Ethnicity and Political Stability in Uganda: Are Ethnic Identities a Blessing or a Curse

To read the full-text of this research, you can request a copy directly from the author.


Uganda has 56 ethnic groups, the largest being the Baganda, occupying the northern shores of Lake Victoria, and the smallest are the Ik, who are found in the northeastern corner of the country. All cities and towns of Uganda as well as state institutions are known for high levels of heterogeneity and the country's politics has been a reflection of its ethnic plurality. However, peace, tranquillity, stability, regional economic equity and orderly transfer of political power have been elusive in Uganda. This paper addresses the role of ethnic identities in the politics of Uganda. It makes an attempt to unearth the extent to which ethnicity has ensured political stability with the view to illustrating whether ethnic identities have been a blessing or a curse. The paper is guided by the ethnic theories of primordialism and instrumentalism. Using interviews with key informants, archival information and a review of the available literature, the author concludes that ethnicity has largely been a curse in post-colonial Uganda but in the pre-colonial epoch it was a blessing.

No full-text available

Request Full-text Paper PDF

To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.

... In about 120 A. D., the Nilotic people who were cattle keepers and subsistence farmers entered Uganda from the north (Classic Africa Safaris, 2020). According to Amone (2015), Uganda has about 56 ethnic groups, the largest being the Baganda who occupy the northern shores of Lake Victoria. All cities and towns of Uganda as well as state institutions are known for high levels of heterogeneity and the country"s politics has been a reflection of its ethnic plurality (Amone, 2015;Ricart-Huguet and Green, 2018;Government of Uganda, 2005). ...
... According to Amone (2015), Uganda has about 56 ethnic groups, the largest being the Baganda who occupy the northern shores of Lake Victoria. All cities and towns of Uganda as well as state institutions are known for high levels of heterogeneity and the country"s politics has been a reflection of its ethnic plurality (Amone, 2015;Ricart-Huguet and Green, 2018;Government of Uganda, 2005). This makes Uganda fit within the context of East Africa, which is a multicultural region with diverse ethnic composition and comprises a number of independent states (Kasujja et al., 2014). ...
... The first track of cultural astronomy in Uganda, hereafter Paper I, involves four ethnic groups (Oruru et al., 2020) out of the 56 ethnic groups found in the country (Amone, 2015). The four broad linguistic groups, and the constituent members are reported in Paper I. The cultural groups reported in this paper (hereafter Paper II) are; Acholi, Banyankole, Iteso, and Lugbara. ...
... The inherent irony of a government that has meted out violence and the harshest economic policies under the auspices of the private indirect government of the World Bank, was likely not lost on those who attended. Neither was the suggestion that for Northern Ugandans, in a region where Museveni's political party lacks popular support [99], secession might be a better alternative [100]. Nonetheless, for President Museveni, in deploying modernist development discourse to suit his own ends, "nationalism", "technology" and "development" are inextricably intertwined [109]. ...
Full-text available
This paper traces the evolution of an Acholi ethnic identity in northcentral Uganda. The main argument is that this evolution began in the late seventeenth century with the establishment of a new sociopolitical order in the region characterized most importantly by chiefly forms of organization. This was followed by language shift on a large scale and then, during the second half of the nineteenth century, by the introduction of a new collective term of identification by Arabic-speaking traders from the north. This new term was "Shooli," eventually transformed into "Acholi."
Full-text available
The author argues that the content of the concept of "national identity" is determined by the way how we construe "nation". She submits two ways of construing the nation as basic ideal types: primor-dial versus instrumental. In primordial terminology the nation is primarily the "ethno-nation", i.e. a community which unites individuals through "the same blood and common fate". The instrumental way of construing the nation stresses the pragmatic and situational aspects of large communities. Thus it approaches the political understanding of the nation. The beliefs about the character of the nation prevailing within a particular community, determine the identification of the member of this commu-nity with the nation. Terminological chaos governs this area of life as well as research on it. The con-cept of "nationalism" can serve as an example: it denotes loyalty to the state as an instrumental politi-cal formation. Simultaneously, however, within the ideology of nationalism, the state is introduced as a primordial community. The aim of this paper is: 1. the analysis of the ways of construing the "na-tion" as a form of social reality by individuals; 2. the use of the construing about the nation in public, cultural, and political discourses; 3. consequences of the ways of construing the nation for the national identity of individuals. The assumed ubiquity of the state nation structure of the world The organization of humankind into state nations 1 is at present firmly estab-lished and institutionalized (United Nations Organization is an example par excel-lence). The overwhelming majority of lay people and politicians understand state nations as "normal" and "natural" frames for the physical and social existence of a society and individuals. Many academic works on nations and nationalism are implicitly based on the assumptions that the state-nation status of human affairs is natural, correct, or even eternal.
