ArticlePDF Available

A step short of the bomb: Explaining the strategy of nuclear hedging



The global spread of technology will inevitably result in more states gaining access to the scientific and technical means to create a nuclear weapon. In order to confront this reality, policymakers and analysts must develop a better understanding of why some states feel compelled to conduct overt nuclear tests while others are content to pursue a strategy of hedging: developing the capability but not actually testing or deploying nuclear weapons. Using case studies from Japan and South Asia, this article seeks to explain nuclear policy through a combination of two factors. First, states attempt to maximize their relative security vis-à-vis their rivals by balancing the value of deterrence with the risk of proliferation. Secondly, domestic political sentiment and the balance of power amongst competing bureaucratic factions may either enable restraint or push a state toward conducting a nuclear test. Finally, by applying these two factors to the case of Iran, this article will evaluate the drivers of Iranian nuclear behavior and offer policy recommendations to increase the odds that Iran will pursue a latent, rather than an overt, nuclear capability.
PB 29
Ches Thurber is a doctoral student at Tufts University’s The Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, where he focuses on international security. He can be reached at richard.
Ches Thurber
The global spread of technology will inevitably result in more
states gaining access to the scientific and technical means to
create a nuclear weapon. In order to confront this reality, poli-
cymakers and analysts must develop a better understanding
of why some states feel compelled to conduct overt nuclear
tests while others are content to pursue a strategy of hedging:
developing the capability but not actually testing or deploying
nuclear weapons. Using case studies from Japan and South
Asia, this article seeks to explain nuclear policy through a
combination of two factors. First, states attempt to maximize
their relative security vis-à-vis their rivals by balancing the value
of deterrence with the risk of proliferation. Secondly, domestic
political sentiment and the balance of power amongst competing
bureaucratic factions may either enable restraint or push a state
toward conducting a nuclear test. Finally, by applying these two
factors to the case of Iran, this article will evaluate the drivers
of Iranian nuclear behavior and offer policy recommendations
to increase the odds that Iran will pursue a latent, rather than
an overt, nuclear capability.
30 31
In the wake of yet another failed negotiation round in January 2011, the
Islamic Republic of Iran appears increasingly unlikely to cease nuclear tech-
nology development. For Iran, the perceived benefits of an active nuclear
program—whether in terms of security, technological advancement, or
national prestige—outweigh anything the West can offer in compensation.
While damage inflicted by the “Stuxnet” computer virus has reportedly
slowed Iran’s progress, nuclear security analysts still believe that Iran may
be able to develop both the technological expertise as well as the sufficient
quantity of fissile material necessary to construct a nuclear device in as few
as three years (Dilanian 2011). Even more worrisome is that Iran is not
alone. As technological barriers are shattered, nuclear capability—once
reserved for the world’s most advanced nations—is coming within reach
of dozens of nations. However, despite the alarming inevitability of nuclear
capability proliferation, nuclear weapon proliferation is not inevitable.
Instead, we may see states adopt a strategy of nuclear “hedging;” whereby
they seek to acquire the technology necessary to construct a nuclear weapon
but refrain from becoming overt nuclear powers. The key question will
become how nuclear-capable states can be dissuaded from testing and
deploying the world’s most dangerous weapon.
Winston Churchill provided an early articulation of nuclear hedging in
1951 when he summarized Britain’s nuclear strategy: I have never wished
since our decision during the war that England should start the manufacture
of atomic bombs. Research, however, must be energetically pursued. We
should have the art rather than the article” (Gowning 1976, 401; Levite
2002, 70). Some analysts have proposed that contemporary Iran may be
following a similar strategy of seeking only to acquire a “latent” nuclear
capacity (Cole 2009). This idea has also been gaining traction in policy
circles. In a January 2010 memo to President Barack Obama, Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates expressed concern that Iran might develop all of the
materials necessary to build a bomb but stop short of actually assembling
it (Sanger and Shanker 2010).
The Churchill model, however, is not cause for optimism; the United
Kingdom tested a nuclear device in 1952, the year after Churchill’s state-
ment. Indeed, some of the most obvious benefits of nuclear weapons
possession do not seem to apply when a state has only a latent nuclear
capability. For instance, nuclear latency is not as effective a deterrent as
actual possession and deployment of a weapon as it poses no threat for
counterattack. Neither is nuclear latency likely to galvanize national pride
30 31
in the same way as a country’s first nuclear test. Despite these limitations,
many states with the requisite materials and capabilities have opted not
to test or deploy a nuclear device. Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Germany,
Japan, the Netherlands, South Africa, and Sweden could all be considered
latent nuclear powers today. Why have these states been able to maintain
a strategy of nuclear hedging, while others have felt compelled to test and
deploy weapons?
This article will argue that nuclear policy can be explained through a
combination of two factors. First, states seek to maximize their relative
security vis-à-vis their rivals by balancing the value of deterrence with the
risk of proliferation. Secondly, domestic political sentiment and the bal-
ance of power amongst competing bureaucratic factions may either enable
restraint or push a state toward conducting a nuclear test. To illuminate these
factors, the paper will present definitions of nuclear latency and nuclear
hedging and apply theories of nuclear proliferation to these concepts. It
will then examine two case studies, using the framework described above to
explain why Japan has remained a latent nuclear state in the face of rising
regional tensions, while India and Pakistan felt compelled to become full-
fledged nuclear states after a period of latency. The argument will then be
applied to the current challenge of Irans nuclear development in attempt
to provide a better understanding of the drivers of Iran’s nuclear policy.
The article concludes with policy recommendations to increase the chances
that Iran will pursue a latent rather than an overt nuclear capability.
The traditional demarcation of a nuclear power has been the successful
detonation of a nuclear device. However, the proliferation of advanced
nuclear technologies for ostensibly civilian use has made the once clear
“red line” murky. It is now possible for a nonnuclear state to develop a
“civiliannuclear program that puts it within months, or even weeks, of
being able to construct a weapon, all while maintaining compliance with
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) regulations. Furthermore, a number of states have sought
to conceal their nuclear weapons capability. Israel is widely acknowledged
to have upwards of one hundred nuclear weapons, though it has never
overtly tested or publicly acknowledged its nuclear status. South Africa
assembled six nuclear weapons in the 1980s, though their existence was
not publicly confirmed until 1993, three years after they were dismantled
(Nuclear Threat Initiative 2010b).
Such ambiguity requires the international community to pay closer
32 33
attention to states’ nuclear programs early in the development process.
