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The Rise of Qatar as a Soft Power and the Challenges

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Abstract

This paper argues that Qatar exercises soft power influence in a troubled region via attraction and “carrots”. The sources of attraction includes: Qatar’s political stability derived from its military alliance with the U.S and effective income redistribution policies and a progressive higher education system which have greatly enhanced the stature of Qatar in the Middle East. Qatar offers the following “carrots” for influence: the potency of its Aljazeera Network, “carrot diplomacy”, sports investments and a generous foreign aid policy. However, the efficacy of these tools could be undermined, by the lack of a democratic culture in Qatar, questionable associations and causes, the unsustainable trajectory of “carrot” diplomacy and a creeping shift towards hard power in resolving conflicts and its attendant backlash.
1
The Rise of Qatar as a Soft Power and the Challenges
This paper argues that Qatar exercises soft power influence in a troubled region via
attraction and “carrots”. The sources of attraction includes: Qatar’s political
stability derived from its military alliance with the U.S and effective income
redistribution policies and a progressive higher education system which have greatly
enhanced the stature of Qatar in the Middle East. Qatar offers the following
“carrots” for influence: the potency of its Aljazeera Network, “carrot diplomacy”,
sports investments and a generous foreign aid policy. However, the efficacy of these
tools could be undermined, by the lack of a democratic culture in Qatar, questionable
associations and causes, the unsustainable trajectory of “carrot” diplomacy and a
creeping shift towards hard power in resolving conflicts and its attendant backlash.
Keywords: Qatar, hard power, soft power, diplomacy, Arab Spring, Middle East
Introduction:
This paper seeks to explore how Qatar exerts soft power influence in its
foreign policy and its attendant challenges. Since Joseph Nye pioneered the concept
of soft power, there have been numerous articles on how countries are exerting soft
power influence. However, most of these articles have disproportionately focused on
the same traditional great powers that dominate international politics in the exercise of
hard power such as the U.S, China, Russia and other European powers. Thus the focus
on Qatar offers a departure from a great power exercising any form of power and
demonstrates how a small country can punch above its weight by exerting soft power
influence and shaping the course of history in the Middle East.
Joseph Nye defines soft power as the ability to affect others to obtain the
outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment.
1
Nye notes
that “one can affect other’s behavior in three main ways: threats of coercion (sticks),
inducements and payments (‘carrots’), and attraction that makes others want what you
want.”
2
Also, soft-power relies on three main resources: cultural - places where it is
attractive; political values -when the promoter adheres to them at home and abroad;
and foreign policies- regarded as legitimate and having moral authority
3
. In this
regard, this paper argues that Qatar relies on attraction and “carrots” in its exercise of
soft power. Qatar’s relative political stability in a turbulent region derived from a
strong military alliance with the U.S and the effective redistribution of wealth among
its citizens constitute a major source of attraction within its sphere of influence in the
Middle East. In addition, the image of the Aljazeera media network as the voice of the
powerless coupled with a progressive higher educational system is shaping the hearts
and minds of thousands of people within the region. In terms of carrots, the volume
1
Joseph Nye, Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.The Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science 616 (2008), 94
2
Ibid
3
J. Nye, Soft power: The Means to Success in World Politics. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 11.
2
and scope of Qatar’s foreign aid, sports investments and “carrot” diplomatic efforts is
a major boost for its attempt at soft power. However, these could be derailed by the
following: creeping utilization of “sticks” in the form of military intervention in Libya
and Syria, questionable associations and causes, the unsustainable trajectory of
“carrot” diplomacy and the risk of negative backlash.
Soft Power by Attraction
Dividends of U.S./Qatar Military Alliance
Although Qatar is not a democratic country in the liberal sense and thus hardly
a symbol for liberal democratic ideals in practice that is worthy of universal
admiration and attraction, it still has some indirect hard-power that that makes it
attractive within its sphere of influence in the Middle East. This is because, Military
power can also be an attraction to those who wish to be on the winning side - or at
least wish to avoid being on the losing side. Military units can be used for disaster
relief”
4
. In this regard, Qatar’s military alliance with the U.S and its hosting of the
U.S. military base, CENTCOM has bolstered its image in the region to the point of
mute attraction and awe which constitute soft power. For example, the U.S/Qatar
military alliance enabled Qatar to engage in military humanitarian intervention in
Libya, addition to the hard power participation in the overthrow of the Gaddafi
regime.
Furthermore, it inoculates Qatar against any immediate regional threat and
preserves the power and authority of the Al-Thani dynasty as would be provocateurs
would have to contend with the full might of the sole Super-power in the world which
has vested military and economic interest in Qatar. Second, the U.S military alliance
also enhances the image of Qatar regionally and worldwide as a stable country that
has the approval and ear of the sole Super-power thereby enabling Qatar to leverage
this benefit into soft power influence in places where Qatar can serve as an
interlocutor between the U.S and its Middle Eastern and Muslim friends, who are
wary and suspicious of U.S motives.
Effective Distribution of National Wealth
Qatar stands out in a region where there is massive disenchantment against the
ruling elites for their failure to effectively manage their respective economies and
distribute immense wealth from oil sales. It is therefore not surprising that Qatar
remains unscathed by the Arab Spring phenomenon. Through this default mode, Qatar
has become the proverbial one-eyed man in the kingdom of the blind, worthy of
everyone’s leadership.
Qatar is blessed with the double fortune of immense natural resources and a
small population which has enabled the leadership to formulate an uncontested
domestic and foreign policy at home. According to the 2008 Economist intelligence
report, Qatar had a GDP per capita per person of a whopping $448, 246. This level of
4
Dan Blatt, review of The Paradox of American Power by Joseph Nye, Futurecasts 4 (2002):3.
3
wealth has insulated Qatar from the socio-economic discontent that has led to the
political turmoil of the Arab Spring. The Qatari state has proven itself to be an
effective distributor of wealth to its citizens through public sector employment, grants
of land to citizens and the provision of subsidized goods and services. This is in
contrast to other countries in the region such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman
where a complex demographic mix and increasing population continue to pose a
strain on wealth distribution
5
.
Indeed there is evidence to show that Qataris are content with the wealth
distribution. According to the results of the third annual Arab Youth Survey published
in March 2011 by the Dubai based Public relations firm, Asda’a Burson-Marstellar,
the percentage of respondents who ranked democracy as important had fallen from
68% in 2008 to just 33% in 2010. Instead, two-thirds of the respondents placed a
higher premium on stability and living in safe neighborhoods. These results show that
Qataris are content with what they are currently receiving and have made a rational
calculation that the cost of rocking the status quo was not worth the hassle. It is
therefore not surprising that the Arab Spring has passed Qatar by.