Full-text available
Though military interventions seem endemic in sub-Saharan Africa, more than a third of all countries have been able to avoid military coups. To solve this puzzle, this article relates the likelihood of military coups to the degree of ethnic congruence between civilian and military leaders, arguing that coup avoidance is most likely when government and army either exhibit the same ethnic bias or are both ethnically balanced. This argument is illustrated by a comparison of the diverging experiences of Zambia and Uganda. While Zambia is among Africa’s coup-free countries, Uganda’s vulnerability to military intervention has varied over time – with four coups under Obote and the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) but no coups under Amin and Museveni. Drawing on original longitudinal data on the ethnic distribution of political and military posts, the article shows that the absence of military coups in Zambia goes back to the balanced composition of government and army. In Uganda, coup avoidance under Amin and Museveni can be linked to the fact that government and army exhibited the same ethnic bias, whereas the coups against the Obote and UNLF regimes reflected either ethnic incongruence between civilian and military leaders or the destabilising combination of a similarly polarised government and army.
Full-text available
Collier and Hoeffler reported that countries with a higher percentage of national income from primary commodity exports have been more prone to civil war, an interesting finding that has received much attention from policy makers and the media. The author shows that this result is quite fragile, even using Collier and Hoeffler’s data. Minor changes in the sample framing and the recovery of missing data undermine it. To the extent that there is an association, it is likely because oil is a major component of primary commodity exports and substantial oil production does associate with civil war risk. The author argues that oil predicts civil war risk not because it provides an easy source of rebel start-up finance but probably because oil producers have relatively low state capabilities given their level of per capita income and because oil makes state or regional control a tempting “prize.” An analysis of data on government observance of contracts and investor-perceived expropriation risk is consistent with this hypothesis.
The emergence of ethnic consciousness and nationalism is a volatile and increasingly powerful force in the contemporary world. It has pulled down empires, created new nations and generated a rising tide of expectations. Minorities are becoming more militant and more self-aware in all nations, whatever their stage of industrial and political development. This paper in a fruitful way takes a new, critical and indepth look at the origins manifestations and consequences of the thorny problem of ethnicity in Africa. This is done with a view to provide solutions to the ethnic problem so as to alleviate its overwhelming negative impact on the African continent vis a vis socio-political and economic development. The paper concludes that each plural polity in the African continent has its own unique configuration of diversity and this inevitably makes generalizations a difficult task. However nations of Africa can move forward by 1. Identifying common grounds in their polities; 2. Reduce discrepancies of power and opportunity; 3. Accommodate divergent interests; 4. Reduce the extent of ethnic differentiation and 5. Embrace institutionalized indignation.
Presenting a theory to explain how politics revolves around one axis of social cleavage instead of another, Daniel Posner examines Zambia, where people identify themselves either as members of one of the country's seventy-three tribes or as members of one of its four principal language groups. Drawing on a simple model of identity choice, Posner demonstrates that the answer depends on whether the country is operating under single-party or multi-party rule, thus revealing how formal institutional rules determine the social cleavages that matter.
For their empirical evaluation, several active research programs in economics and political science require data on ethnic groups across countries. “Ethnic group,” however, is a slippery concept. After addressing conceptual and practical obstacles, I present a list of 822 ethnic groups in 160 countries that made up at least 1 percent of the country population in the early 1990s. I compare a measure of ethnic fractionalization based on this list with the most commonly used measure. I also construct an index of cultural fractionalization that uses the structural distance between languages as a proxy for the cultural distance between groups in a country.