Wohlstetter et al. have argued that the nuclear threshold must now be
pushed back. They claim that states with the capabilities to produce a
weapon should be considered nuclear states just as states that have actually
tested devices:
If, in fact, technological transfers can bring a ‘‘nonnuclear
weapon state’’ within weeks, days or even hours of the ability
to use a nuclear explosive, in the operational sense that ‘‘non-
nuclear weapon state’’ will have nuclear weapons. The point is
even more fundamental than the fact that effective safeguards
mean timely warning. A necessary condition for timely warn-
ing is that there be a substantial elapsed time. But if there is no
substantial elapsed time before a government may use nuclear
weapons, in effect it has them (Albert Wohlstetter, Jones, and
Roberta Wohlstetter 1979, 39).
Wohlstetter et al. thus provide an early conception of “latent” nuclear
capacity. In doing so, they highlight one of the key challenges presented
by nuclear latency: while NPT requirements and IAEA inspections are
supposed to prevent a state from diverting civilian materials toward mili-
tary use, nuclear latency might allow a state to renounce the NPT, throw
out inspectors, and assemble a nuclear weapon in an extremely short time
frame. Such a scenario would leave the international community few, if
any, opportunities to intervene.
“Hedging” describes a state’s strategy of seeking to develop a latent nuclear
capability without actually testing a device. Levite defines nuclear hedging
as “a national strategy of maintaining, or at least appearing to maintain, a
viable option for the relatively rapid acquisition of nuclear weapons, based
on an indigenous technical capacity to produce them within a relatively
short timeframe ranging from several weeks to a few years” (Levite 2002,
While latency refers to a state’s capability, hedging refers to a state’s
policy of seeking or maintaining nuclear latency. Rather than enter into the
debate over what level of nuclear capability constitutes nuclear “latency,”
this article will focus more specifically on the strategy of hedging. The
article also addresses the question of what external and internal political
pressures convince some states to pursue a policy of hedging while others
feel compelled to overtly test and declare their nuclear weapons.
32 33
The field of international relations includes an expansive literature on
the causes of nuclear proliferation, why some states seek these weapons
and others do not, and why some states relinquish their nuclear weapons.
Policy decisions in this realm were traditionally considered binary: a state
could either go nuclear or not. Nuclear latency and the related strategy of
nuclear hedging open a spectrum of gray between these stark black and
white choices. The question becomes not just whether or not a state will
go nuclear, but up to what point will it develop its nuclear capabilities.
New analysis is needed to address this question; yet the traditional theo-
ries of nuclear proliferation can still be applied. The principal variables
that govern whether a state may or may not seek a weapon—the external
security environment and domestic political pressures—may also help
inform whether a state might pursue a strategy of nuclear hedging and to
what degree it might seek to develop its nuclear program.
The Security Environment
Realist scholars consider external security conditions to be the primary
driver of global nuclear proliferation. In this model, states seek nuclear
weapons when they face a significant security threat that they cannot
confront solely through conventional military means. This threat may take
the form of a rival with superior conventional forces or one with a nuclear
capability. Nuclear weapons scholar Scott Sagan has noted that proliferation
often occurs in pairs or bunches: as one state acquires a nuclear weapon,
its rivals feel compelled to acquire it as well (Sagan 1996, 57). History
provides ample evidence for this theory. The knowledge that Germany was
seeking a nuclear device compelled the United States, United Kingdom,
and Soviet Union to scramble to develop a weapon first. India sought to
acquire a weapon after neighboring China tested a device, and Pakistan
conducted its first test just two weeks after India tested weapons in 1998.
This logic also helps explain why states may not want to acquire nuclear
weapons. While a state might seek to develop a weapon if its rival has one,
it may also choose to avoid provoking proliferation by its neighbors. If a
state has a conventional military advantage, it will likely see a situation
in which both it and its rival acquire a nuclear weapon—the great equal-
izer—as a decrease in its relative power. Thus, states will pursue a policy
that Professor T.V. Paul terms “prudential realism,” in which they seek
to balance their desire to maximize their own capabilities with a desire
34 35
to minimize the degree to which they are perceived as a threat to their
neighbors (Paul 2000, 5). Through the lens of prudential realism, nuclear
latency becomes an attractive policy option. It allows a state to develop the
capabilities to quickly build a weapon in the event of escalating regional
tensions, but in the meantime is far less provocative than actually testing
and deploying a weapon.
An alternative policy may be to seek security guarantees from a nuclear
power. A nuclear umbrella may have a deterring effect on a state’s adversar-
ies without pushing them to develop a weapon of their own. In tandem,
nuclear latency and inclusion in a nuclear umbrella may be a particularly
effective policy package. A latent nuclear capability alone may not be a
sufficient deterrent, as a rival can always attack before the latent state is
able to assemble and deploy a weapon. Moreover, the nuclear umbrella
strategy carries the risk that the ally’s commitment to the security guaran-
tee may waiver in the future. But, when combined, the nuclear umbrella
deters potential adversaries while the latent nuclear capability provides an
insurance policy in case that security guarantee weakens.
Domestic Political Dynamics
While external security factors provide a clear and relatively simple explana-
tion for nuclear behavior, states’ nuclear decision-making may be strongly
influenced by internal factors as well. These domestic pressures may take
multiple forms. Sagan’s “domestic politics model” focuses on the effect of
bureaucratic interests on nuclear policy (Sagan 1996, 55). He posits that
nuclear programs are promoted by a coalition of industrial, scientific, and
military actors that seek to benefit from a nuclear weapons development
program. When these interest groups are able to unite and win the battle
of bureaucratic politics, they can push a government to pursue a weapon
even when external security conditions have not changed. Sagan points
to India and South Africa as cases where internal bureaucratic politics can
better explain the timing of key nuclear decisions than security factors.
However, if domestic interest groups opposed to nuclear weapons are bet-
ter organized and more readily mobilized, bureaucratic interests can push
in the other direction. For a government caught between two competing
bureaucratic coalitions, Levite argues that the strategy of nuclear hedging
may carry the lowest political costs (Levite 2002, 74).
Popular beliefs and norms regarding nuclear weapons can also influence
a government’s nuclear strategy. As with bureaucratic coalitions, these
norms can push for or against weaponization. The domestic public may
see nuclear weapons as a symbol of prestige and a necessary step in order
34 35
for a nation to assume its rightful place among elite global powers. On
the other hand, nuclear weapons can be seen as a taboo and contrary to
a nations core values (Sagan 1996, 76). Some states exhibit both of these
normative trends; in these cases, nuclear latency could provide a compro-
mise solution. Developing nuclear capabilities can allow political leaders
to rally national pride over their country’s scientific and technological ac-
complishments. For example they may choose to publicly announce and
celebrate key milestones of nuclear development, such as the successful
uranium enrichment or the construction of a new research reactor. However,
by pursuing only a latent nuclear capability, these leaders are still able to
avoid the risks that would come from actually testing a nuclear weapon.