6
Indeed, this
contentment quiets the home front and gives the government the breathing space to be
more active in foreign affairs.
However, Nye warns that military and economic superiority is frequently not
enough to achieve a desired outcome as history does not always favor the side with
the biggest battalions or the deepest pockets. Furthermore, the player with the
strongest power hand is not always destined to carry the day. Therefore, "Converting
resources into realized power in the sense of obtaining desired outcomes requires
well-designed strategies and skillful leadership. Yet strategies are often inadequate
and leaders frequently misjudge -- witness Japan and Germany in 1941 or Saddam
Hussein in 1990."
7
Progressive Higher Education System
One of the major sources of attraction that has traditionally enabled the U.S
and its western allies to exercise soft power is a strong and reputable higher education
system that attracts thousands of people to study in U.S and other western educational
institutions. Over the years, the U.S has been offering several scholarships to other
nationalities via institutional programs such as the Fulbright and Marshall Programs.
These are aided by other non-governmental programs such as the Ford foundation and
the George Soros financed Open Society program. It is instructive to know that
former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan was a beneficiary of a Ford foundation
scholarship just as President Obama’s father was in the sixties. It is no coincidence
that the U.S strongly backed the candidacy of Kofi Annan, an MIT Alumnus, for the
post of the U.N Secretary General. Having been educated in the U.S, Washington
considered him a known entity in contrast to his unknown fellow African competitor,
the former foreign minister of Tanzania, Ahmed Salim Salim.
The foreign policy benefits of such educational opportunities for host
governments are immeasurable. First, higher educational institutions offer a non
5
Kristain Ulrichsen. “Qatar: Emergence of a Regional Power with International Reach.” E-
International Relations, 2102, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/01/23/qatar-emergence-of-a-regional-power-
with-international-reach/ (25 June, 2013)
6
Ibid
7
Dan Blatt, review of Soft Power by Joseph Nye, Futurecasts 6 (2004):5
4
controversial avenue to shape the hearts and minds of future elites from other
countries who will assume leadership positions in their respective countries. Such
elites are more likely to have forged strong ties with their counterparts in wherever
they received their education and are more amendable to deal making rather than
confrontation. Second, educational opportunities help demystify the fear of the other
as both U.S and international students are able to overcome entrenched stereotypes
and misperceptions about each other through their interaction on various campuses.
This is helpful for future cooperation between the host country and the countries of
origin of the students. Nye points out that personal contact serves a vital channel for
soft power. For example, "Most of China's leaders have a son or daughter educated in
the States who can portray a realistic view of the United States that is often at odds
with the caricatures in official propaganda”
8
.
Thanks to its huge oil and gas revenue, Qatar continues to invest heavily in the
improvement of education, making the country the world leader in terms of the
percentage of GDP spent on education. In addition, the literacy rate stands at 93
percent and 88.6 percent of girls are able to read and write, which is the highest
percentage in the Arab world.
9
In the last few years, Qatar has aggressively courted
and has been successful in getting prestigious U.S universities to open branches in
Qatar where they offer the same degrees as the parent universities in the U.S. In
pursuance of this strategy of attracting foreign universities, Qatar has built an
education city in order to concentrate all the Universities in the same area. Notable
among these Universities are Carnegie Mellon University, Georgetown University,
Virginia Commonwealth University, Weill Cornell Medical College and Texas A &
M University.
10
These institutions have become very popular in the Middle East as it is
obvious that for these universities to be viable in the long run, they would have to go
beyond the small pool of prospective Qatari applicants and instead tap into the greater
Middle East for prospects. Herein lays the soft power impact of Qatar on Middle
Easterners and other foreigners who are attracted by the aforementioned universities
in Qatar. Many of the Middle Eastern students are going to be the elites in their
respective countries and as such the relationships that they forge with Qataris and
other international students’ coupled with their live experiences living in Qatar are
going to make them much more tolerant of Qatari foreign policies in the future if not
susceptible. Furthermore, schools in Qatar’s education city serve as a credible
alternative for higher education for Arabs who are hesitant to pursue higher education
in the West either as a result of visa restrictions or cultural considerations. This adds
to the growing prestige of Qatar in the Middle East and their ability to shape the
minds of current and future generations of Middle Eastern and Muslim elites. It is
instructive to also note that most of the faculty members at these universities are
Westerners who are primed to shape the hearts and minds of future Arab leaders
towards moderation, a foreign policy goal of Qatar.
8
Dan Blatt, review of Soft Power by Joseph Nye, Futurecasts 6 (2004):9
9
Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index, “BTI 2012 Qatar Country Report,” BTI, 2012,
http://www.btiproject.de/fileadmin/Inhalte/reports/2012/pdf/BTI%202012%20Qatar.pdf (20 June,
2013)
10
Helen Ziegler, “International Universities in Qatar”. Helen Ziegler & Associates, n.d,
http://www.hziegler.com/articles/international-universities-in-qatar.html (25 June, 2013).
5
It is noteworthy that during the Cold War, U.S Soft power influences in the
form of cultural exchanges and the thousands of international students who came to
study in the U.S created a significant advantage for the U.S over its Cold War
adversaries. Nye has observed that some of the pioneer international students from the
Soviet Union played a pivotal role in the peaceful demise of the Soviet Union as they
eventually rose to positions of influence upon their return home and began
challenging the status quo from within.
11
Apart from helping in the molding of the future elites of the Middle East,
Qatar is also shaping the foreign policy agenda of the region by inviting scholars and
academics to attend conferences that focus on priority issues of the Qatari
government. For example, in his capacity as Chair of the Qatar Foundation, H.E.
Sheikh Abdullah Bin Ali-Al Thani, holds annual summits in Doha to discuss new
ideas about innovations, inventions and technologies. The theme of the 2009
inaugural summit was global education and how people around the world should
cooperate to achieve something great.
12
Participants of these summits represent
leading and emerging voices from their countries and they are not impervious to
presentations from like-minded people and their Qatari hosts.
Aljazeera Media Influence
Unlike the U.S and other major European powers that have are widely
associated with certain desirable ideals and values which enable them to exert soft
power influence around the world, Qatar until recently was a relatively unknown
country. However, the establishment of the Aljazeera media empire by the Qatari
government in 1996 has given the country unprecedented exposure in the world as
Qatar is now synonymous with the famous Aljazeera brand which is now universally
recognizable. The ability of any country to exert soft power influence by promoting
its ideals or values depends largely on its ability to tout the utility of the proposed
ideals via a medium that the targeted audience trusts or derives its information from.