Cet article examine le mouvement de l'esprit divin d'Alice Lakwena qui apparut en Ouganda entre 1987 et 1989. L'histoire popularisée d'Alice, telle que racontée par la presse occidentale en particulier, a ignoré les contextes historiques et sociaux essentiels à la compréhension des forces qui ont permis Pavènement d'Alice et de ses adeptes. La possession spirituelle révélée par Alice Lakwena prit des formes bien connues par les peuples de ces régions de l'Ouganda. Par ailleurs, les troubles socio-politiques de la fin des années 1980 eurent une influence importante sur les actions d'Alice et ont servi à déterminer un ensemble complet de questions avec lesquelles sa spiritualité allait être associée. Ces faits sont apparents si Ton examine les actions d'Alice elle-même et si Ton reconnait que d'autres médiums étaient actifs dans la même région à la même époque. Ces médiums contribuerent à établir un sens de responsabilité sociale alors même que l'Etat avait perdu sa crédibilité avant de s'effondrer. Sorcellerie et pratiques magiques étaient perçues comme la principale cause de la mortalité. Ces médiums étaient influencés par des concepts moraux Chrétiens. Comme la divination était devenue étroitement liée à PEglise cadiolique, Alice et d'autres médiums purent réunir un grand nombre d'adeptes et attirer les représentants d'une grande variété de couches sociales. Le cas d'Alice Lakwena est fascinant et riche en enseignements, non pas seulement par sa nou-veauté, mais par le fait qu'il combine des formes anciennes et récentes et assure une continuité avec le passé et avec des processus sociaux plus vastes, tout en apportant des réponses aux nouveaux troubles sociaux et à ses traumatismes.
This article outlines the history of a people known as ‘Nubi’ or ‘Nubians’, northern Ugandan Muslims who were closely associated with Idi Amin's rule, and a group to which he himself belonged. They were supposed to be the descendants of former slave soldiers from southern Sudan, who in the late 1880s at the time of the Mahdi's Islamic uprising came into what is now Uganda under the command of a German officer named Emin Pasha. In reality, the identity became an elective one, open to Muslim males from the northern Uganda/southern Sudan borderlands, as well as descendants of the original soldiers. These soldiers, taken on by Frederick Lugard of the Imperial British East Africa Company, formed the core of the forces used to carve out much of Britain's East African Empire. From the days of Emin Pasha to those of Idi Amin, some Nubi men were identified by a marking of three vertical lines on the face – the ‘One-Elevens’. Although since Amin's overthrow many Muslims from the north of the country prefer to identify themselves as members of local Ugandan ethnic groups rather than as ‘Nubis’, aspects of Nubi identity live on among Ugandan rebel groups, as well as in cyberspace.
The assertion that material interests underlie ethnic identification is central to instrumentalist approaches to ethnicity. However, recent approaches—circumstantialism and constructivism—refine instrumentalism, addressing posited shortcomings, including an examination of the contexts and conditions in which interests and identities are expressed and constructed. Nevertheless, these later approaches explicitly or implicitly reproduce instrumentalism’s basic material premise. Using survey data from the multiethnic country of Mauritius, I examine this premise by exploring the relationship between economic instrumentalism and ethnic identification within and across ethnic groups. I find limited support for an instrumentalist approach to ethnic identification as this approach explains only a modest amount of variance in ethnic identification and is insufficient for explaining the significant differences that emerge in the relationship between economic instrumentalism and ethnic identification across ethnic groups. Consequently, it is argued that current instrumentalist approaches provide a deficient account of ethnic identification and related group processes.
This article explores a hitherto overlooked consequence of regime change in Africa. It shows how the shift from one-party to multiparty rule in the region altered the kinds of ethnic cleavages that structure political competition and conflict. The article demonstrates how the different strategic logics of political competition in one-party and multiparty settings create incentives for political actors to emphasize different kinds of ethnic identities: local-level identities (usually revolving around tribe or clan) in one-party elections and broader scale identities (usually revolving around region, language, or religion) in multiparty elections. The argument is illustrated with evidence from the 1991 and 1992 regime transitions in Zambia and Kenya.
Although scholars often treat “ethnicity” as one of the most important phenomena in politics, nothing close to a consensus has emerged about not only what its effects are but also what it is. Theorists typically divide this debate into two camps, usually dubbed “primordialism” and “constructivism,” but these categories are unhelpful and actually obscure some of the most important questions. This study recasts the debate by providing a micro-level explanation for why and how people tend to think and act in terms of macro-level identity categories in the first place. Drawing heavily on recent psychological research, this approach reveals why ethnicity is special and why it is ascribed importance by researchers in fields as diverse as sociology, anthropology, and political science. As it turns out, neither constructivism nor primordialism is fully accurate, and theorists are advised to think in terms that are more consistent with psychological research.