The way in which a government responds to bureaucratic and popular
pressures also depends on the nature of the regime in power. Changes in
government have often been pivotal moments in states’ nuclear trajecto-
ries. It is no coincidence that South Africa gave up its nuclear weapons
program during its transition to a post-apartheid regime. Argentina and
Brazil similarly abandoned their weapons programs as they moved toward
liberalization. India’s on-again, off-again posture towards further testing
and weaponization from 1974 to 1998 corresponded with governmental
changes (Sagan 1996, 66). Changes in government could increase the
likelihood that a state will eventually test a weapon, based on the govern-
ment’s perception of its security environment or the ideology of its political
Japanese nuclear policy is inevitably shaped by the country’s tragic dis-
tinction as the only nation to be the victim of a nuclear attack. Japan’s
constitution specifically renounces war and the use of offensive weapons.
And while historians continue to debate the degree to which this language
was drafted at the demands of the American occupiers at the end of World
War II (Shoichi 1998, 82-83), it has become a firmly embedded principle
of Japanese policy. Japan reiterated these principles and applied them
specifically to the issue of nuclear weapons in the 1955 Atomic Energy
Basic Law, which restricts the use of nuclear energy to purely peaceful
purposes. In 1968, the Japanese Diet, the country’s legislative body, ad-
opted the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” which stipulated that Japan
would not manufacture, possess, or permit the introduction of nuclear
weapons into its territory.
Despite its unique history and the resulting policies banning nuclear
weapons, Japan has developed an extensive nuclear energy program. Nuclear
36 37
power plants account for 30 percent of Japans energy production, and the
country has the third highest number of nuclear reactors in the world with
thirty-five (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2009). Furthermore, Japan has an active
program for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. As a result, it has the largest
stockpiles of separated plutonium of any non-nuclear state (International
Panel on Fissile Materials 2009, 23). The Japanese government maintains
that this material will eventually be used as fuel in new reactors. In the
meantime, however, the plutonium quantities are reportedly sufficient to
produce up to 10,000 warheads (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2009). Analysts
speculate that Japan is mere months away from being able to assemble a
nuclear warhead if it so chooses (Levite 2002, 71). Moreover, in recent
years, Japanese leadership has shown a willingness to broach the topic of
reconsidering its nuclear policy. In 1999, Vice Defense Minister Shingo
Nishimura told a magazine that the Japanese parliament should “consider
that Japan might be better off if it armed itself with nuclear weapons,” and
in 2002 then Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary (and later Prime Minister)
Shinzo Abe argued that Japans laws do “not necessarily ban the posses-
sion of nuclear weapons as long as they are kept at a minimum and are
tactical” (Campbell and Sunohara 2004, 229).
The Security Environment: Japan under the U.S. Nuclear
The protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella has provided Japan with a strong
deterrent while allowing it to maintain its nuclear abstinence. However,
recent changes in the Asia-Pacific security environment may strain this
policy. North Korea’s nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, as well as its mis-
sile tests over Japanese airspace, have led to a widespread perception that
North Korea poses an escalating threat to Japan. Chinas rapid economic
expansion and the corresponding surge in its military and defense spend-
ing represent another potential threat to Japan and the region at large.
Furthermore, China is aggressively pursuing a nuclear energy program that
could involve reprocessing on a large scale. This could result in China also
having large stockpiles of separated plutonium (Jane’s Information Group
2011). The end of the Cold War has compounded these potential threats
by calling into question the United Statessecurity commitment to Japan.
Without the threat of the Soviet Union, and with its forces extended in
Iraq and Afghanistan, would the United States still be able and willing to
come to Japans defense (Hughes 2007, 72)?
Japan has responded to these challenges by redoubling its efforts to
maintain its close security relationship with the United States. For example,
36 37
it has sought explicit clarification that the United States would respond with
force to North Korean aggression (Hughes 2007, 76). Such clarification
was intended not only to provide greater confidence to Japan’s leaders and
population, but also to deter North Korea by emphasizing the potential
consequences of aggression. It has also increased its military participation
in alliance activities, including sending Japanese forces to Iraq in 2003
(Hughes 2007, 79).
The political costs of developing nuclear weapons are also likely to have
influenced Japans nuclear strategy. Going fully nuclear would anger the
United States and thus damage its most important security relationship.
Furthermore, it would likely escalate tensions with China and could spark
a regional build-up of nuclear arms. Under these constraints, nuclear la-
tency represents the optimal strategy for ensuring Japanese security. Since
the U.S. nuclear umbrella currently provides an effective deterrent, Japan
can maintain its long-held position against an internal nuclear weapons
program without unduly compromising its security. But in the event that
the U.S. security guarantee wanes, or is perceived by Japan’s rivals to wane,
Japan is not stuck at square one—it can quickly become a nuclear power
if changes in the security environment convince it that it must.
Domestic Political Dynamics: The Shadow of Hiroshima and
Changes in Japans regional security environment have sparked a revival
of the nuclear debate within its domestic politics. In 2007, Prime Minis-
ter Shinzo Abe declared that acquiring a nuclear weapon might be legal
under Japans constitution, as it could be considered a defensive weapon
(Hughes 2007, 84). However, such arguments are unpopular among the
Japanese polity. Both the Basic Law of 1955 and the Three Principles of
1968 clearly prohibit Japanese acquisition of a bomb. Moreover, Japanese
public opinion remains firmly against nuclear weapons. Even after the first
North Korean nuclear test in 2006, polls indicated that only 17 percent of
the Japanese population supported the idea of nuclear acquisition (Hughes
2007, 89). With such popular opposition and an increasingly competitive
electoral climate, it would be politically reckless for a Japanese government
to go forward with testing a nuclear weapon. Japan’s nuclear latency can
thus be explained both by its security interests and by the strong domestic
pressures against a weapons program.
38 39
While the security environment and domestic politics have led Japan to
maintain a latent nuclear capability, these same two factors led to the op-
posite outcome in India and Pakistan. South Asia presents a case where
two rival states went beyond latency to fully test and deploy nuclear weap-
ons. India first tested a nuclear device in 1974, largely in response to the
Sino-Indian War and China’s successful nuclear test in 1964. But India
did not conduct any further tests or deploy deliverable nuclear weapons
for another thirty-four years. Thus, while most would consider India to
have been a full nuclear power as a result of its 1974 test, it more closely
resembled a latent nuclear state. That is, it sought to demonstrate its
nuclear potential but without incurring the costs of escalation that could
have resulted from testing additional devices or mounting warheads on
missiles. From the perspectives of threat and deterrence, the quasi-latent
status of India’s nuclear program also meant that in the event of a crisis,
adversaries might question whether India truly had the capability to use
nuclear force. Analysts have questioned the efficacy of India’s 1974 nuclear
test (Perkovich 2002, 180), and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi cancelled
planned additional tests in 1982 (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2010c). It is
far from clear when and if India actually had the capability to use a nuclear
weapon in a military context during this time period.