Over the years, the U.S and Great Britain have had major successes promoting their
ideals around the world via their dominance of the major media sources such as CNN,
BBC and Voice of America just to mention a few. However, the duopoly of American
and British Media dominance has been broken by Aljazeera since its inceptions in
1996 and it remains a force in influencing the attitudes and minds of people in the
Middle East.
In fact Hillary Clinton in a March 2, 20011, Congressional testimony cited the
increasing influence of Al Jazeera in her argument for more Congressional funding to
execute what she termed the “information war” which she declared the U.S was
losing. Acknowledging the soft power influence of Aljazeera, she testified as follows:
Al Jazeera has been the leader in that are literally changing people’s minds
and attitudes. And like it or hate it, it is really effective...In fact viewership of
Al Jazeera is going up in the United States because it’s real news. You may
not agree with it, but you feel like you’re getting real news around the clock
11
Dan Blatt, review of Soft Power by Joseph Nye, Futurecasts 6 (2004): 34
12
World Innovation Summit for Education, “WISE Initiative”. WISE, N.D., http://www.wise-qatar.org/
(20 June 2013)
6
instead of a million commercials and, you know, arguments between talking
heads and the kind of stuff that we do on our news which, you know, is not
particularly informative to us, let alone foreigners.”
13
Aljazeera has been providing its audience with different perspectives on the
‘hot button’ global issues which counters the western news media’s narrative thereby
carving a niche for itself as captured by its motto “The View and the Other Point of
View”. In addition, Aljazeera has built a reputation for breaking the media norms of
the Arab world which shies away from critiquing or questioning officialdom. Instead,
the network is widely praised for giving opposition groups the forum to condemn
their repressive governments.
14
The international profile of Qatar in the midst of the Arab Spring has been
greatly enhanced, particularly in the Middle East as a result of the coverage of
Aljazeera. The average man on the streets of Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria is more
likely to view Qatar as siding with the powerless because its news organization is
telling and showing the world their struggles for freedom and democracy. Buttressing
this point, Kinninmont, notes that “Al-Jazeera now wins global accolades for its
cutting-edge coverage of the Arab Spring. It has been the only Arab broadcaster to
make serious inroads with western audiences, challenging the stereotype that
globalization must mean westernization.”
15
Aljazeera has diversified its coverage to include sports, documentaries, local
news and children’s programs in addition to its highly acclaimed English-language
current-events channel that features an ensemble of top notch Western journalists.
Although the network may be popular in the State Department’s cafeteria in
Washington, the network is unfairly tagged as a promoter of jihad in certain quarters
of American society thereby limiting its expansion in the American media
landscape.
16
However, the recent acquisition of Current TV by Aljazeera offers the
possibility of Aljazeera gaining about 40 million American customers for its proposed
Aljazeera America Network.
17
The ability of Aljazeera to broadcast into the homes of
millions of Americans may go a long way to change the attitudes of Americans
towards Muslims and the Middle East in general. If this happens, it will be a novelty
in the sense that it will be the first time that a smaller country via the power of its
media empire is exerting soft power influence on the super-power of the world.
13
Kirit.Radia,“Sec. of State Hillary Clinton: Aljazeera is ‘Real News’, U.S. Losing ‘Information War’”
ABCNEWS, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/03/sec-of-state-hillary-clinton-al-jazeera-
is-real-news-us-losing-information-war/ (20 June, 2013)
14
Jerremy M. Sharp, “The Al Jazeera News Net work. Opportunity or Challenges for U.S,Library Of
Congress Washington Dc Congressional Research Service, 2003,
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA476202 (25 June
2013)
15
Jane Kinninmont, “From Football to Military Might, How Qatar Wields Global Power”, Guardian,
2013, www.guardian.co.uk/.../2013/feb/.../qatar-tiny-gulf-state-global-force (20 June 2013)
16
The Economist, “Al Jazeera Must do Better: The Arabs’ Premier Television Network Bids for
American Viewers,” The Economist, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-
africa/21569429-arabs-premier-television-network-bids-american-viewers-must-do-better
17
Ibid
7
“Carrots” for Soft Power
Carrot Diplomacy
Qatar uses its enormous wealth from natural resources as a tool for its foreign
policy in order to build its regional and international profile. However, Qatar lacks the
organic influence that other countries have over others such as Saudi's religious
influence, America democratic influence and China's economic influence. As a result
of this, Qatar is increasingly relying on its financial muscle when mediating conflicts
by promising huge sums of money after a peaceful settlement to build up
infrastructure and so on. I term this “Carrot Diplomacy.” For war torn and cash
strapped countries, Qatar’s offer of “carrots” for peace is a noble cause.
In order to achieve its diplomatic objectives, Qatar relies on two types of
diplomacy. The first is diplomatic mediation, which seeks to project an image of
Qatar’s as a neutral intermediary that can be relied upon and interested in peace and
stability in the region. Qatar uses diplomacy to maximize its interests and influence on
countries such as Lebanon, Egypt, Yemen and Sudan that have traditionally fallen
under Saudi Arabian influence thereby upending the mantle of domination and
influence of a strong regional hegemon.
The second mode of diplomacy employed by Qatar is public diplomacy
through the media, where it presents Aljazeera as the voice of the people and an open
platform for the voiceless. Diplomatic and public diplomacy is often integrated
whereby Al Jazeera highlights conflicts that Qatar mediates. Most of Qatar’s
diplomatic interventions are aimed at defusing crisis, or relieving tension, and not
necessarily resolving the the conflict. However, Qatar’s modus operandi is being
tested by the Arab Spring whereby Qatar is now compelled to shirk its impartiality
cloak and instead take sides. Thus, Qatar has attained a respectable regional and
international reputation that does not commensurate with its small size and limited
military capability all through a deliberate policy where it uses its tremendous
resources as carrots and sticks.
As part of its public diplomacy strategy, Qatar pursue a deliberate type of
diplomacy which has been described as “Niche Diplomacy, “defined as the targeting
of “resources in specific areas able to generate returns worth having.
18
In line with
this strategy, Qatar has devoted resources in six areas with the hope of exerting soft
power influence to solve some of the most vexing conflicts in the Middle East. The
first strategy is serving as an unbiased interlocutor between two conflicting parties
that Qatar has good relations with. In pursuance of this Qatar offered to open an office
for the Taliban in Doha in order to facilitate peace talks between the Taliban and the
Karzai government and also between the Taliban and the Americans.
