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Been There, Done That: The Margin of Appreciationand International Law
Abstract
The margin of appreciation, as a doctrine of international law, has a great future behind it. It was once thought to be the panacea that would solve international law’s problems, but has in fact diminished in importance in international law. Contrary to what is often argued, the doctrine of the margin of appreciation originated in early public international law, not in Continental domestic public law. In the course of the twentieth century, international law discarded the doctrine. The preferred standard of review, as the International Court set out in Whaling in the Antarctic, is ‘an objective one’. In the sphere where the margin of appreciation is most famously in operation, the law of European human rights, it is being supplanted by the doctrine of subsidiarity. The margin of appreciation is, in international law, an aberration. It is time we treated it as such. This article was presented as the inaugural CJICL Young Scholars’ Lecture in February 2015, held at the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge.
... Although the doctrine of the Margin of Appreciation was a brainchild of the Strasbourg Court (Legg, 2012;Spielmann, 2012;Arai-Takahashi, 2002), it has gained recognisance in other international tribunals (Arato, 2013;Bjorge, 2015;Shany, 2005) and human rights treaty bodies (Cullen, 2009;UNHCR, 2005, p. 32), just as arguments have been advanced for its application in all UN judicial and quasi-judicial institutions (Bantekas and Oette, 2020;Shany, 2005). It should be noted that though the doctrine of Margin of Appreciation has received legislative enactment through Protocol 15 of the ECHR (2014), purporting to add the doctrine to the preamble of the ECHR, it is initially not a statutory right under the ECHR (Stella v. Italy, 2014 ) 6 ; it is instead a judicial doctrine endorsed by states and developed by the Strasbourg Court to enable it to exercise a supervisory and subsidiary role to national courts of high contracting states (Cot, 2013). ...
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom (ECHR) - the focus of this work - in its conceptualisation as a “living instrument” and a bulwark against human rights abuse in Europe, has been construed with different canons of interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights (the Strasbourg Court), including the doctrines of the Margin of Appreciation and the evolutive interpretation. This work aims to review the doctrines of the Margin of Appreciation and Evolutive Interpretation from the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court by attempting a foray into the debates emanating from the court’s interpretative jurisprudence. It also interrogates how the ECHR is interpreted in the context of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). The method adopted is doctrinal, with a critical and analytical approach that involves desk and library research. The work relies on primary and secondary materials such as relevant case laws of the Strasbourg Court, legislations, textbooks, journal articles, conference proceedings/papers, online documents, and news to critically evaluate the significance of the doctrines of the Margin of Appreciation and Evolutive Interpretation to the realisation of the objectives of the ECHR. The article investigates how the Strasbourg Court employs the doctrines of the margin of appreciation and evolutive interpretation in achieving the objectives and purpose of the ECHR. The work finds that regardless of their criticism as judge-made doctrines without normative basis, the doctrines of the Margin of Appreciation and Evolutive Interpretation as applied by the Strasbourg Court align with the rules of treaty interpretation as per the VCLT and, thus, remain the best canon of interpretations befitting for the ECHR. This is so considering that interpretation and applications of laws are undertaken in an ever-changing world that requires dynamic laws that could adapt to new situational contexts that are not initially contemplated at the time of treaty negotiations and formations.
... Indonesia is subjected to respect for its wisdom, consisting of socio-religious and cultural diversity and virtues. It has affirmed the concept of "margin of appreciation" to contextualize the common international principle of the human rights law taking a higher position than the domestic law (Bjorge, 2015;Ulfstein, 2017). ...
Can the bisexual orientation in a marriage bond be considered a legal argument for formulating a verdict in the Indonesia Islamic courts? Does it have such a specific legal standing mentioned directly within any regulation covering the issue of Islamic private law? In answering both these questions, this article implements a normative-juridical inquiry that examines various rational possibilities in developing arguments of law. This article finds that in handling the case of bisexual orientation, the Indonesian legal system has remained a legal vacuum. Consequently, it seems it might not be a direct legal argument because it has no legal standing. This article argues that there is no single legal instrument has been imposed that explicitly mentions the case of the orientation. However, the judge may implement the analogous of the possibility of "adultery that leads to unresolved conflicts" to make a ratio legis of divorce due to the orientation. AbstrakApakah orientasi biseksual dalam suatu ikatan perkawinan dapat dijadikan sebagai dalil hukum untuk merumuskan suatu putusan di pengadilan? Apakah ia memiliki kedudukan hukum tertentu yang disebutkan secara langsung dalam peraturan apa pun yang mencakup masalah hukum privat Islam? Dalam menjawab kedua pertanyaan tersebut, artikel ini menerapkan penelitian yuridis-normatif yang mengkaji berbagai kemungkinan rasional dalam mengembangkan argumentasi hukum. Artikel ini menemukan bahwa dalam menangani kasus orientasi biseksual, sistem hukum Indonesia masih mengalami kekosongan hukum. Akibatnya, seolah-olah tidak bisa menjadi argumentasi hukum langsung karena tidak memiliki legal standing. Artikel ini berargumen bahwa tidak ada satu pun instrumen hukum yang diberlakukan yang secara eksplisit menyebutkan kasus orientasi tersebut. Namun demikian, hakim dapat menerapkan analogi kemungkinan “perzinahan yang berujung pada konflik yang tidak terselesaikan” untuk membuat rasio logis perceraian karena orientasinya.