Opening Paragraph In this article we shall examine songs of the Rwenzururu movement of the Bakonzo and Baamba people in Western Uganda. We will be concerned with their different uses, as repositories of history and vehicles of exhortation, and also with their origins in time and space. The main interest in this paper, however, is to find explanations for the simultaneous expression of often strongly contrasted moods, viewpoints and styles in Rwenzururu songs.
Once taken as primordial givens, ethnic groups are now recognized to be historical constructions. The structure of ethnic cleavages needs to be viewed similarly. The contemporary landscape of linguistic divisions in Zambia, including the number of groups it contains, their relative sizes, and their spatial distribution, can be traced to specific policies implemented by the Northern Rhodesian colonial administration and its missionary and mining company allies. The structure of ethnic cleavages is a heretofore overlooked legacy of colonialism.
Most concepts of ethnicity are unsuitable for political analysis because they ignore either subjective or objective aspects, and because they ignore the fluid and situational nature of ethnicity. The approach flowing from the concept proposed here permits the observer to examine empirical variations that tend to be treated as rigid assumptions by modernization analysts on the one hand and class analysts on the other. The concept is applied to a study of the Nubians of Uganda because of the intermixture of class and ethnic features involved in their fall from status at the beginning of the colonial period and their subsequent sudden rise following the 1071 coup d'état of Idi Amin. The fairly recent creation of the Nubians as an ethnic category and the relative ease with which others can become members illustrate other features of the proposed concept of ethnicity. Finally, this concept is used to examine and criticize overly restrictive notions of ethnicity found in theories based upon both cultural pluralism and consociationalism.
The historically constructed nature of ethnicity has become a widely accepted paradigm in the social sciences. Scholars have especially have focused on the ways modern states have been able to create and change ethnic identities, with perhaps the strongest case studies coming from colonial Africa, where the gap between strong states and weak societies has been most apparent. I suggest, however, that in order to better understand how and when ethnic change occurs it is important to examine case studies where state-directed ethnic change has failed. To rectify this oversight I examine the case of the “lost counties” of Uganda, which were transferred from the Bunyoro kingdom to the Buganda kingdom at the onset of colonial rule. I show that British attempts to assimilate the Banyoro residents in two of the lost counties were an unmitigated failure, while attempts in the other five counties were successful. I claim that the reason for these differing outcomes lies in the status of the two lost counties as part of the historic Bunyoro homeland, whereas the other five counties were both geographically and symbolically peripheral to Bunyoro. The evidence here thus suggests that varying ethnic attachments to territory can lead to differing outcomes in situations of state-directed assimilation and ethnic change.
Ethnic divisions, according to empirical democratic theory, and commonsense understandings of politics, threaten the survival of democratic institutions. One of the principal mechanisms linking the politicization of ethnic divisions with the destabilization of democracy is the so-called outbidding effect. According to theories of ethnic outbidding, the politicization of ethnic divisions inevitably gives rise to one or more ethnic parties. The emergence of even a single ethnic party, in turn, “infects” the political system, leading to a spiral of extreme bids that destroys competitive politics altogether. In contrast, I make the (counterintuitive) claim that ethnic parties can sustain a democratic system if they are institutionally encouraged: outbidding can be reversed by replacing the unidimensional ethnic identities assumed by the outbidding models with multidimensional ones. My argument is based on the anomalous case of ethnic party behavior in India. It implies that the threat to democratic stability, where it exists, comes not from the intrinsic nature of ethnic divisions, but from the institutional context within which ethnic politics takes place. Institutions that artificially restrict ethnic politics to a single dimension destabilize democracy, whereas institutions that foster multiple dimensions of ethnic identity can sustain it. a
War has ravaged Acholiland in northern Uganda since 1986. The Ugandan army is fighting the Lord's Resistance Movement/Army (LRM/A) rebels. Based on anthropological fieldwork, the article aims at exemplifying the ways in which non-combatant people's experiences of war and violence are domesticated in cosmological terms as strategies of coping, and it relates tales of wars in the past to experiences of violent death and war in the present. There has been a politicized debate in Uganda over whether or not the LRM/A rebels have the elders' ceremonial warfare blessing. In sketching this debate, the article interprets the possible warfare blessing - which some informants interpreted as having turned into a curse on Acholiland - as a critical event that benefits from further deliberation, regardless of its existence or non-existence. It is argued that no warfare blessing can be regarded as the mere utterance of words. Rather, a blessing is performed within the framework of the local moral world. It is finally argued that the issue of the warfare blessing is a lived consequence of the conflict, but, nevertheless, cannot be used as an explanatory model for the cause of the conflict.