The second strategy involves Qatar using its good offices to mediate intra
faction conflicts by hosting reconciliation meetings among feuding factions in the
region. For example, Qatar has hosted several reconciliation meetings between Hamas
and Fatah in a bid to unite them for the much bigger challenge of speaking with one
voice against Israel and ending the destruction intra faction political turf wars that
undermines Palestinian unity. Also in November 2012, Qatar hosted a conference in
18
Carl Ungerer, “The ‘Middle Power’ Concept in Australian Foreign Policy. The Journal of Politics
and History 53 (2007):548
8
its capital Doha which brought all the opposition forces against the Assad regime. At
the conference an agreement was signed among the Syrian opposition to form a
Syrian National Coalition of the Opposition and Revolutionary Forces in a bid to
better coordinate their resistance against the Assad regime.
The third strategy is that Qatar hosts big multilateral conferences as it did in
hosting the largest conference on United Nations Convention on Climate change from
November 26- December 6, 2012 with about 17,000 participants. Prior to this, Qatar
hosted the now famous WTO Ministerial Conference known as the Doha round of
talks in 2001 which sought to commit all countries to negotiate for open agricultural
and manufacturing markets and enhanced intellectual property rights protections.
The fifth strategy which is perhaps the most controversial is Qatar increasingly
becoming the preferred destination for many political dissents in the region
sometimes to the discomfort and displeasure of some of its international and regional
allies. For example Qatar hosts Khaled Meshaal the political head of Hamas after the
latter abandoned his patron Assad in the wake of the Syrian uprising. Although the
Qatari move has been interpreted as an attempt to wean Hamas off its Iranian/Syria
influence and thereby moderate its outlook, Tel Aviv and Washington D.C are quite
wary. Similarly, Qatar host a number of prominent Islamic Brotherhood dissidents
that have been expelled from Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E creating a sour spot in an
otherwise excellent relationship among the three nations. On the other hand, Qatar has
dangled the prospect of a comfortable asylum to key actors in some of the conflicts in
the Middle East in order to entice them to defect and assist in ending a conflict. For
example, in August 2012 the former Prime Minister of Syria Riad Hijab defected
from the regime and headed quickly to Qatar. In addition, Qatar granted Asylum to
the former foreign minister of Libya in the Gaddafi Regime Mousa Kousa in the heat
of NATO’s attack on Gaddafi’s forces.
The last strategy involves Qatar projecting its diplomatic efforts through its
Aljazeera network and highlighting its mediation initiatives to the region and the
world at large. This goes a long way to enhance the reputation of Qatar in the world
and the public opinion in places where Qatar is mediating peace. According to Nye
“Shaping public opinion becomes even more important where authoritarian
governments have been replaced by new democracies.”
19
Sports
Sports are non-controversial tools that bring nations together and enhance the
reputation and image of countries that excel in them or host successful events. That is
why many countries have traditionally invested heavily in the preparation of their
athletes for major worldwide sporting events. For example, in the height of the Cold
War, the Olympics became a proxy battle field between the East and West to the point
where some of the Eastern bloc members such as Eastern Germany deemed it
necessary to dope their athletes in order to demonstrate athletic superiority and in
extension, ideological superiority over their Western German counterparts. The
bidding to host major sporting events such as the Olympic Games and the Football
World Cup is a fiercely contested process even though many host countries are unable
to recoup all their financial investments after hosting these events. An intangible and
19
Joseph Nye, Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.The Annals of the American Academy of Political
Science and Social Science 616 (2008): 105
9
an unquantifiable factor behind the fierce competition to host such major sporting
events is the international prestige and stature gained in successfully hosting major
sporting events. This goes a long way to make the host country or the athletically
successful country very attractive to other countries, a major coup for soft power.
Although Qatar is far from being a major world power in any sport, it has been
aggressively seeking and successfully hosting major sporting events. It successfully
hosted the XV Asian Games in 2006 and recently won the bid to host the 2022 World
Cup amid allegations of vote buying which threatens to undermine this tremendous
accomplishment. Winning the right to host the World Cup has greatly enhanced the
image and reputation of Qatar in the Middle East and among Muslims around the
world, just as South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 World Cup was a major source of
pride for the entire African continent.
A successful hosting will further cement the reputation and level of Qatari
attractiveness in the Middle Eastern region thereby boosting its influence in the
Middle East and the Muslim world in general. When countries host major sports
events, the best of their culture and hospitality is also on display and depending on
how attractive it is, it can greatly enhance the image of the host nation. One cannot
under-estimate the impact of the captivating acrobatics and fire displays during the
Beijing Olympics and the James Bond themed cameo of the Queen of England during
the London Olympics. Joseph Nye has identified culture as one of the main resources
of soft-power, particularly in places where it is attractive.
20
Qatar is also using sports to build its soft power beyond its shores through
sponsorship deals with famous European sporting giants and outright purchase of
major European football clubs. For example, in 2010, FC Barcelona accepted the
Qatar Foundation logo in place of the UNICEF logo ending more than a century of
tradition by signing a commercial shirt sponsorship package worth $190 million
dollars. In 2011, Qatar also purchased the iconic but cash strapped Parisian football
club, Paris Saint-German. Thus using its immense financial resources to invest in an
immensely popular global sport, Qatar is tactfully increasingly its global profile via
football diplomacy.
21
Drawing a parallel, with the long held soft power advantage of American
culture in the world, Coruzzi posits that Qatari investment in football will serve “a
similar purpose to that of Hollywood. Sports, like movies, are extremely popular in all
ranks of society. Just like the world learned to love America through Marlon Brando
and Marilyn Monroe, so too will the world learn about Qatar through Paris-Saint
Germain.”
22
20
Joseph Nye, Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.The Annals of the American Academy of Political
Science and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 94.
21
Damien Corruzzi, “Qatar: Football as Soft Power,” Columbia Political Review, 2013,
http://cpreview.org/2013/02/qatar-football-as-soft-power/ (25 June, 2013)
22
Ibid
10
Foreign Aid
The world giving index 2011, ranked Qatar in 20th place based on the
percentage of population giving and the first in terms of the Middle Eastern region
and Arab countries.
23
Countries that integrate substantial foreign aid in their foreign
policy generally generate positive goodwill as it enhances their reputation among the
beneficiaries. In international relations, today’s aid beneficiary is a potential future
ally via soft power influence and as Nye puts it When countries make their power
legitimate in the eyes of others, they encounter less resistance to their wishes."
24
According to Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Ministry, the total developmental and
humanitarian aid given by the Qatari government between 2010-2011 amounted to
over 1 billion U.S dollars.