In the mid-1970s after a series of wars with India, Pakistan began a
nuclear program focused on uranium enrichment. By 1990, it was believed
to have become a virtual nuclear power, possessing stockpiles of highly
enriched uranium (HEU) estimated at between 580 and 800 kg—enough
to make thirty to fifty bombs (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2010d). Pakistan’s
Foreign Secretary Shahryar Khan stated publicly in 1992 that Pakistan
had “all the elements which, if hooked together, would become a [nuclear]
device” (Ahmed 1999, 190).
Thus for a period of eight years beginning roughly in 1990, both Paki-
stan and India could be considered latent nuclear states. But on May 11
and May 13, 1998, India conducted its first nuclear tests in twenty-four
years and subsequently declared itself a nuclear power. Pakistan responded
almost immediately with tests of its own on May 28 and May 30 of the
same year.
The Security Environment: A Security Dilemma in South Asia
While both India and Pakistan were pursuing nuclear hedging strategies
38 39
in the early and mid- 1990s, they also continually worked to improve
their weaponization and delivery systems. In 1994, knowing that Pakistan
had stockpiles of nuclear material, India developed the capacity to deliver
a nuclear weapon by aircraft and subsequently designed a warhead that
could be placed on its Prithvi-1 missile (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2010c).
Pakistan responded by similarly seeking to improve its delivery missiles,
acquiring key technologies from China and North Korea (Nuclear Threat
Initiative 2010d).
Unlike Japan, India lacked a security guarantee from a nuclear power
that might have strengthened its faith in deterrence in the face of Pakistans
increasing military capabilities. Indian leaders place its country’s nuclear
policies in the context of its history of non-alignment with great powers.
As such, it is forced to rely on its own military capabilities for its defense.
Jaswant Singh, a defense advisor to Indias Prime Minister Atal Bihari Va-
jpayee, explains the rationale behind India’s 1974 nuclear test in Foreign
Affairs by saying that “with no international security guarantees forthcom-
ing, nuclear abstinence by India alone seemed increasingly worrisome”
(Singh 1998, 42). According to Singh, it was the same logic pushed India
to renewed testing in 1998. While India raised concerns about the nuclear
assistance that China was providing to Pakistan, “the United States was
either unwilling or unable to restrain China” (Singh 1998, 46). India thus
concluded that it could not rely on foreign help and that the only way to
be sure of deterring Pakistan was to conduct another test to demonstrate
its capabilities and signal its willingness to respond in kind to a potential
nuclear attack.
Once India had tested its weapons, Pakistan, unsurprisingly, conducted
a test as well. The potential negative consequence that had prevented Paki-
stan from testing—that it would spark renewed nuclear proliferation in
India—was no longer applicable after the Indian demonstration. Through
the logic of Paul’s prudential realism, Pakistan no longer had anything
to lose. While Pakistan has historically maintained a close relationship
with China, it lacks the type of security guarantee that the United States
provides to Japan and NATO member states. A Pakistani official declared,
“We will never be able to remove the nuclear imbalance if we do not fol-
low suit with our own explosion” (Ahmed 1999, 194). This supports the
inference that nuclear latency is more difficult to maintain in arms races
among rivals without security guarantees from nuclear powers.
40 41
Domestic Political Dynamics: Nuclear Weapons and National
Rather than act as a restraint, domestic political dynamics in both India
and Pakistan propelled the countries toward testing nuclear devices. Both
felt compelled to demonstrate their capabilities not only for the security
rationale of deterrence, but also as a symbol of national prestige. Jaswant
Singh wrote, “Nuclear weapons remain a key indicator of state power.
Since this currency is operational in large parts of the globe, India was left
with no choice but to update and validate the capability that had been
demonstrated twenty-four years ago in the nuclear test of 1974” (Singh
1998, 44). In fact, public opinion polls taken after the original 1974 test
demonstrated the political popularity of nuclear tests in India; 90 percent
of respondents said they were personally proud of India’s achievement
(Sagan 1996, 68).
Changes in Indias nuclear policies can also be linked to transitions in
political leadership. Following India’s first test under Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi, the nuclear program was put on hold in 1977 when the Janata
Party came to power. But Gandhi revived the program when she returned
to power in 1980. This research laid the groundwork for her son, Rajiv
Gandhi, to authorize development of weapons-specific technologies in the
late 1980s (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2010c).
In the 1990s, the Bharativa Janata Party (BJP) (a successor to the previ-
ously mentioned Janata Party) became the national advocate for testing a
weapon and formally declaring Indias nuclear status. Prime Minister Va-
jpayee planned to conduct a test in 1996 but his party lost its seats before
executing a test. In the 1998 election, Vajpayee and the BJP successfully
ran on a platform that pledged to “reevaluate” India’s nuclear policy and
to “exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons” (Ahmed 1999, 193).
While the extent to which this issue played a role in the election is debat-
able, a nuclear test was clearly part of BJP’s domestic political strategy and,
once in power, it carried out the campaign promise.
Pakistan’s decision to test a nuclear weapon can also be traced to bu-
reaucratic politics, in which its military was the primary driver of a more
assertive nuclear policy. Indias test sparked a debate within Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharifs cabinet, with Sharif himself initially taking a more restrained
approach (Ahmed 1999, 194). The military, however, argued forcefully for
Pakistan to respond with its own nuclear tests; while the cabinet may have
been divided, the internal balance of power in Pakistan strongly favored
the military. The military and civil bureaucracy, “with the acquiescence of
the political leadership,” thus decided to proceed with the tests (Ahmed
40 41
1999, 179). While the militarys central role in this decision suggests that
security concerns played an important role, national prestige was clearly
at play as well. Ahmed writes, “for Pakistani policymakers, particularly
the military, a nuclear stature less than India was unacceptable” (Ahmed
1999, 195).
Public opinion also plays an important role in the decision to conduct
tests. Even before India’s test, a 1996 Gallup poll found that 80 percent of
Pakistanis would support a nuclear test if India were to conduct a test first
(Koch 1996, 4). In short, the inability of India and Pakistan to maintain
a status quo of mutual nuclear latency was caused by both a security envi-
ronment that could not prevent escalation and internal political dynamics
that pushed the countries toward conducting nuclear tests.
An analysis of the external security environment and domestic political
factors helps to explain why Japan has maintained nuclear latency despite
growing regional threats and why India and Pakistan felt compelled to
end their respective periods of latency and become full-fledged nuclear
powers. Applying this framework to Iran may therefore be useful in evalu-
ating whether Iran is likely to test a weapon or content itself with a latent
nuclear capability. While drawing analogies between Iran and the countries
detailed above will not produce any definitive conclusions about its nuclear
ambitions, exploring Irans security environment and internal pressures
provides a framework that will more clearly elucidate the factors at play.
