paper finds that the close economic and trade ties do indeed enhance voting similarity between China and major states in Europe in the UNGA.

Prestige and the Restraint of Power in International Relations

Thesis

Apr 2022

John Brake

Scholars of international politics have long linked states’ quest for prestige with assertions of national power: diplomatic saber-rattling, scrambles for colonies, arms races, and outright war. This thesis charts a sharply divergent, previously neglected, path to international prestige—foreign policy restraint. The argument in brief is that states seek prestige by conspicuously holding back from the use of power and thereby spurning opportunities for national gain. Departing from the prevailing conception of restraint as merely a kind of inaction, this thesis reframes restraint as a performance. Performances of restraint are constituted intersubjectively when a state is perceived to refrain from pursuing its interests to the extent that its power allows. Forswearing the acquisition of nuclear weapons, liquidating profitable military interventions, renouncing territorial claims, de-escalating diplomatic crises, curbing carbon emissions—each of these policies of self-limitation, and many more besides, may constitute performative restraint if recognized as volitional (emanating from the actor’s will) and supererogatory (exceeding the actor’s normative obligations). To secure others’ recognition of their performances, states appeal to existing normative standards of restraint in international society. By conspicuously exceeding those standards, states express both (1) their material capacity—the abundance of underlying resources that equips them to voluntarily forgo self- interested behavior; and (2) their moral character—the exemplary virtues that underlie their prosocial choices. When states believe that they can credibly perform restraint, triggering these signaling mechanisms, they may “hold back” from acquisitive or assertive policies in order to “rise above” others in terms of prestige. Notably, “holding back to rise above” appeals to states as an expressive strategy exactly because it is materially costly and socially non-obligatory. This thesis draws upon insights into the performative nature of restraint from cognate disciplines and everyday life, integrating them into an overarching account with reference to Erving Goffman’s dramaturgical model of social action. It illustrates how “holding back to rise above” applies in four diverse historical cases: (1) the United States’ Good Neighbor Policy of non-intervention in Latin America (1933-40); (2) Germany’s post-reunification foreign policy, culminating with its non-participation in the US “Coalition of the Willing” for the Iraq War (1991-2005); (3) India’s decades of spurning of nuclear weapons and championing non-proliferation (1964-98); and (4) China’s restraint of its carbon emissions in the context of global climate change mitigation (1992-2017). In short, the thesis contributes to a wide range of debates in IR over the sources of international prestige and the reasons for states’ costly compliance with social standards.

South–South Knowledge Production and Hegemony: Searching for Africa in Chinese Theories of IR

Article

Full-text available

Feb 2022

There is a growing community of international relations (IR) scholars who argue for the importance of investigating Global South approaches to IR scholarship, making room for theories and concepts that challenge the discipline's Eurocentricity, and debating the merits and pitfalls of globalizing IR by including perspectives from various Global South locations. In addition to acknowledging this existing critical scholarship that aims at resisting mainstream epistemologies and methodologies of knowing and doing IR, this article's central contribution is to probe the epistemic hegemony and knowledge-production hierarchies that are emerging from within the Global South. The article does not seek to uncover the truth about the representation of Global South actors by Global South IR communities. Instead, it is interested in demonstrating how epistemic hegemony and knowledge-production hierarchies do not exist only in relationships of exclusion and Othering but also in relations of inclusion and Selving. We illustrate our argument with an analysis of the representations of “Africa” in China-based IR intellectual communities. We find that Chinese discourses on solidarity, friendship, community, and shared history lead to a narrative of sameness and Selving whereby Chinese postcolonial experiences are taken to be expandable and applicable to other developing states, making Chinese perspectives seem representative of others, thereby silencing and representing African voices at once.

Perceptions of China in Central Asia: Findings from an elite university in Bishkek

Article

Jan 2022

China's growing involvement in Central Asia economically, culturally, politically and even militarily has been a contentious topic for people from the region. While some view China's involvement as offering Central Asian countries an opportunity for advancement, others view it in more negative ways, with China having tremendous influence in the affairs of their country. In this article, we present our findings from a survey that we conducted at the American University of Central Asia in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Our questions elicited responses that focus on perceptions of trade with China and China's actions regarding COVID-19, which are both polarizing issues in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia overall.

Fears of Falling Short versus Anxieties of Decline: Explaining Russia and China's Approach to Status-Seeking

Article

Full-text available

Jun 2020
Chin J Int Polit

Although recent scholarship has advanced our understanding of status, little attention has been paid to the factors that shape states' status-seeking behaviour. Consequently, existing theories are unable to explain why Russia has been more aggressive and confrontational in its status-seeking than China. What is missing is a detailed examination of the ways in which status-seekers' power trajectories affect their status-seeking behaviour. Whether a status-seeker is rising or in decline shapes its propensity to take risks in pursuit of status, its calculations regarding the utility of attaining more status, and its ability to use non-confrontational and non-aggressive status-seeking strategies to induce other states to accord it higher status. Declining powers, such as Russia, engage in aggressive status-seeking to avoid imminent status losses. Decliners need to initiate confrontations with other states to compel them to recognise their status. Risers, such as China, are more cautious and restrained. Recognising that aggressive status-seeking can jeopardise imminent gains, they are conscious of the costs that accompany elevated status. Their admirable successes and growing power, moreover, make other states all the more willing to accord them higher status. Risers, therefore, can enhance their status without resorting to aggressive or confrontational methods.

AIIB as a Challenger for IMF and WB

Article

Full-text available

Jan 2020

Tony Ng.

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is a new international financial institution set up in 2015 with the goal of supporting the construction of infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) were formed together in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in July 1944. Both are set up to support the world economy, although each has different roles. The role of the International Monetary Fund is to protect the monetary system. Meanwhile, the World Bank plays a role in economic development. Although the size and potential of the AIIB is smaller, it is not so different from the IMF and the WB. Thus, the AIIB is considered a competitor of the IMF and WB and will bring challenges to the existence of the Bretton Woods system with the two leading WB and IMF financial institutions. In addition, according to expert opinion, the AIIB does not have austerity policies such as IMF, so the AIIB will quickly take over many sectors in the economy outside Asia as well as Europe, especially Eastern Europe. This will alleviate the importance, scale and potential of the two largest financial institutions in the world, the IMF and WB.

Securing reverence and disrupting deference: decoding the U.S.-China malaise from an identity lens

Article

Full-text available

Jan 2020

Ning Liao

To decipher the current U.S.-China malaise, this article investigates how the status conflict between the two powers is intertwined with their identity construction. The examination of the evolution of the U.S.-China status hierarchy illuminates the way in which the fracture of the reciprocal bond that held the asymmetric role pattern of the bilateral relationship has set in motion China's open defiance of U.S. authority and the latter's depreciation of the former's ascending social standing. The derived status dilemma, as illustrated in their conflicting claims from the 2008 global financial crisis onward, largely stems from the incongruent national role conceptions and has upended the dominance/deference dyadic relationship. The rupture of the role differentiation between the incumbent hegemon and the status aspirant has accentuated the self-other distinction in the fulfilment of their identity needs. Amid the radicalized identity construction, public discourse of resentment has been stabilized, thereby curtailing the spirit of cooperation.

State transformation and China's engagement in global governance: the case of nuclear technologies

Article

Full-text available

May 2019

Debates over the implications of China's rise for global governance have reached an impasse, since evidence exists to support both 'revisionist' and 'status-quo' intentions. This means that neither is strictly falsifiable and hence the debate, as currently structured, is irresolvable. However, contradictions are explicable if we recognise that China is not a unitary state. Since the beginning of the reform era, its international engagements have been shaped by the uneven transformation-fragmentation, decentralisation and inter-nationalisation-of state apparatuses. Contradictory international actions thus may reflect not top-down strategic direction, but conflicts, disagreements and coordination problems within China's transformed party-state. Our state transformation approach directs us away from evaluating China's approach to global governance in toto-whether it is overall a revisionist or status quo power-towards a detailed analysis of particular policy domains. This is because in each issue-area we find different constellations of actors and interests , and varying degrees of party-state transformation. We demonstrate the centrality of state transformation analysis for explaining the coexistence of revisionist and status quo behaviours through the apparently hard test case of nuclear technologies. Even in this 'high politics' domain, state transformation dynamics help explain China's inconsistent international behaviours.

Destined for Misperception? Status Dilemma and the Early Origin of US-China Antagonism

Article

Full-text available

Jan 2019

William Ziyuan Wang

Why did the US-China relations take a turn for worse around 2010 despite the bilateral efforts to forge a cooperative framework? Concerned about the danger of conflicts in the course of power transition—namely, the “Thucydides Trap”—in US-China relations, scholars tend to see either a security dilemma at play or an intensification of status competition between an emerging power and the established hegemon. While recognizing the explanatory leverage of the security-dilemma framework and the status-competition model with regard to the continued deterioration of the US-China relations up to Trump, this article asserts that both models fall short in addressing the early origin of the deterioration of US-China relations. The concept “status dilemma” promises to fill the analytic gap thereby left. The status dilemma suggests an inability of two states to grasp the status claims signaled from the other side. Misperceptions associated with status dilemmas fall outside of the purview of the security-dilemma framework, and could lead to the emergence of zero-sum competitions for status. Such misperceptions are apt to occur in a situation of power transition whereby status recognition tends to have geostrategic implications for the great powers involved. This article illustrates this logic of status dilemma via the US-China diplomacy over the “core interests.” This investigation promises crucial insights into the analogy of the Thucydides Trap to US-China relations.