25
Notable among Qatar’s giving is a one billion dollar loan to Tunisia with a
2.5% interest rate and a promise to employ 20,000 Tunisians to work in Qatar.
26
Similarly, Qatar has decided to invest 29 million Euros in subsidized housing in
Tunisia which will provide 810 housing units in Sejoumi in the Tunis governorate.
27
This aid comes at an opportune time for Tunisia which went through a tumultuous
democratic transition sparked primarily by agitations for more employment
opportunities and democratic reforms. Qatar’s financial assistance and offer of
employment for Tunisians will go a long way, to ingratiate the Qatari government to
Tunisians. This will make the Tunisian government and public opinion more
susceptible to Qatari influence because the latter will be viewed as having
demonstrated commitment to the welfare of Tunisians in times of need.
In addition, Qatar has given cash strapped Egypt a loan facility of 3 billion
dollars
28
and pledged five free cargoes of liquefied petroleum gas to assist Egypt this
summer.
29
This aid from Qatar was aimed at shoring up the Islamic Brotherhood
government of Morsi, a major ally of Qatar at a time that the West was hesitant to
grant the Morsi government financial assistance pending some political reforms. By
providing financial assistance to Egypt at a critical time of need, Qatar was positioned
to influence Egyptian politics and at the same time ingratiate itself to Egyptian public
opinion in the post-Mubarak era. According to Nye “Shaping public opinion becomes
even more important where authoritarian governments have been replaced by new
democracies.”
30
However, the toppling of Morsi could seriously undermine Qatar’s
23
Charities Aid Foundation, “World Giving Index 2011,” Charities Aid Foundation, 2011,
https://www.cafonline.org/pdf/worldgiving index 2011 191211.pdf ( 20 June, 2013)
24
J. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 10
25
Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Humanitarian Aid in Two Years Exceeds QR 5 BN,” Qatar
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, N.d, http://english.mofa.gov.qa/newsPage.cfm?newsid=22196 (25 June,
2013)
26
Jihen Laghmari, “Qatar Giving Tunisia $1 Billion Loan, May Provide Jobs,” Bloomberg, 2012,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-26/qatar-giving-tunisia-1-billion-loan-may-provide-
jobs.html (25 June, 2013).
27
ANSAmed. “Qatar Gives Tunisia EUR 29 mln for Subsidized Housing,” ANSAmed, 2013,
http://www.ansamed.info/ansamed/en/news/sections/economics/2013/03/13/Qatar-gives-Tunisia-EUR-
29-mln-subsidised-housing8392367.html (25 June, 2013)
28
Bourzou Daraghi, “Qatar Gives Egypt $3bn Aid Package,” Financial Times, 2013, from
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/790a7d52-a1f4-11e2 897100144feabdc0.html#axzz2Y4LfKNqT (25
June, 2013).
29
Summer Said, “Qatar to Give Egypt 5 Free LNG Cargoes This Summer Egyptian,” Wall Street
Journal, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130610-706242.html (25 June, 2013)
30
J. Nye, Soft power: The Means to Success in World Politics. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 105
11
image in Egypt as the former would be viewed negatively for investing in a failed
cause.
Qatar’s indiscriminate humanitarian assistance could yield strong foreign
relations dividends from the recipient governments and countries in the foreseeable
future as Qatar will become an attractive country to deal with. The provision of $100
million dollars assistance to the U.S in the wake of a devastating natural disaster such
as Katrina will help soften the image of Qatar among the U.S public which is very
hostile towards Arabs and suspicious of Muslims as a result of 9/11. For risk averse
and opinion poll conscious American politicians, this will reduce the political
transaction cost of engaging Qatar in foreign policy issues since the former can now
show to the American public a tangible deed of the Qatari government to make the
case that Qatar is an American ally worthy of engagement. Nye posits that "in
democracies where public opinion and parliaments matter, political leaders have less
leeway to adopt tactics and strike deals than in autocracies".
31
Challenges to Qatari Soft Power
Promoting Values without Practicing
On a global scale, Qatar is not faring well in terms of practicing democracy
internally and serving as a good democratic role model in the Middle East. According
to the 2010 Democracy Index released by the Economic Intelligence Unit, Qatar
ranked 137 out of 167. A contributory factor to Qatar’s low democratic ranking is its
0 rating in electoral process and pluralism.
32
This ranking shows that indeed Qatar is
an authoritarian regime and lacks the moral authority to be the torch bearer of
democracy in the Middle East.
During an official visit to the White House, President Obama praised then
Emir of Qatar for his diplomatic and military support in toppling the Gaddafi regime.
However, has acknowledged Qatar’s awkward position as a flawed messenger of
democracy, by observing that “He, Al-Thani, is a very influential guy but he himself
is not reforming significantly.”
33
According to Nye promoting a set of political values could be a major booster
to soft power influence when the promoter adheres to them at home and abroadand
pursues “foreign policies regarded as legitimate and having moral authority
34
In
order for Qatar’s democratic advocacy to be effective and persuasive for its recipients,
Qatar would have to lead by example by practicing what it preaches. It is far difficult
and unattractive to promote a policy based on do as I say, not as I do. As the cliché
goes, action speaks louder than words.
31
J. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 16
32
Economic Intelligence Unit, “Democracy Index. Democracy in Retreat: A Report from the
Economics Intelligence Unit,” The Economist, 2010,
http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf. (25 July, 2013)
33
David Jackson, “No Big Move Towards Democracy in Qatar,USA Today, 2011,
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2011/04/obama-no-big-move-toward-
democracy-in-qatar/1 (25 June 2013)
34
Joseph Nye, Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.The Annals of the American Academy of Political
Science and Social Science 616 (2008): 94.
12
Over Reliance on Carrots and Backlash
Qatar risks a global backlash even in recipient countries of Qatari investments
and foreign aid if it is perceived as buying influence. While the elites in countries
where Qatar is investing or donating money may court or welcome Qatari money, a
segment of the population may resent this and view this as an attempt by Qatar to
prop up a political faction within the country. At worse, the sheer volume of Qatar’s
investment could unnerve the sensibilities of domestic actors already blaming global
forces for their economic plight in a difficult global economic environment. Under
such circumstances, Qatar risks losing the hearts and minds of the people that they
hope to court for future engagements.
