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Honing the proper edge: CERP and the two-sided potential of military-led development in Afghanistan
Abstract
Using a newer and expanded dataset as well as a survey of practitioner perceptions, this article adds to a recent body of literature on reconstruction and violence in Afghanistan. Data are taken from military-led development projects by way of the United States military’s Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) and, to measure violence, from U.S. military Significant Activity reports. The results suggest that, at great cost, large-budget CERP efforts (those in excess of USD50,000 per project) are associated with an increase in violence and thus counter-productive to military stability goals. In contrast, small projects (below USD50,000), which comprise a smaller proportion of total CERP allocations, are associated in statistically significant ways with reductions in violence. To explore why CERP projects may have these effects, the article also examines administrative modalities for CERP spending. The results suggest that timely, flexible expenditure of CERP funds are most effective at reducing violence. [JEL codes: D74, O53]
... Both effects hold for the three months lags only. It is possible that Adams (2015) found an effect whereas Chou (2012) and Child (2014) did not because of slightly different data sources and model specifications. Chou (2012) and Child (2014) use one-month lags, and Child (2014) also used a different source for measuring violence (the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System). ...
... Chou (2012) and Child (2014) use one-month lags, and Child (2014) also used a different source for measuring violence (the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System). Adams (2015) also reports the results from a qualitative survey with nine Civil Affairs Officers who were familiar with CERP in Afghanistan. The results suggest that the respondents did not think that CERP was an effective tool for reducing violence, nor did they think that CERP funds were given conditional, and in exchange for information, which is, as mentioned before, an important element on the causal theory proposed by . ...
... Three studies find qualified effects: Berman at al. (2013) find that CERP dampens violence but only in conjunction with increased troop levels. Adams (2015) finds that CERP increases violence when projects are >$50.000 and dampens violence when projects are < $50.000 and Sexton (2016) finds that CERP increases violence in territories which are not under the control of the counter-insurgents, but dampens violence where counterinsurgents have control. ...
The paper presents findings from the first-ever systematic review of the causal impact of development aid on violence in countries affected by civil war. The review identifies 19 studies: Fourteen within-country studies from Afghanistan, Iraq, Colombia, Philippines, and India, and five cross-national studies. These studies investigate the impact of six aid types: Community-driven development, conditional cash transfers, public employment scheme, humanitarian aid, infrastructure, and aid provided by military commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan. The evidence for a violence-dampening effect of aid in conflict zones is not strong. Aid in conflict zones is more likely to exacerbate violence than to dampen violence. A violence-dampening effect of aid appears to be conditional on a relatively secure environment for aid projects to be implemented. A violence-increasing effect occurs when aid is misappropriated by violent actors, or when violent actors sabotage aid projects in order to disrupt the cooperation between the local population and the government.
... In Afghanistan, Hirose, Imai, and Lyall (2017) found that insurgents strategically leverage the location and intensity of civilian support to target those actors most likely to collaborate with the regime. Other program evaluations of aid and development programs in Afghanistan suggest that external public goods provision has no effect on local attitudes or violence reduction (Adams 2015;Böhnke and Zürcher 2013;Child 2014;Chou 2012;Crost, Felter, and Johnston 2014;Khanna and Zimmermann 2017). These findings suggest that public goods provision may only suppress insurgent violence and build combatant support in areas already controlled by the incumbent regime (Sexton 2016). ...
Civilian support for local combatants is a necessary condition for effective military intervention. And yet, foreign interveners often face a dilemma-how can they build the capacity of the local clients without undermining their partner's legitimacy among noncombatants? I argue that civilian perceptions of local com-batants shape support for foreign interveners and the tactics they pursue. I test the theory's hypotheses on original survey data collected in Baghdad, Iraq, in Novem-ber 2017. My key finding is Iraqi respondents preferred more invasive forms of foreign intervention-including foreign airpower, military trainers, and combat troops-when foreign patrons supported local clients from a common ingroup. These findings suggest that many publicized examples of intervention failure can be attributed to a lack of attention to local partners as opposed to the identity, reputation, or tactics of foreign interveners.