Between conformity and innovation: China’s and India’s quest for status as responsible nuclear powers

Article

Full-text available

Mar 2018

China and India, as rising powers, have been proactive in seeking status as nuclear responsibles. Since the 1990s they have sought to demonstrate conformity with intersubjectively accepted understandings of nuclear responsibility within the global nuclear order, and have also sought recognition on the basis of particularistic practices of nuclear restraint. This article addresses two puzzles. First, nuclear restraint is at the centre of the pursuit of global nuclear order, so why have China and India not received recognition from influential members of the nuclear order for the full spectrum of their restraint-based behaviours? Second, why do China and India nonetheless persist with these behaviours? We argue that the conferral of status as a nuclear responsible is a politicised process shaped by the interests, values, and perceptions of powerful stakeholder states in the global nuclear order. China’s and India’s innovations are not incorporated into the currently accepted set of responsible nuclear behaviours because, indirectly, they pose a strategic, political, and social challenge to these states. However, China’s and India’s innovations are significant as an insight into their identity-projection and preferred social roles as distinctive rising powers, and as a means of introducing new, if nascent, ideas into non-proliferation practice and governance.

Rethinking the Silk Road: China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Emerging Eurasian Relations

Book

Jan 2018

Maximilian Mayer

Focused on the "Belt and Road Initiative", this book discusses China's opportunities to translate economic leverage into political outcomes. The central question is how China's expanding economic influence will transform the Eurasian political landscape. Proposed in late 2013 by President Xi Jinping, the Belt and Road is the most ambitious foreign policy approach adopted thus far and represents the culmination of China's search for a grand strategic narrative. Comparative methods and diverse conceptual frameworks are applied to contextualize and explore the political, economic, and cultural ramifications of the Belt and Road in order to shed light on its transformative significance, risks and opportunities.

LA NUEVA RUTA DE LA SEDA Y LA DIPLOMACIA INTERNACIONAL DE NEGOCIOS New Silk Road and International Business Diplomacy

Article

Full-text available

Dec 2017

En el presente trabajo se analiza la diplomacia internacional de negocios en el contexto de la Nueva Ruta de la Seda, la iniciativa geoeconómica más importante del gobierno chino. Se parte del supuesto teórico de la interdependencia compleja de Kohane y Nye, para señalar la magni-tud de los obstáculos que se deberán solventar. Asimismo, se plantea como mecanismo comple-mentario la participación directa de actores no estatales en la resolución de los conflictos y se sugiere que las empresas chinas con una participación en los proyectos de la Nueva Ruta de la Seda intervengan directamente en defensa de sus propios intereses comerciales, sin depender de su gobierno o de la diplomacia tradicional. Se debe recurrir a la diplomacia internacional de negocios para acercar las posiciones de las partes involucradas y aumentar las probabilidades de éxito del proyecto. China; interdependencia compleja; diplomacia internacional de negocios; Nueva Ruta de la Seda. China; complex interdependence theory; international business diplomacy; New Silk Road.

China’s Rise as Eurasian Power: The Revival of the Silk Road and Its Consequences

Chapter

Jan 2018

Maximilian Mayer

China’s economic and political ascent signals an epochal change. The central question is how China’s expanding economic clout will transform the global political landscape. What kind of great power will China become? What is the scope of Chinese ambitions to create a new order? Which institutional and normative consequences result from China’s attempts to use its growing international leverage systematically? This introductory chapter first traces China’s evolving “Eurasian pivot” and discusses the domestic economic factors behind this new grand strategic narrative. Second, I propose three broad theoretical perspectives—power dynamics, regional transformation, and China’s evolving identity—which offer different insights into China’s rise as a Eurasian power. The chapter concludes by suggesting research puzzles related to the Belt and Road Initiative (BR) and notes several understudied dimensions of the BR.

China’s Domestic Discourse on Status-Building in the Arctic

Chapter

Apr 2025

Marco Volpe

An extensive body of international relations literature demonstrates that a state’s status influences how other states perceive its intentions and evaluate its policies and actions on an international level. For China, which the West has often viewed through the threat theory lens, status-seeking has been especially important to legitimize its position as a rising power in international society. In the Arctic context, where China does not fulfil the territorial definition of a regional state, speculations about potential risks related to the party-state's growing regional presence have been widespread. To alleviate these “China threat” perceptions among regional players, the Chinese leadership has paid particular attention to status-building and legitimization in the Arctic. Over the past decade, for example, it has invested in Arctic research and resource exploitation and increasingly participated in both official and unofficial forums discussing Arctic governance. This chapter analyses the discursive construction of China’s status in the Arctic and the party-state’s efforts to win acceptance for this status in regional politics and economics. Within social identity theory, social creativity allows a change of the criteria by which status is built, through reframing the system of values and including new criteria. Arctic scientific research and the transboundary nature of climate change effects affecting China’s climate and social and economic life are investigated through domestic official and academic debates aimed at enhancing status among Arctic stakeholders.

Social Identity Theory

Chapter

Feb 2025

Le Hu

This chapter focuses on the main theoretical framework the book is built on. The first part of the chapter is a literature review of theoretical frameworks used by scholars to analyze China’s rise. This review aims to show the reasons the book chooses SIT as the theoretical framework. The second part offers a brief introduction of SIT and presents the reasons it could address the flaws in the existing literature. The third part is a critical review of the literature that uses SIT to analyze China’s relationship with other actors. The fourth part of this chapter is about how SIT will be applied to the book to analyze how China maintains a relatively peaceful environment without abandoning its nationalist and communist identities and related crucial interests.

Conclusion

Chapter

Feb 2025

Le Hu

Many optimists that have believed that China’s peaceful rise is possible often argued that through engagement, China’s communist and nationalist identities and related illiberal or assertive behaviors can be socialized or transformed into behaviors that are more socially acceptable in the international community.

China’s Nationalism and Communist Identity

Chapter

Feb 2025

Le Hu

This chapter examines whether competition between China and the US or other regional countries on some important dimensions (e.g., territorial disputes or ideology) is inevitable. As noted, some IR scholars use SIT’s identity management strategies (social mobility, social creativity, and social competition) to analyze whether the competition is avoidable and if China’s peaceful rise is possible.

China-Russia Strategic Partnership

Chapter

Feb 2025

Lei Yu

China has been committed to creating a strategic partnership with Russia over the post-Cold War era, which demonstrates China’s foreign strategy of restoring its past glory as a great power with the partnership as the strategic fulcrum for its “peaceful” rise at the systemic (global) level. This strategy also reflects China’s desire for intensifying its economic and energy cooperation with its largest neighbor. By formulating the strategic partnership, China wishes to reshape the current global order more to its liking and counterattack its perceived US containment of its rise. By intensifying their economic and energy cooperation, China hopes to sustain its economic growth that the Chinese leadership and academics have long considered as underlying China’s overall power and the country’s rejuvenation. By expanding their military collaboration, China aspires to accelerate the PLA’s modernization and work together with Russia to contain US military unilateralism and hegemonism.

China’s Changing Perception of the North Korean Nuclear Issue in Pursuit of Great Power Status

Article

Full-text available

Sep 2024

The rise of China’s status: a relational approach

Article

Jul 2024

Seulah Choi

A Tale of Rice and Copper: The China-Pakistan Economic-Corridor

Chapter

Jun 2024

Toufic Sarieddine

This chapter describes China-Pakistan relations from the 60’s to the present then analyzes the pair’s current relationship under CPEC using the features of hegemony and peripheralization in comparison with the US-Pakistan relationship. We find Pakistan adopting new production processes as well as those grafted from China in addition to fluctuating governance structures. In addition to becoming a new source of copper, Pakistan’s rice exports continue rising to China. Meanwhile, Beijing has secured dominance in competitive exports (including arms), established a trade surplus, and wields influence on Pakistan’s central bank. Pakistan has also become part of several Chinese alternative institutions and has supported its legal stance on the South China Sea. Sino-Pak military cooperation is expanding into training for Pak soldiers by the PLA and growing use of Chinese military technology. China has become the largest study-abroad destination for Pakistani students, Mandarin is being taught not only in elementary schools but also across social strata, and Urdu-speaking Chinese media are flourishing on local airwaves and newsstands.

Hegemonic Features of China in the Belt and Road Initiative

Chapter

Jun 2024

Toufic Sarieddine

This chapter applies the features of hegemony onto China among BRI states. We find China’s production dominance exemplified in dominant machine and technology exports on the world stage, trade soaring with the growing pool of BRI participants and its trade surplus with them increasing overall; the yuan becoming more widely used in bilateral trade, a growing media presence in developing countries for the dissemination of Chinese views, and a government program for making Mandarin the lingua franca of the BRI; increasing Chinese military presence and leadership via UN peacekeeping operations; a Chinese court tasked with resolving BRI-related disputes using Chinese law, and the Shanghai Cooperation Council among the alternative institutions attracting a developing world regressing in democratic features, among others.