This chapter concerns the interaction that imperativeness in private international law has with substantive obligations arising from international and EU lawEuropean Union (EU)-law of. It investigates whether there are certain principles and rules grounded in EU and international law that may be, as of today, considered as the sources of EU and truly international imperative norms, which are repeatedly implemented in domestic legal systems so as to constitute a “minimum content” of imperativeness which is shared by European countries. It also analyses the case law dealing with foreign laws, deeds and decisions running against this minimum content of imperativeness and, on the other hand, facing the unlikely cases where the application of these principles and rules grounded in international and EU lawEuropean Union (EU)-law of may concretely result in a prejudice to the functioning of fundamental principles of the forum.
Science, which inevitably underlies environmental disputes, poses significant challenges for the scientifically untrained judges who decide such cases. In addition to disrupting ordinary fact-finding and causal inquiry, science can impact the framing of disputes and the standard of review. Judges must therefore adopt various tools to adjust the level of science allowed to enter their deliberations, which may fundamentally impact the legitimacy of their reasoning. While neglecting or replacing scientific authority can erode the convincing nature of judicial reasoning, the same authority, when treated properly, may lend persuasive force to adjudicatory findings, and buttress the legitimacy of judgments. In this work, Katalin Sulyok surveys the environmental case law of seven major jurisdictions and analyzes framing techniques, evidentiary procedures, causal inquiries and standards of review, offering valuable insight into how judges justify their choices between rival scientific claims in a convincing and legitimate manner.
Science, which inevitably underlies environmental disputes, poses significant challenges for the scientifically untrained judges who decide such cases. In addition to disrupting ordinary fact-finding and causal inquiry, science can impact the framing of disputes and the standard of review. Judges must therefore adopt various tools to adjust the level of science allowed to enter their deliberations, which may fundamentally impact the legitimacy of their reasoning. While neglecting or replacing scientific authority can erode the convincing nature of judicial reasoning, the same authority, when treated properly, may lend persuasive force to adjudicatory findings, and buttress the legitimacy of judgments. In this work, Katalin Sulyok surveys the environmental case law of seven major jurisdictions and analyzes framing techniques, evidentiary procedures, causal inquiries and standards of review, offering valuable insight into how judges justify their choices between rival scientific claims in a convincing and legitimate manner.
The genetic problem of the conventionality concept
O problema genético do conceito de convencionalidade
Este artículo detalla el recorrido jurisprudencial en la formación del concepto de control de convencionalidad y describe su vocación expansionista, desde su aparición periférica hasta su presentación actual, que exige adecuaciones de la normatividad interna, procedimientos, actuación de jueces y funcionarios, entre otros requerimientos. Hecho este análisis, el estudio se dirige a estudiar el concepto oficial y el carácter vinculante que se le ha pretendido conferir. En este examen se dilucidará si alegar el principio de pacta sunt servanda internacional es suficiente o si el error exime la exigencia. Asimismo, se estudia la naturaleza jurídica de la jurisprudencia en el derecho internacional a fin de conocer cuál es su verdadera ubicación jerárquica y, por tanto, su fuerza obligatoria. Puestos en este punto, se realizará una investigación desde la filosofía del lenguaje para conocer si el propio enunciado y sus términos son acertados. Seguidamente, se enfrenta al control de convencionalidad con conceptos fundamentales del derecho como soberanía estatal y supremacía constitucional en el derecho interno, y principio de subsidiariedad de las vías internacionales en el derecho internacional. Finalmente, se expone la recepción de estos conceptos en el derecho peruano.