The Security Environment: Comparing the Fates of Iraq and
North Korea
Iran faces possible security threats from its Arab neighbors, Israel, and the
United States, each of which could push Iran toward acquiring a nuclear
weapon. Locally, Iran seeks to extend its influence over the Arab Gulf
states. Iran scholar Ray Takeyh writes that, “From the Islamic Republic’s
perspective, the Gulf is its most important strategic arena, constituting its
most reliable access to the international petroleum market” (Takeyh 2004,
53). Moreover, Irans eight-year war with Iraq cost tens of thousands of
lives and remains firmly imprinted in the memories of Irans leaders today.
President Ahmedinejad himself served as a soldier in the Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC). Further, with Saddam Hussein removed from power,
Iran possesses the most powerful conventional military in its immediate
region. Under the logic of prudential realism, deploying nuclear weapons
would actually damage Iran’s regional security by sparking proliferation
42 43
amongst its rivals and thus negating its conventional military advantage.
Israel, however, is widely understood to have a nuclear weapon (Cohen
2010; Nuclear Threat Initiative 2010a). Thus, an Iranian bomb could be a
deterrent against a potential Israeli attack. But despite a history of hostile
rhetoric and proxy battles via the Lebanese Islamist group Hezbollah, there
has been no direct conflict between Israel and Iran. Iran did not partici-
pate in any of the Arab wars against Israel, and Israel has not shown any
inclination to retaliate against Iran for Hezbollahs violent actions. Indeed,
it is Irans nuclear program itself that has raised the possibility of an Israeli
attack. While Israel should rightly be concerned about the possibility of an
Iranian nuclear weapon, it is hard to accept an Israeli threat as rationale for
Iran acquiring the bomb. As former weapons inspector David Kay puts it,
“Iran does not worry that Israel can organize and build a regional coalition
that will limit the power of Iran or might even topple the regime. Only
one state has that power in the eyes of Tehran—the United States” (Kay
2008, 13-14).
Indeed, the United States and Iran have a history of tensions—from the
coup in 1953 to the hostage crisis of 1979—that might cause the Iranian
regime to see the United States as an existential threat. Meanwhile, the
overthrow of Saddam Hussein demonstrated American willingness to use
force to pursue its interests in the region. As one Iranian official stated,
“The fact that Saddam was toppled in twenty-one days is something that
should concern all the countries in the region” (Reuters 2003). The ap-
peal of a nuclear deterrent may be even stronger for Iran as it compares
the respective fates of Iraq and North Korea. The United States targeted
Iraq for forcible regime change, believing Iraq to be developing nuclear
weapons but not yet capable of detonating a weapon. Conversely, the
United States has not pursued coercive action against North Korea, which
demonstrated its nuclear capability in 2006, and has repeatedly offered
North Korea economic incentives in exchange for more cooperative poli-
cies. Takeyh argues that the Iranian regime may interpret U.S. behavior
as suggesting that a developing or latent nuclear capability could put Iran
in jeopardy, while a proven ability to detonate a weapon would be Iran’s
only sure protection against an American attack (Takeyh 2004).
Domestic Political Dynamics: Islam and the Bomb
Irans domestic politics are characterized by factional disputes between
the clerics, revolutionary guard, so-called “pragmatic” conservatives, and
reformists. However, all groups seem to agree that Iran must develop a
high level of nuclear capability. For example, even Mir-Hossein Moussavi,
42 43
the primary challenger to President Mahmud Ahmedinejad in the 2009
elections, declared that “No one in Iran would accept suspension” of the
country’s uranium enrichment program (Financial Times 2009). In 2005,
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa stipulating that no Islamic
state may possess or use atomic weapons. In February 2010, Khamenei
reiterated that Islam is “opposed to nuclear weapons” (Yeranian 2010).
But he has simultaneously been a vocal proponent of developing Iranian
nuclear capacity, even for security purposes. The conservative newspaper
Jumhuriye-Islamii, largely considered a mouthpiece for the Supreme Leader
by scholars of Iranian politics, wrote “in the contemporary world, it is
obvious that having access to advanced weapons shall cause deterrence
and, therefore, security” (Takeyh 2004, 56).
Pragmatic conservatives and reformists, interested in opening Iran for
greater economic growth, may also be wary of the diplomatic and eco-
nomic isolation that a nuclear test would produce. Many have hoped that
if these leaders were to come to power, Iran might be more willing to cut
a deal with the West and, in essence, to exchange its nuclear program for
economic benefits. However, Iran’s 2009 political campaign should cast
some doubt on such optimistic assumptions. Even the reformist candi-
date Mir Hossein Moussavi struck a defiant stance on the Iranian nuclear
program, stating that Iran would never halt its enrichment of uranium
(PressTV 2009).
Finally, the religious edicts of the Supreme Leader and the liberalizing
instincts of the pragmatists and reformists may be irrelevant if, as Iran
analyst Gary Sick suggests, the IRGC has essentially carried out a “soft
coup” and assumed exclusive control of Irans national security decision
making (Sick 2009). The IRGC is less likely to be influenced by religious
dogma or economic incentives and may view a successful nuclear test as
the only way for Iran to establish a credible deterrent against the United
States and assume its rightful place in the elite group of world nuclear
powers. Depending on which faction emerges victorious out of the past
year’s turmoil, Iran’s internal political dynamics could either restrain it
from moving beyond latency or propel it toward a nuclear test.
As Iran progresses toward developing a nuclear weapon capability, the
international community has a compelling interest in preventing it from
testing a nuclear device. Although most states would prefer Iran refrain
from developing even a latent capability, Irans interests and behavior in-
dicate that this is highly unlikely. Iran’s consistent defiance of UN Security
44 45
Council and IAEA resolutions, and its slow but steady uranium enrichment
(even with the most recent “Stuxnet” setbacks), both indicate that it is
only a matter of time before Iran acquires the technological capability to
build a nuclear weapon.
However, it is not inevitable that Iran will test a nuclear device upon
acquiring the capability to do so. Given this situation, the international
community should dedicate its energies toward encouraging Iranian nuclear
latency and preventing nuclear testing. This scenario greatly reduces the
risks that other states in the region would feel compelled to test weapons
or that dangerous non-state groups would try to acquire a nuclear weapon.
The theories and cases examined in this article suggest the following steps
for the international community to increase the likelihood of Iran pursuing
only a latent nuclear capability:
End Talk of Preventive Military Strikes on Iran: The crucial disad-
vantage of the hedging strategy for a potential nuclear power is the lack
of a credible nuclear deterrent. As long as Iran does not have a deployed
nuclear weapon that it can use to threaten counterattack, Iran will feel
vulnerable to military strikes by Israel and/or the United States. This threat
would likely be the primary impetus for Iran to develop an overt nuclear
capability. In fact, Irans current nuclear development efforts could be
seen as a race to develop a nuclear capability before Israel or the United
States decides to attack. Israel and the United States should seek to reverse
this logic by downplaying the possibility of a preventive strike as long as
Iran refrains from testing or deploying a weapon. If Iran were to conduct
a nuclear test, all bets are off, and such an action may invite a forceful
response. By clarifying this “red line,” the United States and Israel will
alter the incentives facing Iran in a way that will encourage Iran to pursue
a latent rather than overt nuclear capability.