Features of Peripheralization and Hegemony in World Systems Analysis

Chapter

Jun 2024

Toufic Sarieddine

This chapter delves into the features of rising hegemons and those which states exhibit when being peripheralized by them. The features of peripheralization are: Incorporation (the creation of new production processes, grafting of partially new production processes, rerouting trade toward the rising hegemon, and changes in governance); specialization (creating production processes compatible with the hegemon’s demand); labor coercion (declining real wages); and stunted expansion (horizontal industry expansion rather than higher into the value chain). The features of hegemony are the production and export of highly profitable goods rendering a significant trade surplus with the periphery and exacting further control over its resources; promotion of the hegemon’s language, education, and cultural paradigms; impressing the hegemon’s institutional norms onto the periphery (law, currency, institutions, and governance); possessing a capable military; and a grand unifying vision.

Cooperative, competitive and responsible: the visualization of China as a major power and its global roles in the CCTV documentary Daguo Waijiao

Article

May 2024

Soft Power and China-Taiwan Competition for Influence in Latin America

Chapter

Feb 2024

Mohamad Zreik

In recent years, China and Taiwan have engaged in a competition for influence in Latin America, with both countries seeking to increase their economic, political, and strategic ties with the region. One key aspect of this competition has been the use of soft power, or the ability to attract and persuade others without coercion. This chapter examines the role of soft power in the China-Taiwan competition for influence in Latin America. The chapter also assesses the effectiveness of these strategies in enhancing each country's influence in the region. One key finding of this chapter is that while China has been more successful in expanding its presence in Latin America, Taiwan has also made significant efforts to maintain its ties with the region. The chapter concludes by considering the attitudes of Latin American countries toward China and Taiwan, and the factors that shape their perceptions of the two countries. Ultimately, the chapter suggests that soft power will be a critical factor in shaping the future of China-Taiwan relations in Latin America, and in determining the overall balance of power in the region.

How Does the BRI Reflect China's Rise and Its Influence in World Politics?

Article

Oct 2023

Xingrui Li

As economies become more globalized and regional integration increases, global trade is closely linked, and after the economic reform and opening up, China's trade volume has increased year by year, becoming the second largest economy in the world. However, in these years of rapid development, China has also begun to overcapacity, slowing down its economic development. In order to improve China's domestic overcapacity situation, as well as to better carry out the development of economic integration, China's President Xi Jinping put forward the BRI. This paper focuses on how the BRI reflects China's rise and its impact on the global political and economic arena, and analyzes its implications for China's development trends and international relations. From cultural, economic, and political perspectives, and by examining the quantitative analysis of the impact of the BRI on trade, this paper explores the empirical case study of the China-Central Asia Gas Pipeline (CCAGP) and finds that the BRI has boosted the trade turnover of the countries along the route, and has contributed to the development of China's internal development and international cooperation. international cooperation. The case study of the China-Central Asia Gas Pipeline (CCAGP) reveals more concretely that China has utilized infrastructure development to broaden new strategic routes in order to safeguard China's energy interests and security, and to promote cooperation with the Central Asian region. The "BRI" has enabled China to contribute to the formation of a new economic order centered on China in the form of trade cooperation, which helps to enhance international discourse. Through the BRI, China's international influence has been increasing and its role in the international arena is growing.

The Slippery Pearl: A World-Systems Assessment of China’s Economic Hegemony in the United Arab Emirates

Article

Aug 2023

Toufic Sarieddine

Multi-agent quantum-inspired deep reinforcement learning for real-time distributed generation control of 100% renewable energy systems

Article

Mar 2023
ENG APPL ARTIF INTEL

CHINA AND THE LONG CYCLE THEORY: Correction of Modelski’s Long Cycle Theory Through the Experience of China's Rise

Article

Nov 2021

Modelski's Long Cycle Theory influences the way scholars understand the process of world political history, including the continuation of the dynamics of world politics in the future. Modelski and his scholars suggest that the facts of the 500-year history of global politics reflect the Long Cycle pattern in which a new great power emerges every 100 years after a global war. This theory is corrected by the historical facts of China's rise in the last 40 years which proves the truth of the Long Cycle Theory on the one hand but at the same time also corrects the theory. New facts tell us that the rise of China as a new great power was not accompanied by a global war as Modelski and his supporting scholars explain. The results of this study tell us that the Long Cycle of global politics needs to be corrected.Keywords: Rise of China, great power, global war, long cycle theory.AbstrakTeori Siklus Panjang Modelski berpengaruh pada cara para sarjana memahami proses sejarah politik dunia, termasuk keberlangsungan dinamika politik dunia selanjutnya. Modelski dan para cendekiawan pendukungnya menginduksikan bahwa fakta sejarah 500 tahun politik global mencerminkan pola Siklus Panjang di mana sebuah kekuatan besar baru muncul setiap 100 tahun setelah sebuah perang global. Teori ini dikoreksi oleh fakta sejarah kebangkitan China dalam 40 tahun terakhir yang membuktikan kebenaran Teori Siklus Panjang di satu sisi tetapi pada saat yang sama juga mengoreksi teori tersebut. Fakta baru memberitahu kita bahwa kebangkitan Cina sebagai kekuatan besar baru tidak disertai dengan perang global sebagaimana penjelasan Modelski dan para sarjaba pendukungnya. Hasil penelitian ini memberi tahu kita bahwa Siklus Panjang politik global perlu dikoreksi.Kata kunci: Kebangkitan Tiongkok, kekuatan besar, perang global, teori siklus panjang.

Status and the Federal Republic of Germany: an international exception?

Article

Apr 2022

Steve Wood

An avoidance of overt status-seeking behaviour contrasts the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) with many other states. Does the FRG desire international status? Is it substantially different? This article contends that the FRG appreciates status and acquired it through economic and civil achievement, and relatively subtle diplomatic and political means. It does not engage in blatant status pursuit nor ostentatiously impress that which it has. Yet there are rarer examples of more robust status defence, lending insight into an evolving national persona. The article explores the status concept and variations in status as a political motivation. It then examines the FRG in general and specific contexts: sport, the goal of a permanent UNSC seat, and bilateral relations with the USA.

The Confines of Power in the Contemporary World: Holistic Theoretical Proposition

Chapter

Mar 2022

M.N.I. Sorkar

This chapter delineates how the normative imperatives of human society evolved over time and how it has poised the States of the contemporary world into inevitable sets of rules diluting the color, contour, and vices of anarchy. This fundamental change is the cardinal element that dictates the states to behave in a certain way. At the outset of the chapter, the holistic theoretical proposition is presented founded on the ontology mentioned above, reviewing the relevant literature and focusing on the concept of power. At the end of the section, eight core takeaways of the holistic theoretical proposition are underlined. In the subsequent sections, the proposition is contrasted vis-à-vis major IR theories, and a detailed review of literature on the calculation of the power of the actors is presented. These simultaneous literature reviews and contrast discern the specificity of the proposition in the existing literature. The proposition is the central contribution of this book, and it is testified in this work through some empirical studies.KeywordsNormative imperativesHolistic powerAnarchyInstitutionsNormative power

COMPETITIVIDAD LOGÍSTICA DE LOS PUERTOS, DEL COLLAR DE PERLAS DE CHINA, PARTE MEDULAR DEL PROYECTO "LA FRANJA-LA RUTA

Conference Paper

Oct 2020

134 ARK: https://n2t.net/ark:/13683/ebdC/4Pc Esta obra está bajo una licencia de Creative Commons. Para ver una copia de esta licencia, visite https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.es. Acta Académica es un proyecto académico sin fines de lucro enmarcado en la iniciativa de acceso abierto. Acta Académica fue creado para facilitar a investigadores de todo el mundo el compartir su producción académica. Para crear un perfil gratuitamente o acceder a otros trabajos visite: https://www.aacademica.org.

The Importance of Hong Kong in the Political and Economic Strategy of the Chinese Communist Authorities under Xi Jinping

Article

Full-text available

Dec 2021

Paweł Bielicki

The aim of the article is to present and analyse the importance of Hong Kong in the political and economic strategy of the communist authorities in China under Xi Jinping. I am going to try to answer the question of whether China’s policy towards the Special Autonomous District has changed after the President of China came to power. I have decided to present this topic as a result of the discussions in the discourse on the future of Hong Kong in the era of Chinese expansionist policy. In the text, I analysed the main determinants of the relationship of both entities and the increasingly frequent attempts to undermine the autonomy that Hong Kong has enjoyed for over 20 years. During Xi Jinping’s rule, the new secretary general of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, aims to accelerate the process of unifying this area with mainland China, recognizing it as the first stage in gaining China’s position as a global superpower. The main thesis of the article assumes that from the beginning of Xi’s rule in power, the Chinese communists recognized Hong Kong as one of the most important problems in Beijing’s political strategy. Therefore, they took specific steps to strengthen control over the province. The authorities in Beijing believe that only strict control over the Hong Kong people will enable a strong influence for China in international events, strengthening its position in the time of a possible confrontation with the United States. The main research paradigm used in the text is the system analysis method.

Reactive to domestic constraints: dynamic operations of a China-backed copper mine in Myanmar, 2011-2021

Article

Jul 2021

Investigating a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project in Myanmar, this paper contests the proposition that China’s state-coordinated investments are, by nature, more accommodating to local people’s demands than Western investments. Tension between Myanmar villagers and the Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) in a copper mine project does not square with Beijing’s “inclusive globalization” narrative. Drawing upon extensive semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in a Sino-Myanmar copper mine project, as well as other secondary data, this study finds that the Chinese SOE’s operation was reactive to the ebb and flow of social resistance and the government’s pressure amid the host country’s democratization in the 2010s. Reforms were more likely to occur when the Chinese SOE observed more domestic constraints in its operation environment. It showed less incentive to improve its business practices when societal actors failed to display strong resistance, and the host government did not care about its legitimacy. Despite Beijing’s efforts to craft an image of itself as a responsible power, conflicts in the BRI project should not be simplified as the SOE’s defiance of the state’s regulations. They are rooted in the state-centric foreign policy that systematically overlooks societal actors in state-coordinated investments.