There is growing resentment throughout Europe and the Middle East as a
result of recent Qatari investments. In the Middle East, there are grumblings against
Qatar for purchasing the downfall of Gadhafi among others. After initially hailing
Qatar for its role in toppling Arab Dictators, protestors in Libya burnt the Qatari flag
for funding the Muslim Brotherhood there. After giving Egypt $3 billion dollars,
some Egyptians burned Qatari flag and accused their government of selling the
country to Qatar. Meanwhile rumors continue to swirl among Egyptians that Qatar
might purchase the Suez Canal in spite of numerous denials from both governments.
Furthermore, anti-Qatar demonstrations flared up after Qatar promised a $1 billion
dollar loan prompting an embarrassed Tunisian government to rebuke its citizens for
insulting a country that is helping them.
35
In France, the backlash against Qatari investments is being spearheaded at the
elite level among far right politicians who are particularly incensed about Qatar’s
plans to invest in low-income “banlieues”. Marine Le Pen, the leader of the far right
party, Front National who scored about 20% of the votes in the last Presidential
elections has labeled Qatari investment plans as an Islamic Trojan Horse.” This has
resonated with a segment of French citizens in the midst of economic and political
anxieties.
36
Limitations of Carrot Diplomacy
Qatar is not universally identified with a particular set of values or ideals that
others will voluntarily embrace without inducements and this can make their soft
power influence fleeting. Buttressing this point Nye posits that "When you can get
others to admire your ideals and to do want what you want, you do not have to spend
as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your direction. Seduction is always
more effective than coercion, and many values like democracy and human rights, and
individual opportunities are deeply seductive.
37
Many people imitate Americans not because they are coaxed to do so but they
are motivated to do so and they are willing to learn and adopt American ways of
thinking or doing things because they think it's a better option. However, what will
happen if Qatar is no longer able to deliver the “carrots” when it faces economic
35
Omar Chatriwala, “Qatar Spending Spree Ignites Backlash, Warnings,” Nuqudy, 2013,
http://english.nuqudy.com/Gulf/Qatar_Spending_Spre-5568 (25 June, 2013)
36
Damien Corruzzi, “Qatar: Football as Soft Power,” Columbia Political Review, 2013,
http://cpreview.org/2013/02/qatar-football-as-soft-power/ (25 June, 2013)
37
J. Nye, Soft power: The Means to Success in World Politics. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), X
13
crises as it is cyclical with resource dependent economies? Will countries welcome
Qatar to mediate their problems and will the influence of Qatar remain the same or
fade away when it can no longer deliver the “carrots"? Nye argues that a powerful
country should set the values and others would follow without any external influence
and notes that motivation plays a major role in soft power.
38
Citing the United States
as a case study, Nye points out that the U.S set the standards for democracy and a set
of ideals romanticized around the world as the American dream for people to
follow.
39
Qatar’s Questionable Friends
Qatar has cultivated and built strong relationships with diverse Islamist groups
across the Middle East and exert considerable influence on them primarily through the
provision of “carrots”. These groups include Muslim brotherhood branches in Egypt,
Tunisia, Libya and to some extent Turkey and Hamas in Gaza. In addition, Qatar host
a number of brotherhood/Islamist dissidents from neighboring Gulf countries such
Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E much to the consternation of these countries. With Qatar
overtly providing financial and moral support to Islamists in the region, any deviation
from democratic norms by the latter regimes will severely dent the international
image of Qatar thereby undermining their soft power credentials.
If Qatar’s Islamist allies are able to consolidate democratic ideals and meet the
aspirations of their people, then Qatar’s image will be enhanced in the region and
become a major source of attraction, a sine-qua non for soft power influence.
However, recent events in Egypt where millions of Egyptians marched on the streets
and forced the ouster of Brotherhood President Morsi for betraying their democratic
aspirations, does not bode well for the image of Qatar in Egypt and beyond. In this
regard, Nye warns that The reputation and credibility of a state or group seeking to
exert soft-power influence also matters particularly because of the “paradox of
plenty”
40
. Thus any information perceived as propaganda may not just be treated with
contempt but may also be counterproductive if it undermines the reputation of the
provider of the information.
41
The Perils of Creeping Hard Power
As Nye points out, one of the resources of soft power is foreign policy if it is
viewed as having moral authority. He adds that When our policies are seen as
legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced".
42
In this regard, Qatar
has earned tremendous amount of goodwill in the Middle East for its role in defeating
the Ghadhafi regime and humanitarian and military support for the Syrian rebels
against the Assad regime. However, such unbridled use of hard power could backfire
and could damage Qatar’s reputation in the long run as there have been credible
reports of atrocities committed by some of the Qatari backed rebels in Syria. There
are also serious fears that Qatar may be supporting the most radical elements of the
rebels with illiberal motives with ties with Al Qaeda. This fear was conveyed by U.S
38
Ibid, 5
39
Ibid
40
. Nye, Soft power: The Means to Success in World Politics. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 107
41
Ibid
42
Ibid, 12
14
President Barack Obama to the Emir of Qatar during an April 23, 2013 meeting in
which the former is “said to have spoken in blunt terms about Qatar’s support for
jihadists and to have warned that Qatari backing of Al-Qaeda-like groups would pose
a direct challenge to the national-security interests of the U.S. The emir was said to
have agreed with the president wholeheartedly on the matter.
43
Conclusion
Qatar will be better served by preserving its main sources of attraction in order
to continue exercising soft power influence in its sphere of influence. In this regard, it
should re-align its regional foreign policy goals with that of its major security
benefactor the U.S. by re-evaluating its support for Islamist groups that the U.S is
suspicious of or disapproves. In order to be taken seriously as a champion of the
movement for democratic change that is currently sweeping across the region, Qatar
should accelerate the pace of its own long over-due democratic reforms by at least
releasing all political dissidents and permitting elective municipal and parliamentary
elections with real legislative powers. This should be supplemented with labor
reforms for the millions of migrant laborers that are fueling Qatar’s economic and
construction boom. Failure to do this could put Qatar under unnecessary international
scrutiny that could undermine its image and thus soft power capability as it prepares
to host the FIFA World Cup in 2022.
43
Jeffrey Goldberg, “Qatar: Attention-Starved Teen of the Middle East,Bloomberg, 2013,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-02/qatar-attention-starved-teen-of- the-middle-east.html
(25 June, 2013)
15
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... In addition to other soft power instruments, foreign aid has been an effective and integral part of the targeted soft power policy. With its new foreign policy doctrine, Qatar has been more aggressive and ambitious to score regional and global influence using all possible ways including aid (Khatib, 2013;Antwi-Boateng, 2013). From statements of Qatari foreign policy elites, as well as empirical evidence from analysis of Qatari foreign aid since 1995, one can conclude that Qatar has been trying to use aid to increase its soft power towards targeted states, nations or groups of individuals. ...