... The results suggest that "since large CERP spending exceeded small CERP by a factor of four on a per capita basis-and at times by an order of magnitude-large CERP projects were non-productive, or even counter-productive, and at great cost." 105 The mechanism responsible for this difference, the author hypothesizes based upon the qualitative interviews, is twofold. First, smaller projects required significant-ly fewer signatures from up the chain of command and thus were implemented in a timelier manner. ...
... The results suggest that "since large CERP spending exceeded small CERP by a factor of four on a per capita basis-and at times by an order of magnitude-large CERP projects were non-productive, or even counter-productive, and at great cost." 105 The mechanism responsible for this difference, the author hypothesizes based upon the qualitative interviews, is twofold. First, smaller projects required significant-ly fewer signatures from up the chain of command and thus were implemented in a timelier manner. ...
... The results suggest that "since large CERP spending exceeded small CERP by a factor of four on a per capita basis-and at times by an order of magnitude-large CERP projects were non-productive, or even counter-productive, and at great cost." 105 The mechanism responsible for this difference, the author hypothesizes based upon the qualitative interviews, is twofold. First, smaller projects required significant-ly fewer signatures from up the chain of command and thus were implemented in a timelier manner. ...
... The results suggest that "since large CERP spending exceeded small CERP by a factor of four on a per capita basis-and at times by an order of magnitude-large CERP projects were non-productive, or even counter-productive, and at great cost." 105 The mechanism responsible for this difference, the author hypothesizes based upon the qualitative interviews, is twofold. First, smaller projects required significant-ly fewer signatures from up the chain of command and thus were implemented in a timelier manner. ...
... The results suggest that "since large CERP spending exceeded small CERP by a factor of four on a per capita basis-and at times by an order of magnitude-large CERP projects were non-productive, or even counter-productive, and at great cost." 105 The mechanism responsible for this difference, the author hypothesizes based upon the qualitative interviews, is twofold. First, smaller projects required significant-ly fewer signatures from up the chain of command and thus were implemented in a timelier manner. ...
... The results suggest that "since large CERP spending exceeded small CERP by a factor of four on a per capita basis-and at times by an order of magnitude-large CERP projects were non-productive, or even counter-productive, and at great cost." 105 The mechanism responsible for this difference, the author hypothesizes based upon the qualitative interviews, is twofold. First, smaller projects required significant-ly fewer signatures from up the chain of command and thus were implemented in a timelier manner. ...
... The results suggest that "since large CERP spending exceeded small CERP by a factor of four on a per capita basis-and at times by an order of magnitude-large CERP projects were non-productive, or even counter-productive, and at great cost." 105 The mechanism responsible for this difference, the author hypothesizes based upon the qualitative interviews, is twofold. First, smaller projects required significant-ly fewer signatures from up the chain of command and thus were implemented in a timelier manner. ...
... This assumption is supported by the limited research on project selection. Adams (2015) uses interviews with US military officers utilizing CERP funds in Afghanistan to report that the officers selected projects based on 'local [civilian] needs' and 'mobilizing local governance'. Moreover, none of the respondents believed that CERP projects improved stability. ...
Can developmental aid bring peace to war-torn communities? The current literature is divided on this issue. One line of reasoning suggests that aid is likely to decrease violence by improving employment and prosperity, thereby making participation in conflict more costly. Another view cites evidence showing an association between aid projects and increased insurgent activity. Addressing this contradiction, we argue that different types of aid projects lead to different outcomes, as some projects foster an unequal distribution of benefits within communities. Our reasoning draws on qualitative accounts from conflict zones, recent research on how grievances associated with exclusion can foster civil war onset, and experimental findings regarding perceived inequity and punishment. Building on this scholarship, we use a recently developed event-matching methodology to offer insight from contemporary Afghanistan. Aid projects that tend to exclude portions of the community yield more insurgent activity in their wake than more inclusive projects. These results shed light on why some aid projects reduce violence while others do not, emphasizing that efforts to ‘win hearts and minds’ can be a source of both contentment and contestation.