The public-private distinction in the shadow of China: Uneven and combined development’s critique of liberal IR theory?

Article

Dec 2020
Camb Rev Int Aff

Social theories of International Relations (IR) are normally premised on a deep distinction between public and private spheres. Whether articulated as ‘capitalism’, ‘the market’, or ‘civil society’, all attribute some analytical priority to the private, with explanatory significance for the public sphere and therefore also central to the critique of realism in International Relations. Liberalism in particular sees the source of peace as a flourishing private sphere that narrows the scope of the otherwise violent, war-prone orientation of the public which defines states. However, we argue that this orientation is ill-equipped to grapple with the world-historical significance of the ‘Rise of China’ that is better understood instead as a form of industrialism not premised on the public/private distinction. This inapplicability of categories foundational to liberal IR theory leaves it unable to meaningfully engage the Rise of China debate. Using Uneven and Combined Development (U&CD), this paper elaborates industrialism as a pattern of state-led development in China that prioritises industrial capacity as an end over strictly private objectives (e.g. profits). Arising in substantial part from the exigencies of political multiplicity, industrialism seeks national unity and vindication of a distinct civilisational identity through the pragmatic means of industrial capacity under conditions of modernity. Whilst this argument partly echoes the developmental state literature, it goes further by visualising this across both the longue durée and the current conjuncture, right up to the much-discussed Belt and Road Initiative. Finally, the argument emphasises U&CD’s potential to originate a simultaneously non-liberal and non-realist account of the implications of China’s rise.

The One Belt and One Road (OBOR) Initiative: Reconceptualisation of State Capitalism Vis-à-Vis Remapping of Global Governance?

Chapter

Sep 2020

Qingxiu Bu

China is emerging as an economic powerhouse with the globalisation of the world economy. The country takes proactive steps to deepen its global engagement through new initiatives, such as One Belt, One Road (OBOR). It offers good evidence of China’s mercantilist efforts to derive political and geostrategic leverage from the OBOR-related projects. The initiative serves as a key indicator of whether China is primarily to satisfy its national interests or whether it seeks to create a win-win Eurasia. No ready formula can suffice to explain the cross-cutting economic and political factors at play. Arguably, the OBOR initiative appears to be a combination of geopolitical and economic strategies to achieve China’s multiple strategies. It all comes down to whether China could be able to write global governance rules via the OBOR initiatives.

Building Pipelines: Experiences with Formal and Informal Screening Mechanisms

Chapter

Jul 2020

Following the example of a number of countries, the European Union recently introduced a regulation for a screening mechanism for foreign direct investments. Also preceding the formal EU-wide screening mechanism, major foreign investments, such as pipelines, could be screened by EU Member States, either formally or informally. The Nord Stream 2 (NSP2) pipeline project has been subject to a number of measures in the different phases of its investment that could be understood as informal screening processes. Such measures have been taken not only by the EU and its Member States but also by the United States in the form of extraterritorial sanction threats. In this chapter, experiences with these mechanisms are discussed with the aim of determining whether a common approach, as adopted in the EU, is necessary and desirable.

A Case for Geoeconomic Restraint: Offensive Realism and the Inflated Threat of Chinese Economic Initiatives

Article

Jan 2020

Dong Jung Kim

Many analysts and practitioners argue that the United States should actively engage in geoeconomic competition with China. This article suggests that an argument against this claim can be counter-intuitively derived from offensive realism – an influential international relations theory known for its pessimism on great power relations. Offensive realism suggests that a great power should try to maximize its material capacity and pay careful attention to the balance of material power between major states. It also suggests that a great power should avoid spending its limited resources in influence or legitimacy competition in the peripheries. In this context, offensive realism prescribes that the United States should not actively oppose Chinese economic initiatives unless those projects have meaningful impact on the bilateral balance of power and its security. On the contrary, Washington should encourage China to expand its investments in geoeconomic initiatives since China is likely to end up spending a large amount of its resources in regions that do not have significant implications to the balance of material power. For offensive realists, a great power should take balance of power competition in major regions seriously, not influence competition around the globe. Accordingly, the United States should restrain itself and avoid geoeconomically confronting China.

Chinese exceptionalism: an interpretive framework to understanding China’s rise and relations with the world

Thesis

Apr 2019

Benjamin Tze Ern Ho

The rise of China as a major player global politics over the past few decades has generated substantial debate among scholars and practitioners of international relations. Many have raised questions and concerns as to what China’s long term intentions are, whether it would cooperate or challenge the existing global order, and how countries should respond, react and relate to it. Given the limitations posed by mainstream international relations theories in explaining China’s behavior, this dissertation seeks to delve into the study of China’s international politics and foreign policy actions by examining the Chinese political worldview concerning its preferred world order and the norms and rules that it seeks to promote. To do so, this thesis introduces the notion of “Chinese exceptionalism” as a framework or lens through which to better account for China’s international politics and foreign policy. In this thesis, I will argue that the Chinese political worldview (i.e. how it sees itself and how it sees the world) perceives China itself as being exceptional, that is, it is good and different, and that this has influenced Beijing’s approach to the practice of international politics. Such an exceptionalism mindset, I argue, provides us with a better understanding and a more comprehensive interpretation to China’s international relations as compared to mainstream IR theories. As this dissertation will highlight, China perceives the existing international order as ripe for change and that it ought to play a more influential role whilst having its interests acknowledged by others. Hence the central question in this dissertation is what is the Chinese worldview concerning global order and what are the norms and principles that China seeks to promote seeing itself as an exceptional power? Furthermore, how does Chinese exceptionalism influence Chinese international relations debates concerning its role in the global system and its preferred world order? The following study provides a systematic analysis to flesh out China’s political worldview and how its conceptions of exceptionalism are being reflected in its international practices and global politics. Drawing upon interviews conducted with international relations scholars (particularly those based in East Asia), senior policymakers both from and outside China, Chinese primary sources, and participatory insights gleaned from extended fieldwork working together with Chinese IR specialists based at a Singapore-based defense think-tank, this dissertation explores China’s worldview and its exceptionalism thinking in five different areas. They are, namely, (I) Chinese theories of international relations, (II) Chinese national identity, (III) China’s national image, (IV) China’s global outreach as shown by the Belt and Road Initiative, and finally, (V) in China’s relations with its neighbors. Through locating Chinese exceptionalism discourse within these five areas, this dissertation seeks to unravel what Chinese exceptionalism entails, and how it it frames Beijing’s worldview towards international politics.

Grading greatness: evaluating the status performance of the BRICS

Article

Full-text available

Dec 2018

An impressive portfolio of case-study research has now demonstrated how and through what means the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) countries have sought higher social status. However, this field of research lacks systematic means of evaluating this status-seeking. This article fills this lacuna by developing a mixed-methods framework enabling scholars to zoom in and compare individual states’ relative status performance. Using diplomatic representation as a proxy for status recognition and comparing it to a country’s status resources (wealth), the framework indicates how successfully countries have generated recognition from the international society. The findings show that China’s economic ascent has been matched by increased recognition, and that South Africa enjoyed an almost immediate ‘status bounce’ following apartheid, turning it from a pariah to a significant overperformer. Russia should be understood as an ‘overperforming status-dissatisfied power’ while India’s status performance has been around ‘par’ for a country of its economic resources. Lastly, Brazil underperforms more than any of the other BRICS, especially since its democratic transition. The findings highlight considerable variance in the type and duration of gaps between status resource and recognition and suggests that rather than treating these as ‘inconsistencies’ awaiting correction, they can and should be accounted for by case study analyses.

China's historical statecraft and the return of history

Article

Nov 2018

Maximilian Mayer

Chinese leaders are increasingly mobilizing historical narratives as part of a broader trend that challenges Francis Fukuyama's thesis of the end of history. China's monumental history as an ancient civilization is used to revise the communist party's ideology and to buttress foreign policy ambitions and infrastructural investments—including the ‘belt and road initiative’ and territorial claims in the South China Sea. This more assertive approach to China's immediate neighbourhood resonates with the official reiteration of imperial tropes and concepts of Confucian philosophy, yet assertions that Beijing wants to reanimate the tribute system remain contested. While using historical narratives to legitimize foreign policy is not new, we are witnessing an unprecedented ‘return of history’ as a global social force. By revisiting Fukuyama's claims, I develop the notion of ‘historical statecraft’ and apply it to China's ‘belt and road initiative’. The Chinese case is exemplary for the importance of ideational factors in understanding the recent structural changes often described as the weakening of the West. This article examines in what ways China's historical statecraft is challenging western narratives, what controversies emerge as China articulates its identity as a re-emerging ancient Great Power—one which expects global audiences to acknowledge the value of its cultural norms—and whether the Chinese approach to the use of the past for construing alternative political imaginaries contributes to a peaceful reconstruction of global order.