Article
Full-text available
This paper presents pertinent aspects of the foreign aid policy of the State of Qatar as a Muslim emerging donor with rising soft power. The study traces and explains the evolution of Qatar's Foreign Aid Policy (QFAP) and identifies the various critical milestones of the policy that has been successfully transformed from a small Gulf Emir-ate into one of the leading players on both regional and global issues including aid giving. Although, Qatar's motivation for aid giving is quite similar to the global setting, the country's sociocultural background and values play a vital in shaping and inspiring its aid policy. As QFAP is closely tied to the country's active foreign policy agenda, political and security motives are heavily reflected in the country's aid practices. In collecting both primary and secondary data this study used various qualitative methods such as face-to-face interviews with key Qatari officials and scrutinized official state documents and quoted speeches, particularly of past and present Emirs as well as other archival sources.
... Antwi-Boateng (2013), p. 357. 27 Nuruzzaman (2015, p. 8.28 Dorsey(2015), pp. ...
Chapter
Qatar has sought political and military shelter for strategic protection and for enhancing the country’s regional and international profile. Qatar’s experience highlights that a small state does not ensure its security solely via military power. In a region of great geostrategic value and a site of numerous intrastate and interstate conflicts, the Qatari balancing act and the government’s attitude of “pragmatism” with regard to other regional and global powers proved the ability of small states to meet their domestic interests and security challenges with agility. The strategy of soft power allowed Qatar to enlarge its presence abroad and spread a unifying national identity. This is evident in its policies and mechanisms of mediation, multilateralism, and public diplomacy. In this regard, Qatari experience may be a rich source of knowledge and insights for other small states. Qatar’s experience demonstrates that international relations theory may need to adapt to the changing realities of the international system, which is increasingly influenced by the role of the small states. The traditional idea that small states are weak actors in the international system due to their lack of resources in terms of population, territory, economy, and military is now much contested.
Thesis
Full-text available
Qatar has recently become a regional power and an influential actor in international politics. Although it faces unfavorable geopolitical conditions, the Qatari state has overcome political and security obstacles. Obviously, Qatar has adopted a foreign policy of soft power, which played a prominent role in its consolidation of national power and rise in the international scene. GCC countries did not overlook Qatar’s unprecedentedly growing role. On 5 June 2017, a diplomatic boycott crisis erupted against Qatar. The Arab Quartet imposed a complete blockade on Qatar and issued a statement of 13 demands. The dissertation explores Qatar’s soft power tools such as lobbying, international mediation, scholarships, foreign aids, and Al Jazeera network that have created a national brand for Qatar. With a non-coercive foreign policy strategy, Qatar’s stance in regional politics developed from neutrality to influence. This thesis will investigate the underlying political, ideological, and strategic factors of the 2017 crisis that manifested the power struggles in the Gulf, in which Qatar under the rule of Tamim bin Hamad has pursued a different foreign policy path from that of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It will explore the role Qatar's foreign policy of soft power played within the context of the Qatar diplomatic crisis; and the extent to which Qatar succeeded in building a resilience strategy. Finally, the dissertation will analyze whether the current situation demonstrates a transient appeasement or a permanent resolution. Keywords: Qatar, Soft power, Blockade, GCC, Survival, Regional Power, Resilience.
Article
Full-text available
Qatar has recently become a regional power and an influential actor in international politics. Qatar has adopted a foreign policy of soft power, which played a prominent role in the rise of the international scene. On 5 June 2017, a diplomatic boycott crisis has erupted against Qatar. The Arab Quartet imposed a complete blockade on Qatar and stated 13 demands. The study explores Qatar’s soft power tools such as lobbying, international mediation, scholarships, foreign aids, Al Jazeera network, which has created a national brand for Qatar. With the non-coercive foreign policy, Qatar’s stance in regional politics has transformed from neutrality to influence. This study will investigate the underlying political, ideological, and strategical factors of the 2017 crisis that has manifested the power struggles in the Gulf, the role of Qatar's foreign policy of soft power in the context of the crisis. Finally, the study will analyze whether the current situation demonstrates transient appeasement or a permanent resolution.
Chapter
This piece is an overview of actors and policies concerning sport in the nation of Qatar. In recent years, sports have been given high priority in government attempts to raise exposure of the nation internationally. Many authors have assessed the rationale of sports policy from an international relations perspective, speaking in terms of soft power or nation branding. Actors beyond the nation state, however, are equally involved in the shaping of ‘Qatar sport’—from businessmen and state-backed companies to individuals at the grassroots level. To redress the focus, the first section explores the establishment of the external view of Qatar as an emerging sports hub through the hosting of high-profile international sporting events and the creation of facilities for training and rehabilitating top-level athletes. The way these activities are organised is shown to be an elite-level, top-down approach. The second section shifts focus to explore informal sports participation at the grassroots level in Qatar. A bottom-up view onto involvement in sports in Qatar reveals a plurality of sporting participation that state and commercial-driven narratives sometimes fail to consider. Such multi-directional and actor-driven approaches are needed to arrive at a better understanding of how sport is viewed—and used—in Qatar.
Chapter
The Palestinian cause continues to represent a major concern for Arabs and Muslims around the world and is considered one of the main reasons for instability in the Middle East. Traditionally, large Arab States, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, were the key players regionally and internationally when it came to the Palestinian cause. Qatar, on the other hand, followed the direction of the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) and the Arab League regarding Palestine. The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, as well as the Second Gulf War in 1991 and the failed coup attempt against Qatar’s leadership in 1996, signified critical junctions in Qatar’s foreign policy. These events forced the nation to reconsider its foreign policy and adopt an independent and pragmatic approach in international politics to protect its security and sovereignty, as well as to play a regional role. Furthermore, Qatar’s visionary leadership effectively utilized the significant financial resources and wealth generated from liquified natural gas (LNG) production and export to prosper in the dynamic geopolitical landscape and to develop influential tools to enable Qatar to be a key player in regional affairs, including with regard to the Palestinian cause. In this chapter, we shed light on the main parameters and events that led Qatar to follow a new, independent approach in international politics. Our focus is the main drivers and tools that Qatar employed to play a role in the Palestinian cause. The study demonstrates the impact and influence that, despite its small size, Qatar has on the Palestinian issue. Driven by its solidarity with the Arab and Muslim causes and to protect its own interests—particularly those of security and sovereignty, given its geographic and demographic vulnerability, and in pursuit of a regional role—Qatar has wisely employed its soft power tools to play a role in the Palestinian issue. This is evidenced by humanitarian aid to the Palestinians, Al Jazeera’s coverage of the conflict, and mediation between the two main Palestinian factions, Fatah and Hamas. This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part addresses Qatar’s foreign policy drivers, which are geopolitical location and the economy, while the second part addresses Qatar’s soft power tools towards Palestine, in particular, financial aid, Al Jazeera, and mediation.