... Berman et al. (2011) show the US military-led Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) reduced conflict in Iraq during a period of increased troop strength. 3 In Afghanistan, Chou (2012), Child (2014), and Adams (2015) each attempt to replicate that analysis, but the impact of CERP across several time periods is generally indistinguishable from zero. Beath et al. (2017) suggest a large community development program in Afghanistan (NSP) improved security and pro-government attitudes. ...
We examine the impact of counterinsurgency aid on conflict in Afghanistan from 2005 to 2009. To enable this analysis we combine unique aid project data from NATO, household data from the Afghan government, and conflict data from US government sources. Our panel data analysis accounts for district and time period fixed effects across 398 districts and 57 months. Projects in the health sector successfully promote stability, whereas those in the education sector actually provoke conflict. Our findings are robust to reverse causation, confounding aid programs, and other sources of endogeneity. The results shed new perspective on the ‘hearts and minds’ theory commonly discussed in this vein of inquiry.
“Hearts and minds” theory contends development aid strengthens community support for counterinsurgents by providing jobs and public goods. Based on field interviews in Kabul, we develop an alternative theoretical framework emphasizing instead the ideological preferences of civilians. In our model, some aid projects are ideologically contentious while others are benign. Given a mix of foreign aid, each civilian supports either the counterinsurgents or rebels, depending on his/her idiosyncratic preferences. In this setting, greater provisions of aid can actually erode community support. Donors therefore calibrate the mix of foreign aid to appease population groups with relatively strong ideological sensibilities. Individual-level analysis based on unique Afghan data substantiates key features of our theory. Benign projects lead to favorable opinions of development, while contentious aid has the opposite effect. Moreover, favorable opinions of development are associated with stronger support for government and counterinsurgents, and weaker support for rebels.
Meta-Review of Evaluations of Development Assistance to Afghanistan, 2008 – 2018
Summary Paper
International Assistance to Afghanistan, 2008 – 2018
Part 1: Systematic Review of Impact Evaluations of Development Aid in Afghanistan, 2008 – 2018
Despite the "local turn" in international peacekeeping and the emphasis on community-centered development during the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it remains poorly understood how local actors-both foreign and indigenous-shape local-level wartime settings. This article explores the processes and consequences of one military unit's efforts to "win hearts and minds" in Afghanistan during 2012-13. The first portion of the analysis examines original textual data with a novel methodological approach depicting the unit's perceptions of commonalities between itself and local actors. The second portion explores the consequences with data from original interviews with residents of southern Afghanistan in 2014-15. The findings suggest that achieving a local peace can be undermined by military and development actors' own perception of the local community. The article concludes with a discussion of how sociological studies of micro-settings between actors can contribute to research on conflict and wartime development, as well as how the sociological study of war can further develop by disaggregating conflict settings and tracing the social construction of wartime socio-political landscapes.
Cambridge Core - International Relations and International Organisations - The United States Department of Defense Law of War Manual - edited by Michael A. Newton
Recent work has suggested the foreign-led reconstruction effort carried out in Afghanistan and Iraq can mitigate violence because it helps win the “hearts and minds” of local people. For the case of Afghanistan, we show there is no evidence behind such an assertion. Analyzing unique data on Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) spending across the country from 2005 to 2009, we find no discernible effect of the reconstruction effort on violence. In light of the absence of empirical evidence for the success of the CERP, we suggest the hearts and minds credo currently guiding U.S. policy be reconsidered
Most interpretations of prevalent counterinsurgency theory imply that increasing government services will reduce rebel violence. Empirically, however, development programs and economic activity sometimes yield increased violence. Using new panel data on development spending in Iraq, we show that violence reducing effects of aid are greater when (a) projects are small, (b) troop strength is high, and (c) professional development expertise is available. These findings are consistent with a "hearts and minds" model, which predicts that violence reduction will result when projects are secure, valued by community members, and implementation is conditional on the behavior of non-combatants.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
Current military doctrine emphasizes the importance of development spending in reducing insurgent violence. Using data from three distinct development programs, the Afghan National Solidarity Program, USAID’s Local Governance and Community Development Program, and the U.S. military's Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), combined with military records of insurgent-initiated events, this article explores whether development aid in Afghanistan is violence-reducing. I find that overall spending has no clear effect on rebel attacks. Moreover, the type of development program most effective at reducing violence in Iraq—small CERP projects—does not appear to do so in Afghanistan. Possible reasons include troop strength, conditionality of aid, effectiveness of aid in producing benign outcomes, and measurement issues.