Support from Russia and China: The U.S. nuclear umbrella has been
a key factor in dissuading Japan from advancing beyond nuclear latency.
It is unlikely and undesirable for any state to similarly accept a nuclear-
backed security guarantee from Russia and China. However, it may be in
the international community’s interest for China and Russia to continue
playing the role of Irans supporters. If Iranian leaders believe that such
great powers as China and Russia will help protect Irans security, they
may forego deploying their own nuclear deterrent. The message from
Russia and China to Iran must be crystal clear in order for such a strategy
to work. They must convey that while they are willing to support Iran’s
nuclear development and its conventional military forces, all assistance
would end if Iran were to test a nuclear device.
44 45
Nuclear Technology in the Arabian Peninsula: The international
community must increase the perceived costs to Iran of testing a nuclear
weapon. One way of doing this is to make a nuclear test a “red line” that
might invite a forceful response as described above. Another strategy is
to continue to provide limited materials and assistance to Irans rivals in
the Arabian Peninsula. Avoiding proliferation among one’s rivals is a key
reason that states pursue a policy of nuclear hedging. Iran may be more
likely to adopt such a policy if it fears proliferation amongst its Arab rivals.
Of course, one of Iran’s regional rivals, Israel, is already presumed to have
a nuclear capability. However, it has to date been unwilling to officially
acknowledge its arsenal and, more importantly, unwilling to threaten its
use in regional conflicts. Iran should fear that conducting an overt nuclear
test might spark a change in Israel’s nuclear policy. An Israel that is will-
ing to threaten nuclear retaliation against Iran for attacks launched by
Hezbollah would put Iran in a very dangerous situation.
Avoid Intervention in Iranian Domestic Politics: Domestic politics
also play an integral role in states’ nuclear policies. The international com-
munity can do little in this regard; efforts by the international community
to intervene in Iranian domestic politics are likely to only exacerbate the
situation. Intervention may increase the chances that Iran will test a nuclear
weapon in an effort to incite nationalist sentiment in support of the ruling
government and to bolster Iranian prestige in the international commu-
nity. The United States may wish to continue pursuing public diplomacy
efforts to help mitigate its image as a threat to the country. However, it
should strive not to be seen as taking sides between political factions or
supporting efforts to overthrow the regime. In fact, even many dissident
groups themselves have argued that support from the United States is
counterproductive and undermines their mission (O’Rourke 2007).
As technologies will inevitably continue to spread, an increasing number
of states will possess at least the scientific capability to produce a nuclear
weapon. Thus, the main barrier to acquiring the bomb will no longer be
technology, but political choice.
It is impossible to predict with any degree of certainty whether and when
Iran might detonate a device and declare itself a nuclear state. However,
the cases of Japan and South Asia shed some light onto the factors that
influence states’ nuclear policy choices. The possibility of future U.S.
intervention provides the most compelling motive for Iran to develop
a demonstrable nuclear deterrent. The contrasting examples set by U.S.
46 47
policy toward North Korea and Iraq make it likely that Iran will continue
to pursue such a deterrent presence unless it can be convinced that weapons
tests will lead to more dire security consequences than abstinence.
The world is likely to face many more cases similar to Iran in the future.
Minimizing the number of states that test and deploy nuclear weapons
will require the international community to address both the security and
domestic political factors that influence whether latent states choose to
become nuclear states. Global powers must provide incentives on both
fronts, from expanding nuclear umbrellas to strengthening norms against
proliferation, if they hope to convince the expanding ranks of nuclear
capable states not to build the bomb.
Ahmed, Samina. 1999. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and
Nuclear Choices. International Security 23, no. 4 (Spring).
Campbell, Kurt M., and Tsuyoshi Sunohara. 2004. Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable.
In The Nuclear Tipping Point. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Cohen, Avner. 2010. The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel’s Bargain with the Bomb. Co-
lumbia University Press.
Cole, Juan. 2009. Does Iran really want the bomb? August 7. http://
(accessed July 6, 2011).
Dilanian, Ken. 2011. Iran’s Nuclear Program and a New Era of Cyber War. The
Los Angeles Times, January 17.
Financial Times Interview: Mir-Hossein Moussavi. Financial Times, April 13.
html#axzz1F6CKu3oK (accessed July 6, 2011).
Hughes, Llewelyn. 2007. Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet). International
Security 31, no. 4.
Hymans, Jacques E. 2010. When Does a State Become a “Nuclear Weapons State”?
The Nonproliferation Review 17, no. 1: 161-180.
International Panel on Fissile Materials. 2009. 2009 Global Fissile Material Report:
Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpiles and Production. http://www.fis-
(accessed July 6, 2011).
Jane’s Information Group. 2011. Strategic Weapon System, China. Jane’s Sentinel
Security Assessment. China and Northeast Asia. January 17.
Kay, David. 2008. Nuclear Fallout. The National Interest.
Koch, Andrew. 1996. Nuclear Testing in South Asia and the CTBT. The Nonpro-
liferation Review: 98 - 104.
46 47
Nuclear Threat Initiative. 2009. Japan Profile. NTI: Research Library: Country
Profiles: Japan. October.
index.html (accessed August 31, 2010)..
———. 2010a. Israel Profile. NTI Research Library: Country Profiles: Israel. Janu-
ary. (accessed April
15, 2011).
———. 2010b. South Africa Profile. NTI: Research Library: Country Profiles:
South Africa. January.
html (accessed August 31, 2010).
———. 2010c. India Profile. NTI: Country Overviews: India: Profile. February. (accessed August 31,
———. 2010d. Pakistan Profile. NTI: Country Overviews: Pakistan: Introduction.
February. (accessed
August 31, 2010).
O’Rourke, Breffni. 2007. Iran: Dissidents Debate Merits of U.S. Democracy Aid.
Radio Free Europe, November 2.
html (accessed July 6, 2011).
Paul, T.V. 2000. Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons. Quebec
City: McGill-Queens University Press.
Perkovich, George. 2002. India’s Nuclear Bomb: the Impact on Global Proliferation.
University of California Press.
PressTV. 2009. Mousavi: Iran will never halt enrichment. Pavyand News. April 14. (accessed July 6, 2011).
Reuters. 2003. Irans New Anxieties. Reuters, April 19.
Sagan, Scott. 1996. Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in
Search of a Bomb. International Security 21, no. 3: 54-86.