Chapter
Full-text available
Qatari citizens have been electing the Central Municipal Council (CMC) every four years since elections were first instituted in 1999. Although elections for the Consultative Council have been announced on numerous occasions since 2003, until today, the CMC remains the only elective Qatari institution. With local attributions, the CMC is a single body at national level, made up of 29 members who have neither executive nor legislative powers and whose role is limited to advising the Ministry of Municipalities on problems that arise in every municipality of the country. Although Qatari authorities have shown great interest in carrying out exemplary elections, the interest shown by citizens has not been comparable and instead showed a very low registration rate on the electoral roll and a decreasing voter turnout since 2015. This chapter addresses the question of why Qatari citizens have been reluctant to engage in the only election conducted in the country in high numbers, as could be expected and although they clearly express interest in ‘political issues’ in a number of different surveys. A preliminary conclusion for this question is the lack of attributions granted to the CMC and the low added value that the CMC has for the Qatari population.
Chapter
With the election of the Justice and Development Party (JDP hereafter) and Qatar’s leadership change in 1995, there is no doubt that interactions between Turkey and Qatar have gained pace. The Turkey–Qatar alliance reached a new high after the Arab Spring, with these two countries emerging as two pro-revolutionary states that are disturbing the status quo in the Middle East.
Chapter
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Armenia is one of the 44 landlocked countries in the world. It is also among those landlocked nation states that face peculiar geopolitical challenges. Armenia has no diplomatic relations with two of its neighbors, which renders 80% of its land borders closed. The geography and regional political conjuncture have unambiguously shaped the priorities in Armenia’s foreign and security policy in the post Soviet-era. Since the early days of independence, a plethora of historical, political, and geostrategic factors has converged the interests of Russia and Armenia. Armenia has actively participated in several Russia-led integration and security projects—the Commonwealth of Independence States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the Eurasian Economic Union, to name only a few. The fact of multi-layered cooperation with Russia, however, did not prevent Armenia from cooperating with the European Union (EU). Armenia has been part of the EU-led European Neighborhood Policy, Eastern Partnership and signed the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with the EU in November 2017. How was Armenia able to find a working compromise between its strategic ally—Russia—and its “normative ally”—the European Union? In contrast to the prevalent argument that the foreign policy choices and security alignments of small states are mostly determined by external and imposed factors, this chapter argues that a set of equally significant domestic variables impact small states in making foreign policy decisions.
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During the early 1990s, the Hawke and Keating Labor governments promoted Australia's diplomatic credentials as an activist and independent middle power. Labor claimed that by acting as a middle power Australia was constructing a novel diplomatic response to the challenges of the post-Cold War world. But a closer reading of the official foreign policy record since 1945 reveals that previous conservative governments have also taken a similar view of Australia's place and position on the international stage. This essay traces the historical evolution of the middle power concept in Australian foreign policy and concludes with an assessment of the Howard government's more recent reluctance to use this label and its implications for Australia's future middle power credentials. Although its use has waxed and waned in official policy discourse and it is more commonly associated with Labor governments, the middle power concept itself and the general diplomatic style it conveys have been one of the most durable and consistent elements of Australia's diplomatic practice.
Article
Soft power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment. A country's soft power rests on its resources of culture, values, and policies. A smart power strategy combines hard and soft power resources. Public diplomacy has a long history as a means of promoting a country's soft power and was essential in winning the cold war. The current struggle against transnational terrorism is a struggle to win hearts and minds, and the current overreliance on hard power alone is not the path to success. Public diplomacy is an important tool in the arsenal of smart power, but smart public diplomacy requires an understanding of the roles of credibility, self-criticism, and civil society in generating soft power.
The Means to Success in World Politics
  • Soft Nye
  • Power
Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 10
Humanitarian Aid in Two Years Exceeds QR 5 BN Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Ministry Of Foreign
  • Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. " Humanitarian Aid in Two Years Exceeds QR 5 BN, " Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, N.d, http://english.mofa.gov.qa/newsPage.cfm?newsid=22196 (25 June, 2013)
Qatar Giving Tunisia $1 Billion Loan Bloomberg, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-26/qatar-giving-tunisia-1-billion-loan-may-provide- jobs.html
  • Jihen Laghmari
Jihen Laghmari, " Qatar Giving Tunisia $1 Billion Loan, May Provide Jobs, " Bloomberg, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-26/qatar-giving-tunisia-1-billion-loan-may-provide- jobs.html (25 June, 2013).
Qatar Gives Tunisia EUR 29 mln for Subsidized Housing ANSAmedQatar-gives-Tunisia-EUR- 29-mln-subsidised-housing8392367.html
  • Ansamed
ANSAmed. " Qatar Gives Tunisia EUR 29 mln for Subsidized Housing, " ANSAmed, 2013, http://www.ansamed.info/ansamed/en/news/sections/economics/2013/03/13/Qatar-gives-Tunisia-EUR- 29-mln-subsidised-housing8392367.html (25 June, 2013)
Qatar Gives Egypt $3bn Aid Package
  • Bourzou Daraghi
Bourzou Daraghi, "Qatar Gives Egypt $3bn Aid Package," Financial Times, 2013, from http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/790a7d52-a1f4-11e2 897100144feabdc0.html#axzz2Y4LfKNqT (25 June, 2013).
No Big Move Towards Democracy in Qatarobama-no-big-move-toward- democracy-in-qatar
  • David Jackson
David Jackson, " No Big Move Towards Democracy in Qatar, " USA Today, 2011, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2011/04/obama-no-big-move-toward- democracy-in-qatar/1 (25 June 2013)
Public Diplomacy and Soft Power The Annals of the American Academy of): 94. REFERENCES ANSAmed Qatar Gives Tunisia EUR 29 mln for Subsidized Housing ANSAmed
  • Joseph Nye
Joseph Nye, " Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. " The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science and Social Science 616 (2008): 94. REFERENCES ANSAmed. " Qatar Gives Tunisia EUR 29 mln for Subsidized Housing, " ANSAmed, 2013, http://www.ansamed.info/ansamed/en/news/sections/economics/2013/03/13/Q atar-gives-Tunisia-EUR-29-mln-subsidised-housing8392367.html (25