Para citar este artículo / To reference this article / Para citar este artigo
Eduardo Acosta Yparraguirre, “El problema genético del concepto convencionalidad”, en Dikaion 29, 1 (2020), 165-201. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5294/dika.2020.29.1.5
Recibido: 31/01/2019
Aceptado: 13/04/2020
Publicado: 14/08/2020
As the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has an ambitious mandate. However, due to its institutional design, the ICJ depends in large part on whether the states allow it to play this role, and their resistance can prove particularly damaging for the ICJ in this regard. Against this background, the article argues that resort to judicial avoidance techniques may be a pragmatic way for the ICJ to adapt to this reality, and that it seems likely that the ICJ has been relying on such techniques on several occasions. With reference to the ICJ’s case law, the article highlights different avoidance techniques at the ICJ’s disposal, proposes a categorization based on their effects, and evaluates the potential and risks each category holds for the ICJ. Accordingly, the article distinguishes between merits-avoidance techniques, issue-avoidance techniques, and resort to deferential standards of review. It demonstrates that relying on merits-avoidance techniques and issue-avoidance techniques is counterproductive and sometimes even dangerous for the ICJ. In contrast, resort to deferential standards of review allows the ICJ to reconcile its ambitious legal mandate with the political realities, and accordingly holds the greatest potential for the ICJ.
Starting from the recent Philip Morris v. Uruguay award, this article tries to analyse the current status in investment arbitration of certain doctrines (and/or principles) which are adopted by arbitral tribunals in order to give due weight to state interests. The reference applies to the concepts of the right to regulate and of the margin of appreciation as well as to the principle of proportionality. It will be argued that the right to regulate, which is today receiving growing attention by arbitrators, scholars and treaty drafters, still does not have the customary status which would entitle tribunals to apply it in the absence of a normative basis. Also the margin of appreciation, as technically developed by the European Court of Human Rights, cannot find a place in investor-State disputes due to the very different framework in which arbitral tribunals operate if compared to the ECtHR. However, the principle of proportionality can offer a valuable legal tool to arbitrators entitling them to pay due deference with regard to state sovereignty.
The main point made in this article concerns arguments about applying international law method in the EFTA pillar of the EEA. General international law does not support any reading down of treaty obligations and EU secondary legislation in the EFTA States of the EEA or the institutions of the EEA. Preserving national sovereignty in the fields covered by the EEA Agreement is not the object and purpose of the EEA Agreement. There is no institutional balance of the kind developed in the EU institutions and between them and the member states. Under international law, EEA obligations may go further for the EFTA States of the EEA, to the extent EEA principles of homogeneity and reciprocity or principles of EU law do not ameliorate this. Under the EEA judicial constitution, the EFTA Court bears the burden of maintaining the EEA principles of homogeneity and reciprocity in treaty interpretation.
The margin of appreciation (MoA) has become the central conceptual doctrine in the institutional and jurisprudential architecture of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This article critiques the existence and operation of the MoA within the ECHR system and defends its use. It is submitted that as each of the central justifications for the MoA under the ECHR applies equally to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), so the doctrine should be applied by the Human Rights Committee.
See the foresight shown in this connection by the critical remarks of Higgins
- United Greece V
- Kingdom
Greece v United Kingdom (Cyprus Case) App no 176/56, (1958) 2 Yearbook of the European Convention on
Human Rights 174, 174–76. See the foresight shown in this connection by the critical remarks of Higgins
(n 2).
Germany's Dialogue with Strasbourg' (2012) 13 GLJ 757
- Schlütter
Schlütter, 'Germany's Dialogue with Strasbourg' (2012) 13 GLJ 757, 769.
Une juridiction non militaire, et surtout une juridiction internationale, ne saurait intervenir dans ce domaine qu' en cas d' abus manifeste de cette liberté d' appréciation')
- Ibid
22 ibid ('Une juridiction non militaire, et surtout une juridiction internationale, ne saurait intervenir dans ce
domaine qu' en cas d' abus manifeste de cette liberté d' appréciation').
Affaire de la dette publique ottomane (1925) 1 RIAA 529, 566–68; Différend SAIMI (Società per Azioni Industriale Marmi d'Italia)—Decisions No 4
Acquisition of Polish Nationality (Advisory Opinion) PCIJ, 1923 PCIJ Rep Series B No 7, 9; Affaire de
la dette publique ottomane (1925) 1 RIAA 529, 566–68; Différend SAIMI (Società per Azioni Industriale
Marmi d'Italia)—Decisions No 4, 11, 19, 38 et 70 13 (1948–50) RIAA 43, 45; Georges Pinson (France v
Mexico) (1928) 5 RIAA 327, 412.
Les principes généraux du droit dans la jurisprudence internationale 52 Hague Recueil 195, 248 (1935); M Bourquin, Stabilité et mouvement dans l' ordre juridique international 64
- A Verdross
See eg A Verdross, Les principes généraux du droit dans la jurisprudence internationale 52 Hague Recueil
195, 248 (1935); M Bourquin, Stabilité et mouvement dans l' ordre juridique international 64 Hague Recueil
354, 400 (1938); R Ago, Le délit international 68 Hague Recueil 419, 471 (1939).