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"Rigging the Contest? CEO Succession in Family Firms: Contest and Agency Theory, & Evidence."
Abstract
The empirical literature considering effects of CEO succession on post-succession performance in family firms highlights inferior performance of family successors. By viewing successions as ruled signaling contests, we argue a family succession is not detrimental per se. Instead, we theorize concentrated ownership structures induce cases where contest governing principals pursue private benefits by imposing contest constraining rules limiting the contests’ selectivity in family firms, which leads to lower human capital of selected successors. We empirically control for these underlying contest (selection stage) constraints, show their negative relation to performance, and empirically highlight advantageous aspects of well-chosen and capable family successors.
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