Sanger, David E., and Thom Shanker. 2010. Gates Says U.S. Lacks a Policy to
Thwart Iran. The New York Times, April 17.
Shoichi, Koseki. 1998. The Birth of Japan’s Postwar Constitution. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press.
Sick, Gary. 2009. Iran’s Political Coup. Gary’s Choices. June 13. http://garysick. (accessed July 6, 2011).
Singh, Jaswant. 1998. Against Nuclear Apartheid. Foreign Affairs 7 7 , n o . 5 ( O c t o b e r ) .
Takeyh, Ray. 2004. Iran Builds the Bomb. Survival 46, no. 4 (Winter -2005).
Wohlstetter, Albert, Gregory Jones, and Roberta Wohlstetter. 1979. Towards a New
Consensus on Nuclear Technology. Los Angeles: Pan Heuristics.
Yeranian, Edward. 2010. Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei Says Islam Opposes
Nuclear Weapons. Voice of America News, February 19. http://www1.voanews.
es-Nuclear-Weapons-84771247.html (accessed July 6, 2011).
The emergence of new nuclear aspirants has posed a great threat to the post-Cold War global nonproliferation regime. These states have adopted a nuclear hedging strategy that has been deemed both strategically risky and politically difficult to maintain. Yet, hedging has not automatically resulted in nuclearisation. We analyse the conditions under which a nuclear hedger shifts its nuclear policy towards one of restraint. Drawing insights from prospect theory, we argue that a nuclear policy shift occurs when a nuclear hedger gains an asymmetric leverage vis-à-vis its adversary. Specifically, a hedging strategy that is based on loss aversion will only be abandoned when a shift in the nuclear aspirant’s reference point occurs during negotiations. To test our theoretical arguments, we conduct an in-depth case study of North Korea’s nuclear policies throughout the 1990s and 2000s. The empirical study of the changes in North Korea’s negotiating stance during the Agreed Framework negotiations and the Six-Party Talks supports our asymmetric leverage thesis. We conclude with broad policy implications for the non-proliferation regime.
Full-text available
Japan's status as a nonnuclear weapons state remains of ongoing interest to policy analysts and scholars of international relations. For some, Japanese nuclearization is a question not of whether but of when. This article reassesses the state of the evidence on the nuclearization of Japan. It finds that support in Japan for the development of an independent nuclear deterrent remains negligible. Evidence demonstrates that ministries and agencies with responsibility for foreign and security policy have sought to consolidate Japan's existing insurance policies against nuclear threats—multilateral regimes and the extension of the U.S. nuclear deterrent to Japan—rather than seeking an indigenous nuclear deterrent. The article also finds, however, that the door to independent nuclearization remains ajar. Policymakers have ensured that constitutional and other domestic legal hurdles do not significantly constrain Japan from developing an independent nuclear deterrent. Further, recent centralization of authority in the prime minister and Cabinet Office has increased the freedom of action of leaders, enabling them to overcome political opposition to changes in security policy to a degree not possible in the past. This suggests that Japan's future position toward nuclear weapons could be more easily altered than before, should leader preferences change.
Since independence, India's nuclear policy has been to seek either global disarmament or equal security for all. The old nonproliferation regime was discriminatory, ratifying the possession of nuclear weapons for the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council while preaching to the nuclear have-nots about the virtues of disarmament. India was left sandwiched between two nuclear weapons powers, Pakistan and a rising China. The end of the Cold War has not ushered in an era where globalization and trade trump old-fashioned security woes. If nuclear deterrence works in the West, why won't it work in India?
Samina Ahmed has written extensively on South Asian nuclear proliferation. She is coeditor of Pakistan and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998). She is currently a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. 1. To date the government has provided very little technical data on the nuclear tests, and officials have contradicted one another about the number of tests conducted. 2. Quoted in "Prime Minister Links Pak-India Amity to Kashmir Solution," News, June 14, 1998. 3. According to Minister for Information Mushahid Hussain Syed, "The world community now treats Pakistan and India as equals." Quoted in "N-Tests Elevated Pakistan's Political Stature: Mushahid," News, June 26, 1998. See also Sandy Gordon, "Capping South Asia's Nuclear Weapons Program: A Window of Opportunity?" Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 7 (July 1994), p. 667. 4. Addressing the National Assembly on September 8, 1998, Commerce Minister Ishaq Dar admitted that Pakistan was on the verge of financial default as a result of the sanctions. Mariana Babar, "Pakistan Faces Engineered Default, Dar Tells NA," News, September 9, 1998. 5. Pakistan refused to accept the accession of the Muslim-majority state of Kashmir to India, which resulted in armed conflict in 1948. India, however, succeeded in retaining control over most of the princely state's territory. India and Pakistan have since rejected each other's authority over Kashmir, and a Line of Control, instead of an international boundary, divides Indian- and Pakistani-administered Kashmir. 6. Pakistan became a member of a number of U.S. or U.S.-sponsored security alliances in the mid-1950s, including the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the Baghdad Pact (later renamed the Central Treaty Organization). 7. Yunas Samad, "The Military and Democracy in Pakistan," Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Fall 1994), p. 190. 8. Quoted in Samina Ahmed and David Cortright, "Going Nuclear: The Weaponization Option," in Ahmed and Cortright, eds., Pakistan and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), p. 90. 9. Cited in Zafar Iqbal Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear Policies: Attitudes and Postures," in P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Iftekharuzzaman, eds., Nuclear Non-Proliferation in India and Pakistan: South Asian Perspectives (New Delhi: Monohar, 1996), p. 10. 10. Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party had won a majority of seats in West Pakistan during the 1970 general elections. 11. Bhutto's army chief, for example, declared that an Indian acquisition of nuclear weapons would mean that "we will have to beg or borrow to develop our own nuclear capability." Quoted in Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984), p. 34. 12. Ibid., pp. 75-76. 13. Ibid., p. 79. 14. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, If I Am Assassinated . . . (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979), pp. 137-138. 15. Bhutto claimed that Kissinger had "threatened" to make "a horrible example" out of him if he did not give up the nuclear weapons program. Quoted in Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 273. 16. Quoted in Akhtar Ali, Pakistan's Nuclear Dilemma: Energy and Security Dimensions (Karachi: Economic Research Unit, 1984), p. 10. See also Mitchell Reiss, "Safeguarding the Nuclear Peace in South Asia," Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 12 (December 1993), pp. 1110-1111. 17. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, p. 101. 18. Pakistan's KANUPP plant did not require uranium enriched beyond 3 to 5 percent U235. 19. U.S. intelligence agencies believed that Pakistan had acquired weapons-grade material, and had even cold-tested some components of its nuclear device by 1986. Leonard S. Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1989-1990 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990), pp. 95, 99. 20. In an interview with an Urdu-language newspaper, Nawai-i-Waqt, in 1984, Abdul Qadeer Khan declared that Pakistan could "efficiently enrich (weapons-grade) uranium." This represented the first public, albeit unofficial, acknowledgment of Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability. Quoted in Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, pp. 98-99. 21. Ali...