Development programs have been increasingly used not only as an instrument for economic and political development, but also as a tool for counter-insurgency. Using a large-scale randomized field experiment in Afghanistan, we explore whether the inclusion of villages in the country’s largest development program alters perceptions of well-being, attitudes towards the government, and levels of security in surrounding areas. We find that the program has a positive effect on all three measures in relatively secure regions, but no effect on attitudes and security in areas with high levels of initial violence, suggesting that a certain minimum threshold of security has to be in place for the provision of goods and services to have an effect on improving attitudes towards the government and reducing violence.
Most nations have experienced an internal armed conflict since 1960. The past decade has witnessed an explosion of research into the causes and consequences of civil wars, belatedly bringing the topic into the economics mainstream. This article critically reviews this interdisciplinary literature and charts productive paths forward. Formal theory has focused on a central puzzle: why do civil wars occur at all when, given the high costs of war, groups have every incentive to reach an agreement that avoids fighting? Explanations have focused on information asymmetries and the inability to sign binding contracts in the absence of the rule of law. Economic theory has made less progress, however, on the thornier (but equally important) problems of why armed groups form and cohere, and why individuals decide to fight. Likewise, the actual behavior of armed organizations and their leaders is poorly understood. On the empirical side, a vast cross-country econometric literature has aimed to identify the causes of civil war. While most work is plagued by econometric identification problems, low per capita incomes, slow economic growth and geographic conditions favoring insurgency are the factors most robustly linked to civil war. We argue that micro-level analysis and data are needed to truly decipher war’s causes, and understand the recruitment, organization, and conduct of armed groups. Recent advances in this area are highlighted. Finally, turning to the economic legacies of war, we frame the literature in terms of neoclassical economic growth theory. Emerging stylized facts include the ability of some economies to experience rapid macroeconomic recoveries, while certain human capital impacts appear more persistent. Yet econometric identification has not been adequately addressed, and there is little consensus on the most effective policies to avert conflicts or promote postwar recovery. The evidence is weakest where it is arguably most important: in understanding c
Rebuilding social and economic order in conflict and post-conflict areas will be critical for the United States and allied governments for the foreseeable future. Little empirical research has evaluated where, when, and how improving material conditions in conflict zones enhances social and economic order. We address this lacuna, developing and testing a theory of insurgency. Following the informal literature and US military doctrine, we model insurgency as a three-way contest between rebels seeking political change through violence, a government seeking to minimize violence through some combination of service provision and hard counterinsurgency, and civilians deciding whether to share information about insurgents with government forces. We test the model using new data from the Iraq war. We combine a geo-spatial indicator of violence against Coalition and Iraqi forces (SIGACTs), reconstruction spending, and community characteristics including measures of social cohesion, sectarian status, socio-economic grievances, and natural resource endowments. Our results support the theory's predictions: counterinsurgents are most generous with government services in locations where they expect violence; improved service provision has reduced insurgent violence since the summer of 2007; and the violence-reducing effect of service provision varies predictably across communities.
Civil war is the most prevalent form of large-scale violence and is massively destructive to life, society, and the economy. The prevention of civil war is therefore a key priority for international attention. We present an empirical analysis of what makes countries prone to civil war. Using a global panel data set we examine different determinants of civil war for the period 1960–2004. We find little evidence that motivation can account for civil war risk but we suggest that there is evidence to support our feasibility hypothesis: that where a rebellion is financially and militarily feasible it will occur.
JEL classifications: O10, D74.
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Winning Hearts and Minds through Development: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2011-14
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Activities (SIGACTs) as well as CERP spending information, all geolocated and timestamped. The data was cleaned using basic qualitative checks, code books, interviews and the sharing of project files with others who also have used these databases
INDURE includes Significant Activities (SIGACTs) as well
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