China's economic slowdown: implications for Beijing's institutional power and global governance role

Article

Dec 2017

Beverley Loke

China's spectacular economic growth over the past decades has given rise to a more confident and proactive China in global governance. China is now an institution-builder, with new Chinese-led institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank designed to cement Beijing's central role in global economic governance. What, then, are the potential implications of a slowing economy for China's institutional power and global governance role? This article locates China's economic growth and slowdown in broader discussions about China's global position and questions about responsibility, order and governance. It argues that China's economic slowdown will not result in a drastic impact on Beijing's institutional power as there are key material, historical and ideational drivers at play here. Unless China is confronted with the prospect of an economic collapse, it will continue to pursue an active institutional role, speak the rhetoric of South–South solidarity with emerging economies and seek a leadership role in reforming global economic governance, even with a slowing economy, because this is intrinsically tied to its identity and how China now positions itself in an evolving global order.

The Responsibility to Protect and the rise of China. Lessons from Australia’s role as a ‘pragmatic’ norm entrepreneur.

Article

Jan 2016
INT RELAT ASIA-PAC

Jason Ralph

The purpose of this article is to explore the development of a norm that emerged during a period of unqualified American hegemony – the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) – and to ask what the rise of China means for R2P norm entrepreneurs like Australia. It argues that by underpinning great power identity claims, which are instantiated by the assertion of normative positions occasionally at odds with liberal states, the rise of China has helped to highlight the contested nature of the R2P norm, in particular the license it notionally gives to the pursuit of externally imposed regime change. Drawing on an innovative combination of critical constructivism and philosophical pragmatism the paper argues that liberal states can better promote R2P in this increasingly pluralist international order by adopting a pragmatic approach to norm diffusion. This balances the demands of a dialog that is sensitive to Chinese concerns with the defense of the substantive core of the norm, human protection. It is further argued that Australia’s geopolitical position to Chinese power and an embedded identity narrative of Australia as a ‘middle power’ demonstrates a potential to act as a pragmatic norm entrepreneur. Indeed, Australia’s recent activity on the UN Security Council can be characterized in these terms.

SILK ROAD ECONOMIC BELT: CHINA’S MARSHALL PLAN, PIVOT TO EURASIA OR CHINA’S WAY OF FOREIGN POLICY

Article

Full-text available

Mar 2015

Antonina Ivanova Habova

Russia says no: Power, status, and emotions in foreign policy

Article

Full-text available

Oct 2014
COMMUNIS POST-COMMUN

Since 2003, Russian foreign behavior has become much more assertive and volatile toward the West, often rejecting U.S. diplomatic initiatives and overreacting to perceived slights. This essay explains Russia’s new assertiveness using social psychological hypotheses on the relationship between power, status, and emotions. Denial of respect to a state is humiliating. When a state loses status, the emotions experienced depend on the perceived cause of this loss. When a state perceives that others are responsible for its loss, it shows anger. The belief that others have unjustly used their power to deny the state its appropriate position arouses vengefulness. If a state believes that its loss of status is due to its own failure to live up to expectations, the elites will express shame. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has displayed anger at the U.S. unwillingness to grant it the status to which it believes it is entitled, especially during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, and most recently Russia’s takeover of Crimea and the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis. We can also see elements of vengefulness in Russia’s reaction to recognition of Kosovo, U.S. missile defense plans, the Magnitsky act, and the Snowden affair.

Rising Powers, Status Ambitions, and the Need to Reassure: What China Could Learn from Imperial Germany's Failures

Article

Full-text available

May 2014

Reinhard Wolf

This article focuses on the ominous parallels between the rise of Germany before World War I and China's ongoing ascendance. It will demonstrate that concerns about national status strongly affected both the fateful escalation of the 1914 crisis and the growing antagonisms of the years preceding. Special emphasis will be given to the role that mutual 'misrecognition' played in the gradual deterioration of Anglo-German relations. The consequences of Germany's excessive fixation on status are highly relevant for contemporary China, due to the startling similarities between both countries' domestic and international settings. If China wants to avoid the policy errors that led to the Kaiserreich's self-encirclement it needs to pay more attention to dangerous feedbacks among ongoing power shifts, maritime security dilemmas and extravagant public status concerns. China should do more to ensure that external trust in its benign intentions grows faster than its international ambitions and military power. This requires, among other things, an early settlement of ongoing territorial disputes, a toning down of jingoistic domestic discourses, enhanced leeway for speakers advocating international cooperation, and higher investment in multilateral institutions. Beijing's partners, for their part, must encourage such self-binding policies by facilitating China's rise in status, specifically by giving Beijing a greater say in these institutions.

Governing the World: China's Evolving Conceptions of Responsibility

Article

Full-text available

Nov 2013

Pichamon Yeophantong

This article examines, from an historical perspective, how the idea of the ‘responsibility of power’ speaks to Chinese political thought, and assesses its significance to China’s evolving engagement with global governance today. It argues that a shift in China’s global mentality is now underway: from an aversion to taking the lead to one which sees China reprising its role as a global power and shouldering the responsibilities attached to this status in the management of world affairs. But, contrary to conventional depictions of China’s ‘responsible power’ identity as an externally imposed or purely modern construct, the article illustrates how notions of responsibility and the corollary concept of responsible governance are not new, but have deep roots in Chinese traditions of statecraft and corresponding visions of world order. Taking into account the complex interplay between Chinese conceptions of responsibility and expectations of its global role, change is necessarily situated amidst historical continuity, as linkages are drawn between China’s past and its present.

Between Core National Interest and a Harmonious World: Reconciling Self-role Conceptions in Chinese Foreign Policy

Article

Full-text available

Feb 2013

Why and how can historical cases support different assessments of China rising with respect to the possibility of its becoming China threat? Rationalists and strategic culture analysts, who predominantly look at China from an external position, debate the influence of power, strategic cultures, and identities in explaining this highly controversial question. We, however, develop an internal view from the standpoint of a China looking out, which argues that different sources of Chinese self-role concepts could yield different policy behaviour. We analyse two discourses on Chinese foreign policy that have emerged in the 21st century—core national interest and harmonious world. We then introduce the dialectic approach of harmonious realism wherein indecisiveness is the essential characteristic. It is failure to decide on the specific purpose of Chinese foreign policy that creates China’s self-role conflict. Harmonious disciplining, balance, racism, and intervention are the practical forms of China’s harmonious realism through which the contemporary case analysis explains the forms, actual policy, and behavioural consequences of China’s self-role conflict.

The Assertive China Narrative: Why It Is Wrong and How So Many Still Bought into It (vol 7, pg 47, 2014)

Article

Full-text available

Feb 2014

Björn Jerdén

Dissenting assaults on the conventional wisdom that China's foreign policy became more 'assertive' in 2009–2010 have intensified. In this article I develop this revisionist critique in three ways. First, to make the most valid and cumulative assessment of the accuracy of the 'assertive China narrative' to date, I conceptualise its key empirical claim as a case of the general phenomenon of 'foreign policy change'. Second, based on this framework, I present a range of new empirical evidence that, taken as a whole, strongly challenges the notion of a new Chinese assertiveness. Third, since academic China and Asia experts played a pivotal role in creating the narrative, I raise a comprehensive explanation of why a great many scholars so strikingly went along with the flawed idea.

Social Psychology and the Identity-Conflict Debate: Is a ‘China Threat’ Inevitable?

Article

Full-text available

Jun 2005
EUR J INT RELAT

Peter Gries

Are the relations among nations inevitably conflictual? Neorealism and neoliberalism share the rationalist assumption that states are self-regarding, but debate over whether states pursue relative or absolute gains. Scholars focusing on identity have recently joined the controversy. Wendt (1992) has argued against the realists that conflict is not the inevitable product of anarchy. Drawing on social psychology to defend realism, Mercer (1995) has countered that conflict is ‘an inescapable feature of... interstate relations’. This paper argues that international identity dynamics do not inexorably lead to competition, let alone conflict. Mercer’s pessimism is unwarranted. Drawing on social identity theory (SIT), it argues that intergroup conflict is a highly contingent outcome, and that social psychology provides insights into when the realists are right, and when the liberals are. Utilizing examples from Sino-American relations, the paper also seeks to contribute to the stalemated debate in the China field between optimists and pessimists over the existence of a ‘China threat’.

Self-Stereotyping in the Face of Threats to Group Status and Distinctiveness: The Role of Group Identification

Article

Full-text available

May 1997

In four studies, effects of self-perceived or public-perceived threats to group status or group distinctiveness on self-stereotyping (defined as similarity to prototypical in-group members) were investigated for people with high or low in-group identification. The main prediction was that high and low identifiers will respond differentially when their group's status or distinctiveness is threatened such that self-stereotyping is reduced for low identifiers but enhanced for high identifiers. Although the four studies investigated different comparison groups and different kinds of group threat, the results of all studies provided support for the prediction, and this was confirmed by a meta-analysis. This supports the authors' argument that the initial level of group identification determines whether group members are likely to set themselves apart from the rest of their group or to show group solidarity when their identity as group members is threatened.

China's Strategy in the South China Sea

Article

Full-text available

Jan 2011

Taylor Fravel

This article examines Chinaâ€™s behaviour in the South China Sea disputes through the lens of its strategy for managing its claims. Since the mid-1990s, China has pursued a strategy of delaying the resolution of the dispute. The goal of this strategy is to consolidate Chinaâ€™s claims, especially to maritime rights or jurisdiction over these waters, and to deter other states from strengthening their own claims at Chinaâ€™s expense, including resource development projects that exclude China. Since the mid-2000s, the pace of Chinaâ€™s efforts to consolidate its claims and deter others has increased through diplomatic, administrative and military means. Although Chinaâ€™s strategy seeks to consolidate its own claims, it threatens weaker states in the dispute and is inherently destabilizing. As a result, the delaying strategy includes efforts to prevent the escalation of tensions while nevertheless seeking to consolidate Chinaâ€™s claims.