Since the publication of Horowitz's Ethnic Groups in Conflict, comparative political scientists have increasingly converged on their classification of ethnic identities. But there is no agreement on the definition that justifies this classification-and the definitions that individual scholars propose do not match their classifications. I propose a definition that captures the conventional classification of ethnic identities in comparative political science to a greater degree than the alternatives. According to this definition, ethnic identities are a subset of identity categories in which membership is determined by attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with, descent (described here simply as descent-based attributes). I argue, on the basis of this definition, that ethnicity either does not matter or has not been shown to matter in explaining most outcomes to which it has been causally linked by comparative political scientists. These outcomes include violence, democratic stability, and patronage.
This paper draws on data from over 35,000 respondents in twenty-two public opinion surveys in ten countries and finds strong evidence that ethnic identities in Africa are strengthened by exposure to political competition. In particular, for every month closer their country is to a competitive presidential election, survey respondents are 1.8 percentage points more likely to identify in ethnic terms. Using an innovative multinomial logit empirical methodology, we find that these shifts are accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the salience of occupational and class identities. Our findings lend support to situational theories of social identification and are consistent with the view that ethnic identities matter in Africa for instrumental reasons: because they are useful in the competition for political power.
While recent historical scholarship has attempted to read back the existence of nations into medieval Europe, a similar revisionism has yet to take place amongst scholars of Africa. Here I take up the case of Buganda, a precolonial kingdom on the northern edge of Lake Victoria in what is now central Uganda. I show that Buganda in the mid-19th century fits various definitions of both ethnic groups and nations, while its neighbors largely do not. Thus the Bugandan case both demonstrates further evidence for the existence of premodern nations and illuminates the great variety of precolonial identities present in Africa.
The article offers a sketch of Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) both in historical perspective and in a wider framework of the world system. The authors discuss the different stages and content of Acholi nationhood, from vague notions in pre-colonial days, through the building of an ethno-military identity during the colonial period, until the Acholi heyday after Obote II. The second period can be described as Acholi-hood on the defensive. Initially, the campaign of resistance fought by the Acholi-dominated Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) still fits into standard conceptions of political resistance. However, social collapse eventually gave birth to Alice Lakwena's Holy Spirit Movement and finally to the LRA. Possessed of a charisma bordering on the prophetic, Kony has forged a new vision of Acholi-hood, based on individual salvation and purity. This ‘biblical’ vision of political redemption, at first sight an inward-looking strategy, is making this movement extremely vulnerable to outward manipulation.
This dissertation presents three essays with the theme of ethnicity and institutions, utilizing insights and data from Lebanon and Yemen, two Arab societies within which ethnicity (sect, tribe, region) is salient politically, but which use different institutions to channel these cleavages through the political system. The first essay uses a methodological innovation to study illiterate voting rights in Lebanon, which has normative, sectarian, and distributional consequences. It first addresses the difficulties of studying sensitive topics with surveys, in which systematic response bias limits the reliability of self-reported data. I present an augmented version of the list experiment and a new statistical estimator called listit to mitigate incentives for respondents to misrepresent themselves. I show that responses to a direct question on illiterate voting rights produce sectarian answers: community membership drives attitudes, whereas material conditions do not. The opposite obtains when the question is asked indirectly via the list experiment: community membership has no influence on attitudes, which instead are driven strongly by material conditions. The second essay studies institutional preferences in Lebanon. Given the salience of sectarianism in Lebanon, it argues that preferences should vary by community membership. Although religion provides the nominal boundaries between the sectarian communities, the Lebanese are also able to invoke shared religious ideals to imagine a larger community beyond the sect: religion unites as well as divides. I show that religiosity reduces favorable assessments of autocratic institutions in all sects, suggesting that religious individuals conceive of the polity in more inclusive terms than do sectarian individuals. The third essay compares Lebanon and Yemen, arguing that the descent principle makes ethnic constituencies captive audiences to their own elites, reducing the cost of political support. The price of votes depends on the institutionally-influenced intraethnic competitive environment: oligopsony, in which elites compete for their coethnics' votes, or monopsony, in which a single vote-buyer dominates and constituents compete for patronage. I provide evidence that constituents in monopsonized communities (Lebanese Sunnis and Yemeni Shiites) make overt displays of political support for leaders with patronage considerations in mind, a dynamic unseen in the more internally competitive communities in either country.