The added value of Avner Cohen's new book on Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity—or as he prefers to call it, "amimut"—is at the descriptive level: interesting historical and anecdotal evidence and documentation on the birth, development, and supporting features of Israel's bargain with the bomb. But analytically speaking, Cohen's book is largely a disappointment. He is critical of amimut and informs his reader from the outset that the time has come for change. But when he attempts to support his thesis—on both domestic and strategic grounds—the result is weak and unsubstantiated. It is quite clear that the impetus for writing this book was the domestic Israeli front, and the unacceptable costs that Cohen believes that Israel as a society and a state has paid for maintaining secrecy in the nuclear realm and upholding the national nuclear taboo. Intellectually, however, Cohen knows that the case for ending amimut must be anchored in strategic realities. The problem is that his two "strategic" chapters—which appear almost as an afterthought —offer a logic that doesn't stand up to scrutiny, especially for the more informed reader. On the issue of taboo, it seems that Cohen cannot escape the chains of his own past experience—namely, the personal price that he paid with the taboo-keepers in Israel for writing his previous book on Israel and the Bomb. But this personal aversion to secrecy should not be confused with the strategic dimensions and implications of Israel's policy of ambiguity and/or the discussion of whether the time has come for a change. Cohen's depiction of the taboo's effect on society is troubling. His static portrayal fails to appreciate the reality that has evolved in Israel, especially over the past 10 to 15 years: the quite extensive debate that is carried out on this topic in Israel on a regular basis—in the media, at conferences, and in academic writing. Academics address the nuclear issue frequently and without concern. One of Cohen's mistakes is to reduce "having a debate on the nuclear issue" to the presence of an active protest movement against the bomb—a problematic criterion for assessing whether Israelis discuss their nation's nuclear policy. Cohen has harsh words for the Israeli public—he regards Israelis as willing accomplices in a culture of non-debate of nuclear issues. He derides them and complains that they support the nuclear policy even though they don't understand it. Even the educated, in his view, have little understanding of the "legal and political intricacies of the nonproliferation regime," and blindly support amimut. From their position of ignorance, "Israelis regard compromising amimut as a direct threat to their national security." But Israelis might be smarter than Cohen gives them credit for. Indeed, they most likely well understand the rather straightforward strategic logic of nuclear ambiguity, which gives them an insurance policy at very low cost. They also seem to realize that "coming clean" will be viewed negatively world-wide, and will increase demands for Israel to disarm. Indeed, although Cohen assumes that people are holding on to their positions for the wrong reasons, they are more likely doing so for the right ones. At the end of the day, the strongest advocate for the continuation of a nuclear taboo—in the sense that he will not admit to any erosion of the omnipresent norm—seems to be Avner Cohen himself. The taboo is actually the linchpin of his analysis—without it, his thesis crumbles. On the strategic front—where the logic of amimut is solid and strong—Cohen's attempt to undermine the policy is even more problematic. He provides a superficial and often tautological reasoning for ending amimut that rests on repeated assertions that the policy is anachronistic. But to say that "everybody knows" Israel is nuclear is not a compelling argument—this has been the situation for at least 25 years. And the original deal of amimut was in any case never about secrecy per se—it was rather grounded in the logic of maintaining a low profile. Therefore, Israel's position of non-admission has importance, regardless of the facts that people...
Scott D. Sagan is Associate Professor of Political Science and a faculty associate of the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University. I greatly benefited from discussions about earlier drafts of this article at seminars at the Aspen Strategy Group, the Institute for Defense Analysis, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Monterey Institute of International Studies, the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. For especially detailed comments and criticisms, I thank Itty Abraham, Eric Arnett, Michael Barletta, George Bunn, Colin Elman, Miriam Fendius Elman, Peter Feaver, Harald Müller, George Perkovich, Jessica Stern, and Bradley Thayer. Benjamin Olding and Nora Bensahel provided excellent research assistance. Support for this research was provided by the W. Alton Jones Foundation and the Institute for Defense Analysis. 1. Among policymakers, John Deutsch presents the most unadorned summary of the basic argument that "the fundamental motivation to seek a weapon is the perception that national security will be improved." John M. Deutsch, "The New Nuclear Threat," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 41 (Fall 1992), pp. 124-125. Also see George Shultz, "Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No. 2093 (December 1984), pp. 17-21. For examples of the dominant paradigm among scholars, see Michael M. May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand," American Scientist, Vol. 82, No. 6 (November-December 1994), pp. 526-537; Bradley A. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Nonproliferation Regime," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 463-519; Benjamin Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," and Richard K. Betts, "Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs, and Nonproliferation Revisited," both in Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds. The Proliferation Puzzle, special issue of Security Studies, Vol. 2, No, 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 37-38 and pp. 100-124; and David Gompert, Kenneth Watman, amd Dean Wilkening, "Nuclear First Use Revisited," Survival, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Autumn 1995), p. 39. 2. See Steve Fetter, "Verifying Nuclear Disarmament," Occasional Paper No. 29, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, October 1996, p. 38; and "Affiliations and Nuclear Activities of 172 NPT Parties," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 2 (March 1995), pp. 33-36. For earlier pioneering efforts to assess nuclear weapons latent capability and demand, see Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); and William C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation (Cambridge, Mass: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1982). 3. For example, May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand"; Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Nonproliferation Regime"; and Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation." 4. The seminal text of neorealism remains Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979). Also see Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 39-52; and Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). 5. The Israeli, and possibly the Pakistani, nuclear weapons decisions might be the best examples of defensive responses to conventional security threats; Iraq, and possibly North Korea, might be the best examples of the offensive coercive threat motivation. On the status quo bias in neorealist theory in general, see Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107, and Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993). 6. Shultz, "Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," p. 18. 7. On the genesis of the atomic programs in World War II, see McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988) pp. 3-53; and Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986). 8. A. Lavrent'yeva in "Stroiteli novogo mira," V mire knig, No. 9 (1970), in David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven, Conn.: Yale...
The Islamic Republic is immersed in an intense debate regarding the direction of its nuclear programme. What Iran will do is likely to depend on the type of relationship it has with the United States, the emerging security architecture in the Persian Gulf and the evolving nature of its domestic politics. As constituencies and alliances shift, and policies and positions alter within the corridors of clerical power, Washington has an opportunity to influence the direction of Iran's nuclear deliberations before decisive steps are taken in the wrong direction. Through a bilateral arrangement involving mutual concessions from both sides, the US could empower those within the clerical estate calling for nuclear restraint. In dealing with Iran's nuclear crisis, US leadership and active engagement are indispensable.