The Price of Prestige: Conspicuous Consumption in International Relations

Book

Jan 2018

Lilach Gilady

3. China: Security Practice of a Modernizing and Ascending Power

Chapter

Jul 1998

Wu Xinbo

Great Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics

Chapter

Oct 2021

When Western countries experience relative decline, China has become the second largest economy in the world. Faced with dramatic changes in international situations and relations between China and the rest of the world, China’s current diplomacy is faced with great opportunities and challenges in a period of transition. Having witnessed survival-related revolutionary diplomacy and construction-related development diplomacy, China now finds itself in the new period of great power diplomacy during which she is committed to realizing the great national rejuvenation. The practice of China’s great power diplomacy must meet the needs of global, national and current situations and conditions. China’s great power diplomacy is characterized by the country’s commitment to new great power diplomacy of peace that promotes world harmony while working on her own peaceful development. It is a complete departure from the traditional great power diplomacy and power politics.

Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China

Book

Sep 2011

Ezra F. Vogel

Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia

Book

Dec 2019

Richard J. Samuels

Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security

Article

Jul 2006

Lying Low No More? China's New Thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy

Article

Sep 2011

A series of moves in China's foreign policies since the global financial crisis in 2008 seems to suggest that China is now more confident than ever in its external behaviour. Indeed, some Western observers argue that China's new confidence even borders on arrogance. Domestically, there is an emerging debate over the famous "tao guang yang hui" (TGYH) strategy. Is China beginning to behave in an arrogant way? Will China change the TGYH strategy? This article documents the evolution of the TGYH strategy and explains why there is an emerging interest in it today. It argues that the TGYH strategy will be continued as a national strategy, though some modifications to it will be highly likely in coming years.

The Advantages of an Assertive China Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy

Article

Mar 2011
FOREIGN AFF

T.J. Christensen

Over the past two years, China's foreign policy has become markedly more belligerent toward both its neighbors and the United States. But Washington should not wish for a weaker Beijing. In fact, on problems from nuclear proliferation to climate change, what the United States needs is a more confident and constructive China as a partner.

China dreams: 20 views of the future

Book

Jun 2013

William A. Callahan

After celebrating their country's three decades of fantastic economic success, many Chinese are now asking, "What comes next?" How can China convert its growing economic power into political and cultural influence around the globe? William Callahan's China Dreams gives voice to China's many different futures by exploring the grand aspirations and deep anxieties of a broad group of public intellectuals. Stepping outside narrow politics of officials vs. dissidents, Callahan examines what a third group - "citizen intellectuals" - think about China's future. China Dreams eavesdrops on fascinating conversations between officials, scholars, soldiers, bloggers, novelists, film-makers and artists to see how they describe China's different political, strategic, economic, social and cultural futures. Callahan also examines how the PRC's new generation of twenty- and thirty-somethings is creatively questioning "The China Model" of economic development. The personal stories of these citizen intellectuals illustrate China's zeitgeist and a complicated mix of hopes and fears about "The Chinese Century", providing a clearer sense of how the PRC's dramatic economic and cultural transitions will affect the rest of the world.

Status and World Order

Article

Apr 2014

Rising powers such as Brazil, China, India, Russia, and Turkey are increasingly claiming heightened profiles in international politics. Although differing in other respects, rising states have a strong desire for recognition and respect. This pioneering volume on status features contributions that develop propositions on status concerns and illustrate them with case studies and aggregate data analysis. Four cases are examined in depth: the United States (how it accommodates rising powers through hierarchy), Russia (the influence of status concerns on its foreign policy), China (how Beijing signals its status aspirations), and India (which has long sought major power status). The authors analyze status from a variety of theoretical perspectives and tackle questions such as: How do states signal their status claims? How are such signals perceived by the leading states? Will these status concerns lead to conflict, or is peaceful adjustment possible?

China's regional strategy

Article

Jan 2006

China: The Post-Responsible Power

Article

Jan 2015

Yong Deng

Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: China-US Intensifying Rivalry Does not Amount to Cold War

Article

May 2012

The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US power in Asia

Article

Dec 2010

John J. Mearsheimer

China's Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils

Article

Jan 2006

China's "Peaceful Rise" to Great-Power Status

Article

Sep 2005
FOREIGN AFF

Zheng Bijian

Despite widespread fears about China's growing economic clout and political stature, Beijing remains committed to a "peaceful rise": bringing its people out of poverty by embracing economic globalization and improving relations with the rest of the world. As it emerges as a great power, China knows that its continued development depends on world peace--a peace that its development will in turn reinforce.

From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement

Article

May 2014

Xuetong Yan

Since 2012, some scholars, both Chinese and foreign, have argued that China's assertive foreign policy is doomed to fail. Nevertheless, after examining China's foreign relations in the last two years, this paper finds that China has experienced improved relations rather than deteriorating ones. In comparison with the strategy of keeping a low profile (KLP), the strategy of striving for achievement (SFA) shows more efficiency in shaping a favorable environment for China's national rejuvenation. The author applies the theory of moral realism to explaining the role of the SFA strategy and argues that morality can increase both international political strength and the political legitimacy of a rising power. The key difference between the KLP and the SFA is that the former focuses on economic gains and the latter seeks to strengthen political support. That is the reason that the SFA values the role of morality and the KLP does not. Due to these different goals, the SFA strategy differs from the KLP strategy in aspects of tenets, general layouts, working approaches, and methods. So far, the SFA has achieved progress beyond people's expectation from Xi Jinping in 2012. Xi's strong leadership may become a new case suitable for illustrating the theory of moral realism.

War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975

Article

Oct 1984

National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy

Article

Sep 1970

Kal J. Holsti

Status and Sacredness: A General Theory of Status Relations and an Analysis of Indian Culture

Article

Oct 1996

“China's Path to Great Power Status in a Globalization Era

Article

Jan 2003

Samuel S Kim

Not since the debate in the mid-1960s over containment with or without isolation have the implications of rising Chi-nese power been so pervasive and controversial as in recent years. This article joins the debate by tracking and explaining China's path to great power status in the post-cold war era of globalization. Globalization has greatly influenced not only the dynamics of power on the world stage but also the very meaning of power. While external assessments of the signifi-cance of a rising China vary considerably depending on nor-mative or theoretical perspective, China's own conceptualiza-tion and assessment have come to focus more on economic, scientific, and technological than military factors. As China is increasingly integrated into the world community, how it wields whatever power it holds determines in the end the character of its international influence. Ross Munro pre-dicted with confidence that "within a few years, China will be the largest economy in the world." 3 On the other hand, some still argue that Chinese power and influence are greatly overrated economically, politically, and ideationally. At best, China is no more than a "second-rank middle power," a "theatrical power" rather than a great power. China would then matter far less than most people inside and outside of China would have us believe. 4 There is a double paradox at work in the heated rise-of-China debate. While China today is more integrated into the "global community" and exhibits greater levels of cooperative (status quo) behavior within it than ever before, the less than subtle premise of the contending approaches of containment, engagement, and constrainment (congagement) is that China as a dissatisfied revisionist (non-status quo) power is operating out-side the global community on a range of international norms, thus posing the most crucial challenge for the future of regional and global orders. 5 Indeed, the rise-of-China thesis is often con-flated with the "China threat theory" that pivots around the fea-sibility and desirability of various competing strategies to man-age the rise of Chinese power through balancing, bandwagoning, capitulating, or ignoring. 6 At a time when the rise of China as a great power has become nearly conventional wisdom among most scholars, pundits, and policymakers in the West, China's own assessments of trends in power transition in comparative terms are increasingly pessimistic about its own capacity to catch up to the United States (see below).

How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?

Article

Apr 2013
INT SECURITY

Alastair Iain Johnston

There has been a rapidly spreading meme in U.S. pundit and academic circles since 2010 that describes China's recent diplomacy as "newly assertive." This "new assertiveness" meme suffers from two problems. First, it underestimates the complexity of key episodes in Chinese diplomacy in 2010 and overestimates the amount of change. Second, the explanations for the new assertiveness claim suffer from unclear causal mechanisms and lack comparative rigor that would better contextualize China's diplomacy in 2010. An examination of seven cases in Chinese diplomacy at the heart of the new assertiveness meme finds that, in some instances, China's policy has not changed; in others, it is actually more moderate; and in still others, it is a predictable reaction to changed external conditions. In only one case—maritime disputes—does one see more assertive Chinese rhetoric and behavior. The speed and extent with which the newly assertive meme has emerged point to an understudied issue in international relations—namely, the role that online media and the blogosphere play in the creation of conventional wisdoms that might, in turn, constrain policy debates. The assertive China discourse may be a harbinger of this effect as a Sino-U.S. security dilemma emerges.

A New Type of Major-Power Relationship: Seeking a Durable Foundation for U.S.-China Ties

Article

Jul 2013

David M. Lampton

This essay considers recent calls for a new major-power relationship between the U.S. and China and examines concrete steps that both countries could take to pursue such a relationship.