Is there case study evidence of a relationship between the socialconstruction of ethnic identities and the probability of ethnic war? Themere observation that ethnic identities are socially constructed doesnot by itself explain ethnic violence and may not even be particularlyrelevant. Our purpose here is to see if we can reject the nullhypothesis that the social construction of ethnicity has little or nobearing on the likelihood of ethnic violence. Our procedure is toexamine closely the narratives of expert observers of some highlyviolent episodes of ethnic relations. Although a different set of casestudies might yield different overall conclusions, the narratives weexamined contain useful clues about the mechanisms that link identityconstruction and ethnic violence.
State Formation and Language Change in Westernmost Acholi in the Eighteenth Century
  • R R Atkinson
Atkinson, R. R., (1984), 'State Formation and Language Change in Westernmost Acholi in the Eighteenth Century', in Ahmed Idha Salim (ed.) State Formation in Eastern Africa.
The Uganda Crisis and the National Question', Working Paper Series Institute of Social Studies. The Hague: Netherlands
  • Martin Doornbos
Doornbos, Martin, (1987), 'The Uganda Crisis and the National Question', Working Paper Series Institute of Social Studies. The Hague: Netherlands, No. 34.
Ethnicity as Being, Doing and Knowinj
  • J Fishman
Fishman, J., (1996), 'Ethnicity as Being, Doing and Knowinj' in J. Hutchinson and A. Smith (eds), Ethnicity, Oxford: Oxford University.
At Variance but in Harmony Ethnicity: Blessing or Curse?
  • Mary Getui
Getui, Mary, N., (1999) 'At Variance but in Harmony', in Albert de Jong (ed.), Ethnicity: Blessing or Curse?, Nairobi: Paulines Publications.
The Construction of Nationhood
  • Adrian Hastings
Hastings, Adrian (1997) The Construction of Nationhood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Northern Ugandans Threaten to Secede, Cite Government Neglect', Voice of America
  • Hilary Heuler
Heuler, Hilary, (2013), 'Northern Ugandans Threaten to Secede, Cite Government Neglect', Voice of America, 21 February.
Milton Obote: Telling His Own Lifetime Story', Daily Monitor
  • Victoria Karamagi
Karamagi, Victoria (2005), 'Milton Obote: Telling His Own Lifetime Story', Daily Monitor, 24
Gen. Otafiire's love affair with controversy', The Observer
  • Edris Kigundu
Kigundu, Edris, (2008), 'Gen. Otafiire's love affair with controversy', The Observer, 2 July.
Northern Secession Talk is no Idle Talk', The Observer
  • Morris Komakech
Komakech, Morris, (2013), 'Northern Secession Talk is no Idle Talk', The Observer, 26 March.
Personal Interview on Cassette recording in possession of the author
  • Lanek Martino
Lanek Martino, (2012), Personal Interview on 19 September 2012. Cassette recording in possession of the author.
Agent-based Monitoring and Constructivist Identity Theory
  • Ian Lustick
Lustick, Ian, (2001), 'Agent-based Monitoring and Constructivist Identity Theory', APSA- CP Vol. 12: 22-25.
Cassette recording in possession of the author
  • Ocaka Isaac
Ocaka Isaac, (2006), Personal Interview on 14 December 2006. Cassette recording in possession of the author.
The 'We Verses Them' Divide in Nigeria: Rethinking Traditional Epestemologies
  • Cyril-Mary Olatunji
  • Pius
Olatunji, Cyril-Mary Pius, (2011). 'The 'We Verses Them' Divide in Nigeria: Rethinking Traditional Epestemologies', Inkanyiso: Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol. 3: 122-130.
The 'Lost Counties': Politics of Land Rights and Belonging in Uganda
  • Hjalmar Rune
  • Espeland
Rune, Hjalmar Espeland, (2004), The 'Lost Counties': Politics of Land Rights and Belonging in Uganda. Norway: University of Bergen Press.
Nationalism and Modernism
  • Anthony D Smith
Smith, Anthony D., (1998) Nationalism and Modernism, London: Routledge.