Stick to the path of peaceful development

Article

Dai Bingguo

The CPC Central Committee's Proposal for Formulating the 12th Five-Year Plan for China's Economic and Social Development adopted by the Fifth Plenary Session of the 17th CPC Central Committee has drawn the grand blueprint for China's development in the next five years. It is reiterated in the part on external relations that China stands firmly for peace, development and cooperation, pursues the independent foreign policy of peace, sticks to the path of peaceful development and the win-win strategy of opening-up, safeguards China's sovereignty, security and development interests, and is ready to work with other countries to build a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity. This explains fully China's external stance, its path of development, its goal and the way to achieve the goal. Therefore, it has great relevance and far-reaching significance to China's diplomacy under the new circumstances. 1. Why has China chosen the path of peaceful development? To stick to the path of peaceful development is not an impulsive decision. On the contrary, it is a carefully considered choice based on our analysis of the great changes that have taken place in the world, in China and in China's relations with the rest of the world. We realize that we must adapt to the changing situation and follow a path that suits the trend of world development and China's national conditions. The world is undergoing extensive and profound changes. Economic globalization and development of information technology are gaining momentum. Science and technology are advancing fast. The world is getting smaller and has become a "global village". Countries are more closely linked and interdependent with their interests more closely integrated than ever before. They find more areas of common interests and more issues that need joint response. They want to engage in mutually beneficial cooperation more than ever before. To some extent, the world has become a community of interests. No country, even the most powerful ones, can stand alone and survive. The behavior of one country will have an impact not only on itself, but also on other countries. Those selfish practices of conquering or threatening others by force, or seeking development space and resources by non-peaceful means are losing ground. It has also become very unpopular for some countries to identify friends and foes on the basis of ideology and gang up under various pretexts in quest of dominance of world affairs. In response to increasing risks and challenges, the international community has opted for peace, development and cooperation, which is the irresistible trend of the times. Countries should consider themselves passengers in the same boat and cross the river peacefully together instead of fighting one another and trying to push one another off the boat.

The Stellar Status Symbol: True Motives for China's Manned Space Program

Article

Jan 2009

Fiona Cunningham

T he image of Chinese "taikonauts" conducting their first spacewalk, broad-cast on a large screen on the front of a Beijing department store, may have appeared a quaint image to the contemporaries of the Cold War space race. 1 Even without a peer competitor or any obvious tangible benefits, and at an exorbitant price tag, China still saw value in finishing the race to put humans in space, forty years after the United States and Soviet Union. China's pursuit of manned space-flight is a manifestation of its quest for improved international status, a necessary prerequisite to admission into the superpower "club." There is nothing new about a status-based explanation for the Chinese manned space program—status is often cited as one of its many motivations. However, such motivations have not been suf-ficiently explored in the context of existing manned space programs, nor have they been situated within more general explanations of Chinese foreign policy behavior. A norm-focused conception of international hierarchy and a brief overview of how manned spaceflight became a status marker during the Cold War will contextualize the status explanation for the Chinese manned space program. Status is the most important motivation for a manned space program in the eyes of elite political lead-ers, who bear greatest responsibility for China's international standing. China has Fiona Cunningham is a research associate at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, Australia.

A tale of two theories

Article

Jan 1982

William Press

Deficiencies in the predictions of an expanding universe according to the theories of gravitation promulgated by Newton and Einstein are examined. Newton qualitatively predicted local collapses or a grand collapse of the universe under the influence of gravity, but did not consider an infinitely expanding universe. Einstein's theory predicted an expanding (or contracting) universe, and Einstein subsequently added a cosmological constant term which had no observational basis and which theoretically assured the existence of a stable universe. It is mentioned that the cosmological horizons grow with time and that horizons grow to include more galaxies with time. General Relativity indicates the presence of space-time curvature accompanying any gravitational field, implying that a density can be reached locally which can cause the object to leave the universe.

ASEAN eyes China - The security dimension

Article

Apr 1997

Allen S. Whiting

China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21st-Century Asia

Article

Aug 2003

Alice D. Ba

In East Asia, few relationships have evolved as much as that between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. While important differences remain, relations have seen a marked improvement over the past decade, especially when compared to the considerable suspicion that once defined their relations. Changing U.S. priorities in Asia have played an important part in that evolution.

Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks

Article

Apr 2003
INT SECURITY

David C. Kang

International Security 27.4 (2003) 57-85 Most international relations theory is inductively derived from the European experience of the past four centuries, during which Europe was the locus and generator of war, innovation, and wealth. According to Kenneth Waltz, "The theory of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era. It would be...ridiculous to construct a theory of international politics based on Malaysia and Costa Rica....A general theory of international politics is necessarily based on the great powers." If international relations theorists paid attention to other regions of the globe, it was to study subjects considered peripheral such as third world security or the behavior of small states. Accordingly, international relations scholarship has focused on explaining the European experience, including, for example, the causes of World Wars I and II, as well as the Cold War andU.S.-Soviet relations. Although this is still true, other parts of the world have become increasingly significant. Accordingly, knowledge of European relations is no longer sufficient for a well-trained international relations generalist. During this time Asia itself—sometimes defined as including China, India, Japan, and Russia and comprising perhaps half the world's population—had an occasional impact on the great powers, but it was never a primary focus. In the past two decades, however, Asia has emerged as a region whose economic, military, and diplomatic power has begun to rival and perhaps even exceed that of Europe. Its growing influence gives scholars a wonderful opportunity in the fields of international relations generally and Asian security specifically to produce increasingly rigorous and theoretically sophisticated work. Because Europe was so important for so long a period, in seeking to understand international relations, scholars have often simply deployed concepts, theories, and experiences derived from the European experience to project onto and explain Asia. This approach is problematic at best. Eurocentric ideas have yielded several mistaken conclusions and predictions about conflict and alignment behavior in Asia. For example, since the early 1990s many Western analysts have predicted dire scenarios for Asia, whereas many Asian experts have expressed growing optimism about the region's future. It is an open question whether Asia, with its very different political economy, history, culture, and demographics, will ever function like the European state system. This is not to criticize European-derived theories purely because they are based on the Western experience: The origins of a theory are not necessarily relevant to its applicability. Rather these theories do a poor job as they are applied to Asia; what I seek to show in this article is that more careful attention to their application can strengthen the theories themselves. In this article I make two claims about the levels of conflict and types of alignment behavior in Asia. First, I argue that the pessimistic predictions of Western scholars after the end of the Cold War that Asia would experience a period of increased arms racing and power politics has largely failed to materialize, a reality that scholars must confront if they are to develop a better understanding of Asian relations. Second, contrary to the expectations of standard formulations of realism, and although U.S. power confounds the issue, Asian states do not appear to be balancing against rising powers such as China. Rather they seem to be bandwagoning. I make these claims with great care. Asia is empirically rich and, in many ways, different from the West. Thus efforts to explain Asian issues using international relations theories largely derived inductively from the European experience can be problematic. Focusing exclusively on Asia's differences, however, runs the risk of essentializing the region, resulting in the sort of ori- entalist analysis that most scholars have correctly avoided. I am not making a plea for research that includesa touch of realism, a dash of constructivism, and a pinch of liberalism. The same social-scientific standards—falsifiability, generalizability, and clear causal logic—should apply in the study of Asian international relations as has been applied to the study of Europe. To achieve this, scholars must not dismiss evidence that does not fit their theories. Instead they must consider such evidence and sharpen their propositions so that...

Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy

Article

Apr 2010
INT SECURITY

The United States needs support from other states to carry out global governance, particularly from rising powers such as China and Russia. Securing cooperation from China and Russia poses special problems, however, because neither state is part of the liberal Western community, ruling out appeals to common values and norms. Nevertheless, an alternative approach that is rooted in appreciation of China's and Russia's heightened status concerns may be viable. Since the end of the Cold War, Chinese and Russian foreign policy has been shaped by the goal of restoring both countries' great power status, which received major blows after China's Tiananmen Square repression and the Soviet Union's breakup and loss of empire. This desire for status can be explained by social identity theory, which argues that social groups strive for a distinctive, positive identity. Social identity theory provides a typology of strategies that states may use to enhance their relative status and suggests appropriate responses to status concerns of rising powers. Redirecting scholarly attention to status considerations and incentives could contribute to a diplomatic strategy for engaging rising powers.

China's quest for great power identity

Article

Jun 1999
Orbis

Gilbert Rozman

An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Contact

Article

Dec 2005
ADV EXP SOC PSYCHOL

This chapter begins with a re-presentation of Allport's classic hypothesis and shows—with reference to recent cross-sectional and longitudinal surveys— laboratory experiments, and meta-analysis, that many of his original propositions have capably withstood the test of time. It examines Brewer and Miller's, and Gaertner and Dovidio's attempts to extend the contact hypothesis, in both of which categorization processes play a key role. This approach sets the stage for the model, first published in 1986 by Hewstone and Brown. In that model, emphasis was given on identifying the conditions that would allow the generalization of attitudes and behavior change beyond the specific context in which the contact occurs. The chapter discusses the developments of contact theory that occurred in the 1980s and reviews the empirical research instigated by the Hewstone–Brown model. It also reviews the progress to date and attempts a theoretical integration of these models in the light of the large volume of research that they have stimulated.

Differentiation Between Social Groups

Article

Jan 1978

Henri. Tajfel

Perceptions of an Assertive China

Article

Michael D. Swaine

During the past two years, and particularly since China's quick and strong recovery from the global recession, the long-discussed topic of China's rise has come to be dominated by a new theme among both Chinese and foreign observers: The image of the supposedly cautious, low-profile, responsibility-shirking, free-riding Beijing of the past giving way to one of a more confident, assertive (some say arrogant), anti-status quo power that is pushing back against the West, promoting its own alternative (i.e., restrictive or exclusionary) norms and policies in many areas, and generally seeking to test the leadership capacity of the United States. This new image has prompted many Western pundits to assert that the Chinese are finally "revealing their true colors." And some believe that the Chinese, in the face of an apparently faltering Western democratic- capitalist model, and with the confidence provided by continued high growth rates and massive foreign exchange reserves, are now challenging American leadership of the global system. Such observations are causing some U.S. politicians, military officials, and members of the business community to question whether China remains committed to the two elements that have together stood for over three decades as the hallmarks of the reform era: maintenance of cooperative relations with the West and a basic reliance on the open, free- market system. If they conclude that China is transitioning to a less cooperative, more assertive, fundamentally revisionist, and in many ways anti-Western approach to vital global and bilateral issues, the repercussions for the international system, and Sino-U.S. relations in particular, could be enormous. This essay examines the features of the discussion in the West, and among many Chinese, regarding the notion of a more assertive China. It attempts to answer several questions: How is assertiveness defined or understood among Western and Chinese observers? What are the main manifestations or expressions of Chinese assertiveness? What is driving such assertiveness, in the views of both Western and Chinese observers? What are the lines of debate over this issue in China and the West, if any? What are the perceived implications of Chinese assertiveness for the future of the international system and Sino-Western relations? The conclusion provides some general observations regarding the significance of this issue for the future.

The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force

Article

Oct 2000
INT SECURITY

Robert S. Ross

Robert S. Ross is Professor of Political Science, Boston College, and Research Associate, John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University. A later version of this article will appear in Coercive Diplomacy: Lessons from the Early Post-Cold War World, Robert Art and Patrick Cronin, eds. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace [USIP] Press, forthcoming). The author is grateful to USIP for its support of research travel to China and to Robert Art, Patrick Cronin, Joseph Fewsmith, Steven Goldstein, Ronald Montaperto, Barry Posen, Alan Romberg, Robert Suettinger, and Allen Whiting for their helpful comments. 1. See, for example, John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997); and Arthur Waldron, "How Not to Deal with China," Commentary, Vol. 103, No. 3 (March 1997), pp. 44-49. 2. The distinction between coercive diplomacy and compellence is not obvious. Thomas C. Schelling's description of compellence is nearly identical to Alexander L. George's later definition of coercive diplomacy (i.e., action that aims to "persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action"). See Schelling, Arms and Influence (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1976), pp. 69-72; and George, "Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics," in Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), p. 7. Either term can capture Chinese behavior. This article uses the term coercive diplomacy rather than compellence to describe Chinese policy, if only because coercive diplomacy has become the more familiar term. Moreover, the difference between coercion and deterrence is often not clear. As Schelling observes, when a state seeks to end the continuance of another state's policy, there are elements of both deterrence and compellence (coercion). Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 77. It can be argued that there are elements of both deterrence and coercion in Chinese behavior. But compellence/coercive diplomacy better captures Chinese behavior, because China took the initiative and maintained its policy of threatening the use of force until it received a response from Taiwan and the United States in terms of concrete policy change. Paul Gordon Lauren calls this pattern "defensive coercion." See Lauren, "Theories of Bargaining with Threats of Force: Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy," in Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 192-193. See also Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 195-196; and Lawrence Freedman, "Strategic Coercion," in Freedman, ed., Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 15-20. 3. The relationship between reputation, credibility, commitment, and deterrence follows Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 42-43. For an extensive discussion of the relationship between reputation and deterrence, see Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), chap. 1. 4. Author interview with Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff. Much of the following analysis of Chinese policy is based on the author's extensive interviews conducted during visits to Beijing between 1996 and 2000 with senior civilian and military specialists on U.S.-China relations and Taiwan in government think tanks and universities. These policy analysts are advisers to such government agencies as the state council, the ministry of foreign affairs, the ministry of security, and the People's Liberation Army. They frequently participate in government meetings regarding policy toward the United States and Taiwan. For obvious reasons, I have not disclosed their identities. 5. On the role of the use of force in coercive diplomacy, see Alexander L. George and William Simons, "Findings and Conclusions," in George and Simons, Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, pp. 273-279; and Freedman, "Strategic Coercion," pp. 20-23. 6. This use of deterrence follows the definition of deterrence found in Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 3. Washington believed that its commitments were "interdependent," so that its follow-through in March 1996 on its commitment to Taiwan would affect the credibility of its future commitments to both Taiwan and other regional actors. On the...

Japan's emerging role as a 'global ordinary power'

Article

Aug 2005

Takashi Inoguchi

In this article we argue that since 1945 Japanese foreign policy has evolved through five phases, which will culminate in Japan's re-emergence as a global ordinary power. We then discuss three potential models of ordinary power that are ideal-typical in nature, but which share some qualities with the respective political circumstances of France, Germany, and Britain. We also consider the legitimacy and capacity deficits that Japan possesses, and the way in which recent electoral developments may contribute to the addressing of these deficits. We argue that Japan is using the British model as a foundation for the acquisition of ordinary power status. In doing so it is increasingly binding itself to the United States. But such a move can also provide a platform from which to develop the possibilities that lie beyond bilateralism (plus), in the realm of the German model, and wider regional cooperation.

Germany and the Use of Force: Still a Civilian Power?

Article

Jun 2000

Hanns W. Maull

Germany's military participation in the Kosovo War against Serbia represents an evolution but not a fundamental departure in its post-war security policy as a 'civilian power'. The decision to join the air strikes even in the absence of a mandate by the UN Security Council was motivated by considerations which have long been central to Germany's foreign-policy role concept. As a result of the Kosovo experience, Germany now is moving towards restructuring its armed forces to make them smaller, more professional and more capable of intervening in crises beyond traditional NATO contingencies. But the shift will probably be slow and messy. Germany's future role in ESDP therefore is likely to be paradoxical: while providing strong political support for further advances in European security and defence integration, Germany's military contribution may continue to fall short of expectations.

The Rise and Descent of "Peaceful Rise

Article

Jan 2004

Robert L. Suettinger

China’s Search for Military Power

Article

Jul 2008
WASH QUART

Taylor Fravel

How much military power does China ultimately desire? A close look at Chinese texts on military doctrine over the last decade reveals that Beijingâ€™s objectives for the use of military power are more certain than many policy analysts maintain.

China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order

Article

Jan 2005
INT SECURITY

David L. Shambaugh

The traditional underpinnings of international relations in Asia are undergoing profound change, and the rise of China is a principal cause. Other causes include the relative decline of U.S. inºuence and authority in Asia, the expanding normative inºuence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the growth of regional multilateral institutions, increased technological and economic interdependence throughout the region, and the amelioration of several formerly antagonistic bilateral relationships. As a result of these processes, the structure of power and the nature of the regional system are being fundamentally altered. China’s growing economic and military power, expanding political inºuence, distinctive diplomatic voice, and increasing involvement in regional multilateral institutions are key developments in Asian affairs. China’s new proactive regional posture is reºected in virtually all policy spheres— economic, diplomatic, and military—and this parallels China’s increased activism on the global stage. 1 Bilaterally and multilaterally, Beijing’s diplomacy has been remarkably adept and nuanced, earning praise around the region. As a result, most nations in the region now see China as a good neighbor, a constructive partner, a careful listener, and a nonthreatening regional power. This regional perspective is striking, given that just a few years ago, many of China’s neighbors voiced growing concerns about the possibility of China becoming a domineering regional hegemon and powerful military threat. Today these views are muted. China’s new conªdence is also reºected in how it perceives itself, as it gradually sheds its dual identity of historical victim and object of great power manipulation. These phenomena have begun to attract

China's Pitch for a Multipolar World: The New Security Concept (Asia-Pacific Security Studies. Volume 2, Number 1, May 2003)

Article

May 2003

Denny Roy

In the last few years, China has promulgated a "new security concept" (NSC) that advocates principles for international relations that the Chinese argue will promote peace and prosperity better than the current order, which is based on a "Cold War mentality." The NSC provides a vehicle for China to counter perceived American "containment" and assert Chinese regional leadership in a way that appears principled, responsible, and non-threatening. The NSC promotes cooperative security, an expanded understanding of security that includes threats beyond traditional state-vs-state military conflict, and security cooperation that is aimed at promoting trust among states rather than targeting specific countries considered potential adversaries. The NSC advocates multilateral dialogue, confidence-building measures, arms control and non-proliferation, and expanded economic interaction as policies that will reduce international tensions. It denounces the use or threat of force to settle political disputes and calls on large countries to treat smaller countries with equality and respect. Promoting the NSC serves several Chinese foreign policy goals, including countering the dominant position of the United States, demonstrating Chinese leadership, and assuring the region that China does not intend to use its growing power to dominate its neighbors. While the United States should welcome China's endorsement of peace-promoting activities such as multilateral dialogue and confidence-building, the NSC also represents a challenge to American leadership -- particularly in the Asia-Pacific region -- as well as opposition to several specific U.S. policies or objectives. These specific American policies include strong bilateral security alliances in the region, criticism of governments that fail to protect human rights, and plans to develop a system to defend against ballistic missiles.

Will China be a New Type of Great Power?

Abstract

No full